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PETITIONER: ZAMINDAR OF ETTAYAPURAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADRAS.(and connected appeals)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/02/1954

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BOSE, VIVIAN ALAGIRISWAMI, A.

CITATION:  1954 AIR  257            1954 SCR  761  CITATOR INFO :  F          1954 SC 605  (2)

ACT:        Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)  Act,  (Act  XXVI  of1948)--Validity  thereof--Article  31(6)  of  the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:   The  Madras   Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion  into Ryotwari)  Act,  (Act  XXVI  of  1948)  was  passed  by  the Provincial  Legislature  of  Madras  functioning  under  the Government of  India  Act, 1935 and it received  the  assent of the Governor*General  of India on the 2nd of April, 1949. After the advent  of the Constitution, the Act was  reserved for the certification of the President and it was  certified on the 12th of April, 1950:  Held, that  in view  of  the  provisions  of art. 31(6) of the  Constitution  the  validity  of the Act  could  not  be challenged   on  the  ground  that   it    contravened   the provisions   of  s. 299(2) of the Government of  India  Act, 1935.  Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ([1952] S.C.R. 89),  The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja  Sir   Kameshwar Singh  ([1952] S.C.R. 889)  and Narayan Deo v. The State  of Orissa ([1954] S.C.R. 1) referred to.

JUDGMENT:   CIVIL    APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:  CIVIL   APPEALS   Nos. 170 to 176 and 178 to 183 of 1953.    Appeals  from  the  Judgment and  Order  dated  the  22nd August,  1952,  of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil   Miscellaneous   Petitions  Nos. 13386,  13388,13390, 7812,  12003,  13188,  13262, 7822,  13123,  13347,   13341, 12997,   12494  of   1950 and  Order  dated  8th  September, 1952, in C.M.P. No. 13936 of 1950.     K.  S. Krishnaswamy  lyengar  (K.  g.Champakesa lyengar, with him) for the appellants.

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 V.   K.T.   Chari,   Advocate-General    of   Madras   (R. Ganapathy  lyer  and   V.V.  Raghavan,  with  him)  for  the respondent  (State of Madras)  in Civil Appeals Nos. 170  to 176 and 178 to 181.     M.  Seshachalapathi  for  the   respondent   (State   of Andhra)  in Civil Appeals Nos. 182 and 183.     1954.   February  5.   The Judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by MUKHERJEA J. I2--95 S.C. I./59 762     MUKHERJEA  J.--These  consolidated  appeals,   numbering fourteen  in all,  are directed against a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated the 23rd  of August,  1952, by which the learned  Judges  dismissed   the petitions of the different appellants made under article 226 of  the Constitution. The  appellants  are  landholders   of Madras,  holding zamindaries within that State, and in their applications  under  article 226 of  the  Constitution  they prayed  for writs in the nature of mandamus,  directing  the State  of Madras to forbear from  notifying and taking  over possession   of   the  estates  held by  them  and  also  to cancel the notifications  already  issued,  in  exercise  of its   powers  under  the  Madras  Estates   (Abolition   and Conversion  into Ryotwari)  Act,  (Act XXVI of  1948).  This Act,   the   constitutional   validity  of  which  has  been assailed  by  the  appellants, was passed by the  Provincial Legislature  of Madras functioning under the  Government  of India   Act,  1935,  and  it  received  the  assent      the Governor-General  of India  on the 2nd of April, 1949.   The avowed   object  of the Act is to  abolish   the   zamindary system  by  repealing   the   Madras  Permanent   Settlement Regulation  of  1802, to acquire  the rights     landholders in   the   permanently  settled  and other ,estates  and  to introduce  the Ryotwari system in all such  estates.   After the  advent  of  the  Constitution, the Act was reserved for certification of the President  and it was certified  on the 12th  of April, 1950.  In  the petitions  presented  by  the appellants,  a large  number of grounds were put forward  by way of attacking the validity of the  legislation  which was characterised   as   confiscatory  in  its   character   and subversive  of  the fundamental  right  of  property,  which the   petitioners   had in the  zamindaries   held  by  them under the Permanent      Settlement    Regulation.   Pending the   disposal   of  these   petitions,   the   Constitution (First  Amendment)      Act of 1951  was passed  on  1st  of June, 1951,  and this amendment introduced  two new articles namely,  article   31-A   and 31-B   in  the   Constitution, apparently   with  a view to protect   the  ’various    laws enacted  for acquisition  of estates  from being  challenged under   the   relevant   articles  of  Part  III  of  the 763 Constitution.  Article  31-B specifically refers to a number of   statutes  mentioned  in  the  ninth  Schedule  to   the Constitution  and it declares expressly that none   of  them shall  be  deemed  to  be  void  on  the  ground  that  they contravened     any     of   the     fundamental     rights, notwithstanding  the decision of a court or tribunal to  the contrary. It  is  not disputed that  Madras Act  XXVI     of 1948  is one of the statutes included in this  schedule.  It may  be remembered that an attempt was made to  impeach  the validity   of  the  Constitution   (First  Amendment)    Act itself   before   this  court  in  the   case   of  Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1).  The attempt  failed and after  the  pronouncement  of  this court  in   Shankari Prasad’s  case,  the  grounds  upon which the writ petitions

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of the appellants were  sought to be supported  became   for the most part unavailing. It  appears  that at the time   of the  final  hearing  of  the  applications   the   arguments actually   advanced   on  behalf of  the  petitioners   were aimed   not  at  invalidating the  enactment  as  a   whole, but  only  some of its provisions,  firstly  on  the  ground that there was  no public purpose behind  the acquisition of some  of  the  items of property   mentioned   therein   and secondly,   that   the  provisions   for   compensation   in certain   aspects  were colourable exercise  of  legislative powers and constituted a fraud upon the Constitution Act  of 1935.  These arguments were sought to be supported  entirely on the authority of the  majority  decision of this court in the case  of  The  State  of  Bihar  v.  Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar  Singh (2)  to the  extent that it pronounced  two of  the provisions  of the Bihar Land Reforms  Act.  1950--a legislation    similar   in   type   to  the   Madras    Act 1948--to   be  unconstitutional.   These    contentions  did not  find favour with  the  learned Judges of the High Court who  heard the petitions  and holding  that  the  principles enunciated  by the majority of this court in the Bihar  case referred   to  above were not  applicable  to  the  impugned provisions  of  the  Madras Act, they   dismissed   all  the petitions.  Certificates,  however, were granted by the High Court to the petitioners (1) [1952] S.C.R. 89. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 889. 764 under  article 132(1)  of the Constitution and it is on  the strength  of these certificates  that the appeals have’ come before us.     Mr.  Ayyangar, appearing in support of  these   appeals, has   taken   his  stand  solely  upon  the   doctrine   of’ ’colourable  legislation’  as  enunciated  by  the  majority of  this court in the Bihar case referred to above.  He  has very properly  not  attempted  to make any  point as to  the absence  of a public purpose in regard to any of  the  items of  acquisition,  since  it is clear that according  to  the majority   view of this court,  as explained in Narayan  Deo v. State of Orissa (1), the existence of a public purpose is not  a  justiciable issue in case  of   an  enactment  which having fulfilled the requirements of clause (4)  of  article 31  of the  Constitution enjoys  the protection afforded  by it.     The contentions of Mr. Ayyangar, in substance, are  that the  provisions  of ’section 27(i) as well as of section  30 of  the impugned Act are colourable  legislative  provisions which  have been enacted in fraud of the  Constitution   Act of  1935.   It  appears that  in determining the  amount  of compensation,  that is to be paid under the Act, in  respect of  an acquired estate, it is necessary,  first of all,   to ascertain what has been described as the ’basic annual  sum’ in   regard  to  that  estate.  The’  basic    annual    sum comprises  several  items  or parts which have been set  out in section 27 and the subsequent sections of the Act, and it is  upon the amount of the  basis  annual   sum   determined in   accordance with the provisions of these  sections  that the  total  amount  of  compensation  money  payable  to   a proprietor is made to depend.  Mr.  Ayyangar  contends  that section 27(i)  of the Act, which lays down that in computing the basic  annual  sum only  one-third  of the gross  annual Ryotwari  demand  of  specified kinds is to  be  taken  into account, is a colourable provision which, ignores altogether the actual income derived from the property  and  introduces an artificial  and an arbitrary standard for determining the

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income or profits which has absolutely no relation to facts. Similarly,  in  computing  the  net  miscellaneous  revenue, which is  an (x) [1945] S.C.R. .A.I.R. x953 8. G. 375 at P. 380. 765 element in the computation of the basic annual sum, what  is to be taken into account under section 30 is not the average of  net  annual  income which  the  proprietors   themselves derived  from the sources,  mentioned in the Act, when  they were in possession of the estates, but which the  Government might  derive from them  in future  years  after  the   date of  notification. ’Thus if  on account  of mismanagement  or for  other  reasons   the Government does   not  derive  any income from these sources,  the  proprietor  would not  have any  compensation   under   this  head   at   all.   It   is argued that these are mere devices or contrivances  aimed at ,  confiscation of private  property  and they neither   lay down nor are based upon any principle of compensation.         Whatever  the merits of these contentions might  be, it  appears  to  us  that  there  is  an  initial   and   an insuperable   difficulty   in  the  way   of   the   learned counsel’s invoking  the authority  of the majority  decision of  this   court  in  the case of  The  State  of  Bihar  v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh(1) to the  circumstances of  ’the  present   case.  The  Bihar  Land   Reforms   Act, ’which  was the subject matter of decision  in  that   case, was a legislation  which  was pending  at the time when  the Constitution   came   into  force.  It  was   reserved   for consideration  of the President and received  his  assent in due   course  and  consequently under  clause (4)of  article 31   of  the  Constitution  it  was   immune  from  judicial scrutiny on the ground that the compensation provided by  it was  inadequate   or  unjust.  With regard ’to  two  of  the provisions  of  the Act, however, which  were  embodied   in sections  4  (b) and 23(f) of ’the Act, it was held  by  the majority   of  this  court   that  they  were void  as  they really  did   not  come  within entry 42  of  List   III  of Schedule   VII   of  the  Constitution, under   which   they purported   to  have  been enacted. Entry 42  of  List   III speaks  of "principles on  which compensation  for  property acquired   or  requisitioned for the purposes of  the  Union or of a State or for  any  other  public purpose is  to   be determined,  and  the form    and the manner  in which  such compensation is (1) [1952] s.c.R. 889. 766 to  be  given."  It  was  pointed  out  that  entry  42  was undoubtedly   the    description  of  a   legislative   head and   in  deciding   the competency of a  legislation  under this   entry,   the  court was  not   concerned   with   the justice  or  propriety  of the  principles  upon  which  the determination   of the compensation  was to be made  or  the form or manner in which it was  to be given.  But even then, the  legislation  must rest upon some  principle  of  giving compensation  and not of denying or withholding it,   and  a legislation   could  not be supported which was  based  upon something  which was non-existent or was unrelated to  facts and consequently could not have  a  conceivable  bearing  on any  principle  of compensation.  The   initial   difficulty in  the  way  of invoking this doctrine in the present  case lies  in the fact that the legislation,  which  is  impugned here,   was  passed by the Madras   Provincial   Legislature functioning  under the Government of India Act,  1935,  and’ there  was no entry  in any  of the lists attached  to   the Act of 1935  corresponding  to  entry  42 in List I1I of the

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Indian   Constitution.  The  only  entry  relevant to.  this point in the Act of 1935 was entry9  of List I1 which  spoke merely of ’compulsory acquisition of land’; and it is  clear that  a   duty to pay  compensation or of’ laying  down  any principle  regarding it was not inherent in the language  of that entry. The guarantee for payment  of  compensation,  so far  as  the  Constitution Act of 1935  is  concerned,   was contained   in section 299  clause (2) which was  worded  as follows:     "Neither  the  Federal  Legislature  nor  a   Provincial Legislature  shall have power to make  any law’  authorising the   compulsory  acquisition  for public purposes  of   any land, or any commercial or industrial’ undertaking  ........ unless the law provides for the payment of compensation  for the property  acquired  and  either fixes the amount of  the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and  the manner in which  it is to be determined."     The  appellants could have very well relied  upon   this guarantee   if a bar had not  been created in  their way  by the  provision of article 31(6)  of the  Constitution.  That clause of article 31 stands of follows: 767     "Any   law   of   the  State   enacted   not  more  than eighteen   months   before   the   commencement   of    this Constitution may within three months from such  commencement be   submitted  to  the  president  for  his  certification; and thereupon,  if  the President  by public notification so certifies,  it shall not be called in question in any  court on  the ground that it contravenes the provisions of  clause (2)  of this article or has contravened  the  provisions  of sub-section  (2) of  section 299 of the Government of  India Act, 1935."     It is not disputed that the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 does fulfil     all   the   requirements     mentioned     above. Consequently,  it  is  not  possible for  us  to  allow  the appellants  to  raise  the  contentions  which the   learned counsel  on  their behalf wants to raise. The result is that the    appeals    would  stand   dismissed,  but   in    the circumstances   of  this  case  we  shall make no  order  as costs.                                Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellants: S. Subramanian. Agent for the respondents: R.H. Dhebar.