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PETITIONER: YUDHISHTER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASHOK KUMAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1986

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  558            1987 SCR  (1) 516  1987 SCC  (1) 204        JT 1986  1021  1986 SCALE  (2)1044  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC1654  (27)

ACT:     Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,  1973, s.  13(3)(a)i)  and 15(4)--Application  for  ejectment--Bona fide  requirement of building by  landlord--Jurisdiction  of appellate authority to admit additional evidence.     Statutory    interpretation--Rent    Act-A    beneficial legislation-Whether it should be read reasonably and justly.

HEADNOTE:     On 11th October 1971, the respondent-landlord  purchased a  house in which the appellant was a tenant since 1962.  He had  also  purchased another house in the same  district  on 10.7.1971  but  sold away the same on 7.8.72 as it  was  not vacant. On 14th January, 1974, the respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant-tenant inter alia on  the ground of bona fide personal requirement.  The  Rent Controller rejected the petition holding that all the ingre- dients  of s. 13(3)(a)(i) of the Haryana Urban  (Control  of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973 had not been proved.     Aggrieved  by  the  order of the  Rent  Controller,  the respondent  filed an appeal before the  Appellate  Authority alongwith  an application for adducing additional  evidence. The  Appellate Authority allowed the said  application,  re- corded  the  additional  evidence and  allowed  the  appeal, holding that: (i) the need of the respondent was bona  fide; (ii)  that the vacant possession of the house  purchased  on the  10th July 1971 by the respondent-landlord had not  been obtained; and (iii) that the sale of the aforesaid house  by the respondent was not a benami transaction. The High  Court dismissed the revision petition of the appellant in limine. Dismissing the appeal by the appellant to this Court,     HELD: 1.1 Section 15 of the Act deals with the powers of the  appellate  and revisional authorities  under  the  Act. Sub-s.  (4) of the said section specifically provides  that, if necessary, after further enquiry as it thinks fit. either personally or through the Controller, the appellate authori- ty shall decide the appeal. Therefore, the appellate author- ity has by express provision jurisdiction to admit addition- al evidence. [520E]

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517     State  of Kerala v.K.M. Charia Abdullah & Co., [1965]  1 S.C.R. 601, relied upon.     1.2 The document relied upon on behalf of the  appellant was a registered document and recited that vacant possession has  been given. The document stated ’Kabza Khali  makan  ka dia  hai’. It was asserted that it meant that a vacant  pos- session, in fact, had been given. The oral evidence  adduced on behalf of the respondent indicated otherwise. The expres- sion  indicated  above does not mean  that  actual  physical vacant possession has been handed over to the purchaser.  In a  document of this type it can equally mean that the  legal right  of the possession not the actual possession has  been handed  over to the purchaser. Therefore, evidence was  per- missible  to  explain  what it meant, and  there  was  ample justification  on  the  evidence on record to  come  to  the conclusion  that  it was ’not physically vacant’.  [524F  -- 525A]     In  the instant case, admission of  additional  evidence was warranted by the facts and the pleadings. By such admis- sion of evidence, no prejudice has been caused to the appel- lant. Indeed reading of the order of the appellate authority makes  it abundantly clear that the appellate authority  had adverted  to all the facts recorded by the  Rent  Controller and  further considered the additional evidence. It is  true that  in referring to the findings of the  Rent  Controller, the  appellate authority in its order had  not  specifically referred to the paragraphs of the order of the Rent Control- ler  but  that does not mean nor does it indicate  that  the appellate  authority  had not  considered  evidence  adduced before the Rent Controller. The criticism that there was  no consideration  of  the  evidence adduced  by  the  appellant before  the Rent Controller by the appellate  authority  is, therefore,  not justified in the facts and circumstances  of the case. [521B -- E]     2.  Though the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation,  it must be read reasonably and justly. If more limitations  are imposed  upon the right to hold the property then  it  would expose  itself to the vice of unconstitutionality.  Such  an approach  in  interpretation of beneficial statutes  is  not warranted.  It is true that one should iron out the  creases and should take a creative approach as to what was  intended by a particular provision but there is always, unless rebut- ted,  a  presumption  as to constitutionality  and  the  Act should be so read as to prevent it from being exposed to the vice of unconstitutionality. [525F -- G]     In the instant case, the suit for eviction for the  need of  the landlord was filed in January, 1972. The  respondent could  not therefore be said, in view of the above  premises having  been purchased and sold prior to the institution  of the  suit, to have occupied another residential building  in the urban area. The 518 contention  on  behalf of the appellant, that the  sale  has disentitled  the respondent to the relief asked for  because he had in his choice the residential building for his  occu- pation  but  he sold it, is not maintainable. There  was  no evidence  either  before the Rent Controller or  before  the appellate authority that this sale of property was with  the intention  or  with  a purpose to defeat the  claim  of  the appellant or to take out the respondent from the purview  of the  limitation imposed by clause (1)(a) of sub-s.(3) of  s. 13 of the Act. As the respondent had sold the properly 1-1/2 years before his suit for his need was instituted, it cannot be said unless there was definite evidence that it was  done

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with  the  intention to defeat the  appellant’s  claim.  The appellate authority accepted the respondent’s need and found him  within the purview of the Act. The High Court  did  not interfere  in revision, nor shall this Court  under  Article 136 of the Constitution. [525D -- F, 526C -- F]     Rani  Sartaj Kuari and Another v. Rani Deoraj Kuari,  15 Indian Appeals, 51 in-applicable.     State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram (Dead) Through  Shri Gurbax  Rai, [1969] 3 SCR 681; Sundarsanam Maistri v.  Nara- simbhulu Maistri and Anr., ILR 25 Mad. 149, 154; Commission- er of Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Others v. Chander Sen and Others, [1986] 3 SCC 567; Lachhman Das v. Rent Control and  Eviction Officer, Bareilly and another AIR 1953 Allahabad 458 at 459, paragraph 6; K.P. Varghese v. 1. T.O., Ernakulam and  Anoth- er[1981] 4 SCC 173 at 179-180 & Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State  of Jammu and Kashmir & Another [1980] 3 SCR  1338  at 1357 referred to:

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 459 of 1980.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  10.1.1980  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 34 of 1980     P.K.  Banerji, V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and  Ms. A. Prabhawathy for the Appellant.     Raja Ram Agarwal, B.P. Maheshwari, S.N. Agarwal and B.S. Gupta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave  is from  the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court  dated 10th January, 1980. The appellant is the tenant. The  appeal arises out of the summary dismissal of the revision petition filed by the tenant under section 151 of the Code of Civil 519 Procedure from the decision of the appellate authority under the  Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,  1973 being  Act  No. 11 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to  as  the ’Act’).     The appellant took on rent the premises in question from the  previous landlord in or about July, 1962. On  or  about 11th October, 1971, the respondent purchased the premises in question being suit No. 292 of Ward No. 13, District Gurgaon from the previous landlord. The premises hereinafter will be referred as the ’premises’.     Few  months prior thereto that is to say on  10th  July, 1971, the respondent had purchased another house near  Kabir Bhavan, Gurgaon. The appellant’s case was that the  respond- ent  got  vacant  possession of the  same.  The  respondent, however,  denied  that assertion. On 7th  August,  1972  the respondent  sold  the said house near Kabir  Bhavan.  It  is asserted that the sale was to one Resham Devi who is alleged to be the sister-in-law of the respondent. On the other hand this  is disputed and it appears that she is the  sister-in- law  of the brother of the respondent. The assertion of  the appellant  was that this was a benami transaction.  On  14th January, 1974, an application for ejectment was filed before the  Rent  Controller by the respondent on  grounds  of  (a) non-payment  of  rent, (b) sub-letting, and  (c)  bona  fide requirement.  So far as the grounds of non-payment  of  rent and sub-letting, are concerned, it has been held by all  the courts  in favour of the tenant. Those findings are  not  in dispute in this appeal. The only ground that survives is the bona  fide requirement of the landlord. The Rent  Controller on 7th November, 1978 rejected the petition of the  landlord

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on  the ground that the landlord had not been able to  prove all  the ingredients of section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act.  The respondent  thereafter filed an appeal before the  Appellate Authority.  Before the Authority, an, application  was  made for    admission    of   additional    evidence    by    the respondent/landlord. Such additional evidence were permitted to be adduced and were recorded on various dates. The appeal was  allowed  by the appellate authority  on  7th  December, 1979.  The  appellant herein filed a  revision  petition  as mentioned  hereinbefore before the High Court under  section 151  of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the same  was  dis- missed by the High Court in limine on 10th January, 1980.     The  only question that requires consideration  in  this appeal, is whether on the facts and in the circumstances  of the case, the landlord came within the provisions of section 13(3)(a)(i)  of the Act. The Act which is an Act to  control the  increase of rent of certain buildings and  rented  land situated within the limits of urban areas, and the  eviction of  tenants  therefrom, provides by section 13( 1 )  that  a tenant  in possession of a building or a rented  land  shall not  be  evicted  therefrom except in  accordance  with  the provisions of the said 520 section.  Sub-section  (3)(a)(i) of section 13  provides  as follows: "(3)  A  landlord may apply to the Controller for  an  order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession-- (a) in the case of a residential building, if--- (i) he requires it for his own occupation, is not  occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and has not vacated such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the 1949 Act in the said urban area."     Before  we  deal with the other contentions, it  may  be mentioned that on behalf of the appellant, Shri P.K. Banerji learned advocate contended that the appellate authority  was in  error  in firstly admitting additional evidence  at  the appellate stage in the facts and circumstances of the  case, and secondly, the appellate authority had not considered the evidence  adduced by the appellant before the Rent  Control- ler.  We  are unable to accept these  submissions  urged  on behalf of the appellant. The appellate authority, it must be mentioned,  has  normally  the same  jurisdiction  to  admit additional  evidence  as the trial court if  the  facts  and circumstances so warrant.     Furthermore,  in the instant case section 15 of the  Act deals  with the powers of the appellate and  revisional  au- thorities under the Act. Sub-section (4) of the said section specifically  provides  that  if  necessary,  after  further enquiry  as it thinks fit either personally or  through  the Controller, the appellate authority shall decide the appeal. Therefore, the appellate authority has by express  provision jurisdiction  to admit additional evidence. Indeed  in  this case  from the written statement, it appears that  the  only contention that was sought to be raised was about the extent of the accommodation available to the landlord in the ances- tral house of the landlord.     The  allegation about the alleged sale of  the  premises near Kabir Bhavan was not clearly spelled out. Therefore, if the interest of justice so demanded, the appellate authority was  justified  in admitting the  additional  evidence.  The parties  in  this  case had ample opportunity  to  test  the veracity  and  to examine and submit on the  value  of  such additional evidence. No prejudice could be said to have been caused by admission of such additional evidence. In State of Kerala  v.K.M. Charia Abdullah & Co., [1965] 1 SCR 601  this

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Court  was dealing with similar power under  Madras  General Sales  Tax Act, 1939 and observed at page 610 of the  report that  by  sub-section (4) of section 250 of the  Income  Tax Act,  1961 which is similar to section 33(4) of  the  Indian Incometax  Act,  1922, the Commissioner was  authorised  for disposing of the appeal to 521 make such further enquiry or to direct the Income-tax  Offi- cer  to  make further enquiry as he thought fit  and  report upon them. This Court held that it could not denied that the said  sub-section conferred upon the appellate  or  revising authority  power to make such enquiry as it thought fit  for fair  disposal of appeal. We are, therefore, clearly  of-the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of a  particular case, the appellate authority has jurisdiction under the Act in question to admit additional evidence. We are further  of the  opinion that in this case admission of such  additional evidence  was  warranted by the facts and the  pleadings  in this  case. We are satisfied that by such admission of  evi- dence, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. Indeed reading  of  the order of the appellate authority  makes  it abundantly  clear that the appellate authority had  adverted to all the facts recorded by the Rent Controller and further considered  the  additional  evidence. It is  true  that  in referring to the findings of the Rent Controller, the appel- late authority in its order had not specifically referred to the paragraphs of the order of the Rent Controller but  that does  not mean nor does it indicate that the  appellate  au- thority had not considered evidence adduced before the  Rent Controller. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the  objec- tions  urged on behalf of the appellant by Shri Banerji,  on admission and consideration of the additional evidence.     The  appellate  authority noted that the party  had  led evidence  before the Rent Controller and after  hearing  the party,  the Rent Controller held in the manner he  did.  The appellate authority therefore was conscious of the  evidence adduced  by  the appellant before the Rent  Controller.  The criticism  that there was no consideration of  the  evidence adduced  by the appellant before the Rent Controller by  the appellate  authority  is, therefore, not  justified  in  the facts and circumstances of the case. The Rent Controller  as noted  hereinbefore held that the appellant had  proved  the bona fide requirement. The appellate authority had noted the evidence  adduced  by the respondent  before  the  appellate authority.  It  is clear that the residential house  of  the family of the petitioner was having two rooms only and there was  large  number of persons occupying the two  rooms.  The family of the petitioner consisted of really seven  brothers and  one sister. Admittedly two brothers and their  families were  occupying the said premises. The premises in  question belonged  to the grand father of the respondent.  The  grand father was an advocate. He died. After his death his chamber was let out to Laxmi Commercial Bank. It was contended  that the  respondent was a co-parcener in the said  joint  family house. It was submitted that if the said chamber which was a big  room  was available, then, it could not  be  said  that there  was  dearth  of the accommodation  in  the  ancestral house. It is true that the appellate authority had proceeded on  the basis that the two rooms for occupation were  avail- able  in  the  said house for the father and  the  two  sons including the respondent and 522 his family in the ancestral house. But assuming that even if we  take  into consideration the chamber of the  late  grand father which had been let out to Laxmi Commercial Bank, that

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will also be wholly insufficient to meet the reasonable  and bona  fide  requirement  of the  respondent.  The  appellate authority further held that the appellant was a licensee  in respect of the ancestral house and he was staying there with the permission or the licence given by his father and he had no  right  and as such his interest in the  ancestral  house could not be considered to be "occupying another residential house" in terms of Clause (1) of sub-section 3(a) of section 13  of  the  Act. It was submitted before us  that  this  is incorrect because a co-parcener in respect of the  ancestral house was a co-owner and an owner could not be considered to be a licensee of the father in respect of a house  belonging to  Mitakshara  joint family. There is no dispute  that  the family  in question is governed by the Mitakshara School  of Hindu Law.     It  is abundantly clear that Ashok, Isher  and  Jagadish being the brothers of the appellant and the family belonging to  the joint family of the respondent with  their  children were staying in the ancestral house. Lalit, another brother, had  another  house. As mentioned  hereinbefore  there  were other  persons but about their stay there was no clear  evi- dence. It is asserted by the respondent that they are  seven brothers and one sister. But even assuming that Ashok, Isher and  Jagadish and the children stay in the  ancestral  house and  assuming  that the big room which had been let  out  to Laxmi  Commercial  Bank  is taken  into  consideration,  the accommodation  is still very inadequate for  reasonable  and bona fide requirement of the landlords. The question, there- fore, whether the respondent was a licensee of his father or a  co-owner of the property, namely the ancestral  house  is not really necessary to be decided. But it was contended  on behalf of the appellant that this approach of the  appellate authority  had  vitiated  the conclusion.  It  is  therefore necessary  to allay the grievance of the appellant  on  this score.     Our  attention was drawn to a decision of  the  Judicial Committee  in Rani Sartaj Kuari and Another v.  Rani  Deoraj Kuari,  [15] Indian Appeals, 51 (Mother and Guardian of  Lal Narindur Bahadur Pal). That case was in respect of an impat- ible estate governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu  Law. There  was a custom that the estate was impartible  and  was descendible to single heir by the rule of primogeniture.  It was held that in order to render alienations by the rejah in that case invalid as made without the consent of his son  it must  be  shown.that  the rajah’s power  of  alienation  was excluded  by the custom or by the nature of the  tenure.  In such  a raj the son is not a co-sharer with his father.  The Judicial Committee further observed that property in  ances- tral estate acquired by birth under the Mitakshara law is so connected with the fight to partition that it does not exist independently of such fight. At 523 page 64 of the report, the Judicial Committee observed  that the property in the paternal or ancestral estate acquired by birth  under  the Mitakshara law is, in the opinion  of  the Judicial  Committee, so connected with the fight  to  parti- tion, that it did not exist where there was no right to  it. We are of the opinion that no much support can be sought for by the appellant from the said decision; Here in the instant case, the question is whether the respondent who undoubtedly was governed by the Mitakshara School of Law, had acquired a fight to ancestral property by his birth. But this  question has  to be judged in the light of the Hindu Succession  Act, 1956.  Reliance  was also placed on State Bank of  India  v. Ghamandi Ram (Dead) Through Shri Gurbax Rai [1969] 3 SCR 681

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at page 686 of the report, this Court observed that  accord- ing  to the Mitakshara School of Hindu law all the  property of a Hindu joint family was held in collective ownership  by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The Court approved  the observations of Mr. Justice Bhashyam  Ayyanger in Sundarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri and Anr.  [ILR 25  Mad. 149, 154. But the question in the instant  case  is the  position of the respondent after coming into  operation of  the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Shri Banerji  drew  our attention  to Mulla’s ’Hindu Law’ 15th Edition at  page  924 where  the learned commentator had discussed effect  in  re- spect  of the devolution of interest in Mitakshara  coparce- nary  property  of the coming into operation  of  the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956.     This  question  has  been considered by  this  Court  in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others v. Chander Sen and  Others,  [1986] 3 SCC 567 where one of  us  (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father’s property and become part  of  the coparcenary. His fight accrues to him  not  on the’ death of the father or inheritance from the father  but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenev- er the father gets a property from whatever source, from the grandfather  or  from  any other  source,  be  it  separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and  it will  become part of the joint Hindu family of his  son  and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family  with him. This Court observed that this position has been affect- ed by section8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and, there- fore, after the Act, when the son inherited the property  in the situation contemplated by section 8, he does not take it as  Kar  of  his own undivided family but takes  it  in  his individual capacity. At pages 577 to 578 of the report, this Court  dealt with the effect of section 6 of the Hindu  Suc- cession  Act, 1956 and. the commentary made by  Mulla,  15th Edn.  pages  924-926 as well as Mayne’s on  Hindu  Law  12th Edition pages 918919. Shri Banerji relied on the said obser- vations of Mayne on ’Hindu Law’, 12th Edn. at pages 918-919. This Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the views expressed  by  the  Allahabad High Court,  the  Madras  High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Andhra  Pradesh High Court appeared to 524 be correct and was unable to accept the views of the Gujarat High  Court.  To the similar effect is  the  observation  of learned author of Mayne’s Hindu Law, 12th Edn. page 919.  In that view of the matter, it would be difficult to hold  that property  which developed on a Hindu under section 8 of  the Hindu  Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand  vis-a- vis his own sons. If that be the position then the  property which  developed  upon the father of the respondent  in  the instant  case on the demise of his grandfather could not  be said  to be HUF property. If that is so, then the  appellate authority  was  fight in holding that the respondent  was  a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.     But as mentioned hereinbefore, even if we proceed on the assumption that the respondent was a member of the HUF which owned the ancestral house, having regard to his share in the property and having regard to the need of other sons of  the father  who  were living in the ancestral house  along  with their families, the appellate authority was ,still fight  in holding *hat the need of the respondent was bona fide.     The  second  aspect of the matter  which  was  canvassed before  us  was that the respondent  had  purchased  another house near Kabir Bhavan in 1971 and there were nine rooms in

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the  said house. It was the appellant’s contention  that  it was sold to Smt. Resham Devi which was a benami transaction. It  was further his contention that in respect of  the  said house the respondent had got vacant possession. Thirdly,  it was  contended that the respondent had within his choice  to keep  the  said premises but he sold the  said  premises  in question.  Therefore he does not come within the  conditions stipulated in section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The  appellate authority on appraisal of evidence before the Rent  Control- ler as well as before it came to the conclusion that  vacant possession  had  not been obtained. There  was  evidence  on record to come to that conclusion.     Our attention was drawn to the document on behalf of the appellant  in support of contention that the document  which was  registered document recited that vacant possession  has been  given.  The document stated ’Kabza Khan maken  ka  dia hai’.  It was asserted that it meant that vacant  possession in fact had been given. The oral evidence adduced  indicated otherwise.  Indeed  the expression aforesaid does  not  mean that actual physical vacant possession had been handed  over to  the purchaser. In document of this type it  can  equally mean  that  the  legal right of possession  not  the  actual possession had been handed over to the purchaser. Therefore, evidence was permissible to explain what it meant.  Reliance for  this purpose was placed on a decision of  the  Division Bench  of the Allahabad High Court in Lachhman Das  v.  Rent Control  and  Eviction Officer, Bareilly and  another.,  AIR [1953]  Allahabad 458 at 459, paragarph 6. Therefore in  the instant  case  even  if the legal right  of  occupation  had passed  on which, in our opinion, was sought to be  conveyed by the expression noted 525 hereinbefore,  then  whether the premises  in  question  was actually vacant to be occupied by the respondent is a  ques- tion on which the oral evidence could be adduced. There  was ample justification on the evidence on record to come to the conclusion that it was ’not physically vacant’. The  expres- sion  noted  above therefore on this aspect  is  really  non sequetur and evidence would clinch the issue. There was  the evidence for the appellate authority to come to the  conclu- sion  that  the house near Kabit Bhavan was not  vacant.  It acted  on the same and in our opinion it did not commit  any error in so doing.     The next aspect urged was that it was benami transaction because the father of the respondent has gone to the  Regis- tration  office.  In view of the evidence discussed  by  the appellate  authority, specially the income-tax  records  and other  records  to which it is not necessary  to  advert  in detail  as  well as the oral testamoney in  this  case,  the appellate  authority rejected the contention that  the  sale was a henami transaction by the respondent. The most  impor- tant  aspect, however, as was highlighted by the  respondent was  that the said property was purchased in July, 1971  and sold  in August, 1972 because it was not in  vacant  posses- sion.     In  the instant case suit for eviction in  question  for the need of the landlord was filed in January, 1972.  There- fore,  the respondent could not be said in view of the  said premises having been purchased and sold by him prior to  the institution  of the suit, to have occupied another  residen- tial  building in the urban area. It was contended  that  by sale  the respondent has disentitled himself to  the  relief asked  for  because  he had in his  choice  the  residential building for his occupation but he sold it. We are unable to accept  this contention. There is no evidence either  before

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the  Rent Controller or before the appellate authority  that this  sale  to Resham Devi was with an intention or  with  a purpose to defeat the claim of the appellant or to take  out the respondent from the purview of the limitation imposed by clause  (  1 ) (a) of sub-section (3) of section 13  of  the Act. If we read in such manner the Act in question, the  Act would  expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionality.  It is  well-settled that though the Rent Act. is  a  beneficial legislation, it must be read reasonably and justly. If  more limitations are imposed upon the right to hold the  property then it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutional- ity. Such an approach in interpretation of beneficial  stat- utes  is not warranted. It is true that one should iron  out the  creases and should take a creative approach as to  what was intended by a particular provision but there is always,. unless  rebutted a presumption as to  constitutionality  and the  Act should be so read as to prevent it from  being  ex- posed  to  the vice of un-constitutionality. State  is  also presumed to act fairly. See in this connection the  observa- tions in State of Karnataka and Another v. M/s. Hans  Corpo- ration; [1980] 4 S.C.C. 697 at 704 & 706 and K.P. Varghesev. Income  Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another,  [1981]  4S.C.C. 173 at 179-180 526 Paragraphs  5 & 6). See also the observations of this  Court in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddv v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Another, [1980] 3 SCR 1338 at 1357.     In  fact  the  respondent did not have a  house  in  his possession.  He purchase one before, but as it was  not  va- cant,  he  sold away ,,before the institution of  the  suit. There  was no restriction by the Act on sale and  alienation of  property. At the relevant time the respondent  fulfilled all  the  requirements to maintain an action  for  eviction. Shri Raja Ram Agarwala, counsel for the respondent,  submit- ted before us that we should take a creative, reasonable and rational  approach  in interpreting the statute.  We  should not,  he  submitted,  put such an  interpretation  as  would prevent sale or mortgage of the property by the owner and in this  case  he  was justified in saying  that  the  landlord respondent  did not have vacant possession. As the facts  of this  case warrant and in fact the respondent had sold  away the  property 1 1/2 years before his suit for his  need  was instituted,  it  cannot be said unless  there  was  definite evidence  that it was done with the intention to defeat  the appellant’s  claim so as to be read that the landlord  occu- pied another residential house at the relevant time i.e.  at the time of institution of the suit.     The  appellate authority accepted the respondent’s  need and found him within the purview of the Act. The High  Court did  not interfere in revision, nor shall we  under  Article 136 of the Constitution.     The  appeal,  therefore, fails and is  accordingly  dis- missed. Interim orders are vacated. In the facts and circum- stances of the case, however, the parties will pay and  bear their own costs. M.L.A.                                                Appeal dismissed. 527