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PETITIONER: YOGENDRA NATH NASKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/02/1969

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1969 AIR 1089            1969 SCR  (3) 742  1969 SCC  (1) 555  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC1355  (2)  R          1976 SC2520  (19)  RF         1977 SC1523  (28)

ACT: Income-tax  Act  (11 of 1922)-Hindu Deity-If  can  be  taxed through shebaits.

HEADNOTE: Finding  that  the  assessments  of  the  income  from   the properties of two Hindu deities in the hands of its shebaits as trustees were set aside on the footing that the status of the assessees had not been correctly determined, the Income- tax  Officer  initiated  proceedings  for  the   assessments against  the  shebaits  of the  deities  and  completed  the assessments  on the deities in the status of  an  individual and  through  the  shebaits.  On the  question  whether  the assessments  on  the deities through the  shebaits  were  in accordance with law, HELD  :  The  Hindu idol is a  juristic  entity  capable  of holding property and of being taxed through its shebaits who are  entrusted  with the possession and  management  of  its property. A   Hindu  deity  fell  within  the  meaning  of  the   word ’individual’ under s. 3 of the Act and could be treated as a unit  of  assessment under the section and  was  capable  of being taxed through its shebaits.  The word ’individual’  in s.  3  of the 1922 Act included within its  connotation  all artificial  juridical  persons and this legal  position  was made explicit and beyond challenge in the 1961 Act. [750  C; 751 D] Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person  in law.   But so far as the deity stands as the  representative and  symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated  by the  donor,  it  can figure as a legal person  and  in  that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it.  There is no  principle why a deity as such a legal person should  not be  taxed  if such a legal person is allowed in law  to  own property  even though in the ideal sense and to sue for  the property,  to realise rent and to defend such property in  a

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court of law again in the ideal sense. [749 F] Manohar Ganesh v. Lakshmiram, I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247; Vidyapurna Tirtha  Swami v. Vidvanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors.,  I.L.R.  27 Mad.  435;  Maharanet  Shibessouree  Dehia  v.  Mothocranath Acharjo, 13 M.L.A. 270; Prosanna Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo,  L.R. 2 I.A. 145; Pramatha Nath Mullick v.  Pradyumna Kumar  Mullick  & Ors., 52 I.A. 245; Bhupati v.  Ramlal,  10 C.L.J. 355; Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trust by Mr. B.  K.  Mukherjea; The Commissioner  of  Income-tax,  Madhya Pradesh & Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, [1958] S.C.R. 1; Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C., [1921] 2 K.B. 403 and Attorney  General v. Clarkson, [1900] 1 Q.B. 156, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 690 to 694 of 1968. Appeals  from  the judgment and order dated April 3,  4,  5, 1965 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference  No. 50 of 1961. 743 M.C.  Chagla and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant  (in all the appeals). S.T.  Desai,  G.  C. Sharma and B.  D.  Sharma,  for  the respondent (in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought from the judgment of the  Calcutta High Court dated 3rd, 4th and 5th April,  1965 in  Income  Tax Reference No. 50 of 1961  on  a  certificate granted  under  section 66A of the Indian Income  Tax,  Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act). One  Ram Kristo Naskar left a will dated 17th May,  1899  by which he left certain properties as debuttar to two  deities Sri  Iswar Kubereswar Mahadeb Thakur and Sri Sri Anandamoyee Kalimata  in  the land adjoining his  residential  house  at 74/75  Beliaghata Main Road.  He appointed his  two  adopted sons  Hem Chandra Naskar (since deceased) and Yogendra  Nath Naskar as the shebaits.  Elaborate provision was made as  to the  manner in which the income from the property was to  be spent.   For  a long time the income from the  property  was assessed  in  the  hands of the shebaits  as  trustees.   In respect of the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52, the two shebaits  contended that there was no trust executed in  the case  and  as  such the income from  the  property  did  not attract  liability to tax and particularly  the  assessments made  in  the  name of Hem Chandra Naskar  and  his  brother Yogendra  Nath  Naskar as trustees of  the  debuttar  estate could   not   be   sustained.    The   Appellate   Assistant Commissioner  accepted  this contention on  appeal  and  set aside  the assessments.  Finding that the  assessments  have been  set  aside  on the footing that  the  status  of  the assessees  had not been correctly determined the Income  Tax Officer initiated proceedings for the assessment years 1952- 53 and 1953-54 against Hem Chandra Naskar and Yogendra  Nath Naskar,  the shebaits of the two deities and  completed  the assessments  on the deities in the status of  an  individual and through the shebaits.  The claim for exemption under the proviso  to  section  4(3)(i)  of the  Income  Tax  Act  was rejected.   On appeal the Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner upheld the assessment orders of the Income Tax Officer.  The assessee  appealed to the Appellate Tribunal  and  contended that  the deities were not chargeable to tax under s.  3  of the  Act;  that section 41 of the Act did not apply  to  the facts  of the case.  Though the shebaits were  the  managers

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who  could come under the ambit of section 41, they had  not been  appointed  by  or under any order  of  the  court  and therefore  the ’assessments were invalid and should  be  set aside.   It was also contended that the case of the  trustee having  been specifically given up it would not be  open  to the Income Tax 744 Department to bring the shebaits under any of the categories mentioned  in section 41.  The  departmental  representative contended  that  the  assessments  had  been  made  on  the, shebaits  not under section 41 as trustees or  managers  but that  the deities had been assessed as individuals and  that section 41 was a surplusage in making the assessments.   The Tribunal held that though the shebaits were the managers for the purpose of section 41, they were not so appointed by  or under  any  order of the court, and, therefore,  the  second condition required by section 41 was not fulfilled, and  the shebaits  could  pot be proceeded  against.   The  Appellate Tribunal  added  that  the  specific  provision  which   the Tribunal first relied was that of trustees under section 41, but  that case having been given up the further  attempt  to assess  the shebaits as managers under section 41 could  not be  upheld.  At the instance of the Commissioner  of  Income Tax, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following  question of law for the opinion of the High Court under section 66(1) of the Act :               "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances               of  the  case, the assessment on  the  deities               through  the shebaits under the provisions  of               section  41 of the Indian Income Tax Act  were               in accordance with law ?"               After  having heard learned counsel  for  both               the  parties  we  are satisfied  that  in  the               question  referred by the  Appellate  Tribunal               the words ’under the provisions of section  41               of  the  Indian  Income  Tax  Act’  should  be               deleted as superfluous and the question should               be  modified in the following manner to  bring               out  the question in real controversy  between               the parties               "Whether an the facts and in the circumstances               of  the case, the assessments on  the  deities               through  the shebaits were in accordance  with               law."               The   main   question  hence   presented   for               determination  in these appeals is whether a               Hindu  deity  can  be treated  as  a  unit  of               assessment under section 3 and 4 of the Income               Tax Act, 1922.               It  is  well established by  high  authorities               that a Hindu idol is a juristic person in whom               the  dedicated  property  vests.   In  Manohar               Ganesh  v.  Lakshmiram(1)  called  the   Dakor               temple case, West and Birdwood, if. state :               "The  Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and  those               derived   from   it,   recognises   not   only               incorporate  bodies  with rights  of  property               vested in the corporation apart               (1)   I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247.               745               from   its   individual  members   but also               juridical persons called foundations.  A Hindu               who   wishes  to  establish  a  religious   or               charitable  institution may according  to  his               law  express his purpose and endow it and  the

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             ruler  will  give effect to the bounty  or  at               least,  protect  it so far at any rate  as  is               consistent  with his own Dharma or  conception               or morality.  A trust is not required for  the               purpose;  the necessity of a trust in  such  a               case  is  indeed a peculiarity  and  a  modern               peculiarity of the English Law.  In early  law               a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar               of  God, sufficed it to convey to  the  Church               the  lands thus dedicated.  It  is  consistent               with  the  grants  having  been  made  to  the               juridical person symbolised or personified  in               the idol".               The same view has been expressed by the Madras               High  Court  in  Vidyapurna  Tirtha  Swami  v.               Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors.(1) in which Mr.               Justice Subrahmania Ayyar stated:               "It is to give due effect to such a sentiment,               widespread  and deep-rooted as it  has  always               been, with reference to something not  capable               of holding property as a natural person, that               the laws of most countries have sanctioned the               creation of a fictitious person in the  matter               as  is implied in the  felicitous  observation               made  in the work already cited  "Perhaps  the               oldest  of  all juristic persons is  the  God,               hero  or  the saint" (Pollock  and  Maitland’s               History of English Law, Volume 1, 481).               That the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is               a  juridical  person has been  expressly  laid               down in Manohar Ganesh’s case (2)  which  Mr.               Prannath Saraswati, the author of the  ’Tagore               Lectures on Endowments’ rightly enough  speaks               of  as one ranking as the leading case on  the               subject,  and in which West J., discusses  the               whole matter with much erudition.  And in more               than  one case, the decision of  the  Judicial               Committee  proceeds  on  precisely  the   same               footing   (Maharanee  Shibessouree  Dehia   v.               Mothocrapath  Acharjo(3) and  Prosanna  Kumari               Debya   v.   Golab   Chand   Baboo(4).    Such               ascription  of  legal personality to  an  idol               must however be incomplete unless it be linked               of   human   guardians  for   them   variously               designated  in Debya v. Golab  Chand  Baboo(4)               the Judicial Committee observed thus : ’It               is only in an ideal sense that               (1)   I.L.R. 27 Mad.435.               (2)   I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247.               (3)   13 M.I.A. 270.               (4)   L.R. 2 I.A. 145.               746               property can be said to belong to an idol  and               the  possession  and management  must  in  the               nature of things be entrusted with some person               as  shebait  or  manager.  It  would  seem  to               follow  that the person so entrusted  must  be               necessity  be empowered to do whatever may  be               required  for the service of the idol and  for               the  benefit and preservation of its  property               at  least to as great a degree as the  manager               of  an  infant heir’-words which  seem  to  be               almost on echo of what was said in relation to               a church in a judgment of the days of  Edward.               A  church  is always under age and  is  to  be

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             treated  as an infant and it is not  according               to law that infants should be disinherited  by               the  negligence  of  their  guardians  or  ’be               barred  of  an  action  in  case  they   would               complain  of things wrongfully done  by  their               guardians  while they are under age’  (Pollock               and  Maitland’s  ’History  of  English   Law’,               Volume 1, 483".               In  Pramatha Nath Mullick v.  Pradyumna  Kumar               Mullick & Ors.(1), Lord Shaw observed :               "A   Hindu   idol  is,   according   to   long               established   authority,  founded   upon   the               religious  customs  of  the  Hindus,  and  the               recognition  thereof  by  Courts  of  law,   a               ’juristic entity’.  It has a juridical  status               with  the power of suing and being sued.   Its               interests  are attended to by the  person  who               has the deity in his charge and who is in  law               its  manager with all the powers which  would,               in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to               the  manager of the estate of an infant  heir.               It  is unnecessary to quote  the  authorities;               for  this  doctrine  thus  simply  stated,  is               firmly established".               It  should  however  be  remembered  that  the               juristic  person  in  the  idol  is  not   the               material  image, and it is an exploded  theory               that  the image itself develops into  a  legal               person  as  soon  as  it  is  consecrated  and               vivified  by the Pran Pratishta ceremony.   It               is not also correct that the supreme being  of               which  the  idol is A symbol or image  is  the               recipient and owner of the dedicated property.               This  is  clearly Jaid down  in  authoritative               Sanskrit  Texts.  Thus, in his Bhashya on  the               Purva Mimamsa, Adhyaya 9, Pada 1, Sabara Swami               states : (1) 52 I.A. 245. 747 "Words such as ’Village of the Gods’, ’land of the Go&’  are used  in a figurative sense.  That is property which can  be said  to belong to a person, which he can make use of as  he desires.   God however does not make use of the, village  or lands, according to its desires".  Likewise, Medhathithi  in commenting on the expression ’Devaswam’ in Manu, Chapter XI, Verse 26 writes "Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for  Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the  like,  because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the  relationship between  the owner and the property owned, is impossible  of application,  to Gods".  Thus, according to the  texts,  the Gods  have  no beneficial enjoyment of the  properties,  and they  can be described as their owners only in a  figurative sense  (Gaunartha).  The correct legal position is that  the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose  of the  donor is the juristic person recognised by law  and  in this  juristic  person  the dedicated  property  vests.   As observed by Mr. Justice B. K. Mukherjea:               "With  regard to Debutter, the position  seems               to be somewhat different.  What is personified               here,  is  not the entire  property  which  is               dedicated  to the deity but the  deity  itself               which  is the central part of  the  foundation               and   stands  as  the  material   symbol   and               embodiment  of  the pious  purpose  which  the

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             dedicator  has  in view.  "The  dedication  to               deity",  said Sir Lawrence Jenkins in  Bhupati               v.  Ramlal(1)  "is nothing but  a  compendious               expression of the pious purpose for which  the               dedication  is  designed".  It is not  only  a               compendious   expression   but   a    material               embodiment  of  the pious purpose  and  though               there  is difficulty in holding that  property               can  reside in the aim or purpose  itself,  it               would   be   quite   consistent   with   sound               principles  of  Jurisprudence to  say  that  a               material object which represents or symbolises               a  particular purpose can be given the  status               of  a legal person, and regarded as  owner  of               the property which is dedicated to it."(2)               The  legal  position  is  comparable  in  many               respects to the, development in Roman Law.  So               far as charitable endowment is concerned Roman               Law-as later developed recognised two kinds of               juristic  persons.  One was a  corporation  or               aggregate of               (1)   10 C.L.J. 355 at 369.               (2)   Hindu  Law  of  Religious  &  Charitable               Trust by Mr. B.K, Mukherjee.               748               persons which owed its juristic personality to               State  sanction.  A private person might  make               over  property by way of gift or legacy  to  a               corporation already in existence and might  at               the same time prescribe the particular purpose               for which the property was to be employed e.g.               feeding  the   poor or giving relief  to-  the               poor  distressed.   The  recipient   corporate               would be in a position of a trustee and  would               be  legally bound to spend the funds  for  the               particular purpose.  The other alternative was               for  the  donor to create  an  institution  or               foundation  himself.   This  would  be  a  new               juristic person which depended for its  origin               upon nothing else but the will of the  founder               provided  it  was  directed  to  a  charitable               purpose.  The foundation would be the owner of               the  dedicated property in the eye of law  and               the administrators would be in the position of               trustees bound to carry out the object of  the               foundation.  As observed by Sohm :               "During  the  later  Empire--from  the   fifth               century onwards-foundations created by private               individuals   came   to   be   recognised   as               foundations in the true legal sense, but  only               if they took the form of a ipia cause’  (’pium               corpus’)  i.e. were devoted to  ’pious  uses’,               only   in  short,  if  they  were   charitable               institutions.   Wherever  a  person  dedicated               property-whether  by  gift inter vivos  or  by               will--in  favour of the poor, or the sick,  or               prisoners, orphans, or aged people, he thereby               created  ipso  facto a new  subject  of  legal               rights  the poor-house, the hospital,  and  so               forth-and  the  edicated property  became  the               sole  property of this new subject; it  became               the  sole property of the new juristic  person               whom the founder had called into being.  Roman               law,   however,   took  the  view   that   the               endowments  of charitable foundations  were  a

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             species  of Church property.  Piae cause  were               subjected  to the control of the Church,  that               is,  of  the  bishop  or  the   ecclesiastical               administrator,  as the case might be.   A  pia               causa  was regarded as an ecclesiastical,  and               consequently, as a public institution, and  as               such  it shared that corporate capacity  which               belonged to all ecclesiastical institutions by               virtue of a general rule of law.  A pia  causa               did not require to have a juristic personality               expressly  coffered  upon  it.   According  to               Roman  law the act-whether a gift inter  vivos               or  a  testamentary  disposition-whereby   the               founder dedicated property to charitable  uses               was  sufficient, without more,  to  constitute               the pia cause a foundation in the legal sense,               to  make it, in other words, a new subject  of               legal rights"(1). (1)  Institute of Roman Law, 3rd Edition pp. 197-198. 749 We  should, in this context, make a distinction between  the spiritual  and the legal aspect of the Hindu idol  which  is installed and worshipped.  From the spiritual standpoint the idol  may  be to the worshipper a symbol  (pratika)  of  the Supreme  Godhead intended to invoke a sense of the vast  and intimate reality, and suggesting the essential truth of  the Real that is beyond all name or form.  It is basic postulate of  Hindu religion that different images do  ’not  represent different divinities, they are really symbols of One Supreme Spirit  and in whichever name or form the deity is  invoked, the Hindu worshipper purports to worship the Supreme  Spirit and nothing else.                     (Rig Vedda 1. 1.64) (They have spoken of Him as Agni, Mitra, Varuna, Indra;  the one  Existence  the sages speak of in many).   The  Bhagavad Gita echoes this verse when it says                        (Chap. xi- 39) (Thou  art  Vayu and Yama, Agni, Varuna and  Moon;  Lord  of creation art Thou, and Grandsire). Samkara,  the great philosopher, refers to the one  Reality, who,  owing  to the diversity or intellects  (matibheda)  is conventionally  spoken  of (parikalpya) in various  ways  as Brahma,  Visnu and Mahesvara.  It is however  possible  that the  founder  of  the endowment of the  worshipper  may  not conceive  on this highest spiritual plane but hold that  the idol  is the very embodiment of a personal God, but that  is not  a matter with which the law is concerned.  Neither  God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law.  But so far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol  of the  particular purpose which is indicated by the donor,  it can  figure as a legal person.  The true legal view is  that in  that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in  it. There  is no principle why a deity as such a  legal  person should not be taxed if such a legal person is allowed in law to  own property even though in the ideal sense and  to  sue for  the  property,  to  realise rent  and  to  defend  such property  in  a  of  law again  in  the  ideal  sense.   Our conclusion  is  that  the Hindu idol is  a  juristic  entity capable  of holding property and of being taxed through  its shebaits   who  are  entrusted  with  the   possession   and management of its property.  It was argued on behalf of  the appellant  that  the word ’individual’ in s. 3  of  the  Act should  not be construed as including a Hindu deity  because it  was not a real but a juristic person.  We are unable  to accept  this argument as correct.  We see no reason why  the

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meaning 10Sup./69-13 750 of  the word ’individual’ in section 3 of the Act should  be restricted to human being and not to juristic entities.   In The  Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh & Bhopal  v. Sodra Devi(1) Mr. Justice Bhagwati pointed out as follows :               "the word ’individual’ has not been defined in               the  Act  and  there  is  authority,  for  the               proposition  that the word  ’individual’  does               not mean only a human being but is wide enough               to include a group of persons forming a  unit.               It  has been held that the  word  ’individual’               includes  a Corporation created by a  statute,               e.g.,  a University or a Bar Council,  or  the               trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated  by               a Baronetcy Act".               We  are  accordingly of opinion that  a  Hindu               deity  falls  within the meaning of  the  word               ’individual"  under section 3 of the  Act  and               can  be treated as a unit of assessment  under               that section.               On behalf of the appellant Mr. Chagla referred               to  section 2 sub-section (31) of  the  Income               Tax  Act,  1961  (Act No. 49  of  1961)  which               states :               "2. In this  Act, unless the context otherwise               requires-               (31)  ’person’ includes-               (i)   an individual,               (ii)  a Hindu undivided family,               (iii) a company,               (iv)  a firm,               (v)   an  association of persons or a body  of               individuals, whether incorporated or not,               (vi)  a local authority, and               (vii)every  artificial juridical  person,  not               falling  within  any  of  the  preceding  sub-               clauses".               Counsel  also referred to S. 2(9) and S. 3  of               the Income Tax Act, 1922 which state:               "2.  In  this Act, unless  there  is  anything               repugnant in the subject or context-               (9)’Person’  includes Hindu  undivided  family               and local authority".               (1) (1958] S.C.R. I at P. 6.               751               "3. Where any Central Act enacts that  income-               tax shall be charged for any year at any  rate               or  rates,  tax at that rate  or  those  rates               shall  be charged for that year in  accordance               with,  and subject to the provisions of,  this               Act in respect of the total income of the pre-               vious   year   of  every   individual,   Hindu               undivided family, company and local authority,               and  of  every firm and other  association  of               persons  or  the partners of the firm  or  the               members of the association individually".               On  a comparison of the provisions of the  two               Acts  counsel  on  behalf  of  the   appellant               contended that a restricted meaning should  be               given  to the word. ’individual’ in section  3               of  the earlier Act.  We see no  justification               for this argument.  On the other hand, we  are               of  the opinion that the language employed  in

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             1961 Act may be relied upon as a Parliamentary               exposition  of  the earlier Act  even  on  the               assumption  that  the  language  employed   in               section 3 of the earlier Act is ambiguous.  It               is clear that the word ’individual’ in section               3   of  the  1922  Act  includes  within   its               connotation  all artificial juridical  persons               and  this legal position is made explicit  and               beyond  challenge  in the 1961 Act.   In  Cape               Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. (1), Lord Sterndale               R. said :               "I think it is clearly established in Attorney               General   v.  Clarkson  (2)  that   subsequent               legislation  may be looked at in order to  see               the  proper  construction to be  put  upon  an               earlier   Act  where  that  earlier   Act   is               ambiguous. I quite agree that  subsequent               legislation  if it procedure on  an  erroneous               construction of previous legislationcannot               alter that previous legislation; but if  there               be  any ambiguity in the earlier  legislation,               then  the subsequent legislation may  fix  the               proper interpretation which is to be put  upon               the earlier Act". For  the reasons expressed we hold that the question of  law referred  by  the  Income-tax  Appellate  Tribunal  and   as modified by us should be answered in the affirmative and  in favour  of the Commissioner of Income-tax.   We  accordingly dismiss these appeals with costs.  One hearing fee. Y.P. Appeals dismissed. (1)  [1921] 2 K.B. 403. (2)  [1900] 1 Q.B. 156,163,164. 752