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PETITIONER: YELAMANCHILI SIVA PANCHAKSHAMMA GODAVARU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: YALAMANCHILI CHEVA ABHAYI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1966

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1967 AIR  207            1966 SCR  (3) 446

ACT: Will-Construction of-Property whether could be claimed as persona designata in terms of the will.

HEADNOTE: The respondent filed a plaint claiming properties  mentioned in  Schedules  A  and B thereof on the ground  that  he  was adopted  by  the appellant who was widow of  L.  Apart  from adoption the respondent’s claim was based on being mentioned as persona designata in L’s will.  The relevant words in the will  were : "It has been settled that my wife should  take, the  second son of my elder brother..........  in  adoption, celebrate  his  marriage,  etc., and  after  he  passes  his minority  she should deliver possession of my other  movable and immovable properties that I have. ........... The  trial court  held that the respondent had not been adopted by  the appellant  nor  was  he entitled to any  rights  as  persona designata  in L’s will.  On appeal the High Court held  that while there was no adoption, the respondent was entitled  to the  property as persona designata.  The appellant  came  to this  Court.  The question presented for  determination  was whether the High Court was right in holding that upon a true construction  of  the will Ex.B-1 there was a  gift  of  the property to the plaintiff as persona designata. HELD :. The will contained no direct words of disposition in favour of the respondent.  There was no expression of devise in favour of the respondent.  There was only a direction  to the  widow to adopt and’ the gift to the respondent was  on condition  of  being adopted.  The.  respondent’s  claim  as persona designata could not therefore be accepted. [448 G-H, 450 A] Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass, 12 I.A. 72 relied on. Nidhoomoni  Debya  v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee, 3  I.A.  253 distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 752 of 1963.

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Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated December 16  1958 of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 284  of 1954. M.   A. Narasayya Chaudhury, I Shivamurthy and K. R.  Sarma, for the appellant. W. S. Barlingay and E. Udayaratnam, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramnswami J. This appeal is brought on behalf of the  defen- dant  against the judgment and decree of the High  Court  of Andhra  Pradesh dated December 16, 1958 in A. S. No. 284  of 1954 whereby                             447 it  reversed  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  Court  of Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in O. S. No. 171 of 1950. In  the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal  the plaintiff alleged that he was duly adopted by the defendant- the widow of Lakshmayya and therefore entitled to properties mentioned in Schs.  A & B of the plaint.  The plaintiff also asserted  that, apart’ from his right as an adopted son,  he was  entitled  to  the  properties  claimed  as  a   persona designata  under the will dated November 30,  1946-Ex.   B-1 executed  by  Lakshmayya.   The suit was  contested  by  the defendant who alleged that the plaintiff was not adopted  as the son of Lakshmayya.  The trial court rejected the case of the  plaintiff  that he was adopted by the widow  after  the death of Lakshmayya.  The trial court further held that  the plaintiff was not entitled to any rights under the will as a persona  designata.  The trial court  accordingly  dismissed the  suit,   On appeal by the  plaintiff  the  High  Court confirmed  the finding that no adoption had been made.   It, however,  held  on  the construction of the  will  that  the plaintiff  was  entitled  to the  properties  claimed  as  a persona  designata.  The High Court allowed the  appeal  and granted  a  decree to the plaintiff for  possession  of  the properties subject to certain incidental directions given in the decree. The  question presented for determination in this appeal  is whether  the  High Court was right in’ holding that  upon  a true  construction of the will-Ex.  B-1 there was a gift  of the properties to the plaintiff as a persona designata. It  is  necessary, at this stage, to set  out  the  material provisions of the will Ex.  B-1 executed by Lakshmayya:-                "I  have  no male or female  issue.   I  have               wife, by name Sivapanchakshari, mother by name               Basavamma, and elder brother by name  Somaiah.               For  the  last 10 days I am suffering  from  a               disease  akin to paralysis and fearing that  I               may   not  survive,  I  make   the   following               settlement  as  set down below to  take  place               after my life.                                                       A.C. Land called Mallukunta  ..  ..   .. . . ..  1-60 Out of Raksh kunta (?) vadde land    ..   . 1-25 Out of Maddurivari land    .. .. ..  ..     1-05 Oat of Pooravarnamvari land ..   ..  ..      2-60                                         --------------                           TOTAL             6-50               Six acres and (50) fifty cents seri wet  land;               10  cents  in Kolli  Chinna  Bapaiah’s  (back)               yard; and 300 yards of house-site towards  the               west  of my house (belonging to my  mother-in-               law) with a tiled house thereon, have been               448               settled  upon  my wife to enjoy as  she  likes               with  all rights of gift, mortgage,  exchange,

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             sale, etc.               2.    Southern side., garden 80 cents  (eighty               cents of seri wet land) has been settled. upon               my  mother Basavamma to enjoy with all  rights               of gift, mortgage, exchange, sale, etc.               3.    It has been settled that my wife  should               take,  the  2nd  son  of  my  elder   brother,               Yalamanchili  Somaiah, in adoption,  celebrate               his  marriage, etc., and after he passes  his.               minority she should deliver possession of  .my               other movable and immovable properties that  I               have  and  described here below.   During  the               life-time  of my wife, if the adopted son  and               she  live together without any trouble,  (she)               is  to  live  in my house,  and  if  there  is               disagreement  between the adopted son  and  my               wife, (she) is to live in .a room of my house.               My  wife  has been given power over  my  minor               (son’s)  property, to collect debts due to  me               and to discharge debts due by me." The  testator then mentioned two items of debts due to  him. He  ,thereafter  enumerated  the  debts  due  by  him  which aggregated  to  Rs. 15,803/-. A description of the  land  is also given. The  question  involved  in  this  appeal  is  whether   the disposition of  the properties to the plaintiff  is  as  a persona   designata  or  by  reason  of  his  fulfilling   a particular  legal  status, namely, the adopted :son  of  the testator.   The  question in such a case is  really  one  of intention of the testator which must be ascertained from the Ianguage  of  the  various  clauses  of  the  will  and  the surrounding circumstances of the execution of the will.   As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass(1)               "The  distinction between what is  description               only  and  what is the reason or motive  of  a               gift or bequest may often be very fine, but it               is  a distinction which must be drawn  from  a               consideration   of   the  language   and   the               surrounding circumstances." In the present case we are satisfied on reading the  various clauses of the will, that there is no gift to the  plaintiff and there was only a direction to the defendant to adopt the plaintiff as the son of Lakshmayya and the intention of, the testator  was that the Plaintiff should take as  an  adopted son  and,  therefore,  the gift made to  the  plaintiff  was conditional on his being adopted.  The reason is that  there are  no.  direct  words  of disposition  in  favour  of  the plaintiff.  In this connection the, language of cl. 3 of the win is (1)  12 1. A. 72. 449 in  contrast  with  that  of cls. 1 and  2  where  words  of disposition  are used with regard to the gifts made  to  the widow-Sivapanchakshari  and to the mother of  the  testator- Basavamma.   Clause  3  of the will  does  not  contain  any expression  of  devise  of the property  in  favour  of  the plaintiff.  Clause 3 only contains a direction that the wife of  the  testator  should take the  plaintiff  in  adoption, celebrate  his  marriage  etc.  and  "after  he  passes  his minority  she should deliver possession of my other  movable and  immovable properties to him".  It is manifest  that  in the present case there is a direction to the widow to  adopt and,  the gift to the plaintiff is on the condition  of  his being adopted.  It appears to us, upon reading the will as a

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whole,  that  the  testator had no  intention  to  give  the property to the plaintiff irrespective of the adoption to be made  by  the widow in accordance with  the  direction.   On behalf of the respondents reference was made to the decision of  the  Judicial Committee in Nidhoomoni  Debya  v.  Saroda Pershad  Mookerjee(1) in which it was held that there was  a gift of his property by the testator to a designated  person (the  words  being  "I declare that I give  my  property  to Koibullo  whom  I  have adopted"), and  this  gift  was  not dependent  on the performance of certain ceremonies  by  his widows.  The principle of the decision is not applicable  to the  present  case where the language  of  the  testamentary instrument  is materially different.  We think  the  present case  is similar to that of Fanindra Deb Raikat v.  Rajeswar Dass(2)  where  the  Judicial  Committee  held  on  a   true construction  of  the angikar-patra by  which  the  deceased purported to give his property to the respondent by  virtue, of  his  being the adopted son, that the gift did  not  take effect inasmuch as the adoption was invalid.  At page 89  of the Report the Judicial Committeee observed :               "They  think  the  question  is  whether   the               mention  of  him as an adopted son  is  merely               descriptive  of the person to take  under  the               gift,  or  whether  the assumed  fact  of  his               adoption  is not the reason and motive of  the               gift, and indeed a condition of it.  The words               are  authorize  you by this  angikar-patra  to               offer  oblations of water and pinda to me  and               my ancestors after My death, by virtue of your               being  my  adopted son.  Moreover,  you  shall               become  the proprietor of all the movable  and               immovable properties which I own and which  I’               may leave behind; you shall become entitled to               my  dena-pawna (debts and dues), and  you  and               your  sons  and  grandsons  shall  enjoy  them               agreeably to the custom of the family.’ He  is               to  make the offerings by virtue of  being  an               adopted  son, and ’moreover’ he is  to  become               the proprietor.  This is to be the consequence               of the adoption."               (1)  3 1. A. 253.               (2) 12  1.  A.               72.                450 For the reasons expressed we hold that the High Court was in error  in interpreting the will of Lakshmayya as a  gift  of the  properties  made  to.  the  plaintiff  as  a.   persona designata.   We  are,  therefore, of the  opinion  that  the plaintiff is not entitled to the properties on the basis  of the  will  executed  by  Lakshmayya  and  the  suit  of  the plaintiff  should be dismissed.  This appeal is  accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed. 451