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PETITIONER: WORKMEN OF M/S FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER CO.OF INDIA (P) LIMIT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1976

BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1775            1976 SCR  (3) 369  1976 SCC  (3) 819

ACT:      Lay-off-Meaning of-Section  2(kkk)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), 1947.      Lay-off-Right  of  the  management  of  an  Iudsustrial Establishment under  the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XlV of 1947), 1947, to lay-off workmen-Section 2(kkk) 25A 25B(2)(i) and 25C of the Act Scope of-Effect of s. 25.j.      Compensation-Lay-off    compensation-Whether    laid-of workmen who  do not  come under Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act  1947 by  virtue of  s. 25A are entitled to any compensation.      Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), 1947-Section 10(1), 33(c)(2),  powers of  the  tribunal  court  to  award layoff compensation.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent-company  manufacturing tyres  in Bombay, due to  the general strike in its factory between the period 3rd March  1967 and 16th May 1967 and again from 4th October 1967 and  due to the consequent short supply of tyres had to lay-off 17  out of  its 30 workmen in the Delhi distribution office and  also some  out of  its 33  workmen in its Madras distribution office.  The workmen  in the  Delhi and  Madras offices were called back to duty on 22nd April 1968 and 29th April 1968  respectively. The  workmen were  not given their wages  or   compensation  for  the  period  of  lay-off.  An industrial dispute  was raised  and referred to the tribunal by the  Delhi Administration  even when  the lay-off  was in operation.  The   Presiding  officer   of   the   Additional Industrial Tribunal,  Delhi held  that the  workmen were not entitled to  any layoff  compensation. The workmen in Madras filed petitions  under s.  33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for  computation of  their wages for the period of their lay-off. The  Presiding officer  of  the  Additional  Labour Court, Madras,  holding  that  the  lay-off  was  justified, dismissed their applications.      on appeal to this Court by special leave, ^      HELD: (I)  The simple  dictionary meaning  according to the concise  oxford Dictionary  of  the  term  "lay-ofF’  is "period during  which a  workman is temporarily discharged". Lay-off means  the failure, refusal or inability of employer

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on account  of contingencies  mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to give employment to a workman  whose name  is borne  on the  Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment.  It has  been called  a  temporary discharge of  the workmen  or a  temporary suspension of his contract of  service. Strictly speaking, it is not so. It is merely a  fact of  temporary unemployment  of the workman in the work  of the  lndustrial Establihment.  Mere refusal  or inability to  give employment to the workman when he reports for duty on one or more grounds mentioned in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 is  not a temporary discharge of the workman. [372A, 374A, B, G]      Gaya Cotton  & Jute  Mills Ltd.  v. Gaya  Cotton & lute Mills Labour Union [1952] II Labour Law Journal 37, referred to.      (2)(i) That  the power to lay-off a workman is inherent in the definition in cl. (kkk) of s. 2 is not correct, since no words in the definition clause to indicate the conferment of any  power on  the employer  to lay-off  a workman can be found. His  failure or  inability  to  give  employment,  by itself militates  against the theory of conferment of power. No section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary implication confers any power, even on the management of the Industrial Establishment  to which  the relevant  provisions are applicable,  to lay-off a workman. There is no provision in the  Act specifically providing that an employer would be entitled to lay-off his workmen 370 for the  reasons prescribed  by s.  2 (kkk).  Such a  power, therefore, must  be found  out from the terms of contract of service or  the Standing orders governing the Establishment. [374 B-G]      (ii) In  the instant  case, the number of workmen being only 3,  there being  no Standing orders certified under the Industrial Employment  (Standing  orders)  Act  (Act  20  of 1946),  1946,   and  there  being  no  contract  of  service conferring  any  such  right  of  lay-off,  the  inescapable conclusion is  that the  workmen were  laid-off without  any authority of  law or  the power  in the management under the contract of service. [374 G-H] The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi & others v. Hotel Workers Union  [1960] 1  S.C.R. 476  and V. P. Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & ors. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448, referred to.      Veiyra (MA  ) Fernandez  (CP.)  and  another  [1956]  1 Labour Law Journal. 547, reversed.      Workmen of  Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. The Management [19641 S S.C.R. 548, applied.      Sanghi Jeevaraj  Ghewar Chand & ors v. Secretary Madras Challies Grains  Kirana Merchants  Workers  Union  and  Anr. [1969] 1 S.C.C. 366, distinguished.      (3) If  the terms  of a  contract  of  service  or  the statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give the power  to lay-off to the employer, the employer would be bound to  pay compensation  for the  period of lay-off which ordinarily and  general would  be equal to the full wages of the  concerned   V  workman.   If,  however,  the  terms  of employment confer  a right of lay-off on the management then in the case of an Industrial Establishment which is governed by Chapter  VA, compensation  will be  payable in accordance with the  provisions contained  therein. But compensation or no compensation will be payable in the case of an Industrial Establishment to  which the  provisions of Chapter VA do not apply and  it will  be so  as per  the terms  of employment. [377-B-D]

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    Kanhaiya Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar Dey and others [1967] II Labour  Law Journal.  761 and Steel and General Mills Co. Ltd v  Additional District  judge Rohtak and others [1972] 1 Labour Law Journal, 2847 approved.      K. T  Rolling Mills  Private Ltd.  and another  v. M  R Meher and others A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 146. reversed.      (4) In  a reference  under s.  10(l) of  the Act. it is open to  the tribunal  or court  to award compensation which may not  be equal  to the  full amount  of basic  wages  and dearness allowance.  But no  such power exists in the Labour Court under  s. 33C(2) of the Act. Only the money due has to be quantified.  If the  lay-off  could  be  held  to  be  in accordance  with  the  terms  of  contract  of  service.  no compensation at  all could be allowed under s. 33C(2) of the Act, while  in the  reference  some  compensation  could  be allowed. [378-B-Cl      [In the  instant case  as regards  the workmen  in  the Delhi case.  the court  held 75%  of  the  basic  wages  and dearness allowance  would be  the adequate  compensation for the lay-off period.]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969 (Appeal by  Special leave from the Award dated the 1st April 1969 of  the Addl.  Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I. D.- No. 83 of 1968) and Civil Appeals Nos. 1857-1859/70. (Appeals by Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated  the 17th November 1969  of the  Addl. Labour  Court, Madras  in claim Petition Nos. 627 and 629 of 1968).      M. K.  Ramamurthi  and  Jitendra  Sharma  and  Janardan Sharma, for the appellants in both the appeals. 371      S. N.  Andley, (Rameshwar  Nath and  B. R. Mehta in CAs 1857- A 59/70) for respondents in both the appeals.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      UNTWALIA, J.-As  the main question for determination in these appeals  by special  leave is  common, they  have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.      Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969      The respondent  company in  this appeal  has  its  Head office at  Bombay.  It  manufactures  tyres  at  its  Bombay factory and  sells the  tyres and  other accessories  in the markets  throughout   the  country.   The  company   has   a Distribution office  at Nicholson  Road, Delhi.  There was a strike in  the Bombay  factory from  3rd March, 1967 to 16th May, 1967  and again  from 4th October, 1967. As a result of the strike  there was  a short  supply of  tyres etc. to the Distribution office.  In the  Delhi office,  there  were  30 employees at  the relevant  time. 17  workmen out of 30 were laid-off by the management as per their notice dated the 3rd February, 1968, which was to the following effect:           "Management is  unable to  give employment  to the      following workmen due to much reduced production in the      company’s factory  resulting from  strike in one of the      factory departments.      These workmen  are, therefore,  laid-off in  accordance      with law with effect from 5th February, 1968."      The  lay-off   of  the  17  workmen  whose  names  were mentioned in  the notice  was recalled  by the management on the 22nd April, 1968. The workmen were not given their wages or compensation  for the  period of  lay-off. An  industrial dispute was  raised and referred by the Delhi Administration

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on the  17th  April,  1968  even  when  the  layoff  was  in operation. The reference was in the following terms:      "Whether the  action of  the management to ’lay-off’ 17      workmen with  effect from  5th  Feb.  1968  is  illegal      and/or unjustified, and if so, to what relief are these      workmen entitled?      The Presiding  officer  of  the  Additional  Industrial Tribunal, Delhi  has held  that the workmen are not entitled to any  lay-off compensation.  Hence this  is an  appeal  by their Union.      We were  informed at-  the Bar that some of the workmen out of  the batch of 17 have settled their disputes with the management and their cases were not represented by the Union in this  appeal. Hence  this judgment  will not  affect  the compromise  or   the  settlement   arrived  at  between  the management and some of the workmen.      The question which for our determination is whether the management had  a right to lay-off their workmen and whether the workmen are entitled to claim wages or compensation. 372      The simple  dictionary meaning according to the Concise oxford Dictionary  of the  term ’lay-off’  is "period during which a  workman is  temporarily discharged." The term ’lay- off’ has  been well  known in the industrial arena. Disputes were often  raised in  relation  to  the  ’lay-off’  of  the workmen in  various industries.  Sometime  compensation  was awarded for  the period  of lay-off but many a time when the lay-off was  found to  be justified  workmen were  not found entitled to any wages or compensation. In Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd.  v. Gaya  Cotton & Jute Mills Labour Union(l) the standing order  of the  company provided  that  the  company could under  certain  circumstances  "stop  any  machine  or machines or  department or  departments, wholly or partially for  any   period  or  periods  without  notice  or  without compensation in lieu of notice." In such a situation for the closure of  the factory  for a  certain period, no claim for compensation was allowed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. We  are aware of the distinction betwen a lay-off and a closure.  But just  to point out the history of the law we have referred to this case.      Then came  an amendment in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -hereinafter  referred to as the Act-by Act 43 of 1953. In section 2 clause (kkk) was added to say:       "lay-off" (with its grammatical variations and cognate      expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of      an employer  on account  of shortage  of coal, power or      raw materials  or the  accumulation of  stocks  or  the      break-down of machinery or for any other reason to give      employment to  a workman  whose name  is borne  on  the      muster rolls  of his  industrial establishment  and who      has not been retrenched      Explanation-Every workman  whose name  is borne  on the      muster rolls  of the  industrial establishment  and who      presents himself  for work  at the establishment at the      time appointed  for the  purpose during  normal working      hours on  any day  and is  not given  employment by the      employer within  two hours of his so presenting himself      shall be  deemed to  have been  laid-off for  that  day      within the meaning of this clause:           Provided that  if the  workman, instead  of  being      given employment  at the  commencement of any shift for      any day  is asked  to present  himself for  the purpose      during the  second half of the shift for the day and is      given employment  then, he shall be deemed to have been      laid-off only for one-half of that day:

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         Provided further  that if he is not given any such      employment even  after so  presenting himself, he shall      not be deemed to have been laid-off for the second half      of the  shift for the day and shall be entitled to full      basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of the      day.’"      (1) [1952] II Labour Law Journal, 37. 373 By the  same Amending  Act, Chapter VA was introduced in the Act to  provide for  lay-off and  retrenchment compensation. Section 25A  excluded the  Industrial Establishment in which less than  50 workmen on an average per working day had been employed  in   the  preceding   calendar  month   from   the application of  Sections 25C  to 25E.  Section 25-C provides for the  right of  laid-off  workmen  for  compensation  and broadly speaking  compensation allowable is 50% of the total of the  basic wages  and dearness  allowance that would have been payable  13 to the workman had he not been laid-off. It would be  noticed that the sections dealing with the matters of lay-off in Chapter VA are not applicable to certain types of Industrial  Establishments. The  respondent is  one  such Establishment because  it employed  only 30  workmen at  its Delhi office  at the  relevant time. In such a situation the question beset  with difficulty  of solution  is whether the laid-off workmen  were entitled  to any compensation, if so, what’?      We shall now read section 25-J. It says:      "(1) The  provisions of  this Chapter shall have effect      not  withstanding   anything   inconsistent   therewith      contained in  any other  law including  standing orders      made under  the Industrial Employment (Standing orders)      Act, 1946:      Provided that  where under  the provisions of any other Act or  Rules, orders  or notifications issued thereunder or under any  standing orders  or under  any award, contract of service or  otherwise, a  workman is entitled to benefits in respect of  any matter which are more favourable to him than those to  which he  would be  entitled under  this Act,  the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in  respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits  in respect  of other  matters under  this Act.      For the  removal of  doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained  in this Chapter shall be deemed to affect the provisions  of any other law for the time being in force in any  State in  so  far  as  that  law  provides  for  the settlement  of  industrial  disputes,  but  the  rights  and liabilities of  employers and  workmen in  so  far  as  they relate to  layoff and  retrenchment shall  be determined  in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter."      The effect  of the provisions aforesaid is that for the period of  lay-off in  an Industrial  Establishment to which the said provisions apply, compensation will have to be paid in accordance with section 25C. But if a workman is entitled to benefits  which are  more favourable  to him  than  those provided in the Act, he shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable  benefits. The  rights  and  liabilities  of employers and  workmen in so far as it relate to lay-off and retrenchment, except as provided in section 25J, have got to be determined  in accordance  with the provisions of Chapter VA.      The ticklish  question which  does not admit of an easy answer is  as to  the source  of the  power of management to lay-off a workman. The employer has a right to terminate the services of  a workman.  Therefore, his  power  to  retrench

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presents no difficulty as retrenchment means the termination by the  employer of  the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever as mentioned in clause (oo) of section 2 of the 374 Act. But  lay-off means the failure, refusal or inability of employer on  account of  contingencies mentioned  in  clause (kkk) to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the Muster  Rolls of  his Industrial  Establishment. It  has been called  a temporary  discharge  of  the  workman  or  a temporary suspension  of his  contract of  service. Strictly speaking, it  is not  so. It  is merely  a fact of temporary unemployment of  the workman  in the  work of the Industrial Establishment. Mr.  S. N. Andley submitted with reference to the explanation  and the provisions appended to clause (kkk) that the  power to  lay-off a  workman is  inherent  in  the definition. We  do not  find any  words  in  the  definition clause to  indicate the  conferment  of  any  power  on  the employer to  lay-off a  workman. His failure or inability to give employment  by itself  militates against  the theory of conferment of power. The power to lay-off for the failure or inability to  give employment  has to  be searched somewhere else. No section in the Act confers this power.      There  are   two  small   matters  which  present  some difficulty in  the solution  of the  problem. In explanation (1) appended  to sub-section  ( 2)  of section 25B the words used are:      "he  has   been  laid-off  under  an  agreement  or  as      permitted by  standing order  made under the Industrial      Employment (Standing  orders) Act,  1946, or under this      Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial      establishment." indicating  that   a  workman  can  be  laid-off  under  the Industrial Disputes Act also. But it is strange to find that no section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary implication confers any power, even on the management of the Industrial Establishment  to which  the relevant  provisions are applicable, to lay-off a workman. Clause (ii) of section 25E says:      "No compensation  shall be  paid to  a workman  who has      been laid-off-           If he  does not  present himself  for work  at the      establishment  at  the  appointed  time  during  normal      working hours at least once a day." This indicates  that there  is neither a temporary discharge of the  work man  nor a temporary suspension of his contract of service.  Under the general law of Master and Servants an employer may  discharge an  employee either  temporarily  or permanently but that cannot be without adequate notice. Mere refusal or  inability to give employment to the workman when he reports  for duty  on one  or more  grounds mentioned  in clause (kkk)  of section  2 is  not a temporary discharge of the work  man. Such  a power,  therefore, must  be found out from the terms of contract of service or the Standing orders governing the  establishment. In the instant case the number of workmen  being only  30, there  were no  Standing  orders certified under  the Industrial employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.  Nor was  there any  term of  contract of service conferring any  such right  of lay-off.  In such a situation the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the workmen were laid-off without  any authority  of law  or the power in the management under  the contract  of  service.  In  Industrial Establishments where  there is  a power in the management to lay-off a workman and to which the 375 provisions of  Chapter VA  apply, the question of payment of

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compensation will  be governed  and determined  by the  said provisions. Otherwise  Chapter VA  is not a complete Code as was argued on behalf of the respondent company in the matter of payment  of lay-off  compensation. This  case, therefore, goes out of Chapter VA. Ordinarily and generally the workmen would be  entitled to  their full  wages but  in a reference made under  section 10(l)  of the  Act, it  is open  to  the Tribunal or  the Court  to award  a lesser  sum finding  the justifiability of the lay-off. ‘-      In The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & others v. Hotel  Workers’ Union(l)  in a  case of  suspension of  a workman  it  was  said  by  Wanchoo,  J.  as  he  then  was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court at page 482:      "Ordinarily,  therefore,  the  absence  of  such  power      either as  an express  term in  the contract  or in the      rules framed  under some  statute would  mean that  the      master would  have no  power to  suspend a  workman and      even if  he does  so in  the sense  that he forbids the      employee to  work. he will have to pay wages during the      so-called period  of suspension.  Where, however. there      is  power   to  suspend   either  in  the  contract  of      employment or  in  the  statute  or  the  rules  framed      thereunder,  the   suspension   has   the   effect   of      temporarily  suspending  the  relation  of  master  and      servant with  the consequence that ‘ the servant is not      bound to  render service and the master is not bound to      pay." The same  principle was  reiterated in  V. P.  Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(2)      We have referred to the suspension cases because in our opinion the  principles governing  the case  of lay-off  are very akin to those applicable to a suspension case.      In Veiyra (M. A.) v. Fernandez (C. P.) and another(3) a Bench of the Bombay High Court opined that under the general law the employer was free to dispense with the services of a workman but  under the  Industrial Disputes Act he was under an obligation  to lay  him off; that being so, the action of lay-off by  the employer  could not . be questioned as being ultra vires.  We do not think that the view expressed by the Bomby High Court is correct.      There is an important decision of this Court in Workmen of Dewan  Tea Estate  and ors. v. The Management(4) on which reliance was placed heavily by Mr. M. K. Ramamurti appearing for the appellant and also by Mr. Andley for the respondent. One of  the question  for consideration  was whether section 25C of  the Act  recognises the  common  law  right  of  the management to declare a lay-off for reasons other than those specified in  the relevant  clause of  the  Standing  order. While considering  this question,  Gajendragadkar, J.  as he then was. said at page 554:      "The question which we are concerned with at this stage      is whether  it can  be said  that  s.25C  recognises  a      common law      (1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476.       (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448.      (3) [1956] I Labour Law Journal, 547.      (4) []964] S                                                  S.C.R. 548. 376      right  of  the  industrial  employer  to  lay  off  his      workmen.  This   question  must,  in  our  opinion,  be      answered in  the negative.  When the  laying off of the      workmen is  referred to in s. 25C, it is the laying off      as defined  by s. 2 (kkk) and so, workmen who can claim      the benefit  of s. 25C must be workmen who are laid off      and laid  off for  reasons contemplated  by s. 2 (kkk);      that is all that s. 25C means.

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Then follows  a sentence  which was  pressed into service by the respondent. It says:      "If any  case is not covered by the Standing orders, it      will necessarily  be governed  by the provisions of the      Act, and  layoff would be permissible only where one or      the other  of the  factors mentioned  by s.  2 (kkk) is      present, and  for such  lay off  compensation would  be      awarded under s. 25C." In our opinion, in the context, the sentence aforesaid means that if the power of lay-off is there in the Standing orders but the  grounds of lay-off are not covered by them, rather, are governed  by the  provisions of  the Act,  then  lay-off would be permissible only on one or the other of the factors mentioned in  clause (kkk).  Subsequent discussions at pages 558 and  559 lend  ample support to the appellant’s argument that there is no provision in the Act specifically providing that an  employer would  be entitled  to lay-off his workmen for the reasons prescribed by section 2 (kkk).      Mr. Andley  placed strong reliance upon the decision of this  Court  in  Sanjhi  Jeevraj  Ghewar  Chand  &  Ors.  v. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains Kirana Merchants Workers’ Union & Anr.(l) The statute under consideration in this case was the  Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and it was held that the Act was  intended to  be a  comprehensive and exhaustive law dealing with  the entire  subject of bonus of the persons to whom it  should apply.  The Bonus  Act was  not to  apply to certain Establishments.  Argument before  the Court was that bonus was  payable de  hors the  Act in  such  establishment also. This  argument was  repe11ed and in that connection it was observed at page 381:      "It will be noticed that though the Industrial Disputes      Act confers  substantive rights  on workmen with regard      to lay  off, retrenchment  compensation, etc.,  it does      not create  or confer  any such  statutory right  as to      payment to  bonus. Bonus  was so  far the  creature  of      industrial adjudication  and was  made payable  by  the      employers under  the machinery  provided under that Act      and   other   corresponding   Acts   enacted   for   ,.      investigation  and   settlement  of   disputes   raised      thereunder.  There   was,  therefore,  no  question  of      Parliament having  to delete  or modify  item S  in the      Third Schedule  to Industrial  Disputes Act or any such      provision in  any corresponding  Act or  its having  to      exclude  any   right  to   bonus  thereunder   by   any      categorical exclusion in the present case." And finally it was held at page 385:      "Considering  the   history  of  the  legislation,  the      background and  the circumstances  in which the Act was      enacted, the      (1) [1969] I S.C.C. 366. 377      object of the Act and its scheme, it is not possible to      accept A  the construction  suggested on  behalf of the      respondents that  the Act  is  not  an  exhaustive  Act      dealing  comprehensively  with  the  subject-matter  of      bonus in  all its aspects or that Parliament still left      it open  to those  to whom  the Act  does not  apply by      reason of  its provisions  either as  to  exclusion  or      exemption to  raise a  dispute  with  regard  to  bonus      through Industrial  adjudication under  the  Industrial      Disputes Act or other corresponding law." In a  case of compensation for lay-off the position is quite distinct and  different. If  the term of contract of service or the  statutory terms  engrafted in the Standing orders do not give  the power of lay off to the employer, the employer

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will be  bound to pay compensation for the period of lay-off which ordinarily  and generally  would be  equal to the full wages of  the concerned workmen. If, however, the terms of r employment confer  a right  of lay-off  on  the  management, then, in  the case  of an  industrial establishment which is governed by  Chapter VA,  compensation will  be  payable  in accordance  with   the  provisions  contained  therein.  But compensation or  no compensation will be payable in the case of an  industrial establishment  to which  the provisions of Chapter VA  do not apply, and it will be so as per the terms of the employment.      In Kanhaiya  Lal Gupta v. Ajeet Kumar Dey and others(l) a learned  single Judge  of the Allahabad High Court seem to have rightly  held that  in the  absence of  any term in the contract of  service or  in the  statute or in the statutory rules or standing orders an employer has no right to lay-off a workman  without paying  him wages. A learned single Judge of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court took an identical view in  the  case  of  Steel  and  General  Mills  Co.  Ltd.  v. Additional  District  Judge,  Rohtak  and  others.  (2)  The majority view  of the  Bombay High  Court in  K. T.  Rolling Mills Private  Ltd. and  another v. M. R. Meher and other(8) that it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act to award  lay-off compensation  to workmen  employed  in  an ’Industrial Establishment’  to which S. 25-C does not apply, is not  correct. The  source of the power of the employer to lay-off workmen  does not  seem to  have been  canvassed  or discussed by the Bombay High Court in the said judgment.      In the  case of  the Delhi office of the respondent the Tribunal has  held that  the lay-off  was justified.  It was open  to   the  Tribunal   to  award   a  lesser  amount  of compensation than  the full  wages. Instead  of sending back the case to the Tribunal, we direct that 75% the basic wages and  dearness   allowance  would  be  paid  to  the  workmen concerned for  the period  of lay-off. As we have said above this will  not cover  the case  of those  workmen  who  have settled or compromised their disputes with the management. Civil Appeals 1857-1859 (NL) of 1970      In these  appeals the  facts are  identical to those in the other appeal. There were only 33 employees in the Madras office of the respondent company. Certain workmen were laid- off for identical reasons from the      (1) [1967] II Labour Law Journal, 761.     (2) [1972] 1                                     Labour Law Journal, 284.                 (3) A.I.R. 1963 Bombay, 146. 378 5th February,  1968. The  lay-off was  lifted  on  the  29th April, 1968.  The concerned  workmen filed  petitions  under section 33C  (2) of  the Act  for computation of their wages for the  period of  lay-off. Holding  that the  lay-off  was justified and  valid the Presiding officer of the Additional Labour Court,  Madras has  dismissed their  applications for salary and allowances for the period of lay-off. Hence these appeals.      In a  reference under  section 10  (1) of the Act it is open to  the Tribunal  or the  Court to  award  compensation which may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages and dearness allowance.  But no  such power exists in the Labour Court under  section 33C  (2) of the Act. only the money due has got to be quantified. If the lay-off could be held to be in accordance  with the terms of the contract of service, no compensation at  all could  be allowed under section 33C (2) of the  Act, while, in the reference some compensation could be allowed.  Similarly on  the view expressed above that the respondent company  had no  power to  lay-off  any  workmen,

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there is  no escape  from the  position that  the entire sum payable to  the laid-off workmen except the workmen who have settled  or   compromised,  has   got  to  be  computed  and quantified under section 33C(2) of the Act for the period of lay-off.      For the  reasons  stated  above  all  the  appeals  are allowed. In Civil Appeal No. 2307/1969 in place of the order of the  Tribunal, an  order is  made on  the lines indicated above. And  in Civil Appeals 1857 to 1859/1970 the orders of the Labour  Court  are  set  aside  and  the  cases  of  the appellants are  remitted back  to that Court for computation and quantification  of the  sums payable  to  the  concerned workmen for the period of lay-off. There will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals. S.R                                        Appeals allowed:-                                         Orders in CA 2307/69             modified : CAs 1857-1859/70 remitted hock to the                                                    Tribunal. 379