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PETITIONER: WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHITEA ESTATE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1958

BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  353            1958 SCR 1156

ACT:      Industrial Dispute-Definition, lnterpretation  of-Test- ’Any person’, Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (Act XIV of 1947),S. 2(k).

HEADNOTE:     The  question for decision in this appeal was whether  a dispute raised by the workmen’ relating to a person who  was not  a workman could be an industrial dispute as defined  by S.  2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as  it  stood before the amendments Of 1956.  The appellants, who were the workmen  of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, espoused the cause of  one Dr. K. P. Banerjee, Assistant Medical Officer, who had  been dismissed  unheard with a month’s salary in lieu  of  notice but  who had accepted such payment and left the  garden  and the dispute raised was ultimately referred by the Government for adjudication under s. 10 of the Act.  Both the  Tribunal and the Appellate Industrial Tribunal took the view that  as Dr.  Banerjee was not an workman within the meaning  of  the Act,  the, dispute was not an industrial dispute as  defined by S. 2(k):     Held,  (per Das, C. J., and S. K. Das, J.,  Sarkar,  J., dissenting),  that the expression ’any person’ occurring  in S.  2(k)  of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947,  cannot  be given  its ordinary meaning and must be read and  understood in the context of the Act and the object the Legislature had in  view.   Nor  can  it be equated  either  with  the  word ’workman’ or ’employee’.    The two tests of an industrial dispute as defined by  the section must, therefore, be,-(1) the dispute must be a  real dispute,  capable  of being settled by relief given  by  one party  to the other, and (2) the person in respect  of  whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment,  non- employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the  case may be), the parties to the dispute have a  direct or  substantial interest, and this must depend on the  facts and circumstances of each particular case.     Applying  these tests, the dispute in the  present  case which  was in respect of a person who was not a workman  and belonged  to a different category altogether, could  not  be said  to be a dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k)  of  the

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Act and the appeal must fail.      Narendra  Kumar  Sen v. All India  Industrial  Disputes (Labour  Appellate)  Tribunal,  (1953) 55  Bom.   L.R.  125, approved.      Western India Automobile Association v. The  Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, [1949] F.C.R 321, distinguished                             1157    Case-law discussed.    Per  Sarkar,  J.-There is no reason why  the  words  ’any person’  in  s. 2(k) of the Act should not  be  given  their natural  meaning so as to include an employee who is  not  a workman  within  the meaning of the  Act.   Consequently,  a dispute  concerning a person who is not a workman may be  an industrial dispute within that section.    The  primary  object  which the Act has in  view  is  the preservation of the industrial peace.    The Act does not make the interest of the workmen in  the dispute  a  condition  of the  existence  of  an  industrial dispute.   Such interest is incapable of definition  and  to make  it a condition of an industrial dispute  would  defeat the object of the Act.    Western  India Automobile Association v.  The  Industrial Tribunal of Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321; Narendra Kumar Sen v. The   All  India  Industrial  Disputes  (Labour   Appellate) Tribunal,  (1953)  55 Bom.  L.R. I25 and  United  Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1952) 1 L.L.J. 782, referred to.    Even  assuming  that the workmen must  be  interested  in order  that there can be an industrial dispute, the  present case satisfies that test and falls within the purview of  s. 2(k) of the Act.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  297  of 1956.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated  August 30, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal  of India, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal. 220 of 1954.     C.    B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants.     Purshottam  Tricumdas  for  N.  C.  Chatterjee,  P.   K. Goswami, S. N. Mukheree and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent.     1958.  February 4. The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K. Das J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.     S.    K.  DAS J.-This appeal by special leave  raises  a question  of some nicety and of considerable  importance  in the  matter  of industrial relations in this  country.   The question  is  the true scope and effect  of  the  definition clause  in  s. 2 (k) of the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947 (hereinafter  referred  to as the Act).   The  question  has arisen in the following circumstances. 1158    The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dimakuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari  Sangha, Dibrugarh.    The  respondent  is  the  management  of   the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam.  One Dr. K. P.  Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer of  the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950.   He was  appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report  and on probation for three months.  It was stated in his  letter of appointment: " While you are on probation or trial,  your suitability for permanent employment will be considered.  If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable

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for  employment,  you -",ill receive seven days’  notice  in writing terminating your appointment.  If you are guilty  of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal.  At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered  suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden’s service." In  February 1951  Dr.  Banerjee  was given an increment  of  Rs.  5  per mensem, but on April 21, Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one  Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate, in which  it  was stated  :  " It has been found necessary to  terminate  your services  with effect from the 22nd instant.  You  will  of’ course receive one month’s salary in lieu of notice." As  no reasons  were  given  in  the  notice  of  termination,  Dr. Banerjee  wrote to the manager to find out why his  services were  being  terminated.  To this Dr.  Banerjee  received  a reply to this effect The reasons for ’your discharge are  on the  medical side, which are outside my  jurisdiction,  best known  to  Dr.  Cox  but a main reason  is  because  of  the deceitful   manner  in  which  you  added  figures  to   the requirements  of the last medical indent after it  had  been signed by Dr, Cox, evidence of which is in my hands."     The  cause  of  Dr. Banerjee was then  espoused  by  the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary  of  that  Sangha  wrote to  the  manager  of  the Dimakuchi  tea estate, enquiring about the reasons  for  Dr. Banerjee’s  discharge.  The manager wrote back to  say  that Dr.- K. P. Banerjee was discharged on the ground                             1159 of incompetence in his medical duties and the chief  medical officer   (Dr.   Cox)  had  found  that  Dr.  Banerjee   was incompetent  and  did  not have sufficient  "  knowledge  of simple  everyday  microscopical and  laboratory  work  which befalls  the lot of every assistant medical officer  in  tea garden  practice." It was further stated that  Dr.  Banerjee gave a faulty, inexpert and clumsy quinine injection to  one Mr.  Peacock,  and assistant in the  Dimakuchi  tea  estate, which  produced an extremely acute and severe  illness  very nearly  causing  a  paralysis of  the  patient’s  leg.   The reasons  given  by the manager for the  termination  of  the services  of  Dr.  K.  P.  Banerjee  did  not  satisfy   the appellants  herein  and  certain  conciliation  proceedings, details  whereof  are not necessary for  our  purpose,  were -unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the  service of Dr. Banerjee.  The matter was then  referred to   a  Board  known  as  the  tripartite  Appellate   Board consisting  of  the  Labour  Commissioner,  Assam,  and  two representatives  of  the  Assam branch  of  the  Indian  Tea Association   and   the   Assam   Chah   Karmachari   Sangha respectively.   This  Board recommended  that  Dr.  Banerjee should  be  reinstated  with effect from  the  date  of  his discharge.   After  the  recommendation of  the  Board,  the respondent herein appears to have offered a sum equal to  28 month’s salary and allowances in lieu of re-instatement;  to this,  however,  the  appellants  did  not  agree.   In  the meantime,  Dr. K. P. Banerjee received a sum of Rs.  306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and left the tea garden in question.   Then, on  December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam  published  a notification  in  which  it  was  stated  that  whereas   an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellants and the respondent  herein  and whereas it was  expedient  that  the dispute  should be referred for adjudication to  a  Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased  to  refer  the  dispute  to  Shri  U.  K.   Gohain, Additional  District  and Sessions Judge, under cl.  (c)  of sub-s. (1) of s. 10 of the Act.  The dispute which was  thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms:

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1160     " (i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. O.?       (ii)     If  not, is he entitled to  reinstatement  or any other relief in lieu thereof ?"    Both  parties filed written statements before  Mr.  ohain and the respondent took the plea that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not  a "workman" within the meaning of the  Act;  therefore, there  was no industrial dispute in the sense in which  that expression  was defined in the Act and the Tribunal  had  no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits.  Mr.  Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr.  Banerjee was a " workman " within the meaning of the Act and came  to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:    "Dr.   Banerjee being not a ’ workman’, his case  is  not one  of  an  " industrial dispute  "  under  the  Industrial Disputes   Act  and  his  case  is  therefore   beyond   the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him."    There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of  India, Calcutta.  That Tribunal affirmed the finding  of Mr. Gohain to the effect that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act.  The Appellate Tribunal  then said:     " A dispute between the employers and employees to be an industrial  dispute within the meaning of section 2  (k)  of the  Industrial Disputes Act, must be between the  employers and  the  workmen.  There cannot be any  industrial  dispute between  the  employers  and  the  employees  who  are   not workmen."     The  appeal  was  accordingly dismissed  by  the  Labour Appellate  Tribunal.  The appellants herein then moved  this Court  for  special leave and by an order  dated  March  14, 1956,  special leave was granted, but was " limited  to  the question  whether a dispute in relation to a person  who  is not  a workman falls within the scope of the  definition  of industrial  dispute contained in s. 2 (k) of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."     It is clear from what has been stated above that the                             1161 question  whether Dr. K. P. Banerjee is or is not a  workman within  the  meaning  of the Act is no longer  open  to  the parties  and we must proceed on the footing that Dr.  K.  P. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act and then  decide the question if the dispute in relation to  the termination  of his service still fell within the  scope  of the  definition of the expression " industrial dispute "  in the Act.    We  proceed  now  to  read  the  definition  clause   the interpretation  of  which is the only  question  before  us. That definition clause is in these terms:    "  S. 2 (k) : " Industrial dispute" means any dispute  or difference  between  employers  and  employers,  or  between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is  connected with the employment or non-employment  or  the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;"     It must be stated here that the expression " workman  is also  defined  in  the  Act, and  the  definition  which  is relevant  for  our  purpose  is  the  one  previous  to  the amendments  of  1956;  therefore,  in  reading  the  various sections of the Act, we shall read them as they stood  prior to  the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments  only when  they  have a bearing on the question before  us.   The definition  of  ’workman’ as it stood at the  relevant  time

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stated :    "  S.  2  (s):  " Workman "  means  any  person  employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any  skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward  and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in  relation to an industrial dispute, a workman  discharged during  that  dispute,  but  does  not  include  any  person employed  in  the  naval, military or  air  service  of  the Government.  "    Now,  the question is whether a dispute in relation to  a person  who is not a workman within the meaning of  the  Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in  s. 2 (k).  If we analyse the definition clause it falls  easily and  naturally  into  three parts: first, there  must  be  a dispute  or  difference; second, the dispute  or  difference must   be  between  employers  and  employers,  or   between employers and workmen or 1162 between   workmen  and  workmen;  third,  the   dispute   or difference  must  be connected with the employment  or  non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of  labour, of any person.  The first part obviously  refers to  the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the  second part  to  the parties to the dispute; and the third  to  the subject  matter  of that dispute.  That subject  matter  may relate  to  any  of  two  matters-(i)  employment  or   non- employment,  and (ii) terms of employment or  conditions  of labour,  of any person.  On behalf of the appellants  it  is contended  that the conditions referred to in the first  and second parts of the definition clause are clearly  fulfilled in  the  present  case,  because  there  is  a  dispute   or difference  over  the termination of service of  Dr.  K.  P. Banerjee  and  the  dispute or  difference  is  between  the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate on  one side, and its workmen on the other, even taking  the expression " workmen " in the restricted sense in which that expression  is  defined  in the Act.   The  real  difficulty arises  when  we come to the third part  of  the  definition clause.   Learned counsel for the appellants  has  submitted that the expression " of any person " occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an expression of very  wide import  and there are no reasons why the words "any  person" should  be  equated with " any workman ", as  the  Tribunals below  have  done.   The argument is that  inasmuch  as  the dispute  or difference between the employer and the  workmen is connected with the non-employment of a person called  Dr. K.  P.  Banerjee  (even though he was not  a  workman),  the dispute  is an industrial dispute within the meaning of  the definition  clause.   At first sight, it  does  appear  that there  is  considerable force in the  argument  advanced  on behalf  of the appellants.  It is rightly pointed  out  that the  definition  clause  does  not  contain  any  words   of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression  " any person " occurring in the third part, and if any limita- tions  as to its scope are to be imposed, they must be  such as  can  be reasonably inferred from the  definition  clause itself or other provisions of the Act.                             1163     A little careful consideration will show, however,  that the expression " any person " occuring in the third part  of the  definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody  in this  wide  world.   First of all,  the  subject  matter  of dispute  must relate to (i) employment or non-employment  or (ii)  terms  of employment or conditions of  labour  of  any person;  these necessarily import a limitation in the  sense

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that  a  person  in respect of  whom  the  employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the  subject  matter  of a  dispute  between  employers  and workmen.   Secondly, the definition clause must be  read  in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently  with the objects and other provision’s of  the Act.  It is well settled that " the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the  sense in which they best harmonise with the subject  of the  enactment and the object which the Legislature  has  in view.   Their  meaning is found not so much  in  a  strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor  even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion  on which  they  are  used,  and the  object  to  be  attained." (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).    It  is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as  a  whole and  examine its salient provisions.  The long  title  shows that  the object of the Act is " to make provision  for  the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain  other  purposes.  " The preamble  states  the  same object and s. 2 of the Act which contains definitions states that  unless there is anything repugnant in the  subject  or context,  certain  expressions will have  certain  meanings. Chapter  11 refers to the authorities set up under the  Act, such as, Works Committees, Conciliation officers, Boards  of Conciliation,  Courts of Enquiry, and Industrial  Tribunals. The primary duty of a Works Committee is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the  employer and his workmen and, to that end,  to  comment upon matters of their common 148 1164 interest  or concern and endeavour to compose  any  material difference   of   opinion  in  respect  of   such   matters. Conciliation Officers are charged with the duty of mediating in  and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes.   A Board  of Conciliation may also be constituted for the  same purpose,   namely,  for  promoting  the  settlement  of   an industrial dispute.  A Court of Enquiry may be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.  Section 7 of the  Act empowers the appropiate Government to constitute one or more Tribunals  for  the adjudication of industrial  disputes  in accordance  with  the provisions of the  Act.   Chapter  III contains provisions relating to the reference of  industrial disputes  to  Boards of Conciliation, Courts of  Enquiry  or Industrial Tribunals, and the reference in the present  case was made under s. 10 of that Chapter.  Under s. 10(c) of the Act  where an appropriate Government is of opinion that  any industrial disputes exist or are apprehended, it may, at any time,  by order in writing, refer the dispute or any  matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a  Tribunal for adjudication.  Chapter IV of the  Act  deals with procedure, powers and duties of the authorities set  up under  the  Act.   Where  an  industrial  dispute  has  been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, s. 15 requires that the  Tribunal shall hold its proceedings  expeditiously  and shall  as  soon  as practicable on  the  conclusion  thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government.  Section  17 lays  down  inter alia that the award of  a  Tribunal  shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks  fit.   Section 17-A lays down that the  award  of  a Tribunal  shall become enforceable on the expiry  of  thirty days  from the date of its publication under s. 17; it  also

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contains   certain  other  provisions  which   empower   the appropriate  Government  to  modify  or  reject  the  award. Section 18 is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates  to awards it states that an award which has  become enforceable ,shall be binding on-                             1165    (a)    all parties to the industrial dispute;    (b)    all  other  parties  summoned  to  appear  in  the proceedings  as parties to the dispute, unless the  Tribunal records  the  opinion  that they were  so  summoned  without proper cause;    (c)    where  a  party referred to under  clause  (a)  or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or  assigns in  respect  of  the  establishment  to  which  the  dispute relates; and    (d)    where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)  is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the  establishment or part of establishment as the case  may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the  dispute and  all  persons who subsequently become employed  in  that establishment or part. Section 19 lays down the period of operation of  settlements and  awards  and  states inter alia  that  an  award  shall, subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  section,  remain   in operation  for a period of one year.  Chapter V of  the  Act deals  with strikes and lock-outs, Chapter V-A with  lay-off and retrenchment, Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter  VII with  miscellaneous matters.  It is important to  note  that though in the definition of "lock-out", s. 2 (1) of the Act, and  "strike",  s.  2 (q) of the  Act,  the  expression  any person’ has been used, in ss. 22 (2) and 23 of the Act which deal  with "lock-out" and "strike", only the word  ’workmen’ has been used.  Section 33 provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or any proceedings before  a tribunal  of any industrial dispute, no employer  shall  (a) alter  to  the  prejudice  of  the  workmen  concerned,  the conditions of their service etc. or (b) discharge or  punish by  dismissal  or  otherwise any workman  concerned  in  the dispute.   Section 33 A, however, uses the word  ’employee’, but  read  with s. 33, the word employee must mean  there  a workman.   Section  36 which deals  with  representation  of parties  has  some bearing on the question  before  us.   It layns down that a workman who is a party to a dispute  shall be  entitled to be represented in any proceeding  under  the Act by- 1166    (a)    an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member;    (b)    an  officer  of a federation of  trade  unions  to which  the  trade  union  referred  to  in  clause  (a)   is affiliated; and    (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade  union, by  an officer of any trade union connected with, or by  any other  workman employed in the industry in which the  worker is  employed  and  authorised  in  such  manner  as  may  be prescribed. An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Act by-    (a)    an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member;    (b)    an  officer  of a federation  of  associations  of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and    (c)    where  the  employer  is  not  a  member  of   any association  of employers, by an officer of any  association

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of  employers  connected  with, or  by  any  other  employer engaged  in, the industry in which the employer  is  engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. Sub-section  (3) of s. 36 states that no party to a  dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal  practitioner in  any  conciliation proceedings under the Act  or  in  any proceedings before a court.  Sub-section (4) states that  in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of  the other  parties to the proceeding and with the leave  of  the Tribunal.  The point to note is that there is no  particular provision  for  the representation of a party other  than  a workman or an employer, presumably because under the  second part  of the definition clause the parties to an  industrial dispute  can only be employers and employers, employers  and workmen, or workmen and workmen.     Thus,  an examination of the salient provisions  of  the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are-                             1167    (1)    the   promotion  of  measures  for  securing   and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen;    (2)    an  investigation  and  settlement  of  industrial disputes,  between  employers and employers,  employers  and workmen,   or   workmen  and  workmen,  with  a   right   of representation by a registered trade union or federation  of trade unions or association of employers or a federation  of associations of employers;    (3)    prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs;    (4)    relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off and retrenchment; and    (5) collective bargaining. The  Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations  of employers and workmen-past, present and future.  It draws  a distinction between ’workmen’ as such and the managerial  or supervisory staff, and confers benefit on the former only.     It is in the context of all these provisions of the  Act that the definition clause in s. 2(k) has to be interpreted. It  seems fairly obvious to us that if the  expression  "any person"  is given its ordinary meaning, then the  definition clause will be so wide as to become inconsistent not  merely with  the objects and other provisions of the Act, but  also with  the other parts of that very clause.  Let us  see  how the definition clause works if the expression " any person " occurring  therein  is  given  its  ordinary  meaning.   The workmen  may then raise a dispute about a person  with  whom they have no possible community of interest; they may -raise a  dispute  about  the employment of  a  person  in  another industry  or  a different establishments  dispute  in  which their own employer is not in a position to give any  relief, in  the matter of employment or non-employment or the  terms of employment or conditions of labour of such a person.   In order  to make our meaning clear we may take a more  obvious example.   Let us assume that for some reason or  other  the workmen of a particular industry raise a dispute with  their employer about the employment or terms of employment of  the District Magistrate or District 1168 Judge of the district in which the industry is situate.   It seems  clear  to us that though the District  Magistrate  or District Judge undoubtedly comes within the expression " any person " occurring in the definition clause, a dispute about his employment or terms of  employment is not an  industrial dispute;  firstly,  because  such a dispute  does  not  come within the scope of the Act, having regard to the definition

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of the words " employer" industry ", and " workman and  also to  other  provisions  of the Act;  secondly,  there  is  no possible   community  of  interest  between   the   District Magistrate  or  District  Judge  on the  one  hand  and  the disputants, employer and workmen, on the other.  The  absurd results  that will follow such an interpretation  have  been forcefully  expressed  by Chagla C. J., in his  decision  in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes  (Labour Appellate) Tribunal (1):     "  If  "any person " were to be read  as  an  expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must  not  put  even any  territorial  restriction  on  that expression.  In other words, it would be open to the workmen not  only  to raise a dispute with regard to  the  terms  of employment  of  persons  employed in the  same  industry  as themselves,  not only to raise a dispute with regard to  the terms of employment in corresponding or similar  industries, not only a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of people employed in our country, but the terms of employment of any    workman or any labourer anywhere in the world The proposition has only to be stated in order to make     one realise how entirely untenable it is.    Take,  for example, another case where the workmen  raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager or  Chief  Medical  Officer  by  the  employer  but  without claiming any benefit for themselves, and let us assume  that a  dispute or difference arises between the workmen  on  one side  and the employer on the other over such an  objection. If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and  is referred  to  an industrial tribunal for  adjudication,  the parties to the (1)  (1953) 55 Bom.  L.R. 125,129, 130.                             1169 dispute will be the employer on one side and his workmen  on the other.  The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer  cannot obviously  be a party to the dispute, because he is  riot  a ’workman’within  the  meaning  of the Act and  there  is  no dispute  between  him  and his  employer.   That  being  the position, the award, if any, 7 given by the Tribunal will be binding,  under  cl.  (a) of s. 18, on the  parties  to  the dispute and not on the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer. It is extremely doubtful if in the circumstances stated  the Tribunal can summon the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer as  a  party  to the dispute, because there  is  no  dispute between the Manager or Chief Medical Officer on one side and his  employer oil the other.  Furthermore, s. 36 of the  Act does not provide for representation of a person who is not a party  to the dispute.  If, therefore, an award is  made  by the  Tribunal  in  the case which we have taken  by  way  of illustration,  that award, though binding on  the  employer, will not be binding on the Manager or Chief Medical Officer. It  should  be obvious that the Act could not  have  contem- plated  an eventuality of this kind, which does not  promote any of the objects of the Act, but rather goes against them.     When  these  difficulties were pointed  out  to  learned counsel   for   the  appellants,  he  conceded   that   some limitations must be put on the width of the expression " any person " occurring in the definition clause.  He  formulated four such limitations:     (1)   The dispute must be a real and substantial one  in respect of which one of the parties to the dispute can  give relief  to  the other; e. g., when the  dispute  is  between workmen and employer, the employer must be in a position  to give  relief  to the workmen.  This,  according  to  learned counsel  for  the appellants, will exclude  those  cases  in

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which the workmen ask for something which their employer  is not  in  a  position to give.  It would  also  exclude  mere ideological differences or controversies.     (2)   The  industrial dispute if raised by workmen  must relate   to   the  particular  establishment  or   part   of establishment in which the workmen are employed so 1170 that the definition clause may be consistent with s. 18 of the Act.     (3)   The  dispute must relate to the  employment,  non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, but such person must be an employee discharged  or  in service or a  candidate  for  employment. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the  person about  whom  the dispute has arisen need not  be  a  workman within  the  meaning of the Act, but he must answer  to  the description of an employee, discharged or in service, or a candidate for employment.     (4)   The workmen raising the dispute must have a  nexus with  the  dispute,  either  because  they  are   personally interested  or  because  they have taken  up  the  cause  of another  person in the general interest of  labour  welfare. The  further argument of learned counsel for the  appellants is that even imposing the aforesaid four limitations on  the width  of  the expression " any person "  occurring  in  the definition  clause,  the dispute in the present case  is  an industrial  dispute  within the meaning of s. 2 (k)  of  the Act,  because  (1)  the employer could give  relief  in  the matter of the termination of service of Dr. K. P.  Banerjee, (2)  Dr. K. P. Banerjee belonged to the same  establishment, namely,  the same tea garden, (3) the dispute related  to  a discharged  employee  (though  not a workman)  and  (4)  the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr. Banerjee (it is stated) belonged to  their  trade  union and the  dismissal  of  an  employee without  the formulation of a charge and without giving  him an  opportunity to meet any charge was a matter  of  general interest to all workmen in the same establishment.     We  now  propose  to examine the  question  whether  the limitations formulated by learned counsel for the appellants are  the only true limitations to be imposed with regard  to the  definition clause.  In doing so we shall also  consider what  is the true scope and effect of the definition  clause and what are the correct tests to be applied with regard  to it.   We think that there is no real difficulty with  regard to the first two limitations.                             1171 They  are,  we  think, implicit  in  the  definition  clause itself.  It is obvious that a dispute between employers  and employers,  employers  and workmen, or between  workmen  and workmen  must  be a real dispute capable  of  settlement  or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the  dispute to give’ necessary relief to the other.  It is also  obvious that the parties to the dispute must be directly or substan- tially  interested  therein,  so that  if  workmen  raise  a dispute,  it  must relate to the establishment  or  part  of establishment  in which they are employed.  With  regard  to limitation  (3),  while we agree that the expression  I  any person ’ cannot be completely equated with ’any workman’  as defined in the Act, we think that the limitation  formulated by  learned  counsel for the appellants is much  too  widely stated  and is not quite correct.  We recognise that if  the expression  ’  any person’ means ’any workman ’  within  the meaning  of the Act, then it is difficult to understand  why the  Legislature  instead  of  using  the  expression   ’any

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workman’ used the much wider expression ’any person’ in  the third part of the definition clause.  The very  circumstance that  in  the  second  part of  the  definition  clause  the expression  used  is  " between  employers  and  workmen  or between  workmen and workmen " while in the third  part  the expression   used  is  "any  person"  indicates   that   the expression "any person cannot be completely equated with’any workman’.   The reason for the use of the expression  "  any person"  in  the definition clause is, however, not  far  to seek.  The word ’workman’ as defined in the Act (before  the amendments  of  1956)  included, for  the  purposes  of  any proceedings  under  the  Act in relation  to  an  industrial dispute,  a.  workman discharged during the  dispute..  This definition  corresponded  to  s.  2.(j)  of  the  old  Trade Disputes  Act,  1929 except that the  words  ,,including  an apprentice  "  were  inserted and  the  words  "  industrial dispute " were substituted for the words " trade dispute  ". It  is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act,  1929, the word ’workman’ meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do I49 1172 any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward.   It  is clear enough that prior to  1956  when  the definition  of ’ workman’ in the Act was further widened  to include  a  person dismissed, discharged  or  retrenched  in connection with, or as a consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal,  discharge or retrenchment led to the dispute,  a workman  who had been discharged earlier and not during  the dispute was not a workman within the meaning of the Act.  If the  expression  "  any person " in the third  part  of  the definition  clause  were to be strictly  equated  with  ’any workman’,  then there could be no industrial dispute,  prior to  1956, with regard to a workman who had  been  discharged earlier  than the dispute, even though the discharge  itself had led to the dispute.  That seems to be the reason why the Legislature  used the expression ’any person’ in  the  third part  of  the definition clause so as to put it  beyond  any doubt  that the non-employment of such a  dismissed  workman was  also within the ambit of an industrial dispute.   There was  a wide gap between a ’workman’ and an ’employee’  under the definition of the word ’workman’ in s. 2 (s) as it stood prior to 1956; all existing workmen were no doubt employees; but  all employees were not workmen.  The supervisory  staff did  not  come  within the definition.   The  gap  has  been reduced  to some extent by the amendments of 1956;  part  of the  supervisory  staff (who draw wages not  exceeding  five hundred  rupees  per mensem) and those  who  were  otherwise workmen  but were discharged or dismissed earlier have  also come  within  the  definition.   If  and  when  the  gap  is completely  bridged,  I  workmen  will  be  synonymous  with ’employees’,  whether  engaged in any skilled  or  unskilled manual,  supervisory, technical or clerical work, etc.   But till   the  gap  is  completely  obliterated,  there  is   a distinction   between  workmen  and  non-workmen  and   that distinction has an important bearing on the question  before us.  Limitation no. (3) as formulated by learned counsel for the  appellants  ignores  the  distinction  altogether   and equates ’any person’ with any employee’-past,                             1173 present or future: this we do not think is quite correct  or consistent  with the other provisions of the Act.   The  Act avowedly  gives a restricted meaning to the word I  workman’ and  almost  all the provisions of the Act are  intended  to confer  benefits  on  that class of  persons  who  generally

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answer  to the description of workmen.  The expression  ’any person’  in the definition clause means, in our  opinion,  a person  in whose employment, or non-employment, or terms  of employment,  or conditions of labour the workmen as a  class have  a direct or substantial interest-with whom they  have, under  the scheme of the Act, a community of interest.   Our reason  for  so holding is not merely that the Act  makes  a distinction  between workmen and non-workmen, but because  a dispute  to  be  a real dispute must be  one  in  which  the parties  to  the  dispute  have  a  direct  or   substantial interest.   Can  it  be said that workmen  as  a  class  are directly or substantially interested in the employment, non- employment, terms of employment or conditions of lab our  of persons  who belong to the supervisory staff and are,  under the  provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act  has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an  industrial dispute and for whose representation the  Act makes  no particular provision ?  We venture to  think  that the  answer  must  be  in  the  negative.   Limitation   (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated.  We recognise that solidarity of labour or general  interest  of tabour welfare may  furnish,  in  some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in  a  dispute  between  employers  and  workmen,  but   the principle  of solidarity of the labour movement  or  general welfare  of  labour must be based on or  correlated  to  the principle of community of interest; the workmen can raise  a dispute  in respect of those persons only in the  employment or  non-employment  or  the  terms  of  employment  or   the conditions  or  labour  of  whom  they  have  a  direct   or substantial interest.  We think that Chagla C. J., correctly put  the crucial test when he said in Narendra Kumar Sen  v. All  India Industrial Disputes (Labour  Appellate)  Tribunal (1). (1)  (1953) 55 Bom.  L.R. 125,129, 130. 1174     "  Therefore, when s. 2 (k) speaks of the employment  or non-employment or the terms of employment or the  conditions of labour of any person, it can only mean the employment  or non-employment or the terms of employment or the  conditions of  labour of only .those persons in the employment or  non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of  labour of whom the workmen themselves are  directly  and substantially interested.  If the workmen have no direct  or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment  of a person or in his terms of employment or his conditions  of labour, then an industrial dispute cannot arise with  regard to such person."    We reach the same conclusion by approaching the  question from  a  somewhat different standpoint.  Ordinarily,  it  is only  the  aggrieved party who can raise a dispute;  but  an industrial dispute’ is put on a collective basis, because it is  now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused  by others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of a. 2 (k). As  Isaacs  J.  observed in the Australian  case  of  George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers’ Union(1):     "The  very  nature  of,  an  I  industrial  dispute’  as distinguished  from an individual dispute, is to obtain  new industrial   conditions,   not  merely  for   the   specific individuals then working from the specific individuals  then employing  them,  and not for the moment only, but  for  the class    of    employees    from   the    class    of    em- ployers.....................   It   is  a  battle   by   the claimants, not for themselves alone."

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Section  18 of the Act supports the aforesaid  observations, in  so far as it makes the award binding not merely  on  the parties to the dispute, but where the party is an  employer, on  his heirs, successors or assigns and where the party  is composed  of  workmen,  on  all  persons  employed  in   the establishment  and  all  persons  who  subsequently   become employed   therein.   If,  therefore,  the  dispute   is   a collective dispute, the party raising the dispute must  have either a direct interest in the subject matter of dispute or a  substantial interest therein in the sense that the  class to which the (I)  32 C.L.R. 4I3,441.                             1175 aggrieved party belongs is substantially affected there. by. It  is  the community of interest of the class  as  a  whole -class of employers or class of workmen-which furnishes  the real  nexus  between  the dispute and  the  parties  to  the dispute.  We see no insuperable difficulty in the  practical application of this test.  In a case where the party to  the dispute is composed of aggrieved workmen themselves and  the subject  matter of dispute relates to them or any  of  them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute.   Where, however, the party to the dispute also composed of  workmen, espouse  the  cause of another person whose  employment,  or non-employment,   etc.,  may  prejudicially   affect   their interest,  the  workmen have a substantial interest  in  the subject matter of dispute.  In both such bases, the  dispute is an industrial dispute.    Learned  counsel  for the appellants has also  drawn  our attention  to  the definition of a ’ trade dispute’  in  the Indian  Trade Unions Act, 1926.  That definition is also  in the same terms, but with this vital difference that the word ’  workmen’  means there "all persons employed in  trade  or industry  whether or not in the employment of  the  employer with whom the trade dispute arises." It is obvious that  the very  wide definition of the word ’workmen’  determines  the ambit  of the definition, of a ’trade dispute’ in the  Trade Unions Act, 1926.  The provisions of that Act have different objects  in  view, one of which is the  expenditure  of  the funds of a registered Trade Union I on the conduct of  trade disputes on behalf of the Trade Union or any member thereof. We do not think that that definition for the purposes of  an Act  like  the  Trade Unions Act is  of  any  assistance  in construing  the definition in the Act with which we are  now concerned, even though the words employed are the same;  for one  thing,  the meaning of the  word  ‘workman’  completely changes the ambit of the definition clause, and for another, the objects, scheme and purpose of the two Acts are not  the same.   For  the  same reasons, we do not  think  that  with regard to the precise problem before us much assistance  can be obtained by a detailed examination of English, 1176 American  or Australian decisions given with regard  to  the terms of the statutes in force in those countries.  Each Act must  be interpreted on its own terms particularly when  the definition  of  a ’workman’ varies from statute  to  statute and,  with  changing  conditions, from  time  to  time,  and country to country.     The  interpretation of s. 2 (k) of the Act has been  the subject  of consideration in various Indian  decisions  from different  points  of view.  Two recent  decisions  of  this Court considered the question if an individual dispute of  a workman was within the definition of an industrial  dispute. The  decision in C. P. Transport Services Ltd. v.  Raghunath (1),  related  to the C. P. and  Berar  Industrial  Disputes

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Settlement  Act  (No.  XXIII of 1947) and  the  decision  in Newspapers  Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P.(2),  to the  U.  P. Industrial Disputes Act (No.  XXVIII  of  1947). Both  these  decisions considered s. 2 (k) of the  Act,  but with  reference  to  a different  problem.   The  definition clause  in  s. 2 (k) was considered at some  length  by  the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (3), and learned counsel for the appellants  has  placed  great  reliance  on  some  of   the obervations  made  therein.   The question  which  fell  for decision  in  that case was whether  "  industrial  dispute" included   within  its  ambit  a  dispute  with  regard   to reinstatement  of  certain dismissed workmen.  It  was  held that  reinstatement was connected with  non-employment  and, therefore,  fell  within the words of  the  definition.   It appears that the finding of the Court from which the  appeal was  preferred  to the Federal Court was  that  the  workmen whose  reinstatement was in question were discharged  during the dispute and were, therefore, workmen within the  meaning of  the Act, Therefore, the problem of  interpretation  with which  we are faced in this case was not the problem  before their  Lordships of the Federal Court.  The observations  on which  learned  counsel for the appellants  has  relied  are these:    " The question for determination is whether the    (1)  [1956]  S. C. R. 956.    (2) A. 1. R. (1957)  S.  C. 532.    (3) [1949] F. C. R- 321, 329-330 346-347. 1177 definition  of the expression "industrial dispute" given  in the  Act includes within its ambit, a dispute in  regard  to reinstatement  of dismissed employees........ The  words  of the definition may be paraphrased thus: " any dispute  which has connection with the workmen being in, or out of  service or  employment  ". " Non-employment " is the negative  of  " employment"  and would mean that disputes of workmen out  of service  with  their employers are within the ambit  of  the definition.   It is the positive or the negative act  of  an employer that leads to employment or to non-employment.   It may  relate to an existing employment or to  a  contemplated employment,  or  it may relate to an existing fact  of  non- employment or a contemplated non-employment.  The  following four illustrations elucidate this point: (1) An employer has already employed a person and a trade union says " Please do not  employ  him  ".  Such a dispute  is  a  dispute  as  to employment or in connection with employment. (2) An employer gives notice to a union saying that he wishes to employ  two particular  persons.   The  union says " no  ".  This  is  a dispute  as to employment.  It arises out of the  desire  of the employer to employ certain persons. (3) An employer  may dismiss a man, or decline to employ him.  This matter raises a dispute as to non-employment. (4) An employer contemplates turning  out  a  number of people who  are  already  in  his employment.   It  is  a  dispute  as  to  contemplated  non- employment.   " Employment or non-employment  "  constitutes the subject matter of one class of industrial disputes,  the other two classes of disputes being those connected with the terms  of  employment  and the conditions  of  labour.   The failure  to employ or the refusal to employ are  actions  on the part of the employer which would be covered by the terms "   employment  or  non-employment  ".   Re-instatement   is connected  with non-employment and is therefore  within  the words of the definition."     "  It  was  contended  that  the  re-instatment  of  the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute

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1178 because  if the union represented the discharged  employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word  in the Industrial Disputes Act.  This argument is unsound.   We see  no difficulty in the respondents (union) taking up  the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being  still an industrial dispute between the employer and the  workmen. The  non-employment  "  of any person "  can  amount  to  an industrial  dispute  between the employer and  the  workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the  Industrial Disputes  Act.   It  was argued  that  if’  the  respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between  them and the employer.  That again  is  fallacious, because  under the definition of industrial dispute,  it  is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged  workmen only.  The last words in the  definition of  industrial dispute, viz., " any person " are a  complete answer to this argument of the appellants." It is true  that two  of  the  illustrations-Nos. (2) and  (3)-given  in  the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not  strictly speaking  "workmen"; but whether those persons would  answer to  such  description  or what  community  of  interest  the workmen  had with them is not stated and in any view  we  do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a  different problem can be taken as determinative of a problem which was not before the court in that case.     A reference was also made to the decision of this  Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee (1).  The question there was  whether the expression " industrial dispute "  included disputes  between  municipalities  and  their  employees  in branches of work analogous to the carrying on of a trade  or business.      More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of  the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a number of appeals reported in 1952  Labour  Appeal Cases, p. 198, where the  question  now before  us, arose directly for decision.  The same  question arose  for  decision  before  the  All  India.    Industrial Tribunal  (Bank  Disputes)  and  the  majority  of   members (Messrs.  K. C. Sen and    (1)    [1953] S.C.R. 302. 1179 J.   N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute  between employers  and  workmen might relate to employment  or  non- employment  or  the  terms of employment  or  conditions  of labour  of persons who were not workmen, and the  words  any person’ used in the definition clause were elastic enough to include  an  officer, that is, a member of  the  supervisory staff.   The majority view will be found in Chap.  X of  the Report.  The minority view was expressed by Mr. N. Chandra- sekhara Aiyar, who said:    " It is fairly clear to my mind that "any person’) in the Act  means any one whe belongs to the employer class or  the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against  whom can  be  said  to be adequately presented by  the  group  or category of persons to which he belongs.    As stated already it should be remembered that the  cases relied  upon for the view that ’any person’ may mean  others also besides the workmen were all cases relating to workmen. They  were  discharged or dismissed workmen and  when  their cases  were  taken up by the Tribunal the point  was  raised that  they  had  ceased to be  workmen  and  were  therefore outside the scope of the Act.  This argument was repelled.     In  my opinion, there is no justification  for  treating such  cases as authorities for the wider proposition that  a

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valid industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about  the employment  or non-employment of someone else who  does  not belong and never belonged to their class or category.     My  view  therefore is that the Act does  not  apply  to cases  of  non  workmen,  or officers, if  they  may  be  so called." Both these views as also other decisions of High Courts  and awards of Industrial Tribunals, were considered by the  Full Bench  of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chairman  of the  Tribunal  (Mr. J. N. Majamdar)  acknowledged  that  his earlier  view  was not correct and  expressed  his  opinion, concurred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p. 210- 150 1180    "  I am, therefore, of opinion that the  expression  ’any person’  has  to be interpreted in terms of  ’workmen.’  The words ’any person’ cannot have, in my opinion, their  widest amplitude,  as that would create incongruity and  repugnancy in the provisions of the Act.  They are to be interpreted in a   manner  that  persons,  who  would  come   within   that expression,   can  at  some  stage  or  other,  answer   the description of workman as defined in the Act."    It  is  necessary to state here that earlier  a  contrary view  had  been taken by the Calcutta High  Court  in  Birla Brothers, Ltd. v. Modak (1), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute  Co.  Ltd. v. S. N. Modak (2), and  by  the  Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd.  v. Their  Workmen (3).  It is necessary to emphasise  here  two considerations which have generally weighed with some of the learned  Judges  in support of the view expressed  by  them: these two Considerations are that (1) normally workmen  will not  raise  a  dispute in which they  are  not  directly  or substantially interested and (2) Government will not make  a reference  unless the dispute is a real or substantial  one. We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression " any person " occurring in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use  the words of Maxwell, is to be found in the subject  or in  the occasion on which the words are used and the  object to be attained by the statute. We are aware that anybody may be a potential workman and the concept  of "a potential workman" introduces an  element  of indefiniteness  and  uncertainty.  We also  agree  that  the expression  "  any  person " is not  co-extensive  with  any workman,  potential or otherwise.  We think,  however,  that the  crucial  test is one of community of interest  and  the person  regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one  in whose  employment,  non-employment, terms of  employment  or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties   (1) I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.  (2) [1951] 1 L.L.J. 145.                   (3) [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122. 1181 to  the  dispute  have a  direct  or  substantial  interest. Whether  such  direct  or  substantial  interest  has   been established  in a particular case will depend on  its  facts and circumstances.    Two  other later decisions have also been brought to  our notice : Prahlad Rai Oil Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1) in which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the  expression ’any person’ in the definition clause did not mean a workman and  the  decision  in  Narendra  Kumar  Sen  v.  All  India Industrial  Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal (2),  being the decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J. from which we  have

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already quoted some extracts.    An  examination  of  the  decisions  referred  to   above undoubtedly  discloses a divergence of opinion :  two  views have  been expressed, one based on the ordinary  meaning  of the  expression  ’any  person’ and the other  based  on  the context, with reference to the subject of the enactment  and the  objects  which the legislature has in  view.   For  the reasons  which  we  have already given, we  think  that  the latter view is correct.    To summarise.  Having regard to the scheme and objects of the  Act,  and  its other provisions,  the  expression  ’any person ’ in s. 2 (k) of the Act must be read-subject to such limitations  and qualifications as arise from  the  context; the  two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must  be  a real  dispute  between  the  parties  to  the  dispute   (as indicated  in the first two parts of the definition  clause) so  as  to be capable of settlement or adjudication  by  one party  to the dispute giving necessary relief to the  other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be  One  in  whose  employment,  non-employment,  terms   of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dipute have a direct or substantial interest. In  the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be  said to be a real dispute between the parties.  Where the workmen raise  a  dispute  as against  their  employer,  the  person regarding   whose  employment,  non-employment,   terms   of employment  or  conditions of labour the dispute  is  raised need  not  be, strictly (1) A.I.R.  (1955)  NUC  (Allahabad) 2664. (2) (1953) 55 Bo-.  L.R. 125. 1182 speaking, a ’workman’ within the meaning of the Act but must be  one  in  whose  employment,  non-employment,  terms   of employment  or conditions of labour the workmen as  a  class have a direct or substantial interest.     In  the  case  before us, Dr. K.P. Banerjee  was  not  a workman’.   He belonged to the medical or technical  staff-a different category altogether from workmen.  The  appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment,  and even assuming that he was a  member  of the  same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests  laid down  by us, that the dispute regarding his  termination  of service  was an industrial dispute within the meaning of  s. 2(k) of the Act.    The  result, therefore, is that the appeal fails  and  is dismissed.  In the circumstances of this case there will  be no order for costs.    SARKAR  J.-On  November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P.  Banerjee  was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate,  whose management is the respondent in this  appeal. On April 21, 1951, the respondent terminated Dr.  Banerjee’s service with effect from the next day and he was offered one month’s  salary in lieu of notice.  He accepted this  salary and  later  left  the Tea Estate.  The workmen  of  the  Tea Estate  raised  a dispute concerning the  dismissal  of  Dr. Banerjee.   On  December 23, 1953, the Government  of  Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of that  dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of s. 10  of the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  The order of  reference was in the following terms:    Whereas  an industrial dispute has arisen in the  matters specified in the schedule below between:    (1)    The  workmen  of  Dimakuchi  Tea  Estate,  P.   O. Dimakuchi,  District  Darrang,  Assam  represented  by   the Secretary, Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C.  Office,

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P.O. Dibrugarh, Assam and,    (2)    The  management  of  Dimakuchi  Tea  Estate,  P.O. Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are  Messrs. Williamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta. 1183    And  whereas it is considered expedient by the  Govt.  of Assam  to  refer  the said dispute  for  adjudication  to  a Tribunal  constituted  under  section 7  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947).    Now,  therefore, in exercise of the powers  conferred  by clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 10, as amended,  of the  Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), the Governor  of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Sri Uma  Kanta Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge (retired) who has  been  appointed  to constitute  a  Tribunal  under  the provisions of the said Act.                          SCHEDULE.    (i)    Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. 0. ?    (ii)If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any  other relief in lieu thereof ?    The Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman  as defined in the Act and, therefore, the dispute referred  was not  an  industrial  dispute  and  consequently  it  had  no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a dispute.  The workmen preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.   That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr. Banerjee  was not a workman within the definition of that term in the  Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non- employment,  it  was  not an  industrial  dispute,  and  was therefore   beyond  the  jurisdiction  of   the   Industrial Tribunal.   From  that decision the present  appeal  by  the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by  this Court  under Art. 136 of the Constitution.  In granting  the leave  this  Court  limited it to  the  question  whether  a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman,  falls within the scope of the definition of " Industrial Dispute " contained  in s. 2(k) of the Act.  That, therefore,  is  the only question before us.    Section 2(k) is in these terms:    "  Industrial  dispute means any  dispute  or  difference between employers and employers or 1184 between  employers  and  workmen,  or  between  workmen  and workmen,  which  is connected with the  employment  or  non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."     The dispute that was raised was between an employer, the respondent  in this appeal and its workmen,  the  appellants before us and concerned the employment or non-employment  of Dr. Banerjee, a person employed by the same employer but who was not a workman.  The question that we have to decide  has arisen because of the use of the words " any person " in the definition.  These words are quite general and very wide and according to their ordinary meaning include a person who  is not  a  workman.  If this meaning is given to  these  words, then  the  dispute  that  arose  concerning  Dr.  Banerjee’s dismissal would be an industrial dispute because the dispute would  then be clearly within s. 2(k).  This indeed  is  not disputed.   Unless there are reasons to the  contrary  these words  have  to be given their ordinary meaning.   In  Birla Brothers  Ltd. v. Modak (1) and in Western India  Automobile Association  v. -Industrial -Tribunal of Bombay (2)  it  was held  that the words " any person " were not meant to  refer only  to  workmen as defined in the Act but  were  wide  and

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general and would include others who were not such  workmen. In The Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak (3),  Banerjee J.  said, " Any person means whatever individual is  chosen. I  see  no  reason  to restrict  the  meaning  of  the  word ’Person’".  The  same  view  was  expressed  in  East  India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (4), which was the decision  of  an Industrial Tribunal.  There  is  then  some support  for  the view that the words I any  person’  should have no restriction put upon them.     It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that it is not  its  contention that the words ’any person’  should  be understood as referring only to a " workman " as defined  in the Act but that those words, should include all persons  of the workman class and (1)  I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (2)  [1949] F.C.R. 321. (3)  [1951] 1 L.L.J. 145. (4)  [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122. 1185 so they would include discharged workmen.  It is then stated that  the  first  two  of the  cases  mentioned  above  were concerned  with a dispute regarding discharged  workmen  and did  not  therefore  decide that the words  (I  any  person’ included  all.   It is no doubt true that these  cases  were concerned with a dispute regarding discharged workmen but  I do  not  understand the decision to have proceeded  on  that basis.   Sen  J. said in Birla Brothers case  (1)  (p.  213) that, " It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior  to the  Act  are  not ’persons"’.  And  in  the  Western  India Automobile Association case (2), it was said (p. 346-7),    "  It  was  contended  that  the  reinstatement  of   the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute because  if the  union represented the discharged employees,  they  were not  workmen  within  the definition of  that  word  in  the Industrial Disputes Act.  This argument is unsound.  We  see no difficulty in the respondents (union) taking up the cause of  the  discharged workmen and the dispute being  still  an industrial  dispute  between the employer and  the  workmen. The  non-employment  "  of any person "  can  amount  to  an industrial  dispute  between the employer and  the  workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the  Industrial Disputes  Act.   It  was  argued  that  if  the  respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between  them and the employer.  That again  is  fallacious, because  under the definition of industrial dispute,  it  is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged  workmen only.  The last words in the  definition of industrial dispute, viz., " any person ", are a  complete answer to this argument of the appellants."     The  last  two of the cases mentioned earlier  were  not however  concerned  with any  dispute  regarding  discharged workmen.   In The Dalhousie Jute Co. -case (3)  the  dispute was  with  regard to the employment of  persons  who  sought employment  as  workmen  and in the  East  India  Industries (Madras) Ltd. case (4) the (1)  I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (2) [1949] F.C.R. 321. (3)  [1951] 1 L.L.J. I45. (4)[1952] 1 L.L.J. 122. 1186 dispute   concerned  the  dismissal  of  a  member  of   the supervisory  staff,  that is, another employee of  the  same employer who was not a workman.  It is however said that  in none  of  these cases the arguments that  are  now  advanced appear to have been advanced and they were not considered in

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the   judgments.   This  comment  is  justified.   I   shall therefore  lay  these cases aside in deciding  the  question that has arisen.     Are there then good reasons for not giving to the  words "  any  persons " their plain meaning ?  Several  have  been advanced  and I shall examine them a little later.   I  wish now to discuss how it is proposed to restrict the meaning of these  words.  I have already stated that the contention  is that the words are not confined to a workman but refer  only to a person of the workman class.  This, I confess, I do not follow.  The word " workman " is a term defined in the  Act. Outside  the  definition it, is impossible to say who  is  a workman and who is not.  That being so, the words "  workman class  " would be meaningless unless they meant all  persons who were workmen as defined in the Act.  So read the words " any person " would mean only a workman.  But it is  conceded that this is not so.  And, of course, it cannot be so,  for, if   that  was  intended,  there  was  no  reason  for   the legislature  not  to  have used the words "  any  workman  " instead of the words it any person ". Again if this was  the intention,  then  a dispute concerning the  dismissal  of  a workman  would not be an industrial dispute for a  dismissed workman was not a workman within the definition of that word in  the  Act as it stood in 1953, that being  the  Act  with which  we  are  concerned.  Such a  result  is  against  all conceptions  of industrial disputes laws.  It is indeed  not contended  that  a  dispute concerning the  dismissal  of  a workman  would not be an industrial dispute.   It  therefore seems to me that the words " any personal cannot be said  to refer only to persons of the workman class.  If they  cannot be restricted as being understood to refer only to a  person of  the workman class, it is not suggested that they can  be restricted in any other manner.     It is then said that the words refer to "workmen 1187 dismissed  as  well as in employment as also those,  who  in future,  become  "workmen".  Again I am in  difficulty.   So understood  the words would not include a person  who  seeks employment as a workman because he has not become a  workman till  he  is employed.  That being so, it would have  to  be said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when new workmen  are  to  be  appointed,  that  only  those  of  the candidates as agree to join their union should be  appointed and  others  should  not  be, would  not  be  an  industrial dispute.   That  again seems to me to be  against  all  con- ceptions  of  industrial dispute laws.   Furthermore,  I  am wholly  unable  to  appreciate what is meant  by  a  dispute concerning  a  person, who is not at the  time  the  dispute arises, a workman but in future becomes one.  When is such a person to become a workman ? I find no answer.  Again, is it to  be said that whether a dispute is an industrial  dispute or not may have to depend on future circumstances for  there is no knowing whether the person concerning whom the dispute arises  will later become a workman or not ? If  he  becomes one,  there can be no dispute concerning him referable to  a point of time before he became one, and, if he does not,  he cannot be one who in future becomes a workman.    It is said that the words "any person " were used instead of  the  word  workman because it was  intended  to  include within  them  persons  who had  been  dismissed  before  the dispute  arose  and who were not within  the  definition  of workmen  in  the Act as it stood in 1953.  If that  was  the reason,  why  could  not the legislature  use  the  words  " workmen  and  dismissed  workmen ?"  There  was  nothing  to prevent  that  being  done.   In  fact  the  definition   of

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"workman"  has  been  amended in  1956  to  include  workmen discharged in consequence of an industrial dispute or  whose discharge  has led to that dispute.  So, as  the  definition now stands, it includes persons dismissed before the dispute arose.  Yet the words " any person " have been left untouch- ed  in s. 2 (k) and not been replaced by the  word  workman. This, to my mind, shows that it was not the 1151 1188 intention  to confine the words " any person to  workmen  in employment or discharged.     But it is said that the words " any person were left  in the Act because it was intended to include not only  workmen in employment and dismissed workmen bat  also persons who in future  become  workmen.  It is said that, that this  is  so appears  from s. 18 of the Act.  I shall presently  consider this section but I desire to observe now that this  argument much weakens the argument noticed in the preceding paragraph for  if the words " any person " were used so  that  persons who in future become workmen might be included in them, they could not have been used to avoid such dismissed workmen  as were  not workmen as defined in the Act being excluded  from them.  It seems to me that if it is argued that the words  " any person " were used so that persons who in future  become workmen  may be included in them,; it cannot be argued  that those words were used instead of the word "workman"  because it  was  intended to include within them  certain  dismissed workmen  who were not workmen within the definition of  that term in the Act as it stood in 1953.    Coming now to s. 18 it is in these terms:    A  settlement  arrived at in the course  of  conciliation proceedings  under  this Act or an award  which  has  become enforceable shall be binding on-   (a) all parties to the industrial dispute;   (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings  as parties to the dispute, unless the Board  or Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that  they were so summoned without proper cause;   (c)  where  a party referred to in clause  (a)  or  clause (b)is  an  employer,  his heirs, successors  or  assigns  in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;   (d)  where  a party referred to in clause  (a)  or  clause (b)is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed  in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the  case may  be,  to which the dispute relates on the  date  of  the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed  in that establishment or part. 1189 1  entirely fail to see how that section assists at  all  in finding  out who were meant to be included in the words  any person  ".  Is it to be said that s. 18(d)  by,  making  the award binding on those who become in future employed in  the establishment  as workmen, indicates that such  persons  are treated in the same way as  workmen in actual employment and therefore it must have been intended to include them  within the  words " any person " along with present  and  dismissed workmen.   I  am wholly unable to agree.  The object  of  s. 18(d)  is  quite clear.  The Act is intended  to  compose  a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a  settlement or  an award brought about by the machinery provided  in  it and  the period during which an award or a settlement is  to remain in force is also provided.  The idea behind s. 18  is that  whoever  takes  up appointment as  a  workman  in  the establishment  to which the dispute relates during the  time when the award or settlement is in force, would be bound  by

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it.   If it were not so, the award or settlement would  have little effect in settling a dispute, for any newly recruited workmen  could again raise the dispute.  Any one having  any experience  of industries knows that workmen are  largely  a shifting population and that the need for replacement of the workmen  leaving  and for addition to the  strength  of  the workmen  employed, is not infrequent.  To meet the  exigency arising  from this need and to make the award or  settlement effective  it was necessary to enact s. 18(d).   Its  object was not to place workmen in employment and workmen recruited in future in the same position for all purposes of the  Act. On  the  same reasoning, in view of s. 18(a), it has  to  be said that it was the intention of the Act to give the heirs, successors or assignees of an employer the same position for all  purposes of the Act as that of the employer.  But  that would  be absurd.  Section 18(d) deals with a person who  in future becomes employed.  The section does not say  employed as  a workman but I will assume that that is what is  meant. I  do  not understand what is meant by saying  that  such  a person is within the words " any person " in s. 2(k).   What is the point of time that has to be considered ? 1190 If it is after he has become employed, then he is a  workman and  admittedly within the words "any person ". Is it to  be said  that  before  such employment also he  is  within  the meaning of those words.  But it is difficult to follow this. It is conceivable that  any person whatsoever may in  future be employed as a workman for there is nothing in the quality of  a human being that marks him out as a workman.  In  this way  the  words  " any person " would  include  all.   That, however, is not meant, for it will defeat the very  argument based on s. 18(d).  Is it to be said then, only such  future workmen  are  meant  as apply for jobs as  such  ?  But  the section makes no reference to such people at all and  cannot therefore  be  of  any assistance in  showing  that  it  was intended  that such applicants would be included within  the words " any person ". I am therefore wholly unable to accept the  argument  that s. 18(d)shows that future  workmen  were intended  to be included within the words "any  person".   I wish  also to say this.  Assume that s. 18(d) shows that  it was  intended to include within the words ,any person "  one who  in future becomes a workman.  But where is  the  reason for  saying  that  the words do not also  include  others  ? Section 18 provides none.    I  proceed  now  to  discuss  the  reasons  advanced  for restricting  the generality of the words " any  person  They were put as follows:    1.     In  certain  sections of the Act the words  "  any person  "  have  been used but there  the  reference  is  to workmen,  and therefore in s. 2(k) the words " any person  " should mean persons of the workman class.    2.     The  scheme and the purpose of the  Act  generally and  the  object  of  the Act  specially  being  to  benefit workmen,  the  words  "any person " should  be  confined  to people of the workman class.    3.     The  word  "dispute" in s. 2(k)  itself  indicates that  the person raising the dispute must be  interested  in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment,  non-employment,  terms  of  employment  or  the conditions of labour of a person, that person must be of the workman class. 1191     The first reason, then, is that in certain sections, the Act uses the words " any person".  I will assume that by the use of these words only workmen are intended to be  referred

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to  in these sections.  But the question arises why is  such intention  to  be inferred?  Clearly,  because  the  context requires it.  I will refer to some of these sections to make my  point clear.  Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as  "  the closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or  the  refusal by the employer to continue to  employ  any number  of persons employed by him." Section 2(q) defines  a strike  as  "  a  cessation of work by  a  body  of  persons employed  in  any  industry  acting  in  combination,  or  a concerted   refusal,   or   a   refusal   under   a   common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so  employed to continue to work or to  accept  employment." Lock-outs and strikes are dealt with in ss. 22, 23 and 24 of the  Act.  Section 22(2) says that no employer  carrying  on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen except  on  certain  conditions mentioned  in  the  section. Section 23 says that no employer of any workman employed  in any industrial establishment shall declare a lock-out during the  periods  mentioned in the section.  Section  24  states that a strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if commenced or declared   in  contravention  of  s.  22  or  s.  23.    The definitions of lock-outs and strikes are for the purposes of ss. 22, 23 and 24.  There are other sections in which  lock- outs  and strikes are mentioned but they make no  difference for  our present purpose.  The lock-outs and  strikes  dealt with  in ss. 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-outs of  and  strikes by,  workmen.  It may hence be said that in s. 2(1) and  (q) by  the  word person a workman is meant.  Therefore,  it  is these sections, viz., 22(2), 23 and 24, which show what  the meaning of the word ’person’ in the definitions is.  I would like  to  point out in passing that s. 22(1)  says  that  no person  employed  in a public utility service  shall  go  on strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing  in the  Act  to show that the word "person" in s.  22(1)  means only a workman.  Proceeding however with the point we are 1192 concerned  with, the question is, is there any provision  in the Act which would show that the words " any person" in  s. 2(k)  were  meant only to refer to persons  of  the  workman class.   I have not been able to find any and none has  been pointed  out.  Therefore the fact that in s. 2, sub-ss.  (1) and (q) the word "  persons " means workmen is no reason for concluding  that  the  same  word must  be  given  the  same restricted meaning in s. 2(k).  The position with regard  to s. 33A, in which the word employee has to be read as meaning a workman because of s. 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with specially.  I may add that if it has to  be said  that  because  in  certain  other  sections  the  word "person"  has  to be understood as referring  to  a  workman only,  in  s.  2(k) also the same word must  have  the  same meaning, then we have to read the words " any person" in  s. 2(k) as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act.   This however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent.   I  may further say that it was  not  contended that the word " person" in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) and the word employee in s. 33A has to be read as including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman and  a person  who in future becomes a workman, and it seems to  me that such a contention would not have been possible.    I  proceed now to deal with the second group  of  reasons based on the object and scheme of the Act.  It is said  that the  Act  makes  a distinction  between  employees  who  are workmen  and all other employees, and that the focus of  the Act is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them.  This was  the view taken in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v.  Kedar

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Nath  Gupta  (1).  I will assume all this.  It may  also  be true that the Act is not much concerned with employees other than  workmen.  But I am unable to see that all this is  any reason for holding that the words " any person " must mean a person  of  the workman class.  The definition  in  s.  2(k) would  be fully concerned with workmen however the  words  " any person " in it may (1)  [1952] 1 L. L. J. 782. 1193 be  understood  because the dispute will be one to  which  a workman  is  a partyl  Is it to be said that the  Act  would cease  to  be  intended  for workmen  or  the  focus  of  it displaced  from  workmen  or that  the  distinction  between workmen  and  other  employees would  vanish  if  a  dispute relating  to  the dismissal of one who is not a  workman  is held to be an industrial dispute, even though the dispute is one to which workmen are parties ? I am unable to  subscribe to such an argument.  But it is said that in such a case the workmen would not be interested in the dispute, the  dispute would  not really be with them and they would not be in  any real  sense of the word parties to it.  So put the  argument comes  under the last of the three reasons  earlier  stated, ,namely,  that  in  order that there may  be  an  industrial dispute  the  workmen must be interested  in  that  dispute. This  contention I will consider later.  It is also said  in the United Commercial Bank Case (1) that the main purpose of the  Act  is to adjust the relations between  employers  and workmen  by securing for the latter the benefit provided  by the  Act.   It  is really another way  of  saying  that  the workmen  must be interested in the dispute, for if they  are not  interested  no  benefit  can accrue  to  them  from  an adjustment  of  it.  This, as I have said,  I  will  discuss later.    It  is  also  said that the Act is  for  the  benefit  of workmen  and therefore if a dispute concerning a person  who is not a workman, is an industrial dispute capable of  being resolved  by adjudication under the Act, then, if the  award goes  in favour of the workmen raising it, a  benefit  would result  to a person whom the Act did not intend to  benefit. So  it  is said, an industrial dispute cannot be  a  dispute concerning  one  who  is not a  workman.   But  the  benefit resulting  to  the  person  in such a  case  would  only  be incidental.  The workmen themselves would also be  benefited by it at the same time.  To adopt this argument would be  to deprive  the  workmen  of  this  benefit  and  there  is  no justification  for  doing  so.  How  the  workmen  would  be benefited would appear later when I discuss the question  of the workmen’s interest in the dispute.  I will show later (1)  [1952] 1 L. L. J . 782. 1194 that  if the workmen were not interested in the  dispute  so that  they could get no benefit under it, there would be  no reference by the Government and there would be no benefit to a  person  who was not a workman.  Further, I am  unable  to agree  that  the  Act  is intended   to  confer  benefit  on workmen.   Its  object  is  admitted  by  all  to   preserve industrial peace.  It may confer some benefit on workmen but at  the  same time it takes away their power  and  right  to strike and puts them under a disadvantage.    We  were referred to the note of dissent to the award  of the  majority  of the All India  Industrial  Tribunal  (Bank Disputes),  dated  July  31, 1950.  This  note  was  by  Mr. Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court. In that note he expressed the view that " any person " in s. 2(k) means any one who belongs to the employer class or  the

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workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom, can  be  said to be adequately represented by the  group  or category  of  persons to which he belongs.  I  have  already stated  my  difficulties  in agreeing that  the  words  "any person  " mean only persons of the work. man class.  I  will presently  deal with the reasoning on which Mr. Aiyer  bases his view but I wish to say now that it seems to me that  the words  "any person" cannot refer to anyone belonging to  the employer  class  because the dispute must be  in  connection with the employment, non-employment, or terms of  employment or  the  conditions of labour of any person and  it  is  not possible to conceive of any such thing in connection with  a person in his capacity as an employer.    Mr. Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to  be put  on the words " any person " is that the  person  should have something to do with the particular establishment where the  dispute has cropped up.  He said that it could  not  be that  the  workmen  in  Bank  A  could  raise  a  valid  and legitimate  industrial dispute with their  employer  because some  one  in  Bank  B had not  been  treated  well  by  his employer.  Assume this is so. But it does not follow that an industrial  dispute must be one concerning a person  of  the workman  class alone, for, a person having something  to  do with an 1195 establishment  need  not necessarily belong to  the  workman class.   An  officer in an establishment where  the  dispute crops  up would be as much a person having something  to  do with  that establishment as a workman there and,  therefore, even  assuming  that the limitation suggested by  Mr.  Aiyar applies,  there  would  be  nothing  in  it  to  prevent  an industrial dispute concerning him arising.  The question  is not whether the person concerning whom an industrial dispute may arise, has to be employed in the establishment where the dispute arises, but whether he must belong to what has  been called  the  workman  class.  The  decision  of  the  former question  which has not arisen in this case, -is of no  help in  deciding  the  question that has arisen  and  I  do  not therefore  feel  called  upon to express  any  opinion  with regard to it.    Mr. Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a Bank raise  a  dispute with that Bank, about an employee  of  the Bank  who was not a workman, for example an officer who  had been  dismissed.  He assumed that the Bank and  the  officer had  no dispute as between themselves.  In his view,  if  in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute and  could be  made  the subject matter of an award  by  an  Industrial Tribunal,  the  award would not be binding  on  the  officer because  he had no concern with the dispute.   According  to him,  it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was  under an  obligation to give effect to the award.   Therefore,  in his view, such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute. Now,  whether the award would be binding on the  officer  or not, would depend on whether he could be made a party to the dispute under s. 18(b).  It is not necessary to discuss that question now.  But assume that the award was not binding  on the officer.  Why should not the bank be under an obligation to give effect to the award in so far as it lay in its power to  do  so ? If the dispute was an industrial  dispute,  the award  would be binding on the Bank and it must give  effect to it.  Then the argument comes to this that the dispute  is not an industrial dispute because the award would not, as 152 1196 assumed,  be  binding  on the officer  concerning  whom  the

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dispute arose.  I cannot accept this view.  Take this  case. An  employer  dismisses five of his  workmen.   The  workmen dismissed  make  no  grievance.   Three  months  later   the employer  dismisses twenty five more and again  neither  the dismissed  workmen nor the workmen in employment  raise  any dispute.  Two months after the second dismissal the employer dismisses  fifty workmen.  These workmen make  no  complaint and  leave.   The workmen in employment now  begin  to  take notice  of  the dismissals and think that  the  employer  is acting  on  a set policy and raise a dispute about  all  the dismissals.   The dispute is then referred for  adjudication and an award is made in favour of the workmen.  Assume  that all  the  dismissed  workmen could be made  parties  to  the adjudication proceedings but for one reason or another, were not  made parties.  This award would not be binding  on  the dismissed  workmen and certainly not on those who  had  been dismissed  on the two earlier occasions.  They would not  be covered by any of the provisions of s. 18.  Is it to be said that  for  that  reason the dispute  is  not  an  industrial dispute?  I am wholly unable to agree.  Such a dispute would be  entirely  within the definition even on  the  assumption that the words "any person" mean only persons of the workman class.   It  follows,  therefore, that in  order  to  decide whether  a dispute is or is not an industrial  dispute,  the question  whether the award would be binding on  the  person concerning  whose employment the dispute was raised,  is  no test.  I therefore find nothing in the minute of dissent  of Mr.  Aiyar to justify the putting of any restriction on  the plain  meaning of the words "any person" in s. 2(k).   As  I shall show later, if certain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and who I will assume would not be bound  by the award, are not to be industrial disputes, the object  of the Act would clearly be defeated.  I cannot therefore agree that the fact that an award is not binding on one affords  a reason  for  holding  that there  cannot  be  an  industrial dispute concerning him.    The matter was put from another point of view.  It 1197 is  said that if workmen could raise an  industrial  dispute with their employer concerning the salary of a manager,  who was  not  a  workman, and an award was  made  directing  the employer  to  pay  a  smaller salary  to  the  manager,  the employer  would be bound by the award but not  the  manager. Then  it is said, suppose, the employer had made a  contract with  the manager to employ him at the higher salary  for  a number of years.  It is pointed out that in such a case  the award  being binding on the employer, he would be  compelled to  commit  a breach of his contract and be  liable  to  the manager in damages.  It is said that it could not have  been the  intention  of the Act to produce a  result  whereby  an employer would become liable in damages and therefore such a dispute cannot be an industrial dispute.  But I do not agree that  the  employer would be liable in damages.   The  award being  binding on him under the Act, the performance of  his contract  with the manager would become unlawful  after  the award  and therefore void under s. 56 of the  Contract  Act. The  employer  would  not, by carrying  out  the  award,  be committing any breach of contract nor would he be liable  in damages.   To  hold  that the  dispute  contemplated  is  an industrial  dispute,  would not produce  the  absurd  result suggested.   The  reason  suggested  for  not  holding  that dispute to be an industrial dispute, therefore, fails.      Take another case.  Suppose there was a dispute between two employers A and B concerning the wage to be paid by B to his workmen, A complaining that B was paying too high wages,

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and the dispute was referred for adjudication by a  Tribunal and an award was made that B should reduce the wages of  his workmen.  Assume the workmen were not parties to the dispute and were not made parties even if it was possible to do  so. The  award  would not be binding on  the  workmen  concerned under  s.  18.   None the less it cannot be  said  that  the dispute  was  not  an  industrial  dispute.   It  completely satisfies  the definition of an industrial dispute  even  on the basis that the words SC any person " mean only  workmen. So again it would appear that the words may include one on 1198 whom the award would not be binding.     I  may add here, though I do not propose to  decide  the question it being wholly unnecessary for the case before us, that  it seems to me that when a dispute concerns  a  person whether  a  workman  or  not, who is riot  a  party  to  the dispute, he can, under s. 18(b), be properly made a party to appear  in the proceedings arising out of that  dispute.   I find nothing in that section to prevent such a course  being adopted.  If he is made a party, there is no doubt that  the decision, whichever way it went, would be most  satisfactory to all concerned.  If this is the right view, then all argu- ments  based on the fact that the words " any person  "  can only  include one on whom the award would be  binding  would disappear,  for  on being made a party the  award  would  be binding on that person.  It would on the contrary show  that it was intended that the words " any person " should include one who is not a party to the dispute, and therefore not  in the workman class.     An  argument based on s. 33 was also advanced.  That  is this.   The  section provides that during  the  pendency  of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect  of an industrial dispute the conditions of  service of workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the employer,  nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise  punished by him except with the permission of the Board or  Tribunal. It  is said that this section shows that it was intended  to protect only workmen and therefore the words " any person  " in s. 2(k) should be understood as meaning workmen only.   I do  not  follow  this argument at  all.   Section  33  gives protection  to  workmen concerned in the dispute  which  can only mean workmen who are parties to the dispute.  A workman concerning  whom a dispute arises may or may not be a  party to  the  dispute.  The object of the section is  clear.   If workmen  could  be  punished  during  the  pendency  of  the proceedings,  then no workman would raise a dispute or  want to take part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its  adjudication.   Further, such punishment  would  surely give rise to 1199 another dispute.  All this would defeat the entire object of the  Act  which  is to compose  disputes  by  settlement  or adjudication.   Section 33 gives protection to  workmen  who are  parties to the dispute and does not purport to  concern itself  with the person concerning whom the dispute  arises. Such  being the position, the section can throw no light  on the meaning of the words "any person " in s. 2(k).   Suppose a  workman  was  dismissed and  thereupon  a  dispute  arose between  the  employer and the other workmen  in  employment concerning   such  dismissal.   Such  a  dispute  would   be undoubtedly an industrial dispute.  And it is none the  less so,  though  no  protection can be given  to  the  dismissed workman under s. 33 for he is already dismissed. Reference  was  also made to s. 36 which  provides  for  the representation  of the parties to a dispute in a  proceeding

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arising under the Act out of such dispute.  Sub-section  (1) of  s. 36 provides how a workman, who is a party,  shall  be represented and sub-section (2) provides how an employer who is likewise a party, shall be represented.  The section does not  provide for representation of any other person.  It  is said that this shows that the words " any person " must mean only  a workman, because they must mean an  employee,  past, present or future and only such employees as are workmen can be parties to the dispute under the definition.  I am unable to  agree.   Section 36 provides for the  representation  of workmen besides employers and of no one else, because no one but a party need be represented in the proceedings and under the definition, a party to an industrial dispute must either be an employer or a workman.  This section has nothing to do with  the  person concerning whom the dispute  arises.   If, however, he is also a party to the dispute, then the section makes a provision for his representation in the  proceedings arising  out of that dispute as such a party and not as  one concerning whom the dispute has arisen.  I have earlier said that  there  may  be  a case  in  which  though  the  person concerning  whom the dispute arises is a workman,  still  he may not be a party to it.  The fact that besides an em- 1200 ployer,  the Act makes provision for the  representation  in the  proceedings  arising out of an  industrial  dispute  of workmen  alone does not show that an industrial dispute  can only  arise concerning a workman.  In my view, therefore  s. 36  is  of no assistance in finding out the meaning  of  the words " any person ". I  come  now  to  the  last  of  the  reasons  advanced  for restricting the natural meaning of the words " any person ". It  is  said that the word dispute in the  definition  shows that  the person raising it must have an interest in it  and therefore  since  the dispute must concern  the  employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of  labour of  a person that person must be a workman.  I confess I  do not follow the reasoning.  It is said that this is the  view expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting  of Chagla  C. J. and Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v.  The  All India  Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal  (1). I  have  some  difficulty in seeing that this  is  the  view expressed  in  that  case.  What  happened  there  was  that certain  workmen  raised a dispute  against  their  employer which  included  a demand for fixing scales of pay  and  for bonus  not only for themselves but also for the foremen  and divisional heads under the same employers who were not work- men and this dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudication  by  the  Industrial  Tribunal.   The  Tribunal refused to adjudicate the dispute in so far as it  concerned the  pay  and  bonus of persons who  were  not  workmen  as, according  to  it, to this extent it was not  an  industrial dispute.   The workmen then applied to the High Court for  a writ  directing the Tribunal to decide the dispute  relating to the claims made for the pay and bonus of the persons  who were not workmen.  The High Court held that the dispute  was not  an industrial dispute and refused the writ.  Chagla  C. J. expressed himself in these words (p. 130): "A  controversy  which is connected with the  employment  or non-employment  or  the  terms of  employment  or  with  the conditions  of labour is an industrial controversy.  But  it is not enough that it (1)  (1953) 55 Bom.  L.R. 125. 1201 should  be an industrial controversy; it must be a  dispute; and  in  my  opinion it is not every  controversy  or  every

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difference of opinion between workmen and employers which is constituted a dispute or difference within the meaning of s. 2(k).   A workman may have ideological differences with  his employer;  a workman may feel sympathetic consideration  for an  employee  in his own industry or in  other  industry;  a workman may feel seriously agitated about the conditions  of labour outside our own country; but it is absurd to  suggest that  any of these factors would entitle a workman to  raise an  industrial dispute within the meaning of s.  2(k).   The dispute  contemplated by s. 2(k) is a controversy  in  which the  workman is directly and substantially  interested.   It must  also  be  a grievance felt by the  workman  which  the employer  is in a position to remedy.  Both  the  conditions must  be  present;  it must be a grievance  of  the  workman himself;  it  must be a grievance which the employer  as  an employer is in a position to remedy or set right.  " Then he said (p. 131): " It is only primarily in their own employment, in their own terms of employment, in their own conditions of labour  that workmen  are  interested and it is with regard  these  that, they  are  entitled  to  agitate  by  means  of  raising  an industrial dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal  by the Government under s. 10." I  find  some difficulty in accepting all that  the  learned Chief  Justice said.  But assume he is right.  How  does  it follow  that because an industrial dispute is one  in  which workmen must be interested it must be concerning  themselves ? I do not see that it does.  Neither do I find Chagla C. J. saying  so.   In the case before him the  dispute  concerned persons  who  were  not workmen and he found  on  the  facts before  him  that the workmen were not  interested  in  that dispute  and  thereupon  held that the dispute  was  not  an industrial  dispute.   But  that  is  not  saying  that   an industrial dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen. Even  the observations that I have read from p. 131  of  the report would not support this view.  It is not 1202 difficult to conceive of a dispute concerning the employment of  a person who is not a workman which at the same time  is one  which  affects  the conditions of labour  or  terms  of employment of the workmen themselves.  I shall give examples of  such  disputes later.. What I wish now to point  out  is that  even if an industrial dispute has to be one  in  which workmen  are interested, that would be no reason for  saying that  it can only be a dispute concerning workmen  and  that therefore the words " any person " in s. 2(k) must mean only workmen.   I  also  think  it right to  say  now  that  this argument  is  not  really open to the  respondent,  for  the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is,  as I  have earlier stated, that the words " any person" do  not mean  a  workman only but mean all persons  of  the  workman class,  or  past, present and future workmen.   Now  I  find nothing  in  the  judgment of Chagla, C.  J.  to  show  that workmen can be interested in the workman class or in past or future  workmen.  On the contrary be says that  workmen  are interested  primarily-and by the word " primarily " I  think he  means,  directly  and substantially-only  in  their  own employment,  terms  of employment or conditions  of  labour. Reliance  on  the  judgment of the Bombay  High  Court  will therefore land the respondent in contradiction. I find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition  of the existence of an industrial, dispute that workmen must be interested in it.  The Act does not say so.  But it is  said that  the  word dispute in the definition  implies  it.   No doubt, one does not raise a dispute unless he is  interested

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in it, and as the Act must be taken to have in contemplation normal men it must have assumed that workmen will not  raise a dispute unless they are interested in it.  But that is not to  my mind saying that it is a condition of  an  industrial dispute  as  contemplated by the Act that  workmen  must  be interested in it.  So to hold would, in my opinion, lead  to grave  difficulties and might even result in  defeating  the object of the Act.  This I will endeavour to show presently. What I have to say will also show that even assuming that an industrial 1203 dispute  is one in which workmen have to be interested,  the dispute that we have in this case concerning Dr.  Banerjee’s dismissal is an industrial dispute for the appellant workmen are directly and substantially interested in it. The  question  that  first  strikes me, is  what  is  the  2 interest  which workmen must have?  I find it impossible  to define that interest.  If it cannot be defined, it cannot of course be made a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute,  for  we would then never know what  an  industrial dispute  is.  Now, " interest ", as we understand that  word in   courts  of  law,  means  the  well-known  concepts   of proprietary  interest or interest in other recognised  civil rights.   Outside  these the matter  becomes  completely  at large.and  well nigh impossible of definition.  To say  that the interest that the workmen must have is one of the  well- known  kinds of interest mentioned above is, to my mind,  to make  the Act largely infructuous.  We cannot lose sight  of the  fact  that  the Act is not  dealing  with  interest  as ordinarily  understood.  It cannot be kept in mind too  well that the Act is dealing with a new concept, namely, that  of the relation between employer and employed or to put it more significantly,  between capital and labour, a concept  which is undergoing a, fast and elemental change from day to  day. The numerous and radical amendments made in the Act since it came  on  the Statute book not so long ago, testify  to  the fast  changing  nature of the concept.   Bearing  all  these things  in  mind,  I find it  almost  impossible  to  define adequately  or  with any usefulness an interest  which  will serve the purposes of the Act.  I feel that an attempt to do so  will  introduce a rigidity which will work harm  and  no good.  Nor does it, to my mind, in any manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and substantial. I  will illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an  example or two.  Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer and the other workmen raised a dispute about it.  Such a dispute comes  completely within the definition even  assuming  that the words 153 1204 "any person " only refer to persons of the workman class, as the  respondent contends.  There is therefore no doubt  that such a dispute is an industrial dispute.  The question  then is   what  interest  have  the  disputing  workmen  in   the reinstatement of the dismissed work man if they must have an interest  ? The reinstatement would not in any  way  improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance any  interest of theirs in any sense of the term, in common use.  The only interest  that  I  can  think  of  the  workmen  having  for themselves  in such a dispute is the solidarity  of  labour. It is only this that if the same thing happens to any one of them,  the  others would rally round and by  taking  up  his cause  prevent the dismissal.  Apart from the Act how  would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking  effect ? They would have, if they wanted to prevent the  dismissal,

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gone  on  strike and thereby tried to force  the  employer’s hands not to give effect to the dismissal.  That would  have destroyed  the industrial peace which the object of the  Act is to preserve.  It is in order to achieve this object  that the Act recognises this dispute as an industrial dispute and provides  for its settlement by the methods of  conciliation or adjudication contained in it and preserves the industrial peace  by  preventing the parties being left  to  their  own devices.   If what I have described as solidarity of  labour is  to be considered as direct and substantial interest  for the purposes of an industrial dispute, as I conceive is  not disputed  by  any  one, then it will  appear  that  we  have embarked  on  a new concept of interest.  I  will  now  take another case which in regard to interest is the same as  the previous one.  Suppose the employer engages some workmen  at a  low rate of wages and the other workmen raise  a  dispute demanding  that  the  wages of these  low  paid  workmen  be increased.   This  case  would  be  completely  within   the definition  of an industrial dispute even according  to  the most restricted meaning that may be put upon the words  "any person  ",  namely  that they refer only  to  work.  men  as defined  in the Act, because the dispute concerns the  terms of employment of such a workman. 1205 So  this  has  admittedly to be held  to  be  an  industrial dispute.   What then is the interest of the workmen in  this dispute ? The increase in the wages claimed would not in any manner  improve  the financial condition  of  the  disputing workmen,  nor  serve any of their  interests  as  ordinarily understood.   It  would however help the workmen  in  seeing that  their  own wages were not reduced  by  preventing  the employer  from being able to engage any low paid workman  at all.  Apart from this I can think of no other interest  that the disputing workmen may have in the dispute.  If therefore it  is  essential that the disputing workmen  must  have  an interest in the dispute, this must be that interest, for, as already  stated,  the dispute is undoubtedly  an  industrial dispute. If  this is sufficient interest to constitute an  industrial dispute  I  fail to see why the workmen have  no  sufficient interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who is  particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should  be removed and they should have a more human foreman.  This  is surely  a  matter in which the workmen raising  the  dispute have  a personal and immediate interest and not, as  in  the last  case,  an  interest in  the  prevention  of  something happening  in future, which conceivably may never happen  at all.   Such  an interest is plainly nearer to  the  ordinary kinds of interest than the interest in solidarity of  labour or  in the prevention of future harm which in the  preceding paragraphs  have been found to be sufficient to  sustain  an industrial   dispute.   The  dispute  last  imagined   would undoubtedly  be an industrial dispute if the foreman  was  a workman for then it would be entirely within the  definition of an industrial dispute.  Now suppose the foreman was not a workman.  Can it be said that then the dispute would not  be an industrial dispute ? Would the interest of the workmen in the dispute be any the less or in any way different  because the foreman whose dismissal was demanded was not a workman ? I conceive it impossible to say so. Therefore if interest is the test, the dispute that I have imagined would have to  be held to be an industrial dispute whether or not 1206 the foreman concerned was a workman. Now  assume that the dispute did not arise out of  a  demand

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for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dismissal  on the  ground that he was a particularly kind and  sympathetic man and the workmen were  happy to work under him.  In  such a  case the interest of the workmen in the dispute would  be the  same  as their interest in the  dispute  demanding  the foreman’s dismissal.  They would be demanding his reinstate- ment  in their own interest; they would be demanding  it  to make sure that their work would be easy and smooth and  that they would be happy in the discharge of it.  Such a  dispute therefore  also has to be held to be an  industrial  dispute and  as  in the last case, it would make no  difference  for this purpose that the foreman concerned was not a workman. If  this  is  right, as I think it is,  then  similarly  the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee would be an industrial dispute for the workmen have sufficient  personal and immediate interest in seeing that they have a doctor  of their  liking to look after them.  It is indeed the case  of the workmen that by his devotion to duty and good  behaviour Dr. Banerjee became very popular with the workmen.   Whether the  contention  of  the workmen is  justified  or  not  and whether  it  would  be upheld by the Tribunal  or  not,  are wholly  different  matters and do not  affect  the  question whether  in  an  industrial dispute the work.  men  must  be interested.   It is enough to say that I find no  reason  to think  that  the appellant had no interest  in  the  dispute concerning  the  dismissal of Dr.  Banerjee.   Therefore,  I would  hold  that even if it is necessary to  constitute  an industrial dispute that workmen must have an interest in it, the dispute before us is one in which the appellants’ have a direct  and  substantial interest and it  is  an  industrial dispute. For  myself  however I would not make the  interest  of  the workmen  in the dispute a condition of the existence  of  an industrial dispute.  The Act does not do so.  I repeat  that it would be impossible to de no 1207 such  interest.  In my view, such a condition  would  defeat the  object  of  the Act.  It is  said  that  otherwise  the workmen  would be able to raise disputes in which they  were not  interested.  Supposing they did, the Government is  not bound  to  refer  such disputes for  adjudication.   Take  a concrete case.  Suppose the workmen raise a dispute that the manager  of the concern should have a higher pay.  It  would be for the Government to decide whether, the dispute  should be referred for adjudication or not.  The Government is  not bound to refer.  Now, how is the Government to decide ? That must depend on the Government’s evaluation of the situation. That this is the intention is clear from the object that the Act has in view.  I will here read from the judgment of  the Federal Courtin Western India Automobile Association case(1) what the object of the Act is.  It was said at PP. 331-332. " We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope.  The Act  is stated in the preamble to be one providing  for  the investigation  and settlement of industrial  disputes.   Any industrial dispute as defined by the Act may be reported  to Government  who may take such steps as seem to it  expedient for  promoting conciliation or settlement.  It may refer  it to  an Industrial Court for advice or it may refer it to  an Industrial  Tribunal  for  adjudication.   The   legislation substitutes  for  free  bargaining  between  the  parties  a binding award by an impartial tribunal.  Now, in many  cases an  industrial dispute starts with the making of  number  of demands by workmen.  If the demandsare not acceptable to the employer-and  that  is what often happens-it  results  in  a dismissal  of  the leaders and eventually in a  strike.   No

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machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes can  be considered effective unless it provides  within  its scope a solution for cases of employees who are dismissed in such conditions and who are usually the first victims in  an industrial dispute.  If reinstatement of such persons cannot be brought about by (1)  [1949] F.C.R- 321. 1208 conciliation  or adjudication, it is difficult, if  not  im- possible, in many cases to restore industrial peace which is the object of the legislation ". This  is the view of the object of the Act that is  accepted by  all  including the decisions in  Narendra   Kumar  Sen’s case(2)  and United Commercial Bank case (2).   In  Narendra Kumar Sen’s case (1) Chagla C. J. said at p. 130: "The  Industrial  Disputes  Act was enacted,  as  Mr.  Desai rightly  says,  to  bring  about  industrial  peace  in  the country, to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers, to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to see that the production in  our  country does not suffer by reason of  constant  and continuous labour troubles ". Therefore in deciding  whether to  refer  or  not, the Government is to be  guided  by  the question  whether  the  dispute is such as  to  disturb  the industrial   peace  and  hamper  production.   I   find   no difficulty  in  thinking that the Government  would  realise that  there  was  no risk of the peace  being  disturbed  or production being hampered by the dispute raised by the work- men  demanding  a higher salary for the manager,  for  being normal  men  the  workmen  were not  likely  to  suffer  the privations  of a strike to enforce their demand for a  cause of this nature.  The Government must be left to decide  this primary  question for itself, and therefore  the  Government must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen  had sufficient  interest in the dispute.  If Government  thought that the workmen had no such interest as would lead them  to disturb  industrial  peace  by strike or  otherwise  if  the dispute  was  not  ended, the Government might  not  in  its discretion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal. It  must  be left free to decide as it thinks  best  in  the interest  of  the country.  It is not for the Court  to  lay down  rigid principles of interest which interfere with  the Government’s discretion, for that might defeat the object of the  Act.  If the Government feels that the dispute is  such that it might lead to the disruption of industrial peace, it is the policy of the Act that it should exercise its  powers under it (1) (1953) 55 Bom.  L.R. I25 (2) [1952]  L.L.J. 782. 1209 to prevent that.  Assume a case in which the workmen  raised a dispute without having what the court considers sufficient interest to make it an industrial dispute and therefore,  on the  matter coming to the court the dispute was held not  to be an industrial dispute.  Upon that the Government’s  hands would be tied and it would not be able to have that  dispute resolved by the processes contemplated in the Act.   Suppose now that, the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is  disturbed and production hamper. ed. The object  of  the Act would then have been defeated.  And why ? Because it was said  that  it was not a dispute in which the  workmen  were interested and therefore not a dispute which was capable  of being adjusted under the provisions of the Act.  It would be no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike  in such  a  case.   If  they  would  not,  neither  would   the

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Government refer the dispute for adjudication under the  Act and  it  would  not be necessary for  the  court  to  decide whether the workmen were interested in the dispute or not or whether  the  dispute  was an  industrial  dispute  or  not. Therefore,  I think that it is not necessary to say  that  a dispute  is an industrial dispute within the meaning of  the Act only when workmen are interested in it.  Such a test  of an  industrial dispute would make it justiciable  by  courts and also introduce a rigidity in the application of the  Act which is incompatible with the fast changing concepts it has in  view and so defeat the object of the Act.  It is  enough to  assume  that as normal men, workmen would  not  raise  a dispute or threaten industrial peace on account of it unless they are interested in it. I wish however to make it clear, should any, doubt exist  as to  this,  that I do not intend to be understood  as  saying that the question whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or  not  is never justiciable by courts of law  and  that  a dispute is an industrial dispute only if the Government says so.   Such  a larger question does not arise in  this  case. All  that  I  say  is  that it is  not  a  condition  of  an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it and no question of interest 1210 falls  for decision by a court if it can be called  upon  to decide  whether a dispute is an industrial dispute  or  not. The  question of interest can only be of practical value  in that  it  helps the Government to decide whether  a  dispute should be referred for adjudication or not. Then  it  is said that if workmen were allowed  to  raise  a dispute  concerning a person who was not a workman, then  it would be possible for such a person to have his dispute with the employer adjudicated through the workmen.  This case was put.  Suppose the manager wanted his salary to be  increased but  could  not make the employer agree to  his  demand,  he could  then  instigate  the workmen and make  them  raise  a dispute  that his salary should be increased and if  such  a dispute  is  an  industrial dispute and the  award  goes  in favour of the workmen then the result would be that the  Act could be used for settling disputes between the manager  and his  employer,  a dispute which the Act did  not  intend  to concern  itself  with.  So it is said that the words  "  any person" in s. :2 (k) cannot include an employee who is not a work. man.  I am unable to agree.  First, in interpreting an Act, the Court is not entitled to assume that persons  would use its provisions dishonestly.  The words in the Act cannot have a different meaning than their natural meaning  because otherwise there would be a possibility of the Act being used for  a  purpose  for which it was  not  meant.   The  remedy against this possibility is provided in the Act, in that  it has  given complete freedom to the Government not  to  refer such  a  dispute.  It is not necessary to  meet  a  somewhat remote  apprehension that the Act may be used  for  purposes other  than  those for which it was meant, to  construe  its language  in a manner different from that which  it  plainly bears,.   Lastly,  in  doing  this  many  cases  like  Chose -earlier mentioned including the present, which are  clearly cases  of industrial disputes would have to be  excluded  in the   attempt   to  prevent  by  interpretation   a   remote apprehension  of  a misuse of the Act.  This would  do  more harm than good. 1211 1  have  therefore  come to the conclusion  that  a  dispute concerning  a  person  who  is  not  a  workman  may  be  an industrial dispute within s. 2 (k).  As it has not been said

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that  the  dispute with which we are concerned  is  for  any other  reason  not an industrial dispute, I  hold  that  the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so. I would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance  with law. ORDER OF THE COURT. In  view  of  the opinion of the  majority,  the  appeal  is dismissed.  But there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.