12 December 1952
Supreme Court
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WORKERS OF THE INDUSTRY COLLIERY,DHANBAD Vs MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRYCOLLIERY.

Case number: Appeal (civil) 133 of 1951


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PETITIONER: WORKERS OF THE INDUSTRY COLLIERY,DHANBAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRYCOLLIERY.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/1952

BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

CITATION:  1953 AIR   88            1953 SCR  428  CITATOR INFO :  R          1959 SC 841  (4)

ACT: Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 20 (2) (b), 22 (1)  (d), 24--Conciliation  proceedings-Withdrawal  of  workers-Strike after Conciliation Officer has made his report but before it is  received by Government-Legality of  strike-Chief  Labour Commissioner whether agent of Government.

HEADNOTE: A conciliation proceeding cannot be deemed to have concluded under s. 20 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in a  case where no settlement has been arrived at, as soon  as the Conciliation Officer sends his report.  It can be deemed to have concluded only when the report is actually  received by the appropriate Government. (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 729. 429 The  Chief  Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, is not,  in  the absence  of any express delegation of powers by the  Central Government,  the  agent  of the latter for  the  purpose  of receiving the report of a Conciliation Officer. The  appellants  who had sent notice of their  intention  to strike  declined to participate in conciliation  proceedings which  were initiated by the Regional  Labour  Commissioner, and  the  latter  sent  his  report  to  the  Chief   Labour Commissioner,  New Delhi, on October 22, 1949.   The  report was received by the Chief Labour Commissioner on October 25, but  a  copy  of the report was sent  by  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner,  and received by the Ministry of Labour,  only on November 17.  Meanwhile the appellants went on strike  on November 7: Held,  confirming the decision of the  Industrial  Tribunal, that  under  s.  20  (2) (b) of  the  Act  the  conciliation proceeding   held  by  the  Regional   Labour   Commissioner concluded  only on November 17 when his report was  received by  the  Central Government, and as the appellants  went  on strike before that date, it was a strike during the pendency of  conciliation proceedings and therefore illegal under  s. 22 (1) (d) of the Act. The  provisions  of  several  sections  of  the   Industrial

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Disputes Act, 1947, show that time is of the essence of  the Act and the requirements of its relevant provisions must  be punctually obeyed and carried out, if the Act is to  operate harmoniously.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 133 of  1951. Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on  the 1st December, 1950, from the Judgment dated the 24th  April, 1950,   of  the  Central  Government  Industrial   Tribunal, Dhanbad, in Appeal No. 1 of 1950, arising out of Order dated the 2nd February, 1950, of the Regional Labour  Commissioner (Central) Dhanbad. N.   C.  Chatterjee  (S.   L. Chhibber, with  him)  for  the appellants. S.   P.  Sinha  (S.  N. Mukherjee, with him)  for  the  res- pondent. 1952.  December 12.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against  the decision  dated  April 24, 1950, of the  Central  Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad confirming the decision dated February 2, 1950, of 430 the  Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad,  which had declared the one-day strike by the appellants that  took place  on  November 7, 1949, to be an illegal  strike.   The relevant facts are as follows: - On October 13, 1949, the appellants through the Secretary of their Union gave a notice to the respondents, under  section 22(1)  of  the  Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947,  that  they proposed to call a one-day strike on the expiry of  November 6, 1949, for the fulfilment of demands, 16 in number,  noted therein.  This strike notice was, in accordance with rule 85 of the rules framed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, sent to (1) the Conciliation Officer (Central), Dhanbad, (2) the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, (3) the Chief Labour Commissioner, Department of Labour,  Government of  India,  New Delhi, (4) Secretary,  Ministry  of  Labour, Government  of  India, New Delhi, and (5)  A.D.C.,  Dhanbad. This  notice  was  received at the office  of  the  Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, on October 15, 1949. ’The    Regional   Labour   Commissioner   (Central)    held conciliation proceedings at Dhanbad on October 22, 1949, but the appellants, by their letter of the same date ,  declined to  participate in the proceedings alleging that  they  were convinced  that nothing would come out of the same and  that the  proceedings  should, therefore, be  considered  "to  be ceased."  On the same day the Regional  Labour  Commissioner (Central),  Dhanbad, addressed letter No. RLC/CON 5  (Token) 7910  to the Chief Labour Commissioner, New  Delhi,  stating that  after  receipt of the notice of strike he  had  issued notice to the parties for conciliation, that the  employers’ representatives  were ready to discuss the demands  but  the Union’s  representative filed a petition in  writing  saying that they did not want to participate in the proceedings and that no fresh material had been placed before him to  change his  view  and that he was not in favour of  recommending  a reference  of  the demand to the Industrial  Tribunal.   The letter ended with a request that -the Government 431 may  be  informed of the situation.  It  appears  that  this report  was  received  in the office  of  the  Chief  Labour

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Commissioner, New Delhi, on October 25, 1949.  Although  the Chief  Labour Commissioner, in his letter’ of  November  17, 1949,  to  the  Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (  Central), Dhanbad, states that the contents of the latter’s report had already been communicated to the Ministry of Labour, a  copy of  the  report  was actually sent to and  received  by  the Ministry  of  Labour only on that day.  In the  meantime  on November  7, 1949, the appellants about 700 in number,  went on  one-day strike as per their strike  notice.   Apparently the  respondents contended that the strike was  illegal  and they  made an application, under section 8 (2) of  the  Coal Mines  Provident  Fund and Bonus Scheme Act,  1948,  to  the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, for a deci- sion  on  the  question  whether the  strike  was  legal  or illegal.  By his order dated February 2, 1950, the  Regional Labour  Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, declared  that  the strike  was  illegal.   Being  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid decision  the  appellants, under section 8 (4) of  the  last mentioned Act, preferred an appeal to the Central Government Industrial  Tribunal  at Dhanbad which, however,  also  held that the strike was illegal and that the conclusions arrived at  by  the  Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (Central)  were correct and accordingly dismissed the appear The  appellants thereafter applied for and obtained special leave to  appeal to this Court. The  only  question  raised on this appeal  is  whether  the strike  was  illegal.  Section 24 (1) of the  Act  provides, inter  alia,  that  a  strike shall  be  illegal  if  it  is commenced  or  declared in contravention of  section  22  or section 23 of the Act.  Section 22 (1) provides as follows:- "  22.  (1) No person employed in a public  utility  service shall go on strike in breach of ’contract(a) without  giving to  the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter  provided, within six weeks before striking; or 56 432 (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified  in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d)  during  the pendency of  any  conciliation  proceedings before  a  conciliation officer and seven  days,  after  the conclusion of such proceedings." Notice  of strike having been given in terms of  clause  (a) and  14 days having elapsed after the giving of such  notice as  required  -by clause (b) and the  actual  strike  having taken place after November 6, 1949, being the date specified in   the  strike  notice,  the  only  other   question   for consideration  is whether the strike took place  during  the pendency   of   any  conciliation   proceedings   before   a Conciliation Officer, and seven days after the conclusion of such  proceedings.   Under  section  20(1)  a   conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have commenced on the date  on which a notice of strike under section 22 is received by the Conciliation  Officer.  In this case the strike  notice  was received by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)  who- is  the Conciliation Officer, ’on October 15, 1949, and  the conciliation proceedings, therefore, commenced on that  date under  section 20(1).  The relevant portion  of  sub-section (2) of that section runs as follows:- A conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded- (a)................................... (b)  where  no settlement is arrived at, when the report  of the  Conciliation  Officer is received  by  the  appropriate Government  or  when the report of, the Board  is  published under section 17, as the case may be, or

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(c)................................... The  Regional  Labour  Commissioner (Central),  who  is  the Conciliation Officer in this dispute, is required by section 12 to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner and,  without delay, investigate the dispute and to  do  all such things as                       433 he  thinks  fit for the purpose of inducing the  parties  to come  to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.   In this -case the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),  held conciliation  proceedings  on  October  22,  1949,  but   no settlement could be arrived at as the appellants declined to take  part in the proceedings on the ground that  they  were convinced that nothing would come out of it.  That being the position,  under  section 12 (4) it became the duty  of  the Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (Central) to  "as  soon’  as practicable  after the close of the investigation,  send  to the  appropriate Government a full report setting forth  the steps   taken   by  him.for  ascertaining  the   facts   and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof together with a full statement of  such facts  and  circumstances.  and the reasons  on  account  of which,in this case, a settlement could not be arrived at  ". Subsection  (6)  of this section. requires that  the  report shall be submitted within fourteen days of the  commencement of  the  conciliation  proceedings or  within  such  shorter period  as may be fixed by the appropriate  Government.   As already  stated, the conciliation proceedings  commenced  on October  15,  1949.   The  report,  therefore,  was  to   be submitted within fourteen days from that date., In point  of fact the report was sent by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)  to  the Chief Labour Commissioner New  Delhi,  on October  22,  1949 (which was well within 14 days  from  the commencement  of  the conciliation  proceedings),  with  the request  that  the  Government  may’  be  informed  of   the situation.  Under sub-section (4) the report has to be  sent to  the  " appropriate Government " which according  to  the definition  under  section 2 (a) means, in  relation  to  an industrial   dispute   concerning  a   mine,   the   Central Government.  The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)  did not send the report direct to Central Government but sent it to  the Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, in  accordance with what has been called the usual course and routine of 434 official  business.  Therefore,however, was received by  the Central Government on or about November 17, 1949, and it  is only  on such receipt that the conciliation proceedings  are to  be deemed to have concluded according to the  provisions of  section  20(2)(b). Prima, facie, therefore,  the  strike which  took  place  .on November 7,  1949,  was  during  the pendency  of  the conciliation proceedings as  held  by  the authorities below. Shri  N.  C. Chattanooga, however, argues that in  point  of fact  the conciliation proceedings came to an end  when  the appellants  had  withdrawn  from  the  proceedings  and  the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) had Bent his  report. It is by a legal fiction, introduced by section 20 (2)  (b), that  the conciliation proceedings are prolonged  until  the actual receipt of the report by the appropriate  Government. According  to  Shri N. C. Chatterjee the  conciliation  pro- ceedings  should  be held to’ terminate  when  the  Regional Labour   Commissioner  (Central)  sent  his  report   within fourteen  days  of  the  commencement  of  the  conciliation proceedings.  The difficulty in accepting this’ argument  is that while the word "send     is used in section 12 (4)  and

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the word " submitted     in section 12(6), the word used  in section  20  (2), (b)is " received ".  That  word  obviously implies  the actual receipt of the report.  To say that  the conciliation  proceedings shall be deemed to have  concluded when the report should, in the ordinary course of  business, have  been  received  by the  appropriate  Government  would introduce  an element of uncertainty, for the provisions  of section 22 (1) (d) clearly contemplate that the  appropriate Government  should have a clear seven days’ time  after  the conclusion  of the conciliation proceedings to make’ up  its mind  as  to  the  further steps it  should  take.   It  is, therefore,  necessary that the beginning of the seven  days’ time should be fixed so that there would be certainty as  to when  the seven days’ time would expire.  It is,  therefore, provided in section 20 (2) (b) that the proceedings shall be deemed to have                            435 concluded, where no settlement is arrived at,when the report is actually received by the appropriate Government.  Shri N. C.  Chatterjee  on the other, hand strongly urges,  and  not without  some  force, that on that construction  it  may  be possible for the Government or its officers to withhold  the report’  designedly or the -report may be lost in course  of transit or may be actually received after the expiry of  the date  fixed  for the strike in the notice under  section  22 (I).  Shri N. C. Chatterjee also points out that it will not be  possible  for  the workers to know when  the  report  is actually  received  and their right to strike  may  thus  be taken  away from them’ Shri N. C. Chatterjee  contends  that the  Government  cannot  take advantage of  its  own  wrong. While we feel considerable force in Shri N. C.  Chatterjee’s argument based on hardship we are bound to assume that  the. public  officers  concerned would act fairly  and  properly. Further, it is not a case of the Government taking advantage of-its own wrong as suggested by Shri N. C. Chatterjee,  for here  we are concerned with a dispute between the  employers and  the  employees and there is no material  before  us  to justify  our  attributing  the  misdeeds,  if  any,  of  the Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (Central) or  of  the  Chief Labour  Commissioner, to the respondents, the employers  who are entitled to take their stand on the language of the law. The  Court can only construe the statute as it finds it  and if there is any defect in the law it is for other  authority than this Court to rectify the same. Shri  N. C. Chatterjee also urges that the  Regional  Labour Commissioner (Central) should have, under section 12,  -sent his report to the appropriate Government, which in this cage means  the Central Government, and he should not  have  sent the report to the Chief Labour Commissioner.  Assuming  that that  is the position then. the fact will still remain  that the  Central  Government  did not receive  the  report  and, therefore,  the conciliation proceedings did not come to  an end when the strike took place.  Shri 436 N.   C.  Chatterjee  also  suggests that  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner should have returned the report to the Regional Labour  Commissioner  (Central) because under  the  law  the report  should not have been made to him.  He, however,  did not  return the,same to the Regional Commissioner  but  took upon  himself to.for ward the same to the  Labour  Ministry. In  the circumstances, Shri N. C. Chatterjee urges,  on  the authority  of Chaturbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of  State  for India (1), that the Chief Labour Commissioner must be deemed to be the agent of the Central Government for the purpose of receiving  the report.  We adjourned this case in  order  to

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enable Shri N. C. Chatterjee to ascertain whether there  was any  delegation of authority in this behalf by  the  Central Government  to  the Chief Labour Commissioner.  Shri  N.  C. Chatterjee has not been able to discover any such delegation of authority.  It seems obvious to us that the Chief  Labour Commissioner cannot possibly be regarded for this purpose as the Central Government.  In point of fact by a  notification in  the  Gazette  of India dated April 5,  1947$  the  Chief Labour  Commissioner  has been appointed as  a  Conciliation Officer.   and,  therefore,  in   conciliation   proceedings conducted by him he has to submit his report to the  Central Government.   It follows, therefore, that the  Chief  Labour Commissioner must be an authority separate from the  Central Government.   According  to rule 85 to which  reference  has been made the strike notice has to be sent, amongst  others, to  the  Chief  Labour  Commissioner  as  well  as  to   the Department  of  Labour  of the Government  of  India,  which again.  indicates that the two are different entities.   The Chief Labour Commissioner is, therefore, only the channel or post   office  through  which  correspondence  between   the Regional  Labour  Commissioner  (Central)  and  the  Central Government is to pass and he cannot possibly be regarded  as an  agent  of  the ’Central Government for  the  purpose  of receiving the report.  The Chief Labour Commissioner (1)  A.I.R. 1927 All, 2i5. 437 being the official channel the ruling relied upon by Shri N. C.  Chatterjee can have no application to the facts of  this case. For  reasons  stated  above  we  are  of  opinion  that  the conclusions  arrived  at by the authorities  below  on  this point  are correct and that this appeal must  be  dismissed. In  the  -peculiar circumstances of the  case,  however,  we think  that  there should be no order as to  costs  and  the parties should bear their own costs. Before  concluding  we  must  draw  the  attention  of   the authorities concerned to the slack and unbusinesslike manner in  which  the matter was dealt with in the  office  of  the Chief  Labour  Commissioner.   The  Act  requires  that  the Conciliation  Officer must submit his report within 14  days from  the commencement of conciliation proceedings and  then on  receipt of the report by the appropriate Government  the conciliation proceedings are to be deemed to have concluded. Although  factually the conciliation  proceedings  terminate when  a  settlement is arrived at  before  the  Conciliation Officer  or  when  it is found that  no  settlement  can  be arrived  at,  the  Act, by a  legal  fiction,  prolongs  the conciliation  proceedings  until the actual receipt  of  the report by the appropriate Government and goes on to  provide that  the appropriate Government must have seven days’  time to consider what further steps it would take under the  Act. Up  ’to the expiry of this period of 7 days the Act  permits no  strike but after that period is over the employees  -are left free to resort to collective action by way of a strike. Indeed, it is on the basis of these provisions that the date of strike has to be carefully selected and specified in  the notice of strike to be given by the employees under  section 22 (1) of the Act.  Thus, even a cursory perusal of the  Act makes  it clear that time is of the essence of the  Act  and that  the  requirements of its relevant provisions  must  be punctually  obeyed and carried out if the Act is to  operate harmoniously at all.  In this case the conciliation  officer submitted his report on October 438 22, 1949, i.e., well within 14 days from the commencement of

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the  conciliation proceedings as required by section 12  (6) of  the  Act.  The report was -sent through  what  has  been called  the  routine official channel.  Admittedly,  it  was received in the office of the Chief - Labour Commissioner at New  Delhi on October 25, 1949, but surprisingly it was  not passed  on to the Ministry of Labour, which is also  in  New Delhi, until about November 17, 1949.  The employees had  no means  of knowing when the report was actually  received  by the  Central Government which is the appropriate  Government in this case or when the period of 7 days after such receipt expired.   But in the belief, entertained, we  think,  quite legitimately, that the official business had been  conducted regularly  and  promptly  the employees went  on  strike  on November 7, 1949, as previously notified.’ It now transpires that  the  report  had -not been actually  received  by  the Central Government and, therefore, on the letter of the law, the strike must be hold to be illegal and the employees must face and bear the consequences of an illegal strike and  may even be deprived’ of benefits to which they would  otherwise have been entitled.  This hardship has been thrown upon  the employees  for no fault of their own but simply  because  of the callous indifference or utter inefficiency and slackness apparently  prevailing  in the office of  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner which cannot be too strongly deprecated.  It is to be hoped that public officers would, in the discharge  of their  official  duties in future, show a greater  sense  of responsibility than, what they have done in the case  before us. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellants:   Gobind Saran Singh. Agent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee.                            439