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PETITIONER: WORKERS EMPLOYED IN HIRAKUD DAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/02/1971

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. SHELAT, J.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1971 AIR 2242            1971 SCR  (3) 646  1971 SCC  (1) 583

ACT: Central  Public  Works Department Code,  Paragraph  11--Word ’dismissed’-   in   paragraph,  meaning   of-Whether   means dismissal   for   serious  misconduct   only   or   includes termination simpliciter.

HEADNOTE: The  construction  of the Hirakud Dam was entrusted  by  the State  of  Orissa  to  the  Central  Water  Irrigation   and Navigation  Commission as their agent.  The  Commission  for this  purpose  employed  a large number of  persons  in  the worked-charged  establishment of scales of, remuneration  at the rate paid by the Central Public Works Department.  Their service conditions were to be governed by the Central Public Works  Department  Code of 1929.  After  completion  of  the first stage of the Hirakud project the State Government took it over from the aforesaid Commission.  The employees of the work charged establishment were given an option to work  for the  State on the scales of remuneration and the  conditions of  service  in  the Code.  However, since  there  was  wide disparity  between  these  employees and  the  work  charged employees  of the State’s own Public Works  Department,  the services  of  the former were terminated Such  of  them  who accepted  reemployment  were employed by the  State  on  the terms  and conditions of service of the State  Public  Works Department.  They were given compensation for termination of service   and  one  month’s  salary  in  lieu   of   notice. Subsequently   they   raised  a   dispute   contesting   the termination of their services by the State.  The  Industrial Tribunal held that under paragraph 11 of the Central  Public Works Department Code which applied to them at the  relevant time  the employees were entitled to remain in service  till the completion of the Project.  The High Court in  petitions under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution by the State held the  termination  justified under paragraph It of  the  Code because it provided inter alia that the members of the  work charmed  establishment were entitled if dismissed  otherwise than  for  serious misconduct before the completion  of  the work  in which they were engaged, to a month’s notice  or  a month’s  pay in lieu of notice.  Paragraph 11 also  provided that  the  workers could resign after a  month’s  notice  or

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forfeiture of pay in lieu of one month’s notice.  In  appeal by  the employees against the High Court’s judgment  it  was contended  before  this Court that  ’dismissal’  within  the meaning  of paragraph 11 was to be understood only  as  dis- missal for serious misconduct and not dismissal simpliciter. Support  for this contention was sought from the  fact  that the  word  ’dismissal’ as used in ’the Government  of  India Act,  1935, and in Art. 311 of the Constitution as  well  as the  Service.  Rules had been interpreted by the  Courts  to mean only dismissal by way of punishment. HELD : The word ’dismissal’ used in the Government of  India Act,  1935 as also in Art. 311 of the Constitution  and  the Service  Rules  has  no  doubt  been  interpreted  to   mean termination  of  a person’s services by way  of  punishment. But  there is clear indication in paragraph 11 of  the  Code that  the word ’dismissal’ has not been used to  denote  the termination  of the services of an employee only as  and  by way of punishment. [654 F] 6 4 7 Having made provisions for the automatic termination of  the services of an employee when the work comes to an end it  is but natural that provisions should be made to terminate  the services  of  an employee even when the work  has  not  been completed  If  the employee wants to give up  the  job  then under paragraph 1 1 he has to give a month’s notice, tailing which  he  forfeits a month’s pay in lieu or  such  notice.. Having provided for the voluntary resignation by an employee even  when the work has not been completed., it will be  odd to  hold  that  a similar right has not been  given  to  the employer to terminate the services of a workman, even though the work has not finished.  It will again be incongruous  to hold  that  when  a person is dismissed, though  not  for  a serious  misconduct,  the  workman will  be  entitled  to  a month’s  notice  or  a month’s pay in  lieu  of  notice,  if otherwise  there can be dismissal for a minor misconduct  as and  by way of punishment.  No decision has laid  down  that even  in case of dismissal a workman will be entitled  to  a months notice or a month’s pay.  The fact that paragraph  11 provides for giving a month’s notice or a month’s pay when a workman  is dismissed otherwise than for serious  misconduct indicates that the work ’dismissed’ has not been used in the sense  of termination of service by way of punishment  alone but  it  covers  also  other cases  of  termination  of  the services  of an employee even before the completion  of  the work. [654 H-655 G] The word ’dismissed’ according to its dictionary meaning  is ’to  send  away,  to  discard, to  remove  from  ’Office  or employment..........  The dictionary meaning makes it  clear that  in substance the word means ’termination of  service’. The  High  Court  was therefore right in  holding  that  the expression ’dismissed’ in paragraph 11 of the Code, has been used  to  take in the, termination of the  services  of  the employees mentioned therein both as a measure of  punishment for  serious. misconduct as well as termination  simpliciter of  the  services of an employee in  which  contingency  one month’s  notice or a month’s pay in lieu of notice is  obli- gatory.[656 B; 658 D] Dr.   Bool  Chand  v.  Chancellor,  Kurukshetra  University, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 434, applied. Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R.  828, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

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CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1492  of 1966. Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment and  order  date April  5, 1968 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 58  of 1965. M.   K. Ramamurthi, A. K. Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma  Datta, for the appellants. M.   C. Bhandare, Santosh Chatterjee and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam  J.-In this appeal by special leave  the  short question that arises for consideration is whether the  State has got 648 power  to terminate the services of any member of the  work- charged  establishment  under paragraph 11  of  the  Central Public Works Department Code (hereinafter to be referred  as the  Code) on giving one month’s notice or a month’s pay  in lieu of notice. The circumstances leading up to this appeal may be stated  A decision was taken to construct three dams right across  the Mahanadi river, one at Hirakud, the second at Tikerpara  and the third at Naraj as a multipurpose measure for  preventing flood  ravage in the Delta area, generating electricity  and providing  irrigation.  The construction of Hirakud Dam  was entrusted  by the State of Orissa to the Central  Waterways, Irrigation  and Navigation Commission as their  agent.   For the purpose of the construction of Hirakud Dam, the C.W.I.N. Commission  employed a large number of persons in the  work- charged establishment on scales of remuneration at the  rate paid by the Central Public Works Department and the  service conditions  of the persons so employed were governed by  the provisions contained in the Code. After  completion  of  the first stage of  the  Hirakud  Dam project,  the State of Orissa decided to take over the  said project from their agent the C.W.I.N. Commission with effect from  April 1, 1960.  The State further decided  to  proceed with the construction of second stage of the project through its own Public Works Department.  An option was given by the State to the employees in the work charged establishment  to decide  whether they Would continue to work under the  State on  the  same  pay  and  allowances  and  subject  to  other conditions  of  service provided in the Code  for  the  said work-charged  establishment.  The employees agreed  to  work under  the  State of Orissa and accordingly  the  employees. were allowed to continue under the State Government. The State, however, later on found that the pay,  allowances and conditions of service between the work-charged personnel of  the  Hirakud  Dam project who had  been  allowed  to  be continued   and   the   work-charged   personnel   in    the establishment of the State Public Works Department showed  a marked difference giving rise to various complications.  The Hirakud Control Board recommended to the State Government to terminate the services of the work-charged personnel of  the Hirakund  Dam by giving one month’s notice with effect  from March 31, 1963.  Accordingly the State Government terminated the  services of the said personnel with effect  from  March 31,  1963 by giving one month’s notice; but the  State  also made  it  clear  that such of those who elected  to  be  re- employed  on the scales of pay and conditions of service  of the  State Public Works Department would be  so  reemployed. On  the issue of the notice by the State, 1200 out  of  2300 personnel who had continued from before in the  work-charged establishment left their services  649

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and  the remaining 1 1 00 agreed to be reemployed on  scales of  pay and conditions of service of the State  Public  Work Department.  The employees were paid an amount equal to what they would have received by way of retrenchment compensation or by way of wages in lieu of notice. Subsequently the personnel of the work-charged establishment raised  a  dispute  contesting  the  termination  of   their services   by  the  State.   As  conciliation  failed,   the Government by its order dated February 13, 1964 referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal Orissa for  adjudication. The points referred for adjudication were :               1.Whether  the Retrenchment of Workmen  by               the   authorities  of  Hirakud   Dam   Project               effected in pursuance of the decision taken by               the Control Board, Hirakud Dam Project on  the               19th  December, 1962, is valid and legal?   If               not, to what the workmen are entitled?               2.Whether the workers who are proposed  to               be retrenched in pursuance of the decision  of               the  Control  Board,  Hirakud  and  are  still               continuing in Employment are entitled to their               original conditions of service ?               3.Whether the workmen, who have  completed               three  years  of services or  more  should  be               confirmed in their respective posts ? The main stand taken by the employees before the  Industrial Tribunal was that their service conditions being governed by the  Code  they are entitled to remain in service  till  the termination  of the work connected with the  Projects.   The work  connected with the Project not having come to an  end, the State has no power to terminate their ’services.  On the other hand, the State of Orissa took up the position that it has power under paragraph 1 1 of the Code they are  entitled to  remain in service till the termination of notice or  one month’s pay in lieu of notice even before the completion  of the work. The  Industrial  Tribunal  recorded  broadly  the  following findings : (1) the action, of the State cannot be considered to  be by way of retrenchment under the Industrial  Disputes Act  as this is not a case of discharge of  surplus  labour, (2)  the  mere  fact that the employees  have  accepted  the notice,  pay  or  compensation  does  not  stop  them   from challenging the legality of their termination, (3) paragraph 11 of the Code does not authorise the State to terminate the services  of an employee before the work is completed.   The said  paragraph gives only a limited power to terminate  the services of an employee by way of a punitive action taken as a  measure of punishment.  In this connection  the  Tribunal has 650 placed  considerable reliance on the expression  ’dismissed’ used  in paragraph 11 of the Code, (4) as the work  had  not been  completed and as the action had not been taken by  way of   punishment,  the  order  of  termination   is   without jurisdiction, (5) the termination of employment is arbitrary and  anti-contractual,  (6)  the  order  of  termination  is invalid and inoperative.  The contention raised by the State that the Project was not an industry was also overruled. The  Tribunal ultimately held that the action taken  by  the Management  of the Hirakud Dam Project in pursuance  of  the Notice  dated February 9, 1963 was invalid and  illegal  and that  the work-charged employees then working  in  different divisions of the Project and who had been recruited prior to April 1, 1960 are entitled to have their original conditions of service including scales ,of pay and dearness  allowance.

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The Tribunal further held that the employees are entitled to continuity  of  service and that their  services  cannot  be terminated before the completion of work except as a measure of punishment. The  State  challenged this award before the High  Court  of Orissa  in  Writ  Petition (O.J.C.  No.  58  of’1965)  under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.  Though the  State contended  that the Hirakud Dam Project was not an  industry and  that  the  Tribunal  has  acted  beyond  the  scope  of reference when it gave certain directions regarding pay  and allowances etc., ultimately these contentions were given up. The only contention pressed before the High :Court was  that the  Industrial  Tribunal had committed an error of  law  in construing  paragraph 11 of the Code when it held  that  the ,State  had  no  power during the progress of  the  work  to terminate  simpliciter  the  services of any  of  the  work- charged employees. The  High Court agreed with the contention of the State  and held  that  under  paragraph  11  of  the  Code,  the  State Government  ’had  power  to terminate  the  services  of  an employee even during the progress of the work on giving  one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice. Mr. M. K. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for, the  appellants,- contended that the construction placed by the High Court  on paragraph 1 1 of the Code is incorrect.  Ms contentions  ran as follows : The employees in the work-charged establishment were entitled to continue in service till the work for which they  have  been  employed  was  completed.   For,   serious misconduct the employer has got the power to dismiss such an employee without giving a month’s notice or a month’s pay in lieu of notice.  But if an employee was being dismissed  for reasons  other than for serious misconduct, the employee  is entitled  to  a month’s notice or a month’s pay in  lieu  of notice.  There  is  no power in the  employer  to  terminate simpliciter the 651 services  of  an employee so long as the work has  not  been comPleted.   The  expression "dismissal"  has  always.  been understood  and  interpreted by the courts as  action  taken against an employee by way of punishment and that expression cannot  be interpreted to include _also the  termination  of the  service  of  an  employee  otherwise  than  by  way  of punishment. Mr.  Bhandari, learned counsel for the State, on  the  other hand, urged that paragraph 1 1 is really intended to  govern the  relationship between the employer and the employees  of the   work-charged   establishment   and   the    expression "dismissal"  has  not  been used in the  sense  that  action should   necessary  have  been  only  as  and  by  way   ’of punishment.    According’   to  the  learned   counsel   the expression  "dismissal"  has  been used  in  a  loose  sense meaning termination of the services of an employee either by way of punishment for misconduct or for any other reason, We  are  not  inclined  to  accept  the  contention  of  Mr. Ramamurthy  that the expression "dismissal" in paragraph  11 has been used to denote only action taken against a  workman as  and by way of punishment.  No doubt, the expression  has not been very happily used in the said paragraph., Paragraph 1 1 of the Code is as follows :               "11.   Members  of  the  temporary  and  work-               charged   establishments,  who   are   engaged               locally,   are  on  the  footing  of   monthly               servants.  If they are engaged for a  specific               work,  their  engagement lasts  only  for  the               period  during  which  the  work  lasts.    If

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             dismissed,   otherwise   than   for    serious               misconduct, before the completion of the  work               for which they were engaged, they are entitled               to  a month’s notice or a month’s pay in  lieu               of  notice;  but otherwise,  with  or  without               notice,  their engagement terminates when  the               work  ends.   If they desire to  resign  their               appointments  they must give a month’s  notice               of  their  intention to do so,  failing  which               they will be required to forfeit a month’s pay               in   lieu  of  such  notice.   The  terms   of               engagement should be clearly explained to  men               employed   in  the   circumstances   mentioned               above."               The following aspects emerge from paragraph  1               1 of the Code               (i)   the  members of the temporary and  work-               charged  establishments, are treated to be  on               the footing of monthly servants;               (ii)if  they are engaged for specific  work,               their services last only for the period during               which the               918 Sup CI/71               652               work lasts.  To put it differently there  will               be automatic termination of the services of an               employee  when the specific work for which  he               was engaged is completed;               (iii)before  the  completion  of  a  work,  a               workman   can   be   dismissed   for   serious               misconduct.   In  such a case no  question  of               giving  a month’s notice or a month’s  pay  in               lieu of notice arises;               (iv)  before  the completion of the work,  the               workman  can also be dismissed otherwise  than               for  serious  misconduct, in  which  case  the               workman  will be entitled to a month’s  notice               or a month’s pay in lieu of notice;               (v)   in  other cases the  workman’s  services               terminate when the work ends;               (vi)  if  the  workman desires to  resign  his               appointment,  he must give one month’s  notice               of  his intention to do so, failing  which  he               will  be required to forfeit a month’s pay  in               lieu of such notice. That  the  above are terms of engagement of  a  workman,  is clear from the concluding part of paragraph 11 to the effect that "the terms of engagement should be clearly explained to men employed in the circumstances mentioned above." The question that arises for consideration is about the con- notation of the expression "dismissed" used in paragraph 11. The  contention  of  Mr.  Ramamurthy  that  the   expression "dismissed"  has  reference  only  to  termination  of   the services  of  an  employee as and by way  of  punishment  is largely   based  upon  the  provisions  contained   in   the Government of India Act and in Art. 311 of the Constitution. Based  upon those provisions Mr. Ramamurthy claims that  the expression "dismissal" is a technical word used in cases  in which  a person’s services are terminated by way of  punish- ment.   Quite  naturally he relied upon  the  Service  Rules where the word "dismissal"’, has been used to denote a major punishment  inflicted upon an employee for misconduct.   Mr. Ramamurthy, no doubt, is well-founded in his contention that the word "dismissal" used in the Government of India Act  as also  in  the Constitution and the Service  Rules  has  been

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interpreted to mean termination of a person’s service by way of punishment. By section 45 of the Government of India Act, 1919 read with Part 1 of the second schedule to that Act, several  sections includ- 6 5 3 ing. s. 96B were introduced in the Government of India  Act, 1915.  Among other things s. 96B provided that no person  in the civil service of the Crown in India may be dismissed  by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Section  96-B for the first time gave statutory  recognition and force, to the English Common Law rule that the  servants of  the Crown held their Offices during the pleasure of  the Crown.   It  also  at the same time  imposed  one  important qualification  upon  the exercise of the  Crown’s  pleasure, namely,  that  a  servant  might  not  be  dismissed  by  an authority   subordinate  to  that  by  which  he  had   been appointed. Section  96-B(1) was reproduced as sub-sections (1) and  (2) of  section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935  and  a new  section  was added to section 240 as  sub-section  (3). Sub-section  (2)  of  section 240 provided  that  no  person referred  to in subsection (1) shall be dismissed  from  the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to  that by which he was appointed.  Sub-section (3) provided that no such  person shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until  he has  been  given a reasonable opportunity of  showing  cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Then came our Constitution on January 26, 1950.  Articles 311 (1) and(2) provided as follows               "31 1 (1   No  person  who is a  member  of  a               civil  service of the- Union or  an  all-India               service or a civil service of a State or holds               a civil post under the Union or a State  shall               be  dismissed  or  removed  by  an   authority               subordinate to that by which he was appointed.               (2)   No  such  person as aforesaid  shall  be               dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except               after an inquiry in which he has been informed               of   the  charge  against  him  and  given   a               reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard   in               respect  of  those  charges and  where  it  is               proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him               any  such penalty, until he has been  given  a               reasonable      opportunity     of      making               representation  on the penalty  proposed,  but               only  on  the basis of. the  evidence  adduced               during such inquiry :" It will be noted that Art. 311 gives a twofold protection to persons  who  come within the article, namely,  (i)  against dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to that  by which  they were appointed and (ii) as against dismissal  or removal   or  reduction  in  rank  without  giving  them   a reasonable  opportunity of showing cause against the  action proposed to be taken in regard to them. 654 Discussing the above provisions in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(1), this Court observed as follows               "It  follows  from the above  discussion  that               both  at the date of the commencement  of  the               1935  Act  and of our Constitution  the  words               "dismissed",  "removed" and reduced in  rank",               as  used  in  the  service  rules,  were   all               understood as signifying or denoting the three               major’ punishments which could be inflicted on

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             Government ,servants.  The protection given by               the  rules to the Government servants  against               dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which               could   not   be  enforced  by   action,   was               incorporated in sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S.  240               to   give  them  a  statutory  protection   by               indicating   a  procedure  which  had  to   be               followed before the punishments of  dismissal,               removal or reduction in rank could be  imposed               on  them and which could be enforced  in  law.               These  protections have now been  incorporated               in Art. 311 of our Constitution.......... Thus               Under   Art.  311  (1)  the   punishments   of               dismissal,  or removal cannot be inflicted  by               an authority subordinate to that by which  the               servant  was appointed and under  Art.  311(2)               the  punishments  of  dismissal,  removal  and               reduction  in rank cannot be meted out to  the               Government  servants  without  giving  him   a               reasonable opportunity to defend himself." If  the interpretation placed upon the word  "dismissal"  in the Government of India Act and the Constitution as well  as the service rules is adopted for construing the said word in paragraph  11 of the Code, the contention of Mr.  Ramamurthy will have to be, accepted.  But there is a clear  indication in  paragraph 1 1 of the Code that the word "dismissed"  has not  been used to denote the termination of the services  of an  employee only as and by way of punishment.  Paragraph  1 1,  in our opinion, contains the terms of engagement of  the workmen.   In view of the very nature of the  employment  In the  work  which  may either finish quickly or  may  take  a considerably long time for completion, Paragraph 11 has been incorporated to govern the relationship between the  Central Public  Works Department and a workman.  In this case  there is  no controversy that even after the State took  over  the construction of the Project, relationship between the  State and the employees is governed by Paragraph 1 1. Having  made provisions for the automatic termination of the services  of an  employee,  when  the work comes to an  end,  it  is  but natural  that  provisions should be made  to  terminate  the services of an employee even when the work (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 820.  6 5 5 has  not  been completed.  In this connection it  should  be noted that if the employee wants to give up the job, he  has to  give  a  month’s notice, failing  which  he  forfeits  a month’s pay in lieu of such notice.  Having provided for the voluntary resignation by an employee even when the work  has not been completed, it will be odd to hold,that a  similar right has not been given to an employer to terminatethe services  of  a  workman,  even  though  the  work  has  not finished. It  is quite understandable  that  provisions should  be made for dismissing an employee even  before  the completion  of the work, for serious misconduct.  In such  a case,  it  is  admitted  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellants, that the question of giving a month’s notice  or a  month’s  pay in lieu of notice does not arise.   In  that contingency, it is easy to hold that the termination of  the services  of  an  employee is dismissal as  and  by  way  of punishment.   Paragraph  1  1 further provides  that  if  an employee  is  dismissed before the completion  of  the  work otherwise  than for serious misconduct, he will be  entitled to  a  month’s notice or a month’s pay in  lieu  of  notice. According to Mr. Ramamurthy, there is nothing incongruous in holding  that  when  a  workman is  dismissed  for  a  minor

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misconduct  he  will be entitled to a month’s  notice  or  a month’s  pay in lieu of notice.  In our opinion it  will  be incongruous to hold that when a person is dismissed,  though not   for  a  serious  misconduct  but  even  for  a   minor misconduct, the workman will be entitled to a month’s notice or  a month’s pay in lieu of notice, if otherwise there  can be  a  dismissal  for a minor misconduct as and  by  way  of punishment.   So  far as we could see no decision  has  laid down  that  even  in cases of dismissal a  workman  will  be entitled  to a month’s notice or a month’s pay.  If it is  a dismissal  by  way of punishment, no question of  a  month’s notice or a month’s pay in lieu of notice ever arises.   The fact that Paragraph 1 1 provides for giving a month’s notice or a month’s pay when a workman is dismissed otherwise  than for  serious misconduct indicates that the word  "dismissed" has not been used in the sense of termination of service  by way  of punishment alone but it covers also other  cases  of termination’ of the services of an employee even before  the completion  of  the work.  Interpreted in this  manner,  the position  will  be that the services of an employee  can  be terminated  as  punishment for serious  misconduct  and  the services  of  an employee can be terminated also  for  other reasons.  If the services are terminated for other  reasons. Paragraph  11  provides  for giving a month’s  notice  or  a month’s pay in lieu of notice. From  the  above  reasoning  it  is  clear  that  the   word "dismissed" has been used loosely to denote both termination of  service  for misconduct by way of  punishment  and  also termination of service simpliciter. 65 6 It must also be noted that the Code has been framed in  1929 long  before  the Government of India Act, 1935,  came  into force.  In Burrows "Words and Phrases" the word  "dismissal" has  been stated to be a word of very ambiguous meaning  and that   it  is  merely  a  convenient  expression   for   the termination  of  an employment whatever its nature  may  be. The word "dismissed" according to its dictionary meaning  is "to  send  away,  to  discard,  to  remove  from  office  or employment..........  The dictionary,meaning makes it  clear that in substance the word means "termination of service." In  Dr.  Bool Chand v. The Chancellor,  Kurukshetra  Univer- sity(1),  the import of the expression "dismissed"  came  up for consideration before this Court.  The appellant in  that case,  who  was  Professor and Head  of  the  Department  of Political Science in the Punjab University, was appointed on June  18, 1965, as the Vice-Chancellor of ’ the  Kurukshetra University.   On  March  31, 1966,  the  Chancellor  of  the University suspended the appellant from the office of  Vice- Chancellor  and by another order the appellant was  required to  show  cause why his services as Vice-Chancellor  be  not terminated.     The   appellant   after    submitting    his representation,  filed  a writ petition in the  Punjab  High Court  for quashing the order dated March 31, 1966.  On  May 8,  1966, the Chancellor of The University, in  exercise  of the  power  under sub-cl. (vi) of cl. 4 of Sch.   1  to  the Kurukshetra  University  Act, 1956, read with S. 14  of  the Punjab  General  Clauses Act, 1898, passed an  order  termi- nating the services of the appellant as Vice-Chancellor with immediate  effect.  The writ petition was  suitably  amended challenging  this order terminating the appellant’s  service as  Vice-Chancellor.   The relevant sub-clause of Cl.  4  of Schedule  I of the Kurukshetra University Act provided  that the  Vice-Chancellor will hold the office ordinarily  for  a period of three years. One  of the contentions raised before this Court  was,  that

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the  Chancellor of the University had no power to  terminate the  services of a Vice-Chancellor before the expiry of  the period  for  which he was appointed and that s.  14  of  the Punjab  General  Clauses  Act,  1898,  while  providing  for dismissal  did  not  empower  the  appointing  authority  to terminate  the services of an officer.  While  holding  that there was no express provision in the Kurukshetra University Act or the statutes thereunder dealing with the  termination of  the tenure of office of the Vice-Chancellor, this  Court held               "But  on that account we are unable to  accept               the  plea of the appellant that the tenure  of               office  of  a Vice-Chancellor  under  the  Act               cannot be determined before  (1)[1968] 1 S.C. R. 434. 6 5 7               the  expiry  of  the period for  which  he  is               appointed.   A  power  to  appoint  ordinarily               implies a power to determine the employment." Regarding  the further contention that S. 14 of  the  Punjab General  Clauses Act only empowers the appointing  authority to  dismiss  an  officer by way of punishment,  but  not  to determine an employment this Court after referring to S.  14 observe as follows               "But  s.  14 of the General Clauses Act  is  a               general  provision : it does not  merely  deal               with  the Appointment of public servants.   It               deals  with all appointments, and there is  no               reason  to hold, having regard to the  context               in  which  the  expression  occurs,  that  the               authority   invested   with   the   power   of               appointment   has  the  power   to   determine               employment  as a penalty, but  not  otherwise.               The  expression  ’dismiss’  does  not  in  its               etymological  sense  necessarily  involve  any               such  meaning as is urged by counsel  for  the               appellant.  The implication that dismissal  of               a servant involves determination of employment               as  a  penalty  has been a  matter  of  recent               development since the Government of India Act,               1935   was  enacted.   By  that  Act   certain               restrictions  were imposed upon the  power  of               the  authorities to dismiss or remove  members               of the civil service, from employment.   There               is no warrant however for assuming that in the               General Clauses Act, 1898,   the    expression               "dismiss" which was generally used  in               connection    with    the    termination    of               appointments was     intended to be used  only               in the sense of determination of employment as               a measure of punishment." From the above extract it is clear that the word "dismissal" has  to be understood in the context in which it occurs  and that  it  denotes the determination of an  employment  as  a penalty  is  a  matter  of  recent  development  since   the Government  of  India Act, 1935 was enacted.  In  the  case- before  us,  we have already pointed out that the  Code  has been  framed as early as 1929 and there is no  warrant  ,for assuming  that the expression "dismissed" has been  used  in the sense that the word was understood since the  Government of India Act, 1935.  Further the word ’dismissed’  occurring in  the  context  in which the  said  expression  occurs  in paragraph 1 1, as pointed out by us earlier, clearly denotes the  termination of the services of an employee for  serious misconduct  and for other reasons.  That expression  is  not

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used in the sense only to denote determination of employment as and by way of punishment. Mr.  Ramamurthy raised the contention that even if there  is power  of  termination  simpliciter in  the  employer  under Paragraph  11  , the High Court should not  have  interfered with the award of 658 the  Industrial  Tribunal  as the Tribunal  has  recorded  a finding that the State has not acted bona fide.  In  support of  this  contention-,  the learned counsel  relied  on  the reasoning  contained in paragraph 18 of the award.  We  have gone  through the reasoning contained in the said  paragraph and we do not find any finding recorded by the Tribunal that the  State has not acted bona fide, when it passed an  order terminating  the  services of the employees.  On  the  other hand,  what the Tribunal has held in the said  paragraph  is that  the  termination of the services of the  employees  is invalid  and illegal as it is not warranted by Paragraph  11 of the Code and hence the order of termination is invalid in law  and inoperative.  There is absolutely no basis for  the contention  that these findings are to the effect  that  the action  of  the State is not bona fide.  Thus  the  findings recorded  by the Tribunal are findings on the basis  of  the interpretation  placed by it on Paragraph 11 that the  State has  no  power to terminate simpliciter the  services  of  a work-charged  establishment.  Therefore, this contention  of Mr, Ramamurthy has to be rejected. To conclude we are in agreement with the High Court in hold- ing  that the expression "dismissed" in Paragraph II of  the Code,  has  been  used to take in  the  termination  of  the services  of  the  employees mentioned  therein  both  as  a measure  of  punishment for serious misconduct  as  well  as termination  simpliciter of the services of an  employee  in which  contingency  one month’s notice or a month’s  pay  in lieu of notice is obligatory. In   the  result  the  appeal  is  dismissed  but   in   the circumstances without any order as to costs. G.C.                            Appeal dismissed. 6 5 9