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PETITIONER: NAVALSHANKAR ISHWARLAL DAVE AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1993

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. MOHAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1994 AIR 1496            1993 SCR  (3) 676  1993 SCC  Supl.  (3) 754 JT 1993 (3)   421  1993 SCALE  (2)813

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950-7th Schedule, List III-Entry  3- Gujarat  Prevention  of Anti-Social  Activities  Act,  1985- Legislative validity and intention of. Gujarat  prevention  of Anti-Social  Activities  Act,  1985: Section   3-Power  of  detention-Delegation-Legality.    of- Illegal  possession  of  public  or  private   lands-Whether disturbs public order. Gujarat  Prevention  of Anti-Social  Activities  Act.  1985- Section  3-Indulgence  of  detenues  in  property  grabbing- Subjective  satisfaction  of District Magistrate  that  such acts  of  detenues affecting maintenance  of  public  order- Detention order-Validity of. Gujarat  prevention  of Anti-Social  Activities  Act,  1985- Sections 3, 11, 15 read with Section 21, General Clauses Act and  article 22 (5) of the Constitution  of  India-Detention order  by  authorised officer- Approval by Board  and  State Government-Procedure-Nor  approved  within  12  days-Effect- Power to revoke or rescind by detaining authority and  State Government-Scope of. Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 21,22 read with section 3,  Gujarat prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act,  1985- Representation of detenue-Consideration by State Government- Delay-Effect"Forthwith "-Meaning of. Gujarat  Prevention  of Anti-Social  Activities  Act,  1985- Sections  2(h),  2  (i)--"Property  grabber",  "unauthorised structure"-Meaning of. Words   and   Phrases-"Property   grabber",    "unauthorised structure", ’forthwith "-Meaning of. Mutation-Revenue  Record-Names  recorded-Evidentiary  value- Whether evidence to title-Title whether follows possession. Evidence Act, 1872- Sections 3, 61-Appreciation of evidence- Mutation 677 of  names in Revenue Record-Whether evidence to  title-Title whether follows possession.

HEADNOTE: The  detention  of  the  appellants  were  ordered  by   the Magistrate  on  his satisfaction in exercise of  the  powers under Section 3(1)and (2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-

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Social Activities Act, 1985. When  the appellants challenged the detention order and  the Act before the High Court filing the writ petitions in  pre- detention execution stage, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the validity of the detention order and the Act. The appellants filed SLPS against the High Court judgment. This Court, when the SLPS came up for admission, directed to list the cases after the proof of surrender of the  detenues petitioners was filed.  The appellants produced the proof of surrender.  As one Pratt, petitioner in SLP (Crl) No. 110 of 1993 did not file the proof, his SLP was dismissed. The   appellants  contended  that  the  blanket   power   of delegation  by the State Government under section 3 of  PASA was  a  negation of satisfaction on the part  of  the  State Govt. and likely to be abused by the District Magistrate  or the  Commissioner  of Police; that the order  of  delegation made  by  the State Govt. without application  of  mind  was illegal  and invalid; that the appellants could not be  said to be property grabbers of their own land, because they,  as partners  of Jaya Prabha Traders, whose name was mutated  in the revenue records since 26.4.1969, were owners of the land and  lawfully in possession, when suo motu revisional  order illegally passed by the District Collector was suspended  by the Revenue Tribunal; that PASA could not be made applicable retrospectively from 1969 and that the exercise of the power under section 3(2) by the District Magistrate was illegal. Allowing the appeals of the detenues, this Court, HELD: 1.1.Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities, Act, 1985  was  made in exercise of the power under  entry  3  of concurrent  list  III  of  7th  Schedule  and  reserved  for consideration of the President and received his assent.   So it is a valid law. (686-B) 1.2.It envisages that the State Govt. under s. 3 (1)  would exercise the 678 power of detention or authorise an officer under s. 3(2)  to detain bootlegger, dangerous person, drug offender,  immoral traffic  offender and property grabber.The PASA was made  to provide  for  preventive detention  of  aforestated  persons whose  activities  were satisfied to be prejudicial  to  the maintenance of public order. (686-C) 1.3.  The  Act postulates satisfaction on the  part  of  the State Govt. that the dangerous and anti social activities of any of the aforestated persons shall be deemed to be  acting prejudicial  to the maintenance of public order whether  the person  is engaged in or is making preparation for  engaging in  any activities enumerated in the definition clauses  and the  public  order  shall be deemed to  have  been  affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely if  the  activities directly or indirectly,  causing  or  is likely  to  cause any harm, danger or alarm  or  feeling  of insecurity among the general public or any section therefore a  grave  or widespread danger to life, property  or  public health. (686-F) 1.4. Taking illegal possession of public or private lands or unauthorised  construction or structures thereon or  dealing with   those   preposition  or   threatening   or   criminal intimidation  of  slum dwellers cause or likely  to  disturb even  public  tempo  disturbing  public  orders-To   prevent dangerous  person  or  persons  indulging  in  anti   social activities   like  land  grabbing  or  dealing   with   such properties  is  a manage to even tempo and  the  legislature intended to provide remedy by detention, be it by the  State Govt.  or the authorised officer on subjective  satisfaction

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that such activity or activities adversely affect or  likely to adversely affect public order. (688-H, 689-A) 1.5.  With  a view to have then effectively dealt  with,  to move  swiftly where public order is affected or  apprehended and   to  take  action  expeditiously  instead   of   laying information  with  the Govt. on each  occasion  and  eagerly awaiting action at State Govt. level, the State Govt  having exercised  the power under s. 3 (2)(conferred on the  Distt. Magistrate or the Commissioner the power to order  detention under s. 3(1) when he considers or deems necessary to detain any  person involved in any of the dangerous or anti  social activities prejudicially affecting or "likely to affect  the maintenance of public order". (687-D-E) 1.6.  So  long as the activities  of  bootlegger,  dangerous person, drug offender, immoral traffic offender and property grabber persist within the local limits of the  jurisdiction of the concerned Distt.  Magistrate and Commis- 679 sioners  of  Police, as the case may be and  being  directly responsible  to  maintain  public order  and  to  deal  with depraved  person  to  prevent  anti  social  and   dangerous activities  which affects adversely or are likely to  affect adversely  the  maintenance of public order,  the  necessity would  exist.  Therefore, the question of periodical  review of delegation of the order does not appear to be  warranted. The delegation to the authorised officer is legal or  valid. (687-FG) A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 710; Para 72, distinguished. 2.1.  If  an order of detention was made by  the  authorised officer, he should report as early as possible from the date of the execution of the order of detention to the Govt.  and the  order remains valid and in force for 12 days  from  the date  of  execution.  If the order is not  approved  by  the State  Govt.  within 12 days, the order of  detention  shall stand  lapsed.   For continuance after 12 days  approval  is mandatory  and remains in force till it is approved  by  the Advisory  Board.  If the Board disapproves, the  State  Govt shall  release  the  define forthwith.  It  is  a  condition precedent.   If the Board approved it then the  State  Govt. shall  confirm it.  However, its operation is for  one  year from the date of the execution under s, 3(3) (i).   However, within  three  weeks from the date of  detention  the  State Govt.  shall report to the Advisory Board and  within  seven weeks  from the date of detention the Board should give  its opinion. (692-F-G) 2.2. The detaining authority has no express power under PASA to revoke the order of detention after the approval given by the State Govt. under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of PASA.  The power to   rescind  the  detention  order,  therefore,  would   be available  to  the  authorised officer under s.  21  of  the General  Clauses Act only during its operation for  12  days from  the  date  of  execution of  the  detention  order  or approval by the State Govt. whichever is later. (692-H) 2.3.  The general power of revocation was conferred only  on the  State  Govt.,  that too in writing for  reasons  to  be recorded in that behalf. (693-H) 2.4.  The State Govt alone, has power to revoke  or  rescind the  order of detention either on representation under  Art. 22 (5) or under s. 15 of PASA.  The representation should be disposed of accordingly. (693-B) 680 2.5.  Once the order of detention was approved by the  State Govt.  within the aforestated 12days period or confirmed  by the  Advisory  Board within the period of  seven  weeks  the

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exercise  of  power  by the  authorised  officer  would  run counter to or in conflict thereof.  The State Govt. has been expressly  conferred  with  powers under s.  15  to  revoke, rescind or modify the order of detention at any time  during one  year  from the date of making the order  of  detention. (693-C) 3.1.  Mutation was got made fraudulently in  collusion  with the City Planning Superintendent.  The same was cancelled by the  District Collector by exercising the revisional  power. The  order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was  to  maintain status  quo.  The appellants, instead of maintaining  status quo,  alienated  the  major  part of  the  land  to  various persons. (689-F) 3.2.  From  the  definition of ’property  grabber’  and  the reasons  in  the  impugned  order  it  is  clear  that   the appellants are property grabbers of the government land  and that  they  created  sales  in  favour  of  third   parties, violating  the law and the order of status quo  directed  by the  Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which led to create or  likely to  create disturbance to public order disturbing  the  even tempo  in the locality.  Therefore, the Distt..   Magistrate subjectively  satisfied  that  the  appellants  indulged  in property  grabbing and for the maintenance of  public  order the Distt.  Magistrate was satisfied that the activities  of the appellants have affected adversely or deemed, likely  to be  affected  adversely creating insecurity  or  feeling  of insecurity  among the general public of that  area.   Unless the appellants are detained, it is not possible to  maintain public  order  and  tardy legal procedure does  not  aid  to maintain public order.  Accordingly the Distt.   Magistrate, exercised power of detention under s.3(1) of PASA correctly, justifiably and legally. (690-C-D) 3.3.  It  being a case of subjective  satisfaction,  Supreme Court  cannot enter upon adjudicating the legality  of  that satisfaction  when  it is found that the impugned  order  is based  on sufficient material and the grounds  are  definite and  specific.   The  impugned order was  made  on  detailed consideration  of the material on record.  The  question  of retrospective operation of PASA is misconceived. (690-B) 4.1.  The  expression forthwith would mean ’as soon  as  may be’,  that the action should be performed by  the  authority with reasonable speed and expedition with a sense of urgency without any unavoidable delay.  No hard and fast rule  could be laid nor a particular period is prescribed.  There should 681 not he any indifference or callousness is consideration  and disposal of the representation.  It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. (693E) 4.2.Any delay in consideration of the representation should be satisfactorily explained.  If no satisfactory explanation has  been  given or found to be wilful or wanton  or  supine indifferent,  it  would be in breach of  the  constitutional mandate  of Art. 22(5).  The liberty of a person  guaranteed under  Art. 21 of the constitution is a cherished right  and it can be deprived only in accordance with law. (693-F) Jayanarayan  Sukul v. State of West Bengal, [1970]3 SCR  225 at  232; Haradham Saha & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal  & Ors.,  [1975] 1 SCR 778; K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and  B.L.  Abdul Knader v. Union of India & Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 476 and  Moosa Husein  Sanghar v. The Slate of Gujarat & Ors., JT 1993  (1) SC 44, referred to. 4.3.  Though  the representation was received by  the  State Govt on February 20 1993, the State Govt. decided to keep it pending awaiting the opinion of the Board and on receipt  of the  report on March 23, 1993, considered the case  and  the

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representation was rejected on the even date, namely,  March 23, 1993. (695-B) 4.4.   The  action  of  the  State  Govt.  in  keeping   the representation  without  being considered  and  disposed  of expeditiously, awaiting the decision of the Board till March 23,1993  and consideration of the representation  thereafter and rejection are illegal. (695-C) 4.5.  There is no material placed before the Court that  the State  Govt. has approved within 12 days after execution  of the detention order i.e. Feb. 5, 1993.  On expiry of 12 days the  order  of detention becomes nonest and  the  subsequent confirmation  by  the Board or by the State Govt.  does  not below  life  into the corpse.  In either case the  order  of detention became illegal. (695D) 5.1. Section 2(h) defined "property grabber" means a  person who illegally takes possession of any lands not belonging to himself but belonging to Government, local authority or  any other agreements in respect of such lands or who  constructs unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire or 682 gives  such  lands  to any person on  rental  or  leave  and licence  basis  for construction or use  and  occupation  of unauthorised structures or who knowingly gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands or for  construction of unathorised structures thereon  or  who collects  or attempts to collect from any occupiers of  such lands  rent,  compensation  or  other  charges  by  criminal intimidation  or  who evicts or attempts to evict  any  such occupier by force without resorting to the lawful  procedure or  who  abets in any manner the doing of any of  the  above mentioned things. (687H, 688-A-B) 5.2.  A persons who illegally takes possession of any  lands not  belonging  to  himself but belonging  to  Govt.,  local authority  or under any other agreement in respect  of  such lands  or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon  or inter into agreement for sale or gives on hire or gives such lands  or  structures to any person on rental  or  leave  or licence basis for construction or for use and occupation  of unauthorised structures or who knowingly gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands or for  construction of unauthorised structures thereon or  who collects  or attempts to collect from any occupiers of  such lands  rent,  compensation,  or other  charges  by  criminal intimidations  or who evicts or attempts to evict  any  such occupier  by force without resorting to lawful procedure  or who  abets  in  any manner the doing or  any  of  the  above mentioned acts or things is a property grabber. (688-C-D) 5.3.  Sec. 2(1) defined "unauthorised structure"  means  any structure constructed in any area without express permission in  writing of the officer or authority concerned under  the enumerated  provisions therein or except in accordance  with the law for the time being in force in such area. (688-C) 6.Mutation  of  the names in the revenue record  are  not evidence of tide though may be relevant for other  purposes. In respect of open land tide follows possession. (689-D) Nirman  Singh v. Rudra Patrap Narain Singh, 53 I.A.  200  at 227; Nageshar baksh Singh v. Mt.  Ganesha, 47 I.A 57;  Durga Prasad  v.  Ghansham  Das,  AIR  1948  PC  210;  Ramana   v. Sambamoorthy, AIR 1961 A.P. 361; Mohinder Singh v. State  of Punjab and Ors., [1978] 1 SCR 177 and Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat  and  Ors., v. Nori Venkatarama  Deekshithula  and Ors. 11991] 2 SCR 531, referred to.  683

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JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 387388 of 1993. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.1992 of the  Gujarat High  Court  in Special Criminal Application Nos.  1647  and 1648 of 1992. S.  Ganesh, C.H. Patel, M.N. Shroff and Ms.  Reema  Bhandari for the Appellants. P.S.  Poti  Ms. Meenakshi Arora and Anip  Sachthey  for  the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.  RAMASWAMY, J. Since common questions of law  arise  from the  same  facts, the appeals are disposed of  by  a  common judgment. In exercise of the powers under s.3(1) of Gujarat Prevention of  Anti-Social Activities Act, 16 of 1985, for  short  PASA and  the notification of the Govt. of Gujarat under  s.3.(2) dated  May 20, 1985, the District Magistrate, Rajkot by  his proceedings  dated September 22, 1992 ordered  detention  of the  appellants  on  his finding  that  "from  the  evidence produced  before me I am satisfied as per the definition  of property grabber under s.2 (h) of the’ PASA and  considering the  seriousness  of your activities under  s.2(1)  for  the unauthorised  structures...... it clearly appears  that  you are  habitual  to  grab the Govt.  land  by  creating  false partnership  firm.  People are feeling insecurity  of  their properties.  The situation in this area is very tense and in such circumstance if any actions are taken according to  law then  there is great possibility of great blast  and  public orders  likely  to adversely affected.   For  creating  such situation your illegal activities are solely liable......... Therefore,  to  prevent the other propels being  grabbed  in future  by  you and also to prevent the  Govt.  lands  being grabbed in future and for the exigencies which have  arisen, it  is necessary to detain you as per the provisions of  the Gujarat  Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985  and an  order has been passed therefore." With detailed  reasons running  into 31 pages, the detaining  authority  enumerated the circumstances under which the detention order came to be made.  It was stated that the land measuring 58,880 sq.yards in  Survey No. 5004 belonging to the Govt. has been  grabbed by Girdhar Joshi and Manu Bhai Vora.  Manu Bhai Vora created a  false partnership firms by name "Jayaprabha  Traders"  to which  the appellants and Prashant Manubhai  Vora  (Manubhai Vora’ s son) are 684 partners.  The lands measuring 4,800 sq. yards in plot No. 4 known as Madir of Sheet No. 226 City Survey No. 3959 in Ward No.7  of Rajkot originally belongs to the former state.   It was purchased by one gopalji D. Doshi from the former  ruler for residential purpose.  But within the prescribed time, as per  the  then  existing rules, no  construction  was  made. Consequently the State had confiscated the said property  in order  No.  8336  of  S.Y.  1995  i.e.  1938-39.   Naginadas Laxmichand  Doshi and Manu Bhai Vora in collusion with  City Survey Superintendent created forged documents mutating  the aforesaid   lands   by  the  order  of   the   City   Survey Superintendent,  dated  April  28,  1968  in  the  name   of Jayaprabha  Traders.  On May 6, 1969 the  above  partnership was created and was got registered on October 22, 1969.  The appellants  and  Prashant  M. Vora  were  partners  therein. Manubhai Vora is the man behind the scheme.  The partnership was dissolved on February 28, 1974.  Yet in the name of  the partnership   the  Govt.  lands  are  being  grabbed.    The

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department  came  to know the collusive acts for  the  first time  on  August  26, 1986 and  necessary  particulars  were collected to find whether it is a Govt. property or  belongs to  the aforesaid persons.  The Record disclosed that it  is the  Govt. property and orders were issued on  December  14, 1987  cancelling  the  mutation  and  also  confiscated  the property   to  the  Govt.   After  becoming  aware  of   the activities Manubhai Vora and Naginadas Laxmichand Joshi were detained.  The appellants and Prashant M. Vora, though  were given show cause notice on August 28, 1986 to appear  before him for hearing, neither they availed of it nor produced any evidence  in support of their claim.  After considering  the material the Collector exercising suo motu revisional  power under  Bombay Revenue Code by order dated  December  14,1987 concluded  that  the property belongs to the Govt.  and  was confiscated  to the State--The appellants and  P.M. Vora  as partners  of  the dissolved partnership firm  and  in  their individual capacity filed appeal before the Gujarat  Revenue Tribunal  on  February 28, 1987, diving  their  address  CIO Economic  traders,  a firm of which Manu Bhai Vora  and  his brothers  are partners.  The Tribunal by orders  on  January 30,  1988,  while  suspending  the  implementation  of   the Collector’s order directed that "till final disposal of this appeal status quo in respect of the lands to be maintained". Yet  the appellants and P.M. Vora sold the lands to  several persons  in  their individual capacity.   The  resident  Dy. Collector.   Rajkot  made an enquiry on June  29,  1992  and recorded  the statements of the purchasers  which  discloses that  instead  of  maintaining status  quo,  the  appellants individually sold away the entire 4,800 sq. yards except 500 to  600  sq. yards to diverse persons.   The  statements  of purchasers  show that the appellants assured them clear  and marketable  title to the lands without any  encumbrance  and collected  about  Rs.  15  lacs  from  the  purchasers   and unauthorised  constructions were made.  While recording  the instatement  and thereafter the purchasers  became  panicky. The  acts of petitioners created tension in the area.   Even on notices given  685 to  the purchasers on July 2, 1992 to produce the  proof  of their title, many of them made admission that they  believed the  s  statement made by the appellants and P.M.  vora  and that they have been missed.  They have also stated that  the appellants  had  taken signatures on blank papers  and  they were  fabricated.   By notice dated July 8,  1992  when  the appellant were called upon to appear on July 13, 1992 before the District Collector, instead of appearing before him  and showing  cause,  they approached the Civil Court  and  filed O.S.  No.  719 of 1992 and obtained injunction  against  the Distt.  Collector, From those facts the detaining  authority concluded  that  "you are not possessing any proof  of  your ownership in respect of the disputed land.  Still,  however, you have sold the disputed land and you have remained active in such scandals.  You have cheated the buyers of the  plots and  in such conspiracy you have created  baseless  evidence whereby more and more people would be cheated you have given false  assurance to the people regarding clear title of  the plots.    Thus   the  people  have   purchased   lands   for construction.   The poor people have purchased the shops  by spending their hard earned money and have purchased shops by making  debts.  You have played game with the lives of  poor people  and  taking advantage of their-  ignorance,  and  on coming  to  know  that they have  been  cheated,  they  feel disappointed  and disheartened and the atmosphere  of  grief has  spread  all  over  the said area  and  they  made  oral

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representations  and  requests  to  punish  the  responsible persons.......   The  detaining  authority  also   referred, wherever  necessary  to  the documentary  evidence  in  that behalf.   On  subjective satisfaction from those  facts  the detention order came to be made.  The appellants  approached the Gujarat High Court in pre-detention execution stage  and High  Court upheld the validity of delegation order and  the Act  in its judgment dated 20th November, 1992;  dealt  with the  scope  of pre-detention order and  dismissed  the  writ petitions.   When  special  leave  petitions  came  up   for admission by order dated Feb. 1, 1993 this court directed to list the cases after the proof of surrender was filed.   The appellants   Navalshanker  Ishwerlal  Dave   and   Shantilal Prabhudas  Dhruv after surrendering before  the  authorities produced its proof.  Prasant Manubhai Vora, son of  Manubhai Vora  did not surrender.  By order dated July 22,  1993  the special  leave petition (Crl.) No. 110 of 1993  of  Prashant Manubhai  Vora was dismissed and the  appellants’  petitions were  taken up for admission.  The state filed  its  counter and  an additional affidavit and we have heard  the  learned counsel on either side at length. Section  3(2) of PASA empowers the State Govt.  That  having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to  prevail in any area within the. local limits of the jurisdiction  of a District Magistrate and the Commissioners of Police, by an order  in  writing  direct  that  District  Magistrate,  the Commissioner of Po lice may also, it satisfied the existence of  conditions  envisaged  in  sub-section  (1)  of  s.3  to exercise the powers of the State Govt. to detain any person. The contention of Shri 686 Ganesh,  the learned counsel for the appellants is that  the blanket power of delegation is a negation of satisfaction on the  part of the State Govt. and likely to be abused by  the District  Magistrate  or the Commissioner  of  police.   The Legislature  entrusted the power to the State Govt.  and  if need  be  only  selectively but not  blanket  delegation  is permissible.  After the issue of the notification in 1985 no review thereafter was done.  The order of delegation made by the State Govt. without application of mind was,  therefore, illegal  and invalid and the sequitur detention made  became illegal.  We find no force in the contention.  PASA was made in  exercise of the power under entry 3 of  concurrent  list III  of 7th Schedule and reserved for consideration  of  the President  and received his assent.  So it is a  valid  law. It  envisages  that  the State Govt.  under  s.  3(1)  would exercise  the  power of detention of  authorise  an  officer under  s. 3(2) to detain bootlegger, dangerous person,  drug offender,  immoral  traffic offender and  property  grabber. The  PASA  was made to provide for preventive  detention  of aforesaid  persons  whose activities were  satisfied  to  be prejudicial  to the maintenance of public order.  Subs.  (4) of  Sec.3  declares  that a person shall  be  deemed  to  be "acting  in  any manner prejudicial to  the  maintenance  of public  order" when such person is engaged in or  is  making preparation  for  engaging in any activities, whether  as  a bootlegger, dangerous person, drug offender, immoral traffic offender and property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public  order. Explanation  thereto postulates that public order  shall  be deemed  to have been affected adversely or shall  be  deemed likely  to  be affected adversely inter alia if any  of  the activities by any person referred to in the sub-section  (4) directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm,  danger  or alarm or feeling of insecurity  among  the

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general  public  or  any  action  thereof  or  a  grave   or widespread  danger  to  life,  property  or  public  health. Therefore,  the Act postulates satisfaction on the  part  of the   State  Govt.  that  the  dangerous  and  anti   social activities of any of the aforestated persons shall be deemed to be acting prejudicial to the maintenance of public  order whether  the person is engaged in or is  making  preparation for  unaging in any activities enumerated in the  definition clauses  and the public order shall be deemed to  have  been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be  affected adversely if the activities directly or indirectly,  causing or  is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or  feeling of  insecurity  among  the general  public  or  any  section thereof of a grave or widespread danger to life,property  or public health.  In the counter affidavit filed on behalf  of the  State in the High Court and consideration  thereof  the High Court held that "the situation was found prevailing  in the  State  in  the  year  1985  where  the  impact  of  the activities of various persons mentioned in the preamble with reference  to  their respective, activities  has  heightened from  being  anti-social  and  dangerous  activities  to  be prejudicial  to  the maintenance of public order".   It  is, with  a  view,  to  curb  those  dangerous  or  anti  social activities, the Govt. considered it appropriate to delegate  687 the  power  under sub-s. (2) of sec. 3  to  the  "authorised officer"  and the Govt. has stated in the notification  that "having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely  to prevail  in  any  area  within  the  local  limits  of   the jurisdiction of each of the District Magistrate specified in the  schedule  annexed  thereto, the  Govt.  of  Gujarat  is satisfied  that  it is necessary so to do"  and  accordingly exercised  the power under sub-s.(2) of sec.3  and  directed the authorised officers i.e. the District Magistrate of each District  specified  in  the schedule  and  also  the  three Commissioners  of Police in the respective  Corporations  to exercise  within  their local limits  of  jurisdiction,  the power conferred by sub-s. (1) of sec.3. It is seen that  the dangerous  or  anti  social  activities  are   legislatively recognised  to be prejudicial to the maintenance  of  public order.   The enumerated activities hereinbefore referred  to are  not  isolated but being indulged in from time  to  time adversely  affecting the public order and even  tempo.   The Dist.    Magistrate  concerned,  being  the  highest   Dist. Officer  on the spot and the Commissioner of Police  in  the cities  have  statutory  duty  to  maintain  public   order. Therefore, with a view to have then effectively dealt  with, to   move  swiftly  where  public  order  is   affected   or apprehended  and  to take action  expeditiously  instead  of laying  information  with  the Govt. on  each  occasion  and eagerly  awaiting  action at State Govt.  level,  the  State Govt. having exercised the power under s. 3 (2) conferred on the Dist.  Magistrate or the Commissioner the power to order detention under s.3(1) when he considers or deems  necessary to  detain  any person involved in any of the  dangerous  or anti    social    activities    enumerated     hereinbefore, prejudicially affecting or "likely to affect the maintenance of  public  order".   The  later  clause  lay  emphasis   on immediacy and promptitude and the authorised officer on  the spot is the best Judge to subjectively satisfy himself  from the  facts and ground situation and take preventive  measure to  maintain public order.  The reliance by Shri  Ganesh  on the  decision of this Court reported in A.K Roy v. Union  of India & Anr.  AIR 1982 SC 710, para72 has no application  in view of the factual background in this Act.  So long as  the

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activities  of bootlegger, dangerous person, drug  offender, immoral traffic offender and property grabber persist within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the concerned  Dist. Magistrate and Commissioners of Police, as the case may  be, and being directly responsible to maintain public order  and to  deal  with depraved person to prevent  anti  social  and dangerous  activities which affects adversely or are  likely to  affect  adversely the maintenance of public  order,  the necessity   would   exist.   Therefore,  the   question   of periodical review of delegation of the order does not appear to  be  warranted.  Accordingly, we have  no  hesitation  to reject the contention that the delegation to the  authorised officer is illegal or invalid. Section  2(h) defend "property grabber" means a  person  who illegally  takes  possession of any lands not  belonging  to himself but belonging to Government, local authority or  any other agreements in respect of such lands or who constructs 688 unauthorised  structures thereon for sale or hire  or  gives such  lands  to any person on rental or  leave  and  licence basis for construction or use and occupation of unauthorised structures  or  who  knowingly gives financial  aid  to  any person  for taking illegal possession of such lands  of  for construction  of  unauthorised  structures  thereon  of  who collects  or attempts to collect from any occupiers of  such lands  rent,  compensation  or  other  charges  by  criminal intimidation  or  who evicts or attempts to evict  any  such occupier by force without resorting to the lawful  procedure or  who  abets in any manner the doing of any of  the  above mentioned things.  See 2(1) defined "unauthorised structure" means any structure constructed in any area without  express permission in writing of the officer of authority  concerned under  the  enumerated  provisions  therein  or  except   in accordance with the law for the time being in force in  such area.  Therefore, a person who illegally takes possession of any  lands not belonging to himself but belonging to  Govt., local  authority or under any other agreement in respect  of such lands or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon or  enter into agreement for sale or gives on hire or  gives such lands or structures to any person on rental or leave or licence basis for construction or for use and occupation  of unauthorised structures or who knowingly gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands or for  construction of unauthorised structures thereon or  who collects  or attempts to collect from any occupiers of  such lands  rent,  compensation,  or other  charges  by  criminal intimidation  or  who evicts or attempts to evict  any  such occupier  by force without resorting to lawful procedure  or who  abets  in  any manner the doing of  any  of  the  above mentioned  acts or things is a property grabber.  Para 4  of the statements and objects of the Act furnishes clue to make the  property  grabbing  or  unauthorised  construction   or dealing  therewith  as  prejudicial to  the  maintenance  of public order thus: "Acute shortage of housing accommodation in major cities  is being  exploited by certain musclemen of some  means,  often get from bootlegging, by taking illegal possession of public or private lands and constructing or permitting construction thereon  of  unauthorised structure or selling,  leasing  or giving  on  leave  and licence  such  land  or  unauthorised structure after collecting heavy price, rents,  compensation and  the  like,  in  so  collecting  the  charge  from   the occupiers,  the musclemen resort to  criminal  intimidation. The  entire community living in the slums is under the  grip of perpetual fear of such land grabbers.  Such activities of

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these   persons   adversely  affect   the   public   order". Therefore,  taking illegal possession of public  or  private lands or unauthorised construction or structures thereon  or dealing  with  those properties or threatening  or  criminal Intimidation  of  slum dwellers cause or likely  to  disturb even  public  tempo  disturbing public  order.   To  prevent dangerous  person  or  persons  indulging  in  anti   social activities like 1and  689 grabbing or dealing with such properties is a menace to even tempo  and  the legislature intended to  provide  remedy  by detention,  be  it  by the State  Govt.  or  the  authorised officer  on  subjective satisfaction that such  activity  or activities  adversely affect or likely to  adversely  affect public order. The  contention  of  Shri  Ganesh  that  the  appellants  as partners  of Jaya Prabhu Traders whose name was  mutated  in the revenue records as early as April 26, 1969 are owners of the lands and lawfully in possession and suo motu revisional order passed by the Dist.  Collector cancelling the mutation under Bombay Revenue Court on December 14,1987, was  illegal and  so it was suspended by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal  on January  30,  1988  which still  subsists.   Therefore,  the appellants  cannot  be  said  to  be  property  grabbers  of their   own  land.   The  Act  cannot  be  made   applicable retrospectively from 1969.  The exercise of the power  under s.3(2)  by the Dist.  Magistrate, Rajkot is illegal.  It  is settled  law  as laid down by the Privy  Council  in  Nirman Singh v. Rudra Patrab Narain Singh, 5 3 Indian Appeal 220 at 227 Nageshar Baksh Singh v. Mi.  Ganesha, 47 Indian  Appeals 57;  Durga  Prasad  v. Ghansham Das.  AIR  1948  PC  2  10-, Ramanna v. Sambamoorthy AIR 1961 A.P. 361 by A.P. High Court and  by this Court in Mohinder Singh v. State of punjab  and Ors., [1978] 1 SCR 177 and Vatticherukuru Village  Panchayat and Ors. v. Nori Venkatarama Deek-shithulu and Ors. [1991] 2 SCR 531 that mutation of the names in the revenue record are not  evidence  of title thou oh may be  relevant  for  other purposes.  Equally it is settled law that in respect of open land  title  follows possession.   The  detaining  authority stated  in the impugned orders that for the first  time  the Dist.   Collector,  Rajkot  became  aware  in  1987  of  the grabbing  of  Govt.  lands  by  the  petitioners’  firm,   a fictitious  one and that the enquiry caused in  that  behalf revealed  that  the  land  is  in  confirmed  list  of   the government  lands.   Mutation was got made  fraudulently  in collusion with the City planning Superintendent. Accordingly the  same was cancelled by exercising there visional  power. The  order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was  to  maintain status  quo.  The appellants, instead of maintaining  status quo, alienated the major part of the land to various persons who had averred in their statements recorded by the Resident Dy.  Collector and sale deeds would show that the appellants sold  the lands individually assuring clear title  and  non- encumbrance  thereof-, permitted many of the  purchasers  to construct   shops  un-authorisedly.   When  questioned   and opportunity  was  given,  the appellants did  not  make  any representation  nor  appeared before the  Dist.   Collector, Instead they invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for injunction.   The purchasers became panic when became  aware that  they have no title to their purchased lands and  their construction are unauthorised.  The Resident Dy.   Collector made  elaborate  enquiry  and  submitted  the  report.    On consideration  of the record he was  subjectively  satisfied that the activities. of the petitioner 690

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constitute property grabbers and in its background the Dist. Magistrate  satisfied  that their  activities  affected  and likely  to  affect  adversely public order  and  passed  the impugned  order.  Therefore, it being a case  of  subjective satisfaction, we cannot enter upon adjudicating the legality of that satisfaction when we find that the impugned order is based  on sufficient material and the grounds  are  definite and  specific.   The  impugned order was  made  on  detailed consideration  of the material on record.  The  question  of retrospective operation of PASA is misconceived.  Therefore, it is difficult to agree with Sri Ganesh that the appellants are  not property rabbits.  From the definition of  property grabber  and the reasons in the impugned order it  is  clear that the appellants are property grabbers of the  government land and that they created sales in favour of third parties, violating  the law and the order of status quo  directed  by the  Gujarat  Revenue Tribunal which led to  create  or  was likely to create disturbance to public order disturbing  the even   tempo   in  the  locality.   Therefore,   the   Dist. Magistrate   subjectively  satisfied  that  the   appellants indulged  in  property grabbing and for the  maintenance  of public  order the Dist.  Magistrate was satisfied  that  the activities of the appellants have affected adversely or were likely  to  be  affected adversely  creating  insecurity  or feeling of insecurity among the general public of that area. Unless  the appellants are detained, it is not  possible  to maintain public order and tardy legal procedure does not aid in   maintaining  public  order.   Accordingly   the   Dist. Magistrate, Rajkot exercised power of detention under s.3(1) of PASA correctly, justifiably and legally. Though the detention orders were made on September 22,  1992 the appellants and Prashant Manubhai Vora avoided  execution thereof  and  till  February 5, 1993  the  detention  orders remained   unexecuted.   Manubhai  Vora  chose   to   remain unsurrendered and obviously so far avoided execution of  the orders.   Therefore, we are not called upon to consider  the legality  of  the detention order passed against  him.   The appellants surrendered on Feb. 5, 1993 and so the  detention order  was  executed on Feb. 5, 1993.   The  dention  orders mention  that "You have the right to make representation  to the detaining authority and also to the Govt. 1 on have also right to make written representation to the Advisory  Board. You   may   send  your  representation  through   the   Jail Superintendent   to   the  addresses  given   herein."   The appellants submitted their representations on Feb. 18,  1993 to  the  detaining authority, respondent No.  2,  the  State Govt., respondent No. 1, and the Advisory Board through Jail authority.  The State Govt. sent the representations to  the Advisory  Board  on  Feb. 20,1993.  On March  10,  1993  the Advisory Board fixed its meeting for consideration on  March 22,  1993  and the Board confirmed the  detention  order  on March 22, 1993.  The State Govt. awaited the opinion of  the Advisory  Board and on its receipt on March 23, 1993 it  was considered and the  691 Govt. rejected the representation on March 23, 1993.  It was despatched  on March 29, 1993, It is stated in  the  written submission  of the appellants that till April 29,  1993  the second  appellant did not receive any reply from  the  State Govt.   The first appellant did not receive any  reply  till that  date  from the detaining authority though  the  second appellant received such a reply rejecting the representation of  Feb. 22, 1993.  The first appellant received  the  reply from  the  State  Govt.   On April  6,  1993  rejecting  the representation after 47 days from the date of his submitting

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the representation.  Sri J.M. Parmar, Under Secretary,  Home Department of Gujarat stated in his Addl.  Affidavit that  a copy of the representation from the appellants was  received on  Feb.  20, 1993 by which date, i.e. on Feb 18,  1993  the State  Govt.  had already referred the case along  with  the relevant  material to the Advisory Board for review  of  the case.    "The  Department  of  Home  decided  to  keep   the representation  in  abeyance  awaiting the  opinion  of  the Advisory Board". sub-s.  (1)  thereof  by any authorised  officer,  he  shall forthwith  report the fact to the State Govt. together  with the grounds on which the order has been made and such  other particulars  as in his opinion have a bearing on the  matter and  no  such order shall remain in force for more  than  12 days  after  making thereof, unless in the meantime  it  has been  approved by the State Govt.  The detaining  authority, the  second respondent, did not file any  counter  affidavit and  the counter affidavit and Add]. affidavit filed by  Sri J.M.  Parmar, did not mention as to when the 2nd  respondent reported  to them of the order of detention and the  grounds or  any  other particulars deemed relevant  as  mandated  in s.3(3). We assume that the 2nd respondent sent them and were received by February 20, 1993 and immediately thereafter  it was referred to the Advisory Board for its opinion.  It  was not  stated  in the counter affidavit that the  State  Govt. approved  the  order of detention, within 12 days  from  the date  of receipt by the State Govt. i.e. February 20,  1993. The  mandate of s.3(3) is that the action of the  authorised officer would be legal only when the State Govt. approves of it  and in its absence on expiry of 12 days detention  order should  stand  lapsed.  Section 15 postulates  that  without prejudice to the Bombay General Clause Act, 1904 a detention order  May  at any time, for reasons to be recorded  in  the order,   be  revoked  or  modified  by  the   State   Govt., notwithstanding   that  the  order  has  been  made  by   an authorised officer.  Sub-section (2) is not material for the purpose  of  this case.  Hence omitted.  Section 21  of  the General Clause Act envisages that where, by any Gujarat Act, a power to issue notification, orders, rules or bye-laws  is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable  in the  like  manner  and  subject to  the  like  sanction  and conditions  if  any, to add to, amend, very or  rescind  any notification, order, rules or bye-laws are issued.   Article 22(5) of the Constitution accords constitutional 692 right  of  representation to the detenue against  any  order made  in  pursuance of any law.  The mandatory duty  on  the authority  making  such  order, "shall as soon  as  may  be" communicated to such person, the grounds on which the  order has been made and shall afford him the earliest  opportunity of making a representation against the order.  Section II of PASA  provides  that  within three weeks from  the  date  of detention of a person tinder the order the State Govt. shall place  before  the Advisory Board the grounds on  which  the order has been made, etc. as well as the report made by  the authorised  officer  under  sub-s.  (3)  of  s.  3  and  the representation, if any.  The Board under s. 12 shall  submit its report, after considering the material placed before  it and  the representation of the dentenue and if  the  detenue desires  to be heard, after hearing him in person, within  7 weeks from the date of the detention of the detenue.  If the Advisory  Board  reports  that in its opinion  there  is  no sufficient  cause for the detention, the State  Govt.  shall revoke  the  detention  order and cause the  detenue  to  be released forthwith.  Under s. 13 the State Govt. may confirm

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the  order  of detention for a period of one year  from  the date  of  detention.   In  other words,  from  the  date  of execution of the order of detention as provided under s. 14 The  reappears to be a seeming over-lap in consideration  of the  representation  of the detenue and its  effect  on  the orders by the authorities concerned.  It is seen that  under sub-s.  (1) of s.3 the State Govt. is empowered to  pass  an order  of detention in which event it has to report  to  the Advisory  Board  as  envisaged  in s. 11.  If  an  order  of detention  was  made  by the authorised  officer,  he  shall report  the same as early as possible without any delay  and the  State Govt. shall approve the same within 12 days  from the date of its making.  In other words, the effect would be that  the  authorised  officer should  report  as  early  as possible  from  the date of the execution of  the  order  of detention  to the Govt. and the order remains valid  and  in force for 12 days from the date of execution.  If the  order is  not  approved by the State Govt.  Within  12  days,  the order  of  detention shall stand  lapsed.   For  continuance after  12  days approval is mandatory and remains  in  force till  it  is approved by the Advisory Board.  If  the  Board disapproves,  the  State  Govt. shall  release  the  detenue forthwith.   It  is  a condition precedent.   If  the  Board approves  it  then  the  State  Govt.   Shall  confirm   it. However, its operation is for one year from the date of  the execution  under  s.3(3) (i).  However, within  three  weeks from  the date of detention the State Govt. shall report  to the  Advisory Board and within seven weeks from the date  of detention the Board should give its opinion.  The  detaining authority  has  no express power under PASA  to  revoke  the order  of  detention after the approval given by  the  State Govt. under sub-s. (3) of s.3 of PASA.  The power to rescind the  detention  order, therefore would be available  to  the authorised  officer  under s.21 of the General  Clauses  Act only during its operation for 12 days from the date of  693 execution  of the detention order or approval by  the  State Govt.  whichever is later.  The general power of  revocation was  conferred only on the State Govt., that too in  writing for  reasons  to be recorded in that behalf.   By  necessary implication  flowing from s.3(3) and concomitant  result  is that the authorised officer has no express power or  general power  under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act to  revoke  or rescind  or modify the order after the State Govt.  approved of  it under sub-s. (3) of s.3 read with S.3(1).  The  State Govt.  alone, thereafter has power to revoke or rescind  the order of detention either on representation under Art. 22(5) or  under  s.  15 of PASA.   The  representation  should  be disposed  of accordingly.  The reason is obvious  that  once the  order  of  detention was approved by  the  State  Govt. Within  the aforestated 12 days period or confirmed  by  the Advisory Board within the period of seven weeks the exercise of  power by the authorised officer would run counter to  or in  conflict  thereof.  The State Govt. has  been  expressly conferred  with  powers  under s. 15 to  revoke  rescind  or modify  the order of detention at any time during  one  year from the date of making the order of detention.   Therefore, the  right  of representation guaranteed  under  Art.  22(5) would,  thereafter  i.e.  after approval under  s.  3(3)  be available  to  the detenue for consideration  by  the  State Govt. The  word ’forthwith’ has been interpreted by this court  by plethora of precedents and it is not necessary to burden the judgment  by referring them once over copiously  though  the counsel  for the appellants has relied on them.  This  court

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held  that the expression ’forthwith would mean as  soon  as may  be’,  that  the  action  should  be  performed  by  the authority with reasonable speed and expedition with a  sense of urgency without any unavoidable delay.  No hard and  fast rule  could be laid nor a particular period  is  prescribed. There  should  not  be any indifference  or  callousness  in consideration  and  disposal  of  the  representation.    It depends  on the facts and circumstances of each  case.   Any delay  in  consideration  of the  representation  should  be satisfactorily  explained.  If no  satisfactory  explanation has  been  given  or  is found to be  wilful  or  wanton  or supinely   indifferent  it  would  be  in  breach   of   the constitutional  mandate  of Art. 22(5).  The  liberty  of  a person  guaranteed  under Art. 21 of the constitution  is  a cherished  right and it can be deprived only  in  accordance with law. In  Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal [1970]  3  SCR 225  at  232, the facts were that the detenue had  made  his representation to the State Govt. on June 23, 1969.  On July 1, 1969, the Govt. forwarded to the Advisory Board his  case together  with his representation.  On August 13, 1969,  the Board  sent  its report and based thereon  the  State  Govt. rejected the representation of the detenue.  A  constitution bench of this Court laid four principles, one of which being that the consideration of the representation of the  detenue by  the  State  Govt. is independent of any  action  by  the Advisory Board including its consideration of the represen- 694 tation.   The  appropriate  Government is  to  exercise  its opinion  and judgment on the representation  before  sending the  case  along with the detenue’s  representation  to  the Advisory  Board.   If  the  appropriate  government   itself releases  the detenue the case need not be sent  along  with detenue’s  representation  to the Advisory  Board.   It  the Advisory Board expresses an opinion in favour of the release of the detenue the release of the detenue thereafter by  the appropriate  government  will be  independent. Even  if  the Advisory  Board express any opinion against the  release  of the  detenue still the government may exercise its power  to release the detenue.In Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. The State  of West Bengal & Ors. [1975] 1 SCR 778, if another constitution bench reiterated the same view holding that the presentation is  made after the matter has been referred to the  Advisory Board,  the detaining authority will consider it  before  it will  send  representation  to the Advisory  Board.  In  KM. Abdulla Kunhi and B. L Abdul Khader v. Union of India & Ors. [1991]  1  SCC 476 reviewing the case law  the  constitution bench held that the representation relates to the liberty of the  individual;, it is enshrined under Art. 2 1;  therefore Cl.(5) of Art. 22 cast a legal obligation on the  government to  consider representation as early as possible and  should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense  of urgency without an unavoidable delay. However, there can  be no  hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends  upon  the facts  and  circumstances of each case. There is  no  period prescribed  in this behalf within which  the  representation should  be  dealt  with but the requirement  is  that  there should  not  be  any indifference  or  callous  attitude  in considering   the  representation.  Unexplained   delay   in disposing  of  the representation would be a breach  of  the constitutional mandate rendering the detention impermissible and illegal. Therein the representation was received by  the Govt. on April 17, 1989, The Advisory Board was  constituted thereafter and held its meeting on April 20, 1989. After its submitting  the report the Govt. on April 27, 1989  affirmed

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the  order of detention and held that there was a breach  of constitutional  mandate  of  Art.  22(5).  In  Moosa  Husein Sanghar  v. The State of Gujarat & Ors. JT (1993) 1  SC  44, the detention order was served on the appellant on  February 21, 199 1. On March 22, 1991 the declaration was made  under s.  9 of COFEPOSA by the Central Govt. The appellant  handed over  the  representation  dated  March  15,  1991  to  jail authorities for onward transmission. It was addressed to the Advisory  Board. It was received by the detaining  authority on March 18, 1991 who returned it to the appellant on  March 27,1991 to follow the manner of service representation meant for  Advisory  Board.On March 25, 1991  the  Advisory  Board considered the representation. On March 30, 1991 again other representation  was  sent to the Advisory Board.  The  Zerox copies  of the representation were sent to the  Chairman  of the  Advisory  Board.  On May 6, 1991  the  Board  sent  its opinion  to  the  State  Govt. On May  13,  1991  the  Govt. confirmed  the  order  of  detention and  on  the  same  day rejected the represen- 695 tation  of the appellant.  When the writ petition was  filed the  Hi  oh Court dismissed the petition.  On  appeal,  this Court  held that though the representation was addressed  to the  Advisory Board, the communication was meant to  be  the representation under Art. 22(5) and the Govt. must  consider and  dispose it of.  The failure to do so and its  rejection on receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board was held  to be in breach of the constitutional mandate under Art. 22(5). Accordingly  this  court  declared that  the  detention  was illegal and set them at liberty. It  is seen that though the representation was  received  by the  State  Govt.  on February 20,  1993,  the  State  Govt. decided to keep it pending awaiting the opinion of the Board and  on receipt of the report on March 23, 1993,  considered the  case  and the representation was rejected on  the  even date,  namely, March 23, 1993.  In view of  this  consistent settled  law  the action of the State Govt. in  keeping  the representation  without  being considered  and  disposed  of expeditiously, awaiting the decision of the Board till March 23, 1993 and consideration of the representation  thereafter and  rejection are illegal.  In addition we have  on  record that detaining authority had not filed its counter as to how the representation of the second appellant was dealt with or rejected.   That apart, there is no material  placed  before the  Court that the State Govt. has approved within 12  days after  execution of the detention order i.e. Feb.  5,  1993. On  expiry of 12 days the order of detention becomes  nonest and the subsequent confirmation by the Board or by the State Govt.  does not blow life into the corpse.  In  either  case the  order of detention became illegal.  Accordingly we  had allowed  the appeals on May 3, 1993 and directed release  of the  detenus forthwith.  The reasons now are as above.   The result  in this judgment does not enure to Prashant  Manubai Vora the absconding detenue. The appeals are accordingly allowed. V.P.R.                               Appeals allowed. 696