03 April 1996
Supreme Court
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Vs

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: /
Diary number: 2 / 9228


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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMEER ALI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/04/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BHARUCHA S.P. (J) PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (4)   123        1996 SCALE  (3)435

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel on both sides.      This appeal  by special  leave arises  from an order of acquittal passed  by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at  Allahabad in  Criminal  Appeal  No.781/84  on August 30,  1990. The  case of  the prosecution  is that the deceased is the wife of the respondent. On October 20, 1983. between 7.00  and 8.00 p.m. after the accused had come home, he found  the deceased  preparing food  with dal. He brought fish and  asked her  to make  curry. When  she was preparing spices to  prepare curry,  he asked  her as  to whom she had already prepared  the food  with dal to which she had stated that she  had prepared the food for him and that she did not know that  he would  bring  fish  for  preparing  curry.  He suspected her  fidelity and  called the  deceased inside the room beat  her and poured kerosene oil) on her and lit fire. He came out and shut the door. When she was crying for help, the neighbours,had  come to  rescue her and taken her to the hospital. In  the hospital  when  Executive  Magistrate  was summoned to record her statement she gave statement at about 9.30 a.m. on October 21, 1983 thus:      "Smt, Wazihunnishan  w/o  Amir  Ali      r/o village Barhar Kot P.S. Utraula      stated on oath that my husband Amir      Ali used  to commit much harassment      to me. He had brought me before the      second marriage  was performed.  He      wanted to  marry someone  else.  He      poured kerosene oil upon me and put      to fire.  I  was  kept  inside  the      house and  so I  could not  run.  I      have a son aged about 2 years. When      I was  burning, the  other women of      the village  had come  and  started

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    pouring  water  to  extinguish  the      fire...."      Subsequently, the Sub-Inspector (PW-6) had recorded her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which now turned out to be the  second dying  declaration and is consistent with the first dying  declaration with  more details.  At the  trial, apart from  the witnesses  who had supported the prosecution case during  investigation and  examined under  Section  164 Cr.P.C. have turned hostile at the trial, the Sessions Judge believed  the   oral  testimony  of  hostile  witnesses  and separated that  part of the statements which were favourable to the  accused and  accepted  their  statement  which  were consistent with  the  dying  declarations  recorded  by  the Magistrate and  also by the Sub-Inspector. Based thereon, he convicted the  accused for  an offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.      On appeal,  as  stated  earlier,  the  High  Court  has acquitted the  respondent giving  him the  benefit of doubt. The High  Court  has  reasoned  that  in  the  second  dying declaration though  the names  of two  witnesses  have  been mentioned, they  were not  present at  the time of recording the  statement.   After  the  statement  was  recorded,  the witnesses have  come and  attested the statement. Therefore, investigating officer  having had  an interest  in recording the statement,  fabricated it.  On that  premise  the  dying declarations were  rejected. We  have carefully  scanned the dying declarations.  Even  excluding  the  evidence  of  the witnesses  who  turned  hostile,  we  find  that  the  dying declarations are  sufficient to  base a  conviction. She has categorically stated  that her  husband put her in the room, poured kerosene  oil and  lit the  fire and  when she was on fire, she  was kept inside the room and was prevented by him from coming  out of  the house  but after she was rescued by the neighbours,  her life  would not  be saved.  Under these circumstances, it is clear that the accused hat an intention to kill her deliberately by pouring kerosene oil on her head and then set her to fire. Death took place on account of the intentional  act   of  the   respondent.  The   High  Court, therefore,  was   wholly   unjustified   in   doubting   the correctness of  the declaration  recorded by the Magistrate. No reasons  have been  given to disbelieve dying declaration recorded by  the Magistrate.  Even with  regard to the dying declaration recorded by the investigation officer, we do not find any  reason to  discard it.  No doubt,  as stated,  the witnesses had  come subsequent to recording of the statement of the  deceased by  the investigating officer but that does not mean  that  investigating  officer  had  fabricated  the statement. As  seen, the  statement given  to the  Executive Magistrate is quite clear and is a categorical statement. It gets corroboration,  if  at  all  it  is  needed,  from  the subsequent dying  declaration recorded  by the investigating officer. It  is settled  law that  a dying  declaration,  if found truthful,  is sufficient  to base a conviction without any  further   corroboration,  In  this  case,  the  medical evidence corroborates  her dying  declarations.  It  is  not necessary  that  it  should  be  recorded  in  the  form  of questions and  answers as  contended for  the  accused.  The doctor  has  certified  that  she  was  in  a  mentally  fit condition to  give the  statement. Taking  the  declarations into consideration,  we find no valid or legally sustainable reasons from  the judgment  of  the  High  Court  to  uphold acquittal. We  hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond any  shadow of  doubt.  The  judgment  and  order  of acquittal passed  by the High Court is set aside and that of the  Sessions  Court  stands  confirmed.  Consequently,  the

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respondent is  convicted for  an  offence  punishable  under Section 302 IPC and is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.      The appeal is accordingly allowed.