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PETITIONER: S.P. ANAND, INDORE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: H.D. DEVE GOWDA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/11/1996

BENCH: CJT, SUJATA V. MANOHAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      Ahmadi, CJI.      Can a  person who  is not  a member of either House  of Parliament be sworn in as the Prime Minister of  India? That is  the  main  question  of  public  importance    that  the petitioner has raised in this petition brought Under Article 32 of  the Constitution.  According to  the petitioner,  the first respondent,  Shri H.D.  Deve Gowda,  the present Prime Minister of  India, not  being a  member  of either House of Parliament was,  under the  Constitution, not eligible to be appointed as  the Prime  Minister of India and the President of India,  Dr.   Shanker Dayal Sharma, the third respondent, committed a   grave  and  serious  Constitutional  error  in swearing him   in  as the Prime Minister. This action of the third respondent,  says  the  petitioner,  is  violative  of Articles 14,  21 and  75 of the Constitution and, therefore, void ab  initio and deserves to be quashed by an appropriate writ of  this Court  which may  be issued in exercise of the powers conferred  by Article  32 of  the  Constitution.  The petitioner has  also  impleaded  the  Union  of  India,  the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Leader of the Muslim League in Lok  Sabha (without naming the individual) as respondents 2,4 and 5 respectively.      A Constitution  Bench of  this Court  had  occasion  to consider whether  a person  who is  not a  member of  either House of the State Legislature could be appointed a Minister of State  and this  question was answered in the affirmative on a  true interpretation  of Articles  163 and  164 of  the Constitution which,  in material  particulars, correspond to Articles 74 and 75 bearing on the question of appointment of the Prime  Minister. In  that  case,  Shri  T.N.  Singh  was appointed the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh even though he was not a member of either House of the State Legislature on the date  of his appointment. His appointment was challenged in the  High Court  by way  of a  writ petition  filed under Article 226  of the  Constitution. The  High Court dismissed the Writ  Petition but  granted a  certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution. That is how the matter reached this Court.      Now, Article  164(4) provides  that a  Minister who for

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any period of six consecutive months is not a member  of the Legislature of  the State  shall at  the expiration  of that period, cease to be a Minister. It was,  however, urged that on the  plain language of the said  provision, it is obvious that it speaks of appointment  of a Minister who is a member of the  State Legislature  but who loses his seat at a later date in  which case  he   can continue  as a  Minister for a period of  six months  during which he must be re-elected or otherwise, must  vacate office. Interpreting the said clause in the   context of Article 163 and other clauses of Article 164,   this Court  held that  Clause 4 of Article 164 had an ancient lineage and there was no reason to whittle down  the plain thrust  of the said provision by confining it to cases where a  person being  a member  of the   Legislature  and a Minister, for  some reason,  loses his   seat  in the State. Accordingly, the  decision of  the  High Court was affirmed. See Har  Sharan Verma  v. Shri      Tribhuvan  Narain Singh, Chief Minister, U.P. and  Another, (1971) 1 SCC 616.      The same  petitioner again  raised the issue when  Shri K.P. Tiwari  was appointed  in November, 1984 as a  Minister of the  U.P. Government  even though  he was not a member of either House  of the  State Legislature.  He  contended that the decision  rendered by  this Court in the case of Shri T. N. Singh  was not  good law  since the  Court had overlooked the  amendment   of  Article   173(a)     effected  by   the Constitution   (Sixteenth)   Amendment   Act,   1963.   [The corresponding provision  in regard to  Parliament is Article 84(a)]. Dealing with this  contention this Court pointed out that the  object of  introducing the amendment in clause (a) of Article  173  of the Constitution was to provide that not only before   taking  his seat shall a member of Legislature take the   oath prescribed by the Third Schedule as required by Article  188 of  the Constitution  but that  even  before standing for  election a candidate must take the same  oath, This was  to ensure that only a person having  allegiance to India shall  be eligible  for members;  the Legislature. The Court further pointed out that  clause (4) of Article 164 of the Constitution provides  that a Minister (which includes a Chief Minister also)  who, for any period of six consecutive months, is  not a   member  of the  Legislature of  a  State shall, at  the   expiration of  that period  cease to  be  a Minister. In    other words the Court held that a person who was not  a   member of either House of the State Legislature could   also be  appointed by  the Governor  as the Minister (Which  includes  the  Chief  Minister)  for  a  period  not exceeding six  consecutive months. The Court, therefore, did not   see any  material change  brought about  in the  legal position by reason of the amendment of Article 173(a) of the Constitution from  that as explained in the earlier decision in Shri T.N. Singh’s case (supra). This decision is reported as Har Sharan Verma v. State of U.P. 1985 (2) SCC 48.      Not content  with these two decisions rendered by  this Court, the  very same  petitioner once again  questioned the appointment of  Shri Sita  Ram Kesri as a  Minister of State of the  Central Cabinet since he was  not a member of either House of  Parliament  at  the  date    of  the  appointment. Spurning the  challenge, this  Court  held that to appoint a non-member of the Parliament as a  Minister did not militate against the  constitutional   mechanism nor  did it militate against  the   democratic     principles  embodied   in  the Constitution. The  Court,  therefore, upheld the appointment under Article 75(5) of the Constitution read with Article 88 thereof, which   Article,  inter alia,  conferred  on  every Minister the   right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the   proceedings  of, either  House, in joint sitting of

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the   Houses, and  in a  Committee of Parliament of which he may   be named  a member,  though not  entitled to vote. The Court, therefore, on a combined reading of the aforesaid two provisions held  that a person not being a member of  either House of  Parliament can  be appointed  a Minister   up to a period of  six months.  This case came to be reported as Har Sharan Verma v. Union of India and Another (1987) Suppl. SCC 310.      We may  now refer to two decisions rendered by the High Courts of Delhi and Calcutta in which the appointment of the present Prime  Minister Shri  H.D. Deve Gowda was challenged on more or less the same ground. One Dr. Janak Raj Jai filed a writ  petition No.2408  of 1996 in which he questioned the appointment since  the present  Prime  Minister  was  not  a member of  either House  of Parliament  on the  date he  was sworn-in by  the President of India as the Prime Minister of India. He  contended that while under Article 75(5) a person can be  appointed a Minister, he cannot be and should not be appointed a Prime Minister. Dealing with this submission the High Court,  after referring  to Articles  74 and  75 of the Constitution, held  that "when  Article 75(5)  speaks  of  a "Minister" it  takes within  its embrace  that Minister also who is  described in the Constitution as Prime Minister". In other words  that High Court found that the Constitution did not make  any distinction  between the  Prime  Minister  and other Ministers. The High Court dismissed the petition.      In the Calcutta High Court C.O. No.1336 (w) of 1996 was filed by one Ashok Sen Gupta, a Senior Advocate, challenging he appointment of Shri H.D. Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister of India  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not  eligible  for appointment as  he was  not a  member  of  either  House  of Parliament. The  learned Single Judge of the High Court in a well considered  Judgment held  that Article  75(5)  of  the Constitution permits  the President  of India  to appoint  a person who  is not a member of either House of Parliament as a Minister,  including  a  Prime  Minister  subject  to  the possibility of his commanding the support of the majority of members of  the Lok-Sabha.  On this  line of  reasoning  the petition was dismissed in limini.      From the  aforesaid three  decisions of  this Court and the High  Courts it becomes clear that a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament or of either House of a State Legislature can be appointed a Minister in the Central Cabinet (which would include a Prime Minister) or a Minister in the State Cabinet (which would include a Chief Minister), as the  case may  be. But  the petitioner herein remains not satisfied.      The petitioner  who argued  the case  in person    with great passion,  zeal and  emotion, claiming  to be concerned about the  survival of  the  democratic  process    and  the pristine glory of our constitutional scheme,  submitted that if a  person who  is not  the elected  representative of the people of  the country  and in  whom   the people  have  not placed confidence,  is allowed  to occupy the high office of the Prime  Minister on whom would rest the responsibility of governing the  Nation during  peace and war (God forbid), it would be  taking a  great risk  which the  country  can  ill afford to  take and,  therefore, we  should so  construe the relevant provisions of the Constitution as would relieve the country of  such a risk. When his attention was drawn to the case law  aforementioned he stated that those decisions were old  and   needed  to   be  reconsidered   in  the   changed circumstances. He submitted his submissions in writing which are by  and large  a repetition  of  the  averments  in  the petition.

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    We  cannot  but  observe  that  the  averments  in  the petition are  of a  rambling nature and lack cohesion. It is regrettable that  a petition  challenging the appointment to the high office of the Prime Minister of this country should have been  drafted in such a cavalier fashion betraying lack of study,  research and seriousness. The petition abounds in casual  and  irrelevant  averments  ranging  from  cases  on freedom of  speech to fraternity, from judicial independence to judicial  review, from civil code to cow slaughter and so on and so forth. In fairness to the petitioner we must state that he  desired to  refer to cases on these subjects but we did not  permit him  as we thought it would be a sheer waste of public  time. We, therefore, asked him to confine himself to the principal issue, namely whether a person who is not a member of  either House  of Parliament  can be  appointed  a Prime Minister. Even on this point his submissions were more in the  nature of  empty rhetoric than of substance. In fact on reading  the petition  and his  written submissions,  the words of Chandrachud, C.J. in Mithilesh Kumar Sinha, etc. v. Returning Officer  for Presidential  Election &  Ors.,  etc. [(1992) Supp.1 SCR 651] come to mind:      "It is  regrettable  that  election      petitions challenging  the election      to the high office of the President      of  India  should  be  filed  in  a      fashion  as  cavalier  as  the  one      which   characterises   these   two      petitions. The  petitions  have  an      extempore appearance and not even a      second look,  leave alone  a second      thought, appears to have been given      to the  manner  of  drafting  these      petitions  or  to  the  contentions      raised   therein.   In   order   to      discourage  the   filing  of   such      petitions,  we   would  have   been      justified in  passing a heavy order      of   costs    against    the    two      petitioners."      In order  to appreciate  the contention  raised in this petition, and  to determine  if the  aforesaid  decision  on which the learned Attorney General relied has any bearing on the point  at issue  in the  present petition,  it would  be advantageous to  read Articles  74 and  75 in  juxtaposition with Articles 163 and 164 of the Constitution :      74. Council  of Ministers  to  aide      and advise  President.-- (1)  There      shall be  a   Council of  Ministers      with the Prime Minister at the head      to aid and advise the President who      shall,  in   the  exercise  of  his      functions, act  in accordance  with      such advice:      [Provided that  the  President  may      require the Council of Ministers to      reconsider  such   advice,   either      generally  or  otherwise,  and  the      President shall  act in  accordance      with the  advice    tendered  after      such reconsideration.]      (2) The  question whether  any, and      if so  what, advice was tendered by      Ministers to  the  President  shall      not be inquired  into in any court.      75.   Other    provisions   as   to

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    Ministers.--(1) The  Prime Minister      shall be appointed by the President      and the  other Ministers  shall  be      appointed by  the President  on the      advice of the Prime Minister.      (2) The Ministers shall hold office      during   the    pleasure   of   the      President.      163. Council  of Ministers  to  aid      and advise  Governor.--  (1)  There      shall be  a  Council  of  Ministers      with the Chief Minister at the head      to aid  and advise  the Governor in      the  exercise   of  his  functions,      except in  so far  as he  is by  or      under this Constitution required to      exercise his  functions or  any  of      them in his discretion.      (2) If  any question arises whether      any matter is or is not a matter as      respects which  the Governor  is by      or under this Constitution required      to  act   in  his  discretion,  the      decision of  the  Governor  in  his      discretion shall  be final, and the      validity of  anything done  by  the      Governor shall  not  be  called  in      question  on  the  ground  that  he      ought or ought not to have acted in      his discretion.      (3) The  question whether  any, and      if so  what, advice was tendered by      Ministers to the Governor shall not      be inquired  into in any court.      164.   Other   provisions   as   to      Ministers.-- (1) The Chief Minister      shall be  appointed by the Governor      and the  other Ministers  shall  be      appointed by  the Governor  on  the      advice of  the Chief  Minister, and      the  Ministers  shall  hold  office      during   the    pleasure   of   the      Governor:      (3) The  Council of Ministers shall      be collectively  responsible to the      House of the People.      (4) Before  a Minister  enters upon      his  office,  the  President  shall      administer  to  him  the  oaths  of      office and  of secrecy according to      the forms  set out  for the purpose      in the Third Schedule.      (5) A  Minister who  for any period      of six  consecutive months is not a      member   of    either   House    of      Parliament shall  at the expiration      of  that   period  cease  to  be  a      Minister.      (6) The  salaries and allowances of      Ministers   shall    be   such   as      Parliament may from time to time by      law determine and, until Parliament      so   determines,    shall   be   as      specified in the Second Schedule.      Provided  that  in  the  States  of

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    Bihar Madhya  Pradesh  and  Orissa,      there shall be a Minister in charge      of  tribal   welfare  who   may  in      addition  be   in  charge   of  the      welfare of the Scheduled Castes and      backward classes or any other work.      (2) The  Council of Ministers shall      be collectively  responsible to the      Legislative Assembly of the State.      (3) Before  a Minister  enters upon      his  office,   the  Governor  shall      administer  to  him  the  oaths  of      office and  of secrecy according to      the forms  set out  for the purpose      in the Third Schedule.      (4) A  Minister who  for any period      of six  consecutive months is not a      member of  the Legislature  of  the      State shall  at the  expiration  of      that period cease to be a Minister.      (5) The  salaries and allowances of      Ministers  shall  be  such  as  the      Legislature of  the State  may from      time to  time by law determine and,      until the  Legislature of the State      so   determines,    shall   be   as      specified in the Second Schedule.      When we  compare Articles  74 and  75 with Articles 163 and 164  the first  point of  difference is  that while  the former deal  with the  President and the Prime Minister, the latter deal  with  the  Governor  and  the  Chief  Minister. Article 74(1)  and Article 163(1) are substantially the same except that  the sentence beginning with ‘except’ and ending with ’discretion’,  special to  the Governor’s  function, is not to  be found  in Article  74(1). The  proviso to Article 74(1) which  grants a  special privilege to the President is not to  be found  in Article  163(1) whereas  clause (2)  of Article 163  is not to be found in Article 74. Clause (2) to Article 163  is a  corollary  to  the  exception  clause  in Article 163(1)  and has  no relevance  to the issue on hand. Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) are verbatim the same.      Article 75(1)  and (2)  are identical to Article 164(1) except that  in the case of the latter, the two clauses have been combined  into one. The proviso to Article 164(1) which is special  to States, is not to be found in Article 75. The rest of the clauses of the two Articles are identical except for consequential changes.      On a  plain reading of Article 75(5) it is obvious that the Constitution-makers  desired to  permit a person who was not a member of either House of Parliament to be appointed a Minister for  a period  of six  consecutive  months  and  if during the said period he was not elected to either House of Parliament, he  would cease  to be  a Minister. This becomes clear if  one were  to read  the debates  of the Constituent Assembly (the draft Articles were 62 and 144 for the present Articles  75   and  164).   Precisely  on  the  ground  that permitting such  persons to  be appointed  Ministers at  the Union or  State levels  would  "cut  at  the  very  root  of democracy", an  amendment was  moved to  provide: "No person should be  appointed a  Minister unless  at the  time of his appointment, he  is elected  member of  the House:"    which amendment was  spurned by  Dr.  Ambedkar  in  the  following words:      "Now  with   regard  to  the  first      point, namely, that no person shall

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    be  entitled   to  be  appointed  a      Minister unless  he is  at the time      of  his   appointment  an   elected      member of  the House,  I  think  it      forgets to  take into consideration      certain  important   matters  which      cannot be overlooked. First is this      and it  is  perfectly  possible  to      imagine  that   a  person   who  is      otherwise  competent  to  hold  the      post  of   a  Minister   has   been      defeated  in   a  constituency  for      ’some reason and which, although it      may be  perfectly good,  might have      annoyed the  constituency,  and  he      might have incurred the displeasure      of that particular constituency. It      is not  a reason  why a  member  so      competent as  that  should  not  be      permitted to  be appointed a member      of the  Cabinet on  the  assumption      that  he   shall  be  able  to  get      himself  elected   from  the   same      constituency   or    from   another      constituency.   After    all    the      privileges that  he is permitted is      a privilege  that extends  only  to      six months.  It does  not confer  a      right on  that individual to sit in      the House  being elected at all. My      second submission  is this that the      fact that a nominated Minister is a      member  of  the  Cabinet  does  not      either  violate  the  principle  of      collective responsibility  nor does      it   violate   the   principle   of      confidence because  he is  a member      of the cabinet if he is prepared to      accept the  policy of  the  Cabinet      stands  part  of  the  Cabinet  and      resigns with  the Cabinet   when he      ceases to  have the  confidence  of      the   House, his  membership of the      Cabinet does  not in  any way cause      any inconvenience  or breach of the      fundamental  principles   on  which      parliamentary government  is based.      Therefore, this qualification in my      judgment is quite unnecessary."      At the end of the discussion, the Constituent Assembly rejected the proposed amendment. Furthermore, as pointed out in the  decision of this Court (1987 Supp. SCC 310), such an appointment  does   not  militate   against  the  democratic principles embodied  in our  Constitution. With  respect, we agree.      The petitioner then invited our attention to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition) page 347 wherein at para 745 it is  stated: "By  conventional usage the Prime Minister is invariably a  member of  either House of Commons or House of Lords";  footnote  (i)  proceeds  to  add  that  the  person selected is  preferably to  be a  member  of  the  House  of Commons. The  petitioner further  urged  that  even  if  the Constitution is  construed to  permit a  person who is not a member of  either House  of Parliament  to  be  appointed  a Minister for  six months,  there is nothing in Article 75(5)

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to suggest  that he  can be  appointed the Prime Minister of the country.  He urged that the status of the Prime Minister is distinct  from that  of a  Minister and, therefore, it is essential that  a person who occupies the high position of a Prime Minister  should be  an elected  representative of the people. This  submission overlooks  the fact that the person who is appointed the Prime Minister is chosen by the elected representatives of  the people  and can  occupy the position only if  he enjoys  the confidence  of the  majority of  the elected representatives  in the Lok Sabha. Secondly, we must bear in  mind the  scheme of  our Constitution  and  if  our constitution permits  such appointment,  that should  put an end to the controversy.      Now Article 75(1) envisages a Council of Ministers with the Prime  Minister at  the  head  to  aid  and  advise  the President, and  the latter  is expected to act in accordance with such  advice but  if he  has any  reservations  he  may require the Council of Ministers to  reconsider such advice. Thus, the President has to act in accordance with the advice of the  council of  Ministers as  a body  and not  go by the advice of  any single  individual. Only  a person  who,  the President 407  thinks, commands  the confidence  of the  Lok Sabha would  be appointed  the Prime  Minister who  in  turn would choose  the other  Ministers. The Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House of the People. The form  of the oath prescribed in the Third Schedule under Article 75(4)  is the same for the Prime Minister as well as a Minister.  In other  words, the Constitution does not draw any distinction  between the  Prime Minister  and any  other Minister in  this behalf.  This is not to say that the Prime Minister does  not enjoy  a special  status; he  does as the head of  the Council  of Ministers but the responsibility of the Council  of Ministers  to the  House of  the  people  is collective.   Besides, the  caption of article 75 as a whole is "other provisions as to Ministers". No separate provision is to  be found  dealing with  the appointment  of the Prime Minister as  such. Therefore, even though the Prime Minister is appointed  by the  President after  he is  chosen by such number of members of the House of the People as would ensure that he has the confidence of the House and would be able to command the  support of  the majority, and the Ministers are appointed on  the advice  of the  Prime Minister, the entire Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House  and  that  ensures  the  smooth  functioning  of  the democratic machinery.  If any  Minister does  not agree with the majority  decision of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  his option is  to resign  or accept the majority decision. If he does not, the Prime Minister would drop him from his cabinet and thus  ensure  collective responsibility. Therefore, even though a  Prime Minister  is not a member of either House of Parliament, once  he is  appointed he  becomes answerable to the House  and so  also his  Ministers and  the principle of collective responsibility  governs the  democratic  process. Even if a person is not a member of the House, if he has the support and  confidence of  the House,  he can  be chosen to head the Council of Ministers without violating the norms of democracy and  the requirement  of being  accountable to the House would  ensure the smooth functioning of the democratic process. We,  therefore, find  it difficult  to subscribe to the petitioner’s  contention that  if a  person who is not a member of  the House  is chosen  as Prime Minister, national interest would  be jeopardised or that we would be running a great risk.  The English  convention that the Prime Minister should be  a member  of either  House, preferably  House  of Commons,  is   not  our   constitutional  scheme  since  our

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Constitution clearly  permits a non-member to be appointed a Chief Minister  or a  Prime Minister for a short duration of six months.  That is  why in  such cases  when there  is any doubt in  the mind  of the  President, he  normally asks the person appointed  to seek  a vote of confidence of the House of the  People within  a few  days of  his  appointment.  By parity of  reasoning if  a person who is not a member of the State Legislature  can be  appointed a  Chief Minister  of a State under  Article 164 (4) for six months, a person who is not a  member of either House of Parliament can be appointed Prime Minister  for the  same duration. We must also bear in mind  the  fact  that  conventions  grow  from  longstanding accepted practice  or by agreement in areas where the law is silent and  such a  convention would  not breach the law but fill the  gap. If  we go  by that principle, the practice in India has  been just  the opposite. In the past, persons who were not  elected to  State Legislatures  have become  Chief Ministers  and   those  not   elected  to  either  House  of Parliament have  been appointed  Prime  Ministers.  We  are, therefore, of  the view that the British Convention to which the petitioner  has, referred  is neither  in tune  with our constitutional scheme  nor has it been a recognised practice in our country.      The petitioner had contended before this Court when his petition was  called on for hearing on 30.7.1996 that he had filed a  similar petition  bearing No.774  of  1996  in  the Madhya Pradesh  High Court  and  that  the  High  Court  had ordered  notice   to  issue  exercising  jurisdiction  under Article 226  of the  Constitution. He  sought permission  to withdraw his  petition. Here  we must  mention that  in  PIL cases, the  petitioner  is  not  entitled  to  withdraw  his petition at  his sweet-will  unless the court sees reason to permit withdrawal.  In granting  the  permission  the  Court would be  guided by  considrations of  public  interest  and would also  ensure that  it does  not result in abuse of the process of  law. Courts  must guard against possibilities of such litigants  settling the  matters out  of the  court  to their advantage  and then  seeking withdrawal  of the  case. There are  umpteen ways  in which  the process can be abused and the  courts must  be aware of the same before permitting withdrawal of the petition. This is not to say that this was one such  case. Here  we did  not  allow  withdrawal  as  we noticed that  the very  same question  was being raised from court to  court. It  was raised  in the High Courts of Delhi and Calcutta.  Notwithstanding the decisions rendered in the said two  cases, to  which we have already referred, we were informed by  the petitioner  himself that  he had raised the issue in  the Madhya  Pradesh High  Court and  another  such petition was  filed in  the Allahabad  High Court.  To avoid such snowballing leading to multiplicity of cases we thought it in  public interest  to examine  the issue with a view of avoiding conflict  of opinions.  That is  the reason  why we refused to  permit withdrawal of the petition and decided to settle the issue of law one way or the other, which we do by this decision.      Before we  part, we  cannot  help  mentioning  that  on issues of  constitutional laws,  litigants who  can  lay  no claim to  have expert knowledge in that field should refrain from filing  petitions, which  if we  may say  so, are often drafted in a casual and cavalier fashion giving an extempore appearance not  having had  even a  second look. This is the impression that one gets on reading the present petition. It is of  utmost importance  that those who invoke this Court’s jurisdiction seeking  a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint  in moving  the Court  by not plunging in

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areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb  to  spasmodic  sentiments  and  behave  like  a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He  must remember  that as  a person  seeking  to espouse a  public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the  court  that  he  does  not  rush  to  court  without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise  the issue.  Besides, it  must be remembered that a good cause  can be lost if petitions are filed on half-baked information without  proper research  or by  persons who are not qualified  and competent  to raise  such issues  as  the rejection of  such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it  must also  be borne  in mind  that no  one has a right to  the waiver  of the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings  is in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned  in public  interest and is not moved by other extraneous  considerations. So  also the court must be careful to  ensure that  the process  of the  Court  is  not sought to  be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point  of view,  almost carrying  it  to  the  point  of obstinacy, by  filling a  series of  petitions  refusing  to accept the  Court’s  earlier  decisions  as  concluding  the point. We say this because when we drew the attention of the petitioner to  earlier decisions  of this  Court, he brushed them aside,  without so  much as showing willingness to deal with them  and without  giving them a second look, as having become  stale   and  irrelevant   by  passage  of  time  and challenged  their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration.  Except for  saying that they needed reconsideration he  had no  answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court  even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead,  as pointed  out earlier, he referred to decisions  having no  bearing on  the question,  like the decisions on  cow slaughter  cases, freedom  of  speech  and expresssion, uniform  civil code,  etc., we need say no more except to  point out  that indiscriminate  of this important lever of  public interest  litigation would  blunt the lever itself.      We would have ordered the petitioner to pay the cost of this petition  but we refrain from doing so on this occasion in the  hope that  he will  exercise  restraint  in  future, failing which  he may  in a  similar or like case be visited with an  order of  cost. With  these observations we dismiss the petition  the interim  order staying proceedings pending elsewhere shall  stand vacated  with a  direction that  they shall be disposed of in the light hereof.