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PETITIONER: PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS.THE CHIEF PERSONNEL (DISCIPLINA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SH. KUNJ BEHARI MISRA, SH. SHANTI PRASAD GOEL

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/08/1998

BENCH: S.C. AGARWAL, S.P. BHARUCHA, B.N. KIRPAL

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH                Civil Appeal No. 7433 of 1995                       J U D G M E N T KIRPAL, J.      In these  two appeals  the common question which arises for consideration  is that  when the inquiry officer, during the  course   of  disciplinary   proceedings,  comes   to  a conclusion  that   all  or  some  of  the  charges  alleging misconduct against  an official  are not proved than can the disciplinary authority  differ from  the tan give a contrary finding without  affording any opportunity to the delinquent officer.      The respondents  in these two appeal, namely, Shri Kunj Behari Misra and Shri Shanti Prasad Goel were working in the appellant  bank   in  the  Hazratganj  Branch,  Lucknow,  as Assistant Managers.  On  10th  November,  1981  on  physical verification of  the currency  chest a shortage of Rs. 1 lac currency  notes  was  found.  Thereafter  first  information report  was   lodged  and   disciplinary  proceedings   were initiated  by   the  appellant   bank   against   both   the respondents, who  were also  placed  under  suspension.  Six charges were  framed against  Misra while  the charge  sheet served on  Goel Contained  seven charges.  The  disciplinary authority did  not conduct  the inquiry  itself  an  inquiry officer was appointed to hold the inquiry.      The inquiry  officer gave the respondent opportunity of being hear.  In his  report submitted in connection with the inquiry against  Misra, he  found him  guilty  only  of  one charge, namely,  that he  did not sign the relevant register from 20th October, 1981 to 9th November, 1981 but exonerated him of  charges two  to six. as far as Goel is concerned the inquiry officer,  in his report, found him not guilty of any of the charges and exonerated him.      On the  receipt of the reports from the inquiry officer the disciplinary  authority, namely, the Regional Manager of appellant bank,  to whom the reports were submitted, did not agree, in  the case  of Misra,  with  the  findings  of  the inquiry officer  in respect  of charges  two to six and by a short order  dated  12th  December,  1983  passed  an  order holding that  it was an undisputed position that Misra being

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Assistant Manager  was in  the joint  custody of the keys of the  currency  chest  and  he  had  personal  responsibility towards the  safe custody  of the  cash and that no material had been  placed during the inquiry proceedings to establish that he  had discharged his duties in the manner expected of him. The disciplinary authority accordingly held Misra to be responsible for  the shortage  in question  and held  that a minor penalty  of proportionate recovery ought to be imposed on the  respondent for the loss of Rs.1 lac caused to be the bank due  to negligence  on his part in the discharge of his duties. Similarly  in the  case  of  Goel  the  disciplinary authority did  not agree  with the inquiry report and passed an order  dated 15th  December, 1983 directing proportionate recovery of the loss of Rs. 1 lac caused to the bank by him. It may  here be  noticed that  during the  pendency of these disciplinary proceedings  both Misra  and Goel superannuated on  31st   December,  1983.   The   disciplinary   authority accordingly directed  the recovery  of the  money  from  the bank’s contribution  to the provident fund of the respondent officers.      The respondents  then filed  appeals to  the  appellate authority but  they were unsuccessful. Thereupon misra filed Civil Writ  Petition No.  3197 of  1984 before  the  Lucknow bench the  Allahabad High  Court while Goel filed Civil Writ Petition No.  1192 of  1984 in  the High Court at Allahabad. The main  contention of  the respondents  in the  said  writ petitions was  that  the  disciplinary  authority,  who  had chosen to  disagree with  the conclusions  arrived at by the inquiry officer,  could not have come to adverse conclusions without giving  them an  opportunity of  being heard and the orders passed  against them  were liable to be quashed. This contention found  favour  with  the  High  Court  wh,  while allowing Misra’s  writ petition vide its judgment dated 20th February, 1990,  quashed  the  order  imposing  penalty  and directed the  appellants to  release the retirement benefits including  provident   fund  and   gratuity.  Following  the aforesaid decision  the Writ  petition  filed  by  Goel  was allowed by  the High  Court on  10th  January,  1995  and  a similar  direction   was  issued  for  the  release  of  the retirement benefits like provident fund and gratuity etc. to the said respondent.      These appeals  by special  leave came  up  for  hearing before a  bench of  two judges  of  this  Court.  While  the appellants placed  reliance on the decision in State Bank of India, Bhopal  Vs. S.  S. Koshal  [1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 468], the counsel for the respondents placed reliance on two other Two-Judge Bench  decision of  this  Court  in  Institute  of Chartered Accountants  of India  Vs. L.  K. Ratna  and  Ors. [(1986) 4  SCC 537]  and Ram  Kishan Vs.  Union of India and Ors. [(1995) 6 SCC 157]. Both the sides also referred to the Constitution  Bench  decision  of  this  Court  in  managing Director  ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar and Ors. [(1993) 4 SCC 727] and each of them sought to place reliance on them.  In view  of the apparent conflict in the decisions in the  first three  cases by order dated 30th October, 1996 the case  was referred  to be  heard by  a large  bench. We, therefore,   propose to  deal with  the point  in issue  and resolve the apparent conflict.      The only  contention urged  by Sh. V. R. Reddy, learned senior counsel  for the  appellant, was that Punjab National Bank Officer  Employees (Discipline  and Appeal) Regulations 1977 [for  short ’the  Regulations’] did  not require  an of opportunity of  being heard  being given  to the  delinquent officer when  the disciplinary  authority disagreed with the findings of  the  inquiring  authority  once  the  inquiring

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authority had  given a  hearing  to  them.  It  was  further submitted by  the learned   counsel  that the requirement of giving such  a hearing  could not  be  read  into  the  said regulations and  no prejudice  could be  said to  have  been caused  to   the  respondents   inasmuch  as  the  inquiring authority had given full opportunity to them. it was  also submitted  by Sh.  Reddy  that  if  before  the decision of  this Court  in union of India and Ors. Vs. Mohd Ramzan Khan  [(1991) 1  SCC 588}  the disciplinary authority did not  have to  give to the delinquent officer the inquiry report then  it was  not necessary  to give him a hearing in case where  the disciplinary  authority  differed  from  the inquiry report  as no  copy of  the inquiry report was to be given to him.      On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that even if there was no provision in the regulations nevertheless it was incumbent upon the punishing authority to give notice to the respondents if the said authority desired to differ with a favourable finding recorded by the inquiry officer. It was also  submitted   that  the   findings   recorded   by   the disciplinary authority  were contrary  to the  provisions of the regulations and were based on surmises and conjectures.      Before dealing  with the  rival contentions  it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant regulations. Regulation 4 of  the regulations  sets out  the  minor  and  the  major penalties which  may be  imposed on  an officer employee for acts of  misconduct or  for any  other good  and  sufficient reason. The  procedure for  imposing the  minor penalties is set out  in Regulation  8. It  provides  that  where  it  is proposed to impose such a penalty the employee concerned has to be  informed in  writing of  the  imputations  of  lapses against him and an opportunity is given to him to submit his written statement.  Regulation 8(2)  provides that where the disciplinary authority  is  satisfied  that  an  inquiry  is necessary, then it shall follow the procedure for imposing a major penalty  as laid  down in Regulation -6. Regulation-6, to the  extent it  is relevant in the present case, reads as follows:      " 6.  Procedure for  imposing major      penalties;      (2)   whenever   the   Disciplinary      Authority is  of the  opinion  that      there  are  grounds  for  inquiring      into the truth of any imputation of      misconduct or  misbehavior  against      an officer  employee, it may itself      enquire into  or appoint  any other      public     servant     (hereinafter      referred  to   as   the   inquiring      authority) to  enquire  into  truth      thereof.      Explanation: when  the Disciplinary      Authority itself  holds the inquiry      any reference in sub regulation (8)      to  sub   regulation  (21)  to  the      inquiring   authority    shall   be      construed   as   a   reference   to      Disciplinary Authority.      (3) Where it is proposed to hold an      inquiry, the disciplinary Authority      shall frame  definite and  distinct      charges  on   the  basis   of   the      allegations  against   the  officer      employee  and   the   articles   of      charge, together  with a  statement

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    of the  allegations, on  which they      are based, shall be communicated in      writing to the officer employee who      shall be  required to submit within      such time  as may  be specified  by      the  Disciplinary   Authority  (not      exceeding 15  days), or within such      extended time  as may be granted by      the  said   Authority,  a   written      statement of his defence.      (4)  on   receipt  of  the  written      statement of  the officer employee,      or if no such statement is received      within  the   time  specified,   an      enquiry  may   be   held   by   the      Disciplinary Authority  itself,  or      if it  considers it necessary so to      do appoint under Sub-regulation (2)      an  inquiring   Authority  for  the      purpose.      Provided  that   it  may   not   be      necessary to  hold  an  inquiry  in      respect of  the articles  of charge      admitted by the officer employee in      his written  statement but shall be      necessary to record its findings on      each such charge.      ...........................      ...........................      (21) (1)  On the  conclusion of the      inquiry  the   inquiring  authority      shall prepare  a report which shall      contain the following:      (a)  a  gist  of  the  articles  of      charge and  the  statement  of  the      imputations   of    misconduct   or      misbehavior;      (b) a  gist of  the defence  of the      officer employee in respect of each      article of charges;      (c) an  assessment of  the evidence      in  respect   of  each  article  of      charge;      (d) the findings on each article of      charge and the reasons therefor.      Explanation - If, in the opinion of      the   inquiring    Authority,   the      proceedings    of    the    inquiry      establish  any  article  of  charge      different from the original article      of  charge,   it  may   record  its      findings on such article of charge.      provided that  the findings on such      article  of  charge  shall  not  be      recorded   unless    the    officer      employee has  either  admitted  the      facts  on  which  such  article  of      charge  is   based  or  has  had  a      reasonable opportunity of defending      himself  against  such  article  of      charge.      (ii) The  Inquiry Authority,  where      it is  not itself  the Disciplinary      Authority,  shall  forward  to  the      Disciplinary Authority  the records

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    of inquiry which shall include.      (a)  the   report  of  the  inquiry      prepared by it under clause (1);      (b)  the   written   statement   of      defence, if  any, submitted  by the      officer  employee  referred  to  in      sub-regulation (15);      (c)  the   oral   and   documentary      evidence produced  in the course of      the inquiry;      (d) written  briefs referred  to in      sub-regulation (18), if any; and      (e) the orders, if any, made by the      disciplinary  authority   and   the      inquiring authority  in  regard  to      the inquiry."      What action  has to  be taken  on the submission of the inquiry report  is provided  by Regulation-7  which reads as follows:      " 7. Action on the inquiry report:      (1) The  Disciplinary Authority, if      it  is   not  itself   the  Inquiry      Authority, may,  for reasons  to be      recorded by  it in  writing,  remit      the case to the Inquiring Authority      for fresh  or further  inquiry  and      report  and   Inquiring   Authority      shall thereupon proceed to hold the      further inquiry  according  to  the      provisions of  regulation 6  as far      as may be.      (2)  The   disciplinary   Authority      shall, if  it  disagrees  with  the      findings of the Inquiring Authority      on any  article of  charge,  record      its reasons  for such  disagreement      and record its own findings on such      charge, if the evidence n record is      sufficient for the purpose.      (3) If  the Disciplinary Authority,      having regard  to its  findings  on      all  or  any  of  the  articles  of      charge, is  of the opinion that any      of  the   penalties  specified   in      Regulation 4  should be  imposed on      the  officer   employee  it  shall,      notwithstanding  anything  imposing      in  regulation  8,  make  an  order      imposing such penalty.      (4) If  the Disciplinary  Authority      having regard  to its  findings  on      all  or   any  o  the  articles  of      charge, is  of the  opinion that no      penalty is  called for, it may pass      an order  exonerating  the  officer      employee concerned.      A bare  reading of  the above regulations shows that on furnishing of  the charge sheet full opportunity is required to  be   given  to  the  delinquent  officer  to  prove  his innocence. This  is a  case where the disciplinary authority decided  that   procedure  contained   in  Regulation  6  be followed.  Under   Regulation  -   6  (2)  the  Disciplinary Authority, instead  of conducting  the inquiry itself, chose to appoint  another person  as the  "Inquiring Authority’ to inquire  into   the  imputations   of  misconduct.   On  the

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conclusion of  the proceedings  in the  manner  provided  by Regulation 6,  the inquiring  authority has  to forward  its report to the disciplinary authority along with all relevant records. The  said  report  has  to  contain  the  inquiring authority’s findings  on each  of the charges framed against the delinquent  officer. According  to sub-regulation (3) of Regulation -  7 the disciplinary authority, having regard to the findings  on all  or any  of  the  articles  of  charge, imposes any  of the  penalties specified  in Regulation  -4. This obviously  implies that  where the  inquiring authority has found  all or  any of  the charges  proved  against  the delinquent officer  and the  disciplinary  authority  agrees with the said findings, then it can proceed to impose any of the penalties specified in the said regulation.      The controversy  in the  present case, however, relates to the  case where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings  of the  inquiring  authority  and  acts  under Regulation  -  7  (2).  The  said  sub-regulation  does  not specifically state  that  when  the  disciplinary  authority disagrees with  the findings of the inquiring authority, and is required  to record  its won reason for such disagreement and also  to record its own reason for such disagreement and also to  record its  own  finding  on  such  charge,  it  is required to give a hearing to the delinquent officer.      Sh. Reddy  relied on the decision of this Court in S.S. Koshal’s  case   (supra).  In  that  case  the  disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the inquiry officer which was  favourable to  the delinquent.  A question  arose whether the  disciplinary authority  was required  to give a fresh opportunity  of being  heard. At  page 470  a Division Bench (Coram:  BP Jeevan  Reddy and  BL Hanasria,  JJ) while coming to  the conclusion  that fresh  opportunity  was  not required observed as follows:      " So  far as  the second  ground is      concerned, we are unable to see any      substance  in   it.  N  such  fresh      opportunity is  contemplated by the      regulations   nor    can   such   a      requirement  be  deduced  from  the      principles of  natural justice.  It      may be  remembered that the inquiry      officer’s  report  is  not  binding      upon the disciplinary authority and      that it is open to the disciplinary      authority  to   come  to   its  own      conclusion on  the charges.  It  is      not in the nature of an appeal from      the   inquiry    officer   to   the      disciplinary authority.  It is  one      and the same proceeding. It is open      to a disciplinary authority to hold      the inquiry  himself. It is equally      open to  him to  appoint an inquiry      officer to  conduct the inquiry and      place the  entire record  before hm      with or  without his  findings. But      in either  case, the final decision      is to  be taken by him on the basis      of the  material adduced. This also      appears to be the view taken by one      of us  (B.P. Jeevan  Reddy, J) as a      Judge of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High      Court in Mahendra Kumar V. Union of      India.   The    second   contention      accordingly stands rejected."

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    Reliance  was  also  placed  on  M.  C.  Saxena’s  case (supra).  In  this  case  also  the  disciplinary  authority disagreed with  the findings  of the inquiry officer and the after recording  reasons in  this regard  it held  that  the charges against the delinquent officer stood established. In coming  to  this  conclusion  it  was  observed  that  while disagreeing the  only requirement  was that the disciplinary authority should  record reasons for disagreement and it was not necessary  in such  a case for the delinquent government servant to be afforded a further opportunity of hearing.      Sh. Sunil  Gupta, learned  counsel for  the respondent, drew our  attention to the decision in the case of Institute of chartered  Accountant of  India (supra).  The  respondent therein, who  was a  chartered accountant,  was  accused  of misconduct. An  inquiry was  instituted under  the Chartered Accountants  Act  1949.  The  disciplinary  committee  after hearing Ratna  submitted its  report to  the Council opining that he  was guilty  of professional misconduct. The Council considered the  report of  the  disciplinary  committee  and found him  guilty of  misconduct and thereupon the Institute wrote to  Ratna that  the Council  had found  him guilty  of professional misconduct  and it  was proposed  to remove his name from the register of members for a period not exceeding five years.  Thereupon a writ petition was filed by Ratna in the Bombay  High Court  which was  allowed with  the finding that the  Council should  have given an opportunity to Ratna to  represent   before  it   against  the   report  of   the disciplinary committee.  While affirming the decision of the High Court and coming to the conclusion that a member of the Institute of  Chartered Accountants accused of misconduct is entitled to  hearing by  the Council when, on receipt of the report of  the disciplinary  committee, it  proceeds to find whether he  is or  is not  guilty, this  Court at  page  550 observed as follows:      " Now  when it enters upon the task      of finding  whether the  member  is      guilty of  misconduct, the  Council      considers the  report submitted  by      the  disciplinary   Committee.  The      report constitutes  the material to      be considered  by the  council. The      Council will  take into  regard the      allegations against the member, his      case  in   defence,  the   recorded      evidence   and    the   conclusions      expressed   by   the   Disciplinary      Committee. Although  the member has      participated in the inquiry, he has      had no  opportunity to  demonstrate      the fallibility  of the conclusions      of the  disciplinary Committee.  It      is material  which falls within the      domain  of   consideration  by  the      Council. It  should also be open to      the member,  we think, to point out      to the  Council any  error  in  the      procedure    adopted     by     the      Disciplinary Committee  which could      have  resulted   in  vitiating  the      inquiry.  Section  21(8)  arms  the      council with  power to  record oral      and documentary evidence, and it is      precisely to  take account  of that      eventuality and to repair the error      that this  power seems to have been

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    conferred. It cannot, therefore, be      denied that  even though the member      has  participated  in  the  inquiry      before the  Disciplinary Committee,      there is  a range  of consideration      by the  Council on which he has not      been heard.  He is clearly entitled      to an opportunity of hearing before      the council  finds  him  guilty  of      misconduct."      In Ram  Kishan’s case  (supra) disciplinary proceedings on two  charges  were  initiated  against  Ram  Kishan.  The inquiry officer  in his  report found  the first  charge not proved  and   the  second  charge  was  partly  proved.  The disciplinary authority disagreed with the conclusion reached by the inquiry officer and a show cause was issued as to why both the  charges should  not be  taken to have been proved. While dealing  with the  contention  that  the  disciplinary authority had  not given  any reason  in the  show cause  to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer an that,  therefore, the  findings based  on that show cause notice was  bad in  law,  a  Two-Judge  Bench  at  page  161 observed as follows:      " ... The purpose of the show-cause      notice,  in  case  of  disagreement      with the  findings of  the  inquiry      officer,   is    to   enable    the      delinquent   to   show   that   the      disciplinary authority is persuaded      not   to    disagree    with    the      conclusions reached  by the inquiry      officer for  the reasons  given  in      the inquiry  report of he may offer      additional reasons  in  support  of      the   findings   by   the   inquiry      officer. In  that situation, unless      the  disciplinary  authority  gives      specific reasons  in the show cause      on the  basis of which the findings      of  the  inquiry  officer  in  that      behalf  is   based,  it   would  be      difficult  for  the  delinquent  to      satisfactorily  give   reasons   to      persuade the disciplinary authority      to  agree   with  the   conclusions      reached by  the inquiry officer. In      the absence of any ground or reason      in the  show-cause notice it amount      to an  empty formality  which would      cause  grave   prejudice   to   the      delinquent officer and would result      in injustice  to him. The mere fact      that  in   the  final   order  some      reasons have been given to disagree      with the conclusions reached by the      disciplinary authority  cannot cure      the defect."      At this  stage it  will be  appropriate to refer to the case of  State of  Assam and  Anr. Vs.  Bimal  Kumar  Pandit ([1964] 2  SCR 1]   decided  by a Constitution Bench of this Court. A question arose regarding the contents of the second show cause  notice when  the Government  accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even  though that  case relates  to Article 311 92) before its  deletion by  the 42nd  Amendment, the  principle

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laid down therein, at page 10 of the report, when read alone with the  decision of  this Court  in Karunakar’s  case will clearly apply  here.  The  Court  observed  at  Page  10  as follows:-      "We ought,  however, to add that if      the  dismissing  authority  differs      from the  findings recorded  in the      enquiry  report,  it  is  necessary      that its provisional conclusions in      that behalf  should be specified in      the second  notice. It  may be that      the report makes findings in favour      of the  delinquent officer, but the      dismissing authority disagrees with      the said  findings and  proceeds to      issue the  notice under Article 311      (2).  In  such  a  case,  it  would      obviously  be  necessary  that  the      dismissing     authority     should      expressly  state  that  it  differs      from the  findings recorded  in the      enquiry report  and  then  indicate      the nature  of the  action proposed      to be  taken against the delinquent      officer. Without  such  an  express      statement in  the notice,  it would      be impossible  to issue  the notice      at all.  There may also be cases in      which the  enquiry report  may make      findings   in    favour   of    the      delinquent officer  on some  issues      and  against   him  on  some  other      issues. That  is precisely what has      happened in  the present  case.  If      the  dismissing  authority  accepts      all  the  said  findings  in  their      entirety, it is another matter: but      if the dismissing authority accepts      the findings  recorded against  the      delinquent officer and differs from      some or  all of  those recorded  in      his favour  and proceeds to specify      the nature  of the  action proposed      to be  taken on it own conclusions,      it would be necessary that the said      conclusions   should   be   briefly      indicated in  the notice.  In  this      category  of   case,   the   action      proposed to be taken could be based      not only  on the  findings recorded      against the  delinquent officer  in      the enquiry report, but also on the      view of  the  dismissing  authority      that the  other  charges  not  held      proved by  the  enquiring  officer,      are  according  to  the  dismissing      authority, proved. In order to give      the delinquent officer a reasonable      opportunity  to  show  cause  under      Article  311(2),  it  is  essential      that the  conclusions provisionally      reached by the dismissing authority      must, in  such cases,  be specified      in  the  notice.  But  whether  the      dismissing  authority  purports  to

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    proceed to issue the notice against      the   delinquent    officer   after      accepting the enquiry report in its      entirety, it cannot be said that it      is essential  that  the  dismissing      authority must  say that  it has so      accepted the  report.  As  we  have      already indicated,  it is desirable      that even in such cases a statement      to that  effect should be made. But      we do not think that the words used      in Article 311 (2) justify the view      that the  failure to  make  such  a      statement amounts  to contravention      of Article  311(2). In dealing with      this point,  we must  bear in  mind      the fact that a copy of the enquiry      report had  been enclosed  with the      notice, and  so, reading the notice      in   common   sense   manner,   the      respondent could not have found any      difficulty in  realising  that  the      action proposed to be taken against      him proceeded on the basis that the      appellants   had    accepted    the      conclusions   of    the   enquiring      officer in the entirety."      In Karunakar’s  case (supra) the question arose whether after the  42nd amendment  of  the  Constitution,  when  the inquiry officer was other than a disciplinary authority, was the delinquent  employee entitled  to a  copy of the inquiry report  of  the  inquiry  officer  before  the  disciplinary authority takes  decision on  the question  of guilt  of the delinquent. It  was sought to be contended in that case that as the  right to  show cause  against penalty proposed to be levied had been taken away by the 42nd amendment, therefore, there was  no necessity  to give to the delinquent a copy of the inquiry  report before  the disciplinary  authority took the final decision as to whether to impose a penalty or not. Explaining the  effect of  42nd amendment  the  Constitution Bench at page 755 observed that "All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point  of  time  at  which  the  representation  of  the employee against  the  enquiry  officer’s  report  would  be considered. Now,  the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives  at its  conclusion with  regard to  his guilt or innocence of  the charges."  The Court  explained  that  the disciplinary proceedings  break into  two stages.  The first stage ends  when the  disciplinary authority  arrives at its conclusions on  the basis of the evidence, inquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. the second stage begins  when the  disciplinary  authority  decides  to impose penalty  on the  basis of  its conclusions. It is the second right  which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right  of the  charged officer  to receive the report of the inquiry officer was an essential part of the first stage itself. This  was expressed  by the  Court in  the following words:      "  The  reason  why  the  right  to      receive the  report of  the enquiry      officer is  considered an essential      part of  the reasonable opportunity      at  the  first  stage  and  also  a      principle  of  natural  justice  is

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    that the  findings recorded  by the      enquiry officer  form an  important      material  before  the  disciplinary      authority  which   along  with  the      evidence     is      taken     into      consideration by  it to come to its      conclusions. It is difficult to say      in advance, to what extent the said      findings including  the punishment,      if any,  recommended in  the report      would  influence  the  disciplinary      authority   while    drawing    its      conclusions. the  findings  further      might have  been  recorded  without      considering the  relevant  evidence      on record,  or by  misconstruing it      or unsupported  by it.  If  such  a      finding  is   to  be   one  of  the      documents to  be considered  by the      disciplinary     authority,     the      principles   of   natural   justice      require that  the  employee  should      have a  fair opportunity  to  meet,      explain and controvert it before he      is condemned. It is negation of the      tenants of  justice and a denial of      fair opportunity to the employee to      consider the findings recorded by a      third  party   like   the   enquiry      officer without giving the employee      an  opportunity  to  reply  to  it.      Although  it   is  true   that  the      disciplinary authority  is supposed      to arrive  at its  own findings  on      the basis  of the evidence recorded      in the  inquiry, it is also equally      true    that    the    disciplinary      authority takes  into consideration      the findings  on the  basis of  the      evidence recorded  in the  inquiry,      it is  also equally  true that  the      disciplinary authority  takes  into      consideration the findings recorded      by   the    enquiry   officer    do      constitute  an  important  material      before the  disciplinary  authority      which is  likely to  influence  its      conclusions. If the enquiry officer      were only  to record  the  evidence      and  forward   the  same   to   the      disciplinary authority,  that would      not   constitute    an   additional      material  before  the  disciplinary      authority of which the delinquent 4      employee has no knowledge. However,      when  the   enquiry  officer   goes      further and  records his  findings,      as stated  above, which  may or may      not be  based on  the  evidence  on      record or  are contrary to the same      or  in   ignorance  of   it,   such      findings are an additional material      unknown to  the  employee  but  are      taken  into  consideration  by  the      disciplinary    authority     while

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    arriving on  its conclusions.  Both      the  dictates   of  the  reasonable      opportunity   as    well   as   the      principles  of   natural   justice,      therefore, require  that before the      disciplinary authority comes to its      own  conclusions,   the  delinquent      employee should have an opportunity      to reply  to the  enquiry officer’s      findings.     the      disciplinary      authority  is   then  required   to      consider the  evidence, the  report      of  the  enquiry  officer  and  the      representation  of   the   employee      against it."      These  observations   are  clearly  in  tune  with  the observations in  Bimal Kumar  Pandit’s case  (supra)  quoted earlier and  would be  applicable at the first stage itself. the aforesaid  passages clearly  bring out  the necessity of the authority  which is to finally record an adverse finding to give  a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the inquiry officer had  given an  adverse finding,  as per  Karunakar’s case (supra)  the first  stage required an opportunity to be given to  the employee  to  represent  to  the  disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them  by the inquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when  the finding  in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed  to be over-turned by the disciplinary authority then no  opportunity should  be granted.  The first stage of the inquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand  that the  authority which  proposes to  decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the inquiring  officer holds  the charges  to be proved then that report  has to  be given  to the delinquent officer who can make  a representation before the disciplinary authority takes  further  action  which  may  be  prejudicial  to  the delinquent officer.  When, like  in the  present  case,  the inquiry report  is in  favour of  the delinquent officer but the disciplinary  authority proposes  to  differ  with  such conclusions then  that authority  which is  deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for  otherwise  he  would  be  condemned  unheard.  In departmental proceedings  what is  of ultimate importance is the findings of the disciplinary authority.      Under Regulation  - 6  the inquiry  proceedings can  be conducted  either   by  an   inquiry  officer   or  by   the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings  stand concluded  with decision  of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can  impose the  penalty and  not the inquiry officer. Where the  disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of  hearing has  to be  granted by him. When the disciplinary authority  differs with the view of the inquiry officer and  proposes to  come to  a  different  conclusion, there is  no reason  as to  why an  opportunity  of  hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where  the charged  officers succeed before the inquiry officer  they   are  deprived   of   representing   to   the disciplinary authority  before that  authority differs  with the inquiry  officer’s report and, while recording of guilt, imposes punishment  on the  officer. In  our opinion, in any such situation  the charged officer must have an opportunity

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to represent  before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is  required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar’s case(supra).      The result  of the  aforesaid discussion  would be that the principles  of natural  justice have  to  be  read  into Regulation  7(2).   As  a   result  thereof   whenever   the disciplinary authority  disagrees with the inquiry authority on any  article of  charge then  before it  records its  own findings on  such  charge,  it  must  record  its  tentative reasons for  such disagreement  and give  to the  delinquent officer an  opportunity to  represent before  it records its findings. The  report of  the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will  have  an  opportunity  to  persuade  the  disciplinary authority to  accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The  principles of  natural  justice,  as  we  have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final  decision  and  can  impose  a  penalty,  to  give  an opportunity to  the officer  charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.      The aforesaid  conclusion, which we have arrived at, is also in  consonance with the underlying principle enunciated by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Institute  of  Chartered Accountants (supra). While agreeing with the decision in Ram Kishan’s case  (supra), we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the contrary view  expressed in  S.S. Koshal  and M.C.  Saxena’s cases (supra) do not lay down the correct law.      Both the  respondents superannuated  on 31st  December, 1983. During the pendency of these appeals Misra died on 6th January, 1995  and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had  superannuated. It  will, therefore,  not be in the interest  of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded  to the  disciplinary authority for the start of another innings.  We,  therefore,  do  not  issue  any  such directions and  while dismissing these appeals we affirm the decisions of  the High  Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty  and had directed the appellants to release the retirement  benefits to  the  respondents.  There  will, however, be no order as to costs.