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PETITIONER: WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, MUMBAI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       26/10/1998

BENCH: S.SAGHIR AHMAD, K.T.THOMAS,

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT S.Saghir Ahmad. J. Leave granted. WHIRLPOOL,   true  to  their  name  have  created  a WHIRLPOOL of litigation in this country.    Based,  as  they are, the United States of America, they started the gyrating movement  by  applying  for registration of their Trade Mark "WHIRLPOOL" to the Registrar of the Trade  Marks  under  the Trade  Marks Act, 1940, which has since been replaced by the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and which for the sake of brevity, shall hereinafter be referred to as  the  "Act". The  Trade  Mark  was  duly  registered and a Certificate of Registration was issued on 31st  of  July,  1957  which  was renewed twice, in 1962 for a period of seven years and again for seven  years  with  effect  from 22.2.70.  Since further renewal was not obtained after 1977, it was removed from the Register but the appellants  continued  to  publicise  their Trade  Mark  "WHIRLPOOL"  as  also  the company name through publications Which had wide circulation in this country  and thus managed to maintain their reputation among the business circle including prospective customers and buyers. On 6th of  Aug.   1986, Mrs.  Sumitra Charat Ram and Mr.  N.R.Dongre, as Trustees of  Chinar  Trust  applied  for registration  of  the  Trade Mark "Whirlpool" in class under Application No.  458134, which was duly  advertised  by  the Registrar in  Trade  Marks  Journal  No.    945  on Page 845 pursuant to which the appellant filed  their  Opposition  on 6th  January,  1989,  but their objections were dismissed by the Assistant Registrar by his order dated  12.8.1992.    An appeal  against this order which was filed in the Delhi High Court on 7.11.1992 has since been admitted on  1.2.1993  and registered as C.M.(Main) No.  414 of 1992.  In  the  meantime, "Whirlpool" was registered as the Trade  Mark  of  the  Chinar  Trust  on  30.11.1992  and   a Certificate  of Registration No. 458134 was granted to them. A petition for Rectification and for removal of  this  entry from  the  Register  has already been filed by the appellant before the Registrar on 4.8.1993 under Sections 45 &  46  of the Act. It is still pending. Since  Chinar Trust had also started using the Trade

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Mark "Whirlpool" in relation  to  certain  washing-machines, allegedly  manufactured  by them, the appellant, as owner of the Trade Mark "Whirlpool", filed a Suit (Suit No.  1705  of 1994)  for  passing  off  in  the  Delhi  High  Court with a application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules  1 &  2  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure for restraining the defendants, namely, Chinar Trust, etc., from using the Trade Mark Whirlpool in relation to  their  products.    A  Single Judge  of  the Delhi High Court granted temporary injunction to the appellant on  31.10.1994  which  was  upheld  by  the Division Bench  on  21.4.1995.  Special Leave Petition filed against this order by the  Chinar  Trust  has  already  been dismissed by this Court on 30.8.1996. On 28.2.1997, the appellant filed an application  in From  TM-12  for  renewal  of  the Trade Mark "Whirlpool" in Class 7 and the Registrar, by his  order  dated  29th  July, 1997,  allowed  the  renewal  for  three successive periods, namely,  22.2.1977,   22.2.1984   and   finally   22.2.1991. Thereafter,  on 8th Aug., 1997 appellant made an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C.  for amendment of the plaint in Suit No.  1705 of 1994, referred to above, so as to  include the  ground  of  infringement  of the Trade Mark also in the suit but the application is still pending in the Delhi  High Court   which   has   already  granted  time  twice  to  the defendants, namely, Chinar Trust to file a reply. In  the  meantime,   Chinar   Trust,   through   its attorneys, wrote on 10th Sept. 1997 to the registrar to take suo  motu action under Section 56(4) for cancellation of the Certificate of Renewal granted  to  the  appellant  on  29th July, 1997 and the registrar, acting on that request, issued a  notice  to the appellant on 26th Sept., 1997 requiring it to show cause why the Certificate  of  Registration  be  not cancelled.  Against  this notice, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court  which  was  dismissed  on 8.12.1997.  It  is  against  this  judgment that the present appeal has been filed. Mr.   Iqbal Chagla, senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has contended that a notice under  Section  56(4) can  be issued only by the ’TRIBUNAL’ which has been defined in Section 2 (1)(x), which means the Registrar or  the  High Court  before  which  the ’proceeding concerned’ is pending. Mr.  Chagla has contended that it is either the Registrar or the High Court, which  can  issue  a  notice  under  Section 56(4), but out of the two, only that authority can issue the notice  before  which the ’proceeding concerned’ is pending. It is further contended that since a  passing-off  suit  was already pending in the Delhi High Court, where the appellant has also moved an application for amendment of the plaint so as  to include the relief of infringement of its Trade Mark. notice under Section 56(4) could have been  issued  only  by the Delhi High Court and not by the Registrar.         Mr.  R.N.Trivedi,  ASG  appearing for the Registrar, has on the contrary, contended that the Registrar  continued to  retain  his  jurisdiction  under  Section 56 of the Act, notwithstanding the pendency of the passing off  suit  filed by  the  appellant  in the High Court as the said suit could not be treated to constitutie, in any manner,  "proceedings" under  the  Act. Moreover, the application for amendment, by which the relief relating to infringement of Trade Mark  was sought  to  be  added  in  the  plaint was still pending and unless that  application  was  allowed  and  the  additional paragraphs,  including  the  above relief, were added in the plaint, the nature of proceedings would not change and  they will  continue to be treated a proceedings in a suit and not "proceeding" under the Act.

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This is also the contention of Mr.  Sudhir  Chandra, senior counsel  appearing for the Chinar Trust.  He has also contended  that  the  High  Court  was  fully  justified  in dismissing  that  petition  at the threshold particularly as the Writ Petition was directed only against a notice  issued under  Section  56(4)  of the Act requiring the appellant to show  cause  why  the  Registration   Certificate   be   not cancelled.   The  appellant,  it  is  contended, should have submitted a reply to that notice and allowed  the  Registrar to dispose of the whole matter on merits particularly as the Registrar had initiated the action principally on the ground that  the  appellant  had  obtained the renewal of the Trade Mark by misrepresentation and concealment of relevant facts. Mr.Chagla, in reply, has submitted  that  where  the action  initiated by a statutory authority is wholly without jurisdiction, it can be challenged under Article 226 of  the Constitution  and  the  Writ  Petition  cannot  be dismissed summarily.  In  the  instant  case,  the  Registrar,  it  is cintended,  could  not have legally acted as the Tribunal as the "Proceedings concerned"  was  pending  before  the  High Court  and, therefore, the High Court alone could have acted as a "TRIBUNAL" and initiated action under Section 56(4)  of the Act. Learned  counsel  appearing on behalf of the parties have thus tried to create a whirlpool  of  arguments  around the work "TRIBUNAL" as defined in Section 2(1)(x) of the Act and,  therefore in order to save ourselves from becoming the victim of "Vertigo" of this whirlpool at the Bar,  we  have, for  the  time  being, dispassionately assumed the role of a grammarian, to consider the science of English language from the point of view of inflexion, punctuation and  of  course, whole syntax, as the argument of the respondent’s counsel is based,  almost  wholly, on the importance of "comma" and the pronouns, "which" or "whom"  occurring  in  that  definition keeping   at  the  same  time  in  our  mind  the  principle Grammatical false non vitiat chartam (false grammar does not vitiate a deed) and the question  whether  this  would  also apply to  statutory interpretation.  But before we do it, we will first dispose of the preliminary objection relating  to maintainability  of  the  Writ Petition as filed in the High Court, allegedly, being premature and  having  been  brought without  first exhausting the alternative remedies under the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that since suo motu action under Section  56(4)  could  be  taken only   by   the   High  Court  and  not  by  the  Registrar, contingencies, namely, where  the  Writ  Petition  has  been filed  for  the enforcement of any of the Fundamental rights or where there has been a  violation  of  the  principle  of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without  jurisdiction  or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this  point  but  to  cut down this circle of fornices whirlpool we would rely or some old  decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. Rashid Ahmad vs. Municipal Board, kairana, AIR  1960 SC 163, laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting  Writs.  This  was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S.Rashid & Son Vs. The  Income  Tax  Investigation Commissioner  AIR  1954  SC  207  which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy  esisted, it  would  be  a  sound exercise of discreation to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This  proposition was,  however,  qualified  by the significant words, "unless

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there are  good  grounds  therefor",  which  indicated  that alternative  remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that  Writ  Petition  under  Article  226  could  still   be entertained in exceptional circumstances. Specific  and  clear  rule was laid down in State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh 1958 SCR 595 = AIR 1958 SC 86, as  under :            "But  this rule requiring the exhaustion of            statutory remedies before the Writ will  be            granted is a rule of policy convenience and            discretion  rather  than  a rule of law and            instances are  numerous  where  a  writ  of            certiorari  has been issued in spite of the            fact that the  aggrieved  party  had  other            adequate legal remedies." This proposition was considered  by  a  Constitution Bench  of  this  Court  in  A.V.Venkateswaran,  Collector of Customs. Bombay vs Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1506 and was affirmed and followed in the following words            "The  passages  in  the  judgments  of this            Court we have extracted would indicate  (1)            that  the  two exceptions which the learned            solicitor General formulated to the  normal            rule  as  to the effect of the existence of            an adequate alternative remedy were  by  no            means  exhaustive  and (2) that even beyond            them a discretion vested in the High  Court            to   have   entertained  the  petition  and            granted     the      petitioner      relief            notwithstanding   the   existence   of   an            alternative remedy.  We need only add  that            the  broad  lines of the general principles            on which the Court should act  having  been            clearly laid down, their application to the            facts   of   each   particular   case  must            necessarily be dependent on  a  variety  of            individual  facts  which  must  govern  the            proper exercise of the  discretion  of  the            Court,  and  that in a matter which is thus            per-eminently one of discretion, it is  not            possible  or  even if it were, it would not            be desirable to lay down  inflexible  rules            which  should  be  applied with rigidity in            every  case  which  comes  up  before   the            Court". Another  Constitution  Bench  decision  in  Calcutta Discount co.Ltd.  vs Income Tax Officer Companies Distt.   I AIR 1961 SC 372 laid down :            "Though   the   writ   of   prohibition  or            certiorari  will  not  issue   against   an            executive  authority,  the High Courts have            power to issue  in  a  fit  case  an  order            prohibiting  an  executive  authority  from            acting without jurisdiction.    Where  such            action  of  an  executive  authority acting            without jurisdiction subjects or is  likely            to  subject a person to lengthy proceedings            and unnecessary harassment.  the High Court            will issue appropriate orders or directions            to prevent  such  consequences.    Writ  of            certiorari   and   prohibition   can  issue            against Income Tax Officer  acting  without            jurisdiction under 8.34 I.T.Act". Much  water  has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions  which

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though  old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a Writ Petition under Article 226 of  the  Constitution,  in spite   of   the  alternative  statutory  remedies,  is  not affected, specially in a case where  the  authority  against whom  the Writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp  jurisdiction  without  any  legal foundation. That  being  so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the Writ Petition at the  initial  stage  without examining  the  contention that the show cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without  jurisdiction  and  that the  Registrar,  in  the  circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the "TRIBUNAL". We proceed to the next question now. Section 56, under which the notice to show cause has been issued to the appellant, provides as under :            56.  Power to cancel or  very  registration            and to rectify the register -            1.    On application made in the prescribed            manner to a High Court or to the  registrar            by  any  person aggrieved, the tribunal may            make such order as it may think fit for the            cancelling or varying the registration of a            trade   mark   on   the   ground   of   any            contravention,  or  failure  to  observe  a            condition  entered  on  the   register   in            relation thereto.            2.   Any person aggrieved by the absence or            omission from the register of any entry, or            by  any  entry made in the register without            sufficient cause or by  any  entry  wrongly            remaining  on the register, or by any error            of defect in any entry in the register, may            apply in the prescribed manner  to  a  High            Court or to the Registrar, and the tribunal            may make such order for making expunging or            varying the entry as it may think fit.            3.   The tribunal  may  in  any  proceeding            under this section decide any question that            may  be necessary or expedient to decide in            connection with the  rectification  of  the            register.            4.    The  tribunal, of its own motion, may            after  giving  notice  in  the   prescribed            manner  to  the parties concerned and after            giving them an opportunity of being  heard,            make  any  order referred to in sub-section            (1) or sub-section (2).            5.   Any order of the High Court rectifying            the register shall direct  that  notice  of            the  rectification shall be served upon the            Registrar  in  the  prescribed  manner  who            shall  upon  receipt of such notice rectify            the register accordingly.            6.   The  power  to  rectify  the  register            conferred by this section shall include the            power  to remove a trade mark registered in            Part A of the register to  Part  B  of  the            register. Section  56(1)  provides that on an application made to the High Court or the Registrar by the person  aggrieved, the  Tribunal  may  cancel  or  vary the registration of the Trade Mark.  Under Sub-section 4 of Section 56,  this  power can be exercised by the "Tribunal" suo motu.

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TRIBUNAL  has been defined under Section 2(1) (x) as under : "Tribunal" means the Registrar, or as  the            case  may  be  the  High Court before which the            proceeding concerned is pending." This definition treats "High Court" and "Registrar" both  as "TRIBUNAL" for purposes of this Act. High Court has been defined in Section 2(h)  as  the "High  Court" having jurisdiction under Section 3" which, in its turn, provides that it shall be that High  Court  within the limits of whose appellate jurisdiction the office of the Trade  Marks Registry referred to in each of the sub-clauses (a) to (e) is situate. We have to consider the meaning of these definitions in the context of other relative provisions of the Act so as to find an answer to the question relating to the extent  of jurisdiction of the Registrar and the High Court functioning as "Tribunal". Now  the principle is that all statutory definitions have to be  read  subject  to  the  qualification  variously expressed  in  the definition clauses which created them and it may be that  even  where  the  definition  is  exhaustive inasmuch  as  the  word  defined  is  said to mean a certain thing, it is possible  for  the  word  to  have  a  somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context.  That is why all definitions in statues  generally  begin with the qualifying words, similar to the words used in the present case, namely ’unless  there is anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or context’.  Thus there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may  have to  be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used and that will be giving  effect to  the  opening  sentence in the definition section, namely ’unless there  is  anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or context’.   In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to look at  the  context, the  collocation  and  the  object of such words relating to such  matter  and  interpret  the  meaning  intended  to  be conveyed  by the use of the words under those circumstance". (See :  Vanguard  Fire  and  General  Insurance  Co.    Ltd. Madras vs Fraser & Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971). Before  considering  the  contextual  aspect  of the definition of "Tribunal", we may first consider its ordinary and simple meaning. A bare look at the definition  indicates that  High  Court  and  the Registrar, on their own, are not "Tribunal".  They  become  "Tribunal"  if  "the   proceeding concerned"  comes  to  be  pending before either of them. In other words, if "the proceeding concerned" is pending before the High Court, it will be treated as "Tribunal". If on  the contrary,  "the  proceeding concerned" is pending before the Registrar, the latter will be treated as "Tribunal". Since  "Tribunal" is defined in Senction 2 which, in its opening  part,  uses  the  phrase  "Unless  the  context otherwise  requires",  the  definition, obviously, cannot be read in isolation. The phrase "Unless the context  otherwise requires" is meant to prevent a person from falling into the whirlpool   of  "definitions"  and  not  to  look  to  other provisions of the Act which, necessarily, has to be done  as the  meaning  ascribed to a "definition" can be adopted only if the context does not otherwise require. The history of legislation is more  than  a  century old.   The first legislation brought on the Statute Book was the India Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 (Act No.  4 of  1889). This was  followed  by the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (Act No.  5 of 1940).  Both these acts were  repealed  by  the  Trade  &

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Merchandise Marks  Act,  1958.  This Act follows the pattern of Trade Marks Act, 1938 of the United kingdom.    Prior  to the  enactment  of  Trade  Marks  Act, 1940, the disputes or problems,  specially  those  relating  to  infringement   of trade-marks  or  passing-off  were  decided  in the light of Section 54 of the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1877,  while  the registration  problem was tackled by obtaining a declaration as  to  ownership  of  a   trade-mark   under   the   Indian Registration Act,  1908.   The present Act which, as pointed out above, as repealed the  Indian  Merchandise  Marks  Act, 1889 and Trade Marks Act, 1940, also provides in Section 129 that  any  document  declaring  or purporting to declare the ownership or title of a person to a trade-mark other than  a registered  trade  mark,  shall  not be registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. We may now have  a  quick  look  at  other  relevant provisions of the Act. Section  4 provides that Central Govt. shall appoint a person as Controller-General of Patents, Designs  &  Trade Marks  who  shall  be the Registrar of Trade Marks under the Act. The functions of the Registrar, as  are  authorised  by him,  can  also  be  performed  by such other persons as the Central Government may appoint. Thus, there is an element of plurality in the sense that the functions of  the  Registrar can be performed by more than one person. Section  5  provides  for  the  establishment  of  a Registry known as Trade Marks Registry, with a  Head  Office and  Branch  Offices  at  such places as the Govt. may think fit. Under Section 6 read with Section 7 of  the  Act,  a Register  of  Trade  Marks, in two parts, namely, Part A and Part B, is to be maintained with the original Register  kept at the Head Office of the Trade Marks Registered Trade Marks with   the   names,   addresses   and  descriptions  of  the proprietors, and all notifications of assignments are to  be entered in that Register. Section 9 indicates the requisites for  registration  of  a  Trade  Mark  in  Part A or Part B. Sub-section  (5)  of  Section  9  gives  guidelines  to  the Tribunal  to  follow  in  determining  one  of  the relevant criteria for that purpose. There is a prohibition contained in  Section  12  on the  registration  of  a  Trade  Mark  which is identical or deceptively similar to an already registered Mark except  as provided  in  Sub-section  (3)  thereof which authorises the Registrar to  permit  the  registration  by  more  than  one proprietor  of  Trade  Marks  which  are identical or nearly resemble each other (whether any such Trade Mark is  already registered   or  not)  in  respect  of  the  same  goods  or description  of  goods  subject  to  such   conditions   and limitations as he may think fit to impose. Section 10(1) provides that  a  trade  mark  may  be limited  wholly  or in part to one or more specified colors, and any such lamination shall be taken into consideration by the "Tribunal" while deciding the distinctive  character  of the trade mark. Section  17 contains the provision for "Registration of Trade Mark subject to disclaimer" and provides  that  the Tribunal,  in  deciding  whether  the  Trade  Mark  shall be entered or shall remain on the register, amy  require  as  a condition  of its being on the register, that the proprietor shall either disclaim any right to the exclusive use of such part or of all or any portion of such matter,  as  the  case may be, to the exclusive use of which the Tribunal holds him not  to  be  entitled,  or make such other disclaimer as the Tribunal may consider necessary for the purpose of  defining

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the rights of the proprietor under the registration. Chapter  III of the Act deals with the procedure for and duration of Registration.  Section  18  deals  with  the making  of  an  application for Registration of a Trade Mark either in Part A or Part B of the Register. The  application has  to  be made to the Registrar though filed in the office of the Trade Mark Registry within whose  territorial  limits the  principal place of business of the applicant, or in the case of joint applicants, whose name is first mentioned,  is situate.  The  Registrar  may  either  accept  or refuse the application  or  accept  it  with  conditions.  Section   19 empowers  the Registrar to withdraw his acceptance if it was given in the circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) the Section. Where  an  application  has  been  accepted   either absolutely or subject to certain conditions and limitations, it has  to  be  advertised  (Sec  :  Section 20), though the Registrar may advertise it even  before  its  acceptance  in certain situations  contemplated  by  that  Section.   Under Section 21,  Notice  of  Opposition  may  be  given  to  the Registrar  by  any  person  opposing  registration  and  the applicant may, in reply thereto, file  a  counter-statement. Thereafter  the  Registrar  is  required,  after  giving  an opportunity of hearing to the applicant and his opponent, to decide whether registration is to be permitted absolutely or subject to such conditions or limitations as he may deem fit to specify.  Then comes the stage  of  registration  of  the Trade  Mark  under  Section  23  which  provides that if the application  is  not  opposed  and  the  period  of   filing "opposition"  has  expired  or  the  "opposition"  has  been decided in favour of  the  applicant,  the  Registrar  shall register  the  Trade  Mark either in Part A or part B of the Register and issue a Certificate of Registration.         Registration of a Trade Mark is done initially for a period of 7 years which can be renewed from time to time  in accordance  with  the  provisions of Section 25. The renewal can be obtained by making an application to the Registrar in the prescribed manner within the prescribed  period  and  on payment  of  the  prescribed  fee.  The  renewal will be for another period of 7 years. Sub-section  (3)  of  Section  25 provides  that  the Registrar, at the prescribed time before the expiration of the last registration of the  Trade  Mark, shall send a notice to the registered proprietor of the date of  expiration and the conditions as to payment of fees upon which a renewal of registration may be obtained. If, at  the expiration  of  the  time  prescribed  in that behalf, those conditions have not been duly complied with,  the  Registrar may  remove  the Trade Mark from the Register. But the Trade Mark can be restored and  it  can  be  renewed  provided  an application  is  made within one year from the expiration of the  last  registration  and  provided  the   Registrar   is satisfied  that it would be just so to do. Once a Trade Mark has been removed from the Register for failure  to  pay  the fee  for  renewal, it would, nevertheless, be deemed to be a Trade Mark already on the Register for a period of one  year for  purposes of any application for registration of another Trade Mark, unless the "Tribunal" is satisfied either :            (a)that there has been no bona fide trade            use of the trade mark which has been removed            during the years immediately  preceding  its            removal; or            (b)that no deception or  confusion  would            be likely to arise from the use of the trade            mark which is the subject of the application            for  registration  by reason of any previous

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          use  of  the  trade  mark  which  has   been            removed. Chapter  IV  of the Act deals with the effect of the registration.  This Chapter deals with the rights  conferred by  registration,  infringement  of  Trade  Marks  and  also defines the acts which do not constitute infringement. Chapter V deals with  assingment  and  transmission, while  Chapter  VI  deals  with  the  use of Trade Marks and registered Users. Chapter  VII deals with Rectification and Correction of the Register, which begins with Section 56, around  which the  bulk of arguments made by both the sides, any three, as Registrar has also addressed us has revolved.  This  Section also  speaks  of  the  "Tribunal", "Registrar" and the "High Court". Chapter VIII deals with Certificate of Trade  Marks, Chapter  IX contains "Special Provisions For Textile Goods", while chapter X deals with offences, penalties and procedure therefor.  Chapter XI contains the miscellaneous  provisions which, inter alia, provides that suits for infringement etc. of  the Trade Marks or relating to any right in a registered Trade Mark or for passing off arising out of the use by  the defendant  of  a  Trade  Mark,  which  is  identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s Trade  Mark,  whether registered  or  unregistered, shall not be instituted in any court inferior to a district Court.  (See :   Section  105). Section  106  specifies  the reliefs which may be granted in suits for infringement or for passing off. Under Section 107 of the Act,  any  application  for rectification   of   Register   has   to  be  made,  in  the circumstances specified therein, only to the High  Court  an not to  the  Registrar.   The provisions of this section are quoted below :-            "107.Application   for   rectification   of            register to be made to High Court in certain            cases.  (1) Where in a suit for infringement            of  a  registered trade mark the validity of            the registration of  the  plaintiff’s  trade            mark is questioned by the defendant or where            in  any  such  suit  the  defendant raises a            defence under Clause (d) of sub-section  (1)            of  section  30  and the plaintiff questions            the validity  of  the  registration  of  the            defendant’s  trade mark, the issue as to the            validity of the registration  of  the  trade            mark  concerned  shall be determined only on            an application for the rectification of  the            register,   and   notwithstanding   anything            contained in section 46, sub-section (4)  of            section  47  or section 56, such application            shall be made to the High Court and  not  to            the Registrar.            (2)Subject    to    the   provisions   of            sub-section (1), where  an  application  for            rectification of the register is made to the            Registrar  under  Section  46 or sub-section            (4)  of  section  47  or  section  56,   the            Registrar  may , if he thinks fit, refer the            application at any stage of  the  proceeding            to the High Court." Since a reference in this Section has been  made  to Sections 46 of the Act, they are reproduced below:-            "46.Removal  from  register and imposition            of limitations on ground of non-use.  -  (1)            Subject  to  the provisions of section 47, a

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          registered trade mark may be taken  off  the            register  in  respect of any of the goods in            respect  of  which  it  is   registered   on            application    made in the prescribed manner            to a High Court or to the Registrar  by  any            person aggrieved on the ground either            (a)that  the  trade  mark  was registered            without any bona fide intention on the  part            of  the  applicant  for registration that it            should be used in relation to those goods by            him or, in a case to which the provisions of            section 45 apply, by the company  concerned,            and  that  there  has, in fact, been no bona            fide use of the trade mark  in  relation  to            those  goods  by any proprietary thereof for            the time being up to a date one month before            the date of the application; or            (b)that up to a date one month before the            date of the application, a continuous period            of five years or longer had  elapsed  during            which  the  trade  mark  was  registered and            during which there  was  no  boan  fide  use            thereof  in  relation  to those goods by any            proprietor  thereof   for  the time being :            proprietor thereof for time Provided that, except where the applicant  has  been permitted under sub-section (3) of section 12 to register an identical  or nearly resembling trade mark in respect of the goods in question or where the tribunal is of  opinion  that he  might  properly be permitted so to register such a trade mark, the tribunal may refuse an  application  under  clause (a)  or  clause (b) in relation to any goods, if it is shown that there has been, before the relevant date or during  the relevant  period,  as  the case may be, bona fide use of the trade mark by any proprietor thereof for the time  being  in relation  to  goods  of the same description, being goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered.            (2)Where in  relation  to  any  goods  in            respect  of which a trade mark is registered            -            (a)the   circumstances   referred  to  in            clause (b) of sub-section (1) are  shown  to            exist so far as regards non-use of the trade            mark  in  relation  to  goods to be sold, or            otherwise trade in, in a particular place in            India  (otherwise  than  for   export   from            India),  or  in  relation  to  goods  to  be            exported  to  a  particular  market  outside            India; and            (b)a  person  has  been  permitted  under            sub-section (3) of section 12 to register an            identical or nearly resembling trade mark in            respect of those goods under a  registration            extending  to use in relation to goods to be            so  sold,  or  otherwise  trade  in  or   in            relation  to goods to be so exported, or the            tribunal  is  of  opinion  that   he   might            properly  be permitted so to register such a            trade mark; on application by that person in the prescribed manner to  a High  Court  or to the Registrar, the tribunal may impose on the registration of  the  first-mentioned  trade  mark  such limitations   as   it   thinks   proper  for  securing  that registration shall cease to extend to such use. (3)An applicant shall not be entitled  to  rely

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for  the purpose of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or for the purposes of sub-section (2) on any non-use of a  trade  mark which  is shown to have been due to special circumstances in the trade and not to any intention to abandon or not to  use the  trade  mark  in  relation  to  the  goods  to which the application relates." "47.Defensive registration of  well  known  trade  marks :(1) Where a trade mark consisting of any invented words has become  so  well  known as respects any goods in relation to which it is registered and  has  been  used,  that  the  use thereof  in  relation  to  other goods would be likely to be taken as indicating a connection  in  the  course  of  trade between  those  goods and a person entitled to use the trade mark  in  relation  to  the  first-mentioned   goods,   then notwithstanding that the proprietor registered in respect of the first mentioned goods does not use or propose to use the trade   mark   in   relation   to   those  other  goods  and notwithstanding anything in section 46, the trade mark  may, on  application in the prescribed manner by such proprietor, be registered in his name in respect of those other goods as a defensive trade mark, and while so registered,  shall  not be  liable  to be taken off the register in respect of those goods under the said section.  (2)The registered proprietor of  a  trade  mark may  apply  for  the  registration thereof in respect of any goods as a defensive trade mark notwithstanding that  it  is already  registered  in  his  name in respect of those goods otherwise than as a defensive trade mark, or may  apply  for the  registration there of in respect of any goods otherwise than as a defensive trade mark notwithstanding  that  it  is already  registered in his name in respect of those goods as a defensive trade mark in lieu in each case of the  existing registration. (3)A trade mark registered as a defensive trade mark and that trade mark as otherwise registered in the name of  the  same  proprietor  shall,  notwithstanding  that the respective registrations are in respect of different  goods, be  deemed to be and shall be registered as associated trade mark. (4)On application made in the prescribed manner to  a  High  Court  or  to  the  Registrar,  by  any  person aggrieved,  the  registration of a trade mark as a defensive trade  mark  may  be  cancelled  on  the  ground  that   the requirements  of  sub-section (1) are no longer satisfied in respect of any goods in relation to which the trade mark  is registered in the name of the same proprietor otherwise than as  a  defensive trade mark, or may be cancelled as respects any goods in  relation  to  which  it  is  registered  as  a defensive  trade  mark on the ground that there is no longer any likelihood that the use of the trade mark in relation to those  goods  would  be  taken  as  giving  the   indication mentioned in sub-section (1). (5)The  Registrar  may  at  any time cancel the registration as a defensive trade mark of a  trade  mark  of which there is no longer any registration in the name of the same proprietor otherwise than as a defensive trade mark. (6)Except  as  otherwise  expressly provided in this section, the provisions of  this  act  shall  apply  in respect  of  the  registration  of  trade marks as defensive trade marks and of trade marks so registered as  they  apply in other case." Section  108  lays down the procedure and the manner in which the application for rectification  shall  be  dealt with by the High Court. It prvides as under :-            "108.Procedure     for     application    for

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          rectification  before  a  High  Court  (1)  An            application  for rectification of the register            made  to  a  High  Court  under  section   46,            sub-section  (4)  of  section 47 or section 56            shall be in such form and shall  contain  such            particulars as may be prescribed.            (2)Every  such application shall be heard by            a single Judge of the High Court :            Provided that any such Judge may,  if  he            thinks fit, refer the application at any stage            of  the proceedings for decision to a Bench of            that High Court.            (3)Where any such application is heard by a            single Judge of the High Court an appeal shall            lie  from the order made by him on application            to a Bench of the High Court.            (4)Subject to the provisions of this Act and            the rules made thereunder, the  provisions  of            the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),            shall  apply  to  applications to a High Court            under this section.            (5)A  certified  copy  of  every  order   of            judgment  of  the High Court or of the Supreme            Court, as  the  case  may  be  relating  to  a            registered trade mark under this section shall            be communicated to the Registrar by that Court            and  the  Registrar  shall  give effect to the            order of Court and shall,  when  so  directed,            amend the entries in, or rectify, the register            in accordance with such order." Section 109 makes provision for  an  appeal  to  the High  Court  against  any order or decision of the registrar under this Act or the rules made thereunder. The  appeal  is to  be  heard by a Single Judge with a further appeal before the Division Bench of the High  Court.  Sub-section  (6)  of Section  109  provides  that in disposing of the appeal, the High Court shall have power to  make  any  order  which  the Registrar could make under the Act. Section  111 provides for the circumstances in which proceedings in a suit are to be stayed. It is  quoted  below :-            "111.Stay   of   proceedings   where   the            validity of registration of the trade mark            is questioned, etc.- (1) Where in any suit            for the infringement of a trade mark -                  (a)the  defendant  pleads that the                  registration  of   the   plaintiff’s                  trade mark is invalid; or                  (b)the  defendant raises a defence                  under clause (d) of sub-section  (1)                  of  section  30  and  the  plaintiff                  pleads   the   invalidity   of   the                  registration   of   the  defendant’s                  trade mark;            the  court  trying  the  suit (hereinafter            referred to as the court), shall, -                  (i)if    any    proceeding     for                  rectification  of  the  register  in                  relation  to  the   plaintiff’s   or                  defendant’  trade  mark  are pending                  before the  Registrar  or  the  High                  Court,  stay  the  suit  pending the                  final disposal of such proceedings;                  (ii)if  no  such  proceedings   are                  pending  and  the court is satisfied

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                that   the   plea   regarding    the                  invalidity  of  the  registration of                  the plaintiff’s or defendant’s trade                  mark is prima facie  tenable,  raise                  an  issue  regarding  the  same  and                  adjourn the case  for  a  period  of                  three  months  from  the date of the                  framing of the  issue  in  order  to                  enable  the party concerned to apply                  to the High Court for  rectification                  of the register. (2)   If the party  concerned  proves            to  the  court  that  he has made and such            application as is referred  to  in  clause            (b)  (ii)  of  sub-section  (1) within the            time  specified  therein  or  within  such            extended   time   as  the  court  may  for            sufficient cause allow, the trial  of  the            suit  shall  stand  stayed until the final            disposal of the rectification proceedings.            (3)    If  no  such  application   as            aforesaid has been made within the time so            specified  or within such extended time as            the court may allow, the issue as  to  the            validity  of the registration of the trade            mark concerned shall  be  deemed  to  have            been abandoned and the court shall proceed            with  the  suit  in  regard  to  the other            issues in the case.            (4)   The final  order  made  in  any            rectification  proceedings  referred to in            sub-section (2) shall be binding upon  the            parties and the court shall dispose of the            suit  conformably  to such order in so far            as it relates  to  the  issue  as  to  the            validity  of the registration of the trade            mark.            (5)   The stay  of  a  suit  for  the            infringement  of  a  trade mark under this            section  shall  not  preclude  the   court            making  any interlocutory order (including            any order granting an injunction directing            accounts to be kept, appointing a receiver            or attaching  any  property),  during  the            period of the stay of the suit." It is in the background of the above provisions that the question relating to the jurisdiction of the "Registrar" and  the  "High  Court",  which  individually and separately constitute "Tribunal" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(x), has to be considered. The functions and  extent  of  jurisdiction  of  the registrar  and  that  of the High Court which, incidentally, has also been constituted as the appellate authority of  the Registrar,   have  been  distinctly  set  out  in  different provisions of the Act. There are, however,  certain  matters for  which  jurisdiction  has  been  given to the "Tribunal" which, by its definition, includes the "High Court" and  the "Registrar" and therefore, the question is "can both be said to  have  "concurrent"  jurisdiction over matters as are set out for example, in Sections 9, 10,26,45,46,47 and 56". If   the  proceeding  is  cognisable  both  by   the Registrar  and  the  High  Court, which of the two will have jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding to  the  exclusion of  the  other or the jurisdiction being concurrent, can the proceeding go on simultaneously before the  High  Court  and

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the  Registrar,  resulting, may be, in conflicting decisions at the end, is a question which seems to be answered by  the words  "before  which  the  proceeding concerned is pending" occuring in the definition of "Tribunal" in Section  2(1)(x) of the Act. Let us test whether the answer is correct. Section   56  contemplates  proceedings  of  varying nature. The  proceedings  contemplated  by  Sub-section  (1) relate  to  the  cancellation  of  Trade Mark or varying the registration of Trade Mark, on the ground that the condition on which the registration was granted, was  either  violated or   there   was  failure  in  observing  the  condition  of registration. These proceedings may be entertained either by the High Court or the Registrar on the application, and,  at the instance, of the "person aggrieved". The proceedings contemplated by Sub-section  (2)  of Section  56 relate to the absence or omission of an entry in the Register or an entry having been made without sufficient cause or an entry wrongly remaining on the Register or there being any error or defect in an entry in the Register.  Such proceedings may also be entertained either by the  Registrar or  the  High Court on an application made in the prescribed manner by a  "person  aggrieved".  The  High  Court  or  the registrar  may,  in  these proceedings, pass an order either for making an entry, or expunging or varying the  entry.  In these  proceedings  which  may  be pending either before the High court or the Registrar, it would be open to  either  of them  to  decide any further question which may be necessary or expedient to decide in connection with the  rectification of   the   Register.   Obviously,   this   gives  very  wide jurisdiction to the High Court or the Registrar working as a Tribunal  as  the  jurisdiction  is  not  limited   to   the proceedings pending under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) but  extends  also  to  decide, in the same proceedings, any other question which may legitimately  arise  in  connection with the rectification proceedings. The  jurisdiction conferred on the High Court or the Registrar under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) can  also be exercised suo motu subject to the condition that a notice is  issued  to  the  parties concerned and an opportunity of hearing  is  given  to  them  before   passing   any   order contemplated by Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2). The  Registrar  and  the  High  Court have also been given the jurisdiction under this Section to  order  that  a Trade  Mark  registered in Part A shall be shifted to Part B of the Register. An order of rectification, if  passed  by  the  High Court,  is  implemented  by  the Registrar by rectifying the Register in conformity with the order  passed  by  the  High Court. The extent of jurisdiction conferred by  Section  56 on  the  Registrar  to  rectify  the  Register,  is, however curtail by Section 107 which provides  that  an  application for rectification shall, in certain situations, be made only to the  High  Court.    These  situations  are  mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 107, namely, where in a suit  for infringement  of  the registered Trade Mark, the validity of the registration is  questioned  by  the  defendant  or  the defendant,  in that suit, raises the defence contemplated by Section 30(1)(d) in which the acts which do  not  constitute an  infringement,  have been specified, and the plaintiff in reply  to  this  defence  questions  the  validity  of   the defendant’s Trade  Mark.   In these situations, the validity of the registration of the Trade Mark can be determined only by the High Court and not by the Registrar. Section  107  thus  impels  the  proceedings  to  be

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instituted  only  in the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Registrar in those cases which are covered by Section 107 is totally excluded.  Significantly,  Section  107(2)  provides that  if  an  application  for  rectification is made to the registrar under Section 46 or Section 47(4) or  Section  56, the Registrar may, if he thinks fit, refer that application, at any stage of the proceeding, to the High Court. Similarly,  under  Section  111  of  the  Act,  in a pending suit relating to infringement of a Trade Mark, if it is brought to the notice of the Court that any rectification proceedings relating to  plaintiff’s  or  defendant’s  trade Mark  are  pending  either  before the Registrar or the High Court, the proceedings in the suit shall be  stayed  pending final  decision  of the High Court or the Registrar. Even if such proceedings are not pending either before the Registrar or the High Court, the trial court, if prima facie satisfied that  the  plea  regarding  invalidity  of  plaintiff’s   or defendant’s  Trade  Mark  is tenable, amy frame an issue and adjourn the case  for  three  months  to  enable  the  party concerned  to  apply  to the High Court for rectification of the Register. If within three months,  the  party  concerned does  not  approach  the  High  Court,  the  plea  regarding invalidity of Trade Mark would be treated as  abandoned  but if  such  an  application  has  been given hearing, the suit would be stayed awaiting final decision of the  High  Court. The finding of the High Court would bind the parties and the issue  relating  to  the  invalidity  of Trade Mark would be decided in terms of those findings. In this background, the phrase "before which the  proceeding concerned  is  pending" stands out prominently to convey the idea  that  if  the  proceeding  is   pending   before   the "Registrar",  it  becomes  the  "Tribunal" Similarly, if the proceeding is pending before the "High Court", then the High Court has  to  be  treated  as  "Tribunal".      Thus,   the jurisdiction  of  the  Registrar  and the High Court, though apparently  concurrent  in  certain  matters,  is   mutually exclusive.   That  is  to say, if a particular proceeding is pending before the registrar, any  other  proceeding,  which may, in any way, relate to the pending proceeding, will have to be initiated before and taken up by the Registrar and the High  Court  will  act  as  the  Appellate  Authority of the Registrar under Section 109.  It  is  obvious  that  if  the proceedings are pending before the High Court, the registrar will  keep  his  hands  off and not touch those or any other proceedings  which  may,  in  any  way,  relate   to   those proceedings,  as  the  High  Court, which has to be the High Court having jurisdiction as set out in Section  3,  besides being  the  Appellate Authority of the Registrar has primacy over the Registrar in all matters under the Act.  Any  other interpretation  of the definition of "Tribunal" would not be in consonance with the scheme of the Act or  the  contextual background  set  out  therein  and  may  lead to conflicting decision on the same question by the Registrar and the  High Court besides generating multiplicity of proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondent -  Chinar  Trust, at  this  stage,  invoked the Rule of Punctuation in English Grammar and contended that the definition of  "Tribunal"  is amply clear and requires no interpretative exercise as there is  a  distinction  between  the  "Registrar"  and the "High Court" inasmuch as  the  Registrar  will  have  jurisdiction irrespective  of  the  pendency  of any proceeding, the High Court will have jurisdiction only when "proceeding concerned is pending before it. This he tried to show by pointing  out thet  the wourds "as the case may be" are placed between tow commas, one at the  beginning  immediately  after  the  word

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"Registrar"  and  the other at the end, with the result that the  words  "Tribunal  means  the   Registrar"   stand   out distinctly,  while  the  words  "High Court before which the proceeding concerned is pending" stand out separately as  an independent  phrase.  It is contended that the words "before which the proceeding  concerned  is  pending"  will  not  be applicable  to  the  Registrar and, therefore, the Registrar can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 56  irrespective of pendency of any "proceeding". The argument is fallacious. Learned  counsel  for  the Chinar Trust is trying to give  a  measure  of  importance  to  the  punctuation  mark "comma", more  than  it    deserves.  If  "comma"  were that important, there, incidentally, is another "comma" obviously separates the phrase "before which the proceeding  concerned is  pending" from the word "High Court" with the result that this phrase becomes applicable both to "High Court" and  the "Registrar".  The word "concerned" in this phrase is also of significance inasmuch as the word Tribunal has been used  in different  sections in relation to different proceedings. At some places  in  the  Act,  all  the  three  words,  namely, Registrar,  High  Court  and  Tribunal  have been used which indicate  that  if  the  proceeding  under  that  particular provision is pending before the Registrar then on account of that  proceeding,  the  Registrar  becomes  the Tribunal. So also, if the proceeding is pending  before  the  High  Court then  that proceeding makes the High Court a Tribunal. It is in that sense that the word proceeidng concerned has  to  be understood. Pronoun means for-a-noun. It is defined  as  a  word used  instead  of  a  noun.  The  Pronoun  with which we are concerned in this case is the relative  pronoun  namely  the pronoun  WHICH  which incidentally can be used in many other forms, namely as an interrogative pronoun, an  interrogative adjective,  or  as  a  relative  adjective.  Its  use is not limited to inanimate objects or animals but it can  also  be used  for people as explained in A Practical English Grammar (A.J.Thomson and A.V. Martinet - Fourth  Edition).  The  two Nouns,  namely, the registrar and the High Court used in the definition of Tribunal are followed by the relative  pronoun which  and  therefore the phrase before which the proceeding concerned is pending would relate to both the Nouns, namely, the Registrar and the High Court. This rule of Grammar which was sought to be pressed into aid by the learned counsel for the repondent is therefore of no use to him. Not   content   with  the  regection  of  the  above contention,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  invoked another  rule  of  English  grammar  relating  to the use of pronouns which and whom and contended  that  if  the  phrase before  which the proceeding concerned is pending were meant to apply to the Registrar, the Legislature would  have  used the  pronoun whom instead of which and the phrase would have read before whom the proceeding concerned is  pending."  The High  Court,  it  is  contended, is an inanimate object and, therefore, the pronoun which has been used. "Pronoun" means "for-a-noun". It  is  defined  as  a word  lused  "instead  of a noun". The Pronoun with which we are concerned in this case is the relative pronoun.  namely, the  pronoun WHICH, which, incidentally, can be used in many other  forms,  namely,  as  an  interrogative  pronoun,   an interrogative adjective. Its use is not limited to inanimate objects  or  animals but it can also be used for "people" as explained in A Practical English Grammar (A.J.  Thomson  and A.V.Martinet -  Fourth edition). The two Nouns, namely,  the Registrar and the High Court,  used  in  the  definition  of

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Tribunal  are  followed  by  the  relative pronoun which and therefore, the phrase before which the proceeding  concerned is  pending  would  relate  to  both  the Nouns, namely, the Registrar and the High Court. This rule of Grammar which was sounght to be pressed into aid by the  learned  counsel  for the respondent is therefore, of no use to him. Moreover,  in  a situation of this nature, mere rule of Grammar would not lead to correct interpretation  of  the definition  which  has  to  be  analysed, as we have already done, in the background of those  provisions  in  which  the word  Tribunal  has  been used together with the propose for which it has been used deeping in mind the overall scheme of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent than cited before us  a  decision  of  the  Calcutta  High  Cort  in  Standard Pharmaceuticals vs. Dy. Registrar of Trade Marks [Appeal No. 213 of 1970 decided on 18.2.1975 by Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. (as  His  Lordship  then was )], in which it was inter alia, observed as under :-           ....  "The definition clause  under  section           2(1)(x) provides as follows; "Tribunal means           the  Registrar  or  as  the case may be, the           High  Court  before  whom   the   proceeding           concerned is  pending.   Therefore, in order           to be a tribunal the Registrar must  be  one           before  whom a proceeding is pending Counsel           for the appellant contended that in  section           56(1) of the Act, a proceeding could only be           pending  before  the  Registrar  where there           were two parties or in  other  words,  where           there  was  a  proceeding  initiated  at the           behest of a third party.  It  was  contended           that in this case no proceeding was pending.           In  my  opinion, this contention also cannot           be accepted.  It is true that under the Act,           the registrar (being the person  designated)           performs  some function as the Registrar and           the Registrar as  well  as  the  High  Court           perform   in  certain  other  cases  certain           functions of the tribunal.    But  both  the           High  Court  perform  in certain other cases           certain functions of the tribunal.  But both           the High Court and the Registrar perform the           function of  the  tribunal,  only  in  cases           where proceedings are pending Proceedings in           the  case  of  statutory  bodies, like this,           need not be a dispute between two contending           private parties.   It  could  be  a  dispute           between the adjudicating party and the party           against whom  the proceedings are taken.  In           this connection, reliance may be  placed  on           the observations of the Supreme Court in the           case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd.  V.           P.N.  Sharma  and another, A.I.R.  1965 S.C.           1965 at page 1999 where  the  Supreme  Court           observed  "If  a statutory body has power to           do any act which will  prejudicially  affect           the  subject then although there are not two           parties apart from  the  authority  and  the           contest  is  between the authority proposing           to do the act and the subject  opposing  it,           the  final  determination  of  the authority           will yet be a quasi  judicial  act  provided           that   the  authority  is  required  by  the           statute to act judicially.  In such case the

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         statutory  body  which  adjudicates  such  a           dispute  would,  in my opinion be a tribunal           in terms of Section 2(1)(x) of the Trade and           Merchandise Marks act, 1958.  In this  case,           after  the  proceeding  which was pending by           the initiation of the notice dated  the  9th           May,  1968,  the  Registrar in deciding this           controversy in my opinion, was acting  as  a           tribunal  and  therefore,  was  competent to           take action as a tribunal contemplated under           section 56(4) of the Act." As  against  the above decision, there is a decision of a Division Bench of the same High Court in  Registrar  of Trade  Marks  and  Anr.  Vs Kumar Ranjan Sen & Ors. AIR 1966 Calcutta 311, in which it was laid down as under :-            "It   will   be   noticed   that  the  word            "Tribunal" as defined in clause (x) As against the above decision, there is  a  decision of  a  Division Bench of the same High Court in Registrar of Trade Marks and Anr. Vs. Kumar Ranjan Sen & Ors.,  AIR  1966 Calcutta 311, in which it was laid down as under :-             "It   will   be   noticed   that  the  word             "Tribunal" as  defined  in  clause  (x)  of             Sub-section (1)  of  S.   2 does not simply             mean the Registrar or the  High  Court  but             the  Registrar or the High Court, only when             proceedings are pending before them.  It is             a convenient way of describing  either  the             Registrar  of  the  High  Court before whom             proceedings were pending.  Coming now to S.             56, we find that sub-section (1) refers  to             an   application  made  in  the  Prescribed             manner to a High Court or to  a  Registrar,             but  it  is  the Tribunal which can make an             order under it of cancellation  or  varying             the registration as the case may be.  It is             a mistake to think that the word "Tribunal"             Stands  in  contra-distinction  to the word             "High Court" or the "Registrar".  The  word             "Tribunal"  has  been  used  as meaning the             "High Court" or the "Registrar" before whom             proceedings are pending.   It  is  in  this             sense  that  the  word  "tribunal" has been             used in sub-section (4).  It is intended to             convey that the "Tribunal", that is to say,             the High Court or the Registrar before whom             proceedings are pending may,  after  giving             notice  in  the  prescribed  manner  to the             parties concerned and after giving them  an             opportunity of being heard, make an order a             referred   to   in   sub-section   (1)   or             sub-section (2).    As  will  appear   from             sub-section  (5)  the High Court has itself             power  to  order  a  rectification  of  the             register.  In fact, the Court below, having             come    to    the   conclusion   that   the             registration had been  improperly  done  in             violation  of  the  provisions  of the said             Act, was not powerless in the  matter,  but             could  of its own motion have rectified the             register, even if its conclusion as to  the             powers  of  the Deputy Registrar was right.             It is clear to us that the use of the  word             "Tribunal" in  sub-section  (4)  of  S.  56             does  not   exclude   the   provisions   of

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           sub-section (2)  of S.4.  The only thing to             note  is  that  in  order  to  attract  the             provisions  of  sub-section  (4) of Section             56.  proceedings must be pending before the             Registrar or the persons authorised by  him             to  exercise  a  particular  function under             sub-section (2) or S.  4. This decision has been  considered  by  the  learned Single  Judge  in  Standard  Pharmaceutical’s  case (supra). In our opinion, both the decisions are in line with the view that we have taken in the instant case on the interpretation of the definition of Tribunal. But the point before us is  a little  different  as  we are concerned essentially with the extent of jurisdiction of the "Registrar" and the High Court vis-a-vis other provisions of the Act. In  the  instant case, it has already been indicated above that when  the  Assistant  Registrar  of  Trade  Marks dismissed  appellant’s  opposition  to  the  registration of respondent’s Trade Mark by its  order  dated  12.8.1992,  it filed  an appeal in the Delhi High Court, which was admitted on 1.2.1993 and has since been registered as C.M.(Main)  414 of 1992.    Thereafter,  on  4.8.1993, the appellant filed a rectification petition under Sections 45 and 46 of  the  Act for  removing the entry relating to the Trade Mark for which Registration Certificate was granted to the  respondents  on 30.11.1992.   The  appellant  has  also  filed  a  suit  for passing-off (Suit No.  1705 of 1994) in the Delhi High Court against the respondents  in  which  an  order  of  temporary injunction has been granted in favour of the appellant which has  been  upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court as also by this Court.  In that suit, an amendment  application has  also  been  filed  so  as  to  include  the  ground  of infringement  of  the  appellant’s  Trade  Mark   but   that application has  not  yet been disposed of.  It is, however, obvious that if the application is allowed,  the  amendments will  relate  back to the date of the application, if not to the date of plaint. In view of the pendency of these proceedings in  the High  Court and specially in view of Section 107 of the Act, the Registrar could not legally issue any suo motu notice to the  appellant  under  Section  56(4)   of   the   Act   for cancellation  of  the  Certificate  of  Registration/Renewal already granted.  The appeal is consequently allowed and the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy Registrar (respondent No.2) on 26th of Sept.  1997 under Section 56(4) of the  Act is hereby  quashed.    The  appellants  shall be entitled to their costs.