09 July 1996
Supreme Court


Bench: RAY,G.N. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-009094-009095 / 1996
Diary number: 78461 / 1991
Advocates: Vs S. R. SETIA






DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/07/1996


CITATION:  JT 1996 (6)   366        1996 SCALE  (5)267



JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      G.N. Ray, J.      Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.      These appeals  are directed against the common judgment dated October  11, 1990  passed by  the  Division  Bench  of Madras High Court in Trade Mark Second Appeal Nos.1 and 2 of 1981 arising  out of  the judgment  dated September 11, 1980 passed by  a Single  Bench of  Madras High Court in AAO Nos. 582-83 of  1978. The  respondent No.1  Company, namely,  the Vazir  Sultan   Tobacco  Co.   Ltd.  Hyderabad,   has   been manufacturing cigarrettes  under the brand name "Charminar". The said  Company in  1942 and in 1955, under the then Trade Mark legislation  obtained registration  of  Trade  Mark  in respect of "manufactured tobacco" falling in Class 34 of the 4th Schedule  to the  rules framed under the Trade Marks Act 1940 and 1950 Act. The respondent No.1 Company, however, did not manufacture  anything other  than cigarettes  during all these long  years. The appellant, namely, Vishnu Das Trading as Vishnudas  Kishendas Zarda  are manufacturing  quiwam and ’zarda’since 1973  and the appellant has been using the same trade mark,  namely, "Charminar" on his bottles and boxes of quiwam and  zarda. The  device of  trade mark "charminar" in the city  of Hyderabad as used by the appellant is, however, different from  the device being used by the respondent No.1 Company. The  appellant applied  for registration  of cuiwam and zarda  with trade  mark "Charminar"  under the Trade and Merchandise Marks  Act 1958  and the Trade Marks Rules, 1959 framed under  the said  Act. The  respondent Company  raised objections that the trade mark sought by the appellant would conflict with  the registered  Trade Nos.  9951  and  170427 which the respondent No.1 Company obtained in 1942 and 1955. The Joint  Registrar of Trade Marks, however, observed inter alia in  the minutes  dated September  24,  1973  about  the objections of  the respondent  to the  effect that  the mark would conflict  with registered  trade marks  Nos. 9951  and 170427. It was also observed that although the applicant had



contended that  such registration  of  trade  marks  was  in respect of  cigarettes but  quiwam and  zarda were  goods of different specifications  and such goods would not cause any conflict with the goods being manufactured by the respondent No.1 Company,  since the  registration was of the trade mark made in favour of the respondent to respect of ’manufactured tobacco’ which  in its  ambit would  also  take  quiwam  and zarda, the  objection of  the respondent  No.1 Company under Section 12(1)  of the Trade Marks Acts, therefore, could not be waived.  It was  noted in the minute that the counsel for the applicant  i.e. the  appellant herein,  had  offered  to apply for  rectification of the said trade mark in favour of the respondent No.1 Company.      Accordingly, on  October 15,  1973, the appellant filed two applications  under Section  46 read  with Section 56 of the  Trade   and  Mechandise  Marks  Act.  1958  before  the Registrar  of   Trade  Marks,   Madras  for  rectifying  the registration of  existing trade  mark held by the respondent No.1 Company mainly on the ground of non user of the same in respect of  quiwam and zarda by the respondent No.1 Company. The  proceedings   before  the   Registrar  of  Trade  Marks continued from  1973-76  but  the  respondent  No.1  Company though contested  the said applications could not dispute or refute the  allegation of  the appellant that the respondent No.1 Company  had never  manufactured any  other article  of tobacco except the cigarettes. The said applications made by the appellant  were ultimately  disposed of by the Assistant Registrar,  Trade  Marks,  Madras  on  August  31,  1976  by allowing the  applications for  rectification. The Assistant Registrar Trade  Marks ordered  that  the  Registrar,  Trade Mark, bearing  Nos. 9951  and 170427  would be  rectified by making the  entries relating  to specification  of goods  to read as ’cigarettes’.      Respondent  No.1   Company  thereafter   preferred  two statutory appeals  under Section  109(2) of  the  Trade  and Merchandise Marks  Act before  a  learned  Single  Bench  of Madras High  Court. By a common judgment dated September 11, 1980, the  learned Single  Judge allowed  the  said  appeals preferred by  the respondent No.1 and set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, dated August 31, 1976. The learned  Single Judge,  in his  order allowing  the said appeals, had  observed that the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks  had   made  a   sub-classification  of  ’manufactured tobacco’ occurring  in Class  34 although sub-classification could not  be made.  It was  also held by the learned Single Bench of  the Madras High Court that to sustain registration for an article manufactured tobacco’ in Class 34, it was not necessary  to   establish  user   of  the   trade  mark  and rectification as  ordered by  the Assistant  Registrar would enable the  appellant to pass them as the goods manufactured by the respondent No.1 Company.      Against the  judgment and  order passed  by the learned Single Bench,  the appellant preferred two statutory appeals under Section 109(5) of the said Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958  (hereafter referred to as Trade Marks Act) before a Division  Bench of  the  Madras  High  Court  and  by  the impugned  common   judgment  dated  October  11,  1990,  the Division Bench  dismissed the said appeals thereby affirming the order  passed by the learned Single Bench of Madras High Court. It  was inter  alia held by the Division Bench of the Madras  High   Court  that   there  could   be  no  separate registration in respect of cigarettes as Class 34 spoke only of  "manufactured   tobacco"  and   that  ground  alone  was sufficient for  setting aside  the order  of  the  Assistant Registrar. The  Division Bench  further held  that the Joint



Registrar had  already passed  an order  under Section 12 of the Trade  Marks Act,  1958 declining  registration of trade marks as  sought by  the appellant  and in  the abscence  of rectification of  the trade  marks in the register in favour of the  Respondent No.1  Company, the  said registration was conclusive of  the matter  ad the rectification applications were not  maintainable. The  Division Bench  also held  that manufacture of  cigarettes would  come  under  ’manufactured tobacco’. Hence,  the respondent  No.1 Company’s  trade mark could not  be removed or restricted on the ground of non-use with reference  to goods of different specifications such as quiwam and  zarda  falling  under  the  class  ’manufactured tobacco’  even   if  quiwam   and  zarda   had  never   been manufactured or  were intended  to be  manufactured  by  the respondent No.1  Company. As aforesaid, the said decision of the Division  Bench of  Madras High Court is under challenge in these appeals.      1) the  respondent Company  is  and      always     has      been     solely      manufacturing cigarettes  under the      brand  name   of  ’charminar’  ever      since  1942   and  1955.  The  said      Company  obtained  registration  of      Trade   Marks   for   manufacturing      tobacco   in    relation   to   the      cigarrettes bearing  the said brand      name falling  under Class 34 of the      4th  Schedule  of  the  Trade  Mark      Rules framed  under the Trade Marks      Act 1940.  The  Schedule  in  Trade      Marks Rules 1942 continues verbatim      as the  4th Schedule  of Trade Mark      Rules framed  under the Trade Marks      Act. The  Trade Mark ’charminar’ is      not  defensive   registration.  The      word ’charminar’ is not an invented      word   which   is   the   condition      precedent    for     a    defensive      registration under  Section  38  of      the  1940   Act  corresponding   to      Section 48  of the subsequent Trade      Marks Act.      ii) the  respondent  Company  never      intended   to   nor   evinced   any      intention to  nor even  intends  to      manufacture  anything   other  than      cigarettes.      iii) Class 34 reads thus      "34 tobacco  raw  or  manufactured,      smokers’ articles, matches."      "manufactured  tobacco"   covers  a      large range  and variety  of  goods      and  articles  which  in  terms  of      their  different   descriptions  as      well   as    different   modes   of      consumption,   may    be    broadly      categorised as:      a)  tobacco  consumed  by  smoking,      cigarattes, cigars  cheroot, bidis,      pipe tobacco      b) tobacco  consumed by chewing and      ingestion quiwam which is the paste      form and  applied as  an ingredient      to pan,  zarda which is in the form      of fine  flakes (usually  aromatic)



    also  applied  to  pan  as  another      ingredient; gutka-it  is  again  in      fine   flakes   which   is   chewed      sometimes with the addition of lime      (chuna).      c) tobacco  consumed by inhalation-      snuff which  is in  powder form and      taken in  or  inhaled  through  the      nose.      iv)   the   word   ’charminar’   is      distinct    and     specific     in      connotation. It  is the  name of  a      well known  18th  century  monument      standing as  a landmark in the city      of   Hyderabad.    Its   name   and      depiction  in   any  form  was  not      susceptible to  any proprietary  or      pre-emotive claim by any one.      v) Since  1973  the  appellant  has      been manufacturing quiwam and zarda      in respect  of which  the appellant      sought trade  marks under the brand      name and  device of  ’charminar’ on      the bottle and boxes of the product      of the  appellant with  an entirely      different depiction  as compared to      that used by the respondent Company      on  its   cigarette   packets   and      cartoons. The  appellant also holds      a duly  registered copyright  under      the  Copyright  Act.  1957  on  the      brand   name    and    device    of      ’charminar’  as   depicted  by  the      appellant.      vi) When  the appellant had applied      for registration  of the said trade      mark under  Class 34  in respect of      quiwam and  zarda, the  trade  mark      Registry declined to grant the same      on  account   of   the   respondent      Company’s  said   registered  trade      mark in  relation to the cigarettes      for   which   the   appellant   was      constrained  to  get  the  register      rectified  in   relation   to   the      respondent  Company’s  trade  mark.      Hence,   the    proceedings   under      Section 46  read with Section 56 of      the  Trade  Marks  Act  had  to  be      initiated by the appellant.      Mr. Ganesh has contended that "manufactured tobacco" is a genus  of which  those consumed variously i.e. by chewing, inhaling or  by smoking  are species.  Each of these species constitutes  articles  of  different  description  from  the others and each is distinct in character and use, though all of them  fall within the same broad Class i.e. "manufactured tobacco".      Mr. Ganesh  has contended that the trade mark is or can be granted in respect of a Class of goods which is  nebulous and lacks in any specificity and precise identification such as "manufactured  tobacco", without  any  reference  to  the particular goods  or articles  or thing falling in the class which is  traded in  or manufactured and in respect of which the applicant  trader or  manufacturer seeks  a trade  mark. Hence,  the   registration  of   Trade  Mark  in  favour  of



Respondent No.1  in 1942  and 1955 as "manufactured tobacco" was  fundamentally  erroneous  and  consequential  erroneous entry  in   the  Trade   Mark  Register   is  liable  to  be appropriately rectified. By such rectification, limiting the respondent Company’s trade marks to cigarettes, no prejudice will be  caused to  the respondent  Company, whereas if such rectification  is   not  carried   out,  the   appellant  si irreparably prejudiced  and is  precluded for  all time from getting the  trade marks  for his  goods, quiwam  and  zarda registered. Such prejudice is equally occasioned to the rest of the  trading and  manufacturing community  in relation to any species of "manufactured tobacco" other than cigarettes. Mr. Ganesh has submitted that such prejudice, preemption and exclusion in  rem can  not be  permitted  by  a  trade  mark registration.      Mr.  Ganesh   has  also   submitted  that   on  a  true interpretation and  proper construction  of Trade  Marks Act and Trade Marks Rules 1959, where (as in this case) a trader or manufacturer  actually trades  in or  manufactures solely one  article  namely  cigarettes  and  evinces  no  bonafide whatever to  trade in  or manufacture  any  other  goods  or articles belonging to the genus "manufactured tobacco", such trader or  manufacturer cannot by obtaining a trade mark for its product  in respect  of the  class in which it falls (in this case,  "manufactured Tabasco")  preclude the  public at large  or  in  any  event,  the  trading  and  manufacturing community e.g. traders and manufacturers of quiwam and zarda or traders  and manufacturers  of snuff  etc. from obtaining any trade  mark in  respect of their products simply because they fall  under a broad class or a genus i.e. "manufactured tobacco" although  the goods belong to different species and are essentially different in description as also in the mode of consumption.      Mr. Ganesh  has further  submitted  that  exclusion  of different species  which may  come under  the heading  of  a genus comprising  various specifics  even when  a trader  or manufacturer having  obtained registration under the heading of genus,  in fact, is manufacturing only one of the species thereby pre-empting  or excluding others to get registration in respect of different species other than the species which is being manufactured by the trader or manufacturer, will be unjust and  unfair  and  against  the  principles  by  which registration of  trade mark  is made. This proposition would be particularly  valid where  (a) the  registration  of  the registered trade  mark is  not a  defensive registration and the brand  name of  the goods  under registration  is not an "invented word"  and the  device, logo  or symbol associated with that  name and depicting the product is not an invented one and  (b) even  though the  registered trade  mark holder obtained the  registration for the entire class in which his product falls,  but he has neither any bonafide intention to use nor  made any  bonafide use of the registered trade mark in relation  to any  other goods  falling within that class, whether within  the stipulated  statutory periods  or beyond them, governing rectification of the Register and imposition of  limitations   on  the   ground  of   non-use  concerning registered trade marks.      Mr.  Ganesh  has  further  submitted  that  a  contrary approach to  the interpratation  and  construcation  of  the Trade Marks  Act and  the rules  framed thereunder  will  go against  the  very  object  and  spirit  of  and  principles underlying the  trade mark law. According to Mr. Ganesh, the aforesaid propositions  and the  principles  they  adumbrate apply a  fortiori to  a case  such as  the present  one. Mr. Ganesh has  contended that  a registered  trade mark  holder



cannot, in  law, claim  exclusive monopoly  rights over  its trade mark as extending to goods of all descriptions falling within the same class in which its sole and solitary product fails. The  registration in favour of the respondent Company cannot be  held to  interpose or  sustain objection  to  the rectification of  its registered trade mark or imposition of limitations thereon  with reference to the goods or articles of entirely  different description,  character and  mode  of consumption in  relation to  which it  had, at  the time  of obtaining the registration, no bonafide intention to use its trade mark  and which  goods  and  articles,  it  has  never manufactured or  intends to  manufacture in fact. Mr. Ganesh has contended  that  the  registration  of  trade  mark  can appertain only to specific goods and not to a generic class. Referring to  Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade Marks Act. Mr. Ganesh has submitted that the statute contains the following postulates: 1)   the existing  trade mark  was  registered  without  any bonafide intention  on the  part of  the applicant  that  it should be  used in  relation to those goods by him and there has in  fact been  no bonafide   use  of the  trade mark  in relation to  those goods by him upto a date one month before the date  of the  application under Section 46 by the person aggrieved. Mr. Ganesh has submitted that this requirement is fully satisfied in the present case. ii)  upto  a   date  one   month  before  the  date  of  the application by  the person aggrieved, a continuous period of five years or longer had elapsed during which the trade mark was registered  and during  which there  was no bonafide use thereof in  relation to  those goods by the registered trade mark holder.  In such  a case, the concerned Tribunal, (High Court or  the Registrar),  may impose on the registration of the existing trade mark such limitations as it thinks proper for securing  that the  existing registration shall cease to extend to  such use.  Mr. Ganesh  has  submitted  that  this requirement  is  also  fully  satisfied  and  the  Assistant Registrar of trade marks has specifically ordered so.      In this  connection, Mr.  Ganesh has submitted that the statutory burden lies on the registered trade mark holder to show that  his said non-use was due to special circumstances in the  trade and  not to any intention to abandon or not to use the  trade mark  in relation  to the  goods to which the application of  the aggrieved  person relates.  It has  been contended by  Mr. Ganesh that the respondent Company has not pleaded that  under any special circumstance the Company did not use  other items of the goods falling under the class in which  the   respondent  Company   got   registration.   The respondent Company  has not  discharged the  burden  arising from non-use  of different  items  coming  under  the  broad classification ’manufactured  tobacco’. Mr.  Ganesh has also submitted that  if either of the above mentioned ingredients is satisfied,  then allowing of an application by the person aggrieved for the rectification will be matter of course and refusal of  such application for any valid reason will be an exception. Mr.  Ganesh has submitted that when the concerned authorities satisfy  that rectification  of  the  registered trade mark  is warranted  an the  facts and circumstances of the case,  such authority  may make  such order  for making, expunging or varying entries in the register as it may think fit for one or more of the following reasons:      a) the  entry made  in the Register      without sufficient cause      b) the absence or omission from the      Register of any entry      c) any  error or defect in an entry



    in the Register      It has  also been  contended by  Mr. Ganesh  that it is consistent with the scheme and provisions of the Trade Marks Act and  the framed thereunder that no registration of trade mark is  absolute, perpetual  and  invariable.  Thus,  under Section 12  which deals  with prohibition of registration of identical or  deceptively similar  trade marks,  in case  of honest concurrent  use or  of  other  special  circumstances which in  the opinion  of the Registrar make it proper so to do,  he  may  permit  the  registration  by  more  than  one proprietor of  trade marks  which are  identical  or  nearly resemble each  other whether  or not  any such trade mark is already  registered   in  respect   of  the  same  goods  or description  of   goods  subject   to  such  conditions  and limitations as  the Registrar  may think  fit to impose. Mr. Ganesh has  submitted that  this statutory  scheme  pervades other provisions  of the Act as well including in particular those    that     relate    to     the    institution     of applications/proceedings for  any purposes  governed by  the Act. In  this connection,  Mr. Ganesh has drawn attention of the Court  to Sections  16,17,18,21,46,47,56,69, and  112 of the Trade Marks Act.      Mr. Ganesh  has also  submitted that intrinsic evidence in the  Trade Marks  Act and the 1959 rules leads inexorably and ineluctably to the following conclusions:-      a) Trade  mark means a mark used in      relation  to   the  goods  for  the      purpose of  indicating or  so as to      indicate a connection in the course      of trade between the goods and some      persons having the right to use the      mark. "Goods"  means anything which      is  the   subject   of   trade   or      manufacture. A trade mark posits an      integral   connection   between   a      specific article  or thing  forming      the     subject      matter      of      trade/manufacture and its attribute      as    that    of    a    particular      trader/manufacturer.     Obviously,      anything which  is the  subject  of      trade or  manufacture, must  be  an      article or thing that is distinctly      complete, identifiable and vendible      but  not   something  nebulous  and      lacking in  specificity or  precise      identification. In this connection,      the  attention  of  this  Court  is      drawn  by   Mr.   Ganesh   to   the      definition  of   "Goods   and   the      definition  of   "Trade  Mark"   in      Sections 2(1) (g) and (v).      b) the  focus of  trade  marks  and      registration    thereof    is    on      concrete,  specific,   identifiable      and vendible  goods and  not  on  a      concept or  appellation of  a class      or  a   genus  of  goods.  In  this      connection, the  Court’s  attention      was drawn  by  Mr.  Ganesh  to  the      definitions       relating       to      "certification trade  mark,"  false      trade description",  "trade  marks"      appearing in Section 2, sub-section      (1)          Clauses           (c),



    (f),(g),(i),(m),(u)   &   (v)   and      Section 2,  sub-section (2)  Clause      (b).      Mr.  Ganesh   has  contended  that  a  trade  mark  can appertain only to specific goods and not to a generic class. No trade  mark is  or can  granted in  respect of a class of goods, such  as "manufactured tobacco" without any reference to particular  goods or  articles or  thing falling  in that class which  is traded  in or manufactured and in respect of which the  applicant trader  or manufacturer seeks the trade mark. Mr.  Ganesh has  contended that  the classification of goods and  names of  the classes  as set  out in  the fourth Schedule to  the 1959 Rules framed under the Trade Marks Act under Section  133 read  with  Section  22  of  the  General Clauses Act, 1897 is purely for the purposes of enabling the Trade Marks  Registry to ascertain in which class, specified goods or a particular article or thing falls before granting and registering any trade mark in respect thereof.      Mr. Ganesh  has further  submitted that  Section 112 of the Trade  Marks Act gives express recognition and weight to the practice  of the  Trade Marks Registry. According to Mr. Ganesh, appreciable  significance and  interpretative  value are attached  to the  index  maintained  and  used  by  time honoured practice  by the Trade Marks Registry. The index is an amplification in alphabetical order of the classification of goods,  names of  the  classes  set  out  in  the  fourth Schedule of the 1959 Rules framed under the Trade Marks Act. The  said   Index  is   based  on   and  derived  from  "The International Classification  of Goods and Services to which Trade  Marks   Act  Applied,"   published   by   the   World Intellectual  Property   Organisation   (WIPO)   which   was established by  a Convention  at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Mr. Ganesh has stated that India is a member country of that Organisation  and   a  signatory  to  that  convention.  The amplification and  refinement of  a statutory classification for   practical   utility   and   efficacy   based   on   an internationally accepted  and time  honoured  classification and practice,  deserves to  be given  due weight  especially when such  practice is  given express  statutory recognition and sanctity  even to the extent of mandatorily constituting evidence in the proceeding.      Mr. Ganesh  has also submitted that the Trade Marks Act maintains a  clear distinction  between goods  of  the  same description  (occurring   in  Section  46  with  grammatical variations in  Sections 12 and 34) and "class of goods" with its grammatical variations in Section 18 and Rules 22 and 26 read with  the fourth  Schedule to  the 1959  Rules. A given class occuring in the said Schedule may comprise a number of goods or  articles or  things each  of which  is  separately identical and vendible and all of which are not goods of the same description  as contradistinguished  from goods falling within the  same class.  ’Manufactured tobacco  is  a  class which covers  widely varying goods of different description, character and  mode of consumption. Mr. Ganesh has contended that Section  2 (1)  (m) of  the  Trade  Marks  Act  defines ’permitted use’  in relation  to a  registered trade mark to mean inter alia the use of a trade mark by a registered user thereof "in  relation  to  goods  with  which  the  user  is connected in  the course of trade". Similarly, a mark i.e. a device, brand,  heading,  label,  ticket,  name,  signature, word, letter  or numeral  or any  combination thereof can be placed or  used  upon  specific  goods  only  and  not  upon something that  is a  concept or  appellation, for  example, manufactured tobacco.  Mr. Ganesh has submitted that Section 2 (2)  (b) of the Trade Marks Act provides that in the Trade



Marks Act  any reference to the use of a mark in relation to goods shall  be construed  as a  reference to the use of the mark upon  or in  any physical  or  in  any  other  relation whatsoever to such goods.      Referring to  Section 8  of the  Trade Marks  Act,  Mr. Ganesh  has  submitted  that  Section  8  contemplates  that registration can  only be in respect of particular goods and that  there   is  a   distinction  between  "goods"  and  "a prescribed class  of goods"  in which they may be comprised. It also  postulates that the attribution of particular goods to their  proper class for purposes of registration of trade mark is  to be determined by the Registrar whose decision in the matter  shall be  final. Mr.  Ganesh has  also submitted that Section  9 of the Trade Marks Act deals with requisites for registration  in the  Trade Marks  Register. Sub-section (4) highlights the point that if it not distinctive, a trade mark shall  not be  registered in  part B  of  the  Register unless such  trade mark  is capable  of distinguishing goods with which  the proprietor  of a  trade mark  is or  may  be connected in  the course  of trade from goods in the case of which no such connection subsists, generally.      Mr. Ganesh  has submitted  that Section  12(3)  of  the Trade Marks  Act provides  that in case of honest concurrent use or  of other  special circumstances which in the opinion of the  Registrar, make it proper so to do, the Registrar of trade marks  which are  identical or  nearly  resemble  each other in  respect of  the same goods or description of goods subject to  such conditions  and limitations, if any, as the Registrar may  think  fit  to  impose.  Section  45(2)  also provides that  the High Court or the Registrar may impose on the registration  of an existing trade mark such limitations as the Tribunal thinks proper for securing that registration shall cease to extend to use of the registered trade mark to the extent of its actual non- use.      Mr. Ganesh  has submitted  that at  the very  stage  of application for  registration of  a trade  mark,  the  Trade Marks Act  recognises the distinction between specific goods and the class of goods in which they way fall. Section 18(2) provides that  an application for registration "shall not be more  in  respect  of  goods  comprised  in  more  than  one prescribed class  of goods."  Similarly,  Section  24  which deals with  jointly owned  trade marks adverts to an article with which  both or  all of them are connected in the course of trade.      Mr. Ganesh has further submitted that extrinsic aids to the interpretation  and construction  of the Trade Marks Act and the  1959 Rules  framed thereunder also serve to sustain the submissions  made by  him. The  extrinsic  aid  includes corresponding  legislation   in  the   United  Kingdom,  the legislative history  of the Trade Marks Act of 1958 and 1959 Rules framed  thereunder, the  Report  of  the  Trade  Marks Enquiry  Committee,   1954,  the   Report  of   Mr.  Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar  on Trade Marks Law Revision in 1955 and the statement  of Objects  and Reasons  for the  Bill  which culminated in  the Trade Marks Act. Mr. Ganesh has submitted that  the   decisions  of  Courts  in  India  and  also  the authorities of  persuasive value  from foreign  jurisdiction support  the   contentions  made  by  him.  Mr.  Ganesh  has submitted  that   the  rationale  of  trade  mark  law  with reference to the rectification of the Registrar is aptly and succinctly articulated  in a  locus classicus in Edwards Vs. Dennis (1885)  30 Ch.  Div. 454 at 474). Lord Justice Cotton (Lindley and  Fry, L.J.J.  concurring) has  observed to  the following effect:-      "....  The   registration  in   the



    present  case   has  been  for  the      entirety  of   that  class.  In  my      poinion that  is wrong.  Even if  a      trade mark  can be registered which      is not  in actual  use. it ought to      be restricted  to  those  goods  in      connection with  which it  is going      to be  used. In  my opinion,  it is      not the intention of the Act that a      man registering  a trade  mark  for      the entire class and yet only using      it for  one article  in that class,      can claim for himself the exclusive      right to  use it  for every article      in the  class..... can  a man claim      registration for  all  the  article      specified in  the  class  when  the      business   he    is   engaged   in,      comprises only one specific portion      of the  article named in the class?      I am of the opinion he cannot......      Consequently, I  am of  the opinion      that  the   Register  ought  to  be      rectified........      "...... In  my opinion,  if  a  man      wishes to  extend his business to a      new description of goods and to use      his trade  mark in  connection with      the goods,  he ought to register it      in respect  of those  goods. All we      have how  to do is to construe this      Act of  Parliament; and  it appears      to me  that it  would  be  a  wrong      interpretation of  the Act, to hold      that, when  registration is general      for an  entire  class,  it  can  be      maintained for  that class by a man      who is  assignee of  a business  in      only one  particular description of      goods in the class".      Mr. Ganesh  has submitted  that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the impugned Judgment  erred in  interfering in  appeal with the properly exercised  discretion of the Registrar to limit the respondent Company’s registered trade mark to cigarettes and to rectify the Register accordingly. In this connection, Mr. Ganesh has  referred  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in National Bell  Co. Vs.  Metal Goods  Co. (1971 (1) SCR 70 at page 86 E-F). This Court has observed that under Section 56, the power  to rectify  is undoubtedly  discretionary.  Where such discretion  has been  properly exercised,  a  Court  of Appeal would  refuse  to  interfere.  Mr.  Ganesh  has  also referred  to   the  decision   in  American   Home  Products Corporation Vs.  Mac Laboratories  Pvt. Ltd. (1985 Supp. (3) SCR 264).  It has  been held  by  this  Court  in  the  said decision that:      "From what  we have  said above, we      must not be understood to mean that      a person who does not intend to use      a trade  mark himself,  can get  it      registered and  when faced  with  a      application  under  Clause  (a)  of      Section 46  (1) to  have that trade      mark removed  turn  round  and  say      that he  intended to use it through



    some person  who was proposed to be      registered as registered user. This      would clearly amount to trafficking      in a trade mark."      Mr. Ganesh  has submitted that the registration in 1945 and 1993  made in favour of the respondent company under the broad classification  "manufactured  tobacco"  although  the Respondent  Company   is   admittedly   only   manufacturing cigarettes and  does not  intend to  manufacture  any  other goods and  articles falling  under  the  genus  manufactured tobacco; has created a monopoly of trade mark over varieties of goods  coming under the said broad classification thereby preventing the  other traders  and  manufacturers  like  the appellant to  get their distinctive articles which also fall under the  general classification  ’manufactured tobacco’ to get registered  in respect  of such distinctive articles. In such  circumstance,   the  rectification   allowed  by   the Assistant  Registrar   was  only  just  and  proper  and  no interference was  called for  by the High Court against such order of  rectification. Mr. Ganesh, therefore, submits that the appeal  should be  allowed by setting aside the impugned decision of  the High  Court and  by restoring  the order of rectification passed  by the  Assistant Registrar  of  Trade Marks in favour of the appellant.      Mr. C.S. Vaidyanatha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1,  however, disputes  the contentions made by Mr. Ganesh.  Mr. Vaidyanatha has submitted that the question involved in these appeals are not confined only to the ambit of Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade Marks Act and Rules 94 to 97  of   the  Rules  framed  thereunder.  According  to  Mr. Vaidyanatha  in  the  proceedings  concerning  the  appeals, question of  infringement of  trade mark by the appellant is also involved.  He has submitted that the appellant has been using trade  mark- ’charminar’  since  1973,  despite  being aware of  the respondent  Company’s objection  to the use of such trade  mark, as  amounting to infringement of the trade mark of  the respondent  Company. The  Madras High Court has categorically  held   that  the   respondent   Company   got registration in  Class  34  and  such  registration  is  for manufactured tobacco’.  The respondent  Company,  therefore, has exclusive  right to  use the  trade mark ’charminar’ for all goods  falling  under  ’manufactured  tobacco’.  As  the Assistant  Registrar   of  Trade   Marks   had   erroneously restricted the  respondent Company’s  registration  only  to cigarettes, both  the Single Bench and Division Bench of the Madras High  Court have  rightly set  aside  such  erroneous order.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has also submitted that the respondent Company had  not filed  the appeal  before the  Madras  High Court solely  for the  purpose of  deciding the questions of law and  procedure regarding  the power  of the Registrar of Trade Marks to solit classes in terms of Sections 46 and 56. The respondent Company preferred the appeals before the High Court to  restore registration  made in  its favour  and  to ensure removal of the restrictions which had been improperly and unjustly  imposed by  the Assistant  Registrar of  Trade Mark by  confining  the  registration  only  in  respect  of cigarettes.      Mr. Vaidyanatha has also submitted that the Madras High Court has  rightly indicated  that  a  conjoint  reading  of Section 8(1)  and Rules  22 the  26 framed  under the  Trade Marks Act  together with  Schedule 4, support the contention of the  respondent Company  that apart  from  classification made in  Schedule 4, no other classification is possible for the purpose  of registration  of trade mark. Mr. Vaidyanatha



has submitted  that there is no separate or independent item in the  classification contained  in the  4th  Schedule  for cigarettes. Cigarettes  can only  be brought under the entry ’manufactured tobacco  under Clause  34 of  Schedule 4,  Mr. Vaidyanatha  has  submitted  that  in  view  of  such  legal position, the  High Court has rightly held that the order of Registrar was liable to be set aside on that ground only.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has also  submitted that  Section 8 of the Trade  Marks Act  is different  from Section  5  of  the previous Trade Marks Act of 1940. The legal incidence of the expression in  Section 8  of the  present Act, "comprised in prescribed class  of goods"  which does  not find  place  in Section 5  of the  previous  Act  or  1940  requires  proper consideration.   Mr.    Vaidyanatha   has   submitted   that legislative change by the aforesaid expression introduced in the present Act has been consciously made by the legislature for a  purpose.  Mr.  Vaidyanatha  has  submitted  that  the Statement of  Object and  Reasons as  contained in the Trade Marks Act,  1958 clearly  indicates that  the  new  Act  was introduced to  enlarge the  field of  registrability and  to avoid the  difficulties which  were being  exercised by  the Indian merchants  in securing registration of trade marks in foreign countries  where the  production of  certificate  of home registration  was a  condition precedent  for obtaining foreign registration. Mr. Vaidyanatha has submitted that the present Trade  Marks Act  was enacted  not  any  to  prevent confusion  and  deception  but  also  to  provide  effective protection to  Trade marks.  To buttress  this argument, Mr. Vaidyanatha has also drawn the attention of the Court to the debates in  the floor of the Parliament (Lok Sabha) when the Bill to  amend the  Trade and Mechandise Marks Act, 1940 was introduced.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has further submitted that a reference to Trade Marks Act 1940, and similar Sections of the English Trade Marks  Act of 1938, 1905 and 1875 will show that under the 1940  Act and  also under  the said  English Trade  Mark Acts, it  could be  registered only in respect of particular goods or  Classes of  goods. The  omission of the expression "particular goods"  and inclusion  of "prescribed  class  of goods" in  the 1958 Trade Act is significant and such change has bearing  on the  true construction  of Section  8 of the Trade Marks  Act. Mr.  Vaidyanatha has  submitted that under the present Trade Marks Act, registration can be only in the nomenclature,  phraseology   and  terminolgoy  used  in  the classification, prescribed under the rules.      Mr. Vaidyanatha has also submitted that the decision of the  English   Court  Edwards  Vs.  Dennis  (supra)  is  not applicable for  considering the effect registration of trade mark in  respect of  specified  class  of  goods  under  the present Act  in view of the express language used in Section 8 of  the present  Act.  the  Madras  High  Court  has  also indicated the  import of such expression in Section 8 of the Trade Marks Act.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has referred  to another  decision  of English Court  in Lever  Brothers, Port  Sunlight,  Ld.  Vs. Sunniwite Products Ltd. (LXVI RPC 84). In the said decision, the plaintiffs  were  proprietors  of  the  mark  "sunlight" registered in 1884 in Class 3 in respect of soap, substances for laundry  use. detergents, and certain cosmetic goods. At the beginning  of 1946,  the defendants commenced to use the mark  "sunniwite"  on  a  spapless  detergent  poweder.  The plaintiffs sued  for infringement and the defendants counter claimed to  rectify the Register by striking out goods other than soap,  on the  ground of non-user. The plaintiff’s mark had been used on a large scale but on soap only. It has been



held in the said deision that:      a) the  mark had been infringed, b)      the specification  of  goods  ought      not  to   be  amended   to  exclude      detergents   or    supstances   for      laundry use,  c) the cosmetic goods      within the  specification were  not      of the same description as soap and      that   subject   to   the   general      discretion of the Court, they might      be liable to exclusion but that- d)      the  defendants  were  not  persons      aggrieved by  the  registration  in      respect of those goods and were not      therefore entitled  to claim  their      exclusion  from   the   plaintiff’s      registration.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has further  submitted that the Madras High Court  has rightly held with reference to Section 46 of the Trade  Marks Act.  in particular the proviso to the said Section that it was quite apparent that the applications for rectificaton   were    not   maintainable.   The   concerned authorities had  already come  to a finding that cigarettes, Quiwam and  zarda- all would come under the same description of goods,  namely, ’manufactured  tobacco’. Accordingly, the cigarettes having  already been registered under the head of ’manufactured tobacco’  at the  instance of  the  respondent Company, the  rectification applications for restricting the said trade mark only for cigarettes were not maintainable so as to  enable the  appellant to register the same trade mark for manufacture  of quiwam  and zarda  even though  the said articles fall  under the  same  description  of  goods.  Mr. Vaidyanatha has  also submitted  that the respondent company alone is entitled to use "charminar" trade mark with respect to  the   ’manufactured  tobacco’   products  in  Class  34. Therefore,  there  was  no  question  of  proving  that  the respondent Company  and utilised  or had intended to utilise its trade mark for quiwam and zarda.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has also contended that the trade mark "charminar" had  been registered in favour of the respondent Company under  the general  heading  ’manufactured  tabacco’ referred to  in Class  34 of  the 4th Schedule. Accordingly, the respondent  Company, namely,  the registered  proprietor cannot be  compelled to  produce or  trade in  all the goods falling under  that category on the pain of losing his trade mark for non-use. So long, a separate classification has not been made  in respect  of different classes of goods falling under  the   general  heading  ’manufactured  tobacco’,  the registration of  the respondent  Company’ s  trade  mark  in respect of ’manufactured tobacco cannot be held to be bad or invalid.  Mr.   Vaidyanatha  has  also  submitted  that  the appellant has been manufacturing quiwam and zarda only after it  had   filed  application   for  registration  which  was initially objected  to by  the Registrar.  It is, therefore, quite evident that on the date of making the application for registration by the appellant, the mark was only proposed to be must  but the  appellant went ahead and started using the marks in  relation to  quiwam  even  though  the  respondent Company had objected to such use as being an infringement of its registered trade mark in Class 34.      According to Mr. Vaidyanatha, the respondent Company by virtue of  its extensive  use and  brior registration  since 1942, is  entitled to use the said trade mark ’charminar’ in relation to the tobacco manufactured products and such right cannot be restricted only to cigarettes which is only one of



the articles  under the said heading ’manufactured tobacco’. Mr. Vaidyanatha  has disputed  the contention  of Mr. Ganesh that cigarettes,  quiwam and  zarda are  neither  "the  same goods" nor  "the same description of goods". Mr. Vaidyanatha has  submitted  that  the  Madras  High  Court  has  rightly observed that  all the  goods are  of the  same description, namely, ’manufactured  tobacco’. Mr.  Vaidyanatha  has  also submitted that  common  trade  channels  through  which  the product of  a trader  or  manufacturer  is  marketed  is  an important consideration in deciding whether the goods are of the same  or  different  description.  Mr.  Vaidyanatha  has further submitted  that it  is not  denied by  the appellant that cigarettes,  quiwam and  zarda are all marketed through the same trade channel.      In support  of such  contention, Mr.  Vaidayanatha  has referred to  a decision  of  this  Court  in  Corn  Products Refining Co.  Vs. Shargrila  Food Products Ltd. (AIR 1960 SC 142). It has been observed in the said decision that:      "an   average    purchaser   would,      therefore, be  likely to think that      the     respondent’s     ’Glucovita      biscuits’  were   made   with   the      appellants   ’Glucovita’   glucose.      This  was   the   king   of   trade      connection between  different goods      which in the "Black Magic" case (In      re: as  application by Edward Hact)      1940-58  RPC   91  was  taken  into      consideration in  arriving  at  the      conclusion   that   there   was   a      likelihood    of    confusion    or      deception. The  goods in  this case      were chocolates  and laxatives  and      it was  proved that  laxatives were      often    made     with    chocolate      coatings...." Similarly, in  the case  reported in  AIR  1983  Punjab  and Haryana 418,  the High  Court of Punjab and Haryana has held that the  goods are  being marketed through the common trade channel by observing that:      ....the   respondent   have   never      manufactured watchesor  clocks  but      they have been manufacturing clock-      work-timers used in photography and      the radio  clocks. The  watches and      clocks are  being sold  on the same      counter    along     with    radio,      transistor  and   other  electrical      appliances     even      by     the      defendants...." Mr. Vaiydanatha  has submitted  that similar  view has  also been taken  by the  Delhi High Court in the case reported in AIR 1986  Delhi 329.  It  has  been  observed  in  the  said decision that:      ".... there  is little  doubt  that      the trade  mark Goodmans  has  been      used by  the plaintiffs  from long,      for their medicines. They being the      prior user,  have the right to seek      its   protection.   The   defendant      manufactured  disinfectants   under      the  same   mark  i.e.  ’Goodmans’,      considering the nature of the goods      manufectured by  the  parties,  the      trade channels  through which  they



    are  marketed   and  the   file  of      activity that  they have,  they can      be termed  as  cognate  goods.  The      likelihood    of    deception    or      confusion that  the  goods  of  the      defendant   are   as   well   being      manufactured  by   the  plaintiffs,      cannot be ruled out."      Mr. Vaidyanatha has also submitted that the Bombay High Court has  also taken  a similar  view by  nothing that  the goods though  of different descriptions, were being marketed through a  common trade  channel. In  a decision in the case reported in  1988 PTC  133, the  Bombay High  Court has held that the  registered  trade  mark  Proprietor  of  Bajaj  in respect of  electrical goods and appliances falling in Class 7,8 and  11 can  prevent the  use of  the mark ’Bajaj’ which falls in  Class 21  in respect  of domestic  utencils on the grounds of common trade channel.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has further  submitted that when there is registration  of trade  mark for ’manufactured tobacco in Class 34  but its  use is  confined to  cigarettes,  another manufacturer of  smoking tobacco,  cigars, snuff, or chewing tobacco or  any form  of manufactured  tobacco which are all made of  tobacco, cannot use the registered trade mark so as to  create  confusion  or  deception  in  the  mind  of  the purchaser that  the goods sold under the trade mark had been produced by  the cigarette  manufacturer. In support of this contention, Mr.  Vaidyanatha has  referred to  a decision of the Privy  Council in  Somerville Vs.  Sehembri (1887 (2) AC 453). He  has submitted  that the  view taken  in  the  said decision was  followed  in  the  decision  of  various  High Courts, namely  Calcutta High  Court in  Rustom Ali Vs. Bata Shoe Company  (AIR 1957  Cal. 120),  Bombay  High  Court  in Sunder Vs.  Caltex (AIR 1969 Bombay 24), Delhi High Court in Nestle Products  Vs. Milkmaid  Corporation (AIR  1974  Delhi 40). Mr.  Vaidyanatha has  submitted that the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court has referred to the decisions mentioned above  and has  rightly held  that having obtained registration in  respect of  the tobacco  products under the heading ’manufactured  tobacco’ in  Class 34, the respondent Company  is   entitled  t   prevent  any   other  trader  of manufacturer to claim registration of the same trade mark in respect of his products which also is manufactured tobacco.      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has also submitted that the proviso to Section 46(1)  of the  Trade  Marks  Act  imports  into  the proceedings for  rectification "the  concept of goods of the same description"  pronibited for registration under Section 12(1). In  this connection,  Mr. Vaidyanatha has referred to the decision  of the English Court reported in (26 RPC 428). Buckley L.J. has held that the alternative of the expression "classes of  goods" which  occurred in  the U.K. Act of 1883 was made designedly. It was observed by Buckley, L.J.that:      "The purpose  of it  was this: that      where the goods are not of the same      class,  but   are   of   the   same      description, taking as an instance,      goods made  of  India-Rubber,  then      the intention  of the  Act of  1883      and that  of  1905  is  that  there      shall  be  a  veto  in  respect  of      registering  an   identical   trade      mark, or  a similar  trade mark  in      respect of goods falling within the      description, as  distinguished from      the class.  Section 19 is perfectly



    capable of  being read,  as  is,  I      think, to  be read,  as if  it  ran      thus:  No   trade  mark   shall  be      registered in  respect of any class      of   goods    falling   within    a      particular  description  of  goods,      when an  identical or  similar mark      is  already   on  the  Register  in      respect of any goods falling within      the description.  It is true that a      man   cannot    register   for    a      description of  goods, but  he  can      register for a class of goods which      fall    within     a     particular      description, and  that is, I think,      what Section 19 was aimed at".      Mr. Vaidyanatha  has submitted that appellant failed in the  attempts  of  getting  its  products  registered  under Section 12(1)  of the  Trade Marks  Act  as  the  respondent Company had  already got an earlier registration of the same trade  mark  in  respect  of  the  class  of  goods  namely, manufactured tobacco. The applications to rectify trade mark in respect  of the  goods of  the appellant  is sought under Sections 46  and 56  of the Trade Marks Act by the method of applying for  rectification of  the entry in the Register in favour  of  the  respondent  Company.  Mr.  Vaidyanatha  has submitted that  such applications  for the  reasons  already indicated are not maintainable. Accordingly, no interference is called  for in  these appeals  and  the  same  should  be dismissed.      Mr. Jayaram,  the learned  Additional Solicitor General appearing for  the respondent  No. 2,  namely the  Assistant Registrar of  Trade Marks,  has submitted  that Section 8 of the Trade  Marks Act provides for registration in respect of any or  many or  all items  within a class. He has submitted that within  a class there may be various goods. Mr. Jayaram has drawn the attention of the Court to sub-rule (2) of Rule 26 of  the Trade  Mark Rules.  He has submitted that Rule 26 envisages that  an application  for registration would be in respect of only class of goods as mentioned in 4th Schedule. If a manufacturer or trader intends to get registration of a number of  goods which  appertain  to  different  classes  a mentioned in  Schedule 4,  separate applications  are to  be made relating  to goods  coming under  each of  the separate classes. Sub-rule  (2) of Rule 26 indicates that in the case of application for registration in respect of goods included in a  class or  of a  large variety of goods in a class, the Registrar may  refuse to  accept an application unless he is satisfied that  the specification is justified by the use of the mark  which the applicant has made or intends to make if and when  it is  registered. Mr.  Jayaram has submitted that sub-Rule  (2)   of  Rule   26  clearly   indicates  that   a registration may be refused in respect of varieties of goods which may be comprised in a class. ’Manufactured tobacco’ is a broad  classification. If  a trader  or manufacturer  gets registration of  a trade  mark in  respect of  such a  broad classification namely manufactured tobacco, then such trader may claim  exclusive right  of the  use of the trade mark in respect  of   all  the  items  falling  under  ’manufactured tobacco’. Mr.  Jayaram has  submitted that for the aforesaid reason, initially  when appellant  made an  application  for registration of  quiwam and  zarda with  the same brand name "charminar", such  application for  registration made by the appellant  could   not  be   accepted  by   indicating  that registration given to the Respondent Company covered various



items under  the genus.  But  when  the  appellant  made  an application  for   rectification  of   the  entries  in  the register, such  entries have  been rectified by limiting the registration to specific product coming under the said broad classification ’manufactured tobacco’, namely, cigarettes by indicating reasons  as to  why such  rectification would  be justified. Mr. Jayaram has submitted that for the purpose of entertaining the  application for registration and allotting the  appropriate   slot  to   the  article  intended  to  be registered, index  of various  articles has  been made. Such index serves  as an important guideline to indicate to which class the  article to  be registered  is to  be  classified. Various goods alphabetically classified in the index ensures rationality  of   approach  in   registering   and   removes arbitrariness. Mr. Jayaram has, in this connection, referred to a  compilation by  Stephen P.  Ladas "Patents Trade Marks and Related Rights - National and International Protection"- Vol.. published by the Haryana University Press. Mr. Jayaram has  submitted   that  cigarettes   being  a   specific  and identifiable  article  is  dealt  separately  in  the  trade channel  and   cigarette  is  specifically  mentioned  as  a distinct commodity  of use in the index in 1975. He has also submitted  that   from  tobacco   various  articles  can  be manufactured but such articles are used differently and have separate identifications  and are  separately vendible  e.g. cigarette, snuff,  quiwam and  zarda. All  the said articles have been manufactured from tabacco but each of the articles is distinctly  different and is differently used. Initially, when the  respondent Company  got registration  of the trade mark "charminar"  not in  respect of  any  specific  article under the  genus, ’manufactured  tobacco’,  the  Company  by virtue of  registration in  a wide  enjoyed the right of the use of  trade mark  in respect of various goods coming under the  said  braod  heading  ’manufactured  tobacco’.  It  has however been  demohstrated  that  ever  since  1942-43,  the respondent Company  had manufactured only cigarettes and had not intended  to manufacture  or  trade  in  other  distinct articles  coming   under  the  broad  heading  ’manufactured tobacco’.  Mr.  Jayaram  has  submitted  that  there  is  no question of  passing off quiwam or zarda for cigarette being manufactured by  the respondent  Company even  if  the  same brand name "charminar" is given to quiwam and zarda produced by the  appellant. Referring to Section 8 of the Trade Marks Act, Mr.  Jayaram has  submitted that  it is  permissible to register any  of the goods which may fall under a prescribed class of  goods. Hence,  only cigarettes  may be  registered under the  broad classification  ’manufactured  tobacco’  by specifically indicating  that the  registration  relates  to cigarettes only  falling under the broad classification. Mr. Jayaram has submitted that as registration in respect of one or some  or the  articles under  the broad classification is permissible, there  cannot be any difficulty in limiting the registration earlier  given to  the  respondent  Company  in respect of  a broad  genus namely, ’manufactured tobacco’ to one of the species under the said genus, namely, cigarettes. Mr.  Jayaram   has  submitted   that  for   the  purpose  of registration of trade mark, apart from the classification as sepcified in  the Schedule  4, no  new classification can be made. But  a particular goods falling under a classification in the  schedule may  be registered  by indicating the broad classification to which the articles in question falls. Such registration will  not militate  against the  provisions  of Section 8 of the Trade Marks Act.      Mr. Jayaram  has submitted  that the respondent Company is certainly  entitled to all the protection under the Trade



Marks Act in respect of the articles dealt or intended to be dealt by  the Company  namely cigarettes.  It has  used  its trade mark  "charminar" in respect of the goods manufactured by it,  namely, cigarettes  and the Company is also entitled to prevent any other trader or manufacturer to use the brand name in  respect of  the said article i.e. cigarette. But it will be not proper to allow him to enjoy monopoly over large varieties of goods which are distinct in their use and which are clearly  identifiable  as  separate  products  and  also separately vendible  and marketed.  Even when the respondent Company is  concerned only  in one of such products, namely, cigarettes if  the rectification  of trade  mark is not made thereby permitting  the other  manufacturers and  traders to deal with  other distinct  products  made  of  tobacco,  the respondent Company  will be  given an unmerited privilege of enjoying monopoly  over all goods coming under a broad class ’manufactured  tobacco’.   Such  position   is  unjust   and inequitable and also not consistent with the Trade Marks Act and the Rules. Mr. Jayaram has, therefore, submitted that in the  facts  of  the  case,  rectification  as  made  by  the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks is rational and justified and such rectification should be permitted.      After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of  the  case  and  submissions  made  by  the learned counsel  for the  parties, it appears to us that the avowed object  of the  Trade Marks  Act as  indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is "to enlarge the field of registrability". In these apeals, the propriety and validity of the  order of  rectification are  only germane. It is not necessary  to   address  on   the  questions   relating   to infringement of  trade mark  or  passing  off  or  defensive registration  because   such  questions  do  not  arise  for decisions. There  is no  dispute that  the  respondent  No.1 Company has  been manufacturing  cigarettes under  the brand name "charminar"  since 1943.  In 1942  and 1955,  the  said Company got  registration of the said brand name "charminar" for the  goods being  classified as  manufactured tobacco in class 34  of 4th  Schedule in  the Rules  framed under Trade Marks Act.  It is  also not  disputed  that  the  expression "charminar" is  not an inventive word which is the condition precedent for defensive registration under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act (Section 38 of the Trade Marks Act of 1940). No evidence  has been led by the respondent Company that the respondent Company  had really  intended or even now intends to manufacture  any other  product  of  tobacco  other  than cigarettes. It  will be  appropriate to refer to Class 34 of Schedule 4 which is to the following effect:-      "34 tobacco  raw  or  manufactured,  smokers’  articles matches."      Manufactured tobacco  is a  broad genus  covering large variety of goods and articles. It has been rightly indicated by the appellant that :      a)  tobacco   may  be  consumed  by      somking  and   articles   made   of      tobacco  which   are  consumed   by      smoking  comprise   of  cigarettes,      cigars,   cheroot,    bidis,   pipe      tobacco.      b)  tobacco   may  be  consumed  by      chewing  and   ingestion  and  this      category includes  quiwam which  is      in  the   paste  form  and  applied      usually as  an ingredient  to  pan;      zarda in  the form  of fine  flakes      (usually aromatic)  is  applied  to



    pan; gutka  also in flakes which is      chewed sometime  with the  addition      of lime (chuna).      c) tobacco  consumed by inhalation.      In this  category snuff which is in      powder form and taken in or inhaled      through nose may be mentioned.      There is  no manner  of doubt  that  the  varieties  of articles made  of tobacco are differently used and they have their  distinctive  quality  and  separate  identity.  These articles are  also marketed  as distinct  articles of use in different manner.  In the common trade channel such articles are not  only held  different and  distinct articles but are marketed separately.  It does not require any imagination to hold that snuff or quiwam are entirely distinct products and even though  the said  products and  the cigarettes,  bidis, cheroot are  also made  of tobacco and all such products may come under  the broad  classification manufactured  tobacco, each of  the said  products is always held as a distinct and separate article of use having its specific characteristics.      The respondent  Company got  registration of  its brand name "charminar" under the broad classification manufactured tobacco.   So long  such registration remains operative, the respondent Company is entitled to claim exclusive use of the said brand  name in  respect of  articles  made  of  tobacco coming  under  the  said  broad  classifiction  manufactured tobacco. Precisely  for the  said reason, when the appellant made application  for registration of quiwam and zarda under the  same   brand  name   "charminar",   such   prayer   for registration was not allowed. The appellant, therefore, made application for  rectification of  the registration  made in favour  of   the  respondent   Company  so   that  the  said registration is  limited only  in respect  of  the  articles being manufactured  and marketed  by the respondent Company, namely, cigarettes. In our view, if a trader or manufacturer actually trades  in or  manufactures only one or some of the articles coming under a broad classification and such trader or manufacturer  has no  bonafide intention  to trade  in or manufacture other  goods or  articles which  also fall under the said  broad classification,  such trader or manufacturer should not  be permitted to enjoy monopoly in respect of all the articles  which may come under such broad classification and  by   that  process   preclude  the   other  traders  or manufacturers to  get registration  of separate and distinct goods  which   may  also   be  grouped   under   the   broad classification. If  same or  similar and  covered by earlier registration and ii)  trade mark  claimed for  such goods  must  be  same  or deceptively similar to the trade mark already registered. It may be  noted that  under sub-section  (3) of  Section 12 of Trade Act.  in an  appropriate case of honest concurrent use and/or of  other special circumstances, same and deceptively similar trade  marks may  be permitted  to  another  by  the Registrar, subject  to such  conditions as may deem just and proper to  the Registrar.  It is  also to  be noted that the expression "goods"  and "description  of goods" appearing in Section 12(1)  of Trade Marks Act indicate that registration may be  made in respect of one or more goods or of all goods conforming a  general description.  The Trade  Marks Act has noted distinction  between description  of goods  forming  a genus and  separate and  distinctly identifiable goods under the genus  in various  other Sections  e.g.  goods  of  same description in  Section 46,  Sections 12 and 34 and class of goods in  Section 18, Rules 12 and 26 read with 4th Schedule to the Rules framed under the Act.



    The "class"  mentioned in  the 4th Schedule may subsume or  comprise  a  number  of  goods  or  articles  which  are separetely identifiable and vendible and which are not goods of the  same description  as commonly understood in trade or in  common   parlance.  Manufactured   tobacco  is  a  class mentioned in  Class 34  of 4th  Schedule of  the  Rules  but within the  said  class,  there  are  number  of  distinctly identifiable goods  which are  marketed separately  and also used differently.  In our  view, it  is not only permissible but it  will be only just and proper to register one or more articles under  a class  or genus if in reality registration only  in   respect  of   such  articles   are  intended,  by specifically mentioning  the names  of such  articles and by indicating the  class under  which such  article or articles are to  be  comprised.  It  is,  therefore,  permissible  to register only cigarette or some other specific products made of manuactured  tobacco as  mentioned in  Class  34  of  4th Schedule of  the Rules.  In our  view, the contention of Mr. Vaidyanatha that  in view  of  change  in  the  language  of Section 8  of Trade  Marks Act  as compared  to Section 5 of Trade Marks  Act 1940,  registration of  trade mark is to be made only in respect of class or genus and not in respect of articles of  different under the genus is based on incorrect appreciation of  Section 8  of the  Trade Marks  Act and 4th Schedule of the Rules.      Since such  registration initially  had not  been done, the  rectification   of  the  registration  by  limiting  or confining the  registration of  trade mark of the Respondent Company to  particular goods,  namely,  cigarettes,  in  the facts and  circumstances of  the case,  cannot  be  held  as illegal or unjustified.      It has  already been  indicated that the controversy in the instant  appeals, is  only confined to the propriety and validity of  the order  of rectification of the registration of trade mark made in favour of Respondent Company and it is not necessary to address on the questions of infringement of trade marks,  passing off,  defensive registration  etc.  In that view  of the matter, various decisions cited at the bar dealing with the likely prejudice to be suffered by a trader or manufacturer  enjoying registration  of trade mark in the event, similar  or deceptively similar trade mark is allowed to other  trader or manufacturer in respect of similar goods or goods  marketed through  common trade channel need not be taken into  consideration for the disposal of these appeals. As  in   the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the rectification of the trade marks registered in favour of the respondent Company  since allowed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade  Marks was  valid and also justified, such order in our view,  should not  have been  interfered with in appeal. We, therefore,  allow these  appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of  the  High  Court  and  restore  the  order  of rectification passed  by the  Assistant Registrar  of  Trade Marks, Madras.  By way  of abundant caution, it is expressly made clear  that we  have not  expressed any  opinion on the claim of  registration of  the  trade  mark  "charminar"  in favour  of   the  appellant   for  quiwam  and  zarda  being manufactured and  traded by  the appellant.  In the facts of the case, there will however be no order as to costs.