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PETITIONER: VISHNU AWATAR ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHIV AUTAR AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1575            1980 SCR  (3) 973  1980 SCC  (4)  81

ACT:      Code of  Civil Procedure,  1908,  Section  115-Revisory jurisdiction of  the High  Court-Section 3  of the  Code  of Civil Procedure (U.P.) Act, 1978 forbidding a revision under Section 115  of the C.P.C. to the High Court from a judgment or order  in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of which  the case  arises is  not one  of the  value of Rs. 20,000/- and  above-Import and  impact of  Section 3  of the U.P. Amendment  Act, 1978-Article  136 of  the  Constitution Supreme Court’s power to interfere.      Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court

HEADNOTE:      HELD: 1.  Ordinarily when  a State Legislation is being interpreted the  meaning received by it in the High Court as the settled intent should rarely be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless  the error  is so  egregious, the  impact  goes beyond the State or like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the  High  Courts  thereon  may  lead  to  confusion  and uncertainty. [979 A-B]      2. Viewing  the text of Section 3, lexically literally, schematically, and in the setting of social justice of which saving  the   average  litigant  from  the  intoxication  of tantalising litigation  is component,  "No revision  to  the High  Court"  would  be  the  only  conclusion.  Purposively speaking, it  will be stultifying to interpret, section 3 to mean that  orders in appeal by District Courts must suffer a distant journey  to revisory  justice from  the High  Court. [980 C-D]      Vishesh Kumar  v. Shanti  Prasad, [1980]  3  S.C.R.  32 clarified.      3. The  short test  to refuse  revisory jurisdiction to the High  Court is  to ascertain whether the decision sought to be  challenged is  in a case arising out of a suit of the valuation of  Rs. 20,000/-  and more. If the answer is ’Yes’ then the High Court has revisory power, but if the suit from which the  case arises  and in which the decision is made is one where  the valuation  is less than Rs. 20,000/- then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class  of cases  where the  decision is  taken for  the first time  by the  District Court  itself in a case arising out of  an original proceeding. From this angle, none of the

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Special Leave Petitions survive. [980 D-F]      After all, our District Courts are easier of access for litigants, and  the High  Courts, especially in large States like Uttar  Pradesh, are  ’untouchable’ and ’unapproachable’ for agrestic  populations and even urban middle classes. Nor is there ground to distrust the District Judges. A hierarchy of courts  built upon  a heritage  of disbelief in inferiors has an  imperial flavour.  If we  suspect a Munsif and put a District Judge  over him  for  everything  he  does,  if  we distrust a  district Judge  and vest  the  High  Court  with pervasive supervision,  if we  be skeptical  about the  High Courts and  watch meticulously  over all  their orders,  the System will  break down  as its  morale  will  crack  up.  A psychic communicable  disease of  suspicion, skepticism  and servility cannot make for the health of the 974 judicial system.  If the  Supreme Court  has a super-Supreme Court above  it, it is doubtful whether many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it differs from itself. [979 E-G] Observation      Democracy, in  a vast country of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic  difficulty and  large-scale  indigency, makes  decentralisation  an  imperative  of  Administration. Access to  Justice also  implies early finality within reach of the rich and the poor. These considerations persuaded the U.P. State, one of direst in poverty, largest in population, and  most   agrestic  in  life-style,  to  attempt  a  tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations  of lesser  financial stakes. Judicial reform is upto now a tinkering exercise, not an engineering project but even  that little  tinkering is  fiercely challenged  as litigative anathema  by the profession which is unfortunate. [980 G-H, 981 A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) Nos. 9945, 10550, 8857 of 1979.      From the  Judgments and  Orders dated  23-7-1979, 25-9- 1979 and  18-7-1979 of  the Allahabad  High Court  in  Civil Revision Nos. 3832/ 78, 2042/79 & 264/76.      Manoj Swarup  for the  Petitioner in  SLP Nos.  9945  & 8857.      Pramod Swarup for the Petitioners in SLP No. 10550.      N. N. Sharma for the Respondent No. 1 in SLP No. 9945.      A. K.  Srivastava for  Respondents Nos.  1-2 in SLP No. 10550.      Mohan Behari Lal for Respondent Nos. 1 in SLP No. 8857.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. These  petitions  for  special  leave deserve to  be dismissed  because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad  High Court  which is  challenged in  all  the three has  been rightly  decided in  our view.  Even  so,  a speaking order  has become  necessary  because,  as  rightly pointed out  by counsel,  the earlier decision of this Court in Vishesh  Kumar v.  Shanti Prasad  does  not  specifically cover the  precise point  that has  been raised before us by counsel for  the petitioner. We are concerned with the ambit and impact  of s.  3 of  the Code  of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment)  Act, 1978  (for short,  the Act),  which forbids a  revision under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (acronymically,  the  C.P.C.)  to  the  High  Court  from  a judgment or  order in appeal by the District Court where the

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suit out of which the case arises is not one of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above. 975      We have,  in Vishesh  Kumar v.  Shanti  Prasad  (supra) considered the  scheme, setting  and  purpose  of  the  U.P. Amendment  to  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  bearing  on  the revisory power  of the High Court under s. 115 C.P.C. We may quote:           A schematic  analysis of  the  judicial  hierarchy      within a  State indicates  that the  High Court, as the      apex court  in the  hierarchy, has  been entrusted, not      only with  the supreme appellate power exercised within      the State  but also,  by virtue of s. 115, the power to      remove, in  order to  prevent a miscarriage of justice,      any jurisdictional  error committed  by  a  subordinate      court  in   those  cases  where  the  error  cannot  be      corrected by  resort to its appellate jurisdiction. The      two salient  features of  revisional jurisdiction under      s. 115  are, on  the  one  hand,  the  closely  limited      grounds on  which the  court is  permitted to interfere      and on  the  other,  the  wide  expanse  of  discretion      available to  the court,  when it decides to interfere,      in making  an appropriate  order. The intent is that so      serious an  error as  one of jurisdiction, if committed      by a  subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected,      and  should   be  removed  and  record  healed  of  the      infirmity  by   an  order   shaped  to   reinstate  the      proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of      the subordinate court.           xx                  xx                  xx           From its  inception there was increasing resort to      the revisional  jurisdiction of the High Court under s.      115. Over the years the volume of litigation reached an      insupportable point in the pending docket of the Court.      To alleviate  the burden, a pattern of decentralisation      of revisional  power was adopted and s. 115 was amended      by successive  State  amendments,  each  attempting  to      close the gap left by its predecessors. Many times,  amendments were made by the U.P. Legislature to effectuate  its  determined  purpose  of  dichotomising  and decentralising the  revisional jurisdiction, a goal which is laudable and  which  other  States  may  well  regard  as  a paradigm.      The crucial provision, s. 3 of the Act, reads thus:           115. The  High Court,  in  cases  arising  out  of      original suits  or other  proceedings of  the value  of      twenty thousand  rupees and above, including such suits      or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1978 and      the District Court in any 976      other case, including a case arising out of an original      suit or  other proceedings instituted before such date,      may call  for the  record of  any case  which has  been      decided by  any court subordinate to such High Court or      District Court,  as the  case may  be, and  in which no      appeal lies  thereto, and  if  such  subordinate  court      appears-           (a)  to have  exercised a  jurisdiction not vested                in it by law; or           (b)  to have  failed to exercise a jurisdiction so                vested; or           (c)  to  have   acted  in   the  exercise  of  its                jurisdiction  illegally   or  with   material                irregularity; the High  Court or  the District  Court, as the case may be,

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may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.      Provided that  in  respect  of  cases  arising  out  of original  suits  or  other  proceedings  of  any  valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section.      Provided further  that the  High Court  or the District Court shall  not under  this section,  vary or  reverse  any order including  an order  deciding an  issue, made  in  the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where,-           (i)  the order,  if so  varied or  reversed, would                finally  dispose   of  the   suit  or   other                proceeding; or           (ii) the  order,   if  allowed   to  stand,  would                occasion  a   failure  of  justice  or  cause                irreparable injury  to the party against whom                it was made.           (Explanation)-In this section, the expression ’any      case  which   has  been  decided’  includes  any  other      deciding an  issue in  the course  of a  suit or  other      proceeding.      The bulk  of the  cases we  disposed of  in the earlier round  turned  on  the  tenability  of  a  revision  upon  a revision-a product  of legal  ingenuity by which the attempt of the  legislature to  save the  little litigant  from  the logistics  of   justice  from  the  distant  High  Court  by confining  lesser   revisions  to  the  District  Court  was metamorphosed into  a dual  revision, one  at  the  District Court level  and the  other at  the High  Court against  the District Court’s  order in  revision. Value-free legalistics can be  counter-productive acrobatics  ! When  that happened the Legislature  stepped in  again  and  again  and  we  are concerned with  the import and impact of s. 3 of the Act vis a vis 977 appellate orders  of District  Courts where  the suits  from which they stem are less than Rs. 20,000/- in value. A brief analysis of  that provision  is contained  in Vishesh  Kumar (supra):      "4.  From 1st August, 1978:           Finally, s.  3, Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (Uttar      Pradesh Amendment)  Act, 1978, which was deemed to have      come into  force on  1st August,  1978,  amended  s.115      again  and   restored  the  bifurcation  of  revisional      jurisdiction between  the High  Court and  the District      Court.      Accordingly now:           (i)  The High  Court alone  had jurisdiction under      s.115 in  cases arising  out of original suits or other      proceedings of  the value  of  Rs.  20,000  and  above,      including such  suits or  other proceedings  instituted      before 1st August, 1978;           (ii) The District  Court  alone  has  jurisdiction      under s.115 in any other case, including a case arising      out  of   an  original   suits  or   other  proceedings      instituted before 1st August, 1978;           (iii)The High  Court has  jurisdiction under s.115      in respect  of cases  arising out  of original suits or      other proceedings  of any  valuation,  decided  by  the      District Court;           (iv) A  revision  proceeding  pending  immediately      before 1st  August, 1978  of  the  nature  in  which  a      District Court  could exercise  revisional power  under      s.115 as amended by the Amendment Act, 1978 if pending;           (a)  in the  District Court,  would be  decided by      that court  as if  the Amendment  Act of  1978 were  in

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    force at all material times;           (b)  in the  High Court,  would be  decided by the      High Court as if the Amendment Act of 1978 had not come      into force.      The provision  now  before  us  is  slightly  different although the purpose and the result are the same. The scheme is clear.  The High  Court has  revisory power only in cases arising out  of original  suits or  other proceedings of the value of  twenty thousand  rupees and  above including  such suits or  other proceedings  instituted before  Aug.1, 1978. The entire residuary area belongs to the District Court. An- 978 other test  of revisional jurisdiction for the High Court is to see whether the first proviso applies:           Provided that  in respect  of cases arising out of      original suits  or other  proceedings of any valuation,      decided by  the District  Court, the  High Court  alone      shall be competent to make an order under this section.      The High  Court, in the last Full Bench decision traced the story  of the  race between the legislature and judicial interpretation and summed up the result rightly thus :           "The High  Court was confined to cases arising out      of original  suits or other proceedings of the value of      Rupees 20,000/- or above, including such suits or other      proceedings instituted  before 1st  August,  1978.  The      jurisdiction of  the District  Court was  in respect of      any other  case including  a case  arising  out  of  an      appeal suit  or other proceeding instituted before such      date. The  legislature has  continued to use the phrase      "cases   arising    out   of   original   suits".   The      interpretation placed  upon this  phrase  by  the  Full      Bench in  Har Prasad  Singh’s case  (AIR 1973 All. 390)      will apply. The revisional jurisdiction would hence not      extend to  cases arising out of the disposal of appeals      or revisions by the District Court. The proviso is also      in the  same terms as the proviso added in 1973 namely,      it uses  the phrase cases arising out of original suits      or other  proceedings". As  already seen,  it will  not      cover cases  arising out  of  disposal  of  appeals  or      revisions.           The words  "or other  proceedings" in  the  phrase      "cases  arising   out  of   original  suits   or  other      proceedings" refer  to  proceedings  of  final  nature.      These words  have been  added in  order to bring within      the  purview  of  the  revisional  jurisdiction  orders      passed in  proceedings of an original nature, which are      not  of   the  nature   of  suits,   like   arbitration      proceedings. This  phrase cannot  include decisions  of      appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will      be deemed  to have  contradicted itself.  The words "or      other proceedings" have to be read ejusdem generis with      the words  "original  suits".  They  will  not  include      appeals or revisions.           The phrase "in any other case" used with reference      to the  District Court  will refer to cases arising out      of original 979      suits of  the value  of less than Rs. 20,000/- and also      cases arising  out of  other proceedings of an original      nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/-".      Ordinarily  when   a   State   legislation   is   being interpreted the  meaning received by it in the High Court as the settled  intent should rarely be disturbed by this Court unless the error is so egregious, the impact goes beyond the State or  like legislation  elsewhere and  decisions of  the

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High Courts  thereon may  lead to confusion and uncertainty. Here no  such consideration  arises and the reasoning of the High Court strikes us as sound.      The residuary  power is  with the  District Court.  The High Court  has no  revisional power under s. 115 unless the case arises out of an original suit or other proceeding i.e. other original  proceeding decided  by the District Court or where the  case arises from a suit of and above Rs. 20,000/- in value.  If the  District Court  has decided,  not in  its original jurisdiction,  then the case, be it a revisional or appellate  order,  is  not  amenable  to  the  High  Court’s revisional jurisdiction.  Of course,  if the case arises out of suits  or other  proceeding of  the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above,  the High  Court has  revisory power.  All  other cases fall  outside and  become final  at the District Court level.      After all, our District Courts are easier of access for litigants, and  the High  Courts, especially in large States like Uttar  Pradesh, are  ’untouchable’ and ’unapproachable’ for agrestic  populations and even urban middle classes. Nor is there ground to distrust the District Judges. A hierarchy of courts  built upon  a heritage  of disbelief in inferiors has an  imperial flavour.  If we  suspect a Munsif and put a District Judge  over him  for every  thing he  does,  if  we distrust a  District Judge  and vest  the  High  Court  with pervasive supervision,  if we  be skeptical  about the  High Courts and  watch meticulously  over all  their orders,  the System will  break down  as its  morale  will  crack  up.  A psychic communicable  disease of  suspicion, skepticism  and servility cannot make for the health of the judicial system. If the Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, who knows how  many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it differs from itself.      Schematically, we  are  satisfied,  that  decisions  of District Courts  rendered in  appeal or  revision are beyond revision by  the High Court, if the suit is of less than Rs. 20,000/-. But  an exception  has been engrafted by the first proviso to s.3 to the effect that where an origi- 980 nal decision  has been  made by  a District  Court the  High Court’s appellate  or revisional  power will come into play. That is  at as  it should  be, for one appeal or revision is almost  universal.   But  otherwise,  the  District  Court’s decision is immune to revisional probe by the High Court.      Lexically, there  is no  escape from  s. 3  because the whole  residue,   except  where  the  High  Court  has  been expressly vested  with revisory power, is beyond reach under s. 115 C.P.C.      Precedentially, the  result is no different as the Full Bench of  the High  Court has  been at  pains to  make  out. Purposively speaking, it will be stultifying to interpret s. 3 to  mean that  orders in  appeal by  District Courts  must suffer a  distant journey  to revisory justice from the High Court. Thus  we  reach  the  convergent  conclusion  of  "no revision to  the High  Court", viewing  the text  of  s.  3, lexically, literally,  schematically, and  in the setting of social justice of which saving the average litigant from the intoxication of tantalising litigation is a component.      The short  test to  refuse revisory jurisdiction to the High Court is to ascertain whether the decision sought to be challenged is  in a  case arising  out  of  a  suit  of  the valuation of  Rs. 20,000/-  and more. If the answer is ’yes’ then the High Court has revisory power, but if the suit from which the  case arises  and in which the decision is made is one where  the valuation  is less than Rs. 20,000/- then the

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litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class  of cases  where the  decision is  taken for  the first time  by the  District Court  itself in a case arising out of  an original  proceeding. From this angle none of the Special Leave  Petitions survive. Special Leave Petition No. 9945 of  1979 is a case where the District Judge disposed of an appeal  and the  revision to  the High Court was directed against the  appellate order. The subject-matter of the suit being below  Rs. 20,000/-  in valuation,  the High Court was right in  refusing to exercise any revisional power. Special Leave Petition  No. 10550 of 1979 falls in the same category and must  be dismissed. The result in Special Leave Petition No. 8857  of 1979  is equally  fatal and for the same lethal reason.      Before we  part with  the case,  we may  make a general observation  in   the  hope   that  it  may  have  value  as legislative guidance.  Democracy,  in  a  vast  country,  of diversity, demographic  immensity, logistic  difficulty  and large-scale indigency, makes decentralisation and imperative of Administration.  Access to  Justice  also  implies  early finality within  reach of  the  rich  and  the  poor.  These considerations per- 981 suaded the U.P. State, one of the direst in poverty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in  litigations of  lesser financial  stakes. Judicial reform is  upto now a tinkering exercise, not an engineering project  but   even  that   little  tinkering   is  fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate. S.R.                                    Petitions dismissed. 982