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PETITIONER: VIRENDRA KASHINATH RAVANT AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VINAYAK N.JOSHI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/11/1998

BENCH: S.SAGHIR AHMAD, K.T.THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  JUDGMENT Thomas J. Loavo grantod. Appellants are  landlords of one Ms.  Shanta Sabnis. A building situate at Benham Hall Lane, Grigaum,  Mumbai  is owned   by   the   appellants   and   was  let  out  to  the aforementioned Shanta  Sabnis.    Appellants  succeeded   in obtaining  an  order  of  eviction  from  the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, on the ground, inter alia, that the premises were sub-let to respondents 1 & 2.  That order was confirmed in appeal.  But the High Court of Bombay interfered with  it under  Article  227 of the Constitution of India and quashed the decree for eviction.  Hence, the  landlords  have  filed the Special Leave Petition.         Some more facts are these : Shanta Sabnis, the original  tenant,  died  and  her mother, who  was  living  with her, also died later.  Second respondent claimed to be  the  daughter  of  Shanta  Sabnis. Appellants  filed  a suit for eviction on different grounds, main among them was that the premises were  sub-let  to  the fourth  respondent  (who  was  third dependent in the suit). During the pendency of the suit  landlords  got  the  plaint amended  for  incorporating  a further allegation that first respondent and his sister were inducted  into  the  building after  institution  of  the  suit without the consent of the landlords. Second  respondent  (who  was  arrayed   as   second defendant  in  the  suit)  contended  that  she  is the only daughter of Shanta Sabnis and hence the  tenancy  right  has devolved  on  her with the death of her mother. She disputed the contention of the appellants that the building had  been sublet  to  the  third  respondent  but  stated that she was allowed by her mother and  grand-mother  to  reside  in  the building  for  the  purpose  of looking after her mother and grand-mother who were old and sick. First respondent admitted that he is  in  possession of the suit premises. But he contended that he was permitted by  the  tenant  to occupy the building on leave and licence basis under an agreement dated 16.10.1971 and  he  continued in  such  possession on 1.2.1973 and also thereafter. So the

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first respondent claimed protection under Section 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging  House  Rates  Control  Act, 1947 (for short the ’Act’). Trial  Court  found  that  second  defendant  is the daughter of the original tenant Shanta Sabnis and  that  the case   of  landlords  regarding  sub-letting  to  the  third defendant is not a subsisting issue to be considered because the third defendant had already vacated the premises.  Trial court further found that first respondent was inducted  into possession by the second defendant.  The claim made by first respondent  for  protection under Section 15A of the Act was repelled and the trial court  concluded  that  induction  of first  respondent  into  the  building  amounted to unlawful subletting.  On the strength of the above finding  a  decree for eviction was granted.         The  appellate authority under the Act confirmed the decree for eviction, but went a step further by holidng that sub-letting to third  defendant  would  also  enure  to  the ground  of  eviction  under  Section  13(1)  (e)  of the Act despite the fact that the aforesaid sub-tenant later vasated the premises. Learned  single  judge  of the High Court approached the issue from a new angle untouched by the trial court  and the appellate  authority.    Learned  single  judge observed first that appellants have not treated the second  defendant as their tenant and secondly that there is no clear averment in  the  plaint  to  the  effect  that the building has been sub-let to the first respondent. The following is the summed up reasoning made by the leaned single judge for upsetting the concurrent finding:            "It  is  therefore,  clear  that  in  order to be            entitled to a  decree  of  eviction  against  the            tenant  on  the ground of unlawful sub-letting an            averment in the Plaint is a must that the  tenant            has  unlawfully  sub-let the suit premises. It is            clear from the allegation in the plaint that  the            plaintiffs  were  not  treating  any of the named            defendants as their tenants. The  Tenant  of  the            plaintiffs  viz.  Ms.  Shanta  had expired before            institution of the suit. Therefore, there  is  no            question of the plaintiffs being in a position to            make a   statement  that  the  tenant    inducted            defendants No. 4 and 5 as unlawful subtenant.  In            these circumstances, therefore, in may opinion, a            decree  of  eviction  could  not have been passed            against the petitioner under section 13(1)(e)  of            the Act because averments necessary for passing a            decree  under  Section 13(1)(e) of the Act itself            were absent  in  the  Plaint.  Therefore,  in  my            opinion,  both  the  courts  below have committed            grave error of law in overlooking  these  aspects            of the matter which were crucial for deciding the            controversy in the matter." The  High Court was not justified in non-suiting the appellants on the premise that they have "no  where  treated the  second  defendant as their tenant." The clear averments in the plaint regarding the tenant are the following:         "One Miss Shanta B.Sabnis during her life  time  was         Plaintiffs’   monthly   tenant  in  respect  of  the         building bearing No. 7 on  a  monthly  rent  of  Rs.         12.85.         The said Miss Shanta B.  Sabnis died some  time  ago         leaving  behind  her  mother  as  the heir and legal         representative.  However, in or about the  month  of         February  1970  the  said  mother  of  the said Miss

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       Shanta B.Sabnis also died.  The plaintiffs in  spite         of  efforts  have not been able to get the names and         addresses of the heirs and legal representatives  of         the said Miss  Shanta  B.Sabis.    Defendant  No.  2         claims to be the daughter of the  said  Miss  Shanta         B.Sabnis.   According  to the Plaintiffs information         the said Miss Shanta B.Sabnis was  a  spinster  till         her death and hence the Plaintiffs do not admit that         the   defendant   No.2   is   the   heir  and  legal         representative of the  said  Miss  Shanta  B.Sabnis.         However,  in  view  of her contention Defendant No.2         has been joined as a party to this suit." It  admits  of no doubt that appellants have clearly recognised Ms.  Shanta Sabnis as their tenant in respect  of the suit  premises.  On her death it became doubtful for the appellants to spell out who are the real legal heirs of  the said tenant.    Whoever  are  the  legal  heirs, they become entitled to the tenancy right and hence appellants  left  it to  the  court  to finally say as to who among the claimants are the legal heirs.  An approach adopted by the  appellants by  way  of  abundant caution cannot now be used against him for non-suiting him altogether.  It must be remembered  that when trial court found the second defendant as the sole heir of Ms.    Shanta Sabnis appellants submitted to that finding as they are not interested in any dispute between  different claimants to the legal heir-ship of the original tenant. Regarding  the  second aspect i.e. subletting to the first respondent, the High Court has obviously exceeded  its jurisdiction  by  upsetting  the concurrent finding of facts reached by the two fact finding courts, on  a  very  fragile reasoning  that  there  was  no  sufficient  averment in the plaint regarding the ground under Section  30(1)(e)  of  the Act. In  the plaint, as it originally stood the following averment was made as regards the case of subletting  to  the third defendant:         "The said premises have been  unlawfully  sublet  to         the  third  defendant  who is at present in unlawful         occupation of  the  said  premises.      The   third         defendant  is  further about to part with possession         to a third party." It was the case of the  appellants  that  during  the pendency  of the suit first respondent and his sister (second respondent) were unlawfully, inducted into possession of  the building.   So  appellants moved an application for amendment of the building.  So  appellants  moved  an  application  for amendment of the plaint and the same was granted by the trial court.   In the plaint so amended paragraph 5-A was inserted, the material portion of which reads thus:         "The   Plaintiffs  say  that  pending  the  suit  the         defendants have or any of them has  inducted  in  the         suit premises Defendant Nos. 4 & 5 unlawfully." Learned  Single  Judge treated the aforesaid pleading as insufficient to make out a case for subletting.  This  was not  a point considered by or even raised before the two fact finding forums. Order 6 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (For short ’the Code’) confers powers on the Court to order a party to make a further statement or even a better  statement or  further  and  better  particulars  of  any matter already mentioned in the pleading. This is incorporated in  the  Code to  indicate  that  no  suit shall be dismissed merely on the ground that  more  particulars  are    not  stated   in   the pleadings.  If the contesting respondents, or any of them had raised  objection  that  the  pleading  was  scanty   perhaps appellants  would  have  further elaborated it as provided in

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Rule 5 above. At any rate this should not have been a premise on which interference by the High Court Should have been made in exercising a jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution.          That apart, the averment extracted above  cannot  by any  standard be dubbed as bereft of sufficiency in pleading. Under Order 6 Rule 2(1) of the Code the  requirement  is  the following:          "Every  pleading  shall contain, and contain only, a          statement in a concise form of the material facts on          which the party pleading relies  for  his  claim  or          defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by          which they are to be proved. The  object  of  the  Rule  is  two-fold. First is to afford the other said  intimation  regarding  the  particular facts  of  hiscase so that they may be met by the other side. Second is to enable the court to determine what is really the issue between the parties.  The  words  in  the  sub-rule  "a statement  in  a concise form" are definitely suggestive that brevity should be adhered to  while  drafting  pleadings.  Of course  brevity  should  not  be  at  the cost of setting out necessary facts,  but  it  does  not  mean  niggling  in  the pleadings.  If  care  is  taken  in  the  syntactic  process, pleadings can be saved from tautology. Elaboration  of  facts in  pleadings  is  not  the ideal measure and that is why the sub-rule embodied the words "and contain  only"  just  before the  succeeding  words  "a statement in a concise form of the material facts". This Court has  indicated  the  position  in  Manphul Singh vs.    Surinder  Singh  (AIR  1973  SC  2158).    On  a subsequent occasion  this  court  has  again  reiterated  the principle in M/s.   Genesh trading Co.  vs Moji Ram (AIR 1978 SC 484).  Following observations made in  the  said  decision are useful in this context:         "Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not  to         obstruct   the   course   of   substantive   justice.         Provisions relating to pleadings in civil  cases  are         meant  to give to each side intimation of the case of         the other so that it may be met to enable  Courts  to         determine  what  is  really at issue between parties,         and to  prevent  deviations  from  the  course  which         litigation on particular causes of action must take." sufficient notice to the other side that he was putting forth a  case  that first respondent was inducted into the premises by the tenant and such  induction  is  unlawful.    Appellant could  not  made a further elaboration as to who is the legal heir of the original tenant and Nance appellant  adopted  the cautious  approach  without  committing themselves as to who, among the rival claimants  to  the  legal  heir-ship  of  Ms. Shanta Sabnis  is responsible for such unlawful act.  We are, therefore, of the clear view that learned single judge  ought not  have  disturbed  the  concurrent  findings  on  such  an erroneous consideration. High   Court  has  thus  erred  as  it  exceeded  its jurisdiction. Hence we allow this appeal and  set  aside  the impugned  judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court.