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PETITIONER: VINOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARAIN DEVI TANEJA

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/01/1980

BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 2012            1980 SCR  (2) 746  1980 SCC  (2) 120  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC 967  (10)

ACT:      Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1970-Sections 25A and 25B(8)- Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      Clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that a landlord can evict a tenant of premises  let for residential purposes on the ground that the same  were required by him bona fide for occupation as a residence for  himself and  that he  has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. An appeal from the order of the  Controller lies to the tribunal and a further appeal to the High Court.      In September,  1975, the  Government of  India  took  a decision that  Government employees  owning houses  in Delhi shall be  required to  vacate accommodation allotted to them by the  Government within  a period of three months from 1st October, 1975.  To avoid  procedural delays in the matter of eviction of  tenants  from  houses  let  out  by  Government servants who  were required  to shift  to their  own houses, Chapter III A was introduced by an Amending Act. Section 14A which was  added in Chapter III provided a right to a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central  Government to  recover immediate  possession of the premises  let out  by him in case he was required by the Government to  vacate the  residential premises  allotted to him.  The  non-obstante  clause  contained  in  section  25A provides that  "the provisions  of this  Chapter or any rule made thereunder  shall have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith  contained elsewhere  in this  Act or any other  law for  the time being in force." Section 25B(8) provides that  when "an order for the recovery of possession of any  premises" has  been made  by the  Controller  on  an application covered  by section  25B  no  appeal  or  second appeal shall lie therefrom.      The respondent’s  application under  clause (e)  of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act was rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that it was not legally permissible for her  to obtain  possession of  the  premises  under  the

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section because she had sought eviction only in respect of a part of the premises.      In the  respondent’s revision  petition before the High Court the tenant contended that the petition was incompetent because in view of the provisions of section 25b(8) the only remedy available  to the  respondent was  by way  of  appeal under section  38. Rejecting  this contention the High Court held that  a, petition  for revision as envisaged by section 25B(8) lay  against the  order  accepting  or  rejecting  an eviction application and against such an order alone.      Dismissing the tenant’s appeal. ^      HELD: The  remedy of the land lady against the order of the Controller  in the  present case  was by way of revision (and revision  only) of  that order  by the High Court under the proviso to section 25B(8), even though it was 747 an  order   not  directing   but  by  refusing  recovery  of possession of the premises in dispute. [756 G-H]      The non-obstante  clause in  section 25A  provides that whenever there  is a  conflict  between  the  provisions  of Chapter IIIA  and those  of the  rest of  the Act  or of any other  law   in  force  the  former  shall  prevail.  If  an application is  made under  clause (e)  of  the  proviso  to section 14(1) it has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure  specified  in  section  25B  and  not  under  the provisions contained  in Chapters  other than  Chapter IIIA. Therefore, the  procedure laid down in section 25A read with section 25B(1) envisages a shortcut to the conclusion of the proceedings before  the Controller.  Section 25B(8)  further provides that  when an  order for the recovery of possession of any  premises has been made no appeal under section 38 or second appeal  under section  39  shall  lie.  The  combined effect of section 25A and section 25B(1) and (10) is that in whatever respect  section 25B  makes a  departure  from  the procedure prescribed  in other  chapters  of  the  Act,  the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall prevail. [753 B-D; 754 D]      The expression "order for the recovery of possession of any premises"  has to  be construed, in the context in which it appears,  as an  order deciding  an application  for  the recovery of possession of any premises; because, firstly, if an order  in favour  of the  landlord alone  was meant to be covered by  sub-section (8)  an order  refusing such  relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under section 38 so that there would be two procedures  for   the  end   product  of   the  Controller’s proceedings being  called in  question, one when the same is in favour  of the  landlord and another when it goes against him, which  would obviously  entail discrimination  and make the sub-section invalid. But if a provision can be construed in a  manner  which  upholds  its  legal  or  constitutional validity it should, if possible, be so construed rather than the other way round. [755 B-E]      All that sub-section (10) of section 25B states is that the  procedure  for  the  disposal  of  an  application  for eviction covered by sub-section (1) shall be the same as the procedure for  disposal of other applications by Controllers except  as   provided  in   Chapter  IIIA.  Sub-section  (8) expressly takes  away the  right of  appeal or second appeal while providing the remedy of revision instead. [747 E-F]      Section 14(7)  does not  require that  an order for the recovery of  possession of  any premises  should  contain  a direction that  the landlord would not be entitled to obtain possession of the premises in dispute before the expiry of a period of  six months  from the  date of the order. The sub-

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section itself  declares that  such an  order would  not  be executable  before   a  certain   period  has  expired.  The declaration is  part of  the law  of the  land and  would be operative as such so that the landlady would not be entitled to execute  the order  before the  expiry of six months from the date  thereof notwithstanding the fact that the terms of sub-section (7)  have not  been made part of the order. [757 C-D]                Devi Singh  v. Chaman Lal (1977) Rajdhani Law      Reporter 566;  R. K.  Parikh v. Uma Verma I.L.R. (1978)      II Delhi  78; Bhagwati  Pershad v.  Om Perkhash  (1979)      Rajdhani Law Reporter 26; Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain      (1979) Rajdhani Law Reporter 159 approved. 748

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2691 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 7-8-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 49/1979.      Yogesh Kumar jain and Mukul Rohtagi for the Appeal.      B. P.  Bhandari, R.  C. Bhatia and P. C. Kapoor for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KOSHAL, J.  This appeal  by special  leave is  directed against the judgment dated August 7, 1979, of a Single Judge of the  High Court of Delhi accepting a petition made by the landlady for  revision of  the order  of an  Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter  called  the  Controller)  of  Delhi refusing to direct eviction of the tenant.      2. The  landlady had sought eviction of the tenant from the premises  in dispute on the ground covered by clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), namely, that she required them bona fide for occupation as a residence for  herself. Her  application  being  triable  in accordance with  the procedure  laid down  in section 25B of the Act, the tenant sought the Controller’s leave to contest it on  grounds which were stated in his affidavit. The leave was granted  and  thereafter  the  tenant  filed  a  written statement  contesting  his  eviction  which  was  ultimately disallowed. The  learned Controller  held that  although the landlady had proved that she required the premises bona fide for her  own occupation,  she was  disentitled to the relief claimed by  her for  two reasons which were (1) that she had not proved  service on  the tenant of a notice under section 106 of  the Transfer  of Property  Act, and,  (2)  that  her application claimed  eviction only  in respect  of a part of the premises let out which was not legally permissible.      The landlady  went up in revision to the High Court and the learned  Single Judge  reversed both  the findings which had been  decided by  the Controller  against her. Two other points were  raised before  the High  Court on behalf of the tenant. It  was contended,  firstly, that  the petition  for revision was  incompetent in  view of the provisions of sub- section (8)  of section  25B of  the Act  and that  only  an appeal as  contemplated by  section 38  thereof should  have been   instituted   before   the   Rent   Control   Tribunal (hereinafter  called   the  Tribunal).  The  contention  was negatived with  the observation that a petition for revision as envisaged  by sub-section (8) above-mentioned lay against an order accepting or rejecting an eviction appli-

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749 cation, and  against such  an order  alone, as  laid down in Devi Singh  v. Chaman  Lal(1), R. K. Parikh v. Uma Verma(2), Bhagwati Pershad  v. Om  Perkash(3)  and  Mahavir  Singh  v. Kamala Narain(4).  The second  contention was that the lease deed on  which the landlady relied in support of the alleged tenancy  was   unstamped  and   therefore  inadmissible   in evidence. This  contention was  repelled for the reason that although the  said deed was taken on the file subject to the objection made  on behalf  of the  tenant, the objection was never pressed at the time of argument before the Controller. It was  also observed  by the  learned Single Judge that the contention was  practically meaningless  as the  tenant  had never denied the tenancy in question.      In the  result the  learned  Single  Judge  passed  the impugned order  directing the eviction of the tenant and, as already stated, that is the order impugned before us.      3. It has been vehemently contended before us on behalf of the  tenant-appellant that  the opinion of the High Court about the  maintainability of  the petition  for revision of the order  of the  Controller is erroneous and that the only remedy open to the landlady against that order was by way of appeal to the Tribunal under section 38 of the Act. In order to determine  the acceptability  of  the  contention  it  is necessary to  undertake a  somewhat detailed  examination of some of  the provisions  of the  Act, especially those which were introduced  by a 1976 amendment with effect from 1st of December, 1975.      4. The  Act  as  originally  framed  provided  for  the control  of  rents  and  of  eviction  of  tenants.  Various safeguards were  created by  it to ensure security of tenure to tenants residing in the urban area of Delhi and the right of the  landlord to evict his tenant was restricted in ambit so as  to be  available only  if the  existence  of  certain specified grounds  was proved.  Those grounds are enumerated in clauses  (a) to  (1) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14  of the  Act. The  ground contained in clause (e) runs thus:           "(e)  that   the  premises   let  for  residential      purposes are  required bona  fide by  the landlord  for      occupation as a residence for himself or for any member      of his  family dependent  upon him,  if he is the owner      thereof, or for any person 750      for whose  benefit the  premises are  held and that the      landlord  or   such  person  has  no  other  reasonably      suitable residential accommodation;"      The jurisdiction  to decide  disputes arising under the Act was vested in Controllers and civil courts were divested thereof.  Chapter   VI  of   the  Act   made  provision  for appointment of  Controllers, their  powers and functions and appeals from  their orders. Out of the sections appearing in that  Chapter  there  are  three  with  which  we  are  here concerned. They  are sections 37, 38 and 39. Section 37 lays down the  procedure to  be followed  by the  Controller  and subsection (2) thereof states:           "Subject to  any rules that may be made under this      Act, the  Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in      any proceeding  before him, follow as far as may be the      practice and  procedure of  a Court  of  Small  Causes,      including the recording of evidence."      Section 38  lays down  that from  every  order  of  the Controller made  under the  Act an  appeal shall  lie to the Tribunal who  shall have all the powers of a court under the Code of  Civil Procedure  when hearing an appeal. Section 39

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provides  for  an  appeal  to  the  High  Court  against  an appellate order  passed by  the Tribunal but, makes it clear that such a second appeal shall lie only if it involves some substantial question of law.      On the  9th of  September, 1975, the Central Government took a  decision that  Government  employees  owning  houses within the  Union Territory  of Delhi  shall be  required to vacate accommodation  allotted to  them  by  the  Government within a  period of  three months  beginning with the 1st of October, 1975,  and that  in case they failed to vacate such accommodation before  the 1st  of January  1976, they  would have to  pay therefor  licence-fee equivalent to rent at the market rate. In view of that decision it became necessary to make  special   provision  for   enabling  such   Government employees to  evict their respective tenants and to shift to their own  houses. It  was also  felt that procedural delays required to  be cut down in the case of disputes between the landlord and the tenant when the landlord bona fide required the demised  premises for  his own  occupation. The  Act was therefore amended  by Ordinance  No. 24  of 1975  which  was eventually replaced  by the  Delhi Rent  Control (Amendment) Act (being Act No. 18 of 1976 and hereinafter referred to as the Amending  Act). The  Amending Act  introduced in Chapter III of  the Act  section 14A which provided for a right to a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government 751 or any  local authority  to recover  immediate possession of premises let  out by  him in  case he  was required  by  the Government  or  the  authority  to  vacate  the  residential premises allotted  to him. The only other change effected by the Amending  Act was  to add  a new  chapter, viz,  Chapter IIIA, to  the Act.  The chapter  is headed "Summary Trial Of Certain Applications"  and consists of three sections, viz., sections 25A,  25B and  25C, the  first two of which may  be reproduced in extenso:           "25A. The  provisions of  this Chapter or any rule      made  thereunder   shall  have  effect  notwithstanding      anything inconsistent  therewith contained elsewhere in      this Act  or in  any other  law for  the time  being in      force."           "25B. (1)  Every application by a landlord for the      recovery of  possession of  any premises  on the ground      specified in  clause (e)  of the proviso to sub-section      (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be dealt      with in accordance with the procedure specified in this      section.           "(2)  The   Controller  shall  issue  summons,  in      relation to  every  application  referred  to  in  sub-      section  (1),  in  the  form  specified  in  the  Third      Schedule.           "(3) (a) the Controller shall, in addition to, and      simultaneously with,  the issue  of summons for service      on the  tenant, also direct the summons to be served by      registered post,  acknowledgment due,  addressed to the      tenant or  his agent empowered to accept the service at      the place  where the  tenant or  his agent actually and      voluntarily  resides   or  carries   on   business   or      personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances      of the  case so require, also direct the publication of      the summons  in a newspaper circulating in the locality      in which  the tenant  is last  known to have resided or      carried on business or personally worked for gain.           (b) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed      by  the   tenant  or  his  agent  is  received  by  the

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    Controller or  the registered  article  containing  the      summons is received back with an endorsement purporting      to have  been made  by a  postal employee to the effect      that the  tenant or  his  agent  had  refused  to  take      delivery of  the registered article, the Controller may      declare that there has been a valid service of summons. 752           "(4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served      (whether in  the ordinary way or by registered post) in      the form  specified in  the Third  Schedule  shall  not      contest the  prayer  for  eviction  from  the  premises      unless he  files and  affidavit stating  the ground  on      which he  seeks to contest the application for eviction      and obtains  leave from  the Controller  as hereinafter      provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance      of  the  summons  or  his  obtaining  such  leave,  the      statement made  by the  landlord in the application for      eviction shall  be deemed  to be admitted by the tenant      and the  applicant shall  be entitled  to an  order for      eviction on the ground aforesaid.           "(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave      to contest  the application  if the  affidavit filed by      the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the      landlord from  obtaining an  order for  the recovery of      possession of  the premises  on the ground specified in      clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section      14, or under section 14A.           "(6) Where  leave is  granted  to  the  tenant  to      contest the  application, the Controller shall commence      the hearing of the application as early as practicable.           "(7) Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  sub-      section (2)  of section 37, the Controller shall, while      holding an  inquiry  in  a  proceeding  to  which  this      Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a      Court of  Small  Causes,  including  the  recording  of      evidence.           "(8) No  appeal or second appeal shall lie against      an order for the recovery of possession of any premises      made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure      specified in this section:           Provided that  the High Court may, for the purpose      of  satisfying   itself  that  an  order  made  by  the      Controller under this section is according to law, call      for the  records of  the case  and pass  such order  in      respect thereto as it thinks fit.           "(9) Where  no application  has been  made to  the      High Court  on revision,  the Controller  may exercise,      the powers  of review in accordance with the provisions      of Order  XLVII of  the Fist  Schedule to  the Code  of      Civil Procedure, 1908. 753           "(10) Save  as otherwise provided in this Chapter,      the procedure  for the  disposal of  an application for      eviction on  the ground  specified in clause (e) of the      proviso to  sub section  (1) of  section 14,  or  under      section 14A, shall be the same as the procedure for the      disposal of applications by Controllers."      5. The  non obstante  clause occurring  in section  25A makes it  quite clear  that whenever  there  is  a  conflict between the  provisions of  Chapter IIIA on the one hand and those of  the rest  of the  Act or  of any other law for the time being  in force on the other, the former shall prevail. Section  25B   provides  a   special   procedure   for   the determination of  an  application  by  a  landlord  claiming recovery of  possession from  his tenant of the premises let

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out to  the latter  on either  of two  grounds, viz.,  those specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14  and in  section 14A. Thus if such an application is based  on the  ground  that  the  landlord  requires  the demised premises  bona fide  for his  own  occupation  as  a residential  accommodation  it  has  to  be  dealt  with  in accordance with  the procedure  specified in section 25B and not under  the provisions  contained in  chapters other than Chapter IIIA,  in so far as the latter are inconsistent with the former.  This follows  directly from  the provisions  of section 25A  read with  those of  sub-section (1) of Section 25B. That  procedure envisages a short-cut to the conclusion of the  proceedings  before  the  Controller  and  for  that purpose makes  the  right  of  the  tenant  to  contest  the application of  the landlord  subject  to  the  Controller’s leave obtained  on grounds  specified in an affidavit. If no such affidavit  is filed,  the question  of leave  does  not arise nor  that of  a contest by the tenant. Furthermore, if the affidavit  is filed  but leave  is refused, a contest by the  defendant   is  again   barred.  In   either  case  the proceedings immediately come to a termination by the passage of an order of eviction of the tenant. In case, however, the required affidavit is filed and leave to contest is granted, the Controller  has to  embark on  the usual inquiry but the same has  again to  be  conducted  in  conformity  with  the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording  of evidence.  This is  the  mandate  of  sub- section (7)  of section  25B, which makes a slight departure in the  matter of  practice and  procedure from  that to  be followed in other applications under the Act as laid down in sub-section (2) of section 37.      Sub-section (8)  of section 25B makes another variation in the  procedure and  states that  when an  order  for  the recovery of  possession of any premises has been made by the Controller on an appli- 754 cation covered by sub-section (1) no appeal or second appeal shall lie  therefrom. In the case of such an order therefore the provisions  of sections  38 and 39 are specifically made inapplicable. The  subsection further  provides however  for the remedy  of revision  by the High Court of any order made by the  Controller under  section 25B, a remedy which is not available to  a party  in a  dispute not  covered by Chapter IIIA.      Reference may  also be made here to sub-section (10) of section 25B  pointedly. That sub-section makes it clear that even in  the case  of applications falling under sub-section (1) of  that section  the procedure  for their  disposal  by Controllers shall  be the  same as  in  the  case  of  other applications, except  as is  provided in  Chapter IIIA.  The combined effect  of section 25A and sub-section (1) and (10) of section 25B is that in whatever respect section 25B makes a departure  from the procedure prescribed in other chapters of the Act, the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall prevail but that where  that Chapter  does not  provide for a variation, applications covered  by subsection (1) of section 25B shall be treated  at par  with  all  other  applications  for  the purposes of procedure.      6. It  is in  the above background that the question as to whether  an appeal  to the  Tribunal or a revision to the High Court  was competent  against the  order passed  in the instant case  by the  Controller has to be decided, and that brings us  directly to  the meaning  of  subsection  (8)  of section 25B.  The proviso to that sub-section gives power to the High  Court to  revise "an  order made by the Controller

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under this  section" which expression is no doubt capable of being construed as any order of whatsoever, nature passed by the Controller while acting in accordance with the procedure laid down  in section  25B. The  proviso, however, has to be read as  a legislative measure carved out of the sub-section to which  it is appended and the order mentioned therein has to be regarded as an order of the type which the sub-section speaks of,  i.e. "an order for the recovery of possession of any premises  made by  the Controller in accordance with the procedure  specified  in  this  section."  Thus,  the  order covered by  sub-section (8)  (and therefore,  by the proviso also) would  be a final order disposing of an application on a conclusion  of the  proceedings under  sub-section (4)  or sub-section (7)  of section 25B. This line of reasoning does not present any difficulty.      7. Learned  counsel for  the tenant however argued that for an order to be covered by sub-section (8) of section 25B it must  be an  order for  the recovery of possession of any premises made  by the  Controller. According  to him,  if an order does not direct recovery 755 of possession  by the landlord from the tenant, it is not an order which  sub-section (8) would embrace. This contention, though not  wholly implausible, runs counter to the decision in Devi  Singh v.  Chaman Lal  (supra) which was followed in Bhagwati Prasad  v. Om  Prakash (supra) and Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain  (supra) and does not find favour with us. Sub- section(8) no  doubt in  terms speaks  only of an order "for the recovery  of possession  of any  premises" and  does not mention one  which refuses  the relief  of eviction  to  the landlord; but  then it  appears to  us that  the  expression "order for  the recovery  of possession of any premises" has to be  construed, in  the context in which it appears, as an order  deciding   application  for   the  recovery   of  the possession of  any premises.  Our reasons in this behalf are two-fold. Firstly,  if an  order in  favour of  the landlord alone was  meant to  be covered by sub-section (8), an order refusing such  relief  would  be  liable  to  be  called  in question by  way of an appeal or second appeal under section 38 so that there would be two procedures for the end-product of the  Controller’s proceedings  being called  in question; one when  the same is in favour of the landlord, and another when it  goes against  him,  which  would  obviously  entail discrimination  and  make  the  sub-section  suffer  from  a constitutional  invalidity.   It  is  an  accepted  rule  of interpretation that  if a  provision can  be construed  in a manner which upholds its legal or constitutional validity it should if possible be so construed rather than the other way round. We  do feel  that the  language used is not happy but then it would not be doing violence to it if it is construed as just above stated.      Secondly, the  scheme of  the Act and the object of the introduction of  section 14A and Chapter IIIA into it by the Amending Act  make us  form the opinion that sub-section (8) of section  25B is  exhaustive of  the rights  of appeal and revision in  relation to  the proceedings  held  under  that Chapter. Before  the enforcement  of the  Amending Act,  all disputes between a landlord and his tenant were liable to be dealt with  according to  a  uniform  procedure  before  the Controller  as   also  in   appeal  and  second  appeal.  No distinction  was  made  between  one  kind  of  dispute  and another. When  it was  felt that the procedure prescribed in the Act  defeated, by reason of the delay involved, the very purpose of  an application  made under  clause  (e)  of  the proviso to  sub-section (1) of section 14, especially in the

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case of landlords who themselves held accommodation allotted by the  Government or  a local  authority  which  they  were required to  vacate,  section  14A  and  Chapter  IIIA  were introduced by  the Amending  Act so as to cut down the time- factor drastically, so much 756 so that  a tenant  was required  to obtain  leave  from  the Controller for  contesting an  application for  his eviction before he  could put  up his defence, and the Controller was given the  power to  refuse leave  and straightway  pass  an order of  eviction if he found that the grounds disclosed by the tenant in support of his right to dispute the landlord’s claim were  not such  as would  disentitle the landlord from obtaining an  order of  eviction.  Sub-section  (7)  further simplified the  procedure on  contest  being  allowed,  even though sub-section  (2) of  section 37 itself provided for a procedure far simpler than ordinarily obtains in proceedings before a  civil court.  Then there  is sub-section (8) which provides for the abolition of the right of appeal and second appeal and  replaces it  by a  power in  the High  Court  to revise an order passed by the Controller. That provision, as a part  of the  overall picture painted, must necessarily be construed  as   laying  down  procedure  exclusive  of  that provided in  sections 38  and 39,  and we hold that the four cases relied  upon  by  the  High  Court  in  rejecting  the contention raised  on behalf  of the  tenant were  correctly decided.      8. In  the way  of the  above  interpretation  of  sub- section (8)  of section  25B, the  provisions of sub-section (10) thereof do not pose a hurdle. All that sub-section (10) states  is  that  the  procedure  for  the  disposal  of  an application for eviction covered by sub-section (1) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of other applications by Controllers,  except as  provided in  Chapter IIIA.  Sub- section (8)  as interpreted  by us  governs  an  application covered by  sub-section (1)  of section  25B  and  expressly takes away  the right  of appeal  or  second  appeal,  while providing the  remedy of  revision instead.  As we have held the provisions  of sub-section  (8) to  be exhaustive of the remedies available  to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the  Controller in  applications  triable  under  Chapter IIIA. such  applications fall  outside the category of those which can  be disposed of like other applications under sub- section (10)  read with  the provisions  contained in  other chapters of the Act.      9. As a result of the above discussion we hold that the remedy of  the landlady  against the order of the Controller in the  present case  was by  way of  revision (and revision only) of  that order  by the  High Court as laid down in the proviso to  sub-section (8)  of section  25B, even though it was  an  order  not  directing,  but  refusing  recovery  of possession of the premises in dispute.      10. Another  contention raised  on behalf of the tenant was that  the order  passed by the High Court while revising that of  the Controller  was illegal  inasmuch as it did not specifically contain a direc- 757 tion that  the landlady  would not  be  entitled  to  obtain possession of  the premises in dispute before the expiration of a  period of  six months  from the date of the order. The contention seeks  support from the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Act which states:      :    "Where an  order for the recovery of possession of any premises  is made  on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be

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entitled to  obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order."      Now this  sub-section does  not at  all require that an order for  the recovery of possession of any premises should contain a  direction of  the type  above mentioned.  On  the other hand,  the sub-section  itself declares  that such  an order would  not be  executable before  a certain period has expired. The  declaration is part of the law of the land and would be operative as such so that the landlady would not be entitled to  execute the order made by the High Court in her favour before the expiry of six months from the date thereof notwithstanding the  fact that  the terms of sub-section (7) have not been made a part of that order.      11. The  only other  ground urged  in  support  of  the appeal was  that the  landlady had  prayed for  the tenant’s eviction from  only a  part of  the premises  and that  such eviction could not legally be granted to her. The contention embraces a  question of  fact which has been decided against the tenant  by the High Court and for reconsidering which we do not find any reason.      12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 758