REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTON

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4211 & 4212 OF 2007

VIJAYA BANK    …APPELLANT

VERSUS

SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH    …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

C.K. PRASAD, J.

1. These appeals, by grant of leave arise out of a common  

judgment  of  the  Division Bench of  the  Gauhati  High Court  

dated 10th January, 2007 in Writ appeal No.381 of 2001 and  

Writ Appeal No.11 of 2002, whereby it had set aside the order  

of the learned Single Judge dated 22nd August, 2001 and 24th  

August, 2001 passed in Civil Rule No.3735 of 1995 and Civil  

Rule No.2771 of 1997 respectively.  

2. Facts lie in a narrow compass :-

Shyamal Kumar Lodh-respondent herein is an employee  

of the appellant-Vijaya Bank. It is a Nationalised Bank. The  

employee filed application before the Labour Court, Dibrugarh  

constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of the  

Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  for  an  award  computing  his  

suspension/subsistence allowance under Section 33C(2) of the  

Act.  

3. It is not in dispute that the appropriate Government in  

relation to an employee is  the  Central  Government and the  

employee  had filed  the  application  before  the  Labour  Court  

constituted  by  the  State  Government.  It  is  further  not  in  

dispute that the Labour Court before whom the employee had  

filed  the  application  has  not  been  specified  by  the  Central  

Government.   On the application so filed the  Labour Court  

issued  notice  to  the  appellant-employer.  The  appellant  

appeared  before  the  Labour  Court  and  questioned  its  

jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on the ground that the  

said  Court  having  not  been  specified  by  the  Central  

Government under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes  

Act, 1947 it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.

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4. The Labour Court by its order dated 19th August, 1995  

over-ruled  that  objection  and  held  that  its  jurisdiction  to  

adjudicate the dispute is not ousted.  Employer aggrieved by  

the  aforesaid  order  dated  19th August,  1995  preferred  writ  

application  which was  registered as  Civil  Rule  No.  3735  of  

1995.  A learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court by its  

judgment  dated  22nd August,  1995  passed  in  Civil  Rule  

No.3735  of  1995  upheld  its  contention  and  while  doing  so  

observed as follows :

“As the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was not specified   by  the  appropriate  Government  they  have  no  jurisdiction to issue notice to the Petitioner in both the  cases.”

5. During the pendency of the proceeding before the Labour  

Court, the employee filed application seeking enhancement of  

the  subsistence  allowance  and  the  Labour  Court  by  order  

dated  17th  Ocober,1996  directed  the  employer  to  deposit  

recurring subsistence allowance in Court.  Employee had also  

preferred writ petition against the aforementioned order dated  

17thOctober, 1996 which was registered as Civil Rule No. 2771  

of 1996.Following its earlier judgment dated 22nd August 1995  

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passed  in  Civil  Rule  No.  3735  of  1995,  the  learned  Single  

Judge by its order dated 24th August, 2001 allowed the writ  

petition and quashed the aforesaid order  dated 17.10.1996.   

6. Employee, aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the Single  

Judge,  preferred separate appeals,  which were registered as  

Writ Appeal No. 381 of 2001 and Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2002.  

Both the appeals were heard together and a Division Bench of  

the High Court by its common judgment dated 10th January,  

2007 allowed the appeals and set aside both the orders of the  

Single Judge.  While  doing so it  concurred with the Single  

Judge that as the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has not been  

specified by the Central Government, it had no jurisdiction to  

entertain the petition preferred by the employee.  However, on  

its  finding  that  claim  of  subsistence  allowance  falls  within  

Section 10A(2) of the Industrial Employment(Standing Order)  

Act,  and the  Branch of the Bank where the employee was  

working, fell within the limits of jurisdiction of Labour Court in  

question, it shall have jurisdiction to decide the claim.  While  

doing so, it observed as follows :

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“In  the  instant  case,  the  Labour  Court  at   Dibrugarh  has  not  been  ‘specified’  by  the  Central   Government  for  the  said  purpose  and  accordingly,   we  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  first  submission  advanced by the  learned counsel  for the  appellant  that  the  Labour  Court  at  Dibrugarh  would  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  application  filed by the  Appellant only on the basis of the provisions under   the Act.

However, the provisions of the Standing Orders  Act  appear  to  indicate  that  a  Labour  Court   constituted under the 1947 Act, whether by the State   Government  or  Central  Government,  would  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  claim  of  subsistence  allowance payable to a workman on an application   made  to  such  Labour  Court  by  the  concerned  workman.   The provisions of  Section  10A(2)  of  the   Standing  Orders  Act  is  a  special  provision   incorporated only for adjudicating  on claim relating  to payment of subsistence allowance.   

Having  regard  to  the  special  provision  under  Section  10A(2)  of  the  Standing Orders Act,  we  feel  that  the  Labour  Court  of  Dibrugarh,  although  constituted  by  the  State  Government,  would  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  claim  for  subsistence  allowance  even  in  respect  of  employees  under  a  nationalized  banks.   It  is  not  specified  in  Section   10A(2)  of  the  Standing Orders Act  that  the  Labour   Court  constituted  under  the  1947 Act  has to  be  a  Labour  Court  constituted  by  an  appropriate   Government.   It  is  also  not  stipulated  that  the   appropriate  Government  has  to  ‘specify’  such  a  Labour  Court  for  entertaining  on  application  under  Section 10A(2) of the Standing Orders Act.  The only   requirement  for  assumption  of  jurisdiction  by  a  Labour  Court under Section 10A(2) of  the Standing  Orders Act is that the  Labour Court has to be one,  which has been constituted under the 1947 Act and  

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the  concerned  establishment  must  be  functioning  within  the  local  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  of  such  Labour Court.

Having noted the provisions as above, we are of   the view that the entertainment of the application by  the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was proper in respect   of the claim for subsistence allowance put forward  by the  Appellant,  we  hold  that  with  regard  to  the  claim for subsistence allowance put forward by the  Appellant against the Respondent bank, the Labour  Court at Dibrugarh has jurisdiction. We accordingly  declare  that  the  Labour  Court  at  Dibrugarh  was   competent and had jurisdiction to entertain the claim  for  subsistence  allowance  put  forward  by  the  Appellant.   The  impugned  decision  of  the  learned  Single Judge to the contrary is accordingly interfered  with.”

7. Employer  is  assailing  this  common  order  in  these  

appeals.

8. Mr. Jagat Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  

the appellant submits that in view of clear and unambiguous  

language  employed  in  Section  33C(2)  of  the  Industrial  

Disputes  Act,  the  money  due  to  an  employee  can  be  

adjudicated by a Labour Court  specified by the appropriate  

Government.   He points out that the appropriate Government  

admittedly  is  the  Central  Government  and  it  having  not  

specified the Labour Court where the employee had brought  

the action, it had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate  

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the  claim  of  the  employee.   In  support  of  the  submission  

reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the  

case of  Treogi Nath and others vs. Indian Iron and Steel  

Co.Ltd. and others (AIR 1968 SC 205) and our attention has  

been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 4 of the  

judgment which reads as follows:  

“The language of S.33-C(2) itself makes it clear that  the  appropriate  Government  has  to  specify  the  Labour Court  which is  to discharge the functions  under this sub-section. The use of the expression  “specified in this  behalf”  is  significant.  The words  “in this behalf” must be given their full import and  effect.  They  clearly  indicate  that  there  must  be  a  specification by the appropriate Government that a  particular Court is to discharge the function under  S.33-C(2)  and,  thereupon,  it  is  that  court  alone  which will  have jurisdiction to proceed under that  provision.  The mere fact that a Labour Court has  been  constituted  under  S.7(1)  of  the  Act  for  the  purpose  of  adjudication  of  industrial  disputes  as  well as for performing other functions that may be  assigned to it under the Act does not mean that that  Court is automatically specified as the Court for the  purpose of exercising jurisdiction under S.33-C(2) of  the Act.  S.33-C(2) confers jurisdiction only on those  Labour  Courts  which are  specified  in  this  behalf,  i.e.,  such  Labour  Courts  which  are  specifically  designated by the State Government for the purpose  of computing the money value of the benefit claimed  by a workman.”

9. Mr.  A.K.  Panda,  learned  Senior  Counsel,  however,  

appearing on behalf of the employee-respondent submits that  

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in  view of  the  explanation  appended  to  Section  33C of  the  

Industrial  Disputes  Act,  Labour  Court  includes  any  Court  

constituted  under  any  law  relating  to  investigation  and  

settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State and the  

Labour Court before which employee laid his claim has been  

constituted  for  investigation  and  settlement  of  industrial  

disputes, it will have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate  

the money claim of the employee.

10. Before we advert to the rival submissions it is expedient  

to go into the legislative history of the enactment in question.  

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as originally enacted did not  

provide for any remedy to individual employee to enforce his  

existing rights and only way to enforce the existing rights was  

to raise an industrial dispute. The legislature inserted Section  

20 in the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)  Act, 1950  

(since repealed) which provided for the recovery of the money  

due from the employer under an award or decision. Further,  

by  the  Industrial  Disputes  (Amendment)  Act,  1953  the  

legislature inserted Chapter 5A to the Industrial Disputes Act,  

1947, and for the recovery of money due to an employee from  

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his employer Section 25-I was enacted. The aforesaid insertion  

confined to the dues under Chapter 5A of the Act only but did  

not  apply  to  moneys  or  benefits  due  under  any  award,  

settlement or any other provision of the Act. Taking note of the  

aforesaid  lacunae  the  legislature  passed  the  Industrial  

Disputes  (Amendment  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act,  

1956.   This  Act  repealed  the  Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate  

Tribunal) Act, 1950 as also Section 25-I in Chapter 5A of the  

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and inserted Section 33C in the  

later  Act.  Section  33C  as  inserted  by  Amending  Act,  1956  

made provision for recovery of money due to an employee from  

his employer not only under the provision of Chapter 5A but  

also  under  settlement  and  awards.  However,  it  did  not  

prescribe  any  period  of  limitation  and  further  only  the  

workman entitled to a money or benefit himself could make an  

application. With a view to obviate this lacuna Section 33C of  

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was recast by Section 23 of  

the   Industrial  Disputes  (Amendment)  Act,  1964(Act  36  of  

1964).  Section  33C of  the  Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947 as  

stood before the amendment by Act 36 of 1964 read as follows:  

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“Section 33C. Recovery of Money Due from an  Employer –  (1)  Whey  any  money  is  due  to  a  workman from an employer under a settlement or  an award or, under the provisions of chapter 5A, the  workman may, without prejudice to any other mode  of recovery, make an application to the appropriate  government  for  the  recovery  of  the  money  due to  him, and if, the appropriate government is satisfied  that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate  for that amount to the collector, who shall proceed  to  recover  the  same  in  the  same  manner  as  an  arrear of land revenue.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from  the employer, any benefit which is capable of  being  computed  in  terms  of  money,  the  amount  at  which  such  benefit  should  be  computed may, subject to any rules that may  be  made  under  this  Act,  be  determined  by  such labour court as may be specified in this  behalf by the appropriate government and the  amount  so  determined  may  be  recovered  as  provided for in sub-section (1).

(3) For the purpose of computing the money value  of  a  benefit,  the  labour  court  may,  if  it  so  thinks fit, appoint a commissioner who shall,  after  taking  such  evidence  as  may  be  necessary, submit a report to the labour court  and  the  labour  court  shall  determine  the  amount  after  considering  the  report  of  the  commissioner and other circumstances of the  case.”

11. Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amended  

by  Section  23  of  the  Amendment  Act  36  of  1964  made  

substantial changes in law with which we are not concerned in  

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the  present  appeals,  except  explanation  inserted  in  Section  

33C,  the effect whereof shall be considered in this judgment.  

Section 33C(2) and (5) of Industrial Disputes Act, as it stands  

today read as follows :

“33C.  Recovery of money due from an employer –  

(1) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the  employer any money or any benefit which is capable  of  being  computed  in  terms  of  money  and  if  the   question arises as to the amount of money due or as   to  the  amount  at  which  such  benefit  should  be  computed,  then  the  question  may,  subject  to  any  rules that may be made under this Act, be decided  by such Labour  Court  as  may be specified  in  this   behalf by the appropriate Government.

(3)   xxx xxx xxx xxx

(4) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(5) Where  workmen  employed  under  the  same  employer are entitled to receive from him any money  or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of   money, then subject to such rules as may be made in   this  behalf,  a single  application  for the  recovery of  the  amount  due  may  be  made  on  behalf  of  or  in   respect of any number of such workmen.

Explanation.—In this section “Labour Court” includes  any  court  constituted  under  any  law  relating  to   investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in  force in any State.”

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12. From a plain reading of Section 33C(2) it is evident that  

money due to a workman has to be decided by such Labour  

Court “as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate  

Government.” Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  

inter  alia  confers  power  to  the  appropriate  Government  for  

constitution of one or more Labour courts for the adjudication  

of  industrial  disputes.   It  also  prescribes   qualification  for  

appointment  as  Presiding  Officer  of  a  Labour  Court.  

Explanation appended to Section 33C of the Act provides to  

include  any  Court  constituted  under  any  law  relating  to  

investigation and settlement of industrial disputes   in   force  

in any State as Labour Court.  The  underlying object behind  

inserting  explanation  seems  to  be  varying  qualification  

prescribed  for   appointment  of  Presiding  Officers  of  Labour  

Court by different State enactments.  The  Parliament  took  

note of the fact while  inserting  explanation  that there are  

different   kinds  of   Labour   Courts   constituted  under  

Industrial Disputes Act  and State Acts     and a  question  

may arise  whether  a  Labour Court  constituted  under  Acts,  

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Central or State could entertain a claim made under Section  

33C(2) of the Act.

13. An  explanation  is  appended  ordinarily  to  a  section  to  

explain  the  meaning  of  words  contained in  that  section.  In  

view of the explanation aforesaid Labour Court shall include  

any Court constituted under any law relating to investigation  

and settlement  of  industrial  disputes  in  force  in  any State.  

Money  due  to  an  employee  under  Section  33C(2)  is  to  be  

decided by “Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by  

the  appropriate  Government”.   Therefore,  the  expression  

“Labour Court” in Section 33C(2) has to be given an extended  

meaning  so  as  to  include  Court  constituted  under  any  law  

relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes  

in  force  in  any  State.  It  widens  the  choice  of  appropriate  

Government  and it  can specify  not  only  the  Labour  Courts  

constituted  under  Section  7  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  

1947 but such other Courts constituted under any other law  

relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes  

in force in any State.    

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14. But  this  does  not  end the  controversy.   The power  to  

adjudicate  money claim is  to the  Labour Court  “as may be  

specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government”.  Every  

word used by the Legislature carries meaning and therefore  

effort has to be made to give meaning to each and every word  

used by it.  A construction brushing aside words in a Statute  

is not a sound principle of construction.  The Court avoids a  

construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which  

renders  an expression or  part  of  the  Statute  devoid  of  any  

meaning or application.  Legislature never waste its words or  

says anything in vain and a construction rejecting the words  

of  a  Statute  is  not   resorted  to,  excepting  for  compelling  

reasons.   There  does  not  exist  any  reason,  much  less  

compelling reason to adopt a construction, which renders the  

words  “as  may  be  specified  in  this  behalf”  used  in  Section  

33C(2) of the Act as redundant.  These words have to be given  

full meaning.  These words in no uncertain terms indicate that  

there has to be specification by the appropriate Government  

that a particular court shall have jurisdiction to decide money  

claim under Section 33C(2) of the Act and it is that court alone  

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which shall  have  the  jurisdiction.   Appropriate  Government  

can specify the court or courts by general or special order in  

its discretion.  In the present case, there is nothing on record  

to show that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been specified  

by the appropriate Government, i.e., Central Government for  

adjudication  of  the  disputes  under  Section  33C(2)  of  the  

Industrial  Disputes  Act.   This  question  in  our  opinion  has  

squarely been answered by this Court in the case of  Treogi  

Nath (Supra).   True it  is  that  rendering this  decision,  this  

Court did not consider the explanation appended to Section  

33C  of  the  Act,  as  the  lis pertained  to  period  earlier  to  

amendment but in view of what we have said above, excepting  

the widening  of choice pertaining to Courts, explanation does  

not   dispense with the requirement of specification of court by  

appropriate Government.

15. Having  said  so  the  next  question  which  falls  for  

determination  is  as  to  whether  Labour  Court  at  Dibrugarh  

could have entertained the application under Section 10-A of  

Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act,  1946. Section  

10A of the Act reads as follows:

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“10-A.  Payment  of  subsistence  allowance.—  (1)  Where  any  workman  is  suspended  by  the  employer  pending  investigation  or  inquiry  into  complaints or charges of misconduct against him,  the  employer  shall  pay  to  such  workman  subsistence allowance-

(a)  at  the  rate  of  fifty  per  cent  of  the  wages  which  workman  was  entitled  to  immediately  preceding the date of such suspension, for the first  ninety days of suspension; and

(b) at the rate of seventy-five per cent of such  wages for the remaining period of suspension if the  delay in the completion of disciplinary proceedings  against such workman is not directly attributable to  the conduct of such workman.

(2)  If  any  dispute  arises  regarding  the  subsistence allowance payable to a workman under  sub-section  (1),  the  workman  or  the  employer  concerned  may  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Labour  Court,  constituted  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947 (14  of  1947),  within  the  local  limits  of  whose  jurisdiction  the  industrial  establishment  wherein such workman is employed is situate and  the Labour Court to which the dispute is so referred  shall,  after  giving  the  parties  an  opportunity  of  being heard, decide the dispute and such decision  shall be final and binding on the parties.

(3)  Notwithstanding anything contained in the  foregoing  provisions  of  this  section,  where  provisions  relating  to  payment  of  subsistence  allowance under any other law for the time being in  force  in  any  State  are  more  beneficial  than  the  provisions  of  this  section,  the  provisions  of  such  other  law  shall  be  applicable  to  the  payment  of  subsistence allowance in that State.”

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16. From  a  plain  reading  of  the  Section  10A(2)  of  the  

aforesaid Act it is evident that the Labour Court constituted  

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the local limits  

of  whose  jurisdiction  the  establishment  is  situated,  has  

jurisdiction  to  decide  any  dispute  regarding  subsistence  

allowance.  Here  in  the  present  case  undisputedly  dispute  

pertains to subsistence allowance and the Labour Court where  

the  workman had  brought  the  action  has  been  constituted  

under  Section  7  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  and  

further the appellant bank is situated within the local limits of  

its  jurisdiction.  The  workman  had,  though,  chosen  to  file  

application  under  Section  33C(2)  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  

Act but that in our opinion shall not denude  jurisdiction to  

the  Labour  Court,  if  it  otherwise  possesses  jurisdiction.  

Incorrect  label  of  the  application  and  mentioning  wrong  

provision neither confers jurisdiction nor denudes the Court of  

its jurisdiction. Relief sought for, if falls within the jurisdiction  

of the Court, it can not be thrown out on the ground of its  

erroneous  label  or  wrong  mentioning  of  provision.  In  the  

present  case  the  Labour  Court,  Dibrugarh  satisfies  all  the  

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requirements  to  decide  the  dispute  raised  by  the  employee  

before it.

17. As the matter is pending before Labour Court since long,  

it shall make endeavour to finally decide the dispute within 6  

months from today.  Appellant as also respondent are directed  

to  appear  before  the  Labour Court,  within four weeks from  

today.  

18. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with cost,  

quantified at Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the  

respondent.

………………………………….J.                                ( G.S. SINGHVI )

………………………………….J.                                ( C.K. PRASAD )

New Delhi, July 6, 2010.

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