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PETITIONER: SHRI VIJAY KUMAR & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/04/1998

BENCH: K.T. THOMAS, M. SRINIVASAN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T SRINIVASNAN, J.      By  the   first  two  prayers  in  this  petition,  the petitioners are  challenging the  validity  of  Notification dated 28.2.83 issued by the Central Government under Section 2 (a)(xi)  of the  Essential Commodities  Act 1955 declaring seeds specified  therein as  essential commodities  for  the purpose of  the said  Act and the Seeds (Control) Order 1983 issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of the said Act on  the ground  that they  are  unconstitutional,  ultra vires and  illegal. There  is a  third prayer  for declaring that Entry 33 of the List III to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  India does  not empower  either  the  Union Legislature or the State Legislature or make laws in respect of "seeds".  In fact,  the third  prayer is  the crux of the argument of the petitioner. 2.   The very  same prayers  and the contentions were raised by some  persons in  writ petitions  filed in  this court in 1984 and  in some  High Courts.  The cases filed in the High Courts were  transferred to  his Court  and heard along with the writ  petitions filed  in this  Court. By judgment dated 28.10.93, a  bench of  Two Judges upheld the validity of the Notification and  the order  the dismissed the petitions and transferred cases,  vide Raghu  Seeds &  Fars &  Ors. Versus Union of India & Ors. (1994) 1 S.C. 278. The petitioners who were probably  waiting for  over ten years for the result in the said  cases filed  this writ  petition in  May 1994.  In fact, the  petitioners filed Writ Petition(Civil) No. 303 of 1994 containing  a prayer  to declare  the judgment  of this Court to  be invalid.  However, they  withdrew it on 25.4.94 stating  that  they  would  file  a  properly  drafted  writ petition. 3.   The Notification  of Central  Government dated  24.2.83 reads thus:      "  In   exercise  of   the   powers      conferred  by  sub-clause  (xi)  of      clause (a)  of  Section  2  of  the      Essential Commodities  Act, 1955  (      10 of 1955), the Central Government      hereby declares the following seeds

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    used   for   sowing   or   planting      (including  seedling   and  tubers,      bulbs,    rhizomes,    and    other      vegetatively propogated material of      food crops  or cattle fodder) to be      essential   commodities   for   the      purpose of the said Act, namely,      (i) Seeds  of food-crops  and seeds      of fruits and vegetable.      (ii) Seeds of Cattle fodder and      (iii) Jute seeds.                          Sd/                     (I. M. Sahai)                Joint Secretary to the                      Govt of India                (F.No. 26(7)/82- ECR)" 4.   Sub-clauses (xi)  of clause  (a) of  Section 2  of  the Essential  Commodities   Act,  1955   empowers  the  Central Government to  declare any  class of  commodity  other  than those mentioned  in Section 2(a) clauses (i) to (x) to be an essential commodity  for the  purposes of  the Act  being  a commodity with  respect to  Entry 33  of the List III to the Seventh Schedule  of the Constitution. The said Entry in the Constitution. The  said Entry  in the Constitution refers to foodstuffs,  including  edible  oil,  oil  seeds  and  oil". According to  the petitioners  the seeds  dealt with  in the Notification will  not fall within the scope of Entry 33. It is argued  that in  order to bring seeds "within the fold of Entry 33"  it should  be either  foodstuff or edible as such seeds. According  to the  petitioners the  seeds with  which they are  dealing are  not edible  as such  and they are not "foodstuff" in any sense of the term. 4.   In support  of the  aforesaid  arguments,  reliance  is placed on  the judgment  of the  Constitution Bench  in Firm Girdhar Kapur Chand Versus Firm Dev Raj Madan Gopal 1964 (1) S.C.R. 995.  In  that  case  the  Court  held  that  forward contracts in  cotton seeds  were not  prohibited by  law  as cotton and  cotton seeds were not included in the definition of ’essential  commodity’. In  the course of the discussion, the Bench observed as follows:      " It is clear that before the order      made under  rule 81  of the Defence      of India  Rules continues  in force      notwithstanding the  expiration  of      the Defence  of India  Rules, it is      necessary that the order must be in      respect of  any matter specified in      S.3. Section 3 empowers the Central      Government to  make various  orders      but   only   in   connection   with      essential commodities. No order can      therefore be  considered to  be "in      respect of  any matter specified in      S.3" unless  it is in respect of an      essential commodity.      " Essential  commodity" is  defined      in S.2 to mean any of the following      classes of commodities"      (i)  foodstuffs,  (ii)  cotton  and      woolen textiles,  (iii) paper, (iv)      petroleum and  petroleum  products,      (v)  spare  parts  of  mechanically      propelled  vehicles,   (vi)   coal,      (vii) iron  and steel  (viii) mica,      "Foodstuffs" was also defined thus:

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    "Foodstuffs" shall  include  edible      oil seeds  and oils".  Cotton seeds      is an  oilseed but it cannot be for      a moment  be suggested  that it  is      fit  for   human  consumption,  So,      clearly, it is not an oilseed which      is edible.  Mr. Aggarwala as a last      resort  argued  that  what  "edible      oil-seed"  means  is  a  seed  from      which edible  oil can  be prepared.      Such an  argument has  only  to  be      mentioned to deserve rejection. The      phrase "edible  oil-seed" can never      mean  what   the  learned   counsel      suggests and can and does mean only      and  oilseed  which  is  edible  as      oilseed.  Cotton  seed,  not  being      edible , falls outside the class of      "edible  oilseed"  and  so  is  not      foodstuff within the meaning of S.2      of the  Ordinance  or  the  Act  of      1946." 5.    The  aforesaid observations  of the Constitution Bench cannot  be   torn  out  of  the  context  and  used  by  the petitioners. The  Court had no occasion in that case to deal with Entry  33 in  List III which expressly refers to cotton seed and also Section 2(a) (ix) of the Essential Commodities Act which also refers to cotton seed. The question which has arisen before  us in  this case  did not  arise before  that Bench. In  the circumstances  the contention that the ruling of the  Division Bench  in Raghu Seeds & Farms & Ors. Versus Union of  India &  Ors. (1994)  1 S.C.C. 278 runs counter to the judgment  of the  Constitution Bench in Firm Girdhar Lal Kapur Chand Versus  Firm Dev Raj Madan Gopal 1964 (1) S.C.R. 995 cannot be accepted. 6.   In such  a situation, there is no circumstance whatever warranting the  exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the Court in a matter which has already been  decided in  batch of  case  including  a  writ petition under  Article 32  of the Constitution. Those cases were initiated  by associations of farmers, seed-growers and merchants. As pointed out earlier, these petitioners had not chosen to  challenge the validity of the Notification issued in 1983 for over 10 years. 7.   Hence we  are of  the opinion that the petitioners have not made  out a  case for  re-considering the question which has been decided by this Court in Raghu Seeds & Farms & Ors. Versus Union  of India  & Ors. (supra) . In that view of the matter nothing  survives in this writ petition and it has to fail. Consequently  the writ  petition is  dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.