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PETITIONER: VIDYA DHAR PANDE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VIDYUT GRIH SIKSHA SAMITI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1988

BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) THAKKAR, M.P. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  341            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 442  1988 SCC  (4) 734        JT 1988 (4)    84  1988 SCALE  (2)916

ACT:     Madhya   Pradesh  Madhyamik  Shiksha  Adhiniyam,   1955: Sections  28(2)(d)  and  Regulations 61, 71  and  79  framed thereunder--Regulations  have force of  law--Termination  of services   of   Higher   Secondary   School   Principal   in contravention of Regulation 79--Held illegal and  quashed.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant  was  appointed from  July  3,  196X  as principal  of  the School run by the respondent  society,  a body registered under the M.P. Non-trading Corporation  Act, 1962.  On  June  23,  1971  the  appellant’s  services  were terminated  with  immediate  effect by  giving  one  month’s salary in lieu of notice. The appellant made  representation to  the Divisional Superintendent of Education who  directed the  Society  to rescind the order of  termination  because, according  to  him,  the termination of  the  appellant  was wrongful being in breach of Regulation 79 of the Regulations framed  by  the Board of Secondary Education  under  section 28(2)(d)  of  Madhya Pradesh  Madhyamik  Shiksha  Adhiniyam, 1955.  The  appellant  however was not  re-instated  by  the society.      The  appellant therefore filed a petition in  the  High Court, which was dismissed. The High Court held that (1) the said  Regulations had on statutory force and  therefore  the violation  in  this  case of  the  procedure  prescribed  in Regulations  71  and  79  would  not  render  the  order  of termination  null and void; (2) the appellant’s  remedy  was only  by  an  action for damages for breach  of  master  and servant contract; and (3) the school being run by a  private body, no writ of mandamus could  he issued.      Allowing the appeal, it was,      HELD    ection 28(2)(d) of the Act confers power on the Board  to  make  Regulations  regarding  the  conditions  of recognition  of the Institutions as well as for  framing  of School  Code"  to ensure minimum standard of  efficient  and uniform management of such schools. [447B-C]                                                   PG NO 442                                                   PG NO 443      (2)  As has been held by this Court in Sukhdev  Singh’s case, there is no subtantial difference between a rule and a

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regulation  inasmuch  as both  are  subordinate  legislation under  powers conferred by the statute. There is  therefore, no  escape from the conclusion that the regulations, in  the present case, have force of law.1449B]      (3) A observed in Sukhdev Singh’s case, the doctrine of ultra vires as applied to statutes, rules and orders  should equally  apply to the regulations and any other  subordinate legislation. [450G]      (4) The order of termination of the appellant from  the post  of Principal of the Higher Secondary School in  breach of  Regulation 79 is illegal and as such the same is  liable to  be quashed as the Regulations have got statutory  force. The  appellant is liable to be reinstated in the service  as Principal of the said school. [454A-B]      (5) The Higher Secondary School in question though  run by  a private trust receives 100% grant from the  Government and  as  such it is amenable to the  writ  jurisdiction  for violation  of  the  provisions of the  said  Regulations  in passing   the  order  of  termination  of  service  of   the appellant. 454B-C]      Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan, [1970]  I SCC 75; Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, [1971] 2 SCC  192;  Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v.  Bhagatram  Sardar  Singh Raghuvanshi   and   Anr.,  [1975]  3  SCR   619;   Prabhakar Ramakrishna  Jodh v. A.L Pandi and Anr., [1965] 2  SCR  713; Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, U.T. of Chandigarh  & Ors.,  [1984]  Supp. S.C.C. 540; and Indra Pal  v.  Managing Committee,,  Model  Inter College Thora, [l984] 3  SCC  384, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL, APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1697 Of 197      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  22.1.1972  of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 358 of 1971.      M.  Narayan,  Mr. B. Shetya and Vineet  Kumar  for  the Appellant.      S.S. Khanduja, Y.P. Dhingra, Baldev Krishan Satija  and T.C. Sharma for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                                   PG NO 444      RAY,  J.  This appeal by special leave is  against  the judgment and order dated 22nd January, 1972 rendered by  the High  Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur  in  Miscellaneous Petition  No.  358  of 1971  dismissing  the  writ  petition holding  that  the Regulations framed by the    Board  of Secondary  Education, Madhya Pradesh under Section  28(2)(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1955 have no  statutory  force and as such termination of  service  in violation of Regulation Nos. 7 1 and 79 does not entitle the appellant to a declaration that the termination was  illegal and for a direction for his reinstatement in service.      The matrix of the case in short, is that the  appellant was  appointed as Head Master by the Managing  Committee  of Vidyut  Grih Siksha Samiti, Korba on probation for a  period of one year on a pay-scale r of  Rs.250-10-290-15-350-EB-20- 450  with effect from 3.7.1968. Meanwhile, the  High  School became a Higher Secondary School and as such on September 1, 1969  the  Managing  Committee appointed  the  appellant  as Principal temporarily on a pay-scale  of 1)  Rs.:Z75-25-300- 15-405-EB-20-550-25-700  with effect from July 3, 1968.  The above  scale was made applicable to him  with  retrospective effect  i.e.  from  July  3,  19  F.N.,  the  date  of   his

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appointment.  The   appointment  letter  further  states  as follows:      "...................      The  appointment  will  be governed by  the  rules  and regulations laid down by the Education Department of  Madhya Pradesh  State Government for the recognised Schools in  the State unless and otherwise specified from time to time.      The appointment can be terminated on one month’s notice or pay thereof on either side."      This  School  was  established by  Vidyut  Grih  Siksha Samiti, Korba, a        body registered under the M.P.  Non- Trading  Corporation Act, l962. The Society under  its  bye- laws  has  a Foundation Committee which is G  its  Governing Body and an Executive Committee, i.e. Managing Committee. On June  23,  1971 the Managing Committee  dispensed  with  the services  of the appellant with immediate effect  by  giving him one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The appellant made a  representation  against  this  order  to  the  Divisional Superintendent of Education who by his letter dated June 24, 1971  directed  the Secretary of the school to  rescind  the order of termination of the services of the appellant and to                                                   PG NO 445 hand  over charge of the school to the  appellant  otherwise the recognition of the School will be withdrawn. This letter was  written  on  the ground that  the  termination  of  the appellant  was  wrongful being in breach of  Regulation  79. However,  the appellant was not reinstated pursuant  to  the said letter. The appellant, therefore, moved a writ petition before  the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at  Jabalpur.  This was  registered as Miscellaneous Petition No. 358  of  1971. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of the  said High  Court and  it was held that Regulation No. 71 as  well as  Regulation  No.  79 framed by  the  Board  of  Secondary Education under Section 28(2)(d) of Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Adhiniyam,  1955  have  no  statutory  force  following  the decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Ram   Pal Chaturvedi  v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1970] 1 SCC  75 and  as such the termination of service of the appellant  in violation  of the procedure prescribed in Regulation No.  71 and 79 of the said Regulations would not render the impugned order  null  and  void.  It could  at  best  be  a  wrongful dismissal  from  service by the master and  the  appellant’s remedy  is  only  by an action for  damages  he  might  have sustained  in  consequence of the breach of the  master  and servant  contract.  It   was also held that  the  School  in question  was run by a private body and as such no  writ  of mandamus  could  be issued. The Court further held  that  an order cannot be made against the society compelling the  re- instatement  of  the  appellant as it is  in  the  realm  of contractual  rights and obligations. The writ  petition  was thus dismissed. Against this judgment and order the  instant appeal has been filed on special leave this Court.      In  order to effectively consider the question  whether these  Regulations  have got statutory force or  not  it  is necessary to set out hereinbelow the relevant Regulations:      "Regulation  61:  No Educational Institution  shall  be recognised, or continued to be recognised unless it complies with the following requirements, namely:      (1) That the Educational Institution shall comply  with the   conditions   laid  down  in  Chapter  XII   of   these Regulations. (2) that there shall be a Managing Committee as defined  under the Adhiniyam consisting of not more than  10 members  of which two shall be the Head of  the  Institution and a nominee of the Educational Officer concerned and  that the Governing Body of Managing Committee shall be registered

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under the Societies Registration Act.                                                   PG NO 446      Regulation  71: All Principal, Head Masters,  Lecturers and  Teachers,  except  those appointed  temporarily  for  a period  of  less than one year, shall be on probation  or  a term  of  one year which may be extended to two   years.  If after  two years service any incumbent is continued  in  his appointment, he shall, unless the appointing authority,  for reasons to be recorded in the writing, otherwise directs, be deemed to have been confirmed in that appointment. On  being confirmed the incumbent shall sign a contract of service  in the  form one or two (appended to these Regulations) as  the case may be, as soon as practicable.      Regulation  79  (1): The Managing Committee  shall  not terminate  the services and reduce the pay of  Principal  or Head  Master  appointed on written  contract  without  first obtaining  Director’s  sanction for holding a  full  enquiry into  the charges against him. The incumbent shall be  given in writing a statement of the charges against him, and  also be  afforded  an  opportunity  of  defending  himself.   His previous  services  and  character with  reference  to  this incidental  file and Service book shall also be  taken  into consideration before arriving at a decision.      (2)  No  decision  as  to  termination  of  service  or reduction of    a Principal or a Head Master shall be valid, unless passed at Special Meeting by a majority of two-thirds of  members of  the Managing Committee. No such  resolution shall be valid, if passed at an adjourned meeting.      3) The Principal or Head Master have a right of  appeal to the Director against decision of the Managing  Committee. The decision of the Director shall be final."      These  Regulations were framed under the  provision  of Sectio 28(2)(d) of the said Act which reads as follows:        "Sec. 28---Powers of Board to make Regulations--      (1)  The Board may make Regulations for the purpose  of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act      (2)   In  particular  and  without  prejudice  to   the generality  of  the  foregoing power,  the  Board  may  make Regulations  providing  for  all or  any  of  the  following matters, namely:                                                   PG NO 447      (d)  The conditions of recognition of institutions  for the purposes of admission to the privileges of the Board and framing  of  a School Code to ensure a minimum  standard  of efficient and uniform management of such schools."      It thus appears that Section 28(2)(d) confers power  on the  Board to make Regulations regarding the  conditions  of the Institutions as well as for framing of "School Code"  to ensure   a  minimum  standard  of  efficient   and   uniform management  of such schools. Regulation 71 clearly  provides that  Principals, Head Masters, Lecturers and Teachers  when appointed  shall be appointed on probation for a  period  of one  year  which  may  be extended to  two  years.  It  also provides that after two years of service if any incumbent is continued in his appointment he shall be deemed to have been confirmed   to  that  appointment  unless   the   Appointing Authority for reasons recorded in writing otherwise directs.      In  this  case  the appellant  has  been  appointed  on probation as Principal with effect from July 3, 1968 and  as he was allowed to continue for more than two years he  shall be deemed to have been confirmed in the post of Principal of the said School. The Managing Committee of the School by its letter  dated June 23, 1971 terminated the services  of  the appellant  after  giving him one month’s salary in  lieu  of notice  without  serving  on him any  charges  against  him,

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Without holding any enquiry and also without giving him  any opportunity of hearing before making the order   terminating his  service as required under the provision  of  Regulation 79(1) of the said Regulations. The  impugned resolution  was also not passed at a special meeting by a majority of ,2/3rd of  the  members of the Managing Committee  as  provided  in clause  (2)  of the  said  Regulation  79. The   High  Court though found that there is a violation of the provisions  of Regulation  71 and 79 yet as these Regulations have  got  no statutory force the appellant could not get the relief of  a declaration that the order of termination of his service was illegal and invalid and also could not get an order for  his re-instatement  in service as his appointment   was  in  the realm  of  a  contract of master and servant  and  his  only remedy was an  action for wrongful termination from service.      Two questions therefore  fall for consideration  namely whether  the Regulations framed pursuant to a Statute can be said  to  have a statutory force the breach  of  which  will entitle the aggrieved employee to get a declaration that the                                                   PG NO 448 impugned  order  was invalid and illegal  and  the  employee should  be allowed to continue in service or should  be  re- instated  in  service. The High Court has  relied  upon  the decision of this Court in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan  and  Ors.,(supra)  as  well  as  Indian  Airlines Corporation  v. Sukhdeo Rai, [ 1971] 2 SCC 192. In the  case of  Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan  and  Ors., the  appointment of three respondents namely Dr. D.G.  Ojha, Dr.  P.D.  Mathur and Dr. Rishi as Principal  of  Sr.  Patel Medical  College,  Bikaner,  Rabindra  Nath  Tagore  Medical College,  Udaipur and Medical College, Jodhpur  respectively was challenged on the ground that though they fulfilled  the qualifications  prescribed  by Rule 30(4) of  the  Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules  1962 they had not the  requisite  experience as provided in Ordinance  No.  65 framed under the University of Rajasthan Act of 1946 and  as such  their  appointments  were not  valid  and  legal.  The Syndicate  of  the Rajasthan  University  constituted  under Section  21  of the Act is empowered under Section  29  read with Section 30 to make ordinances, consistent with the  Act and  statutes, to provide for the matters listed in  Section 29.  These  matters  include in Clause  VI  "emoluments  and conditions of service of University teachers". The Syndicate made  the  ordinances  pursuant to the  provisions  of  this Section. It was held that      "The field of operation of this Ordinance appears to us to  be  restricted  to the question of  affiliation  of  the colleges  concerned  with the Rajasthan  University.  It  is note-worthy  that  the  University has not  thought  fit  to object to these appointments. If there is any violation of a provision  of this Ordinance then that may appropriately  be taken  into  account  by the Rajasthan  University  for  the purpose  of withdrawing or refusing to continue  affiliation of  the   colleges in question. But clearly that  would  not render the impugned appointments null and void a  fortiorari that  can not confer any right on Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi  to approach  the  High Court by means of petition for  writ  of quo-warranto  to challenge the appointments of  these  three persons      This  decision is not an authority for the  proposition that Regulation  framed pursuant to a Statute do not have  a statutory  force.   High  Court  was  in  error  in  holding otherwise.  This question is,  however, concluded in  favour of  the appellant by a decision of this Court rendered by  a 3-Judge Bench.

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                                                 PG NO 449     The  question  whether a regulation framed  under  power conferred by  the provisions of a Statute has got  statutory power  and  whether  an order made in  breach  of  the  said Regulation will be rendered illegal and invalid, came up for consideration  before the Constitution Bench in the case  of Sukhdev  Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh  Raghuvanshi and Anr., [ 1975] 3 SCR 619. In this case it was held that:      "There is no substantial difference between a rule  and a  regulation inasmuch as both are  subordinate  legislation under  powers conferred by the statute.   regulation  framed under a statute applies uniform treatment to every one or to all members of some group or class. The Oil and Natural  Gas Commission,  the  Life  Insurance Corporation  and  Oil  and Natural  Gas Commissionaire all required by the  statute  to frame  regulations inter alia for the purpose of the  duties and conduct and conditions of service of officers and  other employees.  These  regulations  impose  obligation  on   the statutory  authorities.  The  statutory  authorities  cannot deviate  from the conditions of service. Any deviation  will be  enforced by legal sanction of declaration by  courts  to invalidate  actions in violations of rules and  regulations. The  existence of rules and regulations under statute is  to ensure  regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to  that conduct as a standard. The statutory regulations h the cases under consideration give the employee a statutory status and impose restriction on the employer and the employee with  no option to vary the condition.’’      There is therefore, no escape from the conclusion  that regulation  have force of law. The order of the  High  Court must therefore, be reversed on this point unhesitatingly.      In  Indian  Airlines  Corporation v.  Sukhdeo  Rai  the respondent  who  was  an employee  of  the  Indian  Airlines Corporation  Was  found   guilty  of  certain  charges   and dismissed  from service after an enquiry held in  breach  of the  procedure  laid down by the Regulations  made   by  the appellant under Section 45 of the Air Corporation Act, 1953. A suit was filed by the respondent challenging the order  of termination  It was decreed by the Trial Court holding  that the dismissal was illegal and Granted a declaration that  he be  continued to remain he service. The Appellate  Court  as well as the High Court confirmed the decree. On appeal  this Court    held    that   the   relationship    between    the appellant,Indian  Air lines Corporation and  the  respondent would in such cases be contractual  i.e. as between a master                                                   PG NO 450 and  servant and the termination of that relationship  would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had  not  been validly determined.  The  termination  though wrongful  in  breach  of  the  terms  and  conditions  which governed  the relationship between the Corporation  and  the respondent  yet it did not fall under any of the three  well recognised exceptions and therefore the respondent was  only entitled  to  damages  and not to a  declaration  that  this dismissal  was  null  and void. The  respondent  has  sought support from this decision. We are afraid the contention  is wholly untenable. The decision in Indian Airlines’ case  has in  terms been declared to be no longer good law and has  in terms  been overruled  in Sukhdev Singh’s case (1975) 3  SCR 619 by the Constitution Bench. C Says Ray, C.J. speaking for the Court:      "In the Indian Airlines case this Court said that there being  no obligation or restriction in the Act or the  rules subject to which only the power to terminate the  employment could  be exercised the employee could not contend  that  he

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was  entitled to a declaration that the termination  of  his employment  was  null  and  void.  In  the  Indian  Airlines Corporation     case reliance was placed upon the  decision of  Kruse v Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 for the view that  not all  by-laws  have  the force of law.  This  Court  regarded regulation as the same thing as by-laws. In Kruse v. Johnson the  Court was simply describing the effect that the  county by-laws  have own the public. The observations of the  Court in  Kruse v. Johnson, that the by-law "has the force of  law within the      sphere of its legitimate operation" are  not qualified  by  the      words that it is  so  ’’only  when affecting  the  public  or some section  of  the  public  .. ordering  something  to  be  done or  not  to  be  done  and accompanied  by  some   sanction or  penalty  for  its  non- observance.’’ In this view a regulation is not an  agreement or contract but a law binding the corporation, its officers, servants  and the members of the public who come within  the sphere  of  its operations. The doctrine of ultra  vires  as applied  to statutes, rules and orders should equally  apply to  the regulations and any other  subordinate  legislation. The  regulations made under power conferred by  the  statute are  subordinate legislation and have the force and  effect, if  validity  made,  as  the Act  passed  by  the  competent legislature.      In  U.P. Warehousing Corporation and  Indian  Air-lines                                                   PG NO 451 Corporation  case the terms of the regulations were  treated as   terms  and  conditions  of  relationship  between   the Corporation  and  its employees. That does not lead  to  the conclusion  that they are of the same nature and quality  as the   terms  and  conditions  laid  down  in  the   contract employment. Those terms and conditions not being contractual are  imposed  by one kind of subordinate  legislation,  Viz. regulations  made in exercise of the power conferred by  the statute   which   constituted  that  Corporation.   of   the regulations  are  not  terms  of  contract.  In  the  Indian Airlines  Corporation  case  under section  45  of  the  Air Corporations  Act,  1953, the Corporation had the  power  to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made  by the Central Government thereunder. The  Corporation bad no power to alter or modify or rescind the provisions of these  regulations  at its discretion which it could  do  in respect  of the terms of contract that it may wish to  enter with its employees independent of these regulations. So  far as the terms of the regulations are concerned,the actions of the  Corporation are controlled by the  Central  Government. The decisions of this Court in U.P. Warehousing  Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation are in direct conflict  with decision of this Court in  Naraindas Barot’s case which  was decided by the Constitution Bench.     Under  the circumstances the plea of the respondents  is meritless.     In  Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande  and  Anr., [1965] 2 SCR 713 a question arose whether the provisions  of ordinance 20 otherwise called the College Code framed by the University  of Saugar  under Section 32 and Section 6(6)  of the  University of Saugar Act, 1946 embodying the terms  and conditions  of  teachers of the College  affiliated  to  the University, have the force of law. It was held that:     "The provisions of Ordinance 20 i.e. the College Code  " have  got  statutory force. It confers legal rights  on  the teachers on the affiliated colleges and it is not a  correct proposition to say that the "College Code" merely  regulates the  legal relationship between the affiliated colleges  and the  University alone. We do not agree with the High   Court

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that the provisions of the "College Code" constitute   power of  management. On the contrary we are of the view that  the                                                   PG NO 452 provisions of the "College Code" relating to the  pay  scale of  teachers  and  their security of  tenure  properly  fall within  the  statutory power of affiliation granted  to  the University  under the Act. It is true that Clause 7  of  the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated  colleges shall  be  appointed  on  a written  contract  in  the  from prescribed  in Sch. A but that does not mean  that  teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the Governing  Body of  the College. On the other hand, we are of  opinion  that the  provisions  of Clause 8 of the  Ordinance  relating  to security  of the tenure of teachers are part and  parcel  of the  teachers’  service conditions and, as we  have  already pointed  out, the provisions of the "College Code"  in  this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the "College Code"  creates legal  rights in favour of teachers of  affiliated  colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous. ’     In the case of Manmohan Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, U. T.  of  Chandigarh  and  Ors., [1984]  (Supp)  SCC  540  the appellant was   appointed as Head Master of an aided School. He was later confirmed by the competent authority. A charge- sheet was served on the appellant  and disciplinary  enquiry was  held  against him under section 3 of the  Punjab  Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act. The enquiry was  however, withdrawn   later  on  and  his  seven  years  service   was terminated by invoking the service agreement on ground  that his  service was no more required by the School. This  order was  challenged   by a writ petition before the  High  Court which  rejected the same in limine but by a  speaking  order observing  that  as the School cannot be said to  be  ’other authority’ under Article 12, it was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court  negatived the said finding of the High Court and held as follows:     "The  matter  can be viewed from  a  slightly  different angle as well. After the decision of the Constitution  Bench of  this  Court in Ajay Hasia v.  Khalid  Mujib  Sehravardi, [1981]  1 SC 722 the aided school receiving 95% of  expenses by  way  of  grant  from  the  public  exchequer  and  whose employees  have received the statutory protection under  the 1969 Act  and who is subject to the regulations made by  the Education   Department of the Union Territory of  Chandigarh as  also the appointment of Headmaster to be valid  must  be                                                   PG NO 453 approved  by  the  Director of  Public  Instructions,  would certainly  be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the  High Court.  The High Court unfortunately, did not even refer  to the  decision of the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia,  case rendered  on November 13, 1980 while disposing of  the  writ petition in 1983. in 1983. In Ajay Hasia case, Bhagwati,  J. speaking for the Constitution Bench inter alia observed (SCC p. 737, para 9) that "where the financial assistance of  the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation,   it  would  afford  some  indication  of   the Corporation being impregnated with governmental  character". Add  to  this  "the existence of deep  and  pervasive  State control  may afford an indication that the corporation is  a State  agency  or instrumentality". Substituting  the  words ’public trust’ in place of the ’corporation’ and the reasons will  mutatis mutandis apply to the School. Therefore,  also the  High  Court  was in error in  holding  that  the  third respondent-School was not amenable to the writ  jurisdiction

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of the High Court."     In  Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee,  Model  Inter College   Thora,  [  1984]  3  SCC  384  the  appellant  was appointed  on probation for  one year as Principal of  Model Inter  College, Thora, District  Bullandshahr in  accordance with the procedure prescribed by the  Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act No. 2 of 1921) and the  Regulations made thereunder.  The period of probation was however,   extended by  the Managing Committee of the said Model  Inter  College for  a  further period of one year. On April  27,  1969  the Managing   Committee adopted a resolution to  terminate  the services of the appellant  in consideration of the report of the  Manager  of the College to the effect that due  to  his unsatisfactory services, it would not be in the interest  of the Institution to permit him to continue as probationer any longer.  The  service of the appellant was  thus  terminated without  complying with the mandatory procedure laid down in Regulations  35  to  38 which provided for  forming  a  sub- committee  to  enquire  into the   allegations  against  the Principal   and  to  frame  definite  charges  against   the Principal  and  to give him opportunity of hearing.  It  was held  that  the order of termination made in breach  of  the provisions  of  the  said Regulations  which  were  made  in pursuance of the provisions of the said Act, is illegal  and invalid and as such the same was quashed. The appellant  was further declared to be in service of the College.     On  a  conspectus of these  decisions  the  irresistible conclusion follows that the impugned order of termination of                                                   PG NO 454 the  appellant  from  the post of Principal  of  the  Higher Secondary School in breach of the Regulation 79 framed under the  said Act is illegal and as such the same  is liable  to be quashed as the Regulations have got statutory force.  The appellant  is  liable to be re-instated in  the  service  as Principal  of  the    said College. We also  hold  that  the Higher Secondary School in question  though run by a private trust receives 100% grant from the Government as in  evident from  the affidavit sworn on behalf of the appellant and  as such it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction for   violation of  the  provisions of the said Regulations in  passing  the impugned  order of termination of service of the  appellant. We therefore, set  aside the order passed by the High  Court which,  in  our  opinion, is unsustainable  and  direct  the respondents  to re-instate the appellant in  the service  of the  said College. Considering the facts and   circumstances of  the case we are of the opinion that the ends of  justice would  be  met by directing the respondents to  pay  to  the appellant a  sum equal to 50% of the salaries and allowances from  the  date of termination till  his  re-instatement  in service  as  it  appears  that the   appellant  was  not  in employment  during this period. The appeal  is,   therefore. allowed with costs.     R.S.S.                                   Appeal allowed.