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PETITIONER: VIDYA DEVI @ VIDYA VATI (DEAD)BY L.RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PREM PRAKASH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1995

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J) AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1789            1995 SCC  (4) 496  JT 1995 (4)   607        1995 SCALE  (3)580

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           THE 10TH DAY OF MAY, 1995 Present:           Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh           Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.Venkatachala           Hon’ble Mr..Justice S. Saghir Ahmad Mr. Avadh Behari and Mr. R.F. Nariman, Sr. Advs., Mr.R.D.Itorora, Mr. Chaman Lal Itorora, Mr. P.H.Parekh, Mr.S. Fazl, Ms.Lucy and Mr.Uma Datta, Advs. with them for the apperaing parties.                     JUDGMENTS The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION           CIVIL APPEAL NO.974 OF 1980 Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati (Dead) by L.R’S Versus Prem Prakash & Ors.                     JUDGMENT VENKATACHALA, J.      Raghunath who  had lands comorisec in Khasra Nos. 2,5/1 and 6/1  situated in village Macangir, Delhi, as his holding died in  the year 1952 leaving behind Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati, widow  of his  pre-deceased first  son Ram Narain, his second son  Dev Raj  and his  third son Prem Prakash, as his legal heirs to inherit his holding. When in the year 1953-54 a jamabanai  of that  village was  held, entry in the revenu records pertaining  to the said holding was changed from the name of  Raghunath to  the names  of Vidya Devi. Dev Raj and Prem Prakash.  With the  coming into force of the Delhi Land Reforms Act  1954 -  the do  Act, respecting the area of the lands within  which the  said holding  fell,  a  declaration having been  made as  required under  that Act and the Rules made thereunder  on 1st  February, 1958  that the said Vidya

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Devi slias Vidya Vati, Dev Raj and Prem Prakash were the co- bhumidars of that holding, they became the co-bhumidars earn entitled to one-third share thereof.      However, on  9th October, 1973 Vidya Devi, filed a suit as plaintiff therin for partition of her one-third share and separate possession  in the  said holding before the Revenue Assistant, as  provided for under sub-section (1) of section 55 of  the DL  Act against  the other  co-bhumidhars -  Prem Prakash and Dev Raj by impleading then as defendants-1 and 2 respectively in  that suit. Defedant-2, Dev Raj did not have nay objection  for partition  and giving separate possession of one-third  share out  of the said holding to the plantiff as crayed in the suit, indeed, he also claimed for partition and giving  of separate  posession of his one-third share in the said  holding. But,  defendant-1, Prem Prakash contested that suit.  In his defence statement, he pleaded inter alia, that he  being in  exclusive possession  of the said holding eversince the  year 1953-54,  he had  perfected his title in respect  to  the  whole  of  the  said  holding  by  adverse possession  as   against  the   other   co-bhumidhars   and, therefore, question  of  title  was  involved  in  the  suit reducing the Revenue Assistant to frame an issue thereon and refer the  same to  Civil  Court  for  obtaining  a  finding thereon, as required by section 186 of the DL Act. No doubt, the Revenue  Assistant, who  framed the  issues in that suit based on  the pleadings  therin framed  an issue  which read thus:      "Whether any question of title is involved in this case      which requires  any reference  to the civil court under      section 186 of the DL Act."      But, when  that issue  was considered  by  the  Revenue Assistant as  a preliminary  issue, he took the view that no question of  title which  required to  be referred  to Civil Court under  section 186  of the  DL Act  for obtaining  its finding was  involved. However,  that view was questioned by defendant-1 by  taking the  matter in  revision  before  the Finiancial Commissioner. But, the Financial Commissioner who heard the revision, rejected it by upholding the view of the Revenue Assistant  on the said preliminary issue. The reason given by  the Financial  Commissioner for upholding the view of the  Revenue Assistant  on the preliminary issue was that the plea of title taken in his defence by defendant-1 was to be deemed  as untenable within the meaning of explanation to sub-section (1)  of section 186 of the DL Act in that it was solely intended  to out  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Revenue Assistant in  the matter. Defendant-1 filed a writ petition, C.W. No. 691 of 1978 in the Delhi High Court ouestioning the correctness of  the said orders of the Revenue Assistant and the Financial Commissioner renderad on the preliminary issue in the suit. However, the learned Single Judge rejected that writ petition  finding no  merit in it. Defendant-1 filed an appeal  against  the  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge rejecting his  writ petition  in L.P.A.  No. 70 of 1979. The Division Bench  of the  High Court  which heard  that L.P.A. took the  view that  clause (d)  of section 67 of the DL Act which provided for extinction of the interest of a bhumidhar in  his   holding  enabled   a  co-bhumidhar   in  exclusive possession of  such holding  for over  12 years to claim his exclusive title  for it  by adverse possession and hence the aforesaid plea  taken in defence by him which related to his own title  in the holding to the exclusion  of the plaintiff involved a  question of title in the suit. Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the L.P.A., queshec the orders of the learned Single Judge, Financial Commissioner and the Revenue Assistant made  on the  preliminary issue on the question of

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title and  submit the record to the combetent Civil Court on that issue as was required by section 186 (1) of the DL Act. The plaintiff in the suit who was aggrieved against the said order of  the Divison  Bench of the High Court has filed the present Civil Appeal by obtaining special leave.      During the  pendency  of  the  appeal,  the  plaintiff- appellant Vidya  Devi having  died, her  two  daughters  are brought on  record as her L.R’s. As Dev Raj, defendant-2 had died during  the pendency  of the  proceedings in the courts below, respondents  2 to  6 in  this appeal  are brought  on record as his L.R’s.      We have  not only  heard  the  oral  arguments  of  the learned counsel  for the  contesting parties  in this appeal but also have carefully gone through the written submissions filed in  this appeal  by learned counsel on behalf of their respective parties.      The short  question which  needs our  consideration  in this appeal  relates to the correctness of the view taken by the Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  the  imougned judgment as  regards the  applicability of  section 67(d) of the DL  Act to  the  facts  of  the  present  case  and  the direction given  to the Revenue Assistant based on that view for framing  an issue in the suit on 1st defendants title to the holding  and referring  the same  to Civil Court for its finding under section 186(1) of the DL Act. Section 67, insofar it is material, reads : "Extinction of  the interest of a Bhumidhar - The interest of a Bhumidhar in his holding or any part thereof shall be extinguished - (a) when  he dies  intestate leaving  no heir entitled to  inherit in  accordance with  the provisions of this Act. .......................... (d) When  he has  been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barned by limitation: ..........................      The view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court as to the applicability of section 67(d) of the DL Act is as follows:      "We are,  however, unable  to accept Mr.      Bhatia’s contantion  that section  67(d)      applies  only   in  the  case  of  sloe-      bhumidhar. There  is nothing  in the Act      which could  lead to the conclusion that      the  words  ‘interest  of  a  bhumidhar’      would not  include  the  interest  of  a      joint or  a co-bhumidhar.  Just  as  the      interst of  a co-bhumidhar would come to      an end under section 67(a), when he dies      intestate leaving  no hair  entitled  to      inherit   in    accordance   with    the      provisions of  the  Act,  similarly  the      interest  of   a  co-bhumidhar   can  be      extinguished when  he had  been deprived      of possession  and his  right to recover      possession is  barred by limitation. The      provisions  of   section  67(d)  clearly      postulate extingushment of interest as a      bhumidhar   by    reason   of    adverse      possession of the land by another party.      It  is  wholly  immaterial  whether  the      other person  in  occupation  is  a  co-      bhumidhar or a stranger."      The siad view of the Division Bench of the High Court,

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which has led it to the conclusion that the plea taken by defendant-1 (respondant herein, involved the question of title of the plaintiff. (deceased appellant), and the same warranted the framing of an issue as to title in the suit and required to be referred to Civil Court for obtaining a finding from it, cannot be upheld for the reasons which we shall presently state.      Sub-section (2) of section 13, which deals with the rights and liabilities of bhumidahars, reads thus:      "13(2), Every  person who,  after the  commencement  of      this Act,  is admitted  to land  as  Bhumidhar  or  who      acquires Bhumidhari  rights under any provision of this      Act, shall,  have all  the rights and be subject to all      the liabilities  conferred on  imposed upon  Bhumidhars      under this  Act with  effect from the date of admission      or acqulsition, as the case may be."      When it  cannot be disputed that the deceased appellant (palintiff) Vidya Devi, the deceased defendant-2 Dev Raj and respondental (defendantel) Prem Prakash had been admitted to the aforesaid holding of deceased Raghunath on 1st February, 1958 as  co-bhumidhars each  entitled to  one-third share in the holding because of the declaration made under the DL Act and the  Rules made thereunder, all of them rights conferred upon them  under the  above sub-section (2) of section 13 of the DL  Act. When sub-section (1) of section 55(1) or the DL Act is  seen, it  confers right  or every  co-bhumidhar, the right to sue for partition of his holding, in that it reads:      "55(1). Holding of a Bhumidhar partible-      (1). A Bhumidhar may sue for partition of his holding."      Although  section   55(1)  of  the  DL  Act  enables  a bhumidhar to  file a suit for partition in respect of his or her holding,  that suit has to be filed under the DL Act and prosecuted as  provided therefor  because of  section 185 of the DL Act which reads thus:      "185. Cognizance  of suits,  etc. under this Act - (1),      Except as  provided by or under this Act no court other      than a court mentioned in column 7 of Schedule 1 shall,      notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil      Procedure,  1908,   take  cognizance   of   any   suit,      application,  or  proceedings  mentioned  in  column  3      thereof.      (2), Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie      from an  order passed  under  any  of  the  proceedings      mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid.      (3). An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by      a court  mentioned  in  column  7  on  the  proceedings      mentioned  in  column  3  to  the  court  or  authority      mentioned in column 6 thereof.      (4) A  second appeal  shall lie  from the  final  order      passed in  an  appeal  under  sub-section  (3)  to  the      authority, if  any, mentioned against it in column 9 of      the Schedule aforesaid."      The Schedule mentioned in sub-section 10 of section 185 of the  DL Act,  insofar as it concerns a suit for partition which could  be filed under sub-section of section 55 of the DL Act. reads thus:                               "SCHEDULE 1" -------------------------------------------------------------------------- S1.   Section  Description  Period   Time   Proper  Court   Court   2nd No.   of the   of suit      of       from   Court   of      of      Appeal       Act      application  Limit-   which  fees    orig-   1st                and other    ation    peri-          inal    Appeal                proceed-              od be-         juris-                ings                  gins           diction --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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1     2           3        4        5       6       7       8        9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- - .......................... 11.  55        Suit for      None     None   As in   Reven-  Deputy   ..                partition                     the     ue      Commn.                of holding                    Court   Assis-                of a Bhumi-                   Fees    tant                dhar                          Act,                                              1870 on                                              land                                              revenue                                              payable. -----------------------------------------------------------------------      As seen  from entry in Column 4 of Schedule 1 no period of limitation  is prescribed  for a  suit for  partition  of holding to  be filed  by a  bhumidhar. So  also as seen from Column 5,  there is  no time from which period of limitation begin for such suit. Therefore, when a suit for partition is filed by  one  co-bhumidhar  against  his/her  co-bhumidhars under sub-section (1) of section 55 of the DL Act before the Revenue Assistant  in respect  of a  common holding of which they are  declared as  co-bhumidhars under  the DL  Act read with the Rules made thereunder as provided for at S1. No. 11 of Schedule-1,  the co-bhumidhar’s against whom such suit as filed is/are  not entitled  to defend it on the plea that it was barred by period of limitation because of the entries in Columns 4  and 5  therein  certaining  to  such  suit  which declare that  the period of limitation is not fixed for such suit and  no period  of limitation  could begin  to  run  in respect of it.      No doubt, there is scope to contand that a co-bhumidhar can raise  the plea  of acquisition  of exclusive  title  to joint holding  by adverse possession, as a defence in a suit for partition by another co-bhumidhar because of sub-section (1) of section 186 of the DL Act, which reads:      "186. Procedure when question of title is raised-      (1) Notwithstanding  anything contained in section 185,      if in  any suit or proceedings mentioned in column 3 of      Schedule 1, a question is raised regarding the title of      any party  to the  land which is the subject, matter of      the suit  or proceeding  and such  question is directly      and substantially  in issue the Court shall, unless the      question has already been decided by a competent Court,      frame an  issue on the question of the title and submit      the  record  to  the  competent  civil  court  for  the      decision of that issue only."      But, explanation  to sub-section  (1) of section 186 of the DL Act since declares that a plea regarding the title to the land  which is  clearly untenable and intended solely to dust the  jurisdiction of  the revenue  court shall  not  be deemed to  raise a  question regarding the title to the land within the  meaning of  this section, co-bhumidhar a plea of title to the holding raised in defence of suit for partition filed by his/her co-bhumidhars under section 55(1) of the DL Act shall  not be  such which  is clearly untenable and that which is  raised solely  to oust the jurisdiction of Revenue Court. When we now consider the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession to the holding of co-bhumidhars raised by defendant-1  (respondent-1 herein),  a co-bhumidhar  in a suit for  partition of that holding by another co-bhumidhar, it becomes  wholly and  clearly  untenable  because  of  the entries in Columns 4 and 5 relating to suit for partition of co-bhumidhar in  respect of  his holding envisaged at S1.No. 11 to  Schedule-1 fixing  no period  of limitation  for such

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suit against  other co-bhumidhar/s.  Thus, when no period of limitation is  fixed for  filing a suit for partition by co- bhumidhar against  his other  co-bhumidhars in  respect of a joint  holding,  the  question  of  the  other  co-bhumidhar acquiring his  title to  such holding  by adverse possession for over  12 years can never arise. If that be so, such plea of perfection of title by adverse possession of a holding by co-bhumidhar against  his other  co-bhumidhar as  defence in the  latter’s   suit  for  partition  can  be  of  no  legal consequence. In  the said  view of the matter, we agree with the learned single Judge of the High Court who held that the explanation to  sub-seciton (1) of section 186 of the DL Act came in  the way  of defendant-1  (respondent-1  herein)  in raising the  issue of  his title to the holding said to have been acquired  by adverse possession and getting it referred by the  Revenue  Court  to  Civil  Court  for  decision  and disagree with the Division Bench of the High Court which has held that  section 67(d)  of the  DL Act  which provides for extinction of  bhumidhar’s interest  in  a  holding  enabled defendant-1 (respondent-1  herein) to take the plea of title by adverse  possession in  respect of  the holding in a suit for partition of such holding filed by a co-bhumidhar.      In the  result, we  allow this  appeal, set  aside  the judgment of  the Division  Bench of the High Court in L.P.A. No. 70  of 1979  and  restore  the  orders  of  the  Revenue Assistant, affirmed  by the  Financial Commissioner  and the learned Single  Judge of the High Court with costs, which we quantify  as   Rs.20,000/-.  Such  cost  shall  be  paid  by respondent (defendant-1) to the Legal Represantatives of the deceased appellant (plaintiff).           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 974 OF 1980 Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati (Dead) Versus Prem Prakash & Ors.                     JUDGMENT S.Saghir Ahmad, J.      I have  carefully gone through the judgment proposed by esteemed brother  - Venkatachala,  J., but  I am  unable  to agree with  the reasons set out therein though, I agree that the appeal be allowed.      I, find  it difficult to subscribe to the view taken by my brother  that since  under the  Delhi Land  Reforms  Act, period of  limitation for filing a suit for partition is not prescribed, a  co-sharer cannot,  particularly  in  view  of Explanation to  Sub-section (1)  of Section  186, raise  the plea of adverse possession.      The  legislature  has  not  prescribed  any  period  of limitation for filing a suit for partition becuase partition is an  incident attached to the property and there is always a running  cause of  action for  seeking partition by one of the co-sharers  if and when he decides not to keep his share joint with other co-sharers. Since the filing of the suit is wholly dependent  upon the will of the co-sharer, the period of limitation,  specially the  date or  time from which such period would commence, could not have been possibly provided for by  the legislature  and, therefore,  in this Act also a period of  limitation, so  far as  suits for  partition  are concerned, has  not been prescribed. This, however, does not mean that  a co-sharer  who is arrayed as a defendant in the suit cannot raise the plea of adverse possession against the co-sharer who  has come  before the  Court  as  a  plaintiff seeking partition of his share in the joint property.      Normally, where  the property  is joint, co-sharers are

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the representatives of each another. The co-sharer who might be in possession of the joint property shall be deemed to be in possession  on behalf  of all the co-sharers. As such, it would be  difficult to  raise the plea of adverse possession by one  co-sharer against the other. But if the co-sharer or the joint owner had been professing hostile title as against other co-sharers openly and to the knowledge of others joint owners, he can, provided the hostile title or possession has continued uninterruptedly  for the  whole period  prescribed for recovery  of possession,  legitimately acquire  title by adverse possession  and can  plead such  title in defence to the claim for partition.      "Adverse possession" means hostile possession, that is, a possession  which is  expressly in  denial of the title of the true  owner. (See:/  Gaya  Parshad  Dikshit  Vs.  Nirmal Chander and  another (AIR  1984 SC 930). The denial of title of the  true owner  is a sign of adverse possession. In Ezaz Ali Vs. Special Manager, Court of Wards (AIR 1935 PC 53), it was observed:           "The principle of law is firmly established that a      person, who bases his title on adverse possession, must      show  by   clear  and  unequivocal  evidence  that  his      possession was  hostile to  the real owner and amounted      to a denial of his title to the property claimed."      Dr. Markby  in his  treatise "Elements  of Law" (Second Edition) has observed that possession "to be adverse must be possession by  a person who does not acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them. (See also: AIR 1947 PC 15).      It is  a matter  of fundamental  principle of  law that where possession  can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be  considered to be adverse. It is on the basis of this principle  that  it  has  been  laid  down  that  since  the possession of  one co-owner can be referred to his status as co-owner, it  cannot be  considered  adverse  to  other  co- owners. (See:  Maharajadhiraj of Burdhwan, Udaychand Mahatab Chand Vs.  Subodh Gopal  Bose and others AIR 1971 SC 376; P. Lakshmi Reddy  Vs. L.Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 314; Mohammad Baqar and  others Vs. Naim-un-Nisa Bibi & Others AIR 1956 SC 548).      In Karbali  Begum Vs.  Mohd Sayeed (AIR 1981 SC 77), it was held  that a  co-sharer in  possession of  the  property would be a constructive trustee on behalf of other co-sharer who is  not in  possession and  the right  of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustee co-sharer.      Certain observations  of the Privy Council in Coera Vs. Appuhamy (AIR 1914 PC 243, 245-246) may be quoted below:-      "Entering into  possession and having a lawful title to      enter, he  could not  divest himself  of that  title by      pretending that  he had no title as all. His title must      have ensured for the benefit of his co-proprietors. The      principle recognised by Wood, V.C. in Thomas Vs. Thomas      (1856) 25  LJ Ch  159 (161):  110 RR  107  holds  good:      ‘Possession is  never considered  adverse if  it can be      referred to a lawful title’..... His possession was, in      law, the  possession  of  his  co-owners.  It  was  not      possible for  him to  put an  end to that possession by      any secret  intention in  his mind.  Nothing  short  of      ouster or  something equivalent  to ouster  could bring      about that result."      From the underlined portion extracted above, it will be seen that  in order  that the  possession of co-owner may be adverse to  others, it  is necessary  that there  should  be ouster or  something equivalent  to it.  This was  also  the observation of  the Supreme  Court in P.Lakshmi Reddy’s case (supra) which has since been followed in Mohd. Zain-ul-Abdin

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Vs. Syed Ahmad Mohiudding (AIR 1990 SC 507).      "Ouster" does  not mean  actual driving  out of the co- sharer from  the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it  is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute  adverse   possession.  Broadly  speaking,  three elements are  necessary for  establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of hostile animus (ii)  long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster  and (iii)  exercise of  right of  exclusive ownership openly  and to  the knowledge  of other  co-owner. Thus, a  co-owner, can  under law,  claim title  by  adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit  including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law.      Applying the  above principles  to the  instant case, I must immediately  observe that  though under  the Delhi Land Reforms Act,  a period  of limitation  is not prescribed for filing a  suit for  partition, it  does not  mean that joint owner or,  for that matter, a joint tenure-holder cannot set up the  plea of  acquisition of  title by adverse possession against another joint tenure-holder.      Section 186  of the  Delhi Land  Reforms Act is in pari materia with Section 332 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act which  also provided  that if  in any suit filed before  the  Revenue  Court,  a  question  was  raised regarding the  title of  any party  to the land which is the subject matter  of the  suit or  proceeding, the Court shall frame an  issue on  the question  of title  and  submit  the record to the competent Civil Court for the decision of that issue only.  The relevant portion of Explanation appended to Sub-section (1) provides as under:-      "Explanation-(1) a plea regarding the title to the land      which is  clearly untenable and intended solely to oust      the jurisdiction  of the  revenue court  shall  not  be      deemed to  raise a  question regarding the title to the      land within the meaning of this section."      Provisions of  Section 186  including  the  Explanation appended  thereto   have  already  been  reproduced  in  the judgment of  brother -  Venkatachala,J. a  perusal of  which will indicate that those provisions, as pointed out earlier, are the  same as  are contained  in Section  332 of the U.P. Act. Section  332 has  since been  deleted by  U.P. Act  No. XXXVII of 1958 but here in Delhi, the provisions continue to be retained.      Section 186 deals with the procedure when a question of title is  raised in  any suit or proceeding indicated in the Schedule appended  to the  Act. If  the question is directly and substantially  in issue,  the Court has no option except to frame  an issue  on the  question of title and submit the record to the competent Civil Court for the decision of that issue only.  Explanation appended  to Section 186 takes care of the possibility of the provision being abused by litigant who, in  order to  prolong the proceedings may, for the sake of ousting  the jurisdiction  of the Revenue Court, plead or raise the  question of  title. If  such question is not bona fide  raised   and  the   intention  is  only  to  oust  the jurisdiction of  the Revenue  Court, the  question of  title shall not  be deemed to have been raised. It is by the force of legal  fiction that such a plea will have to be discarded whether a plea is untenable or not or it was raised with the intention of  ousting the  jurisdiction of  the Court  would depend upon  the nature  of the  pleading. Merely  because a period of limitation has not been prescribed for a partition suit, would  not mean  that a  plea  of  adverse  possession though raised  bona fide,  would be  untenable on account of

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the Explanation appended to Section 186.      It will  be noticed  that when  the Delhi  Land Reforms Act, 1954  came into  force, Vidya  Devi, Dev  Raj and  Prem Prakash were  declared as  co-bhumidhars on  1.1.58  on  the basis of  their possession  in 1953-54  as recorded  in  the revenue entries.  As pointed  out by this Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh  Vs. Allahabad Bank (AIR 1961 SC 1790) which was a case  under the U.P. Act, bhumidhari rights are new rights created under a statute.      Smt. Vidya  Devi was declared co-bhumidhar with Dev Raj and Prem  Prakash in  1958 conferring upon her new title and status. Her  suit for  partition is sought to be resisted by the respondents  on the  ground of  family partition in 1937 and 1952.  This plea  is clearly  untenable,  at  least  for purposes of  reference to  Civil Court,  based as  it is  on certain alleged  pre-1958 events.  The suit is also resisted on the  ground that  they had  acquired exclusive  title  by adverse possession. What, however, emerges from a perusal of the pleadings  contained in  the written  statement filed on behalf of  the  respondent  is  that  the  plea  of  adverse possession had  not been  specifically raised by setting out all the  requisite ingredients  which had  necessarily to be pleaded in  order to  constitute the  case of acquisition of title by  adverse  possession.  Unless,  the  pleadings  are complete and  all the  necessary ingredients  to  constitute ouster by  adverse possession  are set  out in  the  written statement, the plea relating to the title of the property in question cannot  be said to have been raised and, therefore, there was  no occasion to frame any issue on the question of title or to refer it to the Civil Court. The judgment passed by the  Delhi High  Court cannot  be sustained  and must, as proposed by  esteemed brother  -  Venkatachala,  J.  be  set aside, though for different reasons, set out above.