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PETITIONER: VICTORIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.V. NAIK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/05/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  O R D E R      This special  leave petition  arises fromthe order of the High  Court  of Kerala,  made on  17.3.1997 in  CRP No. 2587/96.      The respondents-mortgagorshad filed O.S. No.285/79 for redemption     of  themortgage.  Thepetitioner-mortgagee claimedfixityof thetenure in   respect  of the  entire extent of  the land   under Section 4(1) (10 (b) and Section 13 of  the Kerala  LandReformsAct; inthe alternative, she claimedto  be entitledto deemed  Kudikidappu rights over 3 cents of  the total  extent of8 cents,  by operation  of Explanation IV to section  2(25) of theAct. The trial Court negatived the  contention   by decree  dated July  51, 1980. Final decree was  passed on September 30, 1992.The court of Kudikidappu  advancedby   the   petitionerarises for consideration only  at the  time  of the execution; thus, in this case,  prima facie,  they are not entitledto reference under Section  125(3)of theAct. When the petitioner had carriedthe  matter tothe High court held that it operates as constructive  res  judicata.  Since that  question was raised at  the time when the final  decree had been  passed, the petitionerraised this  point in  the execution.  Thus, this petition by special leave.      The High Court hasconsidered various decisions ofthat Court in  reaching theconclusion; particularly,  it relied upon ajudgment of  the  Division  Bench  in  Narayanan  s. Kunchiyamma ParukkuttyAmma [1986  K.L.T. 1340].   TheHigh Court  recordedthe findings thus:      "In the  light of this position now      settled,  it   isclear  that  the      judgment debtors  ar precluded from      claiming  that    they     are      Kudikidappukars  entitled to  the      protectionof  Explanation  IV  to      section 2(25)  of the  Act in view      oftheir prior approach tothe Land      Tribunal on a  claim  thatthey are      cultivating tenants  entitled to an      assignment  of the right title and      interest of the land ownerover the

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    land   in question.   The present      plea of  Kudikidappu is, therefore,      barred by res judicata.      Itis  well settled  in this  Court      that whena claim of  tenancy  of      Kudikidappu  is   barred by  res      judicata , such a question   does      not arisefor decision  within the      meaning of Section 125(3) of  the      Act.  (seethe decision ofthe Full      Bench in  Kesava Bhat   vs. Subraya      Bhat,  1979   KLT 766). It   is      therefore, to   be  held in  the      present case    tha  the  claim  of      Kudikidappa  sought     to be  put      forward   and    consequently    no      referenceis   called  for   under      Section  125(3) ofthe Act,      Learned   counselfor thejudgment      debtors  contended  thatin   the      decree forredemption thathas been      passed, the  claimof  thejudgment      debtors   for    protection   under      Explanation   IV to  section  2(25)      ofthe Acthas been left open to be      decided in execution    and  under      such circumstancesthe question did      arise andthe  same  ought  to  be      referred to the Land Tribunal under      Section 125(3) of the Act.All that      was done  by the  judgment in  the      case was  to takenote ofthe plea      ofthe  judgment debtors that  they      were   entitled  to  protection  as      Kudikidappukars and without      deciding that question at the stage      ofthe  decree  leaving  it  to  be      Explanation IV  toSection2(25) of      the   Act.  Norwho   there   an      adjudication     that   they   were      entitled to  claimsuch  a  right.      When the  questionof  claim such a      right.   When   the   question   of      reference under  Section  125(3) of      the  Actto  the concerned  Land      Tribunal is  mooted, the  executing      court has necessarily to decide the      question whether  the claim  raised      arises   for   decision.If   the      executing court were to come to the      conclusionthat  the question  does      not arisefor decision  in view of      the judgment debtor being barred by      res  would not  be  openfor  the      executing  court to  refer  that      question to  the Land  Tribunal.  I      am, therefore, notin a position to      accept  the   contention  that  the      executioncourt  had no option but      torefer  the question  tothe Land      Tribunal.      8.Thus  by making a reference  of      the claimof thejudgment debtors      that theyare Kudikidappukars, the      execution court  has overlooked the

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    fact that the claim of thejudgment      debtors is barredby  resjudicata      inthe light of the decision of the      supreme Court  referred  to  above.      Thereby the  executing   Court   in      under section  115of  theCode  of      civil Procedure.Since  it has to      be held  that a  question  of      Kudikidappu  does not  arise  for      decision, the order  of reference      made by  the   executingCourt is      also one  without jurisdiction."      Learned counsel  for the  petitioner  contends  relying upon the  judgment of  the Division Bench of the KeralaHigh Court in  Balakrishnan vs. Bhaskaran [1987 (2) K.L.T] that a right of  redemption   is  vested  in  the  mortgagor  under Section60  ofthe  Transfer  of  property  Act,    can  be extinguished either  byan  actof  parties orby decree of court. Depositof themortgage money under Section 83does not ipso facto extinguishes themortgage where the mortgagee had refused  toacceptthe deposit. Toput it differently , if thedepositis  notaccepted,  the mortgagedoes not get extinguished; that  means the  patties continueto have the relationship   of mortgagor   and  mortgagee.  When  Section 2,(25) and  125(3)  ofthe  Land  Reforms  Act are  to  be considered in  a suit  of redemption  claimingthe right of Kudikidappu asfound, is  not barred  by the  principle  of constructive res judicata in  executingproceedings. Wefind that later partof the view taken therein is not correct for the reason thatif the plea hasnot been raised, it operates as constructive  res  judicataon  theprinciple of " might and ought".  Ifit is taken andrejected, it operates as res judicata and  the same cannot be raisedin execution .Even if it is left  open, inequity,justiceand good conscience, it must not be extended to  the mortgagee.   Even if it is left open,  in equity,justiceand good conscience, itmust not be extendedto themortgagee. After all, the mortgagee, money-lender  comes  into  possession  of  theproperty  as mortgagee and  always remains as mortgagee unless limitation snaps off the link.  Hecannot be permitted in good sense of law toeat away  the cake  as Kudikidappu,    It  would  be abhorrence to  good conscience and playing uponthe property of indigent  mortgagor’s own  property.Certainly, thatis a matter gone  into at the time of the execution.Since in the suit. the  plea had  been  raised    and  negatived  and  a preliminary decree  hadbeen  passed  followedby  a  final decree,it was not open to thepetitioner to raise theplea after the  passing of  the final decreethat hewas entitled to three cents of landas kudikidappu.      The special leave petition is accordinglydismissed.