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PETITIONER: VENKATESH NARAHAR KATTl

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HAJI SAHEB KHADIR SAHEB MULLA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/10/1965

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SUBBARAO, K. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1085            1966 SCR  (2) 215

ACT: Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (57 of 1948),  s. 29(2) Application unde--Starting point of limitation.

HEADNOTE: On 8th December 1956, the appellant served on the respondent three  months’ notice in writing under s. 14(1) (b)  of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, terminating the tenancy on the ground of default in payment of rent.  On 24th  June 1957 the appellant filed an application under  s. 29(2) for  possession.  The Tahsildar allowed he application and the order was confirmed on appeal.  But in revision, the Revenue Tribunal set aside the order on the ground, that the application was barred by limitation, because, it was  filed more than two years, after 20th May 1955, which was the date of default.  A petition ay the appellant under Art. 227, was rejected by the High Court.  In the appeal to the Supreme Court, on the question whether the  application  was filed within the two  yea&  period  of limitation prescribed by s. 29 (2). HELD : Limitation for the application began to run from  the date  of  the termination of the tenancy and  not  from  the antecedent  date of default in payment of rent and  so,  the application,  filed within two years of the  termination  of the tenancy was not barred by limitation. 220 G] The  legislature  could not have  intended  that  limitation would  commence  to run before the right to apply  under  s. 29(2)  accrues.  The right to apply accrues to the  landlord when the tenancy is terminated by notice under s.  14(1)(b). But in spite of the termination of the tenancy the  landlord has no right to obtain possession without an order under  s. 29(2).   On  the termination of the tenancy,  the  right  to obtain  possession,  though in reality not  accrued  to  the landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued  to him.   Consequently, the date of termination of the  tenancy is  also  the date when the right to  obtain  possession  is deemed   to  have  accrued  to  the  landlord.   Since   the limitation for, the application under s. 29(2) commences  to run  from  the date when the right to obtain  possession  is deemed to have accrued to the landlord, it would follow that limitation  begins to run from the date when the tenancy  is

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terminated by the notice under s. 14(1) (b). [218 A-B,  C-D, F-G] The  history of the legislation also shows that both  before and  after  the Amendment Act, 1951-which provided  the  two years’  period of limitation-the date of the termination  of the tenancy is the starting point of limitation. [218 H] Ramachandra  Anant  v. Janardan, 64 Bom.   L.R.  637  (F.B.) approved. Chimanbai  Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath, I.L.R. [1958] Dom.  917 (F.B.) overruled.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1963. 216 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January 19, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Civil  Petition No. 654 of 1960. S.   G. Patwardhan and K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellant. A.   G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J. The appellant is the landlord  and  respondent No.  1  is  the tenant of S. Nos. 180  and  182  of  village Dhanyal,  taluk  Bijapur.   Respondent No.  1  defaulted  in payment of rent for the years 1951-52, 1953-54 and  1954-55. On December 8, 1956, the appellant served on respondent  No. I  three months’ notice in writing under s. 14(1)(b) of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay  Act No. 57 of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy  Act, terminating the tenancy on the ground of default in  payment of  rent.   On  June  24,  1957,  the  appellant  filed   an application under s. 29(2) read with s. 14(1) of the Tenancy Act  for  possession of the land.   The  Tahsildar,  Bijapur allowed the application, and directed possession of the land to  be delivered to the appellant.  This order was  affirmed on  appeal  by  the  Assistant  Commissioner,  Bijapur.   On revision,  the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal  set  aside the  order  of  the first two tribunals  and  dismissed  the application.  A petition by the appellant under Art. 227  of the  Constitution was summarily rejected by the Mysore  High Court.   The appellant now appeals to this Court by  special leave. The Tribunals below concurrently found that respondent No. I defaulted  in  payment of the rent for  the  years  1951-52, 1953-54 and 1954-55, the last default took place on May  20, 1955  and  the  tenancy  was  properly  terminated  by   the appellant.   The  first  two Tribunals also  held  that  the application was filed within the time, allowed by law.   The Revenue   Appellate   Tribunal,  however,  held   that   the application  being filed more than two years after  May  20, 1955  is barred by limitation.  The sole question before  us is  whether the application was filed within the two  years’ period  of limitation prescribed by s. 29(2) of the  Tenancy Act.  The appellant contends that the application was  filed within  the prescribed period of limitation because (1)  the right  of the appellant to obtain possession of the land  is deemed  to  have accrued to him on the  termination  of  the tenancy by the notice given on December 8, 1956, (2) in  any event, in computing the two years’ period of limitation, the period  of  the three months’ notice should be  excluded  in view of s. 15(2) read with s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.  We are of the opinion that the first  contention of the appellant                             217

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should  be accepted.  In view of this conclusion, we do  not think  it  necessary to express any opinion  on  the  second contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. Sections 14(1) and 29(2) of the Tenancy Act, as they  stood- at. the relevant time, are as follows :               "14. (1) Notwithstanding any law, agreement or               usage, or the decree or order of a court,  the               tenancy of any land shall not be terminated-               (a)   unless the tenant-               (i)   has  failed  to  pay the  rent  for  any               revenue  years. before the 31st day  of  March               thereof;               (ii)  has done any act which is destructive or               permanently injurious to the land;               (iii) has sub-divided, sub-let or assigned the               land in-, contravention of section 27;               (iv)  has  failed to cultivate it  personally;               or               (v)   has  used such land for a purpose  other               than agriculture or allied pursuits; and (b)  unless  the landlord has given three months’ notice  in writing  informing the tenant of his decision  to  terminate the tenancy and the ground for such termination, and, within that  period the tenant has failed to remedy the breach  for which the tenancy is liable to be terminated." 29(2)  No landlord shall obtain possession of any  land,  or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar.   For  obtaining  such order  he  shall  make  an application  in the prescribed form and within a  period  of two  years  from  the  date on which  the  right  to  obtain possession  of the land or dwelling house, as the  case  may be, is deemed to. have accrued to him." At  first  sight,  it  may appear  that  the  Act  gives  no indication  of the time when the right to obtain  possession of  the land or dwelling house is deemed to have accrued  to the  landlord as contemplated by s. 29(2).  But on  a  close scrutiny  of the Act we are satisfied’ that this right  must be  deemed  to  have  accrued to him  on  the  date  of  the termination of the tenancy. It  is  to be noticed that limitation  for  the  application under s.  29  (2)  commences to run from the date  when  the right to obtain                             218 possession  of the land or dwelling house is deemed to  have accrued  to the landlord.  ’Now, the legislature  could  not have intended that,, limitation would commence to run before the right to apply accrues.  It is reasonable to think  that the right to apply also accrues to the ,landlord on the date when limitation for the application begins to run.  But  the right to apply under S. 29(2) read with S. 14(1) accrues  to the  landlord when the tenancy is terminated by  the  notice under S. 14 (1 ) (b).  In Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype v.  Aba Maruti Mali(1), this Court observed :               "The   statute   having   provided   for   the               termination of the tenancy would by  necessary               implication create a right in the landlord  to               recover  possession.  The  statute  recognises               this  right by providing by S. 29(2)  for  its               enforcement   by   an   application   to   the               Mamlatdar." It would follow that limitation for the application under s. 29(2)  read with S. 14(1) begins to run from the  date  when the tenancy is terminated, by the notice under S.  14(1)(b). Consequently, the date of the termination of the tenancy  is also the date when the right to obtain possession is  deemed

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to  have accrued to the landlord.  But it is argued that  on the  date  of the termination of the tenancy, the  right  to obtain  possession  of  the land actually  accrues  ’to  the landlord,  and,  therefore, the legislature could  not  have intended that on that date this right is deemed to accrue to him.  This ,argument must be rejected. In spite of the termination of the tenancy, the landlord has no  right to obtain possession of the land without an  order of  the Mamlatdar under s. 29(2).  Between the date  of  the termination  of  the tenancy and the date of the  order  for possession  under  S. 29(2), the tenant continues to  be  in lawful possession of the land and is liable to pay rent  and not  mesne  profits, see Ramchandra  Avant  v.  Janardan(2). Thus, on the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain possession of the land, though in reality not accrued to the landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued  to him  so that he may immediately apply under S. 29(2) for  an order for possession. This  conclusion is reinforced if we look at the history  of the  legislation.  The Tenancy Act, as originally passed  in 1948, did not provide for a special period of limitation for the  application to the Mamlatdar under s. 29.  But  it  was thought  that s. 72 of the Tenancy Act attracted the  period of limitation prescribed (1) [1961] 1 Supp.  S.C.R.730,747. (2) 64 Bom.  L.R. 635 (F.D.) 637, 641. 219 by  sub-ss.  (3) and (4) of s. 5 of the  Mamlatdars’  Courts Act, 1906 (Bombay Act No. 2 of 1906), which are as follows :               "5(3).   No  suit shall be  entertained  by  a               Mamlatdar’s Court unless it is ’brought within               six months from the date on which the cause of               action arose.               5 (4).  The cause of action shall be deemed to               have   arisen  on  the  date  on   which   the               impediment  to  the natural  flow  of  surface               water  or  the dispossession,  deprivation  or               determination,  of  tenancy  or  other   right               occurred,   or   on  which   the   impediment,               disturbance  or obstruction, or the  attempted               impediment  or  disturbance  or   obstruction,               first commenced." The  Bombay  Revenue  Tribunal,  therefore,  ruled  that  an application  under s. 29(2) must be made within  six  months from  the date when the cause of action accrues, see  A.  S. Desai’s  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  Act,  Second Edn.,  pp.  137-38, 287-88; and in view of s.  5(4)  of  the Mamlatdars’  Courts  Act,  1906, this cause  of  action  was deemed  to accrue on the determination of the tenancy.   The six  months’ period of limitation led to hardship,  and  the legislature  decided to extend the period of limitation  and enacted  the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands  (Third Amendment)  Act,  1951 (Bombay Act No. 45  of  1951),  which amended  s.  29  by  providing  for  two  years’  period  of limitation  and also s. 72 by inserting the words  "save  as provided  in section 29".  Thus, the Amending  Act  extended the  period of limitation from six months to two years,  but both  before  and after the Amending Act, the  date  of  the termination of the tenancy is the starting point of  limita- tion; formerly because the right to apply was then deemed to accrue  to the landlord and now because the right to  obtain possession is then deemed to have accrued to him. The  Tenancy  Act  was  amended  from  time  to  time.   The requirement of a notice for terminating the tenancy under s. 14(1)  was introduced by Bombay Act No. 33 of 1952,  and  is

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repeated  in  the  new s. 14 substituted  for  the  original section  by Bombay Act No. 13 of 1956.  Before  the  tenancy can  be  terminated under the new s. 14(1),  two  conditions must  be fulfilled.  Firstly, the tenant must be  guilty  of one  of the breaches mentioned in s.  14(1)(a).   Secondly,’ the landlord must give three months’ notice in writing under s.  14(1)(b)  and within that period the  tenant  must  have failed to remedy the breach.  The tenancy is not  terminated unless both these conditions are fulfilled.  Neither failure to pay rent nor sub-letting nor any C.I./66-15 220 other breach is sufficient.  The breach must be followed  by the requisite notice terminating the tenancy.  It is on  the termination of the tenancy and not earlier that the right to obtain  possession  of the land is deemed to accrue  to  the landlord  and limitation for the application under s.  29(2) read with s. 14(1) begins to run. In  Chimanbai Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath(1), a Full  Bench  of the  Bombay  High Court held that the period  of  limitation under s. 29(2) for applying to the Mamlatdar for  possession of  the land on the ground that the tenant had  sub-let  it, began  from  the date of sub-letting, and  that  though  the right to obtain possession actually accrues to the  landlord on  the date when he terminates the tenancy, under S.  29(2) it  is  fictionally deemed to accrue as from  an  antecedent point  of  time, viz., the date of  the  sub-letting.   With respect, we are unable to agree with this judgment.  On  the termination of the tenancy by the notice under S. 14 (1) (b) and  before  the order for possession under  s.  29(2),  the landlord  has  no right to obtain possession  of  the  land; nevertheless, this right is then deemed to accrue to him, so that  he may apply immediately for an order  for  possession under  s. 29(2).  The sub-letting alone does not  give  him’ this  right to apply under s. 29(2).  He may, if  he  likes, ignore  the breach.  But where the breach is followed  by  a notice  terminating  the tenancy he acquires  the  right  to apply  under  s. 29(2).  It is difficult to  impute  to  the legislature the intention that limitation would begin to run against the landlord immediately on the sub-letting,  though he  is  not  aware  of the breach and  takes  no  steps  for terminating  the tenancy in consequence of the  breach.   In our opinion, limitation, for the application under s.  29(2) begins  to  run  from the date of  the  termination  of  the tenancy and not from the date of the sub-letting or    the date of default in payment of rent. In  the instant case, three months’ notice in writing  under s.   14(1)(b) terminating the tenancy was given on  December 8, 1956.  The application under s. 29(2) read with s.  14(1) being  filed  on  June  24, 1957 within  two  years  of  the termination of the tenancy is not barred by limitation. In  the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, the  order of  the  Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal,  Belgaum  Branch dated  July 27, 1960 is set aside and the orders  passed  by the  Tahsildar,  Bijapur  and  the  Assistant  Commissioner, Bijapur are restored. Appeal allowed. (1)  I.L.R. 1958 Bom. 917. 221