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PETITIONER: VAZIR GLASS WORKS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHARASHTRA GENERAL KAMGAR UNION AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       04/01/1996

BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1282            1996 SCC  (2) 118  JT 1996 (1)   129        1996 SCALE  (1)181

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T G.N.Ray.J.      Leave granted.      Heard learned counsel for the parties.      This appeal  is directed  against  the  judgment  dated August 9,  1994 passed  by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in  Appeal No.460  of 1994  reversing the  order dated June 22,  1994 passed  by the Single Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1446 of 1994.      By the  impugned order,  reference  to  the  Industrial Tribunal under  Section 25  (O) (5) read with Section 10 (1) of the  Industrial Disputes  Act  made  by  the  Industries. Energy and  Labour Department. Government of Maharashtra, on April 7, 1994 was sat aside.      It appears  that the  appellant, a Company incorporated under the  Indian Companies  Act had  an  Unit  at  Andheri, Bombay. According  to the  Company, the  said unit  became a heavily losing  business  venture  for  reasons  beyond  the control of  the Company  and the said unit started incurring losses from  the veer 1991-92. The loss suffered by the said unit was  to the  tune of Rs.29.20 lakhs. The factory of the appellant-Company at  Andheri was  closed since  November 3, 1992 and  since thereafter,  no manufacturing  activity  has been carried on in the said unit.      It is  the case of the Company that it had employed 774 workmen originally  in the said unit and after the said unit became a  losing  concern,  in  order  to  rehabilitate  the workmen of  the said  unit,  the  Company  offered  generous Voluntary Retirement  Schemes  from  time  to  time  to  its workmen  despite   the  Company’s  financial  hardship.  The Voluntary Retirement  Scheme was accepted by the majority of the workmen  and out of 774 originally employed, 454 workmen had accepted the said scheme requiring payment to be made to the tune  of Rs.560 lakhs. As 320 workmen did not accept the said Voluntary  Retirement Scheme, the appellant-Company was

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constrained to  seek  closure  of  its  industrial  unit  at Andheri because  the monthly  wage  bill  of  the  remaining workmen would  be Rs.12  lakhs and  the other  establishment expenses being another 12 lakhs per month, the total cost to be incurred  by the Company for the said unit would be about 3 crores per annum.      The Company,  therefore, made  an application on August 14, 1992  for closure  of the  said unit  at  Andheri  under Section  25   (O)  (1)   of  the   Industrial  Disputes  Act (hereinafter referred to as Act). Such application, however, was rejected  by the  State Government  on October 12, 1992. The Company thereafter made an application for review of the said order  on February 23, 1993 under Section 25 (O) (5) of the Act  which was  well within  one year  of the  order  of rejection.      The said  review application  was kept  pending by  the State Government  and in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 25  (O) (5)  read with  Section 10(1)  of  the  Act, instead of  reviewing the  order of  rejection dated October 12, 1992  the State  Government  made  a  reference  to  the Industrial Tribunal  for adjudication of the case of closure made by  the Company.  Such reference  was made after notice and opportunity of being heard given to the respondent No.1, namely, the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union.      The Union  thereafter moved  a writ petition before the Bombay High  Court representing the interest of the said 320 workmen, challenging  the legality and validity of the order of reference  made by  the State  Government  under  Section 25(O)(5) read  with Section  10(1) of the Act. The said writ Petition No.  1446 of  1994 was rejected by the Single Bench of the  High Court  by the  order dated 22nd June, 1994. The Union thereafter  preferred an  appeal before  the  Division Bench of  the Bombay  High Court being writ Appeal No.460 of 1994 assailing  the judgment  passed by  the learned  Single Bench. By  the impugned judgment, the Division Bench allowed the said  appeal and  set aside  the judgment  passed by the learned Single  Bench in the said writ petition. It has been held by  the Division Bench that: (1) in terms of Section 25 (O) (4)  of the Act, the order passed on the application for closure remains operative for one year from the date of such order and  after expiry  of such period, the power of review of the  order automatically  comes to  an end. (2) It is not correct to  contend that  until the review application filed by the  company is not finally disposed of, the order passed under Section  25 (O)(2)  by the  State Government  does not become final  (3) The  State Government  is not empowered to pass order  under Section  25 (O) (5) at any time during the pendency of  review application even if one veer had elapsed from the date of the order passed under Section 25(O)(2). As admittedly the  review application was disposed of by making the said  reference under  Section 25(O)(5)  of the  Act, by purporting to dispose of the review application after expiry of one  year from  the  date  of  the  order  rejecting  the application for permission to close, such order of reference to the  Industrial Tribunal  was invalid, having been passed without any jurisdiction.      The  Company   has  challenged   in  this   appeal  the correctness of  such decision  of the  Bombay High  Court in quashing  the   said  reference   made  by   the  State   of Maharashtra. It  will be  appropriate to  refer  to  Section 25(O) of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.      SECTION 25(O)      (1)  An  employer  who  intends  to      close down  an  undertaking  of  an      industrial establishment  to  which

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    this Chapter  applies shall, in the      prescribed manner  apply, for prior      permission  at  least  ninety  days      before  the   date  on   which  the      intended  closure   is  to   become      effective,   to   the   appropriate      Government  stating   clearly   the      reasons for the intended closure of      the undertaking  and a copy of such      application shall  also  be  served      simultaneously        on        the      representative of  the  workmen  in      the prescribed manner:      Provided that  nothing in this sub-      section   shall    apply   to    an      undertaking   set    up   for   the      construction of buildings, bridges,      roads, canals,  dams or  for  other      construction work.      (2)  Where   an   application   for      permission has been made under Sub-      section   (1)    the    appropriate      Government   after    making   such      enquiry as  it thinks fit and after      giving a responsible opportunity of      being heard  to the  employee,  the      workmen and  the persons interested      in such  closure may, having regard      to the  genuineness and adequacy of      the reasons stated by the employer,      the interests of the general public      and all  other relevant factors, by      order  and   for  reasons   to   be      recorded  in   writing,  grant   of      refuse to grant such permission and      a  copy  of  such  order  shall  be      communicated to  the  employer  and      the workmen.      (3)  Where an  application has been      made under  sub-section (1) and the      appropriate  Government   does  not      communicate the  order granting  or      refusing to grant permission to the      employer within  a period  of sixty      days from  the date  on which  such      application is made, the permission      applied for shall be deemed to have      been granted  on the  expiration of      the said period of sixty days.      (4)  An order  of  the  appropriate      Government granting  or refusing to      grant permission  shall subject  to      the provisions  of sub-section  (5)      be final  and binding  on  all  the      parties and  shall remain  in force      for one  year from the date of such      order.      (5)  The   appropriate   Government      may, either on its own motion or on      the   application   made   by   the      employer or any workman, review its      order granting or refusing to grant      permission under Sub-Section (2) or      refer the  matter to a tribunal for      adjudication:

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    Provided that where a reference has      been made  to a Tribunal under this      sub-section, it shall pass an award      within a period of thirty days from      the date of such reference.      (6)  Where   no   application   for      permission under Sub-section (1) is      made within  the  period  specified      therein, or  where  the  permission      for closure  has been  refused, the      closure of the undertaking shall be      deemed to  be illegal from the date      of closure and the workmen shall be      entitled to  all the benefits under      any law for the time being in force      as if  the undertaking had not been      closed down.      (7)  Notwithstanding       anything      contained    in    the    foregoing      provisions  of  this  section,  the      appropriate Government  may, if  it      is satisfied  that  owing  to  such      exceptional    circumstances     as      accident  in   the  undertaking  or      death of  the employer or the like,      it is  necessary so to go, by order      direct that  the provisions of sub-      section  (1)  shall  not  apply  in      relation to  such  undertaking  for      such period  as may be specified in      the order.      (8)  Where   an    undertaking   is      permitted to  be closed  down under      Sub-section (2) or where permission      for closure is deemed to be granted      under   Sub-Section    (3),   every      workman who  is  employed  in  that      under taking immediately before the      date of  application for permission      under   this   action,   shall   be      entitled  to  receive  compensation      which  shall   be   equivalent   to      fifteen days  average pay for every      completed   year    of   continuous      service  or  any  part  thereof  in      excess of six months."      Mr. Bobde  learned senior  counsel  appearing  for  the appellant-Company has  submitted that  the Division Bench of the High Court has held that it is not the date of filing of application  but   the  date  of  the  order  rejecting  the application for  permission for  closure which must be taken into consideration  to examine whether the authority passing the order  on review  application under Section 25(O)(5) had jurisdiction to  pass an order. Mr. Bobde has submitted that the Division  Bench has  erroneously held that once a period of one  year expires from the date of the order passed under Section  25(O)(2)   of  the   Act  on  the  application  for permission to  close an industrial undertaking, the power of review comes  to  end  notwithstanding  presentation  of  an application for  review within  the said  period of one year and pendency  of such  review application  before the  State Government. Mr.  Bobde has  contended in  terms  of  Section 25(O)(4) of  the Act, the order passed under 25(O)(2) of the Act rejecting  the application for permission to close, does not attain  finality and  the review  application  does  not

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become infructuous after expiry of one year from the date of order under  Section 25(O)(2)  of the  Act. On the contrary, the one  year period  for c the finality of the order passed under Section  25(O)(2) of  the Act  gets enlarged  till the order is  made on  the review application. The period of one year as referred to in Section 25(O)(4) is subject to review to be made under Section 25(O)(5) of the Act.      Mr. Bobde  has submitted  that for  giving  appropriate meaning to  sub-section (4)  and sub-section  (5) of Section 25(O) of  the Act,  it should  be held that the order passed under sub-section  (2) remains  valid and  operative for one year from  the date  of such  order under sub-section (2) if within the  said period  of one  year,  no  application  for review of  the order  has been made. But if such application is made  within the  aforesaid time  frame, the  order under Section  25(O)(2)  does  not  attain  finality  but  remains operative subject to order by way of review. Since the order under sub-section  (2) does  not attain  finality during the pendency of  review application,  the State  Government does not cease to have jurisdiction to entertain and consider the review application  on merits.  Any construction  of Section 25(O)(4) and  25(O)(5) of  the Act putting an embargo on the exercise of  jurisdiction of  the State Government to review its order  on an application presented by an aggrieved party within one  year of  the order made under Sub-section (2) of the Act  will violate  the very  purpose of review and would make a  review application  abortive  and  infructuous  even though a  statutory authority  had failed  and neglected  to consider the same.      Mr. Bobde  has submitted  that  in  the  instant  case, admittedly the  Company  presented  the  review  application before the  expiry of one year from the date of rejection of the Company’s  application for permission to close its unit. After one  year, the  Company was  entitled to  make a fresh application for  such permission  to close despite rejection or its  application earlier.  But  if  the  application  for review has  been made  within the  time frame,  neither  the State Government is deprived of its jurisdiction to consider the review  application on merit nor the Company is deprived of its  right to  get such  review application considered on merit by  the State Government and on such application being presented, the  State Government  has jurisdiction  to  pass order by itself or to make reference for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.      Mr. Bobde  has also  submitted that the case of closure of an  industrial unit  is required  to be considered by the concerned  authority   by  taking   into  consideration  all relevant factors  because such  decision  has  not  only  an impact on  the workmen  employed in the concerned industrial unit but  it has  also an  impact on the productivity of the Industry and  economy of  the country.  In the instant case, the Company  made an application for review before the State Government by  drawing its  attention to  the relevant facts which according  to the  Company warrant  sanction  for  the closure. It  is not  unlikely that  the State  Government in view  of  other  urgent  and  pressing  problems  could  not consider the application of the Company before expiry of one year from  the date  of rejection  of  the  application  for permission for  closure. It  appears  that  after  the  said application for  review was  taken up for consideration, the State Government  being  alive  to  serious  implication  of closure of  an industrial  undertaking, thought it expedient that such  question should  be gone  into by  the Industrial Tribunal in  a more effective manner. If on such perception, the State  Government has  made reference  which is  neither

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lacking in jurisdiction hor wholly unreasonable or perverse, there is  no question  of quashing such reference. Mr. Bobde has  submitted   that  instead  of  decision  by  the  State Government an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal is all the more desirable in the interest of both the parties.      Mr.Bobde has  also submitted that the view taken by the High Court  in the  impugned decision that it is the date of filing the  application and not the date of the order passed under sub section (2) of Section 25 (O) of the Act, which is to be taken into consideration for deciding the jurisdiction of  the  State  Government  to  pass  order  on  the  review application under Section 25 (5) of the Act, is not correct. The State  Government did  not cease  to  have  jurisdiction simply with  the expiry  of one  year from the date of order rejecting application  for permission  to close.  It retains its jurisdiction  to review  and does  not become  functions officio if  within a year, an application for review is made and such  application remains  pending. In  support of  such contention, Mr.Bobde  has relied  on the  decision  of  this Court  in   Grindlays  Bank   Ltd.  Vs.  Central  Government Industrial Tribunal  and others (1980 Supp. SCC 420). It has been held  in the  said decision  that  an  application  for setting aside  its ex  parte award  made within  thirty days from  the   date  of   passing  the  award  can  be  validly entertained  by   the  Tribunal.  The  contention  that  the Tribunal had  become functions officio and as such lacked in jurisdiction to  entertain review application was negatived. It has been held that jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on  the date  of the  application made to it and not on the  date  on  which  it  passed  the  order.  Mr.Bobde  has submitted  that  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court  is, therefore, erroneous, being contrary to the decision of this Court.      Mr.Bobde has  also referred to another decision of this Court in  Western Indian  Match Co. Vs. Western Indian Match Co.  Workers  Union  and  others  (1970  (3)  SCR  370)  for contending  that  power  to  refer  to  Industrial  Tribunal remains  unaffected   even  if   on  an   earlier  occasion, Government refused  to made  reference. If  a valid  dispute still remains  and on  consideration of  relevant facts, the Government feels  that a  case for  reference has  been made out, it  can direct  for reference.  Mr. Bobde has submitted that on  the date of passing order of reference the case for closure espoused  by the  Company had  continued and despite earlier rejection  for permission  to  close  an  industrial unit, the  State Government  was quite  competent to make an order of reference to the Industrial Tribunal by considering relevant factors.      Mr.Bobde has  also submitted  that power  of the  State Government to reconsider the case for closure is not limited by any  precondition. What  is contemplated under Section 25 (O)(5) of the Act is not a limited review within the meaning of Order  XVII Rule  1 of  Civil  Procedure  Code.  What  is intended is a reconsideration of the entire matter including the facts  and law  omitted while passing the first order as well as  new development  that took place after the original order was  passed. The object for the provision of review is to do justice between the parties by considering whether the original decision  is correct  or not.  In support  of  such contention, a  decision of  the Kerala  High Court  in Laxmi Starch Limited  Vs. The  Kunda Factory  Workers Union  (1992 Labour and  Industries Cases  1337) has  been relied  on  by Mr.Bobde.      Mr.Bobde  has   further  submitted   that   the   State Government had jurisdiction to consider the case for closure

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of the  industrial unit  by entertaining the application for review on  merits and  the State  Government did  not become functions  officio  in  entertaining  such  application  for review because  the power to review is referable to the date of making  the application  and not  the date  on which  the order or  such review  application is  made. In  the instant case, considering  the possible  impact on the employees and economy as  a  whole  if  closure  is  effected,  the  State Government thought  it  expedient  that  such  consideration should be  made  by  Industrial  Tribunal.  Such  reference, therefore, should not be held invalid. He has also submitted that hearing  before the  Tribunal was  completed  and  this Court by  an interim order directed the Tribunal to pass its award and  send the  same in  a sealed cover. Such award has since been  sent in  a sealed  cover by the Tribunal to this Court. As the reference is legal and valid, the Court should accept the  said award  and direct for giving effect to such award by  treating it  as valid  award made  on a  reference under Section 25 (O)(5) read with Section 10 (1) of the Act.      Mr. Deshmukh,  learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Union has,  however, refuted  the contentions  of Mr.Bobde. It  has been  contended by  Mr. Deshmukh  that the Company is  closely held  public United Company - its shares being held  by family  members. The Company made substantial profit in  1991-92 and  reserve share of the Company was 489 lakhs against paid up share capital of 65 lakhs.      It was  only when  the same  family had  set up  a  new Company called  Neutral Glass  and Allied Industries Limited at Kosama  in Surat mainly to avail various benefits and tax evations for  establishing industry  in backward  area,  the Company had  been  neglected  purposefully.  The  commercial production of  that new  venture hear Surat started in 1989- 90. Immediately,  production in the Company was cut down and production by  the  new  venture  was  increased.  Even  the officials of  the Company had written to its clients in 1989 that all  future orders  should be  placed with the said new venture and  not with the Company. As a matter of fact, many officials of the Company had worked both for the Company and also  for   new  venture   and  documentary  proof  of  such detrimental steps  had been  submitted before the Industrial Court in  Reference No. (IT) 25 of 1994. Hence, the bogey of closing  down   a  sick  and  losing  concern  is  factually incorrect and should not be accepted.      Mr.Deshmukh  has   further  submitted   that  the  main question that  requires for  consideration is whether or not on the  date when reference to Industrial Tribunal was made, the State  Government  had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the Review Application and pass order on the same. The merits of the application  for closure  of the  said unit  at Andheri, however, are  not germane  for deciding  the correctness and validity of  the impugned  judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Mr.Deshmukh has submitted that having regard to  various provisions  of Section  25 (O) of the Act and particularly  having regard  to the  stipulation in sub- Section (3)  of Section  25 (O)  that the  permission sought shall be  deemed to  have been  granted if  the order on the application  for  permission  is  not  communicated  to  the employer within sixty days of the making of the application, it is  quite evident  that the  intention of the legislature that the time should play a dominant role in the proceedings for closure  of an industrial unit, is abundantly clear. For any  interpretation   of  true  import  of  Section  25  (O) consisting of  various sub-Sections,  the importance of time factor should not be missed.      Mr.Deshmukh has contended that closure of an industrial

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undertaking is  bound to  have serious  repercussions on the employer; workmen  and persons  connected with  the industry and also  on the  general public.  Further,  factors  having bearing on  the decision  to close  are numerous and many of such factors  change with  the passing of time. Hence, it is necessary  that   factors  relevant   for  closure  must  be considered within  a time  frame so that with the passage of time,  such   consideration  may  not  lose  its  relevance. Precisely for  the said  reason, legislature  in its wisdom, has fixed  one year  as the  outer limit  within  which  the factors placed  by an  employer for permission to close, may be reviewed by the State Government.      Mr.Deshmukh has submitted that if a review application, though made  within the said time frame of one year from the pate of  rejecting the  employer’s application  for grant of permission for  closure,  is  not  considered  for  whatever reason, the  employer does not in reality suffer any serious prejudice, Because,  the  order  rejecting  the  prayer  for permission for  closure remains  in force,  subject  to  any review to  be made within that time frame. An employer after one year  can make  same prayer  for permission to close not only on  the materials  which he  had placed  earlier but on other or  further materials  which  may  crop  up  with  the passage of time.      Mr.Deshmukh  has   submitted  that   the  decision   in Grindlays Bank’s  case (supra)  since relied on by Mr.Bobde, the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  Company  has  no application in  the facts  of the  case. In Grindlays Bank’s case, this  Court has  made distinction  between  review  on procedural lapse  and review  on merits  of the  case. After indicating that  the ex  parte order  made in  that case was manifestly unjust, it has been indicated that every court or tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to review its order which has resulted in miscarriage of justice in procedural matter. Such exercise  of review  to correct procedural irregularity is based  on the  principle that  court has a duty to remedy the errors  committed by it in following the procedures in a its. In  the  instant  case,  the  State  Government  having applied its  mind on  the  application  for  permission  for closure, held  that such  permission was  not justified  and accordingly dismissed  the application. The State Government had not  committed any error in adopting any procedure which has broughts  about miscarriage  of justice.  The Company by filing review  application has sought for reconsideration of the application.  Such review  application, for  the reasons already indicated,  must be considered within the time frame of one year.      Mr.Deshmukh has  submitted that  the  finality  of  the order passed  under sub  section (2)  of Section  25 (O)  is undoubtedly subject  to any  order  to  be  made  on  review application. If an application for permission for closure is rejected and  immediately or shortly thereafter the employer makes an  application for  review and within one year of the order of  rejection, the  State Government  on reviewing the grounds urged in support of closure, accepts the case of the employer and grants permission within the said time frame of one year,  there is no manner of doubt that earlier order of rejection will  stand superseded. But it will not be correct to contend  that because an order of rejection is subject to any order  that may  be passed  on review  application  made against the  order of rejection, such review application may be presented  at any time even beyond the said time frame of one year  or if  review application is made within such time frame,  such   review  application  will  remain  alive  for consideration even  after expiry  of the  said time frame of

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one year.      Mr.Deshmukh has  submitted that  the decisions  in  M/s Western India Match Co.’s case (supra) and in Laxmi Starch’s case (supra) have no application in the facts of the case in question. The  decision in the aforesaid cases do not relate to the  consideration of  finality of  an order passed under sub section (2) of Section 25 (O) of the Act after expiry of one year  and consequential  invalidity of  consideration by way of  review after  such period. Mr.Deshmukh has submitted that for the constitutional validity of the executive action taken under sub section (2) of Section 25 (O) without making any provision  for judicial  review of such executive order, the time limit of one year within which the order made under sub section (2) of sub section 25 (O) would remain operative coupled with the provision of making review application even within such  period of  one year  and right  to  make  fresh application for  permission for  closure after one year have been  provided  in  Section  25  (O).  In  support  of  this contention. Mr.Deshmukh  has referred  to  the  Constitution Bench Decision  of this Court in Meenakshi Mill’s case (1992 (3) SCC  336) and Pappasan Labour Union’s case (1995 (1) SCC 501).      Mr.Deshmukh has  submitted that if the specific purpose of time frame of one year in Section 25 (O) is kept in mind, the requirement  of making a review application and disposal of the  same within  the  said  time  frame  will  be  quite evident. Since  fresh  application  for  permission  may  be presented after  one year  from the  date of rejection of an application for  permission for  closure,  the  question  of keeping alive  a review  application even beyond one year so that a  party making such review application does not suffer any unmerited  hardship, on  account of non consideration of review application within the time frame does not arise.      Mr.Deshmukh has  submitted that as the State Government lacked in  jurisdiction to  deal with the review application after expiry  of one  year, the  reference made by it to the Industrial   Tribunal   in   the   purported   exercise   of jurisdiction to  entertain and dispose of review application cannot be  held valid.  It will, therefore, be an irrelevant consideration that  reference to Industrial Tribunal instead of State  Government itself  taking a  decision on merit, is more desirable  in the  interest of the parties. Mr.Deshmukh has submitted  that in the aforesaid facts, this appeal must fail and should be dismissed.      After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of  the case  and the  submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that it is quite evident  from the  Scheme of  various sub  sections of Section 25  (O) of  the Act that whenever an application for closure of  an industrial  unit is  made by an employer, the State Government  before whom  such application  is made, is required to  dispose of  such application  within sixty days from the  date of making the application and communicate its decision within  the said  period of  sixty days  so that an employer does  not suffer any hardship on account of failure on the  part of  the State  Government to  dispose  of  such application for  permission for  closure  expeditiously.  In order to  impel the  State Government  to  dispose  of  such application  expeditiously   not   exceeding   sixty   days, provision has  been made  that if  the decision of the State Government on  the application  for permission  to close  an industrial unit  is not  communicated within the said period of sixty  days, it  will be  deemed that such permission has been granted.  Since the  decision on  the  application  for permission for  closure is  to be  taken  by  the  executive

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authority namely the State Government and since no provision for statutory  review before  other authority has been made, the Legislature  has incorporated the provision of review by the State  Government of its decision on the application for closure either  on its  own motion  or on  the basis  of the application to be made by the aggrieved party.      As the  decision made  by the  State Government  on the question of  closure of  an industrial unit cannot but bring about serious consequence affecting productivity, employment opportunities etc.,  the decision  taken on  the application for closure,  has been  made operative for one year only, so that after  such period,  if an  employer still desires that the industrial  unit should  be closed,  it may make a fresh application for  permission to  close the  said unit.  It is quite obvious  that in such application not only the factors which  were   indicated  in   the  previous  application  in justification of  closure of  the industrial  unit but other factors emerging  with the  passage of  time may  be  placed before the  State Government  for  taking  decision  on  the application for  permission to  close. In order to evade any unmerited hardship  meted  out  to  an  aggrieved  party  on account of  improper or incorrect decision made by the State Government on  the application for permission to close, even during the period of one year when the decision of the State Government remains  operative the  review application may be made  by   the  party   aggrieved.  Even   apart  from  such application, the State Government may also initiate sub moto proceeding to  review its  decision. If the State Government passes any order on such review application, such order will supersede the  initial order  made on  the  application  for permission to close.      Since  the   decision  made   on  an   application  for permission for  closure is  to remain  operative only  for a year, in  our view,  it will  be only proper to hold that an order by  way of  review either  on  the  aggrieved  party’s application or  on own  motion of the State Government, must be made  within the  said period of one year. Otherwise, the right to  make fresh  application for  permission  to  close after expiry  of one  year from  the date  of  rejection  of permission for  closure will  lose its  relevance.  It  also appears to  us that  anomalous situation  may arise  if  the application for  review, when presented within the said time frame of  one year  is allowed  to be decided even after the expiry of  the said  time frame  of one  year when the order passed by  the State  Government has  already ceased  to  be operative. As  an illustration,  it may  be indicated that a party aggrieved makes an application for review of the order of the State Government within a year during which the order is operative,  but for  some reason, such application is not disposed of  within one  year. After expiry of one year, the aggrieved party  makes a fresh application for permission to close and  on such application an order is made by the State Government or  the party  obtains a deemed order. This order on a  fresh application,  subject to any review of the same, will remain  in force  for one year. If the State Government is permitted  to pass  order on  the review application made against the  first  order  when  the  right  to  make  fresh application and  to obtain an order has already accrued, any order on  review to be enforceable must conform to the order passed  or   deemed  to   have  been   passed  on  suspended application for  permission to close. Any other order is not conceivable because an order by way of review supersedes the order reviewed  but not  the subsequent  order  on  a  fresh application made  and such  subsequent order being operative for the  next one  year cannot  be by passed by any order of

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review of the earlier order.      Although it  has not  been expressly  indicated  within what period  a review  application validly  made  is  to  be disposed of,  but the provision that order on an application for closure  would remain  in force  for one year and in the absence of  any embargoed to make fresh application for such permission after  expiry  of  one  year  even  if  a  review application remains  pending, makes it abundantly clear that in the scheme of Section 25(O), the review application is to be made before expiry of the said time frame of one year and such application is to be disposed of within such time frame otherwise such  review application  will become infructuous. The argument  that a  party should  not be  made  to  suffer simply on  account of  failure on  the part  of a  statutory authority to  dispose of  review application  within a  time frame and  thereby rendering  it infructuous, is not tenable because after expiry of the said time frame of one year, the party aggrieved  has a  right to make a fresh application by incorporating  all   the  material   factors   germane   for consideration of  its application  for permission  to close, including  the  factors  indicated  in  review  application. Neither the  general principle  of retaining jurisdiction to dispose of review application validly made nor the principle that an  authority if  clothed with the power of review will not become  functions officio after expiry of the time frame of one  year but  it will retain its authority to dispose of the pending  review application will arise in the context of the scheme of Section 25 (O).      It also  appears  to  us  that  the  reference  to  the industrial tribunal  for adjudication of the application for permission to close an industrial unit is made under Section 25 (O)  (5) of  the Act  and such  reference  is  not  under Section 10  (1) of the Act. Hence, although it was mentioned in the  order of  the State Government that the reference to Industrial Tribunal  for adjudication of the application for permission for closure was made under Section 25 (O)(5) read with Section  10(1) of  the Act,  such reference  has in law been made under Section 25 (O)(5) of the Act without the aid of Section 10(1) of the Act.      In the  aforesaid facts,  the impugned  decision to the effect  that  the  State  Government  would  cease  to  have jurisdiction to  review its  order on  the  application  for closure of  an industrial unit after expiry of one year from the date  of rejection  of the application for permission to close, is correct.      It, however,  appears to  us that  after expiry  of one year from  the date  of rejection  of  the  application  for permission for  closure, the  appellant-company was entitled to make  a fresh  application. Such application has not been made because  a review  application validly  made within the time frame  had not been disposed of by the State Government and  the  appellant-Company  had  been  labouring  under  an impression that  the State  Government could  pass  a  valid order on the pending review application and State Government had in fact passed an order of reference for adjudication to the industrial  tribunal. The appellant-Company had occasion to feel assured about the validity of the order of reference in view  of dismissal  of the  Writ Petition  by the  Single Bench of  the High Court since moved by the respondent-Union for challenging the validity of the order of reference.      It also  appears that  on  such  reference  before  the Industrial Tribunal,  both the parties appeared and had made submissions  and   the  hearing  was  concluded  before  the Industrial Tribunal.  In the  aforesaid circumstances,  this Court,  during   the  pendency  of  special  leave  petition

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challenging the  order of  the Division  Bench of  the  High Court allowing  the writ  petition and quashing the order of reference, directed  the Industrial  Tribunal  to  make  the award and  send the same in a sealed cover to this Court and such award has been sent in a sealed cover to this Court.      In the  special facts and circumstances of the case, it will be only appropriate to treat the application for review which was pending after the expiry of the said time frame of one year  as a  fresh application for permission for closure deemed to  have been  made on March 9, 1994 and to treat the order of  reference to  Industrial  Tribunal  by  the  State Government  as   an  order   of  reference   on  such  fresh application so  that the  entire exercise  made  before  the Tribunal by  both the  parties and  the award  made  by  the Tribunal are not rendered abortive. It may be indicated that the time  limit provided in Section 25 (O)(5) will not apply on the peculiar facts of this case as during the pendency of the writ  appeal before the High Court, the proceedings were stayed and  pending the  proceedings before  this Court, the Court had  permitted the  proceedings to go on but the award was not to be published and to be kept in sealed cover. Such course of  action, in  the facts  of the  case, will be only proper and  consistent with  the justice  to be made in this case, we  order accordingly.  Let  the  award  be  published within one  month from  the date  of receipt of the award on being transmitted  to the  concerned Industrial Tribunal. It is further directed that date of receipt of the award by the Industrial Tribunal  on transmission from this Court will be deemed to  be the  date of  the award.  It is clarified that once the  award  is  published,  it  will  be  open  to  the aggrieved party  to challenge  the same  in accordance  with law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly without any order as to cost.