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PETITIONER: VATAN MAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KAILASH NATH

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/03/1989

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1534            1989 SCR  (2) 192  1989 SCC  (3)  79        JT 1989 (2)   196  1989 SCALE  (1)915

ACT:     Rajasthan  Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)  Act, 1950--Section  13-A-benefit of provisions--Conferred on  all tenants-Provided actual eviction had not taken place.

HEADNOTE:     Appellant  herein  was  a lessee of  the  Respondent  in respect  of  a shop since 1961, at a monthly rent  of  Rs.25 later  increased to Rs.30 and in addition to the said  rent, he  was  to pay house tax to the  municipality.  Respondent- landlord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant  on the  ground  of default in payment of rent  for  the  period 1.2.1966 to 31.12.66. The appellant filed an application  in that suit under sec. 13(4) of the Act (as it stood prior  to amendment)  for  determination of arrears of  rent  and  the interest  payable  thereon. The Trial Court  determined  the arrears  of rent and the interest payable by the  appellant. Consequent  upon  the appellant’s depositing the  same,  the suit  was dismissed in terms of sec. 13(7) of the  Act.  The appellant continued depositing the rent in Court. Thereafter the  Respondent filed another suit on 21.5.75 alleging  that the appellant has again committed default in payment of rent and  should therefore be evicted. The appellant  received  a notice calling upon him to appear in Court on 10.2.76. Since he  had  not received a copy of the plaint, he  was  granted time  till  30.3.76 to file his written  statement.  In  the written  statement he refuted his liability to pay the  rent and  also  moved  an application u/s 13(3) &  13(4)  of  the amended Act praying that if in the course of his  depositing the  rent  in  court, there has been any  omission,  due  to oversight  the  Court may determine the arrears  of  rent  & interest payable thereon and permit him to deposit the  same in court.     It may be pointed out here that before the appellant was served  with the notice of the suit, the Act was amended  on 29.9.75  by  Amending Ordinance No. 26 of 75 whereby  a  new section  13-A was added to the Act. The object of the  newly added section was to provide benefit to all tenants  against whom  suits for eviction on the ground of default in  paying the rent were pending by making a provision that the  Courts

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shall  not  pass any decree in favour of landlords  on  that ground if the 193 tenant  makes an application within a stipulated period  and deposits in court the total rent due.     The  Trial  Court passed orders on the  application  u/s 13(3) & 13(4) and called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of  Rs.335  towards  arrears of  rent  and  interest  before 28.7.76.  The appellant complied with the order but  despite that,  the Trial Court passed a decree for eviction and  the appellate Court confirmed the same.     In  the  second appeal preferred by  the  appellant,  he contended  that  the Trial Court ought to have  treated  the application filed by him u/s 13(3) & 13(4), as one filed u/s 13-A  of the Act and given the benefit thereof to him.  Even though  the High Court found that the appellant  having  re- ceived  the notice of the suit late and hence was not  in  a position to make the application within 30 days, declined to interfere  because in its view the Act has not provided  for any  relief to tenants placed in the situation in which  the appellant  was  placed.  The High Court held  that  the  Act contains a lacuna but the same can be remedied by the legis- lature  and not by Courts and as such the  appellant  cannot claim  the benefit of sec. 13-A of the Act. The suit  having been  filed prior to the coming into force of Amending  Act, the  same  will be governed by the provisions  of  unamended Act.     On the dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining  special leave.     Before this Court two questions arose for  consideration viz: (1) whether the appellant is not entitled to the  bene- fit  of  sec. 13-A because he had not filed  an  application within 30 days from the date of commencement of the Act, and (2) even otherwise whether by reason of the earlier  default in  payment of rent for the period 1.2.1966  to  31.12.1966, the  appellant  is disentitled under the Act  to  claim  the benefit of sec. 13-A. Allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  Section  13-A has been given  overriding  effect. Subsection  (1) of section 13-A mandates all courts  not  to pass  any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction  of  a tenant  on the ground of nonpayment of rent, if  the  tenant makes  an  application  as per clause (b) and  pays  to  the landlord or deposits in court within the prescribed time the total  amount of rent in arrears together with interest  and full costs of the suit. [199B-C] 194     The  intention of the legislature to confer the  benefit of section 13-A to all tenants, provided actual eviction had not  taken place could further be seen by the terms of  sec- tion (c). [199D-E]     It  would be unreasonable and inequitable to  hold  that the  legislature had intended to confer the benefit of  sec. 13-A  only to those tenants who had received notice  of  the suit filed against them before the Ordinance came into force and  not  to  those tenants against  whom  proceedings  were pending in the sense they had been instituted but who had no notice of the pendency of the suit. [199F-G]     Even  though  it was found that some arrears had  to  be paid,  the  appellant cannot be denied the benefit  of  sec. 13-A because the section has been given overriding effect in so far as suits and other proceedings which were pending  on the  date of the promulgation of the ordinance and  as  such the  proviso to sub-sec. (6) of sec. 13 of the  amended  Act

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would  not disentitle the appellant to claim the benefit  of sec. 13-A. [202H; 203A]

JUDGMENT:     B.P.  Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v.V.B.K. Bhowmick, [1987]  2  SCR 559, referred to.     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3604  of 1987.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  19.9.1986  of  the Rajasthan High Court in S.B.C.S.A. No. 163 of 1986. S.K. Jain and 1. Makwana for the Appellant.     Rajinder  Sachar,  Rameshwar  Nath,  B.P.S.  Mangat  and Suresh Vohra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     NATARAJAN,  J. In this appeal by special  leave  arising from  a judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in a  second appeal, the question for consideration is whether the appel- lant  will not be entitled to claim the benefit  of  Section 13-A  of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent  and  Evic- tion) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as  has been  held by the High Court. It is worthy of  mention  even here that though the suit for eviction filed by the respond- ent was pending on the date the ordinance came to be promul- gated, the appel- 195 lant had no knowledge of the filing of the suit and he  came to be served with notice in the suit only after some  months after  the Ordinance came to be promulgated. The High  Court has based its conclusions on two factors viz. (1) no  appli- cation under Section 13-A had been made by the appellant  in the suit filed by the respondent within a period of 30  days from  the date of commencement of the Ordinance and (2)  the suit had been filed before the Amending Ordinance No. 26  of 1975 was issued and hence the proceedings would be  governed by the provisions of the unamended Act.     The  facts  are not in controversy and  are  briefly  as under. Since 1961 the appellant was a lessee of the respond- ent  in  respect of a shop. The agreed rent  was  Rs.25  per mensem  and in addition he had also to pay the house tax  to the municipality. The rent was increased to Rs.30 per mensem with  effect from 1.1.1963. On the ground the appellant  had committed  default  in payment of rent for the  period  1.2. 1966  to 31.12.66, the respondent filed a suit on  17.1.1967 for  eviction.  The  appellant filed  an  application  under Section  13(4) of the Act (as it stood prior  to  amendment) for  determination of the arrears of rent and  the  interest payable  thereon. The Trial Court determined the arrears  of rent  and the interest payable thereon and on the  appellant depositing  the  same, the suit was dismissed  in  terms  of Section 13(7) of the Act. Thereafter, the appellant went  on depositing the rent in court. However, the respondent  filed another  suit  on 21.5.75 alleging that  the  appellant  had again committed default in payment of rent and should there- fore  be  evicted. The appellant was served  with  a  notice calling upon him to appear in Court on 10.2.76. Since a copy of the plaint was not sent along with the notice, the appel- lant  was furnished a copy of the plaint on 10.2.76  and  he was granted time till 30.3.76 to file his written statement. In his written statement the appellant refuted his liability to  be evicted on the ground of default in payment of  rent. In addition, by way of abundant caution, he filed a petition under  Section  13(3) and 13(4) of the amended  Act  praying that if in the course of depositing the rent during the long

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period  of eight years from 1967 to 1975 there had been  any omission, due to over-sight, in depositing the monthly rent, the  Court  may determine the amount of  shortfall  and  the interest payable thereon and permit him to deposit the  same in Court.     Even before the appellant was served with notice in  the suit,  the Act came to be amended on 29.9.1975  by  Amending Ordinance  No.  26 of 1975 (later replaced by an  Act).  The Ordinance provided for a new section viz. Section 13-A being added to the Act. Section 13-A is in the following terms: 196               "13-A. Special provisions relating to  pending               and  other matters.--Notwithstanding  anything               to  the  contrary in this Act  as  it  existed               before  the  commencement  of  this   Amending               Ordinance or in any other law.               (a) No court shall, in any proceeding  pending               on  the date of commencement of the  (amending               ordinance)  pass  any decree in  favour  of  a               landlord  for  eviction  of a  tenant  on  the               ground  of non-payment of rent, if the  tenant               applies  under  clause  (b) and  pays  to  the               landlord,  or deposits in court,  within  such               time  such aggregate of the amount or rent  in               arrears,  interest thereon and full  costs  of               the suit as may be directed by the court under               and in accordance with that clause;               (b) in every such proceeding, the court shall,               on  the application of the tenant made  within               thirty  days from the date of commencement  of               the  (amending ordinance) notwithstanding  any               order to the contrary determine the amount  of               rent in arrears upto the date of the order  as               also the amount of interest thereon at 6%  per               annum  and costs of the suit allowable to  the               landlord;  and  direct the tenant to  pay  the               amount  so  determined within such  time,  not               exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by  the               court;  and on such payment being made  within               the  time fixed as aforesaid,  the  proceeding               shall be disposed of as if the tenant had  not               committed any default;               (c)  the  provisions of clauses  (a)  and  (b)               shall  mutatis mutandis apply to all  appeals;               or  applications for revisions,  preferred  or               made, after the commencement of the  (amending               ordinance) against decrees for eviction passed               before  such commencement with  the  variation               that  in clause (b), for the  expression  from               the commencement of the (amending  ordinance),               the expression "from the date of the presenta-               tion  of the memorandum of appeal or  applica-               tion for revision" shall be substituted;               (d) omitted.               (e) omitted.               (f) omitted." 197 The  Trial  Court, after hearing both  the  parties,  passed orders  on .the application filed earlier by  the  appellant under  Sections 13(3) and 13(4) of the Act and  called  upon the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.335 towards arrears  of rent  and interest before 28.7.1976 after giving  credit  to the sum of Rs. 1290 already deposited by him. The  appellant complied with the order of the Court by depositing the  said amount within the prescribed time.

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   Even  so, the Trial Court passed a decree  for  eviction against the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent  and the Appellate Court confirmed the decree.  In  the second  appeal preferred to the High Court, the  appellant’s counsel contended that the Trial Court ought to have treated the appellant’s application under Section 13(3) and 13(4) as one under Section 13-A and given the benefit of the  Section to  the appellant and dismissed the suit for  eviction.  The High  Court, in spite of accepting the position that  though the suit was pending when the Amending Ordinance was promul- gated,  the appellant could not have filed a petition  under Section  13A within thirty days from the date of  the  Ordi- nance  coming  into  force as the suit summons  came  to  be served on him only later, nevertheless declined to interfere because in its view the Act has not provided for any  relief to  tenants. placed in the situation in which the  appellant was  placed.  The High Court has further held that  the  Act contains a lacuna but it can be remedied only by the  Legis- lature  and  not by the Courts and, as such,  the  appellant cannot claim the benefit of Section 13A of the Act. The High Court has expressed its view in the following terms:               "Section 13-A of the Rent Control Act does not               envisage and does not provide for a contingen-               cy  as in the present case where the suit  was               pending but the defendant had no notice of the               pendency  of  the  suit  and  could  not  have               availed of the benefit of Section 13-A of  the               Rent  Control  Act on account  of  restriction               placed under Clause (b) for filing an applica-               tion  u/s 13-A within one month from the  date               of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance.               It  is true that Section 13-A is a  beneficial               legislation, to help the tenants but the Court               cannot substitute or add something to the               Act.  It will be for the legislature to  amend               section 13-A of the Rent Control Act so as  to               cover  up contingency arising in  the  present               case. Language of Amended Section 13-A is  not               ambiguous and therefore, there is no  question               of  interpreting so as to extend the  rule  of               beneficial  construction in order to cover  up               cases like the present one." 198     The High Court has further held that since the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for a second  time, he  will  not be entitled to claim the  benefit  of  Section 13(7)  of the Act once again. The High Court  has  expressed its  view  on  this aspect of the matter  in  the  following terms:               "It  is also not disputed that  defendant  had               taken benefit of Section 13(7) of the Old Rent               Control  Act in an earlier suit filed  by  the               plaintiff on the ground of default in  payment               of rent. Since the suit had been filed  before               coming into force of the Amending Ordinance of               1975  or the Amending Act of 1976, the  provi-               sions  of  the  Old Rent  Control  Act  before               amendment will apply, as has been held by  the               Division  Bench  of this Court in  Kishan  Lal               Sharma (supra)."     The  two grounds on which the High Court  had  dismissed the  appellant’s  second appeal are  the  subject-matter  of attack in this appeal.     Learned  counsel  for the appellant contended  that  the High  Court,  after having found that though  the  suit  was

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admittedly  pending when the Amending Ordinance was  promul- gated  the  appellant had no notice of the pendency  of  the suit at the relevant time and as such he could not  possibly have  filed an application within one month’s time from  the date  of the commencement of the Ordinance, should not  have denied  the benefit of Section 13-A to the appellant on  the ground the Section does not provide for an application being made  beyond  a period of thirty days from the date  of  the commencement  of  the  Ordinance. On  the  other  hand,  the learned  counsel for the respondent argued that the  Section is  clear  in  its terms and, as such, the  High  Court  was perfectly  justified  in holding that the  appellant  cannot claim  benefits  under Section 13A of the Act.  It  was  his further  contention that since the appellant  had  committed default in payment of rent for a second time he will not  be entitled  to  claim benefit under Section 13A, even  if  the delay in filing the application beyond the prescribed period of thirty days is to be overlooked. In view of the conflict- ing arguments of the learned counsel, two questions fall for consideration viz (1) whether the appellant is not  entitled to claim the benefit of Section 13A because he had not filed an application within thirty days from the date of commence- ment  of  the Ordinance and (2) even otherwise,  whether  by reason  of  the earlier default in payment of rent  for  the period 1-2-1966 to 31-12-1966, the appellant is  disentitled under the Act to claim the benefit of Section 13A. 199 So  far as the first question is concerned, the  High  Court has failed to see that the object of enacting Section 13A by the Legislature was to confer benefit on all tenants against whom suits for eviction on the ground of default in  payment of  rent were pending. To achieve the object,  Section  13-A has been given overriding effect. Sub-clause (1) of  Section 13-A mandates all courts not to pass any decree in favour of a  landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground  of  non- payment  of rent, if the tenant makes an application as  per clause  (b)  and pays to the landlord or deposits  in  court within  the  prescribed  time the total amount  of  rent  in arrears  together with interest and full costs of the  suit. It  is no doubt true sub-clause (b) lays down that in  every such  proceeding, the Court shall, on the application  of  a tenant  made  within thirty days from the date of  the  com- mencement of the amending Ordinance, determine the amount of rent in arrears as well as the amount of interest at six per cent  per  annum and the costs of the suit  and  direct  the tenant  to  pay the amount so determined within a  time  not exceeding  ninety  days as may be fixed by the  Court.  Sub- clause (b) further provides that on such payment being made, the  proceedings shall be disposed of as if the  tenant  had not committed any default. The intention of the  Legislature to confer the benefit of Section 13A to all tenants, provid- ed  actual  eviction had not taken place, could  further  be seen  by the terms of sub-clause (c). Under  sub-clause  (c) the  provisions of sub-clause (a) & (b) have been  made  ap- plicable mutatis mutandis to all appeals or applications for revision  preferred  or made after the commencement  of  the Amending  Ordinance  and the only stipulation  contained  is that  the tenant preferring an appeal or an application  for revision should apply to the Court within a period of thirty days  from  the date of presentation of  the  memorandum  of appeal  or the application for revision for giving  him  the benefit  of  Section 13A. Such being the case, it  would  be unreasonable    and   inequitable   to   hold    that    the Legislature/had  intended to confer the benefit  of  Section 13A  only  to those tenants who had received notice  of  the

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suit filed against them before the Ordinance came into force and  not  to  those tenants against  whom  proceedings  were pending in the sense they had been instituted but who had no notice  of  the pendency of the suit. In this  case,  it  is common ground that though the suit was filed by the respond- ent on 21-5-1975, the appellant had no notice of the suit on 29.9.1975 when the Ordinance was promulgated or even  before the expiry of thirty days after the Ordinance was promulgat- ed. Such being the case, the appellant, even if he had known of the promulgation of the Amending Ordinance on  29-9-1975, could not have known that a suit for eviction had been filed against him on the ground of default in payment of rent  and that he should file an applica- 200 tion  under Sec. 13-A(1)(b) within thirty days of  the  com- mencement of the Ordinance. It would therefore be futile  to expect  compliance from him of the terms of Sec.  13-A(1)(b) in  the suit which was no doubt pending, within thirty  days from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance to  claim the benefit of Section 13A.     A somewhat similar situation came to be noticed by  this Court in B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v.B.K. Bhowmick, [1987] 2 SCR 559.  In  that case the tenant made an application,  in  the suit  filed  by the landlord for eviction on the  ground  of default in payment of rent, under Section 17(2) of the  West Bengal  Premises Tenancy Act for the court  determining  the amount  of rent payable by him to the landlord.  During  the pendency of the proceeding, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amending)  Ordinance, which was later replaced by  an  Act, came  to  be promulgated with effect  from  26-8-1967.  Sub- sections (2A) and (2B) to Section 17 of the Act were insert- ed and Section 5 of the Ordinance gave retrospective  effect to  the amendments and provided that the amendments made  by the Ordinance shall have effect in respect of suits  includ- ing appeals which were pending on the date of the  commence- ment  of the Ordinance. To avail the benefit of the  amended provision,  the tenant preferred an application  within  one month and prayed for the payment of the arrears of the rent. The  Trial Court determined the amount and the  tenant  paid the  entire arrears but even so the Trial Court  struck  off the  defence of the appellant on the ground that  in  paying the  rent for the months of September, 1968 and March,  1969 there  had been a delay of 44 days and 6  days  respectively and hence there was a contravention of Section 17(1) of  the Act.  Thereafter  the landlord’s suit was  decreed  and  the decree  was confirmed by the Appellate Court. In the  second appeal  preferred  by  the tenant the High  Court  not  only confirmed  the decree for eviction but went a  step  further and  held that the tenant was not entitled under the Act  to file  an application under Section 17(2A)(b) because he  had not  filed the application within the time  specified  under Sub-section  (1)  of Section 17 of the Act viz.  "one  month from the service of the writ of summons on the defendant  or where he appears in the suit or proceeding without the  writ of  summons  being served on him, within one  month  of  his appearance." The High Court expressed its View as under:                     In   our  view,  the  application  under               section  17(2A)(b) was not also  maintainable.               It  is  true that Section 17(2A)(b)  was  made               applicable to pending suits by the  Ordinance.               But such applicability will be subject to  the               limitation imposed               201               by  sub-section  (2B) of Section  17,  namely,               that an application under sub-section  (2A)(b)

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             has  to be made before the expiry of the  time               specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17 for               the  deposit or payment of the amount  due  on               account  of default in payment of rent.  Under               sub-section (1) of Section 17 the time  speci-               fied is one month from the service of the writ               of  summons on the defendant or where  he  ap-               pears  in the suit or proceeding  without  the               writ  of summons being served on  him,  within               one  month of his appearance. In  the  instant               case, the summons was served on the defendants               on  April 6, 1967. The application under  sec-               tion 17(2A)(b) having been filed on  September               22,  1967, it was barred by limitation   .....               In our view, after the expiry of one month  of               the service of summons on the defendants, they               had no right to avail themselves of the provi-               sions  of section 17(2A). Sub-section (2B)  of               section 17 having prescribed a time limit  for               an  application  under  sub-section  (2A),  no               other period of limitation can be  substituted               for  the purpose of making an application  for               instalments.  It  is true that the  Act  is  a               remedial statute, but that fact does not  give               the Court jurisdiction to alter the period  of               limitation  as prescribed by the  statute  for               the purpose of giving relief to the tenant. If               the  legislature had intended that the  tenant               in a pending suit would be entitled to make an               application  under section 17(2A)  within  one               month  of  the  date of  promulgation  of  the               Ordinance,  it would have  expressly  provided               for  the  same as it has done in  other  cases               covered by section 17B and 17D."     In  the  appeal preferred by the tenant  to  this  Court against  the judgment of the High Court, this  Court  disap- proved  the view taken by the High Court. In  the  judgment, reference was made to the decisions in Madhav Raw Scindia v. Union of India, AIR SC 197 1 530 and Dy. Custodian v.  Offi- cial Receiver, [1965] 1 SCR 220 while setting out the  prin- ciple  to be followed in the matter of construction  of  the provisions of an Act. It was observed that the provisions of an Act must be construed in such a manner that the construc- tion  should  serve  the purpose of achieving  the  aim  and object  of  the  Act and not in a way as  would  defeat  the legislative  intent  behind the Act. After setting  out  the principle,  the fallacy contained in the view taken  by  the High Court was pointed out in the following manner:               "The  High Court was, therefore, in  error  in               holding that               202               the  application under Section  17(2A)(b)  was               itself  not maintainable. If the High  Court’s               view is to be accepted it would then amount to               asking the appellant to perform the impossible               i.e. asking the appellant to file an  applica-               tion under section  17(2A)(b) which came  into               force on 26.8. 1967 within one month from 6.4.               1967 when the suit summons was served."     The  view taken in B.B. Khemka (supra) would have  rele- vance  in this case also because though the  amending  Ordi- nance  came  to be promulgated on 29-9-1975,  the  appellant came to know of the filing of the suit only long after  when notice  was served on him to appear in Court  on  10-2-1976. Therefore,  the  question  of filing  an  application  under

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Section 13A would arise only when the appellant came to know of  the filing of the suit and its pendency.  In  construing the terms of Section 13A, the Court has to bear in mind  the object  underlying  the introduction of the Section  by  the Legislature. It is a settled principle that the  interpreta- tion  of the provisions of a statute should conform  to  the legislative intent as far as possible and the Courts  should not  take a narrow or restricted view which will defeat  the purpose  of the Act. So viewed the first question has to  be answered in favour of the appellant.     In so far as the second question is concerned, it is not as  if the appellant had committed a second default  in  the strict  sense  of the term. The earlier suit  was  filed  on 17-1-1967  and the appellant had made an  application  under Section  13(4) of the Act and had the amount of arrears  and the interest payable thereon determined by the Court. There- after  he had been depositing the rent in  Court  regularly. However,  when the respondent filed a second suit  on  21-5- 1975 alleging that the appellant had again committed default in  payment of rent, the appellant had bonafide  represented to the Court that he had been regularly depositing the  rent and the house tax but it may be possible that there may have been  some  delay  or omission here and there  in  the  long period  of eight years in the payment of rent and hence  the Court  may  determine  the amount of arrears,  if  any,  and afford  him opportunity to pay the arrears. This prayer  was granted  and  the Court had determined the arrears  and  the interest  payable  thereon and the appellant  deposited  the amount so determined within the prescribed time. It  cannot, therefore,  be  said that the appellant  had  knowingly  and wilfully  committed  a second default. Even  though  it  was found that some arrears had to be paid, the appellant cannot be denied the benefit of Section 13A because the Section has been  given overriding effect in so far as suits  and  other proceedings which were pending on 203 the  date of the promulgation of the Ordinance and  as  such the proviso to sub-section 6 of the Section 13 of the amend- ed  Act  would  not disentitle the appellant  to  claim  the benefit  of  Section 13-A. The High Court was  therefore  in error  in holding that since the suit had been filed  before Sec-13A was introduced, the appellant would be governed only by the provisions of the Act before its amendment.     For  these  reasons the second question also has  to  be answered  in  favour of the appellant. In the light  of  our conclusion on the two questions falling for consideration in this  appeal, the judgment of the High Court as well as  the judgments  of the courts below cannot be sustained.  Accord- ingly,  the  appeal  is allowed and the suit  filed  by  the respondent will stand dismissed. The appellant will however, pay  the full costs of the suit to the respondent as  envis- aged  under  Section 13-A, if he has not  already  paid  the same. No order as to costs in this appeal. Y.L.                                                  Appeal allowed. 204