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PETITIONER: VATAL NAGARAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.   DAYANAND SAGAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. KHANNA, HANS RAJ BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  349            1975 SCR  (2) 384  1975 SCC  (4) 127  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC1187  (6)  D          1985 SC  89  (9)  RF         1985 SC1133  (8)

ACT: Representation  of the People Act (43 of 1951), ss. 77,  101 and  123(6)-Difference  between facts  constituting  corrupt practice  and illustration of corrupt  practice-Approach  of trial  Court to poll verdict-Approach of appellate Court  to evidence-Declaration’  in  favour of rival  candidate,  when permissible-Reform   of   election  law   in   relation   to expenditure, suggested.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was declared elected to the State  Legislative Assembly and the first respondent, who get the next  highest number of votes, challenged his election on various  grounds and  also prayed that he should be declared elected  in  the appellant’s  place.  One of the grounds alleged against  the appellant  was that by hiring, 10 cars for campaigning,  and spending money for printing election materials, be ,spent by way of election expenses, money beyond the legal limit,  and thus  committed the corrupt practice under s. 123(6) of  the Representation  of the People Act. 1951 The High Court  held this  ground  proved  and  also that  some  of  the  printed handbills  contained  libellous matter, and  set  aside  the election and declared the first respondent elected. In appeal to this Court, HELD : The setting aside of the appellant’s election by  the High  Court  should  be confirmed, but  the  declaration  in favour of the first respondent should be set aside. [399  B- C] (1)  The numbers of the some of the cars hired as set out in the  petition were :different from those given in  evidence. But  the  infirmity would not have any effect on  the  first respondent’s  case since no prejudice has been sustained  by the  appellant by the change and no integral element in  the ground of corrupt practice, namely excessive expenditure for the  election, has been kept back.  In the law of  election. facts  constitutive of corrupt Practice must be  averred  in the  petition itself or brought in by amendment by leave  of

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court   within  the  limitation  period.   But   particulars ;illustrative  of  corrupt  practices  alleged  stand  on  a different  footing.   Proof at minor variance  with  alleged particulars  may  be  allowed  by  the  court  Provided  the opposite party has not sustained any prejudice and is  given an Opportunity for adducing rebutting evidence. [388 G-389E] Bhagwan  Datt  Shastri v. R. R. Gupta, 11  E.L.R.  448,  456 followed. (2)  Where  the  trial  court has watched  the  delivery  of testimony by the witnesses its opinion on their  credibility is entitled to much credit by the appellate court. [389G-H] (3)  An  election  tribunal must know that there  exists  an initial presumption in favour of the poll verdict; and  that the  whole constituency is invisibly party to the lis.   The voice  of  the voters will be interfered with  only  if  the votes  in  favour of the elected  candidate  were  illegally procured.   In the present case, the High Court has  weighed the evidence  fairly and  correctly. The approach of the court to the evidence is impeccable. There mayhave  been adulteration  of evidence; but, after full consideration  of the  finding  of  the  High Court  that  the  appellant  had committed the corrupt  practice  under s.  123(6)  must  be confirmed. [390 C-D,     E-F; 394H-395A] (4)  But assuming that some of the allegations in  the  hand bills undoubtedly amounted to character assasination of  the first  respondent and injured his poll prospects, and  group disaffection  or threat, as stipulated in s. 123,  could  be ,read into them the sanctity of the poll verdict will  stand violated,  if the tribunal without the strict compulsion  of statutory    provisions,   substitutes   for   an    elected representative  a court picked candidate.  The  requirements under s, 101 before the 385 court  can  declare  a  rival  candidate  as  the   returned candidate, are (a) the returned candidate must have obtained votes  by operation of corrupt practices, (b)  such  tainted votes  must be quantified with judicial assurance,  and  (c) after  deduction of such void votes the petitioner  or  some other candidate must be shown to have secured a majority  of the  valid  votes.   Therefore,  in  the  present  case  the decisive factor would be satisfactory proof of the number of votes,  if any, attracted by the appellant into  his  ballot box  by the corrupt means proved against him.  But there  is no evidence to show how many votes were definitely  obtained by the appellant by the use of corrupt practices.  There  is no  link  between  the  polluted  practice  and  the  voters affected.   Further,  there  is nothing to  show  why  those voters would have Preferred the first respondent and not any other candidate, there being as many as 10 contesting candidates. [396 B-C, H-397E; 398B-D] T.   Nagappa  v.  T. C. Basappa, A.I.R. 1955  S.C.  756  and Jamuna  Prasad v. Lachhi and, AIR1954 S.C. 686, 689:  [1955] S.C.R. 608. referred to. (5)  Money  power casts a sinister shadow on  our  elections Further,  there  is  a  built-in  iniquity  in  the  scheme, because,  an independent candidate who exceeds  the  ceiling prescribed under the law commits a corrupt practice, but his rivals  set  up  by  political  parties  with   considerable potential for fund-raising and using, may lay out a  hundred times more in each constituency on their candidates and  yet escape  the  penalty  under s. 77 on  the  ground  that  the excessive expenditure was not spent by the candidate but  by the  party  for its campaign.  This evasion of  the  law  by using  big  money through political parties is a  source  of pollution of the Indian political process.  It may therefore

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be  proper  to infuse into the election  law  the  cleansing spirit  suggested by this Court in Kanwarlal Gupta  v.  Amar Nath  Chawla  [1975]  2  S. C. R.  259  and  by  the  Select Committee  on  the Indian Election Offences  and  Enquiries Act,  1920.   Elections. constituency wise. are  the  corner stone  of  our  parliamentary system and if the  law  is  to reflect and ensure the democratic norms set by the nation in this  strategic  area,  serious  political  consensus.   not sanctimonious platitudes, on reducing the heavy  expenditure on  election by parties and candidates, must emerge.  it  is only  to  a limited extent that courts can  respond  to  the fulfillment of this constitutional aspiration by a benignant interpretation  of the legal limits on election  expenditure set down in s. 77. [399 D-H; 400 A-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1738  of 1973. Appeal  from the Judgment and order dated the  6th  November 1973  of the Karnataka High Court in Election  Petition  No. 4/72. V.   S.  Desai, B. K. Ramachandra Rao, S.  B.  Chandrasekhar and R.    B. Datar, for the appellant. A.   K. Sen, V. K. Govindrajulu, V. G. Vasanth Kurnar and M. Veerappa, for respondent No. 1 Dewan Balak Ram, for respondent No. 2 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA-  IYER, J.-The locale of this  election  litigation, now at the appellate stage, lies in Bangalore, an industrial city  inhabited  by a blend of  multireligious  poly-lingual communities.  But, when a pathological power-scramble is on, the  politics  of  stoop-to-conquer shows  up  in  forms  of unscrupulous opportunism and investment in group hatred  and the Chamarajpet constituency in Bangalore City is alleged to have  been injected by this virus by the appellant at  about the  time  the State Assmbly elections in March,  1972  were hold.   If  multi-form  corruption  corrodes  the  electoral process--and that is the imputation here the gutter can come to power to adopt a phrase used 386 in  a different context by a great writer.  Judging  by  the general  trend of vice and violation organised  as  election strategy,  only  glimpses of which Judges  get  in  election cases,  we  wonder  whether  parties  and  individuals   who practice  these oblique techniques, fully realise the  moral of   the   Frankenstein’s  monster  episode.    These   dark forebodings,  however,  do not deter us  from  applying  the sound   tests  laid  down  by  a  long  line  of  cases   in interpreting  the provisions and evaluating the evidence  in election  cases.  Out task has, however, become more  uneasy because  both  sides  have  liberally  contributed   dubious testimony in a bid to win their respective cases. A  brief  diary of events will bring into focus  the  issues over  which  the forensic controversy  has  raged.   Sixteen persons   filed  nomination  papers  from  the   Chamarajpet constituency, six discreetly withdrew and the surviving  ten went into battle on March 5, 1972 the date set for the poll. The voting strength of this constituency was 97,379 but  the actual votes polled was only 52,720.  While the D. M. K. and the  Muslim League made a relatively good  showing  securing over  7,000  votes  each,  the real  bout  was  between  the appellant,  an Independent glamourised as a heroic  agitator for Kannada, the language of the vast majority of the people

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of the then Mysore State and the 1st respondent, a  Congress Party  candidate  enjoying  consequential  advantages.   The appellant  won,  polling 15,486 but the 1st  respondent  was close behind with 14,412.  It is art uneasy feature that  in our  electoral  system,  even  with  hot  contest  as  here, sometimes  only  half the voters turn up to  exercise  their franchise  and  he  who gets 15 % of the total  votes  of  a constituency  acquires  the ’right to speak and act  as  its plenary  proxy  in the Legislature.  We do not  regard  this aspect  as  falling  within our province  since  this  vexed question is Parliament’s concern.  Anyway, the infirmity  of the  poll victory agitated before us is that even this 15  % was the product of illegal tactics sufficient to  invalidate the  election of the appellant and, what is  more  bathetic, the further relief sought is that the on(,, who got only 14% i.e.  the 1st respondent, should be declared  the  authentic elected member of Chamarajpet. The  charges  made  by the 1st respondent  to  demolish  the declaration  of the appellant made by the Returning  Officer on  March  11, 1972 relate to certain  malpractices  between February  11,  1972 and March 5, 1972.  It is  a  melancholy reflection  op. the 1st respondent’s methodology of  winning his election petition that he has adduced evidence. some  of which bears traces of forgery and tricky photography  backed by  perjury.  This finding by the trial Court has  not  been shaken  in argument before us.  One should have  expected  a legislative  aspirant representing a national party, an  ex- Deputy  Minister and barrister, to be cleaner in  the  Court while  charging his opponent with corrupt practices  at  the polls. The  young appellant had personalised himself as the  spear- head and become the President of the Kannadiga movement  and its Chaluvali Kendra Mandali.  The popular identification of the  candidature of Vatal Nagaraj, the appellant, with  this somewhat  passionate Organisation is gleaned from  the  fact that his Chief Election Agent in 38 7 Chickpet, Sampangi P. W. 8, was the Secretary of the Mandali and  on  his  resignation in May or  June,  1972  Prabhakara Reddy,  the  Chief  Election  Agent  of  the  appellant   in Chamarajpet, took over the Secretaryship (The appellant  was a   candidate  in.  both  the  constituencies,  which   were contiguous).   It serves our understanding of the forces  at work better if we also remember that there are sizable Tamil and  Muslim  groups  in  Bangalore.   Some  of  the  corrupt practices  alleged are linked up with Tamil presence in  the City.  While economic grievances and social backwardness are the  basic  causes  of what, on the  surface,  shows  up  as language or parochial chauvinism, the fact remains that  the masses  are easily inflamed by  economic-linguistic  appeals peppered by provincialism. We  may now proceed to set out briefly the  charges  leveled against  the appellant, highlighting only those  which  have found  favour with the trial Judge.  However, the  structure of  s.  123 of the Representation of the  People  Act,  1951 (hereinafter called the Act, for short) is such that where a candidate is guilty of one or many of the enumerated corrupt practices,  his election must be set aside and he should  be visited,  under s. 77 of the Act, with a six-year period  of disqualification.   In that view, it may well be that if  we are  satisfied  about  one  of  the  several  charges,   the appellant  must  lose.   However, we  shall  deal  with  the allegations and evidence concisely, so that the  conspirator of the case may not appear distorted, although primarily  we propose to deal with the excess expenditure beyond the legal

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limit  held by the trial judge to have been incurred by  the appellant. While  a close-up of the few counts on which  the  appellant has  been  held  guilty is necessary, a quick  look  at  the fasciculus  of charges, many of which have  been  negatived, may  unfold the characters of the play, their integrity  and the  foul  measure,  apparently  fair  persons  resort   to, sacrificing means to ends.  Purity in elections is a  social process of public concern and national consensus, not just a legislative package or judicial verdict. The publication of many copies of offending leaflets at some cost,  the hiring of tort cars at over Rs. 10,000/- and  the payment of Rs. 500/- to a Kannada Organisation hopefully  to enlist their poll support, are the lethal vices, inter alia, levelled against appellant Nagaraj to undo his election.  In the  unhappy  national  context,  of  unprintable  flood  of leaflets,  movement  of fleets  of  automobiles,  slanderous speeches  and  huge  sums big Parties  and  rich  candidates regard  as the: natural resources to be exploited in aid  of the  politics  of power-grab through adult  franchise,  this election  petition projects a mountain.  molehill  contrast. But  the  Court can only correct what comes  before  it  and perhaps sound warning bells about the enormity of the  envi- ronmental  pollution during elections, for statesmanship  to act,  if’ law in this area is not to be robbed of  pervasive potency. The Catalogue of corrupt practices begins with an  election- eve gift of Rs. 500/- by this Kannada fighter and  President of  the Kannada Chaluvali Kendra Mandali, to  the  Karnataka Yuvaka Pourara Sangha, 0-255Sup.CI/75 388 Bangalore City, motivated by an appealing for voting support from  its members.  We are relieved from  investigating  the legal  import of such financial support to  an  Organisation wedded  to  the programme which is also the passion  of  the candidate  since the story has been rightly rejected by  the High Court and we agree with it.  Certain photographs  (Exs. P-7  and  P-15) alleged to have been taken by P.  W.  3  (an enemy of the appellant) at the Mandali Office and the maiden in  Azad  Nagar,  respectively, on February  20,  1972  were relied on by the Congress ,candidate in this connection  and the  Court,  after a detailed study, discovered  that  there were really taken on April 14, 1972 long after the ,election at  a  school  where he (the  appellant)  was  lured,’taking advantage  of the 1st respondent’s age and vanity’ and  were cleverly  fobbed  off on the Court in hopeful proof  of  the offending  February gift of Rs. 500/-.  The agent  used  for this  purpose was P. W. 30 and the learned  Judge assessed him thus:               "P. W. 30 Raghunath Singh is a creature of the               petitioner, who acted as a spy in the opposite               camp"               a  fifth column tactic hardly fair, if  it  is               true.   A  suspicious February ,edition  of  a               newspaper  called  Karmika Vani (Ex.   P.  10)               carrying  two photos taken in April have  also               been   introduced   by  the   1st   respondent               Dayananda  Sagar.  He has also placed a  make-               believe  letter Exhibit P. 26, signed  by  the               appellant  as  evidence of  car  hire  payment               although the trial Judge has seen through  the               1st   respondent’s  sharp   practice.    Vatal               Nagaraj,  invited to a school  function,  gave               his post-election autograph to children in an

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             exercise  note  book  which  page  was   later               perverted  to  appear as a  letter  forwarding               part  of  the car hire  charges.   This  shady               species  of conduct in election litigation  by               seemingly  important  persons make  us  wonder               whether character assassination cannot be self               inflicted.               We will now move on the crucial issue of  over               spending  by the appellant.  He is alleged  to               have hired, for campaigning, ten cars from the               Bangalore City Cooperative Transport  Society,               the   hire   ,charges  being   Rs.   12,600/-.               Likewise, a sum of Rs. 7,500/-, it is  stated,               ,was paid by the appellant to Nirmala Printing               Press which was run by               P.    W.  2  Devraj,  for  printing   election               materials.               An initial objection was raised by Shri Desai,               arguing  for  the appellant,  that  there  was               substantial  variation  between  pleading  and               proof in this regard, that the numbers of  the               cars hired, as mentioned in the petition, were               different  (regarding 6 out of 10)  from  what               had been put forward in the evidence and  this               divergence had the triple crippling effects of               causing   prejudice,  casting  suspicion   and               disallowing  the plea.  Factually, Shri  Desai               is right but, legally, his objection is bereft               of force. 389 The law of elections is clear on this branch of pleading and proof and a sense of brevity forbids citation of a string of rulings where the rule of law is indubitable.  Litigation is no  hide  and seek game but a search for truth  and  parties must  place their cards on the table.  And procedure is  the handmaid,  not  the  mistress,  of  justice  and  cannot  be permitted  to thwart the fact-finding course.   In  election jurisprudence   tracking  down  corrupt  practices   is   of paramount  importance.  In doing this the rules of the  game must  be  fairly observed.  Facts  constitutive  of  corrupt practices must be averred in the petition itself or  brought in  by  amendment by leave of court; within  the  limitation period.   The opposite party is thus put on his guard as  to what  charges he has to meet.  Particulars, illustrative  of the corrupt practices alleged stand on a different  footing. Even if there have been initial omissions in pleading,  they can be made up, by Court’s leave, at any time.  What is more to  the  point  here-or it is common  case  that  errors  in particulars  of car numbers have at no stage been  rectified in  the present case-proof, at minor variance  with  alleged particulars, may be allowed, the course open to the opposite party  being  to  satisfy  the  trial  Judge  of   prejudice sustained   and  of  opportunity  for   adducing   rebutting evidence.   To  shut  out  cogent  and  clear  evidence   of particulars of corrupt practice (the ground itself being  in the pleadings) on processual technicalities is to orphan the real,  though absent, party viz., the  silent  constituency. This  Court, in Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. R. R.  Gupta(1)  set out the true rule:               "The question in such a case would not be  one               of absence               of  jurisdiction but as to whether  there  has               been any material prejudice occasioned by  the               absence  of particulars. It is in  that  light               that  the validity of the objection raised  by

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             the appellant in this behalf before us had  to               be  judged.  It is,  therefore,  necessary  to               scrutinise the nature of the evidence on which       this finding has been arrived at and  to               see   whether   the  appellant  had   a   fair               opportunity of meeting it." Having heard Shri Desai at length, we are not persuaded that the infirmities he complains of have validity in the case on hand.  No prejudice has been sustained by the change in  the numbers  of  the taxi cars and no integral  element  in  the ground  of corrupt practice viz.,excessive  expenditure  for the  election has been kept back. indeed, even most  of  the particulars have been correctly set out. Before  proceeding to examine the evidence, we must  make  a further cautionary observation. When the trial Court (here a Judge  of  the High Court’) has had an overall view  of  the case  through  the  very process  of  oral  and  documentary unfolding, that panoramic perception cannot be equated  with the  studious  perusal  of the printed record  by  a  higher court.   Where  the  tribunal  has  watched   the   delivery oftestimony   by  the  witnesses,  some  with   equivocating unveracity,  others with nervous truthfulness  or  confident glibness,  its  opinion on credibility is entitled  to  much credit at the appellate stage. Of course, (1)  11 E. L. R. 488,456. 390 even among the judiciary a subjective factor in judging  men and  matters may creep in and so complete dependence on  the assessment of human candour and cunning by trial Judges  can degenerate into legal superstition.               It  is  apt  to remember the  words  of  Judge               Jerome N. Frank(1) as a warning:               "We do know, from occasional candid remarks by               trial Judges, that some of them utilise absurd               rules  of  thumb  such  as  these:  A  witness               unquestionably  lies  who,  while  testifying,               throws  back  his head or wipes his  hands  or               shifts his gaze rapidly; or blushes, or  bites               his lips or taps steadily on his armchair". Having  carefully  considered the matter, we  are  convinced that the High Court has weighed the evidence fairly,  tested the  character  carats of witnesses  correctly  and  reached results rightly. The trial Court has adopted a legally impeccable approach in assessing  the  evidence, as was pointed out by Shri  A.  K. Sen, counsel for the 1st respondent.  Corrupt practices have to be viewed as quasicriminal in character and the strict  ’ standard of proof applicable in such cases, in tune with the decisions  of this Court, has been used as a  touchstone  by the  trial Judge.  The question is whether the  few  corrupt practices, upheld by the High Court, have been proved beyond reasonable  doubt or whether the appellant has been able  to make  any big dent in the case found.’ We will  now  discuss the  heads  of  charge,  itemwise.   The  printed   election literature  has  a dual roll in this case (a) to  boost  the cost  beyond the legal ceilling and (b) to  prove  character assasination.   Both  are corrupt practices.   A  threat  to Tamils i.e. undue influence; is also alleged to be  involved in  the  handbills  in question, Ex.  P. 4 and  Ex.   P.  5. Indeed, an election tribunal must know that there exists  an initial  presumption in favour of the poll verdict  and  the whole  constituency  is invisibly party to  the  lis,  their voice  being  interfered  with  only  if  their  votes  were illegally  pro-cured.   As earlier indicated,  this  leaflet imputation  may,  in  order  of  probative  importance,   be

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considered at a later stage since we are satisfied that  its impact   is  somewhat  indirect  and  its  proof   a   shade inconclusive,  notwithstanding the use to which Shri  A.  K. Sen  has  sought to Put it in  supporting  the  declaration, under  issue  no.   11, that his  client  "obtained  as  the returned candidate. The  critical  issue  which, in our view, is  fatal  to  the appellant’s  election,  is the layout on  hiring  cars.   By itself,  that  item exceeds Rs. 10,000/- and  if  true,  the election  must  be  set aside, without more.   Issue  9  (b) relates to this subject and Paragraph 14(b) of the  petition sets out this ground.  As stated earlier, while the  numbers of the ten cars are enumerated therein, the last six do  not tally  with  the documents produced or  the  Bangalore  City Cooperative Transport (1)Judical  fact finding and psychology, 14 Ohio  State  Law Journal, 183, 186 (Spring 1953)-quoted in Psychology and the Law  by  Dwight  G.  McCartyprentice-Hall,  Inc.,  Englewood Clifts, N.J., USA (1967 4th Printing). 3 91 Society  which was the bailor.  The case is that  the  above Transport,  Society  had  fallen on evil  days  and  so  had authorised its President, one Swaminath, P. W. 7, to ply its vehicles  on a no profit no loss basis.  Swaminath, who  had thus  taken  over the transport operation with  effect  from August 1, 1971 and had, in turn, run a transport service  in the name of Coop.  TOUR COMBINED BOOKING Centre is stated to have  agreed  to  make  available 10 cars  on  hire  to  the candidate  Nagaraj.  Rs. 60/- per day per car, exclusive  of driver  and  fuel, from February 14, 1972 to March  5,  1972 were  the  terms alleged.  It is further  averred  that  the candidate  had authorised Sampangi, P. W. 8, to arrange  for the  hire  of these 10 cars on or about February  10,  1972. The  latter  had made an initial payment of Rs.  3,000/-  on February 12, 1972 through P. W. 30, Raghunath Singh, already referred  to.  The case runs on to the effect that a sum  of Rs.  9,600/- was outstanding as payable to P. W. 7 on  April 10,  1972 when the appellant lodged his account of  election expenses, as required by statute.  It is common ground  that he  did  not enter the sums paid or payable by way  of  hire charges to P. W. 7 in his account submitted to the  Election Commission.  The petition sets out the payment, on April 14, 1972  of a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to P. W. 7’s  Society  towards car hire and this sum is stated to have been sent through P. W.  30,  Raghunath Singh.  Of Course the appellant,  in  his written statement-has denied this story of hiring and piece- meal payments, knowing fully how noxious its effect would be on his victory, in the light of s. 77 of the Act. We  may straightway state that the learned Judge  who  tried the case has referred to P. Ws. 8, 30 and 7 as the principal witnesses  to prove the hiring in of the cars.  However,  he has  already  described P. W. 30 as a spy  of  the  Congress candidate who had slyly operated among the flock of Nagaraj, and  has  discredited him as an  unscrupulous  person.   The learned  Judge has also discarded the testimony of P. W.  8, Sampangi,  for reasons which are self-evident, even  if  one casually  peruses  his deposition.  He is  a  self-condemned perjurer  and  has hardly any claim  to  judicial  credence, particularly  in a case of proof of corrupt practices in  an election petition.  Without expanding on these  unscrupulous souls  any  further,  we  concur with  the  trial  Court  in proceeding to reject that part of the case of the petitioner which lives solely on the lips of P. Ws. 8 and 30.  But  the fact  that  these two dubious beings  have  been  frequently friendly with falsehood does riot destroy the  acceptability

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of  their  testimony  to the extent it  accords  with  other authentic   documentary   material   and   reliable   verbal testimony.    Indeed  the  trial  Judge   has   discerningly observed: "I am placing dependence mainly on the documentary  evidence under  this  issue, supported by the testimony of P.  W.  7, Swaminath." 392 This, we think, is a flawless approach.  We are  constrained to remark that experience proves the wisdom of scepticism in assessing   oral  evidence  in  Court.   In  the  words   of Osborn(1):               "The  astonishing amount of perjury in  courts               of law is a sad commentary on human  veracity.               In  spite  of  the  oath,  more  untruths  are               probably uttered in court than anywhere  else.               This deviation from veracity ranges from  mere               exaggeration  all the way to vicious  perjury.               Much  of this untrue testimony grows  directly               out  of human nature under unusual stress  and               is  not an accurate measure of truth  speaking               in  general.  In order to shield a friend,  or               help  one  to win in what is thought to  be  a               just cause, or because of sympathy for one  in               trouble,  many  members  of  the  frail  human               family are inclined to violate the truth in  a               court of law as they will not do elsewhere,." The  High Court’s discussion is exhaustive.   The  arguments before us have not suffered from inadequacy and since we are affirming  the  principal conclusion of fact  of  the  trial Judge  we content ourselves with stating only the  essential reasons. The  version  of  the  petitioner  regarding  the   vehicles (although  with  different  registration  numbers  has  been substantially  spoken to by Swaminath, P. W. 7. Most of  the details deposed to by him fit in with the original averments and    trivial   discrepancies   cannot   disturb    factual appreciation of the core. P.W. 7, the President of the Society, has not been shown  to be either interested  in the petitioner or animated  against the appellant. If, as    he swears, he did run the  business of transport during the relevant   period,   there   is   no reason  to  be sceptered about acting on his word  on  oath. Exhibit   P-22,  the  proceedings  book  of  the  Board   of Management  of the Society, contains entries, dated July  2, 1971  (P 22A) evidencing the authorisation in his favour  by the  Board of Management.  The marginal doubt, generated  by the fact of the resolution, Exhibit P-22A, put him in charge of the Business only until January 31, 1972 while the period of the hiring was beyond that date, is insufficient to shake his  testimony in the light of all the other  circumstances. For,  until April 17, 1972 the Board of Management  had  not made  over  its transport business to anyone else.   On  the other hand, Ex.  P. 22B, the proceedings of the Board at its meeting  held on April 17, 1972 (item No. 4) reinforces  the case  spoken  to  by  P. W.  7.  The  criticism  that  these proceedings   could   have  been   manipulated   into   life subsequently  stands crushed by the endorsement  Exhibit  P- 22A(1)  made  on  the  proceedings  book  by  the  Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Shri Bhatia, on April 5, 1972.   Even  otherwise,  P. W. 7’s story  suffers  form  no inherent   improbability   and  there  is   no   presentable alternative  put forward by the appellant as to how  he  ran the  automobile  part of his election campaign.   He  swore, more incredibly, that he covered the 25 square miles of  his

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constituency on foot, during the hectic period (1) ’The Problem of Proof’ Albert S. Osborn, pp. 22.23  New York, Methew Bender & Co. 1926-quoted In (2) ibid, p. 226. 393 of  this  bitter  election campaign.  May be,  he  had  many volunteers  ,Of the Chaluvali Kendra Mandali to support  him and they might well have covered the area on bicycles.   May be,  being militantly identified with an  agitational  issue (Kannada  for  Kannadigas,  to capsule  the  movement  in  a slogan) his monetary inputs might have been puny compared to his more prosperous Congress rival.  Evan so, the  Padayatra programme, eschewing automobile journeys altogether, is  too unrealistic and mendacious to be taken seriously.  Moreover, there  is other documentary evidence in proof of payment  of hire   charges.   Exhibits  P-23,  P-24  and  P-25   deserve probative  credit,  in this context, P. W. 8,  Sampangi,  is seen  to  have  signed them and even if  we  disbelieve  the integrity  of  P.  W.  30 who is  alleged  to  have  carried Exlaibit  P-23  or of P. W. 8, who, admittedly,  has  signed that  letter,  there  is  no  gain  saying  the  fact   that documentary  evidence of advance payment of Rs.  3,000/-  is forthcoming  Exhibit  P-24,  dated February 12,  1972  is  a letter written by Swaminath to Nagaraj and Exhibit P. 24A is the  office copy.  Exhibit P-25 further clinches the  matter since it acknowledges the delivery of the cars and bears the signature  of P. W. 8, Sampangi, appended on behalf  of  his principal,  Nagaraj.   Not  P. W. 8 nor P. W.  30,  but  the documentary  testimony  and  the  credibility  of  P.  W.  7 influence our conclusion. Two  major criticisms were levelled against this  branch  of the case by Shri Desai.  Certain minor weaknesses were  also pointed  out  which,  for  general  considerations   already indicated, do not need lengthy scrutiny.  He contended  that P. W. 8, Sampangi, was not his election agent in Chamarajpet Constituency and was an obvious betrayer who had been bought up  by the more powerful petitioner so much so his words  or signatures could not command judicial confidence.  Secondly, he  urged  that the evidence of P. W. 7  and  the  documents stood shaken in view of the reference therein to Exhibit  P- 26 which had been found by the trial Court to be a  forgery. We may examine the force, if any, of these submissions. P.   W.   8  is  a  consummate  artist   in   terminological inexactitudes   who  owns  up  in  cross-examination,   with melodramatic  audacity both perjury and  fabrication.   Even so,  his political bond with Nagaraj during the election  is undeniable.   They  were  President  and  Secretary  of  the Chaluvali  Kendra  Mandali until May or June 1972  when  the latter resigned. P. W. 8 was Chief Election Agent of Nagaraj in  the adjoining Chickpet Constituency and could riot  have confined  his  busy  campaigning, activated  by  the  larger Kannada  cause, to the territorial limits of  Chickpet.   In June  he  ran  for the Legislative  Council  seat  from  the Teachers’  constituency and Nagaraj appealed  for  electoral support through a newspaper column carrying his  photograph. Haunted though we are by hunches about the distance  between honest  processes  of  proof  and  the  petitioner’s   modus operanti in Court, unhesitatingly we held that Sampangi.  P. W. 8, was an activist lieutenant of the appellant during the critical months of February, March and April. 394 Exhibit  P-26,  if we may recapitulate, is  that  pernicious paper  on  which  Nagaraj scribbled  his  then  sought-after autograph  at  a  school  function,  hardly  suspecting  its potential transmigration, into a letter forwarding a part of the car hire.  Without trivialising the trickery played upon

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the  appellant for which vicarious guilt must belong to  the 1st  respondent,  we find no difficulty  in  delinking  this documentary  effort at over-kill, through Ex.  P.  26,  from the other dependable evidence of hiring 10 cars.  Some holes of  perjured evidence somewhere cannot sink the  whole  case which  can  safely  float on other  tested  testimony.   All cobwebs  of suspicion are brushed away by Ex.  P. 28 and  P. 29.  Finding a large sum outstanding from Nagaraj by way  of car  hire,  P. W. 7 Swamiriath, a financially  weak  person, wrote  to the treasurer of the Mandali pleading  that  since the appellant, the President, had owed a substantial  amount in connection with the election where the Mandali had backed him  the  treasurer Lakshmipathi had better  make  good  the money  and  adjust with the President later.  Pat  came  the reply Ex.  P. 29 from Lakshmipathi disowning liability  from the  Mandali.   Again,.  Swaminath (P.  W.  7)  pursued  his claim by writing for balance payment to the appellant with a copy to P. W. 8 (vide Ex.  P. 30).  What followed (it  rings true) may be rendered in the words of P. W. 7:               "I   received  the  reply  Ex.   P.  31   from               Sampangi.  It is dated 22-4-1972.  Through the               reply Ex.  P. 31 Sa.  Kru.  Sampangi asked  me               to  accept  Rs. 8,000/-  from  1st  respondent               Vatal Nagaraj in full settlement.  I went  and               collected Rs. 8,000/- from Sa. Kru.   Sampangi               on behalf of the I st respondent Vatal Nagaraj               on 24-4-1972, issued a temporary receipt.  The               office copy of that receipt is Ex.  P. 32.  On               25-4-1972  1  wrote to  the  respondent  Vatal               Nagaraj,  with a copy to Sa.   Kru.   Sampangi               and sent that letter by post.  The office copy               of that letter is Ex.  P. 33."               We  have  the corroborative  evidence  of  the               receipt book kept by P.   W.  7 Ex.  P. 34  in               his own words;               "Exs.  P. 34(a), P. 34(b), P. 34(c), P. 34(d),               P. 34(c), P. 34(f), P. 34(g) P. 34(h) are  the               respective  receipts regarding cars Nos.   MYA               3981, MYD 9030, MYD 7575, MYD 6756, MYA  4044,               MYA 4114, MYD 9779 and MYA 3633.  The  receipt               Ex.  P.  34(1) refers to the Society  Car  MYD               7222  and the receipt Ex.  P. 34(1) refers  to               the Society Car MYD 8600". These receipts relate to cars of others taken by P. W. 7  to make  up  the ten cars agreed to be  supplied,  his  Society itself being only in possession of two cars.  This wealth of documentary material is convincing enough, in the background of  the trial Court’s remark : P. W. 7 Swaminath  has  stood the test of cross-examination well and his answers seemed to be forthright." Shri Desai did exploit the divergence in car registration  numbers  and  the  unsatisfactory  explanation ,offered by the 1st respondent in that behalf.  So also  the spurious Ex.P. 26.  Adulteration of evidence  perhaps  there is, but, after full con- 3 95 sideration  of the total material we are satisfied with  the affirmative finding on issue 9(b) given by the High Court. Shri  Desai feebly suggested that P. W. 6 was not his  agent in  Chamarajpet but in Chickpet, and P. W. 30 was  riot  his men  at all.  We have disposed of the factual part  of  this plea but the law of agency in election jurisprudence, it may be  rioted,  is more elastic.  In a sense, the  corrupt  act need  not  be done by the candidate or  his  chief  election agent.   It is enough if it is authorised by either,  as  we will  later show and here the hiring was done as  authorised

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by the candidate. The  anxious 1st respondent has made many other  charges  of corrupt practice which,havo been repelled by the trial court and  we concur.  But two invalidating imputations have  been repelled  by  the  trial  Court  and  we  concur.   But  two invalidating  imputations  have been upheld by  the  learned Judge,  both turning on the printed election  material,  its cost and libellous toxicity.  We are not disposed to dissect the evidence in detail on these twin charges since a  single fatal stab is as good as multiple mortal wounds if death  is the  goal.  But the 1st respondent’s ambition is not  merely to  destroy the declaration of the appellant but  to  instal himself as the Chamarajpet MLA through the judicial process. "There’s  the rub". of course, if the law allows it he  must get  it. Exhibits P-4 and-P. 5 are two handbills in  Kannada and  Tamil,  respectively and exhibit P-9  is  the  election manifesto  of  the appellant says the  1st  respondent.   Of course,  the  appellant has denied responsibility  for  this offending  literature  and has gone to the  extent  of  con- tending  that  the alleged printer P. W. 2 was  a  vegetable vendor injected into the scene by the. 1st respondent as  an evenescant  lessee of a press who, ostensibly,  appeared  on the  scene about the time of the election,  engaged  himself solely  in  printing  the appellant’s  election  matter  an( vanished  from  the  printing scene back  to  his  vegetable vendors  job  after the election.  May be the  story,  prima facie, is suspect, but, on a closer scrutiny especially with Ex.  R. 6 in mind, the finding of the trial court must  pass muster.  There is also some evidence of these leaflets being distributed by the workers of Nagaraj.  Considerable  debate there  was  at the bar as to whether Exhibit  P-4,  ever  if true, amounted to character assassination, or other  corrupt practice,  but at least a portion of it relating to  payment of  money to voters undoubtly injures the petitioner’s  good morals  although many other statements may hover around  the border   line   or  cannot  constitute   corrupt   practice. Accepting  Ex.   P. 4 as a passionate plea for  Kannada  and criticism of the rival as one who argues for English, it  is not  ’Character assassination, nor is a militant demand  for larger  areas  for Karnataka State corrupt  practice.   Even notions  on  nude  dances and or  economic  exploitation  of people  cannot  be  judged by  mid  Victorian  prudery  when interpreting  s.  123 of the Act.  We have to  be  aware  of realities informed by the current ethos of the community and remember  the usual margin of electoral exaggeration,  while construing  such speeches and writings.  It is  indisputable that if the printing has been done. by the appellant or  his election agent arid. the cost thereof was as pleaded 396 in the petition, the ceiling on election expenses set by the statute would be further exceeded. We  are not inclined to upset the holding of the High  Court that  "there can be no reasonable doubt that  regarding  the handbills Exhibits P-4, P-5 and P-9 the petitioner’s version is  true" but do not embark on any long discussion as it  is uncalled  for.   But the  almost  astrological’  consequence claimed  to  be flowing therefrom that  the  1st  respondent would have obtained a majority of valid votes demands fuller examination.   For purposes of argument, let us assume  that Exhibits P-4, P-5 and P-9 were printed and distributed prior to  the election and that P. W. 2 had been paid Rs.  7,500/- as printing charges.  We may similarly assume that  personal aspersions  and  implicit group disaffection  or  threat  as stipulated  in  S.  123 of the Act  could  read  into  these leaflets, as claimed in the petition.  Even so, What?

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This takes us to issue No. 11 which, perhaps, is the  second most contested question in the whole case.  Having exceeded, on  our own finding, the financial ceiling set by S.  77  of the  Act,  a  corrupt practice has  been  committed  by  the appellant and his election has been rightly set aside by the High  Court.   Inevitably,  under  S. 8A  of  the  Act,  the appellant  has  to  be visited with  the  punitive  six-year disqualification.  So the High Court’s finding oil issue No. 12 also must stand. The only bitter bone of contention between the parties which survives  is covered by issue no.  11. The sanctity  of  the poll  verdict will stand violated if the  tribunal,  without the   strictest   compulsion   of   statutory    provisions, substitutes  for  an elected representative a  Court  Picked candidate.  The relevant part of S. 101 may well be set  out at this stage:               "101.   Grounds  for which a  candidate  other               than the returned candidate may be declared to               have been elected:-               If  any person who has lodged a petition  has,               in   addition  to  calling  in  question   the               election of the returned candidate, claimed  a               declaration  that  he  himself  or  any  other               candidate  has been duly elected and the  High               Court is of opinion.               (b)   That  but for the votes obtained by  the               returned  candidate by corrupt  practices  the               petitioner or such other candidate would  have               obtained a majority of the valid votes,               the  High  Court  shall  after  declaring  the               election of the returned candidate to be  void               declare   the   petitioner   or   such   other               candidate,  as the case may be, to  have  been               duly elected. The  insistent requirements of the section are that  firstly the  returned  candidate  must have obtained  votes  by  the operation  of  corrupt practices;  secondly,  such  obtained votes  must  be  Quantified  with  judicial  assurance   and thirdly, after deduction of such void votes, the petitioner 397 or other candidate must be shown to have secured a  majority of  the  valid  votes.  In the present  case,  the  decisive factor is the satisfactory proof of the number of votes,  if any,  attracted by the appellant into his ballot box by  the corrupt  means.  How many. voters were lured for certain  by the  expenditure  of several thousand rupees  more  than  is sanctioned  by the law ? Did the campaigning in those  hired cars.  snatch votes at all ? Did deleterious  leaflets  draw into Nagaraj’s net a specific set of voters : To capsule the enquiry, how many votes were definitely obtained by the  use of  each corrupt practice?  This hinges not on mystic  maybe And  vague imponderables and prejudice to prospects  but  on tangible testimony that a number of persons,  arithmetically assessed,  swang towards and probably actually’ for the  re- turned   candidate,  directly  magnetised  by  the   corrupt practice, so that one could positively predicate those votes as  having been obtained by corrupt practices.   This  clear nexus   is  of  critical  importance.   Happy   speculation, hypothetical  possibility and clairvoyant  surmise,  however imaginatively  and  objectively made, cannot  displace  this drastic requirement.  Where, for instance, a certain  number of  persons,  in  violation  of the  legal  ban,  have  been transported by the candidate and they have been shown,  with fair  assurance, to have cast their votes in his  favour  or where  specific cases of false personation or double  voting

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at the instance of the candidate or his agents have occurred and  the  margin of difference between the  victor  and  the nearest  vanquished is narrow and the gap is more than  made up  by  the  illegally  procured votes,  the  case  for  the application  of  s. 101 will surely arise.   Courts  do  not elect candidates or sign into parliamentary seats those whom the  constituency has not yet favored The normal  democratic process  cannot  be bypassed conveniently on  the  score  of corrupt  practices by the rival except in those  exceptional cases where s. 101 stands fulfilled.  You must win not  only an election petition but an election itself. The decisions cited before us by Shri A. K. Sen do not  take us further.  Indeed there is a paucity of precedents in this area,  for reasons which are not difficult to guess.  In  T. Nagappa  v. T. C. Basappa(1) this Court had to deal  with  a case  where the lead of the winner was only 34 votes,  there was cogent proof of about 60 voters having been  transported by the offending candidates to the polling booth of whom  47 voted  for him so that, if their votes were struck out,  the margin  of  difference would disappear and the  loser  would have  secured the larger number of valid votes.   There  the learned  Judges  were  at  pains  to  point  cut  that   the petitioner  got only 34 votes less than the  respondent  and that  the  tribunal (by a majority) had found that  the  bus procured by respondent No. I did carry to the polling booths about 60 voters, leading to the legitimate presumption  that the  Majority of them did vote for respondent No.  1.  Under those  circumstances;  the Court did not care  to  interfere with   the  Tribunal’s  factual  view  that  if  the   votes attributable  to  the  corrupt practice  were  left  out  of account,  the  petitioner would have  gained  an  undisputed majority.   In  that very case while pointing out  that  the High Court should not have: (1)  A. I. R. 1955 $. C. 756. 398 upset  a  finding  of  fact  of  the  Tribunal,  this  Court cautiously added that "it may be that the view taken by the. dissenting  member  of the Tribunal was  the  more  proper." Apparently, the dissenting member was not inclined to  upset the  poll verdict even on this evidence.  Where there are  a number of serious candidates contesting from a constituency, the  situation,  becomes complex and unpredictable.   It  is convenient  assumption, not reasoned probability,  to  guess for  whom,  if  at all, the voters of the  winner  who  used corrupt  practices  would  have  alternatively  cast   their franchise.  Sheer disenchantment with the vicious techniques might  well have turned away many sensitive souls  from  the polling station.  In the appeal before us the lead is over a thousand  votes, no link between the polluted  practice  and the  voters  affected is forged ten candidates were  in  the field and some of them had polled well.  The observations of this Court in Jamuna Prasad’s Case(1) that "there is nothing to  show why the majority of the first  respondent’s  voters would have preferred the 6th respondent and ignored the  3rd and  4th  respondents"  under  scores  the  hazard  in  such multiple-contest  situations.  Shri A. K.  Sen’s  persuasive invitation  to  compute on imperfect date is to  ask  us  to crystalgaze.  We decline the essay in occult. In the present case the reasoning of the trial Court dealing with  this  branch is not brief but a blank.  All  that  the Court  has  said is that the difference is only  1044  votes between  the  appellant  and  the  respondent  and  that   a reasonable judicial guess is not taboo: "Therefore it can be reasonably  concluded as per cl. (b) of s. 101 of the R.  P. Act  that  but  for  the  votes  obtained  by  the  returned

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candidate   (1st  respondent)  by  corrupt  practices,   the petitioner  would  have  obtained a majority  of  the  valid votes".  We are sorry the sequitur is too obscure for us  to see.   There  were  ten  candidates in  the  field  and  the ,curious  plea  bearing  on  this  relief  in  the  election petition  appears to be that the petitioner has done  social service  and  deserved victory and so there was no  need  to send  him  back to the constituency to  seek  a  reelection- strange  compliance  with s. 101 of the  Act.   Indeed,  the petitioner,   himself  a  barrister  and  a  former   Deputy Minister,  conversant with the requirements of election  law knows that where a claim for a declaration in his favour  is put  forward at least formal averments tacking  the  corrupt practice  onto obtaining the definite votes  was  necessary. On the other hand, all that he states is that as a result of the  hate  campaign  against the  Muslims  and  the  Tamils, alleged  to  have been carried on by the appellant  and  his agents,  "the Tamil speaking people though that it would  be to their advantage to support the D. M. K. candidate and the Muslim population thought that they would be protected  only if   the  Muslim  League  candidate  was  returned  to   the Election."  Therefore  %bat?  After adding  that  these  two candidates  had  secured a large number of  votes  from  the Tamils  and  the  Muslims, the  petition  makes  a  puzzling statement:  "These  votes  would have  been  polled  by  the petitioner  and  the  Congress party  but  for  the  corrupt practices under section 123 committed by the 1st respondent, his election agent and the agents of the 1st respondent..  " -The  abstruse  logic,  the bare  assertion  and  the  total absence of a tie-up (1)  A.  1. R. 1954 S. C. 686, 689 (jamuna Prasad v.  Lachhi Ram) [1955] S.C.R. 608. 399 between  specific corrupt practices and the number of  votes obtained  thereby  lead us to an outright rejection  of  the relief, not merely for want of proper averments but also for a  total  void  in proof.  Absent  visible  welding  of  the electoral vice established into the numerical measure of the victory,  the votes at the polls alone, not the writ of  the Court,  can  seat  him  in  the  legislature.   We  have  no hesitation in reversing the finding on issue No. 11. The conclusion therefore is that the appellants’ election is set   aside:  and  the  constituency  has  to   choose   its representative by a fresh poll.  It must be noted that  half the term has already run out since the election which we now set aside.  Having regard to the democratic process and  the duty not to keep Chamarajpet orphaned in the legislature, we expect   the   Chief  Election  Commissioner.   to   proceed expeditiously to hold a fresh election. The  fate  of this case has been the  direct  result,  among other  grounds, of the cost of campaigns, beyond  the  legal ceiling;  incurred  by  the appellant who  contested  as  an Independent.   To  give  all candidates a  fair  chance,  an operationally  fairer, perhaps even radical plan to  finance our  elections,  particularly the campaigning  process,  may have to be devised.  Money power casts a sinister shadow  on our elections and the political payoff of undue  expenditure in the various constituencies is too alluring for parties to resist temptation.  Moreover,, there is a built-in  iniquity in  the scheme because an independent candidate who  exceeds the  ceiling  prescribed  under the law  legally  commits  a corrupt  practice.  His rival, set up by  political  parties with considerable potential for fund raising and using,  may lay  out a hundred times more in each constituency on  their candidates  and yet hope to escape the penalty under s.  77.

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The  convenient-not necessarily correct-plea would  be  that the  candidate spent for his election but the party for  its campaign.  This likely evasion of the law by using big money through  political parties is a source of pollution  of  the Indian  political  process.   To  channel  funds  into   the campaign   for  specific  candidates  getting   around   the requirements of the law by establishing party committees  is all  too familiar in this and some other countries. in  this context  it may be apt to draw attention to a recent  ruling of this Court in Kanwarlal Gupta V. Amar Nath Chawla (1)  on election  expenses.  it  may be proper to  infuse  into  the election  law the cleansing spirit which was emphasized  way back  in  1920  by  the Select  Committee  or),  the  Indian Election Offence and Enquiries Act (XXXIV of 1920).  Half  a century ago it was observed there:               "We feel that there are distinct advantages at               the  present time when election is to play  so               important  a  part in the new public  life  of               India  that  the public conscience  should  be               markedly  drawn in relation to  the  franchise               whether that franchise relates to  legislative               or other bodies." Elections,  constituency-wise,  are the cornerstone  of  our parliamentary  culture  and  if the law is  to  reflect  and ensure the democratic-, (1)  [19751 2’S.  C R. 259. 400 norms  set  by the nation in this  strategic  area,  serious political consensus (not sanctimonious platitudes) on  heavy cut-back on poll outlay by Parties and candidates and  basic morality  in  the electioneering methodology  must  emerge-a consummation devoutly to be wished. if campaigns run berserk and  expenses  unlimited become the rule  general  elections become  national  nightmares and the fabric of  our  freedom shakes.   Courts come in only when specific cases are  filed and cannot arrest this cultural contamination.  We can only express  the  wish, with a sense of social  awareness,  that campaign finances reform, imposing, realistic limitations on spending  on  behalf of candidates directly  or  vicariously seem  necessary if inequality of influence is not  cooperate upon  the  elect  oral process  and  later  upon  government decisions.   To a limited extent Courts can respond  to  the fulfilment of this constitutional aspiration by a  benignant interpretation  of the legal limits on election  expenditure s.  77 clamps down.  This election case is also a caveat  on election  methodology.   True,  large  monetary  inputs  are necessary  evils of modern elections, but "once  we  assuage our ,conscience by calling something a ’necessary evil’,  it begins  to  look more and more necessary and less  and  less evil"  (1).  The manumission of the electoral  process  from money power is the dharma of our Republic. In  the hope that a fresh election for Chamarajpet would  be held  ,early  and in the expectation  that  the  candidates, independents and ’Party-nominees alike would keep within the pecuniary limits set by the law as laid down by this  Court, we  allow the appeal in part, as above  indicated.   Parties will bear their own costs throughout. V.P.S.                                         Appeal partly Allowed. (1)  Sydney  Harris-quoted  by Hidayatullah J. (as  he  then was)  in  "Democracy  in India and  the  Judicial  Process"- Lajpatrai Memorial Lectures, 1965-Asia Publising House-P-60. 401

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