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PETITIONER: VASUDEO VISHWANATH SARAF

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NEW EDUCATION INSTITUTE & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/08/1986

BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 2105            1986 SCR  (3) 458  1986 SCC  (4)  31        JT 1986    80  1986 SCALE  (2)258

ACT:      Constitution of  India, 1950-  Article 226-Necessity of making reasoned orders.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner  was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher  in   a  school   run  by   the  respondent-society, subsequently  promoted  as  Supervisor  and  thereafter  was working as  Principal till  reversion by a Resolution of the Managing Committee of the respondent-society.      The petitioner  challenged the  Resolution of reversion by filing  a suit,  which was dismissed. The Appellate Court allowed the  appeal holding  that the order of reversion was illegal and  bad and  further held  that the  petitioner was entitled  to   have  all  the  benefits  and  emoluments  as Principal.      During the  pendency of  the  second  appeal,  opposite party No.  1 commenced  a departmental  enquiry against  the petitioner, under  cl. 77.3  of Secondary School Code, which related to  mistakes in  accounting in matters pertaining to the society  and not  relating to the school and the Enquiry Committee recommended  the termination  of the  petitioner’s services. The  petitioner filed  an  appeal  to  the  Deputy Director of  Education, who  held that the order terminating service was disproportionate to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Committee and directed that the petitioner’s service should not be terminated till the decision of the suit. This order was  challenged by  the management before the Director of Education.  The joint  Director of  Education allowed the appeal and  upheld the  recommendations made  by the Enquiry Committee regarding the termination of service.      The writ  petition filed  by the petitioner challenging the impugned  order was  rejected by  merely  recording  the order, ’rejected’.      Thereafter, the petitioner filed a suit, and during its pendency the 459 management again  commenced an  enquiry, which was completed without any compliance of the principles of natural justice, and the  Enquiry Committee  recommended termination  of  the services of  the  petitioner  from  the  post  of  Assistant

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Teacher.      In appeal,  the Deputy  Director of  Education, without giving any hearing to the petitioner sent a letter informing him that  under instructions from the Director of Education, the decision  of termination  of service on the basis of the first enquiry  held against him being upheld by the Director of Education  it was  not necessary  to entertain his appeal against  the   decision  of   the  subsequent  enquiry  and, therefore, the appeal was filed.      On  a   representation  made  by  the  petitioner,  the Government forwarded  the appeal  to  the  School  Tribunal, which was dismissed. The writ petition of the petitioner was also rejected.      The petitioner appealed to this Court by way of Special Leave Petition.      Allowing the appeal, the court, ^      HELD: 1.  The Judgment  and Order passed on 8.6.1984 in Writ Petition  No. 4063  of 1984 is set aside, and the Court below directed  to dispose  of the  said  writ  petition  in accordance with law after hearing the parties and by passing a speaking  order as  expeditiously as  possible  preferably within a period of four months. [467B-C]      2. Fair  play and justice demands that justice must not only be done but must seems to have been done. [465F-G]      Mahabir Prasad  v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 (SC) 1302 at 1304, Madhya  Pradesh Industries  Ltd. v.  Union of  India & Ors., [1966]  1 SCR  466, Mahabir Jute Mills v. Shibbon Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2057 at 2060, Siemen Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v.  Union of  India, AIR 1976 (SC) 785, Bachhan Singh v. State of  Punjab, AIR  1980 (SC)  1355 at 1358 paras 18 & 19 and Rangnath v. Daulat Rao and Others, [1975] (1) SCC 686 at 690 para 7, followed.      3. It  is a cardinal principle of the rule of law which governs our  policy that  the Court  including writ Court is required  to  record  reasons  while  disposing  of  a  writ petition. This is imperative for the fair and 460 equitable adminstration of justice. The recording of reasons in  deciding  cases  or  applications  affecting  rights  of parties is  a  mandatory  requirement  to  be  fulfilled  in consonance with the principles of natural justice.[465B-D]      4. It  is no answer that for the purpose of expeditious disposal of  cases  a  laconic  order  like  ’dismissed’  or ’rejected’ will  be made without passing a reasoned order or a speaking order. [465D-E]      5. The  order must  in a  nutshell record  the relevant reasons which  were taken into consideration by the Court in coming to  its final  conclusions and  in disposing  of  the petition or  the cause by making the order, thereby enabling both the  parties seeking  justice as  well as  the superior Court where  an appeal lies to know the mind of the Court as well as  the reasons for its finding on questions of law and facts in deciding the said petition or cause. [465E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1442 of 1986      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  5.10.1984  of  the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 4063 of 1984.      S.B. Bhasme and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant.      V.A. Bobde.  A.K. Sanghi  and Shyam  Murlidhar for  the Respondents.

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    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RAY J.  This application  for special  leave involves a very short  but very  important and  substantial question of law namely  whether a  court while hearing writ petitions is under an  obligation  to  pass  a  speaking  order-an  order recording in  brief at  least the reasons which weighed with the court in determining the salient questions raised by the parties to the action while dismissing or rejecting the writ petition in  order to enable the parties to know the reasons for such  order, more  particularly when  there is provision for appeal  including appeal  on special leave to this Court under Article  136 of  the Constitution  of India to apprise the appellate  court of the reasons of the order in order to conform the basic principles of justice and fair play and as well as  the rule  of law  which pervades our constitutional system and also in consonance with the principles of natural justice. On this vital ground we 461 deem  it   just  and  proper  to  grant  special  leave  and accordingly special leave granted.      The facts  of the case in brief are inter alia that the petitioner a  B.Sc. with 2nd Class honours, was appointed as an assistant  Teacher in  195 I in the New English Institute Girls High  School conducted  and managed  by  a  registered society named New Education Institute, the respondent No. 1. The petitioner  was transferred  in New  High School in June 1953.  The   petitioner  passed   the  Secondary   Teacher’s Certificate Examination  and he  also passed  the Diploma of Education Examination  conducted by  Basic Training  Centre, Dhule. This  diploma is considered as equivalent to Bachelor of  Education   Degree  for   the  purpose   of  considering suitability for  additional  benefits.  The  petitioner  was promoted as  supervisor in  the  same  school  in  1961  and thereafter From  June 1968  he was working as Principal till his reversion  by a  resolution of the managing committee of the Institute dated October 28. 1973.      The  petitioner   challenged  the  said  resolution  of reversion in  a suit  being regular  Civil Suit  No. 755  of 1973. The said suit was dismissed. The petitioner challenged the said  degree of  dismissal in  Civil Appeal  No. 107  of 1979. The  appellate court  allowed the  appeal on reversing the degree  of the  trial court  holding inter alia that the order of  reversion was  illegal and  bad and the petitioner was entitled  to have  all the  benefits and  emoluments  as principal of  the said institution. The opposite party No. 1 preferred a  Second Appeal No. 162 of 1981 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which is pending for hearing.      During the  pendency of  the said  appeal the  opposite party No.  1 commenced  a departmental  enquiry against  the petitioner under  the provisions of Clause 77.3 of Secondary School Code.  A notice  to show  cause  was  issued  to  the petitioner  wherefrom   it  would   appear  that   the  said proceeding mainly  related  to  mistakes  in  accounting  in matters pertaining  to the  society and  not relating to the school. The  Enquiry Committee  on 7.4.1975  recommended the termination  of  the  petitioner’s  services.  Against  that recommendation the  petitioner filed an appeal to the Deputy Director of  Education, Nasik,  the respondent  No.  4.  The respondent No.  4 by  his order  dated 27.12.1975 was of the opinion that the order terminating service of the petitioner was disproportionate to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Committee and  directed that the petitioner’s service should not be  terminated till  the Civil  Court would  decide  the suit. This  order of  respondent No. 4 was challenged by the management in an appeal filed to the Director of

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462 Education. Though  it was submitted that the said appeal was not maintainable  under the  said Secondary School Code, the Joint Director  of Education  however after  hearing allowed the said appeal by his order dated 6.9.1979 holding that all the charges  levelled against the petitioner were of account matters. He  further held  that the  management was  equally responsible  in   as  much  as  it  left  financial  matters pertaining  to   the  management   of  the  society  to  the Headmaster and  his clerks. Since it was not the duty of the Headmaster he could not be held responsible in management of accounts in  the capacity of Headmaster. Some of the charges pertaining to  the duties  as Head  Master  had  been  fully proved and  some partly against the petitioner. To be guilty under a  single charge  pertaining to  financial matters  is very serious.  The Joint  Director, therefore, held that the recommendations made  by the Enquiry Committee regarding the termination of  the service  of the  petitioner  had  to  be upheld.       The  petitioner, thereafter,  challenged the  impugned order in  writ petition  No. 1837  of 1980  before the  High Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay.  On  12.8.1980  the  writ petition was  rejected  by  merely  re  cording  the  order, ’rejected’.  No   reasons  whatsoever  were  recorded  which impelled the court to reject the petition.      The petitioner,  thereafter, brought  an  action  being Civil Suit No. 199 of  1981 in  the Court  of  Civil  Judge, Senior Division, Nasik, which is pending for hearing.      During the pendency of these proceedings the management again commenced  an enquiry  under the  provisions of Clause 77.3  of  the  Secondary  Schools  Code.  This  enquiry  was completed  without  any  compliance  of  the  principles  of natural justice  in as much as the petitioner was not served with the  chargesheet  by  the  Enquiry  Committee  nor  his nominee one  Mr. R.G.  Kunte,  a  teacher,  was  allowed  to participate in  the proceedings of the Enquiry Committee. It was  also  alleged  that  out  of  75  documents  which  the petitioner demanded  inspection of  only 25  documents  were given inspection  and the  Enquiry Committee merely supplied him its  findings without  giving copy  of  summary  of  the proceedings of  the Enquiry Committee. The findings recorded by the  Enquiry Committee  was received by the petitioner on 26.4.1979 recommending  termination of  his service from the post of  Assistant Teacher.  The management  also, sent  its order terminating  the petitioner’s  service  and  this  was received by  him on  26.4.1979. It  was submitted  that  the entire procedure adopted by the Enquiry Com- 463 mittee was  in violation of Clause 77.3 of Secondary Schools Code and  in fact the enquiry was exparte. Petitioner prayed for setting aside the order of the Enquiry Committee and for allowing the appeal.      The Deputy  Director of Education, Nasik without giving any hearing  to the petitioner sent a letter dated 12.2.1980 informing the  petitioner that  under instruction  from  the Director of Education the decision of termination of service on the  basis of the first enquiry held by the management of the Institute  against him  being upheld  by the Director of Education it  was not  necessary  to  entertain  his  appeal against the  decision of  the enquiry subsequently held. The appeal was,  therefore, filed.  The respondent  No.  4,  the Deputy Director  of Education,  thus did not at all consider and decide  the appeal  after hearing  the parties including the petitioner.      The  petitioner  then  made  a  representation  to  the

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Government by  letter dated 8.4.1981 to decide the appeal in accordance  with   law.  The   government  by  letter  dated 24.4.1981 informed  the petitioner  that his  appeal and his letter with  the enclosures had been forwarded to the School Tribunal for  hearing of  the appeal  and deciding  it. This School Tribunal dismissed the said appeal without giving any decisions on merits.        Against   the  order   of  the  School  Tribunal  the petitioner filed a writ petition No. 4063 of 1984 before the High Court,  Bombay. This  writ  petition  was  rejected  by recording the following order:           "Heard. In  view of  the earlier rejection of W.P.           as well  as the  application  to  file  appeal  to           Supreme Court, this W.P.is also rejected.      Aggrieved by the said judgment the petitioner filed the instant petition for special leave to appeal in this Court.      lt was  pleaded in  the special leave petition that the third enquiry  proceeding was  commenced by  the  management under the  provisions of Clause 77.3 of the Secondary School Code. During  the pendency  of the  aforesaid proceedings it was  further   pleaded  that  the  enquiry  committee  while proceeding  with   the  enquiry   arbitrarily  violated  the principles of  natural justice  as well as the provisions of Clause 77.3  of the said code. The Headmaster who was biased against the  petitioner was  appointed as one of the members of the Enquiry Com- 464 mittee and he did not permit the petitioner’s nominee to be. present  in   the  enquiry   which  was  held  exparte.  The petitioner was  asked by  the opposite  party No. 1, the New Education  Institute,  by  its  letter  dated  15.1.1979  to nominate his  representative. The  petitioner by  his letter dated 29.1.1979  enquired  of  the  management  whether  his nominee should  be a Headmaster or an Assistant Teacher or a member of  the Governing  Council as  the charges related to his actions  as Headmaster  as well as Assistant Teacher. No reply was  received by the petitioner to this letter; on the other hand an intimation was received by him on February 28, 1979  about   the  formation   of  the   Enquiry  Committee. Immediately, he  nominated Mr.  R.G. Kunte as his nominee in the Enquiry  Committee. The Enquiry Committee did not permit Mr.R.G. Kunte  to be  associated with the enquiry and it did neither send  any chargesheet  to the  petitioner nor did it supply him  the proceedings  of the  Enquiry  Committee.  It merely communicated  to the petitioner its findings recorded on 25.4.1479  and the same was received by the petitioner on 26.4.1979 whereby the service of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher was  terminated. The  appeal filed by the petitioner against the  said order  to  the  respondent  No.  4  Deputy Director of  Education, Nasik was also not heard and decided after giving hearing to the petitioner. But respondent No. 4 merely communicated  by his  letter dated  12.2.1980 to  the petitioner that  as  the  decision  of  termination  by  the management on  the basis  of  the  first  enquiry  had  been upheld, so the appeal was filed.      It was  urged on  behalf of  the  petitioner  that  the representation made by him to the Government was sent to the School’s Tribunal with a direction to hear the appeal of the petitioner.  The  School’s  Tribunal  dismissed  the  appeal without at  all considering  and  determining  the  relevant questions involved  in the  appeal by  simply  holding  that since writ petition against the earlier order of termination of service of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court, the petitioner  had no  right to  prefer any  appeal to this Tribunal for  agitating the  same question though the appeal

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was filed  against the  subsequent order of termination made by the  managing committee  of the  Institution. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Enquiry Committee was biased against the petitioner and one of the nominee; in the Enquiry  Committee was  the Headmaster  of the Institute who was  the original complainant against the petitioner and therefore he  was nominated  by management to act as a Judge of his  own cause. It was also submitted that the High Court of Bombay did not at all consider and decide both 465 the writ  petitions i.e.  the writ petition No. 1837 of 1980 and writ  A petition  No. 4063  of 1984 on merits which were dismissed by  recording the  laconic  order  ’rejected’.  No speaking order  was made assigning any reason whatsoever for rejecting the  aforesaid two  writ petitions  which involved substantial questions of law and facts.       It  is a  cardinal principle  of  rule  of  law  which governs our  policy that  the Court  including Writ Court is required  to  record  reasons  while  disposing  of  a  writ petition in  order to enable the litigents more particularly the aggrieved  party to  know the reasons which weighed with the mind  of the Court in determining the questions of facts and law  raised in  the  writ  petition  or  in  the  action brought. This  is imperative  for  the  fair  and  equitable administration of justice. More so when there is a statutory provision for appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy of courts  in  order  to  enable  the  superior  court  or  the Appellate Court  to know  or to  be apprised  of the reasons which impelled the court to pass the order in question. This recording of  reasons  in  deciding  cases  or  applications affecting rights  of parties is also a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It  is no answer at all to this legal position that for the  purpose of  expeditious disposal of cases a laconic order like  ’dismissed’ or  ’rejected’ will  be made without passing a  reasoned order  or a  speaking order.  It is not, however, necessary  that  the  order  disposing  of  a  writ petition or  of a  cause must  be a lengthy one recording in detail all  the reasons that played in the mind of the court in coming  to the  decision. What  is imperative is that the order must  in a  nutshell record the relevant reasons which were taken  into consideration by the Court in coming to its final conclusions  and in  disposing of  the petition or the cause by  making the  order, thereby enabling both the party seeking justice  as well  as the  superior  court  where  an appeal lies  to know  the mind  of the  court as well as the reasons for  its finding  on questions  of law  and facts in deciding the  said petition  or cause.  In other  words fair play and  justice demands that justice must not only be done but must seem to have been done.      It is pertinent to refer in this connection some of the decisions rendered by this Court. In Mahabir Prasad v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302 at 13()4 it has been observed as follows:           "opportunity to  a party interested in the dispute           to present his case on questions of law as well of           fact, ascertainment of facts from materials before           the Tribunal after disclosing 466           the materials  to the  party against  whom  it  is           intended to use them, and adjudication by reasoned           judgment  upon   a  finding   of  the   facts   in           controversy and  application of  the  law  to  the           facts  found,  are  attributes  of  even  a  quasi           judicial determination.  It must appear not merely

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         that the  authority entrusted  with quasi-judicial           authority has  reached a conclusion or the problem           before him,  it must  appear that he has reached a           conclusion which is according to law and just, and           for ensuring  that end he must record the ultimate           mental process  leading from  the dispute  to  its           solution.  Satisfactory  decision  of  a  disputed           claim may  be reached  only if  it be supported by           most cogent  reasons the  appeal to the authority.           Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a           disputed  claim   by  a  quasi-judicial  authority           ensures that  the decision is reached according to           law as is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy           or reached on the grounds of policy or expediency.           A party  to the  dispute is ordinarily entitled to           know  the  grounds  on  which  the  authority  has           rejected his  claim if  the order  is subjected to           appeal, the necessity to record reasons in greater           for  with  out  recorded  reasons,  the  appellate           authority  has  no  mate  rial  on  which  it  may           determine  whether   the   facts   were   properly           ascertained,  the   relevant  law   was  correctly           applied and the decision was just."      This decision  was  rendered  in  connection  with  the cancellation of  the license  of a  wholesale distributor in sugar under  U.P. Sugar  Dealer’s Licensing  order, 1962, by the District  Magistrate and  the rejection of the appeal by the State Government without recording any reasons.      The above  decision referred  to in  the case of Madhya Pradesh Industries  Ltd. v.  Union of  India Ors.,  [1966] 1 S.C. R.  466 where it has been observed that the practice of the executive authority dismissing statutory appeals against order which  seriously prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party without  giving reasons  is a negation of rule of law. Similar observations  have been  made in the case of Mahabir Jute Mills  v. Shibbon Lal, A.l.R. 1975 SC 2057 at 2060. The same view  was  also  reiterated  in  Siemen  Engineering  & Manufacturing Co.  v. Union  of India,  AIR 1976 SC 1785 and Bachhan Singh  v. State  of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1355 at 1358 paras 18  & 19  and it  was observed that where an authority made an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial func- 467 tion it  must record  its reasons in support of the order it made. Similar A view was expressed by this Court in the case of Rangnath  v. Daulat  Rao and  others, [1975] 1 SCC 686 at 690 para  7. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. This  well-settled principle will undoubtedly apply to orders made by a Court in disposing of writ applications.       In  the premises  aforesaid the  appeal is allowed and the judgment  and order passed on 8.10.1984 in writ petition No. 4063  of 1984  is hereby  set aside.  The Court below is directed to  dispose of the said writ petition in accordance with law  after giving hearing to the parties and by passing a speaking  order as  expeditiously as  possible  preferably within a  period of  four months from the date of receipt of the records  by the  court below. Let the records be sent to the court  below forthwith. There will, however, be no order as to costs. A.P.J.                                       Appeal allowed. 468