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PETITIONER: VARIAVAN SARASWATHI AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: EACHAMPI THEVI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1992

BENCH: [R.M. SAHAI AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.]

ACT: Kerala Land Reform Act, 1964: Section 4(A)(1)(a)-  Acquisition of  right of  tenant-Junior member  of  Tarwad  redeeming  mortgage  and  continuing  in possession of  land for  more than five years-Whether can be deemed to  be a  mortgage- Whether can acquire the rights of tenant.

HEADNOTE: Two junior  member of  a Tarwad  (somewhat like a joint family) redeemed a mortgage executed in 1870 by the Karnavan (akin to  Manager) of  the Tarwad.  They paid  the amount in 1886, got  the property  released, obtained  possession  and they or their descendants continued in possession as such. In 1967 a suit for partition was filed by sucessors, of other members  of the  Tarwad, in  whose  favour  equity  of redemption, of  the suit  land was  transferred in  a family partition in  1962. The  suit was resisted amongst others on acquisition of right of tenant under section 4A(1)(a) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964. The trial court and first appellate court held that the junior  members,   as  a  result  of  getting  the  property released,   were    holders   of    special   right    under Marumakkathayam Law  and  they  could  not  be  held  to  be mortgages and,  therefore, they  did not  acquire any  right under the Land Reform Act. The High  Court, however,  held that  the junior member being assignee of mortgage in possession for fifty years, on the date  the Kerala  Land Reform Act, 1964, was amended and Section 4(1)(a)  was added  by Amendment  Act of  1969, were entitled to  rights as tenants, and thus, accepted the claim of junior members, because the members of the Tarwad treated the mortgage  to be  continuing on  the date  the  suit  was filed. It  also held   that  a junior  member of the Tarwad, paying off  the debt  of Tarwad,  became a  mortgagee of the excess share in his own right. Allowing the  appeals of the sucessors of other members of Tarwad, this Court, HELD: 1.  A co-mortgagor  or a  junior  member  of  the Tarwad who  continued in  possession over  the excess share, got redeemed  by him, could not be deemed to be mortgagee so as to  acquire right  under Section  4A(1)(a) of  the Kerala Land Reform  Act, 1964.  This position does not alter either because during  partition equity of redemption in respect of property redeemed  by  junior  members  was  transferred  or because  in   the  plaint  it  was  claimed  that  mortgages subsisted. None  of these actions could affect the operation

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of law. [425-D-E] 2.1 Mortgage is creation of an interest in the property for payment of debt. Once the mortgage debt is discharged by a person  beneficially interested  in equity  of redemption, the  mortgage   comes  to   an  end  by  operation  of  law. Consequently, the  relationship of  mortgagor and  mortgagee cannot subsist. [423-E, F] 2.2 In  law, the  status of a person paying off debt to secure the  property either with consent of others or on own volition is  that the becomes the owner, entitle to hold and possess the  property. But,  in equity  the right is to hold the property  till he is reimbursed. In other words, the may hold the  property in  surety or  he may bring the claim for contribution. Similarly,  the co-mortgagor  whose share  has been got  redeemed is entitled, in equity, to get possession over his  share of  property on payment of the amount of his share. But  these rights  in equity, either in favour of the person who  discharge the  debt or the person whose debt has been discharged, do not result in resumption of relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. [423-F, G; 424-B] 2.3 A  plain reading  of Section  92 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882 does not warrant a construction that the substitutee become  a mortgagee. The expression is ‘right as the mortgagee’  and not  right of mortgagee. The legislative purpose was  statutory recognition of the equitable right to hold the  property till the co-mortgagor was reimbursed. And not to  create relationship  of mortgagor and mortgagee. The section confers  certain rights on co-mortgagor and provides for the  manner of  its exercise  as well. The rights are of redemption, foreclosure and sale. And the manner of exercise is as  mortgagee. The  word,  ‘as’  means,  ‘in  the  manner prescribed’. [425-B-C] 2.4  A  co-mortgagor  in  possession  of  excess  share redeemed by  him can  thus enforce  his claim  against  non- redeeming mortgagor  by exercising  rights or foreclosure or sale as  is exercised  by mortgagee  under section 67 of the Transfer of  Property  Act.  But  that  does  not  make  him mortgagee. [426-C-D] Raghavan Nair  v. Anandavally  Amma, 1986  K.L.T.  623, approved. Kochuni v.  State of  Madras Kerala,  A.I.R. 1960  S.C. 1080; Ganeshi  Lal v.  Joti Pershad,  [1953] S.C.R.  243 and Valliamma Champaka Pillay v. Sivathanu Pillay & Ors., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 354, referred to .

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8244 of 1983.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  22.7.1980  of  the Kerala High Court in Second Appeal No. 171 of 1976.      E.M.S. Anam of the Appellants      N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      R.M. SAHAI,  J. Whether  a junior member of the Tarwad, in Kerala, who redeems the mortgage and is in possession for more  than  50  years  is  a  ‘mortgagee  holding  the  land comprised in  a mortgage’  so as to acquire rights of tenant of tenant under Section 4(A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, is the  legal issue  that arises  for consideration  in this appeal, by  successors of  other members  of the  Tarwad who suit for  partition was  dismissed in  second appeal  by the High Court.

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    In the  year 1045 (1870) a mortgage was executed by the Karnavan (akin  to Manager)  of the Tarwad, (somewhat like a joint family).  Two junior  members, of the Tarwad, paid the amount in  the year  1061 (1886), got the property released, obtained possession  and they or their descendants continued in possession  as such.  In 1967  a suit  for partition  was filed by  sucessors, of other member of the Tarwad, in whose favour equity  of redemption,  of  the  land  in  suit,  was transferred in a family partition in 1962. The suit was resisted amongst others on acquisition of right of tenant  under   Section 4(1)(a)  of the Land Reforms Act. Since  there   was  no   dispute  on  basic  facts,  namely, redemption of  mortgage by  two  junior  members  and  their continuance in  possession for  more than fifty years on the date Section  4(1)(a) was  added to the Land Reforms Act the rights of  parties were  decided, more,  as a matter of law. According to  the trial court and  first appellate court the junior  members,   as  a  result  of  getting  the  property released, were holder of special right under Marumakkathayam Law. They could not be held to be mortgagee, therefore, they did not  acquire any  right under  the Land Reforms Act. But the High  Court held  otherwise, mainly because in 1962 when the Tarwad was partitioned the property was treated as under mortgage since  equity of  redemption for the same was given to the  plaintiff-appellant. It was found that, even, in the plaint it  was averred  that in  consequence of  release the mortgagee right  vested in the predecessor of defendants who were  junior   members  of   the  Tarwad.  The  High  Court, therefore,  held  that  the  defendants  being  assignee  of mortgage in possession for fifty years, on the date the Land Reforms Act  was amended   and  Section 4(1)(a) was added by Act XXXV of 1969, were entitled to rights as tenants. The High  Court, thus,  accepted  the  claim  of  defendants because the  member of the Tarwad treated the mortgage to be continuing on  the date  the suit was filed. This, apart, it was held  that junior  member of  the Tarwad  paying off the debt of  Tarwad becomes  a mortgagee  of the excess share in his own  right.  But  this  enunciation,  of  law,  was  not accepted, as  correct by a division bench of the Kerala High Court itself in Raghavan Nair v.  Anandavally Amma, 1986 KLT 623. The  question, therefore, is if a junior  member of the Tarwad who redeems the properly, and gets release, is holder of special  right  only  or  he  steps  into  the  shoes  of mortgagee. Nature of  right of  a junior member in the Tarwad, a family corporation, in  which every member male or female possesses equal right  has been  explained by this Court in Kochuni v. States of Madras & Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 at 1099, thus:-      " The  incidents of a tarwad are so      well-settled  that   it     is  not      necessary to consider the case-law,      but it  would be     enough if  the      relevant  passages  from  the  book      "Malabar  and Aliyasanthana Law" by      Sundara  Aiyar   are   cited.   The      learned author says at p.7 thus:      "The    joint     family    in    a      Marumakkathayam    Nayar     tarwad      consists of  a mother  and her male      and  female   children,   and   the      children of  those female children,      and so  on. The  issue of  the male      children do  not  belong  to  their      tarwad   but to the tarwad of their      consorts. The property belonging to

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    the tarwad  is the  property of all      the males  and females that compose      it. Its affairs are administered by      one of  those persons,  usually the      eldest male,  called the  karnavan.      The  individual   members  are  not      entitled to     enforce  partition,      but a  partition may be effected by      common consent.  The rights  of the      junior members are stated to be (1)      if males,  to succeed to management      in  their   turn,     (2)   to   be      maintained  at  the  family  house,      (3)  to  object  to    an  improper      alienation or administration of the      family property,  (4) to  see  that      the  property  is  duly  conserved,      (5) to  bar an adoption, and (6) to      get a  share at any  partition that      may take  place. These are what may      be   called    effective    rights.      Otherwise everyone  is a proprietor      and has equal rights."      One of  the rights  according to  this  decision  which vests in  the junior  member is  to see that the property is duly conserved. Such a right, obviously, includes a right to redeem the  property by paying the debts outstanding against the Tarwad.  It is  an  incidence  of  co-ownership  or  co- proprietorship which  flows from  the nature  of Tarwad. But whether the  person who  thus   conserves the property steps into shoes  of mortgagee  and  holds  the  same  rights  and interests or  he is  a surety holding the property on behalf of the  Tarwad subject  to right  of contribution  has to be decided on  general principles  of mortgage as the customary law of  Tarwad does  not throw any light on it. Mortgage has been defined  in Section  58 of the Transfer of Property Act as transfer  of an  interest in  specific immovable property for the  purpose of  securing the payment of money advanced. The definition brings out clearly the nature of mortgage. It was understood  and followed in same sense, even, before the Act came  into force. In Gopal v. Parsotam 1883 5 All.  121. 137 F.B. it was observed :      "Mortgage  as  understood  in  this      country cannot  be defined   better      than by  the definition  adopted by      the Legislature  in   section 58 of      the Transfer of Property Act (IV of      1882). That  definition has  not in      any way  altered the  law, but,  on      the contrary,  has only  formulated      in clear  language the  notions  of      mortgage as  understood by  all the      writers of   text-books  on  Indian      mortgages.  Every   word   of   the      definition  is  borne  out  by  the      decisions  of   lndian  Courts   of      Justice."      It was  not different  where customary  law  prevailed. Even in customary Marumakkathayam Law,  governing section of people inhabiting  the West  Coast,  the law of mortgage was understood in no different sense.      Since the  transfer in a mortgage is, only, of interest and not  of the  entire right  and title,  as takes place in sale, the mortgagor and the mortgagee can transfer or assign their interest.   A  mortgagor may  assign or  transfer  the

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equity of  redemption or  may even  create second  mortgage. Similarly a  mortgagee may  assign his  interest  or  create another mortgage.  What happens when a mortgagee assigns his interest in  favour of another person? Since an assignor can pass interest  that he  has, the  assignee becomes holder of the same  interest that  a mortgagee has. In other words, he steps into  the shoes of the mortgagee. Can the same be said where a  co-mortgagor  or  anyone  on  behalf  of  mortgagor authorised under  law, pays  the amount and brings to an end the interest  the mortgagee  had? Mortgage is creation of an interest in  the property  for payment  of  debt.  Once  the mortgage  debt   is  discharged  by  a  person  beneficially interested in equity  of redemption the mortgage comes to an end by  operation of  law. Consequently  the relationship of mortgagor and  mortgagee cannot  subsist. What  then is  the status of  a person  paying off  debt to secure the property either  with consent of others or on own volition? In law he becomes the  owner,    entitled  to  hold  and  possess  the property. But  in equity  the right  is to hold the property till he  is reimbursed.  In other  words, he  may  hold  the property     in  surety  or  he  may  bring  the  claim  for contribution. In  Ganeshi Lal  v. Joti   Pershad, [1953[ SCR 243, it was held;-      "....Equity insists on the ultimate      payment of  a debt  by one  who  in      justice  and   good  conscience  is      bound to  pay   it and  it is  well      recognised  that  where  there  are      several joint  debtors, the  person      making the  payment is  a principal      debtor as  regards the  part of the      liability he  is to discharge and a      surety in  respect of the shares of      the rest of the debtors...."      Similarly the  co-mortgagor whose  share has  been  got redeemed is entitled,  in equity, to get possession over his share of property on payment of the  amount of his share. In Valliamma  Champaka  Pillay  v.  Sivathanu  Pillay  &  Ors., [1980] I SCR 354 the principle was explained thus:      "From what  has been  said above it      was clear  that where  the Transfer      of Property Act is not in force and      a mortgage  with possession is made      by two  persons, one  of whom  only      redeems discharging  the  whole  of      the common mortgage debt,  he will,      in  equity,     have  two  distinct      rights: Firstly,  to be  subrogated      to  the  rights  of  the  mortgagee      discharged,    vis-a-vis  the  non-      redeeming  co-mortgagor,  including      the right to get into possession of      the latters portion or share of the      hypotheca.   Secondly,  to  recover      contribution  towards   the  excess      paid by him on the security of that      portion or  share of the hypotheca,      which belonged  not to  him but  to      the other  co-mortgagor. It follows      that where  one  co-mortgagor  gets      the right  to  contribution against      the other  co-mortgagor  by  paying      off the  entire mortgage debt, a co      related right  also accrues  to the      latter to  redeem his  share of the

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    property and  get its possession on      payment  of   his  share   of   the      liability  to   the  former.   This      corresponding right  of the  ’ non-      redeeming’ co-mortgagor, to pay his      share  of  the  liability  and  get      possession of his property from the      redeeming co-mortgagor,    subsists      as long  as the  latter’s right  to      contribution subsists "      But these  rights in  equity, either  in favour  of the person 2who discharges the debt or the person whose debt has been discharged, do not result in resumption of relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. Even under  subrogation, a legal concept,  meaning  substitution,  applied,  on  English  Law principle, even  earlier, inserted  now  as  Section  92  in Transfer of  Property   Act since  1929, the rights that are created in  favour  of  a  co-mortgagor  as    a  result  of discharge  of  debt  are  ’so  far  as  regards  redemption, foreclosure or  sale of  such property,   the same rights as the mortgagee  whose mortgage   he  redeems’.  What  is  the meaning of  expression ’right  as mortgagee’?  Does a person who, in  equity, gets  subrogated becomes  mortgagee? Or his rights are confined to foreclosure or sale?  A plain reading of the  section does  not warrant  a construction  that  the substitutee becomes  a mortgagee.  The expression is, ’right as  the   mortgagee’  and  not  right  of  mortgagee.    The legislative  purpose   was  statutory   recognition  of  the equitable right  to hold  the property till the co-mortgagor was reimbursed.  And not to create relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee.   The  section confers  certain rights on co- mortgagor and  provides for  the manner  of its  exercise as well.   The rights  are of redemption, foreclosure and sale. And the  manner of  exercise is as mortgagee. The word, ’as’ according to  Black’s Legal Dictionary means, ’in the manner prescribed’. Thus  a co-mortgagor  in possession,  of excess share redeemed  by him,  can enforce  his claim against non- redeeming mortgagor  by exercising  rights of foreclosure or sale as  is exercised  by mortgagee  under section 67 of the Transfer of  Property  Act.  But  that  does  not  make  him mortgagee.  Therefore, a co-mortgagor or a  Junior member of the Tarwad  who continued  in  possession  over  the  excess share, got  redeemed by  him,   could not  be deemed  to  be mortgagee so  as to  acquire right under Section 4A(1)(a) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.      Legal position  explained above  does not  alter either because during  partition equity of redemption in respect of property redeemed  by junior   members  was  transferred  or because  in   the  plaint   it  was  claimed  that  mortgage subsisted. None  of these actions could effect the operation of law.      In the  result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and  order of  the High  Court is set aside and the order of  the trial  court  decreeing the suit for partition is restored. Parties shall bear their own costs. N.P.V. Appeals allowed. STATE bank of india and anr. v. V. PARTHASARATHY ETC. NOVEMBER 9, 1992 [KULDIP SINGH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.] Civil Services: State Bank  of India-Promotion  to the  post of  Head Clerk- Circular No. 42-Clause Three options-Outside the city-within

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city and  within the  same office-Debarment  on  refusal  of third and  final offer-Local  Head  Office  and  five  other offfices to  be considered  as one  Unit-Final offer made in one  such   office  Whether  valid  and  debars  the  optees permanently on refusal to accept.      The appellant-Bank issued Circular No. 42 containing an understanding reached  with the  Staff-union laying down the policy for  promotion of  clerks to the post of Head Clerks. As per clause 1(d) of the Circular the employees who decline to accept  Head Clerk  s post at a branch office outside the city in which they work, will have a further option when a vacancy arises  at any one of the Bank’s offices within that city. However, this was subject to the condition that at the material time  there was  no other  senior employee  who had similarly declined  the post  outside his  branch office, in which case  the senior-most  would have the first choice. It was further  provided that if an employee declines to accept the post  of Head  Clerk at  an office within the same city, his case  would be  considered only when a vacancy arises at his office.  This was  also subject  to the  condition  that there was  no senior  employee  similarly  situated  at  the material time.  If the  third and  final offer  is declined, there would be a permanent debarment of promotion.      Since there  were six  offices at the Madras Local Head Office, a  common seniority  was maintained  and all the six offices were  considered as  one  office,  viz.  local  Head Office of which the other five offices were only parts.      The Respondents  declined their first, second and final offers, though indisputably the final offer was made to them for being posted in an office forming part of the local Head Office. Both  the Respondents moved the High Court by way of Writ Petitions  and the  High Court  took the  view that the final offer made was not in the same office and so they were entitled to be posted as Head Clerks in the same office.      Being aggrieved  by the  said two decisions of the High Court, the appellant-Bank preferred the present appeals.      On the question of interpretation of clause 1(d) of the circular in question:      Allowing the appeals, this Court,      HELD :1. The High Court’s interpretation of cl. 1(d) of the Circular that the third offer made was not in the office where the  Respondents  were  working  and  therefore  their refusal to  accept the post did not exhaust the third option and they  were entitled  to be  posted as Head Clerks in the Office where  they were  working is incorrect in view of the fact that the local Head Office was split into six different offices which  together constituted one unit. By refusing to accept the  third  and  final  offer,  the  Respondents  had clearly exhausted  all the  three  options  and  had  become permanently debarred  from seeking  promotion to the post of Head Clerk. [366-E-G]      2. This  Court does  not intend  to interfere  with the appointment of  the respondents to the post of Head Clerk in the Regional  Office in the facts and circumstances of these matters which show that in one case a fortuitous appointment had arisen due to death of an employee within almost a month of the  Respondent’s refusal to accept the offer, and in the other case,  the Respondent has already been accommodated in the post  of Head  Clerk  in  the  Regional  Office  itself. However, this  would not  be treated as a precedent and this would not  affect the  interpretation of  clause 1(d) of the Circular, placed by this Court. [366-H; 367-A]      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos.  4799 4800 of 1992.      From the  Judgments  dated  4.3.1992  and  8.4.1992  in

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Madras High  Court in  W.P. No.  246/92 and  W.A. No. 349 of 1992.      G.  Ramaswamy   Attorney  General,   K.  Sankaran,   A. Rangananthan and A.V. Rangam for the Appellants.      M.K. Ramamurthi,  M.A. Krishnmoorthy, M.A. Chinnaswamy, H. Subramaniam and Ms. C. Ramamurthi for the Respondents.      Rajendra Sachhar, Ambrish Kumar and M.D. Pandey for the Inter-vener.      The Order of the Court was delivered:      Intervention application is allowed.      Leave granted.      Civil Appeal No. 4799 of 1992.      2. The controversy in this case is in a narrow compass. The appellant-Bank  issued Staff  Circular No. 42 containing an understanding  reached with  the Bank  staff-union laying down the  policy for promotion of clerks to the post of Head Clerks. Clause 1(d) of the said circular states as follows:      Employees  who  decline  to  accept      Head  Clerk’s   post  at  a  Branch      Office  outside   their  place   of      service, i.e.,  outside their city,      will   again    be   offered    the      appointment  only  when  a  vacancy      arises at  any one  of the  offices      within that  city, provided that at      the material time there is no other      senior employees at that office who      had  earlier   declined  a  posting      outside his Branch, as a Head Clerk      in  which   case  the   senior-most      employee will  first be offered the      appointment. Also,  if an  employee      declines to  accept the  post of  a      Head Clerk  at an office within the      same city, his case for appointment      as Head-Clerk  will  be  considered      only when  a vacancy  arises at his      office,  in   the  order   of   his      seniority.  His   case  cannot   be      considered for  a vacancy at any of      the other offices in the city."      3. It  will be apparent from the above provision of the said clause  that those  employees who decline to accept the Head Clerk’s  post at  a branch  office which is outside the city in  which they  work will  have a  further option. Such employees would  be offered the post of Head Clerk again but only when  a vacancy arises at any one of the Bank’s offices within that city. This is of course subject to the condition that at the material time, there is no other senior employee who had  similarly declined  the  post  outside  his  branch office, in  which case, the senior-most would have the first choice. The further provision of this rule and with which we are concerned  in the  present case  is as  follows.  If  an employee declines  to accept  the post  of Head  Clerk at an office within the same city his case for appointment as Head Clerk would  be considered only when a vacancy arises at his office. This  is also subject to the condition that there is no senior  employee similarly situated at the material time. If the  third and the final offer for the post of Head Clerk is  declined,   there  is   a  permanent  debarment  of  the promotion. One  more thing  necessary to be stated before we come to the facts of the present case is that the appellant- Bank has  a local  Head Office  at Madras.  In 1972,  it was split into  two -  the local  Head Office  and  Madras  Main Branch. In  1976-77, there was a further splitting up of the

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local Head  Office and  the Main  Branch and  ultimately  in 1979,  the   Madras  Local  Head  Office  was  divided  into following six offices as part of the same Head Office:      "(i) Local Head Office      (ii) Madras Main Branch      (iii) Overseas Branch      (iv)  Regional   Office,  which  is      called Zonal Office      (v) The Commercial Branch      (vi) Siruthozhil Branch"      4. There  is no  dispute that  as far as the Clerks and the Head  Clerks in all the six parts of the same local Head Office are concerned, a common seniority list is maintained. The effect of the aforesaid arrangements for the purposes of the clause  1(d) is  that "the employees" in the said clause means the  employees in  all the said six parts of the local Head Office.  In other  words, if a vacancy for a Head Clerk occurred at  any of  the said six offices, it was considered to be a vacancy in one office, viz.,the local Head Office of which the other five offices were only parts.      5. It appears that respondent Parthasarathy was working as a  clerk in  the Madras Regional Office (now called Zonal Office) which is, as will be clear from above, a part of the Local Head  Office itself.  On 21st  August,  1973,  he  was offered the  post of  Head Clerk  at Deva  Kottain which  is outside Madras  city. This offer was declined by him. On 1st July, 1980,  he was  offered the  post of  Head Clerk in the Sowkarpet branch office in the same city which was less than 2 kms,  from his  Regional office  where he  was working. He declined the said offer too. He was then entitled to be considered for  posting as  Head Clerk  only in  his  office which meant  in any  of the  six parts  of  the  local  Head Office, that  being the third and the final offer that could be made to him. The third offer was made to him for the post of  Head Clerk  at the  Overseas branch, and that being part of  the same  local Head Office, he was bound to accept it. However, he declined the third and the final offer also, and issued a lawyer’s notice to the Bank contending that the Overseas branch was different from the Regional office where he was  working and,  therefore, the  offer given to him was contrary to  the said  clause 1(d).  The allegations made in the notice were of course denied by the bank.      6. On  6th September,  1983, one  A. Nizamuddin who was working as Head Clerk in the Regional office passed away and that post  became  vacant.  On  24th  September,  1983,  the respondent filed  a writ  petition before the High Court for quashing the  third and  the final  offer made to him on 4th August 1983,  and for  a direction  for posting  him in  the Regional office  where the  vacancy had  occurred. The  High Court took  the view  that the  third offer made was not for the post  of the  Head Clerk  in the  same office  where the respondent was working and, therefore, his refusal to accept the post  did not  exhaust  the  third  option  and  he  was entitled to the vacancy created by Nizamuddin’s death in the Regional office  where the  respondent was  working. We  are afraid this  interpretation is  incorrect  in  view  of  the position explained  above with  regard  to  the  local  Head Office which  was split  into six  different  offices  which together constituted  one unit.  The respondent, when he was offered the third option in the Overseas branch, was offered the post  in the  same office  where  he  was  working,  the Regional office  being as  much a part of the Head Office as the Overseas  branch. By  refusing to  accept the said third and the  final offer,  the respondent  had clearly exhausted all his  three options  and had  become permanently debarred

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from seeking promotion to the post of Head Clerk.      7. We,  however, do  not interfere with the appointment of the  respondent to the post of Head Clerk in the Regional office in the facts and circumstances of the case which show that a  fortuitous appointment  had arisen  within almost  a month of  his refusal  to accept  the offer.  This, however, will not  be treated  as a  precedent nor does it affect the interpretation that  we have  placed on  the clause  1(d) as above.      Civil Appeal No. 4800 of 1992      In this  case also,  the respondent Sampath was working as a Clerk in Madras Regional Office. The first offer of the post of  Head Clerk  was made  to him on 6th August, 1973 at Mudukulathur branch  which  is  in  Madras  city.  This  was declined by  him. On 12th May, 1980, he was given the second offer for  the post  of Head  Clerk  at  Air  Force  Station branch, Tambaram  which was  in Madras  city. The  third and final offer  was made to him on 4th August, 1983 to the post of Head  Clerk in  the Stationery  department of  the Madras Local Head  Office. There  is  no  dispute  that  Stationery department of the Local Head Offfice and the Regional Office form part  of one  unit, viz., Madras Local Head Office. The respondent declined this offer as well, and on 23rd January, 1984 filed  a writ  petition in  the High Court for quashing the third  offer and  for posting  him in  his office, viz., Regional Office  as the Head Clerk. The learned Single Judge of the  High Court  quashed the order making the third offer and allowed  the petition  following the earlier decision in Parthasarathy’s case  with which we have dealt with earlier. The Division  Bench of  the High  Court also  confirmed  the order.      For the  reasons we have given in C.A.No. 4799 of 1992, we   are unable  to accept  the interpretation  given by the High Court on clause 1(d) of Staff Circular No. 42. However, if in  the present  case, the  respondent has  already  been accommodated in  the post  of Head  Clerk  in  the  Regional Office itself,  we do not intend to interfere with the same. It is  nonetheless made  clear that it is the interpretation that we have placed on the said clause that will prevail and not the interpretation placed by the High Court.      With these  observations, the  appeals are allowed only to  the   extent  that  the  interpretation  placed  by  the appellant-Bank on  clause l(d)  of the Staff Circular No. 42 is correct  and the  decision of the High Court on the point is incorrect. There will be no order as to costs. G.N.                                       Appeals allowed