29 November 1996
Supreme Court
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V.T.V.L.AMMA Vs V.T.V.D.MENON .

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,G.T. NANAVATI
Case number: C.A. No.-015610-015610 / 1996
Diary number: 76364 / 1994
Advocates: Vs M. P. VINOD


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PETITIONER: VALLIKAT THEKKEDATH VALAPPIL LAKSHMIKUTTYAMMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VALLIKAT THEKKEDATH VALAPPIL DEMODARAMENNON & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/11/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel on both sides.      This  appeal   by  special  leave  arises  against  the judgment and  decree of  the  Kerala  High  Court,  made  on 22.7.1993 in S.A. No.616/85.      The admitted  facts are  that  item  6  of  the  Plaint Schedule Property belonged to the Tarawad. The Karanawan had executed the  Possessory mortgage  as per  Exhibit B-1 for a sum of  Rs.200/-. The  appellant Ithiridutty  Appachi  filed suit No.  OS-114/70 in  the Court  of Munsiff,  Pattambi for redemption of  the mortgage,  Exhibit B-1.  The property was redeemed by the appellant. Thereafter, the present suit came to be filed for partition of the plaint schedule property in their respective  shares. We  are not concerned in this case with other items. We are concerned only with respect to item 6 of the mortgage property. Based on the contentions, it was found and accepted by the trial Court and the District Court that since  the appellant  had  redeemed  the  property,  he subrogated himself  into the  shoes of  the mortgagee. Since the respondents  have not  redeemed the  mortgage  within  a period of  30 years from the date of execution of Exhibit B- 1, the  appellant has become absolute owner of the property. As a  result, the suit for partition in respect of item No.6 of the Plaint Schedule Property is not partible; it does not lie. The  High Court  in the  above  impugned  judgment  has reversed the finding and held that item 6 is also partible.      The learned counsel  appearing for the appellant relied on Valliamma  Champaka Pillai  vs, Sivathanu  Pillai &  Ors. [(1979) 4  SCC 429]  and contended  that the respondent have failed to  redeem the  property within  the limitation  and, therefore, they  cannot file  a suit  for partition.  It  is difficult to  accept the  contention of the learned counsel. It is  seen that  in that case in the suit for redemption by one of  the mortgagers, he had redeemed the mortgage but the suit was filed for delivery of the possession after 50 years or after  the expiry  of 12  years  from  the  date  of  the redemption  of  the  mortgage  was  decreed.  The  question, therefore, was:  when the limitation for filing the suit for possession would arise? It was held in para 28 as under:

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    "Steering clear  of the tangled web      of   conflicting    and   confusing      decisions    rendered     on     an      interpretation  of   the   relevant      provisions  of   the  Transfer   of      property Act,  1882, as  they stood      before the  amendment of  1929,  we      may say at once that even where the      Transfer of property Act was not in      force,  a   redeeming  co-mortgagor      discharging  the   entire  mortgage      debt,  which   was  the  joint  and      several liability  of  himself  and      co-mortgagor,   was,   in   equity,      entitled to  be subrogated  to  the      rights of  the  mortgagee  redeemed      and to  treat the non-redeeming co-      mortgagor as  his mortgagor  to the      extent of  the latter’s  portion or      share in  the hypotheca and to hold      that portion  or share  as security      for the excess payment made by him.      This   equitable   right   of   the      redeeming co-mortgagor  stems  from      the  doctrine   that   he   was   a      principal debtor  in respect of his      own share  only, and  his liability      in respect of his co-debtor’s share      of the  mortgage debt was only that      of a  surety; and  when the  surety      had discharged  the entire mortgage      debt,  he   was  entitled   to   be      subrogated to  the securities  held      by the  creditor, to  the extent of      getting himself  reimbursed for the      amount paid  by him  over and above      his share  to discharge  the common      mortgage debt."      From what has been said above it is      clear that  where the  Transfer  of      Property Act  is not in force and a      mortgage with possession is made by      two  persons,   one  of  whom  only      redeems discharging  the  whole  of      the common  mortgage debt, he will,      in  equity,   have   two   distinct      rights: Firstly,  to be  subrogated      to  the  rights  of  the  mortgagee      discharged,  vis-a-vis   the   non-      redeeming  co-mortgagor,  including      the right to get into possession of      the latter’s  portion of  share  of      the hypotheca. Secondly, to recover      contribution  towards   the  excess      paid by him on the security of that      portion or  share of  the hypotheca      which belonged  not to  him but  to      the other  co-mortgagor. It follows      that where  one  co-mortgagor  gets      the right  to contribution  against      the other  co-mortgagor  by  paying      off the  entire  mortgage  debt,  a      correlated right  also  accrues  to      the latter  to redeem  his share of      the property and get its possession

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    on payment  of  his  share  of  the      liability  to   the  former.   This      corresponding and get possession of      his property from the redeeming co-      mortgagor, subsists  as long as the      latter’s  right   to   contribution      subsists. This  right of  the ’non-      redeeming’ co-mortgagor, as rightly      pointed out  by the  learned  Chief      Justice of  the High  court in  his      leading  judgment,   is  purely  an      equitable   right,   which   exists      irrespective of  whether the  right      of contribution which the redeeming      co-mortgagor  has  as  against  the      other co-mortgagor,  amounts  to  a      mortgage or not.      Since subrogation  of the redeeming      co-mortgagor  would  give  him  the      right under  the original  mortgage      to  hold   the  non-redeeming   co-      mortgagor’s property as security to      get  himself   reimbursed  for  the      amount paid by him in excess of his      share of  the liability, it follows      that a  suit for  possession of his      hare or  portion of the property by      a non-redeeming  co-mortgagor’s  on      payment of the proportionate amount      of the  mortgage debt, may be filed      either   within    the   limitation      prescribed   for    a   suit    for      redemption of the original mortgage      or within the period prescribed for      a  suit  for  contribution  by  the      redeeming co-mortgagor  against the      other co-mortgagor."      It is  now settled  legal position  that one of the co- owners or one of the co-mortgagers is entitled to redeem the mortgage and  on redemption, he subrogates into the shoes of the mortgagees.  To the  extent of  his  liability  for  the mortgage, he  gets discharge and to the extent of the shares of  other  co-mortgagers,  he  stands  in  the  position  of mortgagee viz-a-viz other co-mortgagers. Therefore, it would be open to the other mortgagers to sue for possession of the property, after  paying their  share within  the  period  of limitation. It  is not  in dispute that 12 years is a period of limitation  for possession  of  the  property  since  the appellant came into possession to the extent of the share of other co-owners,  namely, their  Karvans of  the Tarwad as a mortgagee. They  are entitled  to pay  to the  extent of the respective shares of the mortgage amount and seek possession from the  co-mortgagor, namely,  appellant within  12  years from the date of the redemption of the mortgage. Under these circumstances, suit  has been  filed within limitation for a partition of  property and  preliminary decree  shall follow subject to  the payment  of mortgage amount to the extent of their shares to the appellant.      The appeal  is accordingly  dismissed  with  the  above modifications but, in the circumstances, without costs.