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PETITIONER: V. S. KUTTAN PILLAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1979

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  185            1980 SCR  (1) 673  1980 SCC  (1) 264

ACT:      Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  Sections  91  and 93(1)(c)-Scope of  -Appellants office  bearers of  a  Sabha- Warrant under  s. 93(1)(c)  issued for search and seizure of documents-Search warrant if violates fundamental right under Article 20(3) of Constitution.      Constitution of  India-Article 20(3)-Right  if violated by issue  of search  warrant under  s. 93(1)(c)  of Cr.P.C.. 1973.

HEADNOTE:      Section 91  of the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973 confers power  on the  court or  an officer  in charge  of a police station  to issue  a summons  or written order to any person  in   whose  possession   or  power  a  document  the production of  which the  court  or  the  officer  considers necessary   or   desirable   for   the   purposes   of   any investigation, inquiry,  trial or  other proceeding under D. the Code calling upon him to produce the document.      Section 93 of the Code contemplates three situations in which the  court may  issue a  search warrant: (a) where the Court has  reason to  believe that  a  person  to  whom  the summons or  order under s. 91 has been or might be addressed will not  or would  not produce  the document  or  thing  as required by  such summons  or requisition  or (b) where such document or  thing is  not known  to the  court to be in the possession of  any person  or (c)  where the court considers that the  purposes of any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under this  code will  not be  served by a general search or inspection, then  it may  issue a  search warrant;  and  the person to  whom such  warrant  is  directed  may  search  or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions contained in the code.      The complainant (respondent no. 1 ) made an application before a  magistrate for  the issue  of a  warrant  for  the search and seizure of certain books and documents of a Sabha of which  the accused were office-bearers. After the seizure of the books and documents, on the application of one of the accused persons, the magistrate directed their return to the persons from  whom they  were recovered.  In the  respondent revision petition  the High  Court held  that the provisions contained in  s. 93(1)  of the  Cr.P.C. were not hit by Art.

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20(3) of the Constitution.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: The  High  Court  was  right  in  sustaining  the general search  warrant under  s. 93(1)(c) of the Code. [682 H]      1. The  immunity against  self incrimination extends to any  incriminating   evidence  which   the  accused  may  be compelled to  give but  does not extend to cover a situation where evidence which may have tendency to incrinate 674 the accused  is being collected without compelling him to be a party to the collection of the evidence. The search of the premises occupied  by the  accused, without  compelling  the accused to  be party  to such search, would not be violative of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. [682C]      2. A  search and  seizure pursuant  to a search warrant under s.  93 (  1 )  (c) 8  of the  Code would  not have the remotest  tendency  to  compel  an  accused  to  incriminate himself. He is not required to participate in the search. He may remain a passive spectator or may even be absent. Merely because the accused is occupying the premises to be searched it cannot be said that by such search and consequent seizure of documents,  including  the  document  which  may  contain statements attributable  to the  personal Knowledge  of  the accused and  which may  have a  tendency to incriminate him, would violate  the constitutional  guarantee  against  self- incrimination because  he is not compelled to do anything. A passive submission  to search cannot be styled as compulsion on the accused to submit to search. If anything is recovered during the  search which  may provide incriminating evidence against  the   accused  it  cannot  be  called  a  compelled testimony. [681 G-H]      3. Section  93(1)(c) comprehends  a situation  where  a search warrant  can be issued as the court is unaware of not only the  person but  even the place where the documents may be found  and that a general search is necessary. Therefore, power of  the court  under this clause cannot be cut down by importing some  of the  requirements of  cl. (b)  of the  s. 93(1). [682 F-G]      In  the   instant  case   although  the  order  of  the magistrate was  laconic certain  important aspects could not be over-looked.  The objects of the Sabha  were of a general charitable nature.  An earlier search warrant was quashed by the High  Court. When  the  complainant  made  more  serious allegation a  search warrant  was issued to conduct a search of the institution. The office premises, the books and other documents of the Sabha could not be said to be in possession of any  individual accused.  They were  in the possession of the institution.  A search  of such a public place under the authority  of   a  general  search  warrant  can  easily  be sustained under  s. 93(1)(c).  Viewed  this way there was no illegality in the Magistrate’s order.      Shyamlal Mohanlal  v. State  of Gujarat,  [1965] 2  SCR 457, M.  P. Sharma  &  others  v.  Satish  Chandra  District Magistrate, Delhi  & ors.,  [19541 SCR  1077, The  State  of Bombay  v.  Kathi  Kalu  Gohad  &  Ors.  [1962]  3  SCR  10. explained.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  judgement and order

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dated 16-3-1978  of the  Kerala High  Court in Crl. M.P. No. 124/77.      T. C. Raghavan and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant.      Nemo for the Respondent. 675      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A      DESAI,  J.-Nemo  tenetu  prodere-no  man  is  bound  to ’accuse himself-which  finds constitutional  recognition  in Article 20(3)  of he  Constitution, conferring immunity from compelling an accused person to be a witness against himself by giving  self-incriminating evidence,  has been  put  into forefront to support a prayer for quashing he search warrant issued by  the Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Always,  on  4th January ]977  directing The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Always, to  search the  premises styled  as  the  office  of H.M.D.P. Sabha  (’Sabha’ for  short),  Moothakunam,  and  to seize the  books, documents  and papers  as set  out in  the application for  issuance of  search warmly.  The Magistrate had before  him a  complaint filed  by the  first respondent Ramakrishnan against  the petitioner and S others for having committed offences  under sections  403, 409,  420 and  477A read with  s. 34, Indian Penal Code. Original accused 1, and accused  2   the  present   petitioner,  were   respectively President and  Secretary of the Sabha and original accused 3 to 6  were described  as Managers  of the  Institution.  The complainant  made   an  application   on  4th  January  1977 requesting the  learned Magistrate to issue a search warrant to search  the office  premises of  the Sabha  and seize the books, documents,  etc. described  in  the  application,  if found therein.  On the  very day  the  Magistrate  issued  a search warrant  and in  fact it  was  executed  and  certain books, vouchers  and papers  were produced before the Court. The present  petitioner (original  accused 2)  requested the learned Magistrate  to recall  the warrant and to return the books and documents seized under the authority of the search warrant. The  learned Magistrate  was of the opinion that in view of  the decision  of this Court in Shyamlal Mohanlal v. State of  Gujarat(l), and  an earlier decision of V. Khalid, J. Of  Kerala High  Court, no search warrant could be issued under s.  91 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (’new Code’ for  short), and  accordingly directed  that  anything recovered pursuant  to the  search warrant  Issued by him be returned to  the person  from whom  the same were recovered. The order was, however, to take effect after the decision on the requisition  which was by then received from the Income- Tax officer  under s.  132A of  the Income  Tax  Act.  First respondent  (original   complainant)  preferred  a  revision application to  the High  Court of  Kerala  questioning  the correctness of  the decision  of the  learned Magistrate and the claim  to constitutional  immunity of  the accused  from search and seizure of books, documents, etc. directed with a view to  collecting evidence against him, being violative of Art. 20(3) of the Cons- 676 titution was  canvassed before  the Court.  The  High  Court after an exhaustive review of the decisions of this Court as well as those bearing on the Fifth Amendment to the American constitution held  that the  provisions relating  to  search contained in  s. 93(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, are not hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution.      Section 91  confers power on the Court or an officer in charge of  a J  police station to issue a summons or written order as  the case may be, to any person in whose possession or power  a document,  the production  of which the Court or the  officer   considers  necessary  or  desirable  for  the

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purposes of  any  investigation,  inquiry,  trial  or  other proceeding under  the Code.  Section 93 confers power on the Court  to   issue  search   warrant  under  three  different situations.      Sections 91  and 93,  so far as they are relevant, read as under:           "91. (1)  Whenever any  Court or  any  officer  in      charge  of   a  police   station  considers   that  the      production of  any document or other thing is necessary      or desirable  for the  purposes of  any  investigation,      inquiry, trial  or other  proceeding under this Code by      or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a      summons, or such officer a written order, to the person      m whose  possession or  power such document or thing is      believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it,      or to  produce it, at the time and place stat ed in the      summons or order."           "93. (l)(a)  Where any Court has reason to believe      that a  person to whom a summons or order under section      91 or  a requisition under sub-section ( 1 ) of section      92 has been, or might, be, addressed, will not or would      not produce  the document  or thing as required by such      summons or requisition, or           (b) where  such document  or thing is not known to      the Court to be in the possession of any person, or           (c) where the Court considers that the purposes of      any inquiry,  trial or other proceeding under this Code      will be  served by  a general  search or inspection, it      may issue a search-warrant; and the person to whom such      warrant  is   directed,  may   search  or   inspect  in      accordance therewith  and  the  provisions  hereinafter      contained".      In exercise  of the  power conferred by s. 91 a summons can be  issued by  the Court to a person in whose possession or power any 677 document or  other thing  considered necessary  or desirable for the   purpose  of any  investigation, inquiry,  trial or other proceeding  under the Code calling upon him to produce the document  or thing at the time and place to be mentioned in the  summons. On  the advent  of  the  Constitution,  and especially in view of the provision contained in Art. 20(3), Courts were faced with a problem whether the person referred to in  s. 91(1) of the Code (s 94 of old Code) would include an accused.  In other  words, the  question  was  whether  a summons can  be addressed to the accused calling upon him to produce any document which may be in his possession or power and which  is necessary  or desirable  for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial, etc. in which such person was an accused  person. The  wider question that was raised soon after the enforcement of the Constitution was whether search of the  premises occupied  or  in  possession  of  a  person accused of an offence or seizure of anything therefrom would violate the  immunity  from  self-incrimination  enacted  in Article 20(3).  In M.  P. Sharma & others v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate,  Delhi &  ors.,(ll) the  contention put forth was that a search to obtain document for investigation into an  offence is- a compulsory procuring of incriminatory evidence from  the accused himself and is, therefore, hit by Art. 20(3)  as  unconstitutional  and  illegal.  A  specific reference was  made  to  ss.  94  and  96  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code,  1898 (’old  Code’ for short), both of which are re-enacted in almost identical language as ss. 91 and 93 in the new Code, in support of the submission that a seizure of documents  on search  is in  the contemplation  or law  a

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compelled production of documents. A Constitution Bench of 8 judges of  this Court  unanimously negatived this contention observing:           "A power of search and seizure is in any system of      jurisprudence an  overriding power of the State for the      protection  of   social  security  and  that  power  is      necessarily regulated  by law.  When  the  Constitution      makers have  thought fit not to subject such regulation      to  constitutional  limitations  by  recognition  of  a      fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American      Fourth Amendment,  we have  no justification  to import      it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some      process of  strained construction. Nor is it legitimate      to assume  that  the  constitutional  protection  under      Article  20(3)  would  be  defeated  by  the  statutory      provisions for searches". 678 It was concluded that a search under the enabling provisions of the  Criminal Procedure  Code  cannot  be  challenged  as illegal on the ground of violation of Article 20(3). It must be made clear that the question whether there is any element of compulsion in issuing a summons to a person accused of an offence under  s. 94 (old) s. 91 (new) to produce a document or thing  in his  possession or power considered n necessary or desirable  for any inquiry, investigation or, trial under the Code  of Criminal  Procedure was  kept  open.  In  other words, the question whether the expression ’person’ in s. 94 (old) s.  91 (new)  would comprehend  a person accused of an offence was left open.      Following the  decision  in  M.  P.  Sharma’s  case,  a Division Bench  of the  Madras High  Court  in  Swarnalingam Chettiar v.  Assistant Labour  Inspector, Karaikudi(l)  held that a  summons could  not be  issued under s. 94 of the old Code to  the accused  for production of certain documents in his  possession  irrespective  of  the  fact  whether  those documents contained  some statement  of the  accused made of his personal knowledge and accordingly the summons issued to the accused  to produce certain documents was quashed. After the matter  went back  to the trial court, on an application of the  Sub-Inspector investigating  the case,  for a search warrant to  be issued  to obtain  documents mentioned in the list attached  to the petition and likely to be found upon a search of  the premises of Karaikudi Railway out Agency, the Magistrate issued  a notice  to the accused to show cause E, why a  general search  warrant as  asked for  should not  be issued. Again  the accused  moved the High Court in revision and in  Swarnalingam  Chettiar  v.  Assistant  Inspector  of Labour  Karaikudi(2)  the  High  Court  quashed  the  notice holding that such notice practically amounts to stating that either he produces the document or else the premises will be searched and this will amount to testimonial compulsion held impermissible by  the decision of the Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma’s case (supra). This view of the Madras High Court is no more  good law  in view  of the  later decisions  of this Court.      In The Slate of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Ors.,(3) a question arose  whether obtaining  specimen hand  writing or thumb  impression   of  the  accused  would  contravene  the constitutional guarantee  in Art.  20(3). In this case there was some  controversy about  certain observations  in M.  P. Sharma’s case  (supra) and,  therefore, the matter was heard by a  Bench of 11 Judges. Two opinions were handed down, one by Chief Justice Sinha for himself and 7 brother judges, and another by Das Gupta, J. for himself and 2 other colleagues. In Sinha, CJ’s opinion, the observation in M. P.

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679 Sharma’s case (supra) that s. 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on  the connotation  of the  word ’witness’  is  not entirely  well-founded   in   law.   Immunity   from   self- incrimination as  re-enacted in  Art. 20(3) was held to mean conveying information  based upon  the personal knowledge of the person  giving the  information and  could  not  include merely the  mechanical process  of  producing  documents  in court which  may throw  a light  on any  of  the  points  in controversy, but  which do  not contain any statement of the accused based  on his  personal knowledge.  It was concluded that to  be  a  witness  is  not  equivalent  to  furnishing evidence in  its widest  significance; that  is to  say,  as including not merely making of oral or written statement but also production of document or giving materials which may be relevant at  trial to  determine the  innocence or  guilt of the’ accused.      What was  kept open  in Sharma’s case (supra) whether a person accused  of an offence could be served with a summons to produce  documents was  decided when it was observed that immunity from  self-incrimination would  not comprehend  the mechanical process of producing documents in court which may throw a  light on any of the points in controversy but which do not  contain a  statement of  the accused  based  on  his personal knowledge.      The matter again came up before a Constitution Bench of this Court  in Shyamlal  Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat(l). In that case  appellant Shyamlal Mohanlal was a licensed money- lender and according to the provisions of the relevant Money Lending Act and Rules he was under an obligation to maintain books. He  was prosecuted  for failing  to maintain books in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The police prosecutor  incharge of  the case  on behalf  of  the prosecution presented an application requesting the Court to order the  appellant Shyamlal Mohanlal to produce daily book and ledger  for a  certain year. Presumably it was a request to issue  summons as  contemplated by s. 94 of the old Code. The Learned  Magistrate rejected  the request  on the ground that in  so doing  the  guarantee  of  immunity  from  self- incrimination would  be violated. The matter ultimately came to this  Court and  the question  that was  put in forefront before the  Court was  whether the expression ’person’ in s. 94(1) which  is the  sale as  s.  91(1)  of  the  new  Code, comprehends within  its sweep a person accused of an offence and if  it does,  whether an  issue of  summons to produce a document in  his  possession  or  power  would  violate  the immunity against  self-incrimination guaranteed  by  Article 20(3). The  majority opinion  handed down by Sikri, J. ruled that s. 94(1) upon its true construction does not 680 apply to  an accused  person. While  recording this  opinion there is no reference to the decision of the larger Bench in Kathi Kalu  oghad’s case (supra). Shah, J. in his dissenting judgment referred  to the  observation that  the accused may have documentary  evidence in his possession which may throw some light  on the controversy and if it is a document which is  not  his  statement  conveying  his  personal  Knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon to produce it.  Proceeding further  it was  observed that  Art. 20(3) would  be no  bar to  the summons  being issued  to  a person accused  of an offence to produce a thing or document except in the circumstances herein above mentioned. Whatever that may  be, it  is  indisputable  that  according  to  the majority opinion  the expression  ’person’ in  s. 91(1) (new Code) does  not take within its sweep a person accused of an

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offence which would mean that a summons issued to an accused person to  produce a  thing or document considered necessary or desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry or trial would  imply compulsion  and the  document or thing so produced would be compelled testimony and would be violative of the constitutional immunity against self-incrimination.      There  appears   to  be   some  conflict   between  the observations in  M. P. Sharma’s case (supra) as reconsidered in Kothi  Kala oghad’s  case (supra) and the one in the case of Shyamlal  Mohanlal (supra).  However, as this case is not directly relatable to a summons issued under s. 91(1), we do not consider  it necessary  to refer  the matter to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict.      In view  of the  decision in  Shyamlal Mohanlal’s  case (supra) one  must proceed  on the  basis that  a summons  to produce a  thing or  document as  contemplated by  s.  91(1) cannot be  issued to  a person accused of an offence calling upon him  to produce  document or thing considered necessary or desirable  for the  purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial  or  other  proceeding  under  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.      If summons  as hereinbefore  discussed cannot be issued to an  accused person  under s.  91(1), ipso  facto a search warrant contemplated by s. 93(1) (a) cannot be issued by the Court for  the obvious  reason that  it can  only be  issued where the  Court could  have issued  a summons but would not issue the  same under  the apprehension  that the  person to whom such  summons is  issued will  not or would not produce the thing  as required  by such  summons or  requisition.  A search warrant  under s. 93(1)(a) could only be issued where a summons could have been issued under s. 91(1) but the same would not  be issued  on an apprehension that the person, to whom 681 the summons  is directed would not comply with the same and, there- A  fore, in  order to obtain the document or thing to produce which  the summons  was  to  be.  issued,  a  search warrant may be issued under s. 93 (1) (a) .      Section 93,  however, also  envisages situations  other than one  contemplated by  s. 93(1)(a)  for  issuance  of  a search warrant.  It must  be made  distinctly clear that the present search warrant is not issued under s. 93 ( 1 ) (a) .      Section 93(1)  (b)  comprehends  a  situation  where  a search warrant  may be issued to procure a document or thing not known  to the  Court to  be in  the  possession  of  any person. In  other words,  a general  search warrant  may  be issued to  procure the  document or  thing  and  it  can  be recovered from  any person  who may  be ultimately  found in possession of  it and it was not known to the Court that the person from  whose possession it was found was in possession of it.  In the  present case  the search  warrant was  to be executed at  the office of the Sabha and it can be said that office bearers  of the  Sabha were  the persons  who were in possession of  the documents  in respect of which the search warrant was  issued. Therefore, clause (b) of s. 93(1) would not be attracted.      Section  93(1)  (c)  of  the  new  Code  comprehends  a situation where the Court may issue a search warrant when it considers that  the purpose  of an  inquiry, trial  or other proceeding under the Code will be served by a general search or inspection  to search,  seize and  produce the  documents mentioned in the list. When such a general search warrant is issued, in  execution of  it the premises even in possession of the  accused can  be searched and documents found therein can be  seized irrespective  of the  fact that the documents

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may contain  some statement  made by  the accused  upon  his personal knowledge  and  which  when  proved  may  have  the tendency to  incriminate the accused. However, such a search and seizure  pursuant to  a search  warrant issued  under s. 93(1) (c) will not have even the remotest tendency to compel the accused  to incriminate  himself. He  is expected  to do nothing. He is not required to participate in the search. He may remain  a passive  spectator. He may even remain absent. Search can  be conducted under the authority of such warrant in the  presence  of  the  accused.  Merely  because  he  is occupying the  premises which  is to  be searched  under the authority of  the search  warrant it cannot even remotely be said that by such search and consequent seizure of documents including  the   documents  which   may  contain  statements attributable to the personal knowledge of the 682 accused and  which may  have tendency  to  incriminate  him, would violate  the constitutional  guarantee  against  self- incrimination because  he is not compelled to do anything. A passive  submission   to  search   cannot  be  styled  as  a compulsion on  the  accused  to  submit  to  search  and  if anything  is  recovered  during  search  which  may  provide incriminating evidence  against the  accused  it  cannot  be styled as  compelled testimony.  This is too obvious to need any  precedent   in  support.  The  immunity  against  self- crimination extends  to any incriminating evidence which the accused may  be compelled  to give.  It does  not extend  to cover such  situation  as  where  evidence  which  may  have tendency to  incriminate  the  accused  is  being  collected without in  any manner  compelling him or asking him to be a party to  the collection  of the  evidence.  Search  of  the premises occupied  by the  accused without the accused being compelled to  be  a  party  to  such  search  would  not  be violative  of  the  constitutional  guarantee  enshrined  in Article 20(3). .      It was,  however, urged  that s. 93(1) (c) must be read in the  context of s. 93(1) (b) and it would mean that where documents are  known  to  be  at  a  certain  place  and  in possession of a certain person any general search warrant as contemplated by  s. 93(1)  (c) will  have to  be  ruled  out because in  such a  situation s.  93(1)(a)  alone  would  be attracted. Section  93(1)(b) comprehends  a situation  where the Court  issues a  search warrant in respect of a document or a  thing to  be recovered  from a certain place but it is not known  to the Court whether that document or thing is in possession of  any particular person. Under clause (b) there is a  definite allegation  to recover  certain  document  or thing from a certain specific place but the Court is unaware of the  fact whether  that document or thing or the place is in possession  of  a  particular  person.  Section  93(1)(c) comprehends a situation where a search warrant can be issued as the  Court is unaware of not only the person but even the place where  the documents  may be  found and that a general search is  necessary. One  cannot, therefore,  cut down  the power of  the Court  under s. 93(1) (c) by importing into it some of  the  requirements  of  s.  93(1)(b).  No  canon  of construction would  permit such  an erosion  of power of the Court to issue a general search warrant. It also comprehends not merely  a general  search but even an inspection meaning thereby inspection  of a  place and a general search thereof and seizure of documents or things which the Court considers necessary or  desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial  or other proceeding under the Code. The High Court accordingly  sustained the  general search  warrant in this case under s. 93(1)(c).

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683      Turning to the facts of this case it was contended that the order  of the Magistrate clearly disclosed an utter non- application of  mind and  a mere  mechanical disposal of the application before  the Court. Undoubtedly the order is of a laconic nature.  But then  there are  certain aspects of the case which  cannot be  overlooked before  this  Court  would interfere in such an interlocutory order.      The appellant  and his co-accused are office bearers of a public  institution styled  as  H.M.D.P.  Sabha.  We  were informed at  the hearing of this petition that this Sabha is a public  institution engaged  in the.  activity of  running educational   institutions   and   supporting   objects   or activities of  a general  charitable nature.  When the first complaint  was   filed,  the  allegation  therein  was  that criminal breach  of trust  in respect of funds of the public institution  has   been  committed  by  the  office  bearers thereof. A  search warrant  was issued but it was quashed by the Kerala  High Court.  Thereafter an  other complaint  was filed making  some more  serious allegations  and  a  search warrant was  sought. Now,  this  search  warrant  was  being issued to  conduct search  of the premises used as office of an institution.  The place  will be  in  possession  of  the institution. The  office bearers of the Sabha are accused of an  offence.   Documents  and   books  of  accounts  of  the institution are  required  for  the  purpose  of  the  trial against the  office bearers  of the  institution. The office premises could  not be  said to  be  in  possession  of  any individual  accused   but  stricto  sensu  it  would  be  in possession of  the institution.  Books of accounts and other documents of  the institution  could not  be said  to be  in personal custody  or possession of the office bearers of the institution but  they are  in possession  of the institution and are  lying in the office of the institution. A search of such a  public place under the authority of a general search warrant can  easily be  sustained under  s. 93(1)(c). If the order of  the learned  Magistrate is construed to mean this, there is  no,  illegality  committed  in  issuing  a  search warrant. Of  course, issuance  of  a  search  warrant  is  a serious matter  and it  would be advisable not to dispose of an application  for search  warrant in a mechanical way by a laconic  order.   Issue  of  search  warrant  being  in  the discretion of  the Magistrate  it  would  be  reasonable  to expect of  the Magistrate  to give  reasons which swayed his discretion in  favour  of  granting  the  request.  A  clear application of  mind  by  the  learned  Magistrate  must  be discernible in the order granting the search warrant. Having said this,  we see no justification for interfering with the order of the High Court in this case. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 684