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PETITIONER: V.S.CHARATI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HUSSEIN NHANU JAMADAR(DEAD) BY L.RS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/11/1998

BENCH: Sujata V. Monohar, G.B.Pattanaik

JUDGMENT:

DER         The appellant  is the landlord.  He has claimed that in a partition effected in the year 1956 in the joint family of which he was a member  an  area  admeasuring  1  acre  19 gunthas out  of Revision Survey No.  8 of village Kudnoor in Gadhinglaj Taluka  came  to  his  share.    This   land   is agricultural  land  of  which  the original respondent was a tenant at the material time.

       On  coming  into  force  of  the  Bombay  Tenancy  & Agricultural   Lands  Act.  1948,  the  appellant  filed  an application under Section 31(1) read with Section 29 of  the said  Act  for  possession  on  the ground that he bona fide required the land for  personal  cultivation.  Although  the appellant  was  a  minor  at the time of the application, he chose to exercise  his  rights  under  Section  31(1).  This application  was  ultimately  dismissed  by the Mamlatdar on 29.5.1957 on the ground that under Section 31-B, there is  a prohibition   against   termination   of   tenancy  if  such termination would result in contravention of the  provisions of  Bombay  Prevention  of  Fragmentation & Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. Therefore, by virtue of the dismissal of the appellant’s application under Section  31(1)  under  the provisions  of  Section 31(1) the respondent became a deemed purchaser of the said land on the postponed date  29.5.1957, the  latter  being  the date on which the application of the appellant was dismissed.

       Thereafter  proceedings  lunder  Section  31-G  were taken   for   determination   of   purchase   price.   These proceedings, however, were dropped by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal on 31.5.1961 on the ground that the  appellant  was then a minor and the tenant could not purchase the land. The tenant  did  not take any steps to challenge the decision of the Tribunal dated 31.5.1961.

       On  20.10.1964,  by  Maharashtra  Act  39  of  1964, Chapter  III-AA  was added in the said Act to confer certain benefits on the members and ex-members of the armed  forces. Under  this Chapter, Section 43-18 provides, inter alia that it shall  be  lawful  for  a  landlord  at  any  time  after commencement  of  the  said  Amendment Act, to terminate the tenancy of any land and obtain possession thereof, but of so much of such land as will be sufficient to  make  the  total land upto the ceiling area. Under sub-section (4) of Section 43-1B,  nothing  in the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation & Consolidation  of  Holdings  Act.,  1947  shall  affect  the

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termination   of   any   tenancy  under  this  Chapter.  The "landlord" for the purposes of this Chapter  is  defined  in Section  43-1A  as  a  person  who is or has ceased to be, a serving member of the armed forces. The  appellant,  in  the present case, joined the armed forces on 21.11.1965 after he attained  majority  on 7.11.1965. He served, on 11.4.1972, a notice terminating tenancy of the respondent  under  Section 43-1B(2).  In  the  proceedings which took place thereafter, his application was allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 31.3.1976. An appeal  from  this  order  to  the  Additional Commissioner     was    dismissed    on    25.4.1976.    The respondent-tenant thereupon moved the High Court by way of a writ  petition  which  has  been  allowed  by  the  impugned judgment & order dated 8.10.1980. Hence, the present appeal.

       The  short  question  that requires consideration is whether in view of the dismissal of the original application filed by  the  appellant-landlord  under  Section  31(1)  on 29.5.1967,  it  was  open  to  the appellant to avail of the provisions of Chapter III-AA.  Under Section  43-1B,  it  is provided  that  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in the foregoing  provisions  of  this  Act,  but  subject  to  the provisions  of  this  section,  it  shall  be  lawful  for a landlord (a member or ex-member of the armed forces) at  any time  after the commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1964 to terminate the tenancy of  any land  and obtain possession thereof in the manner set out in the section.    Section  43-1B,  therefore,  overrides   the preceding provisions  of  the said Act.  Section 43-1E which forms a part of Chapter III-AA, provides as follows:

       "Sec.43-IE:      Nothing  in  this   Chapter            shall  apply in relation to land which before the            commencement  of  the  Tenancy  and  Agricultural            Lands  Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 is purchased by            any tenant under the provisions of Chapter III."

       According to the appellant, Section 43-IE will  come into  operation  only  in  those  cases  where  there  is  a completed purchase in favour of the tenant.    It  will  not protect  a  tenant  who  is  only a deemed purchaser, but in respect of whom proceedings under section 32G have not  been completed.   The  appellant  therefore  contends  that  as a member of the armed forces he can avail  of  Chapter  III-AA and  Section  43-IB  forming a part thereof to terminate the tenancy of the respondent and obtain possession of the  said land.  According  to  the  respondent.    Section 43-IE will protect him against Chapter III-AA provisions because he has become a deemed purchaser on 29.5.1957.

       This  issue  came  up  for  consideration  before  a Division Bench of the Bombay  High  Court  in  the  case  of Bhimrao Tatoba  Sawant  & Anr.  Vs Heramb Anant Patwardhan & Ors.  reported in AIR 1986 Bombay 408.    While  considering the  scheme  of  Chapter  III-AA, the Bombay High Court held that Section 43-IE would come into operation only  if  there has  been  so as to say, a completed purchase of the land by the tenant under the provisions of Chapter III.  It will not be possible to introduce, while  interpreting  that  section the  theory  of  "deemed  purchase"  and its ineffectiveness under certain circumstances.  What is material is  that  the vested  rights  flowing from the purchase of the land by the tenant under Chapter III should not be disturbed.    If  the rights   of   the  tenant  as  a  purchaser  have  not  been crystallised, the landlord belonging to the armed forces can

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claim benefit of the provisions of chapter III-AA.   In  the present  case,  as  section 32G proceedings were dropped the rights of the respondent-tenant as a purchaser have not been crystalised.  The very purpose of introducing Chapter III-AA by the Amending Act of 1964 is to give  additional  benefits to those landlords who are members of the armed forces.  The High  Court  has rightly observed in connection with Chapter III-AA as follows:

               "All  these  provisions  would  be  set  at            naught  if  we  accept  the  contention  of  Shri            Bhonsale that under Chapter III a tenant would be            the  purchaser  in  every  case  except where the            purchase has become ineffective under S.32G(3) or            S.32F.  It is material to note that wherever  the            purchase  has  become ineffective under these two            provisions it is the landlord  who  has  a  first            preference  to  get  possession of the land. This            right has been conferred on  the  landlord  under            S.32P.  What  is  important  is  that  under that            section the landlord, whether he is a  member  of            the  armed  forces or not is entitled to have his            first preference. It would  thus  mean  that  the            provisions   of   Chapter  III-AA  could  not  be            implemented  to  the  benefit  of  the   landlord            belonging  to  the  armed  forces  if we record a            finding that prior to the introduction  of  Chap.            III-AA  on  the statute book the tenant should be            held to have become the owner except  lunder  the            two  contingencies covered by Ss. 32G(3) and 32F.            In our opinion, the interpretation sought  to  be            put  by  Shri Bhonsale on S.43-IE would take away            all the benefits which the  Legislature  intended            to confer on the landlords who lhave been serving            as members of the armed forces. It is material to            note that S.43-IE uses the words ’purchase by the            tenant’.  It  appear  that  the  Legislature  has            purposefully chosen not to use the words  ’deemed            to have been purchased by the tenant’ under Chap.            III.  The  words  ’purchased  by the tenant’ will            have to be interpreted in such a manner that  the            intention  of  the Legislature to give additional            benefits to the landlords belonging to the  armed            forces  is  implemented.  This  is permissible if            there is no violence to the language used by  the            Legislature   and   the  meaning  of  the  phrase            ’purchased  by  the  tenant’  can   be   opoperly            understood  as  not to cover ’deemed to have been            purchased by the tenant’."

                                          (underling ours)

       The appellant, therefore, in the present  dase,  did not  lose  his  rights  under  Chapter  III-AA  because  the proceedings under Section 32-G had  been  dropped,  and  the tenant  remained  only  a  deemed purchaser and could not be called a purchaser as contemplated under Section 43-IE.

       It  is  submitted  by  the   respondent   that   the Agricultural  Lands  Tribunal  was  not  right  in  dropping proceedings under Section 32-G. Its order  of  31.5.1961  is bad  in  law.  He  relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Nago Dattu Mahajan Vs. Smt.  Yeshodabai Huna  Mahajan reported in (1976) 78 BLR 427 where this Court

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has held that lunder Section 31 the landlords have a  choice to  avail  of one of the two provisions of resumption namely either Section 31(1) or Section 31(3). No landlord can avail of both the provisions. Learned counsel for the  respondent, therefore,  contends  that in the present case the appellant having exercised his choice under Section 31(1),  could  not have   urged  in  the  proceedings  under  Section  31G  his disability as a minor under  Section  31(3).  The  order  of 31.5.1961  of  the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, however, was not challenged by the respondent. The order of 31.5.1961 has become final and the decision rendered by  the  Agricultural Lands  Tribunal  as between the appellant and the respondent is binding on both the parties. A decision simply because it may be wrong would not thereupon become a nullity. It  would continue to bind the parties unless set aside. The effect of the  decision  of 31.5.1961 on the parties therefore, cannot be ignored. In the present case, since the tenant could  not complete  his  purchase  by  reason of the proceedings under Section 31G being dropped he cannot  now  contend  that  the decision  has  no legal effect or that the proceedings under Section 31G ought to have been completed and, therefore,  he should be looded lupon as a purchaser.

       The  appellant  has  also  drawn  our  attention  to Section 31F(IA) under which, if a tenant holding land from a landlord who was a minor has not been  given  intimation  at the  commencement  of  the  Bombay  Tenancy and Agriucltural Lands Amendment Act, 1969, but being in  possession  of  the land  on  such  commencement,  is desirous of exercising the right conferred on lhim lunder sub-section(1)  he  may  give such  intimation  to  the landlord and the Tribunal within a period of two  years  from  the  commencement  of  the  Act. Therefore, the tenant was given an additional opportunity to give  intimation after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1969. Even this opportunity was not  availed  fo  by  the tenant.  The  respondent has thus continued as a tenant. His tenancy can be terminated under Section 43-IB.

       In the permises the High  Court  was  not  right  in coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  application  of  the appellant was barred under  Section  43-IE.  We,  therefore, allow this appeal  set aside the impugned judgment and order of   the   High   Court   and   restore  the  order  of  the Sub-divisional  Officer  as  confirmed  by  the   Additional Commissioner. There will, however, be no order as to costs.