http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1849 of 2002

PETITIONER: V. Laxminarasamma

RESPONDENT: A. Yadaiah (dead) & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/2008

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1849 OF 2002 (With Civil Appeal No. 1850 of 2002)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Heard learned counsel for the parties.

 2.      When the matter was being heard, learned counsel for  the parties submitted that two decisions of this Court, each  rendered by two learned Judges expressed contrary views and,  therefore, the matter deserves to be referred to a larger Bench.     3.      The disputes relate to the Andhra Pradesh Land  Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short the ’Act’).  In Konda  Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. (2002 (3) SCC  258), it was observed that all the questions concerning the  civil nature of dispute are to be decided by the Special Court  set up under the Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction.   It was specifically mentioned that the questions of ownership,  lawful possession can be decided by the Civil Court and mere  allegation of land grabbing would suffice.  In para 17 it was,  inter-alia observed as follows:     "17. It is pertinent to note that mere allegation  of an act of land grabbing is sufficient to  invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. In  both Section 7(1) and Section 8(1) of the Act  the phrase "any alleged act of land grabbing" is  employed and not "act of land grabbing". It  appears to us that it is designedly done by the  legislature to obviate the difficulty of  duplication of trial once in the courts under  the Act and over again in the ordinary civil  court. The purpose of the Act is to identify  cases involving allegation of land grabbing for  speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the  Act are nonetheless civil courts which follow  the Code of Civil Procedure and are competent  to grant the same reliefs which can be  obtained from ordinary civil courts. For the  purpose of taking cognizance of the case the  Special Court is required to consider the  location or extent or value of the land alleged  to have been grabbed or of the substantial

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

nature of the evil involved or in the interest of  justice required and to give an opportunity of  being heard to the petitioner [sub-section (1- A)]. It is plain that sub-section (2) opens with a  non obstante clause and mandates that  notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil  Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, or  in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972,  any case in respect of an alleged act of land  grabbing or the determination of question of  title and ownership to, or lawful possession of  any land alleged to have been grabbed under  the Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court  constituted for the area in which the land  grabbed is situated and the decision of the  Special Court shall be final . Sub-section (2-B)  specifically provides that notwithstanding  anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to  try all offences punishable under this Act. It is  left to the Special Court to determine the order  in which the civil and criminal liability against  a land grabber be initiated. Sub-section (6)  provides that every finding of the Special Court  with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing  shall be conclusive proof of the fact of the land  grabbing and of the persons who committed  such land grabbing and every judgment of the  Special Court with regard to determination of  title and ownership to, or lawful possession of,  any land alleged to have been grabbed, shall  be binding on all persons having interest in  such land. It contains three provisos but they  are not relevant for the present discussion.    Sub-section (8) brings about automatic  transfer of any case pending before any court  or authority immediately before the  constitution of a Special Court, as would have  been within the jurisdiction of the Special  Court if the cause of action on which such suit  or proceeding is based, has arisen after the  constitution of the Special Court. The  provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 which  commences with a non obstante clause confer  jurisdiction on the Special Court and Section  15 of the Act directs that the provisions of the  Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything  inconsistent therewith contained in any other  law for the time being in force or custom,  usage or agreement or decree or order of a  court or any other tribunal or authority. A  combined reading of these provisions leads to  the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil  court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil  Procedure and under the Civil Courts Act is  ousted and the Act which is special law will  prevail and as such the Special Court will have  jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with  thereunder. (See: Sanwarmal Kejriwal v.  Vishwa Coop. Housing Society Ltd. 1990 2 SCC  288)."  

4.      In N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land  Grabbing (Prohibition) Act and Ors. (2006 (4) SCC 214) it was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

held that actual dispossession has to be established and  questions like acquisition of title by adverse possession can be  decided only by the Civil Court.  In paras 46 and 47 it was,  inter-alia, held as follows:

"46. The main issue which surfaces in these  appeals is whether the actions arising out of  the dispute raised by the heirs of Uppari  Ramaiah can be said to attract the provisions  of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,  1982. Admittedly, the transferees from Mir  Riyasat Ali and Chandra Ramalingaiah as also  P. Neelakanteswaramma have been in  possession of the properties in dispute and at  no point of time had their possession been  disturbed. The attempts by the heirs of Uppari  Ramaiah to dispossess the said transferees  could at best be said to be an attempt to gain  possession of the lands without actually  obtaining possession thereof, which would not  constitute an act of land grabbing within the  meaning of the A.P. Land Grabbing  (Prohibition) Act, 1982. We agree with both Mr  Venugopal and Mr Nariman that in order to  constitute an act of land grabbing, an attempt  to dispossess must be followed by actual  dispossession which would then constitute  land grabbing so as to attract the penal  provisions of the 1982 Act.  47. These appeals should fail on the said  ground alone but it has also been argued, and,  in our view, quite rightly so, that the initial  document executed by Uppari Ramaiah in  favour of Mir Riyasat Ali on 8-2-1961 was void  since Uppari Ramaiah did not have any  saleable interest in the land at that stage  having regard to the express prohibition under  Sections 47 and 49 of the Tenancy Act of 1950.  We are unable to agree with Mr Parasaran that  this was merely a voidable transaction and  was capable of being avoided without the  defect being cured under Section 50-B of the  said Act. It was all the more so since the  transfer was being made by a protected tenant  as an agriculturist to a non-agriculturist which  has also been expressly prohibited under the  Act. That Uppari Ramaiah was aware that the  lands were agricultural in nature is evident  from the application filed before the learned  Special Judge in which the said lands were  described as "dry agricultural lands". Except  for the fact that the said lands were now  included within an urban area there is nothing  to show that the user of the same had been  altered with the passage of time. The decision  in Sarifabibi case 5 cited by Mr   Parasaran  does not, therefore, help his clients’ case. The  scheme of the Tenancy Act of 1950 is reflected  in Section 30 of the Act which prohibits  subdivision or sub-letting of any land by a  tenant or assignment of any interest held by  him therein. The preamble to the Act provides  that it was expedient inter alia to amend the  law regulating the relations of landlords and  tenants of agricultural lands and the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

alienation of such lands and to enable the  landholders to prevent excessive subdivision of  agricultural holdings. In our view, in a  proceeding before the Special Court the only  issue which fell for decision is whether there  has been an act of land grabbing as alleged  and who is the guilty party. The Special Court  has no jurisdiction to decide questions relating  to acquisition of title by adverse possession in  a proceeding under the Act as the same would  fall within the domain of the civil courts. The  learned Special Judge apparently travelled  beyond the jurisdiction vested in him under  the 1982 Act in deciding that even if the  provisions of Section 47 of the Act were a bar  to transfer without the sanction of the  Tahsildar, the occupants of the land had  perfected their title thereto by way of adverse  possession."  

5.      As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the  appellants, the view expressed by two Benches of this Court  are contradictory.                            6.      Above being the position, we refer the matter to a larger  Bench.  The records may be placed before the Hon’ble the  Chief Justice of India for necessary orders.