18 December 1964
Supreme Court
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V. K. A. RANGANATHA KONAR Vs THE TIRUCHIRAPPALLI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BY ITSCOMMISSIONER,

Case number: Appeal (civil) 675 of 1963


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PETITIONER: V. K. A. RANGANATHA KONAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE TIRUCHIRAPPALLI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BY ITSCOMMISSIONER, A

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/12/1964

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1966 AIR   65            1965 SCR  (2) 645

ACT: The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (Mad. Act 3 of 1922),  ss.  4(1) and 4(4)-Landlord to pay  compensation  to evicted tenant for improvements on land-Decree in favour  of landlord  under  s. 4(1) not specifying  time  within  which payment  to  be made-Payment not made within  three  months- Provisions of s. 4(4) whether attracted Suit whether  liable to be dismissed.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was the tenant of respondent No. 1 on a  piece of land and had built a cinema house thereon.  On the expiry of  the  lease, respondent No. 1 filed a suit for  rent  and eviction against the appellant and his sub-lessee.  The suit was  decreed.   Under s. 4(1) of the  Madras  City  Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921, the court determined the value of  the superstructures  made by the appellant, and the decree  said that  possession of the suit properties was to be  delivered to  respondent  No. 1 on the latter making  payment  of  the compensation  for the superstructures as determined  by  the court.  The decree did not specify the time during which the payment was to be made.  According to s. 4(4) of the Act the compensation money had to be paid within three months of the passing  of the decree in the landlord’s  favour,  otherwise the landlord’& suit would stand dismissed.  Respondent No. 1 paid the compensation money into court after the said period of three months had expired and prayed to the court that the decree  be amended by specifying the time during  which  the payment  was  to be made.  The court amended the  decree  by inserting  therein  that the payment was to be  made  within three months from the passing of the original decree.   Thus respondent  No. 1 remained in default under s. 4(4) and  the court dismissed the suit.  Respondent No. 1 appealed to  the High  Court which held that s. 4(4) did not come  into  play when  the  decree under s. 4(1) did not specify  the  period within which payment was to be made and its decision went in favour of respondent No. 1. The appellant then applied for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court  which was granted. It  was urged on behalf of the appellant that the  provision prescribed  by  s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect  in  the

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decree  which  is  passed  under s.  4(1)  cannot  help  the plaintiff-landlord  to  circumvent the effect  of  the  said provision.   On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was  urged that s. 4(1) should be read as controlling s. 4(4), first  a decree must be properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying  the period  of  three months within which the amount  should  be paid and then only s. 4(4) could be invoked. HELD  : The High Court was in error in reversing  the  order passed by the trial court. (i)  The  controversy had to be decided in the light of  the object  of  the  Act.   The  object  was  clearly  to   give protection  to tenants who had taken open land on lease  and had built superstructures on it in the hope that as long  as they paid rent they would not be evicted. [649 H] 646 (ii) Having  regard to the mandatory terms in which s.  4(4) is couched it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling a. 4(4).  The relevant clause provides that  the decree  should direct that on payment by the  landlord  into court,  within  three months, of the amount found  due,  the tenant  shall put the landlord into possession.  The  clause in respect of the payment by the landlord into court  within three months amount to a condition which has to be satisfied by the landlord before the tenant is required to deliver  to him possession of the property in question.  In other words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount found due  within the specific period in s. 4(1) is not so much  a direction  issued  by  the  court  as  specification  of   a condition  expressly and independently provided by s.  4(4). [651 D-F] (iii)     In s. 4(4) the expression "the decree passed under sub-s. (1)" merely describes the sub-section under which the decree  is passed, the emphasis in the context being on  the date  of  the  said decree and not so  much  on  the  strict compliance with the form prescribed in s. 4(1).  The logical way  to reconcile s. 4(1) and s. 4(4) would be to treat  the provision  prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and  paramount and  read  in the relevant portion of s.  4(1)  accordingly. Even  if the decree does not mention that the amount has  to be  paid within three months, the landlord’s  obligation  to make  the payment within three months is  still  enforceable under s, 4(4); otherwise defective decrees would deprive the tenants  of the benefit intended to be conferred on them  by s. 4(4). [651 G652 E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 17, 1960 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 92 of 1957. T.   V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant. A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastri  and  S.  Venkatakrishnan,   for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,  C.J. The short question which  this  appeal raises before us relates to the construction of S. 4(1) read with  S. 4 (4) of the Madras City Tenants’  Protection  Act, 1921  (Madras  Act  III of 1922)  (hereinafter  called  ’the Act’).   This question arises in this way.  On September  1, 1944,  respondent No. 1, Tiruchirappalli Municipal  Council, leased  T.S.  No.  3283/1-A/2 to the  appellant,  V.  K.  A. Ranganatha Konar, for a term of three years at a rent of Rs. 100/-  per month.  On the premises thus let out to him,  the appellant  erected a building for the purpose of  exhibiting

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cinematographic films.  In 1945, he sub-leased the  property to  the  second respondent, A. Muthukumaran.  In  1947,  the lease  was renewed for a period of three years, and  so,  it expired on March 31, 1950.  Nevertheless, the appellant  and respondent No. 2 continued in possession. 647 On December 23, 1954, respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for the  eviction of the appellant and respondent No. 2 and  for arrears  of  rent.  While the suit was pending the  Act  was extended   to   the  Municipal  Town   of   Tiruchirappalli. Accordingly,  the  value  of the improvements  made  by  the appellant and respondent No. 2 was determined by the learned trial Judge and declared to be Rs. 64,661-13-5 under s. 4(1) of  the  Act.  On March 26, 1956, the trial Court  passed  a decree  which, inter alia, provided "that the defendants  do put  the  plaintiff  in possession of  the  suit  properties described  hereunder  on payment of Rs. 64,661-13-5  by  the plaintiff to the first defendant being the compensation  for the  superstructure belonging to the first  defendant."  The appellant  was the first defendant in the said  proceedings. This decree did not in terms direct respondent No. 1 to  say the,  said amount within three months from its date, and  it is  the comission to issue this direction which  has  caused the present controversy between the parties. On October 1, 1956, the appellant filed an application  I.A. No.  301 of 1956 inviting the attention of the Court to  the fact  that respondent No. 1 had not made the deposit  within three months from the date of the decree, and claiming  that by virtue of the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) of the Act, the Court was bound to dismiss the suit filed by  respondent No. 1 for ejecting him and respondent No. 2. On November  5, 1956, respondent No. 1 filed a counter to this interlocutory application.   On  the same date, respondent  No.  1.  filed another interlocutory application praying that the decree in question should be amended so as to specify the time  within which   the   deposit  should  be   made.    Pending   these applications, on November 15. 1956, respondent No. 1 sent a cheque to the Court in regard to the said amount  .The  said cheque  was  duly  cashed and the  amount  credited  in  the accounts  of the Court on November 20, 1956. On the date the trial Judge passed an order directing that the decree should be  amended by inserting a direction to the effect that  the deposit should be made before June 23, 1956, that is to  say within  three months from March 26, 1956 on which  date  the original decree had been passed.  Since this amendment could not help respondent No. 1, the learned trial Judge processed to pass an order dismissing the suit under the provisions of s. 4(4) This  order of dismissal was challenged by respondent No.  1 by an appeal preferred before the Madras High Court.  It was urged  before the High Court on behalf of respondent  No.  1 that  since  the  original decree did not  give  a  specific direction  that  the amount of compensation should  be  paid within three months, the 648 provisions of s. 4(4) could not be invoked until the  decree was suitably amended.  The argument was that it is only when the  decree makes a direction calling upon the plaintiff  to deposit  a  certain  amount by way of  compensation  to  the defendant-tenant within three months, that the  requirements of s. 4(1) are complied with. and it is only where a  decree has been properly drawn in accordance with the  requirements of s. 4(1) that the mandatory provisions of s. 4(4) could be invoked.   In  substance, the High Court has  accepted  this plea,   with  the  result  that  the  appeal  preferred   by

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respondent  No. 1 has been allowed and the  original  decree passed on March 26, 1956, has been confirmed.  The result of this decision is that respondent No. 1 is at liberty to take out execution for obtaining possession of the property.  The appellant  then applied for and obtained a certificate  from the  High Court and it is with this certificate that he  has brought this appeal before us.  On behalf of the  appellant, Mr. Tatachari has urged that the High Court’s decision under appeal  proceeds  on  a misconstruction  of  the  provisions contained  in  s.  4(4) read with s. 4(1) of  the  Act.   He argues that the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) is mandatory and  any defect in the decree which is passed under s.  4(1) cannot help respondent No. 1 to circumvent the effect of the said provision. Before  dealing with this point, it is necessary to read  s. 4(1) & (4).    Section 4(1) reads thus               "In  a suit for ejectment against a tenant  in               which  the landlord succeeds, the court  shall               ascertain the amount of compensation, if  any,               payable under section 3 and the decree in  the               suit shall declare the amount so found due and               direct  that, on payment by the landlord  into               court,  within three months from the  date  of               the  decree, of the amount so found  due,  the               tenant shall put the landlord into  possession               of  the  land  with  the  building  and  trees               thereon."               Section 4(4) provides               "If  the  amount found due is  not  paid  into               court within three months from the date of the               decree under subsection (1) or of the  interim               order   under  sub-section  (2),  or   if   no               application is made under section 6, the  suit               or  application,  as the case  may  be,  shall               stand dismissed, and the landlord shall not be               entitled   to  institute  a  fresh  suit   for               ejectment, or present a fresh application  for               recovery  of possession for a period  of  five               years from the date of such dismissal."  649 Mr.  Sastri for respondent No. 1 has  strenuously  contended that  in  appreciating  the  effect  of  the  two   relevant provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind that ultimately, the direction contained in the decree must be enforced,  and if  the original decree did not require respondent No. 1  to pay  the compensation amount within three months, the  right of  the appellant to recover that amount must inevitably  be enforced  by execution proceedings under Article 182 of  the Limitation  Act.   In  the case of such a  decree,  s.  4(4) cannot  apply, because s. 4(4) postulates that a proper  and valid  decree  has  been  passed  in  conformity  with   the requirements  of s. 4(1) Section 4(4) provides a  period  of three months "from the date of the decree under  sub-section (1)";  it is the decree under ,sub-section (1) which  starts the period of limitation, and before a decree can be said to be  a decree under sub-section (1), it must comply with  all the requirements prescribed by the said sub-section; in  the present case, the decree did not specify that the amount  in question  should be paid within three months, and so, it  is not  a decree properly passed under sub-section (1)  and  as such, s. 4(4) cannot be invoked. Mr.  Sastri has put his argument in another form.   He  con- tends  that  though the original decree passed  between  the parties  in the present proceedings did not comply with  the requirements of s. 4(1) inasmuch as it failed to specify the

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period   of  three  months  within  which  the   amount   of compensation  should  be  paid, it cannot be said  to  be  a nullity;  it  is  a decree passed by a  court  of  competent jurisdiction, and so, when the appellant seeks to invoke  s. 4(4),  what  he is virtually asking the Court to  do  is  to ignore  the fact that the decree did not  direct  respondent No.  1  to pay the amount within three months,  and  in  the absence  of  a  direction in the decree,  it  would  not  be permissible  to  the Court to enforce the provisions  of  s. 4(4) against respondent No. 1. He would, therefore, read  s. 4(1) as controlling s. 4(4); first a decree must be properly passed  under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three  months within which the amount should be paid, and then s. 4(4) can be invoked.  That is how Mr. Sastri has presented before  us his  solution to the problem of construing section 4(1)  and (4) together. In  dealing with this question, it is necessary to  bear  in mind  the object which the Act is intended to  achieve.   As the   preamble  indicates,  the  Act  was  passed  to   give protection  to certain classes of tenants in areas to  which it  was  extended.   The Legislature  thought  that  it  was necessary to give protection to tenants who had  constructed buildings  on others’ lands in the hope that they would  not be  evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for  the  land. In 650 other  words, the Legislature took the view that in a  large majority  of  cases  where open plots were let  out  to  the tenants  and the tenants, in their turn, invested  money  by constructing  buildings on the said plots in the  hope  that they would be allowed to remain in possession of the  leased property  so long as they continued to pay a fair  rent,  it was necessary to protect their tenancy rights.  Though  this Act was passed in 1922, it was not extended to the whole  of the State of Madras; it has been extended stage by stage  to different areas.  In fact, we have already seen that the Act was extended to the municipal area of Tiruchirappalli  while the  present  suit between the parties was  pending  in  the trial Court. In order to carry out its object of affording protection  to the   tenants,  s.  3  has  provided  for  the  payment   of compensation on ejectment.  It lays down that if a tenant is ejected, he would be entitled to compensation for the  value of the building which he might have constructed on the  plot let  out  to  him.   Section 3  deals  with  a  question  of compensation  and  provides  how it  should  be  determined. Section  4  then  deals  with  the  disposal  of  suits  for ejectment.   Section  4(1)  provides that  if  the  landlord succeeds  in  obtaining a decree for  ejectment,  the  Court shall  ascertain the amount of compensation payable  to  the tenant, and the decree in the suit shall declare the  amount so  found  due and direct that, on payment by  the  landlord into court, within three months from the date of the decree, of  the  amount  so  found due, the  tenant  shall  put  the landlord  into possession of the land with the building  and trees, thereon.  Section 4(4) contains a mandatory provision that  if  the  amount found due is  not  paid  within  three months, the suit of the landlord shall stand dismissed.   We will  presently deal with the question of  construing  these two  sub-sections.   Meanwhile,  we  may  refer  to  s.  10. Section  10(1) provides that sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and  9-A shall,  inter  alia, apply to suits in ejectment  which  are pending or in which decrees for ejectment have been  passed, but have not been executed.  Section 10(2) deals with  cases in  which  decrees for ejectment have been passed,  but  the

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amount  of  compensation  has not been  determined,  and  it provides  that on an application by the tenant, such  amount would  be determined in accordance with s. 4. Section  10(3) deals with cases of decrees which are pending execution; and it requires that the Court shall, on the application of  the tenant,  recall  execution orders, ascertain the  amount  of compensation, and pass an interim order under s. 4. It  will thus be clear that wherever the Act is extended, the protec- tion  afforded by the Act and the benefits conferred  by  it can  be claimed not only by tenants against whom  suits  are pending or  651 would  be filed in future, but also by tenants against  whom decrees  have already been passed, but have not  been  fully executed.   Section 10 clearly brings out the fact that  the policy of the legislature was to extend ample protection  to the tenants in the areas to which ’he Act would be  extended from time to time. Reverting  then  to the question of construing s.  4(1)  and (4), it would appear that what s. 4(1) purports to do is  to require  that  the decree in the suit to  which  it  applies shall,  in the first instance, declare the amount found  due by  way of compensation.  The said provision  also  requires that .he decree shall declare that the tenant shall put  the landlord  into  possession  of the land on  payment  by  the landlord  into court, within three months from the  date  of the  decree,  of the amount found due.   The  two  operative parts  of  the decree as contemplated by s. 4(1) are  :  the declaration  of  the  amount  due to  the  tenant,  and  the direction to the tenant to deliver possession of the land to the landlord in case he paid into Court within three  months of  the date of the decree the amount declared due.   It  is true  that the decree would state that the landlord  has  to pay the amount within three months from its date; but having regard to the specific and mandatory terms in which s.  4(4) is  couched, it would not be reasonable to construe s.  4(1) as  controlling s. 4(4).  The relevant clause provides  that the decree shall direct that on payment by the landlord into Court,  within  three months, of the amount found  due,  the tenant  shall put the landlord into possession.  The  clause in respect of the payment by the landlord into court  within three  months  amounts  to  a  condition  which  has  to  be satisfied  by the landlord before the tenant is required  to deliver  to him possession of the property in question.   In other words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount  found due within the specified period in s. 4(1)  is not so much a direction issued by the Court as specification of  a condition expressly and independently provided  by  s. 4(4). The  provision of s. 4(4) clearly shows that if  the  amount found due is not paid within three, months, the suit of  the landlord  shall stand dismissed.  The opening clause  of  s. 4(4)  shows  that  the amount has to be  paid  within  three months from the date of the decree passed under  sub-section (1).   The expression "the decree under sub-section ( 1 )  " merely  describes the sub-section under which the decree  is passed, the emphasis in the context being on the date of the said  decree and not so much on the strict  compliance  with the  form  prescribed by s. 4(1).  If the decree  is  passed under  s.  (1),  its date is material  for  the  purpose  of deciding  the  period beyond which s. 4(4) would  come  into operation.  In other words, 652 as  soon as it is shown by a tenant that a decree  has  been passed  under s. 4(1) declaring the amount  of  compensation

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due  to him from the landlord, he is entitled to claim  that he  is no longer under obligation to deliver  possession  of the  property  to the landlord, because  three  months  have passed  from the date of the decree and the amount  declared as  compensation  has not been paid to him.  If  the  decree happens  to  be  defective in the sense  that  it  does  not reproduce the requirement of s. 4(1) expressly in its terms, that would not take the case outside the purview of s. 4(4). We are inclined to think that having regard to the mandatory terms   used  in  s.  4(4),  it  would  be   illogical   and unreasonable  to  suggest that a defective decree  like  the present enables the landlord to circumvent the provisions of s.  4(4).  The applicability of s. 4(4) cannot  be  repelled merely on the ground that the decree passed under 6. 4 (1  ) does not specify the period of three months within which the amount  found  due  has to be paid.   In  our  opinion,  the logical  way  to reconcile S. 4(1) and S. 4(4) would  be  to treat  the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory  and paramount   and  read  the  relevant  portion  of  s.   4(1) accordingly.   That  is  why even if  the  decree  does  not mention that the amount has to be paid within three  months, the  landlord’s obligation to make the payment within  three months  is  still  enforceable  under  s.  4(4),   otherwise defective  decrees would deprive the tenants of the  benefit intended  to  be  conferred  on them by  s.  4(4).   We  are therefore  satisfied  that the High Court was  in  error  in reversing  the order passed by the trial Court.   Respondent No.  1 has not paid the amount within three months from  the date of the decree and the suit instituted by it shall stand dismissed under s. 4(4). The  result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed  by the  High  Court is set aside and that of  the  trial  Court restored.  In the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs throughout.                         Appeal allowed. 653