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PETITIONER: V. C. SHUKLA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE THROUGH C.B.I.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/12/1979

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N. DESAI, D.A. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  962            1980 SCR  (2) 380  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC1382  (81,110)  RF         1981 SC 723  (9)  R          1988 SC 922  (24)

ACT:      Special Courts  Act, 1979-Section 11(1) and 11(2)-Scope of-Order of  Judge of Special Court directing a charge to be framed against  the accused-  Whether an interlocutor order- Appeal-If lies against that order-      Interlocutory order-What is.      Non-obstante clause-Interpretation of.

HEADNOTE:      Section 11(1)  of the Special Courts Act, 1979 provides that "notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or  order, not  being  interlocutory  order,  of  a Special Court  to the  Supreme Court both on facts and law." Sub-section (2) provides that "except as aforesaid no appeal or revision  shall lie  to  any  court  from  any  judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court."      The Special  Judge appointed  under the  Special Courts Act, 1979  directed  a  charge  to  be  framed  against  the appellant  under  section  120B  I.P.C.  read  with  section 5(1)(d) and  section 5(2)  of the  Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947.  At the stage of hearing, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal was raised on behalf of the  State on  the ground  that the  order impugned being purely an  interlocutory order within the meaning of section 11(1) of the Act no appeal lay to this Court.      On behalf  of the  appellant it  was contended that the term "interlocutory  order" has  been used in the same sense as has  been used  in section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and  the same construction placed by this Court on the expression should apply in interpreting this expression, particularly when  the Act  does not  give any remedy to the accused. Per S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Sen, JJ.      The  order   passed  by   the  Special   Judge  was  an interlocutory order  and the appeal filed against that order in this Court is not maintainable. [434 Ap

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    1(a) The  expression  interlocutory  order  in  section 11(1) has  been used  in the  natural sense  and  not  in  a special or in the wider sense in which lt is used in section 397(2) of the Code. [433 G]      (b) on  a true construction of section 11(1) and taking into consideration  the natural  meaning of  the  expression interlocutory order  there can  be no  doubt that  the order framing charges  against the  appellant under  the  Act  was merely n  interlocutory order  which neither  terminated the proceeding nor  finally decided  the right  of the  parties. Taking ib natural meaning and applying the 381 non-obstante clause  the position  is that the provisions of the Code  of Criminal   Procedure  are expressly excluded by the non-obstante  clause and,  therefore, section  397(2) of the Code  cannot be  called into  aid for  holding that  the order impugned is not an interlocutory order. [433 B-C]      (c) The  term "interlocutory  order"  used  in  section 397(2) of  the Code  relates to various stages of the trial, namely inquiry,  trial or  any other  proceeding. The object seems to be to cut down tho delays in stages through which a criminal case  passes before  it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or  conviction. Having  regard to  the very  large ambit and  range of  the Code  the expression  interlocutory order would  have to  be given  a broad  meaning  so  as  to achieve  the  object  of  the  Code  without  disturbing  or interfering with the fairness of the trial. [392 A-C]      (d) In Amar Nath v. The State of Haryana, although this Court held  that an  order summoning  an accused  was not an interlocutory order  being a  matter of moment which decided an important aspect of the trial it was, in a sense, a final order which  could be  revised by  the Sessions Judge or the High  Court   under  section   397  of   the  Code.  In  the circumstances of  that case  this Court  held that  such  an order could not be said to be purely an interlocutory order. [394 D] D]      Amar Nath  & Ors.  v. State  of Haryana & ors. [1978] 1 SCR 222, approved. D      (e) In  Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra this Court held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and,  therefore, a  revision against such an order was competent before  the Sheepish  Judge or the High Court. But in the  circumstances of  this case the order was not merely interlocutory order  but partook the nature of a final order or at  any rate  an intermediate order so as to be taken out of the  bar contained  in  section  397(2)  of  he  Code  of Criminal Procedure. [395 H; 396 H]      Madhu Limaye  v. The State of Maharashtra, [1978] 1 SCR 749 approved.      (f) The  term interlocutory  order used  in the Code of Criminal  Procedure   has  to   be  given   a  very  liberal construction in  favour of  the accused  in order  to ensure complete fairness  of the trial because the bar contained in section 397(3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up  before the  courts not  only being offences under the Penal  Code but  under numerous  Acts. If  the right  of revision was  to be  barred the provision containing the bar must be  confined within  the four corners of the spirit and the letter  of the  law. But  the same cannot be said of the Special Courts  Act which  is meant  to cover only specified number of  crimes and  criminals and  the  objective  to  be attained was  quick dispatch  and speedy  disposal of cases. [398 D-F] G      State of Karnataka v. L. Munniswamy & ors. [1977] 3 SCR 113; Parmeshwari  Devi v. State & Anr [1977] 2 SCR 160, held

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inapplicable.      2. The  heart and  soul of the Special Courts Act being speedy disposal  of cases, the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so  as to  eliminate all possible delay or means of adopting  dilatory tactics  by  plugging  every  possible loop-hole in  the Act.  It could  not have  been intended by Parliament that,  while the  Criminal Procedure Code gives a right of  revision against an order which, though not purely interlocutory, is  either intermediate  or quasi-final,  the Act 382      would provide  a full-fledged  appeal against  such  an order. It  is mainly for the purpose of avoiding flooding of this Court  with appeals  against the  orders Of the Special Court framing the charges that a non-obstante clause was put in section 11 to bar appeals against any interlocutory order whether it  is intermediate  or quasi-final. The Act applies only to  a  specified  number  of  cases  which  fulfil  the conditions contained  in it  and  in  view  of  its  special features  the   liberty  of   the  subject  has  been  fully safeguarded by providing a three-tier system. [408 B-F]      3. The  non-obstante clause  in section  11 excludes an appeal from  any interlocutory  orders of  a  Special  Court because such  an exclusion  is  fully  consistent  with  the object of  the Act.  Since the non-obstante clause expressly excludes. the  provisions of  the Code of Criminal Procedure section 397(2)  of the  Code cannot  be invoked because that would frustrate  the very  object which section. 11 seeks to subserve. [409 F-G]      4. When  the Act  excludes the  Code then  it obviously excludes an  appeal against any type of interlocutory order. The absence  of revision  is more than compensated by giving the accused  a right of appeal against any judgment or order of the  Special Judge  as of  right and  on facts  and  law. Secondly the  trail is  held by  a sitting Judge of the High Court who would have the power of revision if he was sitting in a High Court. Therefore it muse be presumed that whenever a  Special  Judge  passes  any  interlocutory  order  or  an intermediate. Order  like framing of charges. he would do so only with  full and  complete application  of his  mind  and considering the  various principles and guidelines indicated by this  Court. It  would not be in keeping with the dignity decorum and  status of  the Special  Judge to provide for an appeal even  against such  an order  which he is supposed to pass with  full application  of mind  and due  deliberation. [410 B-D]      5. (a)  The  non-obstante  clause  has  the  effect  of overriding and excluding the provision of the Code. [411 D]      Aswini Kumar  Ghosh &  Anr. v.  Arabinda  Bose  &  Anr. [1953] SCR 1, referred to.      (b) The  term interlocutory  is to  be  understood  and taken to  mean the  converse of  the term "final order". The essential attribute  of an  interlocutory order  is that  it merely  decides  some  point  or  matter  essential  to  the progress of  the suit  or collateral to the issue sought but is not  a final  decision or  judgment on  the matter  under issue. An  intermediate order  is one which is made between. the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. [412 C, 414 D-E]      Madhu Limaye  v. The State of Maharashtra, [1978] 1 SCR 749 referred to.      (c) An order framing a charge being interlocutory falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term "interlocutory order"  as used  in section 11(1) of the Act. [414 F]

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    Salaman v.  Warner [1891]  1 QBD 734; Ex Parte Moore in Re Faithful [1885] 14 Q.B.D. 627; Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council  [1903] 1  KBD 547;  Shubrook v.  Tufnell 9 Q.B.D. 621;  Isaacs &  Sons v. Salbstein & Anr. [1916] 2 KBD 139 Hunt  v. Allied  Bakeries Ltd.  [1956] 3  All. E.R. 513; Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh [1971] 2 Q.B.D. 597 referred to. 383      6.  A   conspectus  of  the  decisions  of  this  Court establishes the  following propositions:  (i) an order which does not  determine the  right of  the parties  but only one aspect of  the suit  or the  trial is an interlocutory order (ii) the  concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contra-distinction to a final order. If an order is not a final order it would be an interlocutory order. (iii) one of the tests  generally accepted  by Courts  is to  see if  the order is  decided one  way it  may terminate the proceedings but if  decided the other way the proceedings would continue because the term interlocutory order in the Code of Criminal Procedure has  been used  in a  much wider  sense so  as  to include even  intermediate or  quasi-final orders.  (iv)  an order passed  by the  Special Court  discharging the accused would undoubtedly  be a  final order  inasmuch as it finally decides the  rights of  the parties  and puts  an end to the controversy and  thereby terminates  the entire  proceedings before the  Court so  that nothing is left to be done by the Court thereafter.  (v) Even  if an  Act does  not permit  an appeal against  an interlocutory  order the  accused is  not left without  any  remedy  because  in  suitable  cases  the accused can  always move  this Court  under Article 136 even against an order framing charges against him. Thus it cannot be said  that by  not allowing  an appeal  against an  order framing charges  the Act  works  serious  injustice  to  the accused. [4241]      In the  instant case  the order framing charges against the accused  is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the  proceedings but  the trial  goes on  until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. [425 B-C]      7. The  argument that  a statute which gives a right of appeal should  be  liberally  construed  in  favour  of  the accused so  as not to deprive him of the right of appeal has no force  because in the instant case the right of appeal is expressly excluded  by providing  that no  appeal shall  lie against an  interlocutory  order.  Even  by  stretching  the language of  the section  no right of appeal can be inferred when no  such right  has been  conferred.  The  non-obstante clause cannot be construed to contain a right of appeal even against an interlocutory order. [432 G-H] Desai, J. concurring.      1. The order framing a charge is an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 11(1) of the Act and an appeal against  such  an  order  is  incompetent  in  view  of  the provisions contained  in section  11(2) and  therefore.  the preliminary objection must be upheld. [468 E]      2. Interlocutory  orders passed by a court disposing of ancillary disputes  in the  course of  a judicial proceeding are steps  taken by the court towards the final adjudication and for  assisting the  parties in  the prosecution of their cases. They  regulate the  procedure only  and do not affect any right  or liability  of the  parties. An  order does not cease  to  be  an  interlocutory  order  merely  because  it disposes of  a certain aspect of the controversy between the parties. The  test of  finality is whether the order finally disposes of the right of the parties. The finality must be a finality in  relation to  the suit.  If after  the order the suit is  still a live suit and the rights of the parties are

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still to  be determined,  no appeal  lies against  it  under section 109A  of the  Code. Even  if the  order  decides  an important and  even a vital issue in the case but leaves the suit alive Fl and provides for its trial in the ordinary way it would  still not  be a  final order. Another test is that the decision  whichever  way  it  is  given  if  it  finally disposes 384 of the matter in dispute it is final. The decision, if given in one way it will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in another it will allow the action to go on it is not final but interlocutory. [454 E; H; 455 B-D; 456 D]      Kuppuswami Rao  v. The  King [1947]  F.C.R. 180;  Abdul Rahman v.  D. K.  Cassim &  Sons 60  I.A. 76;  Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd.  & Others  v. Dominion  of  India  and  Others [1949-50] FCR,  842; Salter  Rex &  Co. v.  Ghosh R [1971] 2 W.B.D. 597 referred to.      3. In  the context  of section 397(2) read with section 482 of  the Code  this Court,  with a  view to  providing  a judicial  umbrella   of  active   supervision  tor  reaching possible correctable  injustice by  activist  attitudes  and pragmatic interpretation  found  a  third  class  of  orders neither  interlocutory   nor  final   but  intermediate  and therefore outside  the bar  of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  But the  test remained  unaltered  that every interlocutory  order, merely because it disposes of an aspect in  the course of a pending proceeding even adversely affecting a  party for the time being would not be something other than interlocutory. To be specific the earlier test is not departed  from but the power of supervision sought to be constructed, was  widened by  ascertaining a  third class of orders  namely,   intermediate  orders   which  are  neither interlocutory nor final. 1462 B-D]      Amar Nath  & Ors.  v. Stole  of Haryana & Ors. [1978] I S.C.R. 222;  Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat [1968] 2 S.C.R. 685; Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharahtra [1978] 1 S.C.R. 749: Parmeshwari Devi v. State & Anr. [1977] 2 S.C R. 160 referred to.      4. (a) There is no force in the contention that framing of a  charge concludes an enquiry anterior to it and that it is likely to result in the deprivation of the liberty of the accused because he is asked to face the trial. 1463 Cl      (b) The  framing of  a charge  is an  intimation to the accused of what precise offence or what allegations of facts he is  called upon to meet. Its object is to warn an accused of the  case he  is to  answer. The  order framing  a charge would be  an intermediate  order and  not  an  interlocutory order. In  the course  of a  trial of  a civil  or  criminal proceeding there  can be no stage where an order can be made without bringing  to bear  on the subject an active judicial mind  and  judicially  determining  the  dispute.  Any  such dispute   if    mechanically   disposed   of   may   warrant interference. Therefore  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  court expecting it  to seriously  apply its  mind at  the stage of framing a  charge. It  does not  make tho  order  framing  a charge anything  other than  an interlocutory order. [463 G; 464 F-G]      B. N.  Srikantiah &  Ors. v. The State of Mysore [1959] S.C.R. 496  at 503;  State of  Karnataka v.  L. Muni Swami & Ors.  [1977]   3  S.C.R.   113  and   Century  Spinning  and Manufacturing Co.  Ltd. v.  State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545, referred to.      (c) If  framing a  charge is  an  interlocutory  order, excluding the  non-obstante  clause,  no  appeal  would  lie against such  an order  under section  11 of the Act because

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there is  a specific  provision  under  section  11(2)  that except as  provided in  section 11(1)  no appeal or revision shall lie  to any court from any judgment, sentence or order cf Special Court. [465 D-E] 385      (d) It  is well  settled that  there is  no inherent or common law  right of A appeal in a subject and appeal is the creature of  statute. Therefore  the right  to appeal can be enjoyed  only   within  the   strictly   demarcated   limits conferring such right of appeal. [465 E]      In the instant case the order under challenge being one passed by  tho Special  Court set up under the Act an appeal from such  an order  would only  be competent if it squarely falls within  section 11(1).  Therefore there  is  no  gain- saying the  fact that  if the  order sought  to be  appealed against is an interlocutory order excluding tho non-obstante clause by  the main  provision of  section 11(1) the present appeal would be incompetent. [465 D]      5. The  substantive provision of section 11 ( 1 ) while providing for  an appeal  against any  judgment sentence  or order made  by a  Special; Court  circumscribed the right to appeal against  the orders  by  excluding  therefrom  orders which are interlocutory. [466 D]      6. When  the non-obstante  clause  provides  for  "not- withstanding anything  in the  Code" the  expression as  per grammatical construction would mean that something contained in the  Code is to be excluded while examining the scope and content of the substantive provision of section 11(1). There is nothing  in the  Code providing  for an appeal against an interlocutory order.  While enacting  the Act the Parliament was conscious  of appeals  and revisions  under the Code and that is  manifest from  the language in section 11(2) of the Act. If  there was no provision in the Code providing for an appeal against  any interlocutory  order in  any  proceeding under the  Code  it  is  inconceivable  that  such  a  wider jurisdiction of  appeal was  sought to  be enacted under the substantive provision of section 11 (1), [467 B-Cl      7. The  paramount object in enacting the Special Courts Act was  to bring  the prosecutions  to a speedy termination and commission  of offences  should be judicially determined with the  utmost dispatch.  This being  the objective of the Act  construction   of  its  provisions  must  receive  such interpretation as  would facilitate  the  achieving  of  the object underlying  it and  not frustrating  it.  That  would stand thwarted  if  against  every  interlocutory  order  an appeal to the highest court as a matter of right both of law and fact can be filed. [467 E]      8.  The  argument  that  there  is  unfairness  in  the procedure is  utterly unreal  because  the  trial  is  by  a sitting judge  of the  High Court  to be  appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. The Special Court would always  be amenable  to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. [468 B]      9. There  is no  substance in  the contention  that  in narrowly interpreting  the, expression "interlocutory order" in  section   11(1)  door   may  not   be  thrown  open  for introduction of  a procedure  lacking in fairness and likely to result in the deprivation of personal liberty. [468 D]      Singhal J. (dissenting).      1. The  impugned order  is not  an interlocutory order. The accused  is entitled  as of  right to  prefer an appeal. [452 G] H      2. Section  9 of  the Act provides that a Special Court could in  the trial of cases falling within its jurisdiction follow the procedure prescribed by the Code

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386 of Criminal  Procedure for the trial of warrant cases before a Magistrate.  Section 239  is a  valuable provision  to The advantage of  the accused because it envisages a careful and objective consideration  by the  Judge  whether  the  charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming  that he  has committed  an offence. Similarly when an  order for the framing of a charge under section 240 is passed  it amounts to a. decision that the accused is not entitled to  discharge under  section  239,  that  there  is ground for  presuming  that  he  has  committed  an  offence triable under  Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead  guilty of  it. Therefore,  an order for framing of the charge  is a serious matter for the accused. [434 H; 435 F-H]      3. Section 9 of the Special Courts Act does not provide that an  appeal against the order of the Special Court shall be heard and decided according to the procedure laid down in the Code.  Section 11 which deals with appeals starts with a non-obstante  clause.  Neither  section  11  nor  any  other section states  that the  Code shall apply to the hearing of an appeal. At any rate the Code has no application in so far as the right of appeal and the form of appeal are concerned. [436 C & E]      4. lt  is true that there is no right of appeal against an interlocutory   order  under section  11 of  the Act. The clear propositions laid down by this Court on the meaning of the words  "final" and "interlocutory" are (i) that an order may be  "final" for  one  purpose  and  "interlocutory"  for another and (ii) that an order may be final as to a part and interlocutory as to a part. The meaning of the two words has to be  determined in  relation to the particular purpose For which it is required to be given. [436 G; 438 G]      Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thaker v. State of Gujarat,  [1968] 2 SCR 685 referred to.      (iii) An order may also be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made.      Parameswari Devi  v. State [1977] 2 S.C.R. 160 referred to.      (iv) The  expression ’interlocutory order has been used in section  397(2) of  the Code  in a  restricted sense.  It denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not  decide or  touch the important rights or liabilities of the  parties  and  that  any  order  which  substantively affects the  rights of  the accused  is not an interlocutory order. [441 A-B]      Amar Nath  and others  v. State  of Haryana  and others [1976] 1 S.C.R. 222 referred to.      On this reasoning the order for the framing of a charge against the  accused in  this case  cannot be  said to be an interlocutory order. [442 A]      (v) An  order rejecting  the plea  of the  accused on a point which,  when  accepted,  will  conclude  a  particular proceeding is  surely not  an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Code. [444 A]      5. The  revisional power  of the  Court concerned under section 397(1)  of the Code will be rendered nugatory if the plea that  an order  framing or  directing the framing of a. charge against  an accused  is an interlocutory order and is therefore beyond  the reach of that sub-section by virtue of sub-section (2) is accepted. The nature of that order cannot be determined  merely with reference to the eventuality that the accused may ultimately be acquitted on the completion of the trial.  There is  no reason why section 397 should be so narrowly

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387 construed and  why the  real nature of the order framing the charge should  be taken  to be  merely  interlocutory  order beyond the  reach of  the revisional  power conferred on the Court concerned  under section  397 when it cannot be denied that if  the contention  of the  accused against  the  order framing the  charge against him were allowed, that would, by itself, have  concluded  the  proceeding  against  him.  The object cf section 397(1) of the Code is to provide relief to the aggrieved  party where it is deserved, only if the order complained of  is not of an interlocutory nature. Section 11 of the  Act is  in that  respect quite similar B: in purpose and content  to section  397 of  the Code  and there  is  no reason why  the same  meaning and effect should not be given to it. [444 C-F]      S. Kuppuswami  Rao v. The King [1947] F.C.R. 180; Mohd. Amin  Bros.   v.  Dominion   of  India  [1949)  F.C.R.  held inapplicable.      6. The purpose of an appeal which is in the nature of a judicial examination  of a decision by the higher court of a decision of  an inferior  court is  to rectify  any possible error  in   the  order  under  appeal.  In  that  sense  the revisional jurisdiction  is regarded as a part and parcel of the appellate  jurisdiction. Statutes  pertaining to a right of appeal  should  be  liberally  construed  and  any  doubt regarding that  right should  be resolved  in favour  of the right. [445 H]      7. Section  11 of  the Act  gives  a  right  of  appeal against "any  order" of  a Special Court and not merely from its "final order". It is well settled that the Dr use of the words ’any  order ’  in Article  136, along  with the  other difference of  language, had  "greatly widened’ the scope of Article 136  in regard  to the appeal thereunder. Section 11 of the  Act not  only grants that remedy in the case of "any order" but allows it as a matter of right whereas the remedy under Article  136 is  in terms  discretionary.  Section  11 takes care to state categorically that the appeal thereunder shall  relate  both  to  the  facts  and  the  law.  lt  is, therefore, a  liberal and  beneficial provision in favour of the aggrieved  party and excels the Remedy under section 397 of the Code. [446 D; F-G]      8. The  correct way  of interpreting a provision of law with a  non-obstante clause  is to  first ascertain what the enacting part  of the  section  provides  according  to  the natural and  ordinary meaning and the non-obstante clause is to be  understood as  operating to  set aside  as no  longer valid anything contained in the relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment. [447 B-C]      Aswini Kumar  and another  v. Arabinda Bose and another [1953] S.C.R. 1.      9. The revisional power under the Code is discretionary and is  not available to an aggrieved party as of right. The remedy by  way of  a revision petition has been hedged round with certain  limitations and  restrictions, whereas section 11 ensures  a right  of appeal  "both on facts and on law ’. What section  11 does  is to  do  away  with  the  power  of revision under  the Code  (sub-section 2)  and to substitute for it  an unlimited  right of  appeal against any judgment, sentence or  order of  she Special  Court  so  long  as  the impugned order  is  not  of  an  interlocutory  nature.  The aggrieved party  has really  lost nothing  to which it would have been  entitled under  the Code  for Section 397(2) also specifically states  that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (  I ) shall not be exercise(l in relation to an interlocutory order.  The net  effect  of  the  non-obstante

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clause. therefore.  is to  widen the  remedy available under the Code. [447 H; 448 A-B]      10. While  under the Code two correctional remedies are open to  the aggrieved  party-one by  way of  an appeal  and other by way of petition for revision 388 which however  is a remedy within the discretion of the High Court or  the Sessions Judge-section 11 of the Act makes any and every  judgment, sentence or order appealable so long as the order  is not  of an interlocutory nature. In respect of an interlocutory  order, however, no remedy by way of appeal or revision  is permissible  under the Code and the position in that  respect is  not worse  under section 11 of the Act. The right  of appeal  under section  11 is, therefore, wider than the  appellate and  revisional remedies provided by the Code. [448 G-H]      In the  instant case  the decision which the Judge took in making the impugned order clearly dealt with at least one important stage  and aspect  of the case against the accused finally and once for all. That order clearly put him to full course of  trial and there is no reason why it should not be treated as  "any order"  against which  he  is  entitled  to appeal under  section 11  of the  Act and  why it  should be considered to be a merely interlocutory order. [450 B-C]      11. An  order  framing  a  charge  affects  a  person’s liberties substantially  and it  is the duty of the Court to consider  judicially   whether  the  material  warrants  the framing of the charge. [451 B]      12.  The   question  whether   an  order  is  final  or interlocutory is  not  to  be  determined  merely  from  the character of  the proceeding in which it is entered but from the character of the relief granted or refused [451 H]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 562 of 1979.      From the  order dated 17-9-1979 of the Special Court at New Delhi  in Criminal Case No. 1/79.      P. R. Mridul, and O. P. Sharma for the Appellant.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Solicitor  General of  India, R.  N. Sachthey, Girish  Chandra, Bipin  Behari Lal and Miss Niklam Grover for the Respondent.      The Judgment of S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and A. P. Sen, JJ. was delivered  by Fazal  Ali, J. D. A. Desai gave a separate opinion and P. N. Shinghal, J. gave a dissenting opinion.      FAZAL ALI,  J.-This appeal is directed against an order dated 17th  September 1979  passed by Justice Joshi, Special Judge appointed  under the  Special Courts Act, 1979 (No. 22 of 1979)  (hereinafter to be referred as the ’Act’) by which the learned Judge directed a charge to be framed against the appellant under  s. 120B  of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 5  ( 1  ) (d)  and s.  5 (2)  of the  Prevention  of  the Corruption Act,  1947 and  also under  s. 5(2)  read with s. 5(1)(d) of  the said  Act. This appeal has been filed by the appellant under  section 11(1)  of the  Act. The  appeal was placed for preliminary hearinbefore a Division Bench of this Court where  Mr. Soli  Sorabjee, the  Solicitor  General  of India, put in appearance on behalf of the respon- 389 dent   and   raised   a   preliminary   objection   to   the maintainability of  the   appeal. The  preliminary objection raised by  the Solicitor  General was  mainly on  the ground that the  order impugned  being a purely interlocutory order

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within the  meaning of s. 11(1) of the Act, no appeal lay to this Court.  The Division Bench in view of the nature of the substantial question  of law involved referred the case to a larger Bench  even  at  the  stage  of  preliminary  hearing because if  the. appeal  was admitted  for hearing, it would impliedly involve  a decision  on the question raised by the Solicitor General by way of a preliminary objection.      We have  heard the  counsel for  parties at  very great length on  the various  aspects of  the respective points of view put  forward by  the counsel  for the  parties.  It  is manifest that  if the  preliminary objection  raised by  the respondent finds  favour then the appeal has to be dismissed in limine  as  being  not  maintainable.  If,  however,  the preliminary objection is overruled and the contention of the appellant is  accepted, the  appeal will have to be admitted to hearing.  In view  of the  limited nature of the scope of the appeal  we find  it wholly  unnecessary to  go into  the facts, circumstances  or the  evidence on a consideration of which the Special Judge has based his order because that can be done only if the appeal is to be heard on merits.’      The sheet-anchor of the argument of Mr. Mridul, counsel for the appellant, appears to be that the Special Courts Act being a  statute in   pari  materia, the  Criminal Procedure Code, the  expressions used  and the  meaning of  the  words employed  in   the  Act  must  have  the  same  meaning  and signification as  used in  the  various  provisions  of  the Criminal Procedure  Code of 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as  the ’Code’).  It was  submitted in the first instance that on  a prop r construction of s. 11 of the Act, the word ’interlocutory order’  has been  used exactly  in  the  same sense as  the same  word has  been used  in S. 397(2) of the Code. The  argument merits  serious  consideration  and  has various phases  and facets  to be  gone into  after a proper examination of  the scheme  and object  of the  Code and the Act. To  begin with,  it would appear that the Code has made revolutionary changes in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and has  inserted additional  pro- visions  with a  view  to ensure speedy  justice  without  impeding  fairness  of  the trial. In  this connection,  the relevant  portions  of  the Statement  of  objects  and  Reasons  of  the  Code  may  be extracted:-           "The amendments  of 1955  were extensive  and were      intended to  simplify procedures and speed up trials as      far   as possible.  In addition,  local amendments were      made by  State Legislature, of which the most important      were those 390      made to  bring about  separation of  the Judiciary from      the  Executive.   Apart  from   these  amendments,  the      provisions  of   the  Code   of  1898   have   remained      practically unchanged  through  these  decades  and  no      attempt was  made to  have a  comprehensive revision of      this old  Code till  the Central Law Commission was set      up in 1955.      ........ The main task of the Commission was to suggest      measures to remove anomalies and ambiguities brought to      light by  conflicting decisions  of the  High Courts or      other wise, to consider local variations with a view to      securing and  maintaining  uniformity,  to  consolidate      laws wherever  possible  and  to  suggest  improvements      where necessary.  Suggestions for improvements received      from various sources were considered by the Commission.       ........................           3. The  recommendations  of  the  Commission  were      examined carefully  by ’he Government, keeping in view,

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    among others, the following basic considerations:-           (i)   an accused person should get a fair trial in                accordance with  the accepted  principles  of                natural justice;           (ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in                investigation and  trial which is harmful not                only to  the individuals involved but also to                society; and            (iii) The procedure should not be complicated and                should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure                fair-deal  to  the  poorer  sections  of  the                community.           The occasion  has been  availed of to consider and      adopt where appropriate suggestions received from other      quarters based on practical experience of investigation      and the working to criminal courts.      ............           In addition  to ensuring fair deal to the accused,      separation as  provided for  in the  Bill would  ensure      improvement in  the quality  and speed  of disposal, as      all Judicial Magistrates would be legally qualified and      trained persons  working under close supervision of the      High Court.           5. Some  of the more important changes proposed to      be made  with a  view to  speeding up  the disposal  of      criminal cases are:- 391           (a)   the preliminary  inquiry which  precedes the                trial by  a Court of Session, otherwise known                as committal  proceedings, is being abolished                as it  does not  serve any useful purpose and                has been  the cause of consider able delay in                the trial of offences;                ..........."           (d)   the powers of revision against interlocutory                orders are  being taken  away as  it has been                found to  be one  to  the  main  contributing                factors in  the delay of disposal of criminal                cases;                .............."      A perusal of the objects and Reasons clearly shows that the Parliament wanted to implement the recommendation of the Law Commission  as far  as possible. In the instant case, we are mainly  concerned with  two important changes which have been made  in the Code. Tn the first place, as para S of the objects and Reasons shows that The preliminary inquiry which preceded the  trial by  a court  of sessions  was  known  as committal proceedings  has been abolished and the Magistrate before when  the chargesheet is submitted has merely to find out whether  the offence is exclusively triable by a session court and,  if so,  to send  the case to the sessions court. This was  obviously done  to cut down considerable delay and duplication in  the trial OF serious 1 criminal offences. We have laid  special stress  on this  part  of  the  amendment because a  serious argument  was built  up  by  the  learned counsel for  the appellant  on the  question as  to when the trial in  a warrant  chase starts.  We shall  deal with this aspect of  the matter a little later. Secondly, para 5(d) of the objects  and Reasons  emphasises the fact that powers of revision against  interlocutory orders  have been taken away as they were found to be the main contributing factor in the delay of the disposal of criminal cases. It may be mentioned here that  in the  Codes of Criminal Procedure, prior to the Code of 1973, the word ’interlocutory order’ was not used at all and,  therefore, if  has to be interpreted for the first

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time only  after the Code came into force. Section 397(2) of the Code  which contains  the  powers  of  revision  against interlocutory orders runs thus:           "(2) The  powers of  revision  conferred  by  sub-      section (1)  shall not  be exercised in relation to any      interlocutory order  passed  in  any  appeal,  inquiry,      trial or other proceeding."      It  will   be  important   to  note   that   the   word ’interlocutory order’  used in  this sub-section  relates to various stages of the trial? namely, appeal, 392 inquiry, trial  or any other proceeding. The object seems to be to  cutdown the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes  before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction.  So far  as the  Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 is  concerned, it  has got  a wide  and diverse area of jurisdiction inasmuch as it regulates the procedure of trial not only  of the  large number  of offences contained in the Indian Penal  Code but also in other Acts and statutes which apply the  Code of  Criminal Procedure or which are statutes in pari  material the Code. Having regard, therefore, to the very large  ambit and  range of  the  Code,  the  expression ’interlocutory order’  would  have  to  the  given  a  broad meaning so  as to  achieve the  object of  the  Act  without disturbing or  interfering with  the fairness  of the trial. Fortunately, however,  there are  a few decisions which have interpreted  the   expression   ’interlocutory   order’   as appearing in  s. 397(2)  of the  Code. Before we come to the decisions, certain  features may  be noticed  here.  In  the first place,  the concept  of appeal  against  interlocutory order seems  to be by and large foreign to the scheme of the Code or for that matter the scheme of the b Code of Criminal Procedure right from 1872 uptodate. Appeal has been provided only against  final orders  and  not  against  interlocutory orders. Instead of appeal, the Code of 1898 as also the Code of 1872  contained powers  of revision  which vested  in the High Court  to revise  any order passed by a criminal court. In the  previous Codes,  the term  ’interlocutory’  was  not used. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction was wide enough to embrace within its scope any order whether interlocutory. intermediate or  final. Secondly,  by virtue  of  scores  of decisions of  the various High Courts in India and the Privy Council,  it   was  well   settled   that   the   revisional jurisdiction possessed  by the  Sessions Judge  and the High Court could  be exercised  only to  example the  legality or propriety of  the order  impugned and  more particularly the Courts; were  to interfere only if there was an error of law or procedure.  Previous to  the Code, the powers of revision enjoyed by the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate for the Chief  Judicial Magistrate  through  various  amendments were rather limited whereas the power of High Court was wide and unlimited.  Apart from  the revisional  power  the  High Court under  the Code of 1898 possessed an inherent power to pass order  ex debito justitiae in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This was a special power which was to be  exercised by  the High  Court to  meet  a  particular contingency not  expressly  provided  for  in  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure.  Even in  the present Code, the inherent power of  the court  has been  fully retained under sec. 482 which runs thus:-           "482. Nothing  in this  Code shall  be  deemed  to      limit or  affect the  inherent powers of the High Court      to make such 393      orders as  may be necessary to give effect to any order

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    under this  Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of      any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."      One of  the questions  that arose  was as to whether an interlocutory order  which could  be revised by the Sessions Judge, can  be further  revised under  s. 482 of the Code by the High  Court because  s. 3.97(3) 1 permitted the power o, revision to  be exercised  only by  the High  Court  or  the Sessions Judge  but not  by both  of  them.  The  limitation contained in s. 397(3) runs as follows:-           "(3) If an application under this section has been      made by  any person  either to the High Court or to the      Sessions Judge,  no further  application  by  the  same      person shall be entertained by the other of them." Sub-section (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of  the High  Court contained  in s. 482, as mentioned above. It  merely curbs  the revisional  power given  to the High Court  or the  Sessions Judge  under s.  397(1) of  the Code. We  need not  dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon  to consider  the interpretation of S. 397(3) of the Code,  although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has  been gone into and that is why we have indicated the same.  Mr. Mridul  contended that  as the Special Courts Act has fully applied the procedure of the Code to the trial of  the  offences  by  the  Special  Judge,  the  expression ’interlocutory order’  has been  used exactly  in  the  same sense as  in s.  397(2). In  other words, the contention was that s.  11 of  the Act is modelled on s. 397(2) of the Code by telescoping  sub-section (2)  of the said section into s. 11(1) of  the Act. In support of his contention reliance was placed in the case of Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.(1) and  particularly to the following observations made by this Court:-           "It seems  to  us  that  the  term  ’interlocutory      order’ in s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a      restricted sense  and not  in  any  broad  or  artistic      sense. It  merely denotes orders of a purely interim or      temporary nature  which do  not  decide  or  touch  the      important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any      order which  substantially affects  the  right  of  the      accused, or  decides  certain  rights  of  the  parties      cannot be  said to  be an  interlocutory order so as to      bar a  revision to  the High  Court against that order,      because that  would be  against the  very object  which      formed the basis for insertion 394      of this  particular provision  in s.  397 of  the  1973      Code. Thus,  for instance,  orders summoning witnesses,      adjourning cases,  passing orders for bail, calling for      reports and  such other  steps in  aid of  the  pending      proceeding,  may  not  doubt  amount  to  interlocutory      orders against  which no  revision would  lie under  s.      397(2) of  the 1973  Code. But orders which are matters      of moment  and which affect or adjudicate the rights of      the accused  or a particular aspect of the trial cannot      be said  to be interlocutory-orders so as to be outside      the purview  of the revisional jurisdiction of the High      Court." In that  case, one  of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was a party to the decision and  spoke for  the Court. It is no doubt true that this Court  held that  an order summoning an accused was not an interlocutory  order but  being a  matter  of  moment  it decided an important aspect of the trial and was, therefore, in a  sense a  final order  which could  be revised  by  the Sessions Judge  or the  High Court under s. 397 of the Code. The observations  made by  this Court,  however, have  to be

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read in  the light  of the  peculiar facts of the said case. What had happened in that case was that an FIR was lodged at police station  Butana, District Karnal, mentioning a number of accused persons as having participated in the occurrence. The  police,   after  holding  investigations,  submitted  a chargesheet against  the other  accused persons  except  the appellants before  the Supreme  Court against  whom a  final report under s. 173 of the Code was given by the police. Th, report was  placed before a Judicial Magistrate, First Class who, after  perusing  the  same,  accepted  the  report  and released the  appellants. Thereafter the complainant filed a revision before  the Additional  Sessions Judge  against the order of  the Judicial  Magistrate releasing  the appellants but the  revision  petition  was  dismissed  by  the  Judge. Thereafter the  informant filed  a regular  complaint before the Judicial  Magistrate against  all the  accused including the appellants. The learned Magistrate after having examined the complaint  found that  no case against the appellant was established. A  further revision  was taken  up  before  the Sessions  Judge  who  accepted  the  revision  and  directed further inquiry,  on receipt  of which the Magistrate issued summons to  the appellants  straightaway. Against this order the appellants  went up  in revision to the High Court which dismissed the  petition in  limine, obviously  on the ground that the order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory one. That is how the matter  came up by special leave before this Court.  It would thus had been that before the stage of trial of  the case  reached the appellants had been released by the Magistrate who accepted the final report that no case was made against them. Even a complaint which was in the 395 nature of  a protest petition against the final report filed before  the  A  Magistrate  was  also  dismissed.  When  the Magistrate issued  summons  in  pursuance  of  an  order  of further inquiry  by the  Sessions Judge cognizance was taken against the  appellants who  were ordered to be put on trial because  the   order  summoning   the  appellants  virtually amounted to  asking the accused to face the trial. It was in the background  of these  circumstances that this Court held that such  an order  being  a  matter  of  moment  affecting important rights  of the  parties, could  not be  said to be purely an  interlocutory order.  We have  no doubt  that the decision of  this Court,  referred to  above, was absolutely correct. In  fact this  part of the decision was endorsed by a later  decision of  this Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra The Court observed thus-           "In Amar Nath’s case, as in this, the order of the      Trial Court  issuing process  against the  accused  was      challenged and  the High  Court was  asked to quash the      criminal proceeding  either in exercise of its inherent      power under  section 482 of the 1973 Code corresponding      to section  561A of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,      3898-herein after called the 1898 Code or the old Code,      or under  Section 397(1)  of the new Code corresponding      to section 435 of the old Code. Two points were decided      in Amar Nath’s case in the following terms:-           (1)   "While we fully agree with the view taken by                the learned  Judge that  where a  revision to                the High  Court  against  the  order  of  the                Subordinate Judge  is expressly  barred under                sub-s. (2)  of s.  397 of  the 1973  Code the                inherent powers contained in s. 482 would not                be available  to defeat  the bar contained in                s. 397(2)."           (2)  The impugned order of the Magistrate, however

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              was not an interlocutory order.      ............ But  we are going to reaffirm the decision      of the Court on the second point." G      A Division  Bench consisting  of three Judges held that an order  framing a  charge was  not an  interlocutory order and,  therefore,  a  revision  against  such  an  order  was competent before  the Sessions  Judge or  the High Court. In dwelling  on   the  various   shades  and   aspects  of   an interlocutory order,  Untwalia J.  who spoke  for the Court, referred to  previous decisions  of the  Court regarding the scope and 396 ambit of  a final order in order to highlight the nature and signification of  the  term  ’interlocutory  order’.  Before analysing the  decision, it  may be  necessary to  state the facts on  the basis  of which  the  aforesaid  decision  was rendered.  The   prosecution  case   was  that  in  a  press conference held  at New  Delhi on  September ’7,  1974,  the appellant before  the Supreme  Court is  said to  have  made certain  statements   and  handed   over  a  press  hand-out containing allegedly  some defamatory  statements  regarding Shri A.  R. Antulay, the then Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra.  The State  Government decided  to prosecute the appellant  for an  offence under  s. 500  of the  Indian Penal Code  after obtaining  the necessary sanction under s. 199(4) (a)  of the Code. Armed with the sanction, the Public Prosecutor filed  a complaint  in the  court of the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. The Sessions Judge took cognizance of the complaint  and issued  process against the appellant. At the time  when the appellant was being heard in the Sessions Court, the  allegation against  him was  resisted  on  three grounds-      (1)   that the court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to           take cognizance  of the  offence without  a formal           commitment of the case to it;      (2)  that the sanction given was bad inasmuch as it was           not given by the appointing authority; and      (3)  that the sanctioning authority had not applied i s           E; mind  to the  facts of  the case  and  accorded           sanction in a casual manner.      The Sessions  Judge rejected  all these contentions and framed charges  against the  appellant under  s. 500, I.P.C. Thereafter, the  appellant moved  the High Court in revision against the  order framing  the  charges.  Before  the  High Court, a  preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the  revision   application  was  taken.  Before  proceeding further, it may be observed that the objections taken by the appellant in  the aforesaid  case related to the root of the jurisdiction of  the Sessions  Judge and  if accepted, would have rendered  the entire  proceedings void  ab initio.  The case before  this Court  was not one based on allegations of fact on  which cognizance  was taken  by a  trial court  and after-having found  that a  prima facie  case was made out a charge was  framed against  the accused.  Even so, the ratio decidendi  in   the  aforesaid  case  was,  in  our  opinion absolutely correct and we are entirely in agreement with the learned Judges  constituting the Bench that the order of the Sessions Judge  framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, was  not merely  an interlocutory order but partook of the nature of a final order or, at any rate, an intermediate order so  as to  be taken  out of  the bar  contained in  s. 397(2) of the 397 Code In  that case,  Untwalia J.,  speaking  for  the  Court observed  as follows:-

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          "It  is to  be noticed  that the  test laid  down      therein was  that  if  the  objection  of  the  accused      succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice      versa. The  order can  be said to be a final order only      if, in  either event, the action will be determined. In      our opinion,  if this strict test were to be applied in      interpreting the  words ’interlocutory order’ occurring      in section  397(2), then the order taking cognizance of      all offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally      or without  jurisdiction, will not be a final order and      hence will  be an  interlocutory one.......  But in our      judgment  such  an  interpretation  and  the  universal      application of  the principle  that what is not a final      order  must   be  an  interlocutory  order  is  neither      warranted nor  justified. If  it were so it will render      almost nugatory  the revisional  power of  the Sessions      Court or  the High  Court conferred  on it  by  section      397(10) ..........................           On the  one hand,  the legislature kept intact the      revisional power  of the  High Court and, on the other,      it put  a bar on the exercise of that power in relation      to any  interlocutory order.  In   such a  situation it      appears  to   us  that   the  real   intention  of  the      legislature  was   not   to   equate   the   expression      "interlocutory order"  as invariably  being converse of      the words ’’final order". There may be all order passed      during the  course of  a Proceeding  which may  not  he      final  in   the  sense  noticed  in  Kuppuswami’s  case      (Supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order-      pure or  simple. Some  kinds  of  orders  may  fall  in      between the  two. By a rule of harmonious construction,      we think  that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397      is  not   meant  to  be  attracted  to  such  kinds  of      intermediate orders.  They may  not be final orders for      the purposes of Article 131 of the Constitution, yet it      would not  be correct  to characterise  the  as  merely      interlocutory orders  within the meaning of section 397      (2).                xxx            xxx           xxx           Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no      difficulty in  coming  to  the  conclusion,  after  due      consideration, that  all order  rejecting, the  plea of      the accused  on  a  point  which  when  accepted,  will      conclude the  particular proceeding, will surely be not      an interlocutory  order within  the meaning  of section      397(2)." (Emphasis ours) 398      Reading the  observations made  by this  Court  in  the aforesaid case  as a  whole we  are unable to agree with the argument  of   Mr.  Mridul   that  this  Court  in  any  way disapproved the  tests of  a final  order  or  interlocutory order accepted  by the  Federal Court  in case  of S.  Kuppu swami Rao  v. The  King This Court took care to explain that in a  situation with  which the  Judges were dealing in that particular case,  it would ’not be proper to treat the order framing charges  as an  interlocutory order pure and simple. Even thought  the order  may be intermediate it could not be said to be final so as to bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High  Court  under  s.  397(3)  of  the  Code.  We  find ourselves in  complete agreement  with the exposition of the law by the learned Judges who decided the said case. We will deal with  a broader  and a  wider aspect of the matter in a later part  of our  judgment when we deal with the scope and ambit of  the Act.  We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition  that the  term ’interlocutory  order’ used in

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the Code  of Criminal  Procedure has  to  be  given  a  very liberal construction  in favour  of the  accused in order to ensure complete  fairness  of  the  trial  because  the  bar contained in  s. 397(3) OF the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right  of revision  was to  be barred,  the  pro  vision containing the  bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power  of the  High Court  or the  Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate  or quasi  final. The same, however, in our opinion, could  not be  said of the Special Courts Act which was meant  to cover  only specified  number  of  crimes  and criminals and  the objective  attained was quickest despatch and speediest  disposal. Mr.  Mridul  further  relied  on  a decision of  this Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy  &  ors.  and  particularly  on  the  following observations made by Chandrachud, J. as he then was:           "On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned      counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal v. D. D.      Ghadigaonkar and  Century Spinning, & Manufacturing Co.      v. State  of Maharashtra a show that it is wrong to say      that at  the stage  of framing charges the court cannot      apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or      no. there is any ground for presuming the commission of      the offence  by the  accused. As observed in the latter      case, the order framing a charge 399      affects a  person’s liberty substantially and therefore      it is  the . A duty of the court to consider judicially      whether  the  material  warrants  the  framing  of  the      charge. It  cannot blindly  accept the  decision of the      prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial." Great stress  was  laid  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellant on  the fact  that the Court had observed that the stage of  framing of  charges was  a very  important  matter because it  affected a  person’s liberty  substantially and, therefore, the  Court should consider judicially whether the materials warrant  framing  of  the  charge.  There  can  be absolutely  no   doubt  regarding  the  correctness  of  the observations made  by Chandrachud J. This decision, however, is no  authority for  holding that an order framing a charge is not  an interlocutory  order. In the aforesaid case, this Court was  called upon to exercise its jurisdiction under s. 482 of  the Code, that is to say, the inherent powers of the Court was  invoked to  quash the  proceedings  in  order  to prevent  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court.  The  term ’interlocutory order’  7 appearing in s. 397 (2) of the Code did not  arise for  interpretation in  that case.  In  these circumstances, therefore, we do not think that this case can be of  any assistance  to the  appellant. Reference was also made to  a decision of this Court in the case of Parmeshwari Devi v.  State &  Anr. This  case also  depends on different facts and relates to the circumstances under which a summons could be  issued under  s. 94(1)  of the  Code of  1898.  In passing, however, this Court observed:-           "The Code  does not define an interlocutory order,      but it  obviously is an intermediate order, made during      the preliminary  stages of  an enquiry  or  trial.  The      purpose of  sub-section (2)  of section  397 is to keep      such an  order outside  the purview  of  the  power  of      revision so  that the  enquiry  or  trial  may  proceed      without delay.  This is  not likely  to  prejudice  the      aggrieved party  for it  can always challenge it in due

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    course if  the final order goes against it. But it does      ’not follow  that if  the order  is directed  against a      person who  is not a party to the enquiry or trial, and      he will  have no  opportunity to  challenge it  after a      final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he      cannot apply  for its  revision even  if it is directed      against him and adversely affects his rights." 400      Although this  Court said that the Code does not define an interlocutory  order, it does not include an intermediate order made  during the  preliminary stages, of an inquiry or trial. This  Court laid  greater stress  on the fact that an order which  was directed  against a  person who  was not  a party to  the  inquiry  or  trial  and  had,  therefore,  no opportunity to place his point of view could not be bound by any order  passed against  him. This appears to be the ratio of that case. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in  the case  of Century  Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.  The State  of Maharashtra in order to urge that the stag, of  framing of  charges is  a matter  of moment and an order  framing   a  charge   could  not   be  termed  as  an interlocutory order. In the first place, the judgment of the aforesaid case  was rendered  before the  Code of  1973  was passed and,  therefore, the  interpretation of interlocutory order as  contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for  consideration. Secondly,  the decision was given on the  scope and  ambit of  s. 251A  of the Code of 1898 AS amended by  the Act  of 1958. Dealing with the scope of sub- sections (2)  and (3)  of s.  251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1)           "The argument  that the  Court  at  the  stage  of      framing the  charges has not to apply its judicial mind      for considering  whether or  not there  is a ground for      presuming the  commission of  the  of  offence  by  the      accused  is   not  supportable  either  on  the,  plain      language  of   the   section   or   on   its   judicial      interpretation or  on any other recognised principal of      law. The  order framing  the charges does substantially      affect the  person’s liberty  and it is not possible to      countenance the  view that the Court must automatically      frame  the   charge  merely   because  the  prosecuting      authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in      Section 173,  consider it proper to institute the case.      The responsibility  of framing  the charges  is that of      the  Court  and  it  has  to  judicially  consider  the      question of  doing so.  Without fully  adverting to the      mate rial  on the  record it must not blindly adopt the      decision of the prosecution."      There can  be no doubt that the stage of framing of the charges is  all important stage and the Court before framing the charge  has to apply its mind judicially to the evidence or the  material placed  before it  in order  to make up its mind whether  there are  sufficient grounds  for  proceeding against the  accused. But  this case is not an authority for the proposition  that once  the Court, after considering the materials, 401 passes an  order framing  the charges,  the order is a final order  which  could be revised and would not be barred under s. 397  (2) of the Code which, however, did not exist at the time when  the decision was given. It follows Therefore that an order  framing a charge was clearly revisable by the High Court under  ss. 435  and 439  of the  Code of 1898. We may, however, point  out that  we are  in complete agreement with the principle  involved in the cases discussed above that an

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order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important  aspect of  the trial and it is the duty of the Court to  apply its  judicial mind to the materials and come to a  clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out on  the basis  of which it would be justified in framing charges The  question, however,  with which we are concerned in the present appeal is essentially different. The order of the Special Judge framing the charge is a reasoned order and not a  mechanical or  a casual  order so  as to  vitiate the order of  the Special  Judge. In  the instant  case, we  are concerned with  a much  larger question, viz. whether or not the term  ’interlocutory order’  used in s. 11(1) of the Act should be given the same meaning as this very term appearing in s.  397 (2)  of the Code. In other words, the question is whether s. 11 (1) of the Act tightens or widens the scope of the term ’interlocutory order’ as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code  and as interpreted by this Court in the decisions, referred to above.        This   brings  us  to  the  discussion  of  the  main preliminary objection  taken by  the Solicitor  General. The Solicitor General  submitted that  s. 11, which is extracted below starts  with a  non obstante  clause which  completely excludes the  application of  the provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore the decisions of this Court rendered on an interpretation of s. 397(2) of the Code would have no  application whatsoever in considering the scope and ambit of s. 11:           Appeal 11  . (1)  Notwithstanding anything  in the      Code,  an  appeal  shall  lie  as  of  right  from  any      judgment, sentence  or order,  not being  interlocutory      order, of  a Special Court to the supreme Court both on      facts and on law.           (2) Except  as aforesaid,  no appeal  or  revision      shall lie  to any  court from any judgment, sentence or      order of a Special Court.           (3) Every  appeal  under  this  section  shall  be      preferred within  a period of thirty days from the date      of any judgment. sentence or order of a Special Court:           Provided that  the Supreme  Court may entertain an      appeal after  the expiry  of the  said period of thirty      days if it is satis- 402      fied that  the appellant  had sufficient  cause for not      preferring the  appeal  within  the  period  of  thirty      days." It was  further contended  that even  if  the  non  obstante clause was  not there,  the aim  and object of the Act being speediest disposal  of  cases,  cutting  down  all  possible delay,  the   term  ’interlocutory   order’  should   be  so interpreted so  as to  advance the  object of the Act rather than retard it. As against this, Mr. Mridul, counsel for the appellant, submitted  that the  non obstante clause does not change the  complexion of  the  term  ’interlocutory  order’ which is  a term  of well  known significance  and has  been construed by  this Court  in s.  397(2) of  the Code and the same principle  would apply  in interpreting this expression particularly when the Act does not give any remedy by way of revision to  the accused  against an  order which may not be purely interlocutory  but which  is undoubtedly  a matter of moment and  therefore an  inter mediate  or  a  quasi  final order. It  was further  argued  that  as  an  order  framing charges against  the accused  affects the  liberty of the 1) subject, the  Act appears  to have given a wider connotation to the  term so  as to provide for appeal against that order to the highest court of the country.

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    In appreciating the respective arguments put forward by counsel  for  the  parties  we  may  have  to  consider  the background, the aim, the object and scheme of the Act.      It may be mentioned here that before the Act was passed a Bill  was moved in the Parliament which was adopted by the Government and  the President of India was requested to make a reference  to  this  Court  regarding  the  constitutional validity of the Act. The reference was heard by seven Judges particularly on  the various  constitutional aspects  and we would have  to advert to some important observations made by this Court  in the  Reference in order to highlight the main object of the Act.      To begin  with we  may glance  through extracts  of the speech  of   the  Union   Home  Minister   at  the  time  of introduction of the Bill in the Lok Sabha. While introducing the Bill,  the Hon’ble  Home Minister  laid  stress  on  the (dominant object  of the  Bill which  is  contained  in  the extracts from his speech given below:-           "It is  the obligation  of the  state not  only to      prosecute persons  involved in  such crimes but also to      make arrangements for the speedy judicial determination      of such 403      prosecutions.  The   ordinary  criminal  courts  for  a      variety of  reasons, cannot  reasonably be  expected to      bring these  trials to an early conclusion. Government,      therefore, considers  that only  if special  courts are      established at  a high  level lo  deal exclusively with      such offences,  the trial  of these  cases will  not be      unduly protracted." (Emphasis ours) (Lok Sabha Debates,      Vol. XXIl, No. 8, dated 28-2-79, Sixth Series p. 278).      The details  to the  aims and  objects to  the Act  are further reflected  in the Preamble of the Act which contains several clauses,  the relevant  portions  of  which  may  be extracted Thus:           "Whereas Commissions  of Inquiry  appointed  under      the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act,  1952  have  rendered      reports  disclosing   the  existence   of  prima  facie      evidence of offences committed by persons who held high      public or  political offices  in the country and others      connected with  the com mission of such offences during      the operation  to the  Proclamation of Emergency, dated      the 25th June, 1975, issued under clause (1) of Article      352 of the Constitution:        ..            ..            ..          ..      And Whereas  the offences  referred to  in the recitals      aforesaid were  committed during  the operation  of the      said Proclamation  of Emergency,  during which  a grave      emergency, was  clamped on  the  whole  country,  civil      liberties were  curtailed to  a great extent, important      fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict      censorship was  imposed on  the press,  judicial powers      were severely crippled and the parliamentary democratic      system emasculated;    ..              ..               ..               ..      And  whereas   the  ordinary  criminal  courts  due  to      congestion of  work and other reasons cannot reasonably      be expected  to bring  those prosecutions  to a  speedy      termination;      And  whereas   it  is   imperative  for  the  efficient      functioning  of   parliamentary   democracy   and   the      institutions created  by or  under the  Constitution of      India that  the commission  to offences  referred to in      the recitals  aforesaid should be judicially determined      with the utmost dispatch;

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       ..             ..             ..             .. 404      And whereas  it is  expedient to  make some  procedural      changes  whereby   avoidable   delay   in   the   final      determination of  the innocence or guilt of the persons      to be  tried is eliminated without interfering with the      right to a fair trial;      The effect of the speech given by the Home Minister and the recitals in the Preamble bring out the following special features of the Act :-           (1)   That the Act makes a distinct departure from                the trial  of ordinary  offences by  criminal                courts in  that the  trial of the offences is                entrusted to  a very high judicial (dignitary                who is  a sitting  Judge of the High Court to                be appointed  by the  Chief Justice concerned                on the  recommendations of  the Chief Justice                of India.  This contains a built-in safeguard                and  a   safety  valve   for   ensuring   the                independence of judiciary on the one hand and                a complete fairness of trial on the other. In                appointing the Special] Judge, the Government                has absolutely no hand or control so that the                Special   Judge    is   appointed    on   the                recommendations  of   the  highest   judicial                authority in  the country,  viz.,  the  Chief                Justice of India. This would naturally instil                great confidence of the people in the Special                Judge who is given a very elevated status.           (2)   Secondly,  whereas  in  ordinary  cases  the                matter is  straightaway brought  to the court                after the investigation is completed, the Act                requires   certain   preliminary   safeguards                before  the   matter  is  placed  before  the                Special  Court.   In  the  first  place,  the                allegations made  against  the  accused  have                been   scrutinised    by   a   High   Powered                Commission,  presided  over  by  Mr.  Justice                Shah, a  retired Judge  of the Supreme Court,                as indicated  by the  Home  Minister  in  his                speech while  introducing the Bill. Secondly,                the matter does not rest there but a thorough                investigation  has   been  made  not  by  the                ordinary police  but by  the C.B.I.  Thirdly,                after the  investigating is  made, the matter                is placed before the Central Government which                makes a  declaration  after  being  satisfied                about existence of prima facie 405                evidence of  the  commission  of  an  offence                alleged  A  to  have  been  committed  by  an                accused. It  is only after such a declaration                is made that the matter is brought before the                Special  Court,  designated  by  the  Central                Government. It  thus appears  that  before  a                case to  the Court  a three-tier  system  has                already been  adopted  which  eliminates  any                possibility of  miscarriage of justice or any                element   of   unfairness   or   foul   play.                Furthermore,  although   the  Special   Judge                functions  as   a  Sessions   Judge  for  the                purposes of the trial and follows a procedure                provided for  the trial of warrant cases, the                fact  remains   that  the  Judge  is  a  high                judicial dignitary, being a sitting Judge not

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              subordinate in any way to the Government. The                Special Judge appointed, therefore, is a very                experienced  judicial  officer  who  must  be                presumed to  act in  an  extremely  must  and                equitable manner keeping himself alive to the                rules of natural justice and fair play. In fact, this Court has held in a number of cases: That where  a power  is vested in a very high authority, the abuse of  the power  is reduced  to  the  minimum.  In  this connection, we  may refer to two decisions of this Court. In the case  of K.  L. Gupta  & Ors.  v. The  Bombay  Municipal Corporation & Ors this Court observed as follows:-      "The fact  that no  appeal from the decision under s 13      was provided  for is  a matter  of no  moment  for  the      authority under s. 13 is no less than the Municipal Com      missioner himself or the Chief officer of the Municipal      Borough  or   a  person  exercising  the  power  of  an      Executive officer  of any  local  authority.  When  the      power had  to  be  exercised  by  one  of  the  highest      officers of  the local  authorrity intimately connected      with the preparation of the development plan in all its      stages,  it   is  difficult   to  envisage  what  other      authority could be entrusted with the work of appeal or      revision." 406 A similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Chinta Lingam &  ors. v.  Government of  India &  Ors.  This  Court observed thus:      "In these  circumstances the absence of a provision tor      appeal or  revision can  be of no consequence. At any n      rate, it has been pointed out in more than one decision      of this  Court that  when the power has to be exercised      by one  of the highest officers the fact that no appeal      has been provided for is a matter of no moment.. It was      said that though the power was discretionary but it was      not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could      not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption      that public  officials  would  discharge  their  duties      honestly and in accordance with rules of law."      Although these  judgments were  rendered in  explaining the scope  of Art.  14 of  the Constitution of India but the principle  deduced  from  these  decisions  applies  to  the present case in order to show that fairness of the trial has to be presumed when a person of the status of a sitting High Court Judge  tries the  case  against  an  accused.  Another important feature  of the Act is that unlike other cases, an appeal against  the decision  of a Special Court lies to the highest Court of the country, namely, the Supreme Court, and the appeal  lies as  a matter  of right both on facts and on law. In  other words,  any judgment  rendered by the Special Court is  to be examined by the highest court of the country which is  bound to  consider  the  diverse  aspects  of  the materials, evidence  and findings given by the Special Court without being  fettered by any legal or factual restriction. Thus, an  analysis of the aforesaid features clearly reveals that no  accused can  have any genuine grievance against the fairness of  the trial  that is meted out to him by the Act. If any  error of  fact or  law is  committed by  the Special Judge that can be corrected by this Court.      Coming back  now to the question at issue, the dominant purpose  of   the  Act   is  to   achieve  not  only  speedy determination but  a determination with the utmost despatch. We may  refer to  certain observations  made by  this  Court while  deciding  the  Presidential  Reference  in  order  to emphasise the  most expeditious disposal of the case, a goal

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which the Act seeks to subserve. 407      In  In   Re  The   Special   Courts   Bill,   1978,(1), Chandrachud,  C.J.   speaking  for  the  Court  observed  as follows:-           "....In relation to the objective mentioned in the      sixth paragraph  of the  Preamble that it is imperative      for the  functioning of parliamentary democracy and the      institutions created  by or  under the  Constitution of      India that  the commission  of such  offences should be      judicially determined with the utmost dispatch; and the      latter in  relation to their status, that is to say, in      relation to the high public or political office held by      them in India.       ..              ..               ..               ..      If it  be true,  and we  have to  assume it to be true,      that offences  were committed  by persons  holding high      public or political offices in India under cover of the      declaration of  emergency and in the name of democracy,      there can  be no  doubt that  the trial of such persons      must be  concluded with  the  utmost  dispatch  in  the      interest of the functioning of democracy in our country      and  the  institutions  created  by  our  Constitution.      Longer these trials will tarry, assuming the charges to      be justified,  greater will  be  the    impediments  in      fostering democracy,  which is  not  a  plant  of  easy      growth. If  prosecutions which  the Bill  envisages are      allowed  to   have  their  normal,  leisurely  span  of      anything between  5 to  10 years,  no fruitful  purpose      will be served by launching them. Speedy termination of      prosecutions under  the Bill  is the  heart and soul of      the Bill." Similarly, Krishna Iyer J. Observed as follows:-      "And so,  to track  down and give short shrift to these      heavyweight criminaloids  who often  mislead the people      by   public   moral   weight-lifting   and   multipoint      manifestoes is  an urgent legislative mission partially      undertaken by the Bill under discussion.       ..              ..              ..               ..           It is  common  knowledge  that  currently  in  our      country  criminal  courts  excel  in  slow-motion.  The      procedure is  dilatory, the dockets are heavy, even the      service  of   process  is   delayed  and,   still  more      exasperating,  there   are  appeals  upon  appeals  and      revisions and supervisory jurisdictions, H 408      baffling   and    baulking   speedy    termination   of      prosecutions, not tc speak of the contribution to delay      by the  Administration itself  by neglect  of the basic      necessaries of the judicial process."      The aforesaid  observations,  therefore,  clearly  show that the  heart and  soul of  the Act is speedy disposal and quick  dispatch   in  the  trial  of  these  cases.  It  is, therefore, manifest  that the  provisions of the Act must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means  of adopting  dilatory tactics  by  plugging  every possible loophole  in the  Act through which the disposal of the case may be delayed. Indeed if this be the avowed object of the  Act, could  it have  been intended by the Parliament that while  the Criminal  Procedure Code  gives a  right  of revision  against   an  order   which,  though   not  purely interlocutory, is  either intermediate  or quasi  final, the Act would  provide a  full fledged  appeal against  such  an order. If the interpretation as suggested by the counsel for the appellant  is accepted,  the result  would be  that this

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Court would be flooded with appeals against the order of the Special Court framing charges which will impede the progress of the  trial and  delay the  disposal of  the case which is against the  very spirit  of the  Act. We are of the opinion that it  was for this purpose that a non obstante clause was put in  s. ll  of the  Act so  as to bar appeals against any interlocutory order  whether it is of an intermediate nature or is  quasi final. The Act applies only to specified number of cases  which  fulfil  the  conditions  contained  in  the provisions of  the Act  and in view of its special features, the liberty  of the,  subject has  been fully safeguarded by providing a three-tier system as indicated above.      Let us  now examine the scheme of the Act. Under s. 4 a Special Court  is to  take cognizance  or try  cases as  are instituted before  it or  transferred to  it as  hereinafter provided. Section  S provides that if the Central Government is of  opinion that  there is  prima facie  evidence of  the commission of  an offence  and that  in accordance  with the guidelines contained  in  the  Preamble,  the  said  offence should be  dealt with under this Act, the Central Government shall make  a declaration to that effect. In other words, s. 5 imposes  a further screening process by providing that the Central Government  which is  a very  high authority  should satisfy itself that a prima facie case 11 is made out before making a  declaration and  sending the  case to  the Special Judge. Section  6 provides that after a declaration under s. 5  is   made,  notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  the prosecution in 409 respect of  the offence  which is  the subject matter of the declaration A and any prosecution pending in any Court shall stand transferred  to a  Special  Court  designated  by  the Central Government. Thus, we find that s. 6 makes a distinct departure from  the provisions of the Code in entrusting the trial of  the offence  to a Special Judge, designated by it. We are not concerned with s. 7 which deals with the transfer of any  revision or appeal pending in any Court of Appeal or Revision which  would stand transferred for disposal to this Court. Section 5 provides for the joint trial of the offence against the  accused in  accordance with the Code. Thus, the provisions of  the Code are for the first time applied by s. 8. Similarly, s. 9 (1) enjoins that a Special Court shall in the trial of cases before it follow the procedure prescribed by the  Code for trial of warrant cases before a Magistrate. Similarly, the  provisions of the Code in respect of ss. 307 and 308  are also  applied by virtue of s. 9(2). Sub-section (3) appears to be the residuary clause which applies all the provisions of  the Code  which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Here also, a departure from the Code is indicated  in that  the 1)  provisions of  the Code would apply where  the same  are either  expressly or by necessary intendment excluded. Subsection (3) of s. 9 further provides that a  Special Court  shall be  deemed to  be  a  Court  of Sessions and  shall have  the powers of a Court of Sessions. This part  of the section merely creates a legal fiction but does not  reduce the  status of  a sitting High Court Judge. Section 1 O cm- powers the Supreme Court in certain cases to direct any  particular  case  to  be  transferred  from  one Special Court to another. Then we come to s. 11(1) which has already been  extracted. The non obstante clause which stars with  the   words  Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code" excludes appeals  from any  interlocutory order of a Special Court. The  reason for  this exclusion is not far to seek. F In the  first place,  such an  exclusion is fully consistent with the  object of  the Act,  viz., to  secure the quickest

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dispatch and  an expeditious  disposal of  the case so as to cut down  all delays  which may  be caused  by providing for appeal  against   interlocutory  orders  also.  As  the  non obstante clause  expressly excludes  the provisions  of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure,  we cannot  call into  aid  the provisions of  s. 397(2)  of the  Code which would amount to frustrating the  very object  which s.  11 seeks to advance. Mr. Mridul  realising the  force of  the non obstante clause has submitted  a very  attractive and ingenious argument. In the first  place, he  submitted that  as the  Act  does  not provide for any revision against intermediate or quasi final orders. and  as the  object was to give a very fair trial to the accused, hence instead of a revision, an appeal has been provided. We are, 410 however, unable to agree with this argument, which is not at all borne  out by the plain language employed in s. 11 (1) . When the  Act excludes  the Code  then it is obvious that it excludes an  appeal against  any type  of  an  interlocutory order. The  absence of  revision is more than compensated by giving the accused a right of an appeal against any judgment or order  of the Special Judge as of right and open on facts and law.  There is one more reason why the power of revision has been excluded. The trial is held by a sitting High Court Judge who  also would  have the  power of revision if be was sitting in  a High Court. In these circumstances, it must be presumed  that   whenever  a   Special  Judge   passes   any interlocutory order  or an  inter mediate order like framing of charges,  he would  do so  only with  full  and  complete application  of   his  mind   and  considering  the  various principles and guidelines indicated by this Court in several decisions, some  of which  have been  discussed above,  and, therefore, it  would not  be in  keeping with  the  dignity, decorum and  status of  the Special  Judge to provide for an appeal even  against such  an order  which he is supposed to pass with full application of mind and due deliberation      It was  then contended  by the  learned counsel for the appellant that the non obstante clause should be interpreted according to  the salutary  principles  laid  down  by  this Court. In support of his submission, he relied on a decision of this  Court in  the case  of Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. where Sastri, C.J. observed as follows:      "It should  first be ascertained what the enacting part      of the  section provides  on a fair construction of the      words used  according to  their  natural  and  ordinary      meaning,  and   the  non   obstante  clause  is  to  be      understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid      anything contained  in relevant  existing laws which is      inconsistent with the new enactment.      ..          ..            ..              ..      The true  scope of the enacting clause must, as we have      observed, be  determined on a fair reading of the words      used in. their natural and ordinary meaning." Similar observations were made by Mukherjee J..      "In my  opinion,  the  section  on  its  negative  side      eliminates so  far as  the Supreme  Court Advocates are      con- 411      cerned, all disabling provisions existing under any law      in regard  to persons who are not enrolled as Advocates      of any particular High Court. On the positive side, the      section  confers   on  Supreme   Court  Advocates   the      statutory privilege  of practising  as of right, in any      High Court  in India,  no matter whether he is enrolled      as an Advocate of that court or not."

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Das, J. as he then was, observed as follows:-      "Tn short,  there is no escape from the conclusion that      the ambit,  scope and effect of the non obstante clause      are to  supersede the  Indian Bar  Councils Act and any      other  Act   only  in  so  far  as  they  regulate  the      conditions referred to therein.      The observations  of Das,  J.  clearly  show  that  the effect of  non obstante  clause was  to supersede the Indian Bar Councils  Act and  any other  Act  in  so  far  as  they regulate the  conditions referred  to therein,  If we  apply this test  to the  present case then it is manifest that the non obstante  clause would have the effect of overriding and excluding the provisions of the Code. Applying the test laid down by  Sastri, C.  J., we  find that  the position  may be summed up as follows. -           (1)   We should exclude the statute concerned from                consideration.  in   the  instant  case  ’The                Code’;           (2)   We should  construe the words used according                to their natural and ordinary meaning instead                of referring  to the  statute which is sought                to be excluded.      We  entirely  agree  with  the  approach  indicated  by Sastri, C.J.  and which  is also  binding on  us. Let us see what is  the effect  of interpreting the non obstante clause according to the test laid down by the decision, referred to above, and particularly the observations of Sastri C. J. Let us for  the time being forget the provisions of s. 397(2) of the Code  or the-  interpretation put  by this  Court on the term ’interlocutory  order’ as appearing in the Code because the decisions were based purely on the interpretation of the provisions  of  the  Code.  We  have,  therefore,  first  to determine   the    natural   meaning   of   the   expression interlocutory order’.  To begin  with, in  order to construe the term  ’interlocutory’, it has to be construed in contra- distinction to  or in  contrast with  a final  order. We are fortified by  a  passage  appearing  in  The  Supreme  Court Practice, 1976  (Vol. I  p. 853)  where it  is said  that an interlocutory order is to be contrasted with a final order, 412 referring to  the decision  of Salaman  v. Warner.  In other words, the  words ’not  a final order’ must necessarily mean an interlocutory  order or  an intermediate order. That this is so  was pointed out by Untwalia J, speaking for the Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) as follows:           "Ordinarily   and    generally   the    expression      ’interlocutory order’  has been understood and taken to      mean as a converse of the term ’final order’." Thus,  the   expression  ’interlocutory   order’  is  to  be understood and  taken to  mean converse  of the  term ’final order’. Now,  let us  see how  this term has been defined in the Dictionaries  and the  text books.  In  Webster’s  Third International Dictionary  (Vol. II,  p. 1170) the expression ’interlocutory order’ has been defined thus:           "not final  or definitive; made or done during the      progress of an action; INTERMEDIATE PROVISIONAL".           Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, Vol.      3, p. 1410) defines the interlocutory order thus: -           "  ’Interlocutory   order’  (Judicature  Act  1873      (c.66), s.  25(8) was  not confined  to an  order  made      between writ  and final  judgment, but  means an  order      other than final judgment." Thus, according  to Stroud,  interlocutory  order  means  an order other  than a  final judgment. This was the view taken

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in the  case of Smith v. Cowell and followed in Manchester & Liverpool Bank  v. Parkinson.  Similarly,  the  term  ’final order’ has  been defined  in volume 2 of the same Dictionary (p. 1037) thus:           "The judgment  of a  Divisional Court on an appeal      from a  county court  in an  interpleader issue,  was a      ’final order"  within the  old R.S.,  Ord.   58,  r.  3      (Hughes v.  Little, 18  Q.B.D. 32);  so was an order on      further consideration  (Cummins v.  Herron,  4  Ch.  D.      787); unless  action was not thereby concluded.. But an      order under  the old  R.S.C., ord. 25, r. 3, dismissing      an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was      not ’final"  within the  old Ord. 58, r. 3, because had      the decisions  been the other way the action would have      proceeded." 413 Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 22, pp. 743- 744) describes an interlocutory or final order thus:           "Interlocutory judgment  or order:  An order which      does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but      either (1)  is made before judgment, and gives no final      decision on  the matters in dispute, but is merely on a      matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and      merely directs  how the  declarations of  right already      given in  the final  judgment are  to be worked out, is      termed ’interlocutory’.  An interlocutory order, though      not conclusive  of the  main dispute, may be conclusive      as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.....      In general  a judgment  or order  which determines  the principal matter in question is termed ’final’."      At page 743 of the same volume, Blackstone says thus:           "Final judgments are such as at once put an end to      the action  by declaring  that the plaintiff has either      entitled himself,  or has not, to recover the remedy he      sues  for.................  Four  different  tests  for      ascertaining the  finality of  a judgment or order have      been  suggested:   (1)  Was  the  order  made  upon  an      application such  that a  decision in  favour of either      party would determine the main dispute? (2) Was it made      upon an  application upon  which the main dispute could      have  been  decided?  (3)  Does  the  order,  as  made,      determine the  dispute? (4) If the order in question is      reversed, would the action have to go on." Corpus Juris  Secundum (Vol. 49 p. 35) defines interlocutory order thus:           "A final  judgment is  one which  disposes of  the      cause both  as to the subject matter and the parties as      far as  the court  has power to dispose of it, while an      interlocutory judgment  is one which reserves or leaves      some  further   question  or   direction   for   future      determination  ........  Generally,  however,  a  final      judgment is  one which disposes of the cause both as to      the subject  matter and the parties as far as the court      has power  to dispose  of it,  while  an  interlocutory      judgment is one which does not so dispose of the cause,      but  reserves   or  leaves  some  further  question  or      direction for  future determination.....  ..  The  term      "interlocutory judgment"  is, however, a convenient one      to indicate  the determination  of steps or proceedings      in a cause preliminary to 414      final judgment,  and in  such  sense  the  term  is  in      constant  and   general  use   even  in  code  states."      (Emphasis ours) Similarly, Volume  60 of  the same series at page 7 seeks to

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draw a:  distinction between  an interlocutory  and a  final order thus:           "The word  "interlocutory", as  applied to rulings      and orders  by the  trial  court,  has  been  variously      defined.  It   refers  to   all  orders,  rulings,  and      decisions made by the trial court from the inception of      an action  to its  final determination.  It means,  not      that which  decides the  cause,  but  that  which  only      settles some  intervening matter relating to the cause.      An interlocutory  order is  an order  entered pending a      cause deciding  some point  or matter  essential to the      progress of  the suit  and  collateral  to  the  issues      formed by  the pleadings  and not  a final  decision or      judgment on  the matter  in issue  ..  An  intermediate      order  has   been  defined  as  one  made  between  the      commencement  of   an  action  and  the  entry  of  the      judgment."      To sum  up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is  that  it  merely  decides  some  point  or  matter essential to  the progress  of the suit or collateral to the issues sought  but not  a final  decision or judgment on the matter. in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the  commencement of  an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia  J. in  the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge  is not  an interlocutory  order  but  is  an intermediate order  as defined  in  the  passage,  extracted above, in  Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete  agreement with  the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum.  It is  obvious that an order framing of the charge being  an intermediate  order falls  squarely with in the ordinary  and natural meaning of the term ’interlocutory order’. as  used in  s. 11(1)  of  the  Act.  Wharton’s  Law Lexicon (14th  Edition, p.  529) defines interlocutory order thus:           "An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or      given during  the progress of an action, but which does      not finally dispose of the rights of the parties."      Thus, summing  up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order,  the conclusion  is inescapable that an order which  does not  terminate the  proceedings or finally decides the  rights of  the parties is only an interlocutory order. In  other words,  in ordinary  sense of  the term, an interlocutory order  is one  which only decides a particular aspect or  a particular  issue or  a particular  matter in a pro- 415 seeding, suit   or trial but which does not however conclude the trial  A at  all. This  would be  the result if the term interlocutory  order  is  interpreted  in  its  natural  and logical sense  without having  resort to  Criminal Procedure Code or  any other statute. ’I hat is to say, if we construe interlocutory order  in ordinary  parlance it would indicate the attributes,  mentioned above,  and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in s. 11(1) of the Act B      We shall,  however, examen  a  number  of  English  and Indian authorities  that have  been cited  before us  by the parties as to the true intent and import of an interlocutory order.      In the  case of  Ex Parte  Moore In  Re Faithfull  Lord Selbome while defining a final judgment observed as follows:           "To constitute  an order  a final judgment nothing      more is  necessary than  that there  should be a proper      litis contestatio, and a final adjudication between the      parties to it on the merits.

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Similarly, Brett, M.R. Observed as follows:           "The question  is whether in the Chancery Division      there cannot  be a  "final  judgment"  when  everything      which has to be done by the Court itself is finished.           Is that  a final  judgment which  directs  certain      things to  E be  done and certain inquiries to be made,      and certain  other things to be done on those inquiries      being answered ? If the Court ordered the result of the      inquiries to  be reported to itself before the judgment      was given,  it would  not be  a final judgment. But, if      the Court  orders something to be done according to the      answer to  the inquiries, without any further reference      to itself, the judgment is final." This authority  therefore clearly  indicates  that  a  final order or  a judgment  would be  one which amounts to a final adjudication between the parties on merits. Practically, the same view  has been  taken by  Brett M.R.  with whom Cotton, L.J. also concurred. In the case of Salaman v. Warner & ors. (Supra), Lord  Esher propounded  an important  test to judge whether  an  order  was  interlocutory  or  final.  In  this connection, he observed as follows:           "The question  must depend  on what  would be  the      result  of   the  decision  of  the  Divisional  Court,      assuming it  to be  given in  favour of  either of  the      parties. If their decision, 416      whichever way  it is given, will, if it stands, finally      dispose of  the matter in dispute, I think that for the      purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand,      if their  decision, if  given in  one way, will finally      dispose Of  the matter in dispute, but, if given in the      other, will  allow the action to go on, then I think it      is not final, but interlocutory. That is the rule which      I suggested  in the case of Standard Discount Co. v. La      Grange, and  which on the whole I think to be best rule      for determining these questions; the rule which will be      most  easily   understood  and   involves  the   fewest      difficulties."      In other  words, the test adopted by Lord Esher in this case has  been consistently  followed by this Court in later cases and  appears  to  us  to  contain  the  most  valuable guidelines  to   judge  whether   an  order   is  final   or interlocutory. Applying  this test  to the  present case  it would follow  that if  the Special  Judge did  not  frame  a charge and  discharged the accused, the proceedings would no doubt terminate but if it framed charges against the accused the proceeding  would continue.  Unless, therefore, an order results in a final termination of the proceeding ill any way it is decided, the order is of an interlocutory nature. Fry, L.J. almost took the same view when he observed thus:           "I think  that the  true  definition  is  this.  I      conceive ’hat an order is "final" only where it is made      upon an  application or  other  proceeding  which  must      whether such  application or  other proceeding  fail or      succeed, determine  the action. Conversely 1 think that      an order is "interlocutory" where it cannot be affirmed      that in either event the action will be determined." Lopes, L.J. fully agreed with Lord Esher, M.R. and observed:           "I think the definition suggested by the Master of      the Rolls  in the case that has been referred to is the      right definition  for this  purpose.  I  think  that  a      Judgment or  order would be final within the meaning of      the rules,  when,  whichever  way  it  went,  it  would      finally determine the rights of the parties." According to  the test  laid down  by Lord  Esher and  other

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Lords, the order of the Special Judge impugned in the appeal is undoubtedly  an interlocutory  order and  therefore falls within the mischief cf s. 11 (1) of the Act      Similarly, another  test to determine whether or not an order  is   an  interlocutory  order  was  evolved  by  Lord Alverstone C.J. in the case of 417 Bozson v.  Altrincham Urban District Council who observed as follows           "It seems  to me  that real  test for  determining      this question  ought to  be this:  Does the judgment or      order, as  made, finally  dispose of  the rights of the      parties ?  If it  does, then  I think  it ought  to  be      treated as  a final  order, but  if it  does not  it is      then, in my opinion, an interlocutory order."      Sir Jeune  P. concurred with Lord Alverstone while Lord Halsbury preferred to follow an earlier decision in the case of Shubrook v. Tufnell. In Shubrook v. Tufnell what happened was that an action was filed by the lessee against lessor to recover damages  caused to  them by the defendant’s making a drain through  the adjoining  land. By  an order in Chambers the action  was referred to the arbitrator who sent The case to the  Court for its opinion. In that case the position was that if  the case  was referred  back to the arbitrator, the award had  to be  given by him, if not, then judgment was to be entered  for the  defendant. The  question was whether an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal against the reference made by the  arbitrator. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case,  Jessel, M.  R. with  whom Lord Lindley concurred, ’held that  appeal lay  as the  order seeking the opinion of the court  was not  an interlocutory  order. It  is manifest that in  this case the proceedings would have terminated. In any event  if the  case was referred back to the arbitrator, then the  arbitrator  would  have  to  give  his  award  and therefore the reference proceedings terminated. If, however, the reference  was not  made to  the  arbitrator,  then  the judgment was  to be  entered for  the defendant.  Thus,  the order passed  in this  case undoubtedly could not be said to be an  interlocutory order  even in  the widest sense of the term. At  any rate,  the preponderance of the authorities of the English  Courts favour  the view  that an  interlocutory order is  one which  finally disposes  of the  rights of the parties as observed by Lord Alverstone in the case of Bozson v. Altrincham  Urban District  Council, (supra) cited above. We might,  however, state  that although  Lord Halsbury  had expressed his  dissent from Salaman v. Warner’s case (supra) yet the  Federal Court  as also  this Court  appear to  have followed and  accepted the  view taken  by  Lord  Esher,  as discussed above.  We shall  deal with the authorities of the Federal Court and this Court on this point a little later.      Again in  the case  of Isaacs & Sons v Salbstein & Anr. Lord  Swinfen   Eady  followed   the   Bozson’s   case   and particularly the obser- 418 vations of  Lord Alverstone in that case. In this connection Lord Eady observed as follows:           "Then there  is Salaman  v. Warner in which it was      held that  a final  order was  one  made  on-  such  an      application or  proceeding that, for whichever side the      decision might be given, it would, if it stood, finally      determine the  matter in  litigation. Neither  decision      seems  quite   consistent  with   that  in   Bozson  v,      Altrincham Urban  Council which  puts the matter on the      true foundation  that what  must be  looked at  is  the      order under  appeal. In  the present  case the order is

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    clearly an  interlocutory  order,  and  the  appeal  is      properly in the interlocutory list." Similarly,  Lord  Pickford  who  agreed  with  Lord  Swinfen distinguished. Shubrook’s  case (supra)  and  explained  the view of Lord Halsbury thus:           "In the  present case the order appealed from does      not put  a final  end to  the action,  and this  is  an      appeal from  an interlocutory  and not  from  a  final,      order." Bankes L.J.  concurred. In  a  later  case  Hunt  v.  Allied Bakeries Ltd.,  it was held that all order striking, out the whole or part of a claim on the ground that it was frivolous and vexatious  and staying  further proceeding was merely an interlocutory  order.  In  this  connection,  Lord  Evershed observed thus:           "After consulting  with the  Chief  Registrar  and      looking at  the cases, and also after consultation with      my colleagues,  I am  left in  no doubt  at  all  that,      rightly or  wrongly, orders  dismissing  actions-either      because they  are frivolous  and’ vexatious,  or on the      ground of  disclosure of no reasonable cause of action-      have for a very long time been treated as interlocutory      ........... For  these reasons  (and this decision will      now necessarily  govern other cases) I hold that orders      under R.S.C.,  Ord. 25, r. 4, striking out the whole or      part of  a claim  on the  ground that  it discloses  no      reasonable  cause   of  action,  or  is  frivolous  and      vexatious,   or   both,   and   staying   all   further      proceedings, must be treated as interlocutor" Lord Birket  and Lord  Romer agreed with Lord Evershed. This is rather  important because even though the case was struck cut  on  the  ground  that  the  action  was  frivolous  and proceedings were stayed, 419 the order was treated to be an interlocutory one although it had decided  k an  important aspect of the case. In a recent decision in  the ease  of Salter  Rex g  Co. v.  Ghosh, Lord Denning reviewed  the entire  case law  on the  subject  and ultimately preferred  the view  taken by  Lord Alverstone in Bozson’s case  (supra) and  Lord Esher in Salaman’s case. In other words,  both the Salaman’s and the Bozson’s cases were endorsed by  Lord Denning.  In this connection, Lord Denning observed as follows :-           "There is  a note  in the  Supreme Court  Practice      (1970) under  R.S.C. Ord.  59,  r.  4,  from  which  it      appears that different tests have been stated from time      to time  aS to what is final and what is interlocutory.      In Standard  Discount Co.  v. La Grange [18771 3 C.P.D.      67 and  Salaman v.  Warner [1891] 1 Q.B. 734 Lord Esher      M.R.  said   that  the  test  was  the  nature  of  the      application to  the court:  and not  the nature  of the      order which the court eventually made. But in Bozson v.      Altrincham Urban  District Council  [1903] 1 KB 547 the      court said that the test was the nature of the order as      made. Lord  Alverstone C.J.  said that  ".. the test is      whether the  judgment or order as made finally disposed      of the  rights of  the parties."  Lord  Alverstone  was      right in  logic but Lord Esher was right in experience.      Lord Esher’s test has always been applied in practice."                    ..      ..      ..           "So I  would apply  Lord Esher’s  test to an order      refusing a  new trial.  I took to the application for a      new trial and not to the order made. If the application      for a  new trial  were granted,  it  would  clearly  be      interlocutory. So,  equally, when  it is refused, it is

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    interlocutory."      This is  the position so far as the English authorities are concerned.  It may  be noticed  here  that  in  all  the English cases,  referred to  above, the word ’interlocutory’ appears to  have been  used in  its natural sense and giving the meaning attached to it in ordinary parlance. We now come to the  authorities of  the Federal  Court and this Court on the subject.  In the  case of  Hori Ram  Singh v. The Crown, Sulaiman J.  referred to Salaman’s case (supra) and seems to have approved  the test  laid down  by Lord  Esher which was quoted in  extenso in  the judgment.  Similarly, a reference was also  made to Bozson’s case (supra) and the Judge quoted the observations of Lord Alverstone 420 which have  already been extracted above. After scrutinising these authorities, Sulaiman J. Observed aS follows:-           "If the  effect of  the order  from  which  it  is      sought to  appeal is  not finally  to  dispose  of  the      rights of  the parties,  then even though it decides an      important and even a vital issue in the case, it leaves      the suit  alive and  provides  for  its  trial  in  the      ordinary way.           As the  "final order"  may be either in a civil or      criminal case  the definition  given by their Lordships      in the  civil case  must by  analogy be  applied  to  a      criminal case as well It is still to be finally decided      by the  Sessions Judge  whether the  accused was or was      not guilty  of the  offences with  which  he  had  been      charged. The  question of  want  of  consent,  although      vital for the purposes of the proceedings as it went to      the root  of the  matter so far as their continuance is      concerned, is  after all  a preliminary  question as to      whether the proceedings had been properly instituted or      not. The  criminal case  is still  a live case, and the      innocence or  the guilt  of the  accused has  not  been      finally determined." Thus, it  was pointed  out that  the concomitant  of a final order would  he the  same whether  it is  a civil  case or a criminal case and the definition given by the English Judges would apply  to both. This case was noticed in S. Kuppuswami Rao v.  The King which, in our opinion, is a leading case on the subject  or, if we may say so, it is the locus classicus so far as the nature of an interlocutory order is concerned. In this  case, Kania C.J. speaking for the Court referred to the decision  of Sulaiman  J. (supra)  and also  noticed the view of  Lord Esher in Salaman v. Warner (supra) as also the view of Lord Alverstone and observed as follows:           "The question  then is  what  is  the  meaning  of      "judgment, decree  or final  order of  a High Court" in      this section  ? The  expression "final  order" has been      judicially interpreted  and its  meaning  is  now  well      settled." After referring  to a  number of decisions the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:-           "The effect  of those  and other judgments is that      an order  is final if it finally disposes of the rights      of the  parties. The  orders now  under appeal  do  not      finally dispose  of those  rights, but leave them to be      determined by the Courts in the 421      ordinary  way."   These  observations   show  that  the      Judicial Committee  considered that  the words  used in      the above  mentioned three  English decisions  gave the      same meaning  to  the  expression  "final  order",  and      adopted the  definition as given by Lord Ester N.E.. in

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    Calamines case.  The Judicial  Committee  further  held      that when  the effect  of the  order was  to leave  the      rights to  be determined  by the  Court in the ordinary      way, the order was not a final order." These observations  clearly show that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council accepted the view expressed in the case of Salaaming  v.  Warner  and  Boston  v.  Altrincham  Urban District Council  (supra). It  is, therefore,  pertinent  to note that  the view of Lord Halsbury does not appear to have been accepted  either by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court either  in Hori  Ram Singh (supra) case or in the case cited above.  Similarly, while  examining the language of s. 205 of  the Government  of  India  Act,  the  Chief  Justice observed as follows .-           "The words  "final order"  were used  in s. 109 of      the  Civil  Procedure  Code.  That  section  prescribes      conditions under  which an  appeal lies to the Judicial      Committee of  the Privy  Council from a decree or final      order passed  on appeal by a High Court. It was noticed      that the  words "final  order ’  were used  in contrast      with interlocutory  order, The  learned Judge  took the      view that  in cases  in which the decision of the Point      in  dispute  either  way  did  not  result  in  finally      disposing of  the matter before the Court, the decision      did not amount to a final order." Reference had  also been  made by  the Chief  Justice to the judgment of  the Privy  Council in  Abdul Rahman  v.  D.  K. Cassim &  Sons where Sir George Lowndes stated that the test of finality  was whether  the order  finally disposed of the rights of  the parties. To the same effect was a decision of the Privy  Council in  Ramchand Manjimal’s  case where after examining the  decisions of  the English  Court, it was held that the  test of  finality was  whether the  order  finally disposes of  the rights  of the  parties and  held that  the order in  question was  not a final Order because the rights of the  parties were  left to be determined by the courts in the  ordinary   way.  After   a  consideration  of  all  the authorities the Chief Justice observed thus .           "These and  other English  decisions make it clear      that in  England when  the word  judgment or  decree is      used, whether 422      it is  preliminary   or final, it means the declaration      or final  determination of the rights of the parties in      the  matter  brought  before  the  Court.  In  criminal      proceedings, an examination  of the discussion in paras      260-64  of  Vol.  IX  of  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England      (Hailsham Edition)  shows that  the word "judgement" is      intended  to  indicate  the  final  order  in  a  trial      terminating in  the  conviction  or  acquittal  of  the      accused           In our  opinion, the  decisions of  the Courts  in      India show  that the  word "judgment",  as in  England,      means the determination of the rights of the parties in      the matter brought  before the Court." Another important  observation made  by  the  Chief  Justice which appears to be directly in point may be extracted thus:           "In  our   opinion,  the  term  "judgment"  itself      indicates a  judicial decision  given on  the merits of      the dispute  brought ’  before the Court. In a criminal      case it  cannot cover  a preliminary  or  interlocutory      order." Thus, the Chief Justice clearly indicated that in a criminal case  a   final  order   cannot  cover   a  preliminary   or interlocutory order. Ultimately, the Chief Justice concluded

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by the following observations:           "The words  judgment and final order in connection      with civil  appeals have  received a  definite judicial      interpretation. In  connection with  civil  appeals  to      this Court  therefore that  interpretation  has  to  be      accepted. If  so, the  same interpretation  has  to  be      accepted in  case of  appeals from  criminal proceeding      brought  to   this  Court   under  s.   205(1)  of  the      Constitution Act."      This case  was followed  in the  case of  Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd.  & Ors.  v. Dominion  of India & Ors. where it was held  that  so  far  as  this  Court  is  concerned  the principles laid down in Kuppuswamis case (supra) settled the law. In  this connection,  in the aforesaid case, Mukherjea, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows:           "The expression  "final order"  has been  used  in      contradistinction to  what is  known as  "interlocutory      order" and  the essential  test to  distinguish the one      from the  other has  been discussed  and formulated  in      several cases decided by 423      the Judicial  Committee. All the relevant authorities A      BEARING on  the question  have been  reviewed  by  this      Court in  their recent  pronouncement in  S. Kuppuswami      Rao v.  The King,  and the law on point, so far as this      court is  concerned, seems  to be well settled. In full      agreement with the decisions of the Judicial (committee      in Ram  Chand Manjimal  v. Goverdhandas  Vishindas  and      Abdul  Rahman  v.  D.  K.  Cassim  and  Sons,  and  the      authorities of  the English  Courts  upon  which  These      pronouncements were  based, it  has been  held by  this      court that  the test for determining the finality of an      order  is,   whether  the  judgment  or  order  finally      disposed of the rights of the parties." C Thus, the  Federal Court  in  its  decision  seems  to  have accepted two principles, namely,-           (1)   that a final order has to be. interpreted in                contradistinction to  an interlocutory order:                and           (2)  that the test for determining the finality of                an order  is whether  the judgment  or  order                finally  disposed   of  the   rights  of  the                parties.      These principles  apply to  civil as  also to  criminal cases as  pointed out  by Kania  C.J.  in  the  case  of  S. Kuppuswami Rao  v. The  King (supra?.  We find  ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by Mukherjea J. which is based  on English  cases as  also the  view taken  by the Judicial Committee and the Federal Court.      The  view   taken  in  Kuppuswami’s  case  (supra)  was endorsed by  this Court  in the case of Mohan Lal Magarl Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat where it was held that generally speaking a  judgment order  which determines  the  principal matter in question is termed final. The English decisions as also the  Federal Court  decisions were  referred to in this case  and   after  considering  the  decisions,  this  court observed as follows :           "The  meaning   of  the   two  words  "final"  and      "interlocutory"  has,   therefore,  to   be  considered      separately in  relation to  the particular purpose f-or      which it  is required.  However, generally  speaking, a      judgment or order which determines the principal matter      in question  is termed final....An interlocutory order,      though not  conclusive  of  the  main  dispute  may  be      conclusive as  to the  subordinate matter with WHICH it

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    deals ....If  the decision  on an  issue puts an end to      the suit, the 424      order is  undoubtedly a  final one  but if  the suit is      still left  alive and  has  yet  to  be  tried  in  the      ordinary way,  no finality  could attach to the order..      This test  was adopted in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King      where the court also held that the words "judgment" and      ’order’ have the same meaning whether the proceeding is      a civil  or a  criminal proceeding.  In  Mohammad  Amin      Brothers Ltd.  v. Dominion  of India  the Federal Court      following its  earlier  decision  adopted  against  the      test, viz.,  whether  the  judgment  or  order  finally      disposed of the rights of the parties."      There is  yet another aspect of the matter which has to be concerned so far as this decision is considered, to which we shall  advert when  we t deal] with the last plank of the argument of  the learned  counsel for the appellant. Suffice it to say at the moment that the case referred to also fully endorses the view taken by the Federal Court and the English decisions, viz.,  that an  order is  not  a  final  but  all interlocutory one  if it  does not  determine or  decide the rights of  parties once for all. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the. following proposition emerge:-           (1)   that an  order which  does not determine the                rights of  the parties but only one aspect of                the suit  or the  trial is  an  interlocutory                order;           (2)   that the  concept of interlocutory order has                to be  ex plained.  in contradistinction to a                final order.  In other  words, if an order is                not  a   final  order,   it   would   be   an                interlocutory order;           (3)   that one  of the tests generally accepted by                the English  Courts and  the Federal Court is                to see if the order is decided in one way, it                may terminate  the proceedings but if decided                in another  way, then  the proceedings  would                continue; because,  in our  opinion, the term                ’interlocutory   order’   in   the   Criminal                Procedure Code  has been used in a much wider                sense so  as to  include even intermediate or                quasi final orders;           (4)   that an  order passed  by the  Special Court                discharging the  accused would undoubtedly be                a final  order inasmuch as it finally decides                the rights  of the parties and puts an end to                the controversy  and thereby  terminates  the                entire proceedings  before the  court so that                nothing is  left to  be  done  by  the  court                thereafter;           (5)   that even  if the  Act does  not  permit  an                appeal against  an  interlocutory  order  the                accused is not left without 425                any remedy  because in  suitable  cases,  the                accused can  always move  this Court  in  its                jurisdiction   under    Art.   136   of   the                Constitution even  against an  order  framing                charges against  the accused. Thus, it cannot                be  said  that  by  not  allowing  an  appeal                against an  order. framing  charges, the Act.                works serious injustice to the accused.      Applying these tests to the order impugned we find that

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the order  framing of the charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on  until it  culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true!  that if  the Special  Court would  have refused to frame charges  and discharged  the accused,  the proceedings would have  terminated but  that is  only one  side  of  the picture. The  other side  of the  picture  is  that  if  the Special   Court refused  to discharge the accused and framed charges against  him, then  the order would be interlocutory because the  trial would still be alive. Mr. Mridul tried to repel the  argument of  the Solicitor  General and explained the decisions,  referred to  above, on  the ground  that the English decisions as also the Federal Court’s decisions made the observations  while interpreting  the provisions  of the Government  of   India  Act   or  the   provisions  of   the Constitution where  the word  "final"  order  was  expressly used. It  was urged  that the  same construction  would  not apply to  the present  case where  the word  ’order’ is  not qualified -  by the  word ’final’.  With due  respect to the learned counsel,  in our  opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn is a distinction without and difference. This court as also  the Federal  Court have clearly pointed out that so far as the tests to be applied to determine whether an order is final  or interlocutory, apply as much to a civil case as to a  t criminal case. Furthermore, as already indicated, it is impossible  to spell  out the concept of an interlocutory order unless  it is understood in contradistinction to or in contrast with  a final  order. This  was held in a number of cases referred  to, including  Made  Limeades  case  (supra) which has  been expressly  stressed by us in an earlier part of  the   judgement.  For   these  reasons,  therefore,  the contention of  the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the matter fails and is hereby overruled.      The last  argument advanced  by the learned counsel for the appellant,  which also appears to be very attractive, is that accepting the theists referred to above and applying to the facts  of the present case, the order impugned should be construed as  a final order inasmuch as the order completely terminates the  proceedings preceding  the trial.  In  other words, it  was contended  that until  the charge is actually framed the  trial does  not start  and all proceedings up to the framing of the 426 charges are  in the nature of an inquiry or a sort of a pre- trial proceeding  which finally  culminates  either  in  the order of discharge or in the order framing of charges. Thus, in any  event, an  order framing charges must necessarily be held to  be a  final order and not, an interlocutory one. In support of  this contention  the learned counsel relied on a decision of  a Full  Bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the  case of  State v.  Ghani Bandar in which the leading judgment was  delivered by  one of  us (Fazal Ali J.). It is true that  the Jammu & Kashmir High Court on a consideration of a  large number of authorities of the various High Courts in India, observed as follows:           "On a  careful consideration,  therefore,  of  the      authorities and  analysis of  the various provisions of      the Code  I am of the opinion that ’trial’ in a warrant      case commences  only when  the charge  is read  to  the      accused and  he is called upon to answer the charge and      until the proceedings have reached , this stage proviso      (a) to  clause (1) of s. 350 does not come !. into play      and the  accused has  no right  to  ask  the  Court  to      resummon  the   witnesses.  In  the  present  case,  it      appears, the  case is  yet at  an  inquiry  stage,  and

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    therefore, the  Magistrate was not right in acceding to      the prayers of the accused."      This decision, however, in our opinion, does not appear to be  of 1. any assistance to the appellant for the reasons that we  shall give  here after.  In the  first  place,  the decision was  rendered not  on the provisions of the Code of 1973 but under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Jammu & Kashmir State which were quite different from the provisions  of the  Code of 1973 which does not apply to that State.  Secondly, it  would appear  that  the  Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) expressly contained a definition of the word trial which was defined thus:           " "Trial"  means the  proceedings taken  in  Court      after a  charge has  been drawn  up, and  includes  the      punishment of the offender:           It includes the proceedings under chapters XVI and      XVIII, from  the  time  when  the  accused  appears  in      Court." Thus, the  word ’trial’  clearly meant the proceedings after charges had  been drawn  up and included even the punishment of the offender. Furthermore, the definition was wide enough even to  include proceeding   right  from the  time when the accused appeared in Court to the 427 culmination of  the proceedings.  This definition  is to  be found in  s. 4  of the  Act X  of 1872. The said Act defined ’inquiry’ thus:           " "Inquiry"  includes any  inquiry  which  may  be      conducted by a Magistrate or Court under this Act."      Both the definition of the word ’trial’ as also that of ’inquiry’ underwent.  a radical  change in the Code of 1898. The Code  of 1898  completely dropped  the definition of the word ’trial’  and instead widened the definition of the term ’inquiry’. Under  s. 4(j) of the Code of 1898, ’inquiry’ was defined thus:           ""Inquiry"- "inquiry" includes every inquiry other      than a  trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate      or Court." Thus, the  position was  that under  the Code of 1898, trial was not  defined at all but all proceedings except the trial were held  to be  inquiry within  the meaning of s. 4(j). So far as  the Code  of 1973  is concerned,  with which  we are dealing, while  the definition of inquiry is retained, trial has not been defined at all. In the instant case, s. 9(1) of the Special  Courts Act  clearly provides  that the  Special Court shall  hl the  trial of  cases before  it  follow  the procedure prescribed by the Court for trial of warrant cases before a  Magistrate. Let  us examine  the position  and the various aspects  of the procedure laid down for the trial of warrant cases under the Code as also under the Code of 1898, as amended  in 1955.  So far as the decision of the J&K High Court, referred  to above,  is concerned  it was given under the Criminal  Procedure Code of Jammu & Kashmir prior to the amendment  of   1955  which,  though  passed  by  the  State Legislature, was  enforced sometime after 1964. Prior to the amendment of 1955, under the Code of 1898, the procedure for trial of  warrant cases by a Magistrate was the same whether the case was instituted on a police report or otherwise than on a  police report. The procedure is found in the unamended ss. 251 to 254 onwards which may be extracted thus:           "251. Procedure  in  warrant  cases-The  following      procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in the trial      of warrant cases.           252. Evidence for prosecution-(1) When the accused      appears  or   is  brought  before  a  Magistrate,  such

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    Magistrate shall  proceed to  hear the  complainant (if      any) and  take all  such evidence as may be produced in      support of the prosecution:           Provided that the Magistrate shall not be bound to      hear 1  any person  as complainant in any case in which      the complaint has been made by a Court. 428           (2)  The  Magistrate  shall  ascertain,  from  the      complainant Gr  otherwise, the  names  of  any  persons      likely to  be acquainted with the facts of the case and      to be  able to  give evidence  for the prosecution, and      shall summon  to give  evidence before  himself such of      them as he thinks necessary.           253. Discharge  of accused-(1) If, upon taking all      the evidence referred to in section 252 and making such      examination (if  any) of  the accused as the Magistrate      thinks necessary,  he finds  that no  case against  the      accused has  been made out which, if unrebutted , would      warrant his  conviction, he  Magistrate shall discharge      him.           (2) Nothing  in this  section shall  be deemed  to      prevent a  Magistrate from  discharging the  accused at      any previous  stage of  the case  if for  reasons to be      recorded by such Magistrate. he considers the charge to      be groundless.           254. Charge  to be  framed  when  offence  appears      proved -If,  when such  evidence and  examination  have      been taken  and made,  or at  any previous stage of the      case, the  Magistrate is  opinion that  there is ground      for presuming that the accused has committed an offence      tribal under  this Chapter.  which such  Magistrate  is      competent to  try, and  which, in  his opinion could be      adequately punished  by him he shall frame in writing a      charge against the accused."      It  is  therefore,  clear  that  under  the  provisions extracted above, There was no question of the trial starting until the  charges were framed because under s. 252 when the accused appeared  or was  brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate had  to hear the complainant and take evidence as may be  produced by him. After summoning the witnesses under s. 252(2), the Magistrate had to take the evidence and after examining the  same he  had to  determine whether a case was made out  by the  prosecution which,  if  unrebutted,  would warrant the conviction of the accused. If the Magistrate was of the opinion from the examination of the evidence taken at the earlier  stage that the accused had committed an offence triable under  the said  Chapter, then only charge was to be framed. By  the amendment  of 1955, however, Th procedure of the trial  of warrant  cases was split up into two parts. By the first  part a  different procedure was indicated, (which is contained  in s. 251) in cases starting on the basis of a complaint whereas  under s.  251A a  separate procedure  was evolved for  cases triable  on the basis of a police report. We are, however, not concerned with either s. 251 or 251A as amended in 1955. So far as the decision of the J & K 429 High Court  is concerned, that was given on the basis of the Code of   1898  before the  amended of  1955 and  was  quite correct having  regard to  ss. 251, 252 and ’’53 of the Code of 1898,  prior to the amendment of 1955, because under that procedure there  could be  no question  of there  being, any trial until  the charge was framed, because the court had to hear the complainant, record evidence even before the charge was framed.  In these circumstances, therefore, the decision of the  Full Bench  of the J & K High Court cannot be called

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into aid  in deciding  the  present  issue.  As  regard  the argument that the trial preceded an inquiry which culminated in framing of the charges or discharge of an accused, we are of the  opinion that  this  argument  is  also  without  any substance. Under  the Code, the commitment inquiry preceding the trial  has been  completely abolished as indicated while referring to  the objects and reasons of the Code. Under the code the  Magistrate is  not to  record any evidence or hold any inquiry but only to find out as to whether a case put up before him  is exclusively  triable by  a Sessions Court and once this  is so,  he is  to send  the case to the Court for trial. Thus,  there being  no inquiry as was the case in the Code of  1898, there  is  no  room  for  acceptance  of  the argument of  the counsel  for the  appellant that an inquiry precedes  the   trial  in  such  a  case.  This  contention, therefore. appears  to be  without substance. Realizing this difficulty, the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  put forward an  alternative argument,  viz., that  s. 238 of the Code itself  consists of  two separate  stages one  starting from s.  238 and  ending up to s. 240 and the other starting from s. 242 and ending up to s. 248. We are, however, unable to agree  with this  argument because  it appears  that  the enactment of  s. 251A by virtue of the amendment of 1955 the words ’commencement  of trial’ were introduced for the first time which clearly denote that the trial starts in a warrant case right  from the  stage when  the accused  appears or is brought before  the court. This appears to up to be the main intent and purpose of introducing the words ’commencement or trial’ by  the amendment Act of 1955 which did not appear in the Code  of 1898  or in  the various amendments made before the Act  of 1955  to the  Code. Thus, if the trial begins at that stage,  it cannot be said that the proceedings starting with s. 251A ONWARDS amount to an inquiry within the meaning of s.  2(j) of  the Code.  Furthermore, it would appear that the  amendment   of  1955  in  fact  simplified  the  entire procedure for  trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate by not requiring the  Magistrate  to  record  any  evidence  before framing of  the charge  or discharging the accused. All that the Magistrate  had to  do was  to satisfy  himself that the documents referred  to in  s. 173  had been furnished to the accused and  if that  had not  been done, to direct that the documents should be furnished. Thereafter, the Magis- 430 trate on  consideration of  the documents  referred to in s. 173 only  without recording any evidence, was to examine the accused if  he considered  necessary, and  after hearing the parties proceed  either to  frame the charge or to discharge the  accused.  In  other  words,  the  simplified  procedure introduced by  the amendment  of 1955, which is now retained by the  Code in  ss. 238  to 240,  amounts to  a trial  from beginning to  end. The  fact  that  no  evidence  is  to  be recorded before framing of the charge and the Magistrate has to proceed  only on  the documents referred to under s. 173, i.e., the  statement recorded  in the  case diary, and other papers or  materials collected  by the police, clearly shows that these proceedings are not an inquiry at all because the scheme of  the Code generally appears to be that whenever an inquiry is  held, evidence or affidavits have to be recorded by the  court before  passing an  order. This, therefore, an additional reason to hold that the proceedings starting from s. 251A in the previous Code and s. 238 in the Code of 1973, do not  amount to  an INQUIRY  at  all  but  amount  to  the starting  of  a  trial  straightaway.  Contrasted  with  the procedure which  prevailed under  the Code of 1898, prior to the amendment  of 1955,  there  was  express  provision  for

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recording of  evidence before  the charge and that procedure undoubtedly amounted  to  an  inquiry  which  has  now  been dropped by  the amendment  of 1955 and retained by the Code. For these  reasons, therefore,  we are  satisfied  that  the proceedings starting  with s.  238 of the Code including any discharge or  framing of  charges under  s. 239  or  s.  240 amount to a trial. the question of a pre-trial, as suggested by the  counsel for the appellant, does not arise on a plain interpretation of the language of ss. 238 and 239 which were the-same as s. 251A under the Code of 1898 as amended by the Act of 1955.      Similarly, counsel  for the appellant drew analogy from the pro  visions OF  s. 476  to illustrate that the order in question was  a final  order. Section 476 appears in Chapter XXV of  the Code of 1898 which is equivalent to Chapter XXVI of the  Code. The Chapter relates to proceeding in a case of offence  affecting   the  administration   of  justice.  The provisions contained  in this  Chapter amount  to a separate and  independent   proceeding  which   deals  with  specific offences affecting  administration of  justice. The relevant portion of s. 476 runs thus:           "476. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195-      (1) When  any Civil,  Revenue  or  Criminal  Court  is,      whether on  application made  to it  in this  behalf or      otherwise, of  opinion that  it  is  expedient  in  the      interests of  justice that  an inquiry  should be  made      into any  offence referred  to  in  section  195,  sub-      section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to 431      have been  committed in  or in relation to a proceeding      in that A Court, such Court may, after such preliminary      inquiry, if  any, as  it  thinks  necessary,  record  a      finding to  that effect and make a complaint thereof in      writing signed  by the  presiding officer of the Court,      and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the first      class having  jurisdiction,  and  may  take  Sufficient      security for  the appearance of the accused before such      B, Magistrate or if the alleged offence is non-bailable      may, if  it thinks necessary so to do, send the accused      in custody  to such  Magistrate, and  may bind over any      person  to   appear  and   give  evidence  before  such      Magistrate." Section 476A  is another provision which empowers a superior court to  file  a  complaint  in  respect  of  the  offences mentioned in  s. 476 and s. 476B provides for appeals to the higher  court   concerned.  Thus,   these  three  provisions provided  a  separate  and  self-contained  procedure  which starts with an inquiry and terminate with an order of filing a  complaint   or  refusing  to  do  so.  This  Chapter  is, therefore, restricted  only to  offences mentioned in s. 195 (1)(b) and (c) of the Code. Thus, in view of the independent nature of  the procedure  contained in these sections, it is manifest that  any  order  under  s.  476  either  filing  a complaint or  refusing to  file a  complaint becomes a final order in  any event  as such  an order completely terminates the proceedings  and brings  the matter to an end so far as’ the First  Court is concerned. ’the same power is given to a superior court under s. 476A which also ends with the filing or refusal  to file  a complaint.  Section 476B provides for appeal  as   indicated  above.  It  is  true  that  separate proceedings are  taken when  a complaint  is filed but these proceedings  are   fresh  proceedings   starting  with   the complaint and ending with the conviction or acquittal of the accused. In  other words,  once the  Court decides to file a complaint forming  an opinion whether or not it is expedient

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in the  interest of  justice to  do so  the procedure spends itself out.  In these  CIRCUMSTANCES, therefore. the analogy drawn by  the counsel  for the  appellant cannot  apply to a trial of warrant case under sections 238 onwards.      In this  connection, RELIANCE was placed by the counsel for the  appellant on the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan  Lal Thacker  v. state  of Gujarat (supra). In this case  it  appears  that  after  inquiry  Under  s.  476  the Magistrate ordered  filing of  a complaint  against which an appeal was  taken to  the Additional Sessions Judge who held that the  complaint was  justified. A  revision was taken to the High  1 Court  which dismissed  the revision.  The  High Court, however, gave a certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) and that is how the appeal came 432 before this  Court.  It  was  in  the  background  of  these provisions that  it was  urged before  this Court  that  the order passed  by  the  High  Court,  not  being  final,  the certificate ought  not  to  have  been  given.  This  Court, however, pointed  out that  an order  may be  final for  one purpose and  interlocutory for  another. The  main  question which arose  in that  case was  whether the High Court could entertain a  revision application  against that  order. This Court pointed out that as the appellant in that case filed a revision in  respect of  the  complaint  for  the  remaining offence under  s.  205  read  with  s.  114,  the  order  of dismissal dispose of the controversy between parties and the proceeding  regarding   the  question   as  to  whether  the complaint in  that regard  was  justified  or  not  was  not finally decided  and the Court held that the order passed by the High  Court in  revision was  a final  order within  the meaning  of  Art.  134(1)  (c).  This  case  is,  therefore, distinguishable and  does not  deal with  the situation with which we are confronted in the present case.      The learned  counsel for  the  appellant  then  finally submitted that  the present  statute which  gives a right of appeal, should  be liberally  construed  in  favour  of  the accused so as not to deprive him of the right of appeal. The counsel  relied   on  the   observations  of  Crawford  ’The Construction  of   Statutes’  (pp.  692-693)  which  may  be extracted thus :-           "S. 336. Appeals.           .....Moreover, statutes pertaining to the right of      appeal should  be given a liberal contraction in favour      of the right, since they are remedial. Accordingly, the      right will  not be  restricted or  denied unless such a      construction is unavoidable."      There can  be no  dispute regarding  the correctness of the proposition  mentioned in the statement extracted above, but here  as the  right of  appeal is  expressly excluded by providing that  no appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order, it  is not possible for us to stretch the language of the section to give a right of appeal when no such right has been conferred.  Even the  statement extracted above clearly says that  "the right  will not  be restricted unless such a construction is unavoidable". In the instant case in view of the non  obstante clause,  s. 11(1)  of the  Act  cannot  be construed to  contain a  right of  appeal  even  against  an interlocutory order  and, therefore,  the present  clause fl falls within  the last  part of  the statement  of Crawford, extracted above.  Thus this  argument of the learned counsel also is wholly devoid of any substance. 433      For  the   reasons  given  above,  therefore,  all  the contentions raised  by the learned counsel for the appellant

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fail.      On a  true construction  of s.  11(1) of  the  Act  and taking  into   consideration  the  natural  meaning  of  the expression ’interlocutory order’, there can be no doubt that the order  framing charges  against the  appellant under the Act  was   merely  an   interlocutory  order  which  neither terminated the proceedings nor finally decided the rights of the parties. According to the test laid down in Kuppuswami’s case  (supra)   the  order   impugned  was   undoubtedly  an interlocutory order.  Taking into  consideration, therefore, the natural  meaning of interlocutory order and applying the non obstante  clause, the position is that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstante  clause and  therefore s.  397(2) of  the  Code cannot be  called into  aid in  order to hold that the order impugned is  not an interlocutory order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye’(supra) and Amarnath & Ors.  v. State  of Haryana  & Ors. (supra) were given with respect to  the provisions  of  the  Code,  particularly  s. 397(2), they  were  correctly  decided  and  would  have  no application to  the interpretation  of s.  11(1) of the Act, which expressly  excludes the  provisions  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause.      We feel  that one  reason why  no appeal  was  provided against an  interlocutory order like framing of the charges, as construed  by us so far as the Act is concerned, may have been that it would be against the dignity and decorum of the very high  status which  the Special  Judge  under  the  Act enjoys in  trying the  case against  an accused  in that the Judge is  a sitting Judge of a High Court and therefore must be presumed  to frame the charges only after considering the various principles  and guidelines  laid down  by other High Courts and  this Court  in some  of the  cases  referred  to above.      Thus, summing  up the  entire position  the inescapable conclusion that  we reach  is  that  giving  the  expression ’interlocutory order’  its natural  meaning according to the tests  laid   down,  as  discussed  above,  particularly  in Kuppuswamy’s (supra)  case and  applying  the  non  obstante clause, we  are satisfied  that so  far  as  the  expression ’interlocutory order’  appearing in  s. 11(1)  of the Act is concerned, it  has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Code in s. 397(2). The view  taken by  us appears  to be in complete consonance with the  avowed object  of the  Act to  provide for  a most expeditious trial  and quick  dispatch of  the case tried by the  Special  Court,  which  appears  to  be  the  paramount intention in passing the Act. 434      In these  circumstances, therefore,  we hold  that  the order passed by the Special Judge was an interlocutory order and the  appeal filed  against that  order in  this Court is clearly  not   maintainable.  We,   therefore,  uphold   the preliminary objection  taken by  the Solicitor  General  and dismiss the appeal as being not maintainable.      SHINGHAL, J.-I  am unable to agree with the decision of the Court,  for I believe the accused has been deprived of a right which is his by statute-the right of a full hearing of his appeal.      The case  has come  to this "larger Bench" on reference by two of us. While it has been stated at one place that the "most important  question to  be decided is as to whether or not the  concept or  connotation of the word ’interlocutory’ in section  11 purports  to convey the same meaning as given to it  in section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure",

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the two  brother judges  have made  a "further  mention"  as follows,-           "..... although  we would  have normally  admitted      this appeal  but as  the admission of the appeal itself      would imply  a decision  that the order under appeal is      not an interlocutory one which has to be decided before      admitting this  appeal, hence  we  have  considered  it      expedient to  make a reference to a large Bench even at      the stage of preliminary hearing."      The question for consideration therefore is whether the impugned order  of Judge,  Special Court  No. 1,  New Delhi, dated September  17, 1979, directing the framing of a charge against  appellant  V.  C.  Shukla  for  the  commission  of offences under  section 120B  of the  Indian Penal Code read with ss.  5(1) (d)  and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and  s. 5(2)  read with  s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act  is not  an "interlocutory  order" within the meaning of  s.  11(1)  of  the  Special  Courts  Act,  1979, hereinafter referred to as the Act.      In order  to appreciate  the controversy,  it  will  be proper to  refer, briefly, to the relevant provisions of the Act  and  to  those  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973,  hereinafter referred to as the Code, which bear on it.      Section 9  of the  Act provides  that a  Special  Court shall,  in   the  trial   of  cases   falling   within   its jurisdiction, follow  the procedure  prescribed by  the Code for the  trial of  warrant cases  before a  magistrate. That procedure has  been prescribed  in Chapter  XIX of  the Code and, for  convenience of  reference I  shall  take  it  that wherever reference has 435 been made  to magistrate  in that  chapter it relates to the Judge of the Special Court.      It  is  not  disputed  before  us  that  the  procedure mentioned under  the rubric "A.-Cases instituted on a police report" has  been  followed  by  the  Judge  in  making  the impugned  order.  The  procedure  with  which  he  has  been concerned so far, is that laid down in ss. 238 to 240 of the Code. Section  238 requires  that the  Judge  shall  satisfy himself about  compliance with  s. 207  of the  Code for the supply of  the copy of the police report and other documents to the  accused. Then  come ss.  239 and  240 which are both important. Section  239 provides  that if,  upon considering the police  report and  the documents  sent with it under s. 173, and  making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Judge thinks necessary, and after giving the prosecution and the  accused an  opportunity of  being heard,  the Judge considers the  charge against  the accused to be groundless, he  shall   discharge  him.   It  is   obligatory,  in  that eventuality, for  the Judge,  to record  his reasons  for so doing. The accused is thus entitled to an order of discharge if the  Judge, after complying with the procedure prescribed by s.  239, reaches  the conclusion  that the charge against him is  "groundless". The  section is of great importance to the accused  for it  gives him  an opportunity  of making  a statement, if the Judge thinks it necessary to give him that opportunity, and  it also gives him the opportunity of being heard at  that early stage of the case, so that, in a proper case, he  can look  forward to  an order of discharge at the threshold of the trial and be spared any further proceeding. In  fact   s.  239   envisages  a   careful  and   objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused  is  groundless  or  whether  there  is  ground  for presuming that  he has  committed an  offence. What  s.  239

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prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is  a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law.      But  if   the  Judge,   upon  considering  the  record, including the  examination, if  any, and  the hearing, is of the opinion  that there  is "ground  for presuming" that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is  required by  s. 240  to frame,  in writing  a  charge against him. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an  empty or  routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to  discharge under  s. 239,  that there is, on the other hand,  ground for  presuming that  he has committed an offence triable  under Chapter  XIX and  that he  should  be called upon  to plead  guilty to  it and  be  convicted  and sentenced on  that plea,  or face the trial. So an order for the fram- 436 ing of the charge is a serious matter for the accused for he is thereafter  no longer  a free  man as  he is put to trial according to the procedure laid down in ss. 242 and 243, and consideration of  the question whether he is to be acquitted or convicted  is deferred  until the  case reaches the stage envisaged by s. 246.      Unlike s. 9 of the Act which provides for following the procedure prescribed  by the  Code for  the trial  of  cases referred to in s. 8, the Act does not provide that an appeal against the  order of  the Special  Court shall be heard and decided according  to the  procedure laid  down in the Code. Section 11 of the Act deals with appeals. Sub-section (3) of that section  relates to  the period  of limitation  for the filing of  the appeal and is of no relevance for purposes of the present controversy. The rest of the section provides as follows,-           "11.(1) Notwithstanding  anything in  the Code, an      appeal  shall  lie  as  of  right  from  any  judgment,      sentence or  order, not being interlocutory order, of a      Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on      law.           (2) Except  as aforesaid  no  appeal  or  revision      shall lie  to any  court from any judgment, sentence or      order of a Special Court."      The section  thus starts  with a non obstante clause. I shall have occasion to refer to its meaning and significance in a  while, but it may be mentioned here that s. 11 or, for the matter  of that,  any other section of the Act, does not say, in  terms, that  the Code shall apply to the hearing of an appeal,  or in  regard to  the powers  of  the  appellate court. At any rate, the Code has no application in so far as the right  of appeal  and the forum of appeal are concerned. Both these matters are governed by s. 11 of the Act.      But even  as it  is, sub-s.  (1) of s. 11 provides that while an appeal shall lie "as of right" from "any" judgment, sentence or "order" of a Special Court, both on facts and on law, it  states, at the same time, that the appeal shall lie against that  order which  is not  an  interlocutory  order. There  is   therefore  no   right  of   appeal  against   an interlocutory order of the Special Court.      What then  is an "interlocutory order" ? The expression has not  been defined in the Act, or in the Code even though it has  been used  in s.  397(2), and  has been the subject- matter of  controversy both  in this  country and elsewhere. How uncertain is its meaning, will 437 appear from  the following observation of Lord Denning M. R.

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in Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh,-           "The question  of "final" or "interlocutory" is so      uncertain that  the only  thing for practitioners to do      is to  lock up the practice books and see what has been      decided on  the point.  Most orders  have now  been the      subject of  decision. If  a new  case should  arise, we      must do  the best  we can  with it.  There is  no other      way." I confess  I am  unable to  do  better.  I  shall  therefore proceed to  see what  has been  decided by this Court on the point.      I shall  start with the decision in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat, which has been rendered by five Judges of  this Court  and relates to a criminal case. There the Magistrate,  after enquiry  under s.  476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1898, ordered that the appellant may be prosecuted for offences under ss. 205, 467 and 468 read with s. 114  I.P.C. On appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge held that the complaint was justified, but only in respect of the offence under s. 205/114 I.P.C. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s revision petition, but granted certificate under art. 134(1)(c)  of the Constitution. The State urged in this Court that  the High  Court’s order  dismissing the revision petition was not final as it did not determine the complaint filed by  the Magistrate  and did not decide the controversy whether the  appellant had  committed the offence. The trial had in fact still to begin.      Article 134(1)  (c) as  it stood  at that time provided that an appeal shall lie to this Court from, inter alia, any "final order"  in a  proceeding of  the  High  Court  if  it certified that the case was a fit one for appeal. This Court referred to  the decisions in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, Mohammad Amin  Brothers Ltd. and others v. Dominion of India and others,, State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungh Ramesh and another v. Seth Gondalal Motilal Patni and others, and other cases. It  made a  reference to  Halsbury’s Laws  of England (3rd edition)  volume 22,  pages 742-743  and the four tests mentioned 438 therein, including  the test in Salaman v. Warner and others and observed as follows,-           "The question as to whether a judgment or an order      is final or not has been the subject matter of a number      of decisions;  yet no  single general test for finality      has so  far been laid down. The reason probably is that      a judgment  or order  may be  final for one purpose and      interlocutory for  another or  final  as  to  part  and      interlocutory as  to part. The meaning of the two words      "final"  and  "interlocutory"  has,  therefore,  to  be      considered separately  in relation  to  the  particular      purpose for which it is required."      It may  be mentioned  that in  reaching that conclusion this Court  clearly  mentioned  that  the  test  applied  in Salaman’s  case  as  to  whether  the  order  made  upon  an application was  such that  a decision  in favour  of either party would  determine the  main dispute,  was not  followed even by Lord Halsbury in Bozson v. Altrigcham Urban District Council. It  was pointed  out in that case that there was an earlier decision  of the  Court of  Appeal  in  Shubrock  v. Tufnell  (supra)  which  was  not  cited  in  Salama’s  case although it appeared to be in conflict with it. That was why Halsbury L.C. preferred to follow the "earlier decision" and not the decision in Salama. This Court observed in Mohan Lal Magan Lal’s  case (supra)  that  a  so-called  interlocutory order, "though  not conclusive  of the  main dispute  may be

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conclusive as  to  the  subordinate  matter  with  which  it deals." In  fact when  the matter  came up for consideration again in  Salter Rex  & Co.  v. Ghosh  Lord  Denning  M.  R. referred to  Salaman’s case  (supra) and preferred to follow it only  to the  extent that  the test  whether an order was final or interlocutory was the "nature of the application to the Courts  and not  the nature of the order which the Court eventually made".      The aforesaid  view taken  by this  Court in  Mohan Lal Magan Lal  (supra) is therefore significant, for it does not approve of the view taken in Salaman’s case and lays down at least two  clear propositions  of law;  (i) an  order may be final for  one purpose  and interlocutory  for another,  and (ii) it  may be  final as  to part  and interlocutory  as to part, and  that the  meaning of  the two  words  has  to  be determined in 439 relation to  the particular purpose for which it is required to be  given. A  I shall  show, both  these propositions are significant in  this case  for while  an order  framing  the charge against  the accused  does not conclude his trial, it is "final"  in the  sense that  his right  to  an  order  of discharge is  refused to  him once  for all and he is put on trial.      The above observations in Mohan Lal Magan Lal have been followed by  this Court  in Parmeshwari  Devi v.  State  and another (supra)  to which  one of  us was  a  party.  There, during the  course of  the trial  of a  criminal  case,  the complainant made  an application  under s. 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1898,  praying  that  Smt.  Parmeshwari Devi, who  was not  a party  to the case, may be directed to produce a  document. The  Magistrate made an order summoning her with  the  document.  Smt.  Parmeshwari  Devi  professed ignorance of  the document,  and stated  that as  she was  a "pardanishin" lady she may not be summoned by the Court. The Magistrate thereupon passed an order directing her to attend the court  so that  if she made a statement on oath that she was not  in possession  of the document, the court may get a chance to  put her  a few  questions for  satisfying  itself regarding the  whereabouts of the document. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi applied  for revision  of that  order to  the  Sessions Court and the High Court, but to no avail. When she obtained special leave  for appeal  to this Court, it was argued that the Magistrate’s  order was  interlocutory and  the power of revision conferred  by s.  397(1) of  the Code  could not be exercised in  relation to it by virtue of sub-s. (2). It was held that  an order "may be conclusive with reference to the stage at  which it is made" and that such an order could not be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision petition under s. 397(2). The stage at which the order under challenge is made, is therefore significant for deciding its true nature.      The next  case which  bears on the controversy is State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others to which also one of us was  a party.  It was  alleged in  that case that accused Nos. 1  and 8  to 20  conspired to  commit the murder of the complainant,  and  that  in  pursuance  of  that  conspiracy accused Nos.  1, 8 and 10 hired accused No. 2 to execute the object of  the conspiracy. Accused No. 2 in turn engaged the services of accused Nos. 3 to 7, and eventually accused Nos. 1 and  6 were alleged to have assaulted the complainant with knives thereby  committing offences  under ss.  324, 326 and 307 read  with s. 34 I.P.C. etc. The Magistrate directed all the 20 accused to take 440

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their trial before the Sessions Court for offences under ss. 324, 326  and 307  read  with  s.  34.  The  Sessions  Judge discharged accused  Nos. 11,  12 and  16, and  observed that there was  some material  to hold that the remaining accused had something to do with the incident. He adjourned the case to September  1, 1975,  for framing specific charges against them. Two  revision petitions were filed by the accused, one by accused  Nos. 10,  13, 14 and 15 and the other by accused Nos. 17  to 20.  They were  allowed by the High Court on the view that  there was  no sufficient  ground  for  proceeding against them,  and the  proceedings for  the framing  of the charge were  quashed. The  matter then came to this Court in appeal. After  considering s.  227 of  the  Code,  which  is substantially similar  to s.  239 of  the Code,  this  Court upheld the  revisional order of the High Court, although the controversy here  referred to  the scope  of s.  482 of  the Code, and  it was  observed that  "the ends  of justice  are higher than  the ends  of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature".      Then comes Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others to  which one  of us  was a  party. It  was a case of alleged  murder,   where  an   F.I.R.  was   lodged  by  the complainant.  The  Police  sent  a  final  report,  and  the Magistrate set  all the  accused at liberty. The complainant filed a  revision petition  against that  order, but  it was dismissed by  the Additional Sessions Judge. He then filed a regular complaint  before the  Magistrate  against  all  the accused, but  is was  also dismissed.  The complainant again went in  revision to  the Sessions Judge and he remanded the case to the Magistrate for "further enquiry." The Magistrate accordingly issued  summons to  the accused,  who moved  the High Court  under ss.  397 and  482 of the Code for quashing the order  of the  Magistrate. The  High Court dismissed the petition on  the ground  that as the order of the Magistrate was interlocutory, a revision to it was barred by sub-s. (2) of s.  397 and that consequently the case could not be taken up under s. 482.      The matter  came to this Court. It proceeded to examine the question whether the impugned order was interlocutory so as to  justify the  view that it was barred under sub-s. (2) of s. 397 and held as follows,-           "It seems  to  us  that  the  term  "interlocutory      order" in s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a      restricted sense  and not  in  any  broad  or  artistic      sense. It merely de- 441      notes orders  of a  purely interim  or temporary nature      which do  not decide  or touch  the important rights or      the  liabilities   of  the  parties.  Any  order  which      substantially affects  the rights  of the  accused,  or      decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to      be an  interlocutory order  so as  to bar a revision to      the High  Court against  that order, because that would      be against  the very  object which formed the basis for      insertion of this particular provision in s. 397 of the      1973  Code.   Thus,  for   instance,  orders  summoning      witnesses, adjourning  cases, passing  orders for bail,      calling for  reports and such other steps in aid of the      pending   proceeding,    may   no   doubt   amount   to      interlocutory orders  against which  no revision  would      lie under  s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which      are matters  of moment  and which  affect or adjudicate      the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the      trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to      be outside  the purview  of the revisional jurisdiction

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    of the High Court." It has  to be  appreciated that  the order  of the  Sessions Judge on  the  revision  petition  of  the  complainant  for "further enquiry",  left no  option to the Magistrate but to summon the  accused  and  proceed  with  their  trial  after framing a  charge against them, but it was nevertheless held by this Court as follows,-           "It is  difficult to  hold that the impugned order      summoning the  appellants straightaway  was  merely  an      interlocutory order  which could  not be revised by the      High Court  under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of section 397 of      1973 Code  ......We are,  therefore, satisfied that the      order impugned was one which was a matter of moment and      which did  involve a  decision regarding  the rights of      the appellants." The contrary  order of  the High Court refusing to entertain the revision petition on its interpretation of sub-s. (2) of s. 397  was set  aside and  it was asked to decide it on the merits. This  view was  taken even though it was appreciated that s.  397(2) had  been incorporated in the Code "with the avowed purpose of cutting out delays."      This Court  has therefore taken the view in Amar Nath’s case (supra)  that the  expression "interlocutory order" has been used  in s.  397(2) of  the Code in a restricted sense, that it  "denotes" orders  of a  purely interim or temporary nature which  do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities  of   the  parties  and  that  any  order  which substantially affects the rights of the accused is not an 442 interlocutory order.  On that  reasoning, an  order for  the framing of  a charge against the accused in this case cannot be said to be an interlocutory order.      The matter  again came  up for  consideration in  Madhu Limaye v.  The State  of Maharashtra  where one  of us was a member of  the Bench  which heard  the case,  and one of the other two  Judges was a party to the decision in Amar Nath’s case. The case arose on a complaint by the Public Prosecutor in the  Court of  Session, after obtaining sanction under s. 199(4) of  the Code, as the alleged offence was under s. 500 I.P.C. for  defaming a  Minister. Process was issued against the accused.  After the Chief Secretary had been examined to prove the  sanction of  the State  Government,  the  accused filed an  application for  the dismissal of the complaint on the ground  that the  allegations were  made in  relation to what the  Minister had done in his personal capacity and not as a  Minister. The  accused made  two other contentions and challenged the  legality and  validity  of  the  trial.  The Sessions Judge  rejected all  the contentions  and framed  a charge under s. 500 I.P.C. The accused challenged that order by a  revision petition  to the  High Court.  A  preliminary objection was  raised there  to the  maintainability of  the revision petition with reference to the bar under sub-s. (2) of s.  397 of the Code. The High Court upheld the objection, and the  matter came in appeal to this Court at the instance of the  accused. The  question for consideration was whether the order  of the Sessions Judge framing the charge under s. 500 I.P.C. was interlocutory.      Untwalia J.,  who spoke  for the Court, referred to the two points  which arose  for consideration  in  Amar  Nath’s case,  to   which  reference  has  already  been  made,  and reaffirmed  the  decision  on  the  second  point  that  the impugned order  of the  Magistrate in  that case  was not an interlocutory order.  He however  thought  it  advisable  to "enunciate and  reiterate the  view taken by the two learned judges of  this Court  in Amar  Nath’s case (supra) but in a

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somewhat modified and modulated form".      Their  Lordships   considered  S.  Kuppuswami  Rao  and Salaman’s cases  (supra) and  examined the  question whether the test  that if  the decision  whichever way it was given, would, if  it stood,  finally  disposed  of  the  matter  in dispute, was a proper test for deciding whether an order was interlocutory, and  disapproved it.  They went on to hold as follows,-           "But in  our judgment  such an  interpretation and      the universal application of the principle that what is      not a  final order  must be  an interlocutory  order is      neither warranted  nor justified. If it were so it will      render almost nugatory 443      the revisional  power of the Sessions Court or the High      Court conferred  on it  by section  397(1). On  such  a      strict  interpretation   only  those  orders  would  be      revisable  which   are  orders   passed  on  the  final      determination of  the action  but  are  not  appealable      under Chapter  XXIX of  the Code. This does not seem to      be the  intention of  the Legislature  when it retained      the  revisional  power  of  the  High  Court  in  terms      identical to the one in the 1898 Code." After referring  to the  rule of interpretation of statutes, their Lordships further stated that,-           "On the  one hand, the Legislature kept intact the      revisional power  of the  High Court and, on the other,      it put  a bar on the exercise of that power in relation      to any  interlocutory order.  In such  a  situation  it      appears  to   us  that   the  real   intention  of  the      legislature  was   not   to   equate   the   expression      "interlocutory order"  as invariably  being converse of      the words  "final order".  There may be an order passed      during the  course of  a proceeding  which may  not  be      final  in   the  sense  noticed  in  Kuppuswami’s  case      (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order-      pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between      the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think      that the  bar in  sub-section (2) of section 397 is not      meant to  be attracted  to such  kinds of interlocutory      orders. They  may not  be final orders for the purposes      of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be      correct to  characterise them  as merely  interlocutory      orders within  the meaning  of section  397(2).  It  is      neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of      orders to  demonstrate which  kinds of  orders would be      merely, purely  or simply interlocutory and which kinds      of orders  would  be  final  and  then  to  prepare  an      exhaustive list  of those  types of  orders which  will      fall in  between the two. The first two kinds are well-      known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We      may, however,  indicate that  the type  of  order  with      which we are concerned in this case, even though it may      not be  final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory      so as  to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of section      397. In  our opinion it must be taken to be an order of      the type falling in the middle course."      Their Lordships made a reference to Mohan Lal Magan Lal and  added   that  even   though  the   case   under   their consideration might not 444 be said  to be  squarely covered  by that decision, "yet for reasons already  alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the  conclusion, after  due consideration,  that an order rejecting the  plea of  the accused  on a  point which  when

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accepted (emphasis  provided), will  conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning  of section  397(2)". They  also pointed  out an "obvious, almost  insurmountable, difficulty  in the  way of applying literally  the test  laid down  in Kuppuswami Rao’s case, and  in holding  that  an  order  of  the  kind  under consideration being not a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one".      This decision is directly in point in the present case, and I  have no hesitation in following it, for otherwise the revisional power  of the Court concerned under sub-s. (1) of s. 397 of he Code will be rendered nugatory on the mere plea that an  order framing  or directing the framing of a charge against the  accused is an interlocutory order and is beyond the reach  of that  sub-section by virtue of sub-s. (2). The nature of  that  order  cannot  be  determined  merely  with reference to the eventuality that the accused may ultimately be acquitted  on the  completion of  the trial.  There is in fact no  reason why s. 397 of the Code should be so narrowly construed and  why the  real nature of the order framing the charge should  be taken  to be a merely interlocutory order, beyond the  reach of  the revisional  power allowed  to  the court concerned  under s.  397 when it cannot be denied that if the  contention of  the accused against the order framing the charge  against him were allowed, that would, by itself, have concluded  the proceeding  against him.  It  is  hardly necessary to  say that the object of sub-s. (1) of s. 397 of the Code  is to  provide relief to the aggrieved party where it is deserved, if only the order complained of is not of an interlocutory nature.  As it happens, s. 11 of the Act is in that respect, quite similar in purpose and content to s. 397 of the  Code and there is no reason why the same meaning and effect should not be given to it.      I  have  made  a  reference  to  the  decisions  in  S. Kuppuswami Rao  (supra)  and  Mohammad  Amin  Brothers  Ltd. (supra), on  which considerable  reliance has been placed by learned Solicitor  General, while  dealing with this Court’s decisions mentioned  above, and it will be sufficient to say that they  have been  adequately dealt  with in those cases. They both  relate to  the right of appeal under s. 205(1) of the Government  of India  Act, 1935  from, inter  alia,  any "final order".  In S.  Kuppuswami Rao (supra) there were two preliminary objections,  one on  the ground  that consent of the Government  was necessary  under s.  270(1) but  was not obtained, and the other on 445 the ground  that the proceedings were against s. 197 Code of Criminal Procedure read with s. 271 of the Constitution Act. It appears  that reliance  was placed  by their Lordships on Salaman’s case,  to which  also I have made a reference; and in arriving  at the  decision in Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. case, reliance  was placed  on S. Kuppuswami Rao’s. case for taking the  view that  the law  on the  point, so far as the Federal Court  was concerned,  seemed to  have  been  "well- settled". These  two decisions  cannot therefore  avail  the learned Solicitor General.      So on  looking up  and seeing  what has been decided on the question  of "final" or "interlocutory" order, I have no doubt that  the impugned order is not an interlocutory order and is clearly appealable under s. 11 of the Act.      But even  if it  were a  "new case",  the answer,  as I shall presently show, will not be different.      Sub-section (1)  of s.  11  of  the  Act,  it  will  be recalled, expressly  states that  an appeal shall lie "as of right" from  "any" judgment,  sentence or "order", not being

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an interlocutory order, to this Court both on "facts" and on "law". The  words to  which emphasis  has been  supplied are significant, or  are, at any rate, not without significance. They provide  that if  "any" "order" of the Special Court is not of  an interlocutory  nature, it  is the  "right" of the aggrieved party  to prefer  an appeal  against  it  to  this Court. Sub-section  (2) provides that except as mentioned in sub-s. (1),  no appeal  or revision  shall lie  to any court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. The significance of  these provisions  can be better appreciated with reference to provisions like those contained in ss. 372 to 379  of the  Code which  place some  restrictions on  the right of  appeal from  a judgment  or order  of  a  criminal court. These  restrictions are  not there  in the case of an appeal under  s.  11  of  the  Act.  The  section  no  doubt prohibits an  appeal from  an  interlocutory  order,  but  a corresponding restriction  in that respect is to be found in sub-s. (2)  of s.  397 of  the Code  which  deals  with  the revisional power  of the High Court or the Court of Session, so that,  in sum,  the provision  in s.  11 is  clearly more liberal than the provisions in the Code.      It has  to be appreciated that an appeal, in substance, is in  the nature of a judicial examination of a decision by a higher  court of  a decision  of an  inferior  court.  The purpose is  to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal.  In   that  sense  the  revisional  jurisdiction  is regarded as a part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction: 446 Krishnaji Dattatraya  Bapat v.  Krishnaji Dattatraya  Bapat. Moreover, it  is well  settled that statutes pertaining to a right of  appeal should be liberally construed. The position has been  stated as  follows in Crawford on the Construction of Statutes,  paragraph 336,  with particular  reference  to interlocutory orders,-           "Moreover, statutes  pertaining to  the  right  of      appeal should be given a liberal construction in favour      of the right, since they are remedial. Accordingly, the      right will  not be  restricted or  denied unless such a      construction  is   unavoidable.  In   a  few  statutes,      however, where  the statute  pertains to  appeals  from      interlocutory orders,  the rule  of strict construction      has been  applied. But,  there  seems  to  be  no  real      justification for  this departure from the general rule      in accord  with which  a liberal  construction would be      given by the court." Any doubt  regarding the right of appeal should therefore be resolved in favour of the right.      There is  another reason  for this  view. Section 11 of the Act  gives a  right of  appeal against  "any" order of a Special Court,  and not  merely from  its "final" order. The significance  of   such   a   dispensation   came   up   for consideration in  this Court  in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees  of the  Bharat Bank  Ltd., Delhi  and  it  was observed by  Fazal Ali  J., after  comparing the language of art. 136  of the  Constitution, which,  inter alia, provides for special  leave to  appeal to this Court from "any" order in any  cause or  matter passed  or made  by  any  court  or tribunal, with the provision in arts. 132, 133 and 134 which provide for appeal from a "final order", that the use of the words  "any  order"  along  with  the  other  difference  of language had  "greatly widened"  the scope  of art.  136  in regard  to   the  appeal  thereunder.  It  has  also  to  be appreciated that  s. 11  of the  Act not  only  grants  that remedy in  the case,  inter alia, of "any order", but allows it as  a matter  of right, whereas the remedy under art. 136

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is, in  terms, discretionary.  Further, s.  11 takes care to state categorically  that the appeal thereunder shall relate both to the facts and the law. It is therefore a liberal and beneficial provision  in favour  of the  aggrieved party and excels the remedy under s. 397 of the Code.      Section 11  of the  Act  starts  with  a  non  obstante clause, and  it is  necessary to  examine  its  meaning  and significance also for decid- 447 ing whether it really enlarges or circumscribes the right of appeal granted by it.      Both Mr.  Mridul and  Mr. Sorabji  agree, and  I  think rightly, that  the correct  way to  interpret a provision of law with  a non obstante clause has been stated by Patanjali Sastri C.J.,  in Aswini  Kumar and  another v. Arabinda Bose and another as follows,-           "It should  first be ascertained what the enacting      part of  the section provides on a fair construction of      the words  used according to their natural and ordinary      meaning,  and   the  non   obstante  clause  is  to  be      understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid      anything contained  in relevant  existing laws which is      inconsistent with the new enactment."      It has  therefore to  be ascertained  what the enacting part of  s. 11  provides. There  can be  no  doubt  that  it provides that  an appeal  shall lie  as of  right  from  any judgment, sentence  or order,  not  being  an  interlocutory order, of  a Special  Court. As  this would  not  have  been permissible, in  respect of certain judgments, sentences and orders of  a Criminal  Court under  the Code,  e.g. in cases falling under  ss. 375  and 376,  the  non  obstante  clause operates to  rid the  aggrieved party of any such limitation or disability and gives him an unfettered right of appeal so long as  the judgment,  sentence  or  order  is  not  of  an interlocutory nature.      It has  to be  remembered  that  s.  372  of  the  Code categorically states  that no  appeal  shall  lie  from  any judgment or  order of a Criminal Court except as provided by the Code or any other law for the time being in force. So in respect of  such judgments  and orders  from which  the Code does not  provide a  right of  appeal, s. 397 provides for a revision of  the incorrect  order.  But  a  reading  of  the section shows that the revisional power cannot be invoked by the aggrieved  party as of right, and all that it does is to empower the High Court or any Sessions Judge to call for and examine the  record of  any proceeding  before any  inferior criminal court  for the  purpose  of  satisfying  itself  or himself as  to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence  or order, and as to the regularity of any proceeding of  such inferior  court. The revisional power is therefore discretionary  and is,  at any rate, not available to the  aggrieved party  as of right. Moreover the remedy by way of  a revision  petition  has  been  hedged  round  with certain limitations 448 and restrictions,  whereas s.  11 ensures  a right of appeal "both on  facts and  on law".  In fact what s. 11 of the Act does is to do away with the power of revision under the Code [sub-s. (2)], and to substitute for it an unlimited right of appeal against  any  judgment,  sentence  or  order  of  the Special Court  so long  as the  impugned order  is not of an interlocutory nature.  The  aggrieved  party  has,  thereby, really lost  nothing to  which it  would have  been entitled under the  Code, for  sub-s. (2) of s. 397 also specifically states that  the power  of revision  conferred by sub-s. (1)

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shall not  be exercised  in  relation  to  an  interlocutory order. So the net effect of the non obstante clause in s. 11 is to widen the remedy available under the Code. On the view taken by  this Court  in South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum and another, the phrase "notwithstanding  anything in the Code" is equivalent to saying  that inspite of the provisions of the Code, s. 11 shall prevail, in so far as the right of the aggrieved party to obtain  redress of  its grievance  against any  judgment, sentence or  order (not  being an  interlocutory  order)  is concerned.      Sub-section (2)  of s.  11 of  the Act does not provide anything which  may detract  from the view I have expressed, for all  that it  says is that except as mentioned in sub-s. (1), no  appeal or  revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence  or order of a Special Court. As has been stated, s.  372 of  the Code  is equally  emphatic  that  no appeal shall  lie from  any judgment  or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for the time  being in  force; and  it will be recalled that the exercise of  the revisional jurisdiction under s. 397 of the Code is  entirely in  the discretion  of the superior courts mentioned in  that section,  with the further prohibition in sub-s. (2)  thereof that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in  relation to  an interlocutory  order. So while under the  Code two  correctional remedies  are open  to the aggrieved party-one by way of an appeal and the other by way of a  petition for revision which however is a remedy within the discretion  of the  High Court  or the  Sessions  Judge- section 11 of the Act makes any and every judgment, sentence or order  appealable so  long as  the order  is  not  of  an interlocutory nature.  In respect of an interlocutory order, however,  no   remedy  by  way  of  appeal  or  revision  is permissible under the Code, and the position in that respect is not  worse under  s. 11  of the  Act. The right of appeal under s.  11 is  therefore  wider  than  the  appellate  and revisional remedies provided by the Code. 449      What then  has happened  in this  case  ?  The  Central Government has  made a  declaration under s. 5(1) of the Act that the  offence alleged  to have  been  committed  by  the accused ought  to be  dealt  with  under  the  Act.  It  has designated, under  s. 6,  Special Court No. 1, New Delhi, to be the  court where the prosecution for the offence shall be instituted, and  it is  not disputed  that  that  court  has acquired the jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence in respect  of which  the declaration  has been  made.  That court, as  has been  stated, is  required to try the case by following the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of a  warrant case before a magistrate. The accused appeared before the  Judge of  the Special Court, and it has not been disputed before  us that  the Judge  followed the  procedure laid down  for cases  instituted  on  a  police  report.  He accordingly satisfied  himself, as required by s. 238 of the Code, that  he had  complied with  the provisions  of s. 207 which require  the supply  to the  accused of  a copy of the police report  and  the  other  documents  i.e.,  the  first information report,  statements recorded  under s. 161(3) of all persons  whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, the  confessions and statements (if any) recorded under s.  164 and  any other  document or  relevant  extract thereof forwarded  with the  police report  under s. 173(5). All the  relevant record  was thus available to the Court as well as  the accused, and under s. 239 of the Act it was the duty of  the Judge  to consider  it. He had also to consider

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whether, looking to the nature of the case and the aforesaid evidence, it  was necessary  for him to examine the accused. We are  told that the Judge did not consider it necessary to examine the  accused. He therefore heard the prosecution and the accused  as required  by s. 239, and we take it that, in view of  the contents  of the  impugned order,  he  did  not consider the  charge against  the accused to be "groundless" and there  was no occasion for him to record the reasons for his discharge. On the other hand, he formed the opinion that there  was   ground  for  presuming  that  the  accused  had committed an  offence triable  as  a  warrant-case,  and  he ordered the  framing of  a charge  or charges against him in writing. It  is hardly necessary to say that all this had to be done  objectively, and  the Judge  must have  done so. He thus reached  the conclusion  that the  charge  against  the accused was  not  groundless,  that  he  was  therefore  not entitled to  an order of discharge, that, on the other hand, there was  ground for  presuming that  he had  committed the offence or  offences triable by him, that he should frame in writing a  charge against  him for  that  offence,  that  he should read  out and explain the charge to the accused, that he should ask him whether he pleads guilty to the offence 450 or claims  to be  tried, that  he should record the plea and convict the  accused if  he pleads  guilty or fix a date for the  examination   of  witnesses  and  proceed  to  try  him according to  the other  procedure provided by the Code. The decision which  the Judge  took in making the impugned order thus clearly  dealt with  at least  one important  stage and aspect of the case against the accused finally, and once for all. That  order clearly  put him to a full course of trial, and there  is no reason why it should not be treated as "any order" against which he is entitled to appeal under s. 11 of the Act  and why  it should  be considered  to be  a  merely interlocutory order. It cannot be gainsaid that the position of an  accused against  whom an  order has been made for the framing of  a charge  for the commission of serious offences like those  referred to  in the impugned order, is far worse than that  of a  person against  whom no such order has been made and  who is  looking forward  to an order of discharge, for, in  so far  as he  is concerned,  his argument that the charge against  him is  groundless has not been rejected and he has  the expectation  that he will not be put on trial at all.      Reference in  this connection  may be  made to  Century Spinning and  Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra where it has been held by this Court that an order framing a charge against  the accused  "does substantially  affect the person’s  liberty".  The  gravity  of  the  charge  and  the responsibility of the court in that respect have been stated as follows in that case,-           "The argument  that the  Court  at  the  stage  of      framing the  charge has  not to apply its judicial mind      for considering  whether or  not there  is a ground for      presuming the  commission of the offence by the accused      is not  supportable either on the plain language of the      section or  on its  judicial interpretation  or on  any      other recognised  principle of  law. The  order framing      the  charge  does  substantially  affect  the  person’s      liberty and  it is not possible to countenance the view      that the  Court must  automatically  frame  the  charge      merely because  the prosecuting authorities, by relying      on the  documents referred  to in Section 173, consider      it proper  to institute the case. The responsibility of      framing the  charges is that of the Court and it has to

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    judicially consider the question of doing so."      Reference may  also be made to this Court’s decision in Munniswamy to  which, as  has been  stated, one  of us was a party. 451 There Chandrachud J., as he than was, while speaking for the Court, followed  the view  expressed in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company  (supra) and reiterated the importance of an  order framing  a charge with reference to the liberty of the accused as follows,-           "As observed in the latter case, the order framing      a charge  affects a  person’s liberty substantially and      therefore it  is the  duty of  the  court  to  consider      judicially whether the material warrants the framing of      the charge."      It is  therefore the  view of  this Court and, if I may say so,  rightly that  an order framing a charge is of great importance to  the accused  for it substantially affects his liberty. I  am in  fact unable to think that it is merely an interlocutory order  and is not open to correction by appeal under s.  11 of the Act. It has to be appreciated that it is permissible for  the accused  not to  plead  guilty  to  the charge and  claim that  he should be tried for it. And if he does so,  he has to undergo the full procedure for the trial and there is no reason why he should not be heard to say, in his appeal  under s.  11 of the Act, that the charge against him is  wholly groundless  and he is entitled to an order of discharge straightaway.      An attempt  was made  to argue  that the impugned order should be held to be interlocutory because it was no less an authority  than   the  Central  Government  which  made  the declaration referred to in s. 5(1) of the Act on framing the opinion  that   there  was   prima  facie  evidence  of  the commission of  the offence  by the accused, and the impugned order was  made by  no less  a Court than the Special Court. The argument  does not deserve any serious consideration for as is  well known, there are many decisions in which no such importance has  been attached  to  sanctions  given  by  the Central  Government   under  s.   197  Cr.  P.  C.  for  the prosecution of  public servants,  and, as  is  equally  well known, this  Court quite often interferes with discretionary orders of  High Courts even in matters like grant or refusal of bail or temporary injunction etc.      To say  that an  appeal against  an order directing the framing of a charge against the accused should be refused on the ground  that such  an  order  is  interlocutory,  is  to misunderstand the  meaning of  an interlocutory order. After all,  the   question  whether   an  order   is  "final"   or "interlocutory" has  not to  be determined  merely from  the character of  the proceedings  in which  it is  entered, but from the character of the 452 relief granted  or refused. For instance, if i na given case a serious point of law relating to the bar of limitation, or the jurisdiction of the court, or a material irregularity in the procedure  adopted by it, and/or the framing of a wholly untenable charge,  is raised  but is rejected by an order of the court  dealing with  the case,  it does not require much argument to  hold that  it will certainly not be permissible to contend  that  such  an  order  is  interlocutory  merely because its  decision against  the accused has not concluded the case.  It will  not therefore  be permissible to contend that such  an order  is not  revisable under  the  Code,  or appealable under  s. 11  of the Act, as the case may be. The dictionary meaning  of "interlocutory"  cannot be conclusive

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of the  true nature  of an  order for, after all, you cannot make a fortress out of a dictionary.      An argument  has however  been made that we should hold the impugned  order to  be interlocutory,  for otherwise the trial of  such cases  will be held up and will be delayed by the appeals  which the  accused may  file under s. 11 of the Act as  a part  of their  dilatory  tactics,  and  the  very purpose of  passing the  Act will be defeated. That this was not the  view of  those who introduced the Bill, will appear from the  fact that  it contained  a clause  providing for a right  of  appeal,  inter  alia,  against  all  orders,  not excluding the  interlocutory orders.  That in fact continued to be  the position even when the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha. It  was not therefore the view, until after that late stage of  the Bill,  that providing  for the right of appeal against every  order (not  excluding an interlocutory order) would defeat  the purpose  of the  statute to  determine the trial of  such cases with the utmost dispatch. After all the anxiety for  the "speedy  termination" of such prosecutions, or determination  of the trial of such offences with "utmost dispatch," cannot  be allowed to interfere with the right to a fair  trial, for  that is  of  the  very  essence  of  the fundamental  right   of  protection   of  personal   liberty guaranteed by  art. 21  of the Constitution, and it has been noticed in  the ninth  paragraph of the preamble of the Act. It is  not permissible  to whittle it down on the pretext of mere expedition,  which, in  its  true  sense  and  meaning, should not be equated to a hurried trial, at the cost of the personal liberty  of the  citizen and  in derogation  to his right under  the very  special Act  under which he is put to trial as an accused out of the ordinary.      I have  no hesitation  therefore in  holding  that  the impugned order  is not  "interlocutory" and  the accused  is entitled of right to prefer the present appeal. 453      DESAI, J.-While I concur in the final order proposed by Fazal Ali  J. this  separate opinion has become a compelling necessity to  focus attention  on the central issue avoiding the unnecessary side issues.      A preliminary  objection was  raised on  behalf of  the respondent urging that in view of the provision contained in section 11  (1) of  the Special  Courts Act,  1979 (Act  for short), the  present appeal  which is  directed  against  an order framing  charge by  the Judge  presiding over  Special Court No.  1 set  up under  the  Act,  the  order  being  an interlocutory order, is incompetent. The question that needs to be  answered is:  whether framing  of charge  in a  trial conducted according to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant case  filed on  a police  report is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec. 11 (1) of the Act. If it is an interlocutory  order, it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  the present appeal would be incompetent.      Section 11 may be extracted:      11. (1)   Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code,  an                appeal  shall   lie  as  of  right  from  any                judgment,  sentence   or  order   not   being                interlocutory order,  of a  Special Court  to                the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.           (2)  Except as  aforesaid, no  appeal or  revision                shall lie  to any  court from  any  judgment,                sentence or order of a Special Court.           (3)  Every appeal  under  this  section  shall  be                preferred within a period of thirty days from                the date  of any  judgment, sentence or order                of a Special Court:

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         Provided that  the Supreme Court may entertain any      appeal after  the expiry  of the  said period of thirty      days  if   it  is  satisfied  that  the  appellant  had      sufficient cause  for not  preferring the appeal within      the period of thirty days.      Section 11(1)  starts with  a non-obstante  clause.  In order to  arrive at  the true  import, the content-the width and  breadth   of  appellate   jurisdiction,  it   would  be advantageous  to   exclude  the   non-obstante  clause   and ascertain what  has been  provided for  by  the  substantive provision contained  in Section 11(1). Obliterating the non- obstante clause and shorn of it, Section 11 (1) provides for an appeal  from any  judgment, sentence  or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law and this appeal lies as a matter of right. The expression ’not being interlocutory order’ carves out from  the orders  made appealable  under the  section  a class or  category of  orders which would not be appealable. In other  words, an  order which  if it  can be styled as an interlocutory order  made by a Special Court in a proceeding before it, no appeal would lie against it 454 to the  Supreme Court. This becomes clear from the provision in sub-section  (2) which  in terms  provides that except as otherwise provided  in sub-section  11  (1),  no  appeal  or revision would  lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order  of a  Special  Court.  The  substantive  provision contained in  Section 11(1)  provides for an appeal from any judgment, sentence  or order, not being interlocutory order, as a  matter of  right, to  this court  both on facts and on law.      It is,  therefore,  necessary  to  ascertain  the  true import of what can be styled as an interlocutory order which would not be appealable under Section 11 of the Act.      Ordinarily speaking,  the expression ’interlocutory’ in legal parlance  is understood  in contra-distinction to what is styled  as final.  In the course of a judicial proceeding before a  court, for judicially determining the main dispute brought to  the  Court  for  its  resolution,  a  number  of situations arise,  where that  court goes  on  disposing  of ancillary disputes  raised by  parties to  the proceeding by making orders  and unless  the order  finally disposes  of a proceeding in  a court, all such orders during the course of a trial  would be broadly designated ’interlocutory’ orders. Such interlocutory orders are steps, taken towards the final adjudication  and   for  assisting   the  parties   in   the prosecution of  their case  in the  pending proceeding. They regulate the  procedure only  and do not affect any right or liability of the parties (See Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand A.I.R.  1967 S.C. 799). Every such interlocutory order may, for  the time  being, dispose  of a particular point of controversy raised  in the  proceeding, yet  nonetheless the order would  be an  interlocutory order  unless by  such  an order  the   controversy  between  the  parties  is  finally disposed of.  Again, in legal parlance such an order finally disposing of  a dispute  between  the  parties  would  be  a judgment in  a civil  proceeding. In  a criminal  proceeding when either  the  accused  is  acquitted  or  convicted  and sentence is  pronounced upon,  the order would be a judgment disposing of  case before the Court trying the accused. Till this situation is reached, a number of orders may have to be made, during  the progress  of adjudication of main dispute, such orders  can appropriately  and  legally  be  styled  as ’interlocutory order’.      Where some  facet or  aspect of  a controversy  in  the

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course of  adjudication of  the  main  dispute  between  the parties is disposed of by an order but the order has not the effect of finally disposing of the dispute which the parties brought to  the court,  the order  would nonetheless  be  an interlocutory  order  and  it  would  not  cease  to  be  an interlocutory order  merely because it disposed of a certain aspect of  the controversy  between the parties. That is why in some statutes prescribing procedure 455 for trial  of cases  civil or  criminal, a provision is made that except  where   an appeal  is provided  for against  an interlocutory order,  all such interlocutory orders would be open to  question while  hearing an appeal against the final judgment  finally  disposing  of  the  dispute  between  the parties. It  is in  this sense  that the  expression  ’final order’ in section 205(1) of the Government of India Act 1935 was interpreted  by the  Federal Court  in Kuppuswami Rao v. The King. Approving the observation of Sir George Lowndes in Abdul Rahman  v. D.K.  Cassim &  Sons, it  was held that the test of  finality was  whether the order finally disposed of the rights  of the  parties. The finality must be a finality in relation  to the  suit. If  after the  order the  suit is still a live suit and the rights of the parties are still to be determined  no appeal  lies against it under section 109A of the Code. Even if the order decides an important and even a vital  issue in  the case  but it  left the suit alive and provided for  its trial  in the ordinary way, it would still not be a final order. When the question again came up before the Federal Court in Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. & others v. Dominion of India and Others, a larger, Bench of the Federal Court unanimously approved the aforementioned interpretation of the expression ’final order’ in section 205(1). The Court observed then:  "All the relevant authorities bearing on the question have  been reviewed  by this  court in their recent pronouncement in  S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, and the law on the point, so far as this court is concerned, seems to be well settled.  In full  agreement with  the decisions of the Judicial Committee  in Ram  Chand Manjimal  v.  Goverdhandas Vishindas and  Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim and Sons and the authorities  of   the  English   Courts  upon   which  these pronouncements were  based, it  has been  held by this Court that the  test for  determining the finality of an order is, whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the  parties. To quote the language of Sir George Lowndes in Abdul  Rahman v. D. K. Cassim and Sons, the finality must be a  finality in  relation to  the suit. If after the order the suit  is still  a live  suit in  which the rights of the parties have  still to be determined, no appeal lies against it. The  fact that the order decides an important and even a vital issue is by itself not material. If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but if the suit is still left alive and has got to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order." 456      In the aforementioned two decisions Salaman v. Warner , Bozson v.  Altrincham Urban  District Council  and Issac  v. Salbstein were  referred to and relied upon but it was urged that a  different note  was sounded  by Lord Halsbury in the Bozson’s case  when  he  preferred  the  view  expressed  in Shubrook  v.  Tufnell  (9  Q.B.D.  621)  and  therefore  the aforesaid two  decision particularly  approving the ratio in the case  of Ramchand  Manjimal and  Abdul Rahman  would not provide a  reliable test. It is not necessary to examine all the decisions  in detail  to find out whether there was some

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conflict in  the view  taken in the abovementioned decisions and one  taken by Lord Halsbury in view of a recent decision in Salter  Rex &  Co. v.  Ghosh wherein  Lord Denning  after examining the earlier decisions and the apparent conflict as mentioned herein  above  observed  that  the  view  of  Lord Alverstone in  Bozson’s case  was right  in logic but one of Lord Esher  in Salaman’s  case was  right in  experience and Lord Esher’s test has always been applied in practice. It is to the  effect that  the decision whichever way is given, if it finally  disposes of  the matter in dispute, it is final. While, on  the other  hand, if  the decision if given in any one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in other will allow the action to go on, it was not final but interlocutory.      It was, however, said that the test herein indicated is the one  in the  context of  the expression ’final order’ in section  205(1)  of  the  Government  of  India  Act,  which expression has been bodily retained in Articles 132, 133 and 134 of  the Constitution.  It was further said that the test that the  expression ’interlocutory  order’ has to be under- stood in  contra-distinction to the expression ’final order’ has not  been subsequently  accepted by  this Court,  but in fact it  has been  departed from  and, therefore,  the later decisions  specifically  rendered  in  the  context  of  the expression ’interlocutory  order’ as  used in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would hold the field.      In Amar  Nath &  Ors. v.  State of  Haryana &  Ors. the matter came  before this  Court  against  an  order  of  the Magistrate issuing  summons upon  a complaint  filed by  the complainant which  the High  Court declined  to quash  in  a petition filed  by the accused under sections 482 and 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Code for short). The contention was  that  the  Magistrate  had  issued  the  summons  in  a mechanical manner  without applying his judicial mind to the facts of the case. The 457 High Court  dismissed the  petition in limini and refused to entertain it  on  the  ground  that  as  the  order  of  the Magistrate dated  November 15,  1976  was  an  interlocutory order, a  revision to  the High  Court was  barred  by  sub- section (2)  of sec. 397 of the 1973 Code. The learned Judge further held  that as  the revision  was barred,  the  Court could not  take up the case under Sec. 482 in order to quash the very  order of  the Judicial Magistrate. The observation of  this  Court  which  was  the  subject  matter  of  rival interpretation may be extracted: "The  order   of  the   Judicial  Magistrate  summoning  the appellants  in   the  circumstances  of  the  present  case, particularly  having   regard  to  what  had  preceded,  was undoubtedly a  matter of moment, and a valuable right of the appellants had  been taken  away by the Magistrate’s passing an  order  prima  facie  in  a  mechanical  fashion  without applying his  mind. We  are, therefore,  satisfied that  the order impugned  was one  which was  a matter  of moment  and which did  involve a  decision regarding  the rights  of the appellants. If  the appellants  were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to  face a  trial without  proper application  of mind cannot  be held  to be  an interlocutory matter but one which decided  a serious  question as  to the  rights of the appellants to be put on trial."      The test  formulated by  the Court  was that  any order which substantially  affects the  right of  the  accused  or decides certain  rights of  the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory  order. The fact that the controversy still

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remains alive  was considered  irrelevant. The  attention of the Court  was not  drawn to  either  Kuppuswamy’s  case  or Mohammad Amin Brothers’ case. In fact, the Court relied upon Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat.      The ratio  of Mohan  Lal’s case has to be understood in the light  of the  proceeding from  which the matter came to this Court.  A Judicial Magistrate had made an inquiry under S. 446  of 1898  Code against appellant Mohan Lal whether it was expedient in the interest of justice to file a complaint against him  for impersonation and false identification of a surety in  a criminal  case. This  has to  be a separate and independent proceeding  started by the Court suo moto as the offence appeared  to be  committed in relation to a criminal proceeding in  a Court.  No one  except the  court in such a situation has  locus standi  to file a complaint which could be filed by the court, but before such a complaint was filed it was  necessary to hold an inquiry to ascertain whether it was expedient  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  file  the complaint. A party 458 against whom  a complaint  is ordered  to  be  filed  has  a statutory right  of appeal. The Judicial Magistrate directed a complaint .......... to be filed and this order was upheld by the  Addl. Sessions  Judge in appeal. Appellant Mohan Lal preferred a  revision petition  which was  dismissed by  the High Court  and when  he prayed for a certificate under Art. 134,  a   question  arose  whether  the  order  directing  a complaint to  be filed  was a  final order  or interlocutory order for  the purpose  of Art.  134 which  provides for  an appeal to  this Court in a criminal proceeding. It is in the background of  these facts  that this  Court  approving  the ratio in  Kuppuswamy Rao’s  case and Mohammad Amin Brothers’ case,  held   that  an   interlocutory  order,   though  not conclusive of  the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter  with which  it deals. If the decision on issue puts  an end  to the  suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still alive and yet to be tried in the  ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order. On behalf of the appellant it was said that Mohan Lal’s case is an  authority for  the proposition  that an interlocutory order, though  not conclusive  of the  main dispute,  may be conclusive as  to the subordinate matter with which it deals and such  an order  could not be said to be an interlocutory order. This observation has to be read in the context of the controversy in  that case  especially in  the context of two independent proceedings one leading to filing of a complaint which will  be over  when complaint  is  filed  and  another independent one  of a  trial upon the complaint so filed. At any rate,  a proceeding  before the  Magistrate commenced to find out  whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to  file   a  complaint  concludes  finally  when  an  order directing the  complaint to be filed is made and the statute provides for  an appeal  against such  an order.  After  the complaint is  filed, it  cannot be  urged that the complaint ought not  to have  been filed. The complaint would be tried in  an   ordinary  way.   Therefore,  the  first  proceeding independent by itself, came to a final end and it is in this sense that the order was held final by this Court.      Now, in  Amar Nath’s  case the  Magistrate  directed  a summon to  be issued  on a  private complaint thereby taking cognizance of  the case.  The case  had a  zig zag  journey. Earlier the  Magistrate had  declined to take cognizance and dismissed  the   complaint.  As  far  as  the  accused  were concerned, the  matter came  to an  end. After the remand by the Sessions  Judge in  a revision  application filed by the

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complainant, the  Magistrate directed  to issue the summons. In a way, the proceeding was reopened. It is in this context that the Court held the order not to be interlocutory within the meaning  of Sec.  397 of the Code. What particular order was treated final in this case is hardly relevant. The 459 test to  determine  the  nature  of  order-interlocutory  or final-is binding  unless departed  from. The test formulated by the  Court is  extracted hereinbefore. Accepting the test without demur  for the time being, though it runs counter to the decision  in S. Kuppuswami and Mohmad Amin Brothers Ltd. cases, it  may be  determined whether  framing of  a  charge under Sec. 239 of the Code is a matter of moment and whether it disposes  of any vital aspect of the case so as not to be interlocutory.      In Madhu  Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra this Court was concerned  with a  question whether an order repelling a challenge to  the jurisdiction  of the  court was an interim order not  amenable to  the revisional  jurisdiction of  the High Court  under section  397. There  is some dispute as to what was  the order challenged before the High Court in this case. The  Public Prosecutor  filed a complaint in the court of the  Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, complaining that the accused Madhu  Limaye  was  guilty  of  defamation  of  Shri Antulay, the  then Law  Minister of  Maharashtra, punishable under section  500 of  the Indian  Penal Code. The complaint was  filed   after  the   Government  granted   sanction  in accordance with Sec. 199(4) (a) of the Code as it was of the view that  the Law  Minister was  defamed in  respect of his conduct in  the discharge of his public functions. After the Chief Secretary  to the  Government of  Maharashtra      was examined as  a witness in the Sessions Court, an application was filed  on behalf of the accused to dismiss the complaint on  the  ground  that  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  to entertain the complaint. It must be made clear at this stage that a  complaint by the person defamed alone for an offence of defamation is maintainable and is triable by the Judicial Magistrate or  the Metropolitan  Magistrate as  the case may be, and  the Sessions  Judge is  not the  court of  original jurisdiction   for   entertaining   a   complaint   alleging defamation punishable u/s 500 I.P.C. However, in view of the provisions  contained   in  Sec.   199(2),  jurisdiction  is conferred upon  the Sessions Judge to take cognizance of the offence  of  defamation  if  it  is  alleged  to  have  been committed against a person who amongst others at the time of commission was  a Minister  of the  State and was defamed in discharge of his public function if the complaint in writing is made by the Public Prosecutor after obtaining sanction of the State Government. The application given by accused Madhu Limaye was that the Court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to entertain the  complaint presented  by the Public Prosecutor because the  allegations were made against Shri Antulay, the then Law  Minister, were  in relation to what he had done in his personal capacity and not in his capacity of discharging his public  functions as a Law Minister. It must, therefore, be clearly 460 borne in  mind that the challenge was to the jurisdiction of the Court  to entertain  the complaint.  This will  also  be clear from  what is  stated in the judgment at page 751 that chiefly on  the aforementioned ground and some other ground, the jurisdiction  of the Court to proceed with the trial was challenged  by   the  appellant.  The  Court  negatived  the challenge and  framed  the  charges.  Accused  Madhu  Limaye preferred a  revision petition  in the  High Court which was

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dismissed, observing that the order sought to be revised was an  interlocutory  order  not  amenable  to  the  revisional jurisdiction u/s 397 (1) of the Code. Against the refusal of the High Court to entertain the petition, the matter came to this Court.  It is, therefore, incorrect to contend that the decision in  Madhu Limaye’s  case is  an authority  for  the proposition  that   framing  of   the  charge   is  not   an interlocutory order  but it is such an intermediate order as not to  fall within  the ambit of interlocutory order. There was no  challenge to the framing of the charge but there was a challenge  to the  jurisdiction of  the Court to entertain the complaint.  Now, where  a  challenge  is  to  the  Court entertaining the  complaint, the  decision on  the  question will go  to the  root of  the  matter  inasmuch  as  if  the challenge is  accepted, the complaint must fail. That again, however, is  not the test of the order being something other than an  interlocutory  order.  Undoubtedly,  affirming  the ratio in  Amar Nath’s  case, this  Court observed  that  the order may  be neither  an interlocutory  order nor final but may be  an intermediate  order. In trying to illustrate what can be  an intermediate order, it was illustrated that where a defendant  raises a  plea before a particular court to try the suit  or bar of limitation and succeeds, then the action is determined  finally in  that court;  but if  the point is decided against  him, the  suit proceeds. The order deciding such a  point may  not be  interlocutory yet  it may  not be final either.  For the  purpose of Sec. 115 of the C.P.C. it will be a case decided. Then the Court observed as under:      "We think it would be just and proper to apply the same kind of  test for  finding  out  the  real  meaning  of  the expression ’interlocutory order’ occurring in Sec. 397(2)".      This Court  by process  of judicial  activism putting a pragmatic  interpretation   on  the   word   "interlocutory" occurring  in   section  397(2)   provided  for  a  judicial supervisory umbrella  over subordinate  courts. However, the decision is  not  an  authority  for  the  proposition  that framing of a charge by itself is not an interlocutory order.      The last  case in  this context  to which attention was drawn is  Parmeshwari Devi  v. State  & Anr.  In that case a complaint was 461 filed on  behalf of  Parmeshwari Devi  against three persons accusing them  of committing  offences u/ss  182, 193,  197, 199, 200,  465, 466 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. In the course of  the trial  complainant made an application to the Court u/s  94 of  the Code  of 1898  for a  direction to the accused  to   file  the  original  deed  of  dissolution  of partnership, an  attested copy of which was filed by accused No. 2  in the court. The accused contended that the original was not  in  their  possession.  The  court  made  an  order summoning Smt.  Parmeshwari Devi  to appear before the court with the  document. She  contended before the court that she did not  know anything about the document and that she was a purdahnashin  lady  living  in  Calcutta  and  need  not  be summoned in  the court. Her request was rejected and she was directed to  forthwith attend  the  court  and  produce  the document if  it is  in her possession. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi moved an  application for revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge and  then before  the High  Court, both  of which were rejected. In  her appeal  to this  court  a  contention  was raised that the order of the Magistrate was an interlocutory order and  the power of revision conferred by sub-sec (1) of Sec. 397  of the  Code could not be exercised in relation to it by  virtue of  sub-section (2).  This Court  allowing the appeal held  that ’the  Code did not define an interlocutory

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order but obviously it is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary  stages of  inquiry or trial. The purpose of sub-section (2) of Sec. 397 is to keep such an order outside the purview  of power  of the  revision so that the trial or inquiry may  proceed without  delay. This  is not  likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due  course if  the final  order goes  against it. But it does not  follow that  if the  order is  directed against  a person who  is not  a party  to the inquiry or trial, and he will have no opportunity to challenge it after a final order is made affecting the parties concerned, he cannot apply for its  revision  even  if  it  is  directed  against  him  and adversely affects  his rights’. After referring to Mohan Lal Thacker’s case,  it was  held that the order under challenge adversely affected  the appellant who was not a party to the inquiry or  trial as  it was solely directed against her and she would not have opportunity to challenge it after a final order is  made because  such a  belated challenge would have been purposeless  for it  would have given her no relief. It is in  this context that the Court held that the order under appeal was  not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec. 397(2) of the Code.      Can  it   be  said   that  the   tests  formulated   in Kuppuswamy’s case  and Mohammad Amin’s case have been either over-ruled or  departed from  in the  last  mentioned  three cases. As has been held in Madhu 462 Limaye’s  case   ordinarily  and  generally  the  expression ’interlocutory order’  has been understood and taken to mean as a  converse of  the term ’final order’. This statement of law in  terms approves and affirms the ratio of Kuppuswamy’s case and  Mohammad Amin  Brothers’ case.  But undoubtedly in the context  of s. 397(2) read with s. 482 of the Code, this Court with a view to providing a judicial umbrella of active supervision for  reaching possible  correctible injustice by activist attitude and pragmatic interpretation found a third class  of   orders  neither   interlocutory  nor  final  but intermediate and  therefore outside  the bar of s. 397(2) of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  But  the  test  remains unaltered that  every interlocutory  order merely because it disposes of an aspect, nay a vital aspect in the course of a pending proceeding  even adversely affecting a party for the time being  would not be something other than interlocutory. To be specific the earlier test is not departed from but the power of supervision sought to be constricted was widened by ascertaining a  third class  of orders, namely, intermediate orders which are neither interlocutory nor final.      Having said  this can  it be  said that  framing  of  a charge is  an order  which would  be  something  other  than interlocutory. For  that purpose, it is necessary to keep in view the  procedure prescribed  for trial  of warrant  cases instituted on  a police  report as  contained in  Part A  of Chapter XIX  of the  Code. Sec.  238 provides that when in a warrant case  instituted on  a police  report,  the  accused appears  or   is  brought   before  a   Magistrate  at   the commencement of  the trial,  the  Magistrate  shall  satisfy himself that  he has  complied with the provisions of s. 207 which casts  an obligation  on the  Magistrate to furnish to the accused,  free of  cost, copies  of the document therein set out. This is to be done at the commencement of the trial which would  mean that  when this  statutory duty cast by s. 207 is performed by the Magistrate, the trial commences. The trial cannot  commence unless  the accused is furnished with copies of  requisite documents.  And the duty is cast on the Magistrate to  ascertain at  the commencement  of the  trial

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that s.  207 is complied with and if it is not done, as part of trial  furnish the requisite copies. Then follow Sections 239 and  240. Under sec. 239 the court after considering the police report  and the  accompanying documents  submitted to the court  u/s 173  and after giving the prosecution and the accused an  opportunity of  being heard if the Magistrate is of the  opinion that  the  charge  against  the  accused  is groundless, he  must discharge  the accused  by  a  speaking reasoned order.  If on  the other hand after proceeding with the trial  as prescribed  in s. 239, if the Magistrate is of the opinion  that there  is ground  for presuming  that  the accused has  committed an  offence triable under Chapter XIX which 463 such Magistrate is competent to try and which in his opinion could be  adequately punished  by him,  he  shall  frame  in writing a  charge against  the accused.  This is  to be done after  the   trial  commences   at  the  stage  of  s.  238. Indisputably, therefore,  it is  an order made in the course of proceeding conducted according to procedure prescribed in Chapter  XIX.   Without  anything   more  it   would  be  an interlocutory order.      The contention  is that framing of a charge is a matter of moment  and of such vital importance that it concludes an inquiry anterior to the framing of the charge and that it is a matter  of  moment  which  is  likely  to  result  in  the deprivation of  the liberty  of the  accused because  he  is asked to  face  the  trial.  There  are  two  limbs  of  the submission and both may be separately examined.      What is the purpose or object in framing a charge ?      When the  accused is  brought before  a  court,  he  is supplied with  copies of  documents referred  to in  s. 207. Now, these documents may contain a number of matters and the accused  may  be  at  large  as  to  what  is  the  specific accusation, he  is  supposed  to  meet.  Charge  serves  the purpose of  notice or  intimation to  the accused,  drawn up according to  specific language  of law,  giving  clear  and unambiguous or  precise notice  of the  nature of accusation that the  accused is  called upon to meet in the course of a trial. Sec.  217 clearly  prescribes what  the charge should contain and a bare reading of it would show that the accused must be  told in  clear and unambiguous terms allegations of facts  constituting  the  offence,  the  law  which  creates offence with  a specific  name if  given to  it. The section which is  alleged to be violated with the name of the law in which it  is contained.  The fact that the charge is made is equivalent  to   a  statement  that  every  legal  condition required by  law  to  constitute  the  offence  charged  was fulfilled in  the particular  case. It is thus an intimation or notice  to the  accused of  what precise  offence or what allegations of  facts he  is called upon to meet. The object of a  charge is  to warn an accused person of the case he is to answer.  It cannot  be treated  as if  it was a part of a ceremonial. (See  B. N.  Srikantiah &  Ors. v.  The State of Mysore. If  this be  the purpose of the charge, reference to the provisions  contained in  Chapter XVII as to the various forms and  modes of  framing a  charge or joinder of charges and joinder  of persons  to be tried at one trial are beside the point.  The importance of framing the charge need not be overemphasised and that this should be shunned becomes appa- 464 rent from  the observations  of Bose J. in William Elaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh which reads as under:-      "We see no reason for straining at the meaning of these plain and  emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to

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be regarded  as of  the essence  in criminal  trials. We are unable to find any magic or charm in the ritual of a charge. It is  the substance  of these provisions that count and not their outward  form. To  hold otherwise  is only  to provide avenues of escape for the guilty and afford no protection to the innocent."      It was,  however, said  that framing  of a  charge is a matter of  moment as has been held by this Court in State of Karnataka v.  L. Muni  Swami & Ors. and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and therefore the order  framing the charge would be an intermediate order and  not  an  interlocutory  order.  These  two  cases  only emphasize the  application of  judicial mind by the court at the stage of framing the charge. The question never arose in these two  cases about the nature and character of the order framing the  charge. In  a criminal trial or for that matter in any  judicial proceeding,  there is no stage at which the court can  mechanically dispose of the proceeding. An active judicial mind  must always  operate at  every stage  of  the proceeding because  any stage of it if mechanically disposed of may  cause an  irreparable harm. To wit a rejection of an application for  summoning witnesses  may shut out the whole case, even a rejection of an application for adjournment may cause irremediable harm. Therefore, in the course of a trial of a  civil or  criminal  proceeding,  it  is  difficult  to conceive of  a stage  where an  order can  be  made  without bringing to  bear on  the subject  an active  judicial  mind judicially determining  the dispute.  Any  such  dispute  if mechanically  disposed   of  may  warrant  an  interference. Therefore, emphasis  was laid  on the  court expecting it to seriously apply its mind at the stage of framing the charge. It does not make the order framing the charge anything other than an  interlocutory order. There is no decision since the Code of  1974 is in operation, which introduced a concept of commencement of  trial at  the stage  anterior to framing of charge and,  eliminating an inquiry before the charge as was the requirement  prior to the amendment of 1891 Code in 1955 which would  show that  Court has  treated order framing the charge other  than interlocutory. However, reference in this context was made to a decision 465 of a  Full Bench  of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in State v.  Ghani   Bandar  wherein  the  Court  after  exhaustively examining various decisions of different High Courts bearing on the  subject came  to the  conclusion that on framing the charge  the  inquiry  anterior  to  trial  of  the  case  is concluded. Let  it be  recalled that the decision is under a Code which  prescribed examination  of  witnesses  prior  to framing the  charge and the word ’trial’ was defined to mean the proceeding  taken under the Code after a charge has been drawn up  and included  a punishment  of the  offender.  The procedure is  wholly omitted  in the  Code of  1974 and  the stage of commencement of trial is specifically demarcated in sec. 238  and therefore  this decision  would not render any assistance in  deciding the  point under  discussion. Merely because emphasis is laid on the court seriously applying its judicial mind at the stage of framing charge, and therefore, it can  be said  to be an important stage, the order framing the charge  even after  applying  the  ratio  of  the  later decisions would  not be an order other than an interlocutory order. It would unquestionably be an interlocutory order.      If framing  of a  charges  is  an  interlocutory  order excluding  the  non-obstante  clause,  no  appeal  would  be against such  an order  u/s 11  because there  is a specific provision in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 11 that except as provided

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in sec.  11(1) no  appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any  judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. It is a  well settled  proposition of  law  that  there  is  no inherent or  common law right of appeal in a subject and the appeal is the creature of statute and therefore the right to appeal can  only be  enjoyed within  the strictly demarcated limits conferring  such right  of appeal. (See Shankar Karba Jadhav &  Ors. v.  State of  Maharashtra.  The  order  under challenge being one passed by the Special Court set up under the Act,  an  appeal  from  such  an  order  would  only  be competent if  it  squarely  falls  within  sec.  11(1).  The controversy is  not that an appeal would lie even against an interlocutory order,  but the  contention is  that the order framing charge  is not  an interlocutory  order  within  the meaning of  sec. 11(1).  Therefore, there  is no gain-saying the fact  that if the order sought to be appealed against is an interlocutory  order, excluding  the non-obstante clause, by the  main provision  of sec.  11(1), the  present  appeal would be incompetent.      On behalf  of the  appellant it  was contended that the non-obstante clause  enlarges the  scope of  appeal while on behalf of  the respondent,  it was  urged that  non-obstante clause excludes the operation of the 466 Code with  reference to  the provision of the appeals in the Code and  provides  for  an  appeal  as  fossilised  in  the substantive provision of s. 11(1).      What is  the effect  of non-obstante  clause is no more res integra.  In fact,  in Aswini  Kumar  Ghosh  &  Anr.  v. Arabinda Bose & Anr., it was observed:           "It should  first be ascertained what the enacting      part of  the section provides on a fair construction of      the words  used according to their natural and ordinary      meaning,  and   the  non   obstante  clause  is  to  be      understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid      anything contained  in relevant  existing laws which is      inconsistent with the new enactment."      Applying  this   test,  it   would  appear   that   the substantive provision  of s.  11(1) while  providing for  an appeal against  any judgment,  sentence or  order made  by a Special Court, circumscribed the right to appeal against the orders by excluding therefrom orders which are interlocutory orders. If  this is  the substantive  provision in s. 11(1), the question is whether the non-obstante clause enlarges the provision or  restricts it with reference to the substantive provision of  appeals in the Code itself. It is necessary to bear in  mind at  this stage  a fundamental fact. Unlike the provision contained  in Order  XLVII of  the Code  of  Civil Procedure, there  is no  provision in  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, either  the present or the earlier one which ever provided for any appeal against any interlocutory order. The very concept of an appeal against an interlocutory order was wholly foreign  to the  Code of Criminal Procedure. There is an  understandable   difference  between  an  appeal  and  a revision. Till the prohibition contained in s. 397(4) of the Code was  enacted for  the first  time, interlocutory orders were amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court  or   the  High  Court  under  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure. But  the notion  or idea  of an appeal against an interlocutory order  in  any  Criminal  Procedure  Code  was foreign to  the Criminal  Jurisprudence.  If  this  was  the statutory position  at the  time of enactment of the Act, it would be  interesting to  find out  whether  the  Parliament wanted to  make a  redical departure  by providing an appeal against every interlocutory order-a term which is wider than

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even an intermediate order as spelt out in the cases of Amar Nath and  Madhu Limaye,  by incorporating  the  non-obstante clause with  a view  to widening  the substantive  provision contained in  s. 11(1).  If  such  was  the  object  of  the Parliament there was no necessity of cutting 467 down  the   operation  of  the  word  ’order’  by  excluding therefrom interlocutory orders. Again, when the non-obstante clause provides  for ’notwithstanding  anything in the Code’ the expression  as per  grammatical construction  would mean that something contained in the Code is to be excluded while examining the scope and content of the substantive provision of s. 11(1). However, there is nothing in the Code providing for an appeal against an interlocutory order. While enacting the  Act,  the  Parliament  was  conscious  of  appeals  and revisions under  the Code  and that  is  manifest  from  the language incorporated  in sub-section  2 of  Sec. 11  of the Act. Now,  if there  was no  provision in the Code providing for  an  appeal  against  any  interlocutory  order  in  any proceeding  under   the  Code,   it  is  inconceivable  that excluding that  non-existent provision  a wider jurisdiction of appeal  was sought  to be  enacted under  the substantive provision of s. 11(1).      Before concluding on the question of construction it is necessary also  to bear  in mind the purpose behind enacting the Special  Courts Act. The preamble of the Act consists of 9 paragraphs.  It inter  alia  provides  that  the  ordinary criminal courts  due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a  speedy   termination  and  that  commission  of  offences referred to  in the  various recitals in the preamble should be judicially  determined  with  the  utmost  dispatch,  the Parliament enacted  the Act.  If this  was  the  object  and motive and  purpose in enacting the Act, the construction of its provisions  must receive  such interpretation  as  would facilitate the  achievement of  the object underlying it and not frustrate  it. If the object was speedy determination of cases with  utmost dispatch,  it would  stand  thwarted,  if against every  interlocutory order,  and they  can be plenty and galore,  an appeal  to the  highest court as a matter of right both on law and fact can be filed. In this connection, it is  better to  bear in mind the observation of this court (In Re  The Special  Courts Bill,  1978)- that the paramount object and  purpose of  the Act  is  the  trial  of  persons proceeded against  under the  Act should  be concluded  with utmost dispatch.  Speedy termination  of prosecutions is the heart and  soul of the Act. The provisions of the Act should therefore receive  such construction  as would  advance  the object for  which the  Act is  enacted and  not stultify  or frustrate  the   same.  This   is  a  well  known  canon  of constriction and need not be embellished by any authority.      It was,  however, said  on behalf of the appellant that by denying the accused a trial by ordinary courts a right to challenge an intermediate order by revision is denied to him and therefore in order to 468 obviate any unfairness in procedure guaranteed by Art. 21 as interpreted  in   Maneka  Gandhi   v.  Union  of  India  the expression  ’interlocutory   order’  should   receive   such construction as  would enable  the appellant not to feel the tinge of  denial of  opportunity to  seek correction  of  an order by  a revision  petition by  enabling him  to file  an appeal  u/s  11(1).  This  alleged  apparent  unfairness  in procedure is  utterly unreal  because here the trial is by a sitting Judge  of the  High Court  to be  appointed with the

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concurrence of  the Chief  Justice of  India. Such  a highly placed judicial mind will pass interlocutory orders which as stated earlier  are steps leading towards final adjudication of the  dispute and  that  the  absence  of  any  revisional jurisdiction may  hardly introduce  any  unfairness  in  the procedure. However it must not be forgotten that the Special Court would  always be  amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 and Art. 136 permits a challenge to any order interlocutory or final of any court or tribunal in the territory of  India with  the special  leave of  this court. Therefore, there  is no  substance in the contention that in narrowly interpreting  the expression  ’interlocutory order’ in Sec.  11(1), door may not be thrown open for introduction of a  procedure possibly  lacking in  fairness and likely to result in deprivation of personal liberty.      In view  of the  conclusion that  the order  framing  a charge is  an interlocutory  order within  the meaning of s. 11(1), the  appeal against  such an  order is incompetent in view of  the provision  contained in s. 11(2), and therefore the preliminary  objection must  be upheld and the appeal is dismissed.                          O R D E R      In accordance  with the  opinion of  the  majority  the appeal is dismissed. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 469