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PETITIONER: V.C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, COIMBATORE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/02/1957

BENCH:

ACT: Road  Transport-Permit for stage carriage-Rerewal-Whether  a continuation  of  the  original  Permit-Whether  subject  to implied  condition of validity of the original  Permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV Of 1939), ss. 57, 58.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage by the Regional  Transport  Authority under the provisions  of  the Motor  Vehicles  Act, 1939, but on appeal to  the  appellate authority,   the   Central  Road  Traffic  Board,   by   the unsuccessful  applicants the order granting the  permit  was set  aside and the order of the Central Road  Traffic  Board was approved by the Government in revision.  The  appellant, thereupon, moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari  to quash the proceedings of the Central Road Traffic Board  and the  Goverment.   During the pendency of  these  proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside the grant  of the permit to the Appellant, with the result  that be   continued   to  run  his  buses   notwithstanding   the cancellation of his permit.  Before the expiry of the period fixed in the original 664 permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit  from the  Regional  Transport Authority under s. 58 of  the  Act. The High  Court finally dismissed the application for a writ of certiorari and ’the question arose as to the validity  of the  renewal  of  the permit in view  of  the  High  Court’s decision.  The matter was raised before the High Court  once again by proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution  and the High Court held that the renewal having been obtained on the basis of a permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it  could not be regarded as a fresh permit, that  when  the original  permit was set aside, it must be taken to  be  non est for all purposes, and I that the renewal must  therefore be  held  to be a nullity.  The appellant  appealed  to  the Supreme Court. Held:(1)  Under  the provisions of the Motor  Vehicles  Act, 1949  and  the  rules  framed thereunder,  a  renewal  is  a continuation  of  the original permit.   When  the  original permit was renewed in favour of the appellant it was subject to  the decision of the High Court in the proceedings  under Art.  226 of the Constitution which were then  pending  and, therefore, when the order granting the original permit   was fin ally set aside the renewed permit became void. Anjiah  v. Regional Transport Officer, Guntur,  1956  Andhra Law Times, 347, disapproved. (2)When  the appellant applied for a renewal of  his  permit under s. 58 of the Act and not merely for a fresh permit the

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order  of  the  Regional Transport  Authority  granting  the renewal  must  be  held to have been  made  subject  to  the implied  condition  that the right of the appellant  to  the original  permit  is recognized by the High Court  and  that accordingly,  in  the event that had happened,  the  renewed permit ceased to, be effective.,. Veerappa  Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., (1952)  S.C.R.  583, explained and distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals No&323 and  324 of 1956. Appeal from the judgment and orders dated April 27, and July 13,  1956, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos.  42 and 88 of 1956 arising out of the orders dated March 23, and July 9, 1956, of the said High Court in Writ Petitions  Nos. 333 and 564 of 1956. A.   V.  Viswanatha Sastri, J. B. Dadachanji, S.  N.  Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant. Daphtary,  Solicitor-General of India,, R. Gan.  pathy  Iyer and R. Gopalkrishnan, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 665 1957.  February 19.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are appeals against the  judgment of  the  High Court of Madras on a certificate  given  under Art.  133  (1)  (c) of the Constitution, and  they  raise  a question  of some importance as to the true legal  character of  a permit when it is renewed under the provisions of  the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) hereinafter  referred to as the Act. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary  to  state the material facts leading  up  to  the present  dispute.  Towards the end of 1952, the  appropriate authorities  under the Act decided to grant  two  additional permits  for stage carriages in  the  Ondipudur-Agricultural College  route  in the town of Coimbatore in  the  State  of Madras,,  and invited applications therefor under s.  57  of the  Act.  There were as many as 39 applicants, and  by  his order  dated  December  3,  1952,  the  Regional   Transport Authority  granted  one  permit to  applicant  No.  24,  the Thondamuthur Trading Company Ltd., and another to  applicant No. 30, the V.C.K. Bus Service.  There were appeals by  some of  the unsuccessful applicants to the Central Road  Traffic Board, which by its order dated February 19, 1953, set aside the  order of the Regional Transport Authority  and  granted the  permits, one to Stanes Transports Ltd., and another  to Thirumalaiswami  Goundar.  Revisions were preferred  against this order by the aggrieved applicants under s. 64-A of  the Act,  and  by its order dated July 9, 1953,  the  Government confirmed  the  grant  of the permit  to  Stanes  Transports ,Ltd.,  but  set aside the permit given  to  Thirumalaiswami Goundar,  and granted it instead to Annamalai Bus  Transport Ltd.  Thereupon,  applicants Nos. 24 and 30 moved the High  Court of  Madras under Aft. 226 for a writ of certiorari to  quash the  order of the Central Road Traffic Board dated  February 19,  1953 and of the Government dated July 9, 1953; but  the applications  were  dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar  J.  on March  8,  1954.   Against the  orders  of  dismissal,  Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were preferred, and they were 666 dismissed  by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J.  on

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March  21, 1956.  It should be mentioned that the  operation of ’the order dated February 19, 1953 was stayed pending the disposal  of  the  revision  under  s.  64-A  and  the  writ proceedings  in  the High Court, with the result  that  both Thondamuthur  Trading  Company Ltd. and V.C.K.  Bus  Service which  had  been granted permits by the  Regional  Transport Authority on December 3, 1952, continued to run their  buses notwithstanding  cancellation of those permits  on  February 19, 1953.  It should also be mentioned that in June 1954 the business of the V.C.K. Bus Service which was the grantee  of one of the permits under the order of the Regional Transport Authority  dated  December  3, 1952, was  taken  over  by  a Company  called  the V.C.K. Bus Service Ltd., which  is  the appellant  before  us,  and  by an  order  of  the  Regional Transport Authority dated July 7, 1954, it was recognised as the transferee of the permit granted to V.C.K. Bus Service. To continue the narrative, the permit which was the subject- matter  of the litigation aforesaid was for a period of  one year  and a half, and it expired on June 30,  1954.   Before its  expiry, the appellant applied on April 15, 1954, for  a renewal   thereof  for  a  period  of  three  years.    This application was duly notified under s.57, and objections  to the grant were preferred by both Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai  Bus  Transport Ltd.  On September  5,  1954,  the Regional  Transport  Authority  granted  a  permit  to   the appellant for a period of one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30,  1955,  obviously in the expectation that  Writ  Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 would by then have been decided.   On March 19, 1955,the appellant again applied for a renewal  of the  permit, and that was also notified under s. 57, and  no objections  having  been  filed to the  grant  thereof,  the Regional  Transport  Authority by his order dated  June  23, 1955,  renewed the permit for a period of three  years  from July 1, 1955 to June 30, 1958.  It is this permit that forms the subject-matter of the present litigation. It has been already stated that Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and  32 of 1954 were dismissed on March 21, 1956. 667 Apprehending that the Regional Transport Authority might, in view  of the judgment of the High Court, cancel  the  permit which was renewed on June 23, 1955, the appellant filed Writ Petition  No.  333  of  1956  for  a  Writ  of   Prohibition restraining the Regional Transport Authority from Cancelling the permit, and that was dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on  the ground that when the original permit was set  aside, the renewal thereof fell to the ground.  The appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 against this order, and that  was heard  by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. who  by their  judgment  dated  April 27, 1956,  held,  following  a previous  decision  of  that Court in  K.  Muthuvadivelu  v. Regional  Transport Officer(1) that the renewal having  been obtained   on  the  basis  of  a  permit  which   had   been subsequently cancelled, it could not be regarded as a  fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it must be  taken  to  be non est for all  purposes,  and  that  the renewal  must  therefore be held to be a  nullity.   In  the result, they dismissed the appeal, but granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c), observing that the case raised a point of  general  importance, which was stated by them  in  these terms: When  an  application for renewal of a permit  is  made  and granted  and eventually it is held that the original  permit was itself wrongly granted, does the renewed permit  subsist for  the  period  for  which it  was  renewed,  or  does  it automatically  cease  to  be in force  when  it  is  finally

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decided that the original permit was not granted validly ? This  matter now comes before us in Civil Appeal No, 323  of 1956. After  the High Court delivered its judgment in Writ  Appeal No.  42 of 1956 on April 27, 1956, the  respondents  herein, viz.,  Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai  Bus  Transport Ltd.,  applied to the Regional Transport Authority to  grant them  permits in accordance with the decisions of  the  High Court, and on May 5, 1956, the Regional Transport  Authority cancelled  the  permit granted by him on June 23,  1955,  in favour (1)  A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 143. 86 668 of  the  appellant,  and  granted  permits  instead  to  the respondents.   Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ  Petition No. 554 of 1956 for a writ of certiorari to quash the  order dated May 5, 1956, on the grounds which had been put forward in  Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 and Writ Appeal No. 42  of 1956.  That petition was dismissed by Rajagopalan J. on July 9,  1956, and the Writ Appeal No. 88 of 1956  filed  against that  order was dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and  Panchapa- kesa  Ayyar  J. on July 13, 1956.  Leave to  appeal  against that judgment was also given under Art. 133 (1) (c), as  the subject-matter  thereof was the same as that of Writ  Appeal No.  42 of 1956 in respect of which leave had  already  been granted.   Civil  Appeal No. 324, of 1956  relates  to  this matter.   Thus, both the appeals relate to the same  matter, and raise the same point for determination. Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel who appeared in support of the appeals, contends that the view taken by  the learned  Judges of the High Court that when a permit is  set aside by higher authorities, it should be treated as  wholly non-existent,  and that, in consequence, a  renewal  thereof must  be  held to be void, is not sound, that on  a  correct interpretation of ss. 57 and 58, a renewal is practically in the nature of a new grant, that the permit which was granted to  the  appellant for the period July 1, 1955 to  June  30, 1958,  though  styled a renewal, was in  substance  a  fresh permit, and that the fact that the old permit was set  aside did  not therefore affect the rights of the appellant  under this  permit.   He also argues that the Act  and  the  rules framed thereunder contain elaborate provisions as to when  a permit could be cancelled, forming in themselves a  complete code  on the subject, that the cancellation of the  original permit  is not one of the grounds on which a renewed  permit could  be  set  aside, and that the order  of  the  Regional Transport  Authority dated May 5, 1956, was therefore  ultra vires.  The contention of the learned Solicitor-General  for the.  respondents  is  that when a permit  is  renewed,  the renewal is, on a true construction of the provisions of  the Act, in substance as in name a continuation of the 669 previous  permit, and that, in consequence, when the,  grant of a permit is set aside by a higher authority, the  renewal thereof  must also stand automatically set aside,  and  that further even if a renewed permit is not to be regarded as  a continuation  of  the original permit,, seeing  that  it  is granted on the basis of that permit it should be held to  be subject  to  an  implied term that it should  cease  if  the original permit is cancelled.  The two points that arise for decision  on  these contentions are: (1) when  a  permit  is renewed, is it a continuation of the original permit, or  is it, in fact, a new one? and (2) if a renewed permit is not a continuation  of  the original permit, is the  grant  of  it

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subject  to  the implied condition that it is liable  to  be cancelled, if the original permit is cancelled ? On  the first question, it is necessary to refer to  certain provisions   of  the  Act  material   thereto.    Section,57 prescribes  the  procedure to be followed in  the  grant  of stage  carriage  permits.  Under  sub-s.  (2),  applications therefor have to be made not less than six weeks before  the date appointed by the Regional Transport Authority therefor. Sub-section  (3) requires that they should be: published  in the   prescribed   manner,  and  provision   is   made   for representations  being made in connection  therewith.   When any representation is so received, sub-s. (5) provides  that the person making it is to be given an. opportunity of being heard   thereon   in  person  or  by  a,   duly   authorised representative, and that the application for permit is to be disposed  of  at a public hearing.  Section  58  deals  with renewals, and is as follows: (1)  "  A permit other than a temporary permit issued  under section  62  shall  be effective without  renewal  for  such period,  not  less than three years and not more  than  five years,  as  the  Regional Transport  Authority  may  in  its discretion specify in the permit: Provided  that  in the case of a permit  issued  or  renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall  be effective without renewal for such period of  less than three years as the Provincial Government may prescribe. 670 (2)  A  permit  may be renewed on an  application  made  and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: Provided that, other conditions being equal, an  application for renewal shall be given preference over new  applications for permits.  " The  contention  of the learned counsel  for  the  appellant based on s. 58 (2) is that under the Act an application  for renewal is to be dealt with exactly as an application for  a new  permit,  that  it is to be notified  under  s.  57  and representations have to be called for in connection herewith and considered at a public hearing, that though the grant of the previous permit furnishes a ground of preference, it  is subject  to  the limitation that the  other  conditions  are equal  and is thus only one of several factors to  be  taken into account, and that therefore when a renewal is  actually granted, it is on an independent consideration of the merits and  it cannot be distinguished from a fresh grant.  It  was further  argued that the proviso to s. 58(2)  meant  little, because  it was well established that the grant of a  permit was not a matter of right, and the authorities under the Act would  be  acting  within their powers if  they  refused  an application for renewal and granted a fresh permit to a  new applicant.   It was also contended that though  the  statute spoke  of  a renewal of a permit, that  expression  did  not accurately  bring  out the true position, because  in  legal terminology,  renewal imports that the transaction which  is renewed,  as  for  example, a lease, is  to  operate  for  a further period but on the same terms, but that when a permit was  renewed, it was open to the authorities to  impose  new conditions,  to  alter  the period during which  it  was  to operate  and  generally  to  modify  its  terms,  and   that therefore the use of the word ,renewal " should not lead  to the.  inference  that it was the original  permit  that  was being continued. There  is  force in these contentions, but there  are  other provisions  bearing  on  this question, and  when  they  are reviewed  as  a  whole,  it is  abundantly  clear  that  the intention  of  the legislature was to treat a renewal  as  a

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continuation of the previous permit.  To 671 start with, s. 58(1) enacts that a permit shall be effective for  the period specified therein, but this is qualified  by the  words " without renewal ". Therefore, when there  is  a renewal,  the  effective period is not the  original  period specified,  but  the  period  up to  which  the  renewal  is granted.   That indicates that the life of a renewed  permit is  one and continuous.  The matter is placed  beyond  doubt when  we turn to the rules which have been framed under  the Act.  Rule 184 (1) provides that when a renewal is  granted, it shall be endorsed on the permit itself, and Form No.  33, which is prescribed therefor is as follows: " This permit is hereby renewed up to the day of....... 19 Thus,   what  is  renewed  is  "  this  permit".   In   this connection,  reference must be made to the definition  of  " permit " in s. 2(2) of the Act ’as " the document issued  by a  Provincial or Regional Transport Authority Rule  1985  is very material for the purpose of the present discussion, and it runs as follows: If an application for the renewal of a permit has been  made in  accordance with these rules and the prescribed fee  paid by  the  prescribed date, the permit shall  continue  to  be effective  until  orders are passed on  the  application  or until the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the  application  whichever is earlier.  If  orders  on  the application are not passed within three months from the date of  receipt of the application, the permit-holder  shall  be entitled  to  have  the  permit  renewed  by  the  Transport Authority for the period specified in the application or for one year whichever is less and the Transport Authority shall call  upon  the permit-holder to  produce  the  registration certificate  or certificates and Part B or Parts A and B  of the  permit, as the case may be, and endorse the renewal  in Parts  A and B of the permit accordingly and return them  to the permit holder ". Under  this rule, when an application for renewal  is  made, the permit already granted is to be in force ’until an order is  passed thereon, and what is more important, if no  order is passed within three months, 672 the  permit ’becomes automatically renewed for the  ,,period mentioned in the rule.  This goes a long way to support  the contention of the respondents that on the scheme of the Act, renewal is a continuation of the original permit.  It should also be mentioned that the rules provide for different forms for an application for fresh permit and one for renewal, and the  fee  to be paid along with those applications  is  also different.  A reading of the relevant provisions of the  Act and of the rules leads indubitably to the conclusion that  a renewal is a continuation of the permit previously  granted. The  fact  that  the grant of renewal is  not  a  matter  of course,  or  that it is open to the  authorities  to  impose fresh  conditions at the time of renewal does not, when  the permit is in fact renewed, alter its character as a renewal. We  shall  now  consider the authorities  cited  by  learned counsel  for  the appellant as supporting the  view  that  a renewal  under  the Act is in the same position as  a  fresh permit.   In Mahabir Motor Co. v. Bihar State(1), the  point for  decision  was  whether an appeal lay under  s.  64  (f) against  an  order  granting a renewal  of  a  permit.   The contention  before  the  Court  was  that  the  Act  made  a distinction  between  the grant of a permit  and  a  renewal thereof, and that as s. 64 (f), provided only for an  appeal

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against an order granting a permit, no appeal lay against an order granting a renewal.  In repelling this contention  the Court observed "Both  grant.  and renewal stand more or less  on  the  same footing by reason of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act............ This  observation  has  reference to  the  procedure  to  be followed in the renewal of a permit and the right of  appeal given  under  a. 64 as part of that procedure.  It  has,  no -bearing  on the character of a permit when it  is  renewed. Another  decision on which the appellant strongly relied  is Anjiah  v.  Regional Transport Officer, Guntur  There,  the, facts  were that an order of suspension had been passed  for breach of one of the (1)  [1556] I.L.R. 34 Patna 429. (2)  [1956] Andhra Law Times 347. ]                           673 conditions of the permit. - The correctness of the order was challenged  before higher authorities, but without  success. Meantime, the period fixed in the permit had expired, and it had  been renewed.  The question was whether the  period  of suspension could be enforced against the renewed permit.  It was  held  by the Andhra High Court that it  could  not  be, because the renewal was, in essence, a new permit and not  a mere  continuance  of  the old one.  The  reason  for’  this decision was thus stated in the judgment: " There is no right of renewal as such and when a permit  is renewed,  there  is  no right either, on  the  part  of  the permit-holder  to  insist upon the continuance  of  the  old terms.   It  would be undesirable that there should  be  any such restrictions upon the right of the authorities to grant the  permit  to  anybody  they  choose  or  subject  to  any conditions  that they think -it to be necessary  to  impose, provided  that  they are acting all the time in  the  public interest and subject to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the.  Rules made thereunder." These considerations, though not without force, can. not, in our  opinion,  outweigh the inference to be drawn  from  the other provisions to which we have made reference and for the reasons  already  given, we are unable to  agree  with  this decision. In the view that we have taken that under the provisions  of the  Act and the rules, a renewal is a continuation  of  the original permit, there can be no doubt as to what the rights of  the appellant are.  When the proprietor of V. C. K.  Bus Service  was  granted  a permit by  the  Regional  Transport Authority on December 3, 1952, that grant was subject to the result  of  the  decision of  the  higher  authorities.   On September 5, 1954, when the permit was renewed in favour  of the appellant, that was subject to the decision of the  High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954, which was then pending. When  the renewed permit dated September 5, 1954, was  again renewed  on June 23, 1955, that was likewise subject to  the result of the decision in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954.   When the High Court by its judgment dated March 674 21,  1956,  passed  in  the  said  Writ  Appeal  upheld  the cancellation  of  the permit which had been granted  by  the Regional Transport Authority on December 3, 1952 to V. C. K. Bus  Service,  the permit renewed on June 23,  1955,  became ineffective  at  least  as from  that  date.   The  Regional Transport  Authority was therefore right in treating  it  as having  become void, and granting by his order dated May  5, 1956, permits to the respondents. The  second  question arises on the  alternative  contention

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advanced  by the respondents that even if the renewal is  to be  regarded, not as a continuation of the  original  permit but  as an independent grant, it must be held to  have  been subject to an implied condition that if the original  permit is ultimately set aside, the renewal thereof should come  to an  end.   Mr. Sastri, learned counsel  for  the  appellant, disputes the correctness of this contention.  He argues that when there is a document embodying the terms’ of a contract, it is not permissible to imply therein a condition, if  that will  contradict or vary any terms contained in it, that  to read into the permit a condition that it is to cease if  the decision  of  the High Court went  against  the  appellant,’ would be to modify the terms contained therein that it is to be  effective  upto  June 30, 1958, and that  it  could  not therefore  be  implied.   He also relies  on  the  following observation  of  Lord  Parker in  P.  A.  Tamplin  Steamship Company  Limited v. AngloMexican Petroleum Products  Company Limited (1) : "  This principle is one of contract law, depending on  some term  or condition to be implied in the contract itself  and not  on something entirely dehors the contract which  brings the  contract  to an end.  It is, of course,  impossible  to imply in a contract any term or condition inconsistent  with its express provisions, or with the intention of the parties as gathered from those provisions." It  is  undoubted law that when the terms of a  contract  or grant  are reduced to writing, no condition can  be  implied therein, which will be inconsistent with its express  terms. But the contention of the respondents (1)  [1916] 2 A.C. 307, 422. 675 involves no conflict with this principle.  They do not  seek to obtain any modification or alteration of the terms of the permit, -leaving it to operate subject to such  modification or alteration.  They want that the whole permit with all its terms  as to duration and otherwise should be held  to  have become  inoperative.  What they are pleading is a  condition subsequent on the happening of which the permit will  cease, and  to that situation the observation quoted above  has  no application.   Reference may be made in this  connection  to the  following observation occurring later in the speech  of Lord  Parker in F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company  Limited  v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Company, Limited (supra): " Moreover, some conditions can be more readily implied than others.  Speaking generally, it seems to me easier to  imply a  condition  precedent  defeating  a  contract  before  its execution   has  commenced  than  a   condition   subsequent defeating the contract when it is part performed." Thus,  there  is no legal obstacle to implying  a  condition that the renewal should stand cancelled if the right of  the appellant  to the original permit was negatived by the  High Court. That  brings  us on to the question of fact, whether  on  an examination  of the permit and of the circum. stances  under which  it came to be granted, we can infer that it  was  the intention  of the Regional Transport Authority to renew  the permit  subject  to the result of the decision of  the  High Court  in the appeal which was then pending before it.   The permit  granted to the V. C. K. Bus Service on  December  3, 1952,  had been cancelled on February 19, 1953, and  it  was only by reason of the stay orders that the bus was permitted to run.  When the appellant applied for renewal on April 15, 1954,  there was opposition to the grant thereof  from  both the  respondents  herein,  based  on  the  decision  of  the Government  dated July 9, 1953, and it was in view of  their

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objection that the Regional Transport Authority renewed  the permit for one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955.   It is true that 87 676 when  the appellant applied again for renewal on  March  19, 1955,  the respondents did not raise objection thereto,  but as  the appeals in the High Court were still  pending,  they had good reason to believe that the renewal would not affect whatever  rights  might be declared in their favour  by  the High Court.  As all the papers relating to the grant of  the original permit and the subsequent proceedings were part  of the  record before the Regional Transport Authority when  he renewed  the  permit on June 23, 1955, it is  impossible  to resist  the conclusion that he really intended to renew  the permit only subject to the decision of the High Court. It is of the utmost importance in this connection to bear in mind  that the appellant applied not for a fresh permit  but for a renewal, and in sanctioning it, the Regional Transport Authority  expressly acted in exercise of his  powers  under Rule  134-A  read with s. 58 of the Act, and if he  did  not expressly provide that it was subject to the decision of the High Court, it must be because he must have considered  that that  was implicit in the fact of its being only a  renewal. That that is how the appellant understood it is clear beyond doubt from the proceedings taken by it immediately after the High Court pronounced its judgment. But  it is argued for the appellant on the strength  of  the decision  in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman  Ltd.(1)  that the  mere knowledge on the part of the authorities that  the rights  of  the  parties  were under  litigation  is  not  a sufficient  ground to import a condition in the permit  that it is subject to the result of that litigation, when in  its terms it is unconditional.  We do not read that decision  as authority  for  any  such  broad  contention.   There,   the question related to five permits, which had been  originally granted  to  one  Balasubramania.   Raman  and  Raman   Ltd. obtained  a transfer of the relative buses, and  applied  to the  transport  authorities for transfer of the  permits  to itself.   Then,  Veerappa  having  subsequently  obtained  a transfer of the same buses from Balasubramania, (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 583. 677 applied  to  have the permits transferred in his  name.   On October 3, 1944, he also instituted a suit in the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam,  to  establish his title to  the  buses  against Raman and Raman Ltd., and that was decreed in his favour  on May  2,  1946.  Raman and Raman Ltd. appealed  against  this decision  to  the Madras High Court, which by  its  judgment dated  September  2, 1949, reversed the decree of  the  Sub- Court  and  held that it was entitled to the  buses.   While these  proceedings were going on, the transport  authorities suspended  on  March 28, 1944, the permits  which  had  been granted  to  Balasubramania and instead, they  were  issuing temporary  permits  from time to time to Veerappa,  who  had been  appointed  receiver  in the  suit  in  the  Sub-Court, Kumbakonam.   On March 29, 1949, the Government  decided  to discontinue   the  policy  of  granting  temporary   permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent permits,  to Veerappa.   Then on October 14, 1949, Veerappa  applied  for renewal of these permanent permits, and that was granted  by the  Regional  Transport Authority on January  3,1950.   The question  was whether this order was bad on the ground  that it was inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that

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it was Raman and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a valid title to  the  buses.  This Court held that the ownership  of  the buses  was only one of the factors to be taken into  account in granting the permits, and that as the Regional  Transport Authority granted the renewal on an appreciation of all  the facts,  his  decision  was not liable to  be  questioned  in proceedings  under  Art. 226.  It should be noted  that  the renewal  which  was  granted  on January  3,  1950,  was  of permanent permits granted in pursuance of the, order of  the Government  dated  March 29, 1949, which had  quite  plainly declared  as  a matter of policy  that  notwithstanding  the pendency  of  litigation  between  the  parties,   permanent permits  should  be granted to Veerappa.  There  can  be  no question  of implying thereafter a condition that they  were subject to the decision of the Court.  Moreover, the renewal was  granted  on January 3, 1950, after the  litigation  had ended  on  September 2, 1949, and any attack on  that  order could only be by 678 way of appeal against it, and that had not been done, We are of  opinion that the decision in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman  & Raman Ltd. (1) is of no assistance to the appellant. In the result, we affirm the decision of the High Court both on  the  ground that the renewal dated June 23, 1955,  is  a continuation of the permit granted on December 3, 1952,  and must fall to the ground when that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated  March  21,  1956, and on the ground that  it  was  an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be  subject to  the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and  that in  the  event  which  had happened, it  had  ceased  to  be effective. These  appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs  in  Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956. Appeals dismissed.