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PETITIONER: UNNI KRISHNAN, J.P. AND ORS.  ETC.  ETC

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.  ETC.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1993

BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (CJ) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (CJ) BHARUCHA S.P. (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MOHAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 2178            1993 SCR  (1) 594  1993 SCC  (1) 645        JT 1993 (1)   474  1993 SCALE  (1)290

ACT: Constitution of  India, 1950:

HEADNOTE: Articles  21,  41, 45 and 46-Right  to  education-Whether  a fundamental  right-Held:Every child/citizen has a  tight  to free  education up to the age of 14 years and thereafter  it is subject to limits of economic capacity and development of the  State-State obliged to follow directions  contained  in Article  45-Article  21  to be construed  in  the  light  of Articles 41, 45 and 46. Article 21-Right to Education-Whether implicit under the Ar- ticle-Whether flows from right to life and personal liberty- Extent and content of the right. Parts   III   and  IV-Fundamental   Rights   and   Directive Principles  Whether  complementary to each  other-Whether  a right  could be recognised as a fundamental rot even  though not expressly mentioned Articles   14,  15,  21,  41,  45  and  46-Private   unaided recognised   affiliated  educational  institutions   running professional  courses like engineering and  medical  course- Whether entitled to charge a fee higher than that charged by Government institutions-Held:Entitled to charge a higher fee but  such  a  fee cannot exceed the  ceding  fixed  in  this regard-However,    commercialisation   of   education    not permissible fee-Meaning of. Whether  private  aided  recognised/affiliated   educational governed  by  rules and framed by Government in  matters  of admission of students and fee chargeable as also recruitment and conditions of service etc, of teachers and staff. Whether  private recognised/affiliated institutions  obliged to  act  fairly consistent with Articles 14 and  15  and  in accordance   with   conditions  of  grant   of   recognition affiliation-Held: as conditions of grant of aid they were governed    by    such   rules    and    regulations-Private institutions receiving aid 595 obliged to act fairly in consonance with fundamental  rights

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as  well  as regulations framed by  Government-State,  while granting    recognition/affiliation   obliged   to    impose conditions for maintaining standards and ensuring  fairness, inter alia, in respect of fees chargeable and admission. Admission  and  charging  of  capitation  fees  in   private unaided/aided recognised/affiliated educational  institution conducting   professional  courses  such  as   medical   and engineering  courses-Scheme  framed  by  Court   eliminating discretion  of management in admissions in and fees  payable in such institutions and substituting merit of the  students as the sole criterion. Article 12-Private insupplementing State function  viz., imparting education-Whether aninstrumentality of State- "ether public duty  performed by it viz,imparting    of education would make it amenable to Pail     III,  such   as Articles 14 and15. Articles  19(1)(g)  and  (6(-Right  to  establish  and   run educational   institutions-Whether  a   fundamental   right- Imparting   education-Whether  a  commercial   activity   of establishing an education institution Whether a  profession- Words  ’Profession’,  ’Occupation, ’Trade’  and  ’Business’- Meaning of. Articles  12  14,  A 19(1)(g), 21, 30, 41, 45  and  4  ether private educational institutions have a fundamental right to recognition/affiliation-Whether such a right can be inferred by reading into Article 19(1) (g) a right in the of  Article 30. Articles  29  and  30-Rights conferred on  minorities  in  a positive way-Whether negate the assumption of such rights by other citizens. A.P.  Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission  and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act 1983. Section  3-A-Power  to  grant  admission  to  students   who qualified in entrance/qualifying examination irrespective of their ranking in the examination and to charge any amount in addition  to tuition fee-Whether violative of Article 14  of the Constitution. Karnataka    Educational   Institutions   (Prohibition    of Capitation    Fee)    Act    1984/Maharashtra    Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act  1987/Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Collec- 596 tion  of Capitation Fee) Act 1992.  Constitutional  validity of-Held:  Constitutional as they do not  contain  provisions offending Article 14 of the Constitution. In   the  writ  petitions  flied  before  this  Court,   the correctness  of  the decision of this Court in the  case  of Mohini  jain v. State of Karnataka and Others, [1992] 3  SCC p.  666 was challenged by private educational  institutions, engaged  in or proposing to engage in imparting medical  and engineering  education  in  the States  of  Andhra  Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. In Mohini Jain’s case, this Court had held, inter alit; that every   citizen   has  a  right  to  education   under   the Constitution; the State was under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said  right; the State may discharge its obligation  through State  owned or State-recognised  educational  institutions; that  when the State Government granted recognition  to  the private  educational institutions, it created an  agency  to fulfil its obligation under the Constitution, that  charging capitation fee in consideration of admission to  educational institutions,  was a patent denial of a citizen’s  right  to education  under the Constitution and that the State  action in  permitting  capitation  fee  to  be  charged  by  State-

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recognised  educational  institutions was  wholly  arbitrary and,  as such, violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution; that  the capitation fee brought to the fore a  clear  class bias; and that when the State Government permitted a private medical  college to be set up and recognised its  curriculum and degrees, then the said college was performing a  funtion which under the Constitution had been assigned to the  State Government  and If the State permitted such  institution  to charge  higher  fee from the students, such a  fee  was  not tuition fee, but in fact a capitation fee. The aforesaid decision was followed by the Full Bench of the A.P. High Court in Kranti Parishad v. N.J. Reddy, [1992]  3 ALT  "  while allowing the writ petitions  filed  before  it challenging  the permission granted by the State  Government for the establishment of private Medical and Dental Colleges in the State and also the constitutional validity of section 3-A   of   the  Andhra   Pradesh   Educational   Institution (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983.  The  respondents before  the High Court, including the State,  riled  Special Leave  Petitions against the High Court’s  judgment  Besides several  writ petitions questioning the correctness  of  the decision  of  this  Court in Mohini Jain’s  case  also  were flied. 597 The  validity  of the State enactments of  Karnataka,  Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra and the notifications issued thereunder on  the subject of charging of excess fee from the  students was also questioned In the writ petitions, civil appeals and Special Leave Petitions filed before this Court. It  was contended that (a) the State had no monopoly in  the matter  of  imparting  education;  every  citizen  had   the fundamental right to establish an educational institution as a part of the right guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)(g) of the  Constitution, which extended even to the  establishment of an educational institution with a profit motive i.e.,  as a  business adventure; the said right was  absolute-subject, of course, to such reasonable restrictions as may be  placed upon it by a law within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19; (b) the vice was not in the establishment of educational institutions  by  individuals  and  private  bodies  but  in unnecessary State control; the law of demand and supply must be  allowed  a  free  play,  (c)  the  establishment  of  an educational  institution  was no different  from  any  other venture  eg.,  starting  a  business  or  Industry,  It  was immaterial  whether the institution was established with  or without  profit  motive; only when there was  profit  motive that persons with means would come forward to open more  and more  schools and colleges; (d) even If It was held  that  a person had no right to establish an educational  institution as a business venture, he had atleast the right to establish a self-financing educational institution, which  institution might   also  be  described  as  one  providing   cost-based education;  and  thus, it was open to a  person  to  collect amounts from willing parties and establish an institution to educate such persons or their children, as the case may  be; the  quantum of the fees to be charged in  such  institution should  be  left  to  the  concerned  institution  and   the Government  should  have no say in the matter,  it  was  not possible  for the Court in the very nature of things, to  go into the issue; these private educational institutions  were providing a large number of ’free seats’ to the nominees  of the Government, and all these students would not have had an opportunity  of studying the course of their choice but  for the existence of these private educational institutions; (e) in these circumstances, Mohini Jain’s case was not right  in

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saying, that charging of any amount, by whatever name it was called, over and above, the fee charged by the Government in its  own colleges, must be described as capitation fee,  and saying  so amounted to imposing an impossible condition,  it was not possible for the private educational institutions to survive  if they were compelled to charge only that  fee  as was 598 charged in Governmental institutions; the cost of  educating an engineering or a medical graduate was very high; all that cost  was home by the State in Governmental Colleges;  since the  State  was  not  subsidising  the  private  educational institutions,  these institutions had to find their own  and that  could  come only from the students; (f)  even  if  the right to establish an educational institution was not  trade or business within the meaning of Article 19(1) (g), it  was certainly  an  ’occupation’ within the meaning of  the  said clause;   the  use  of  the   four   expressions-profession, occupation, trade or business in Article 19(1)(g) was  meant to  cover  the  entire  field of  human  activity,  and  the petitioners  had the right to establish private  educational institutions- at any rate, self-financing/cost-based private educational institutions, which would be restricted only  by a  law as contemplated by clause (6) of Article 19; (g)  the right to establish and administer an educational institution (by  a  member  of  the  minority  community,  religious  or Lnguistic)  arose by necessary implication from Article  30; the Constitution could not have intended to confine the said right   only   to  minorities  and  deprive   the   majority communities therefrom; (h) the Government or the  University could    insist   or   stipulate   as   a    condition    of recognition/affiliation   that   the   private   educational institutions  should  admit students exclusively  on  merit: moreover,   there   might  be  several  kinds   of   private educational  institutions  which might  be  established  for achieving  certain specified purposes viz., to cater to  the needs  of a particular region or a district, or  to  educate children of members of a particular community, (1) by virtue of   mere  recognition  and/or  affiliation  these   private educational  institutions did not become instrument  of  the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the  Constitution; the  concept of State action could not be extended to  those colleges  so  as to subject them to the discipline  of  Part 111; it might be a different matter V the institution was in receipt of any aid, partially and wholly, from the State; in such  a situation, the command of Article 29 (2)  came  into play, but even that did not oblige the institution to  admit the students exclusively on the basis of merit  but only not to deny admission to anyone on any of the, grounds mentioned therein,  and (i) that Article 21 was negative in  character and it merely declared that no person should be deprived  of his  life  or  personal  liberty  except  according  to  the procedure  established by law, and since the State  was  not depriving   the  respondents-students  of  their  right   to education, Article 21 was not attracted. On behalf of the respondents and the Indian Medical  Council and 599 All  India Council for Technical Education it was  contended that; (a) imparting of education bad always been  recognised from  does  immemorial as the religious duty and also  as  a charitable  object, and as a trade or , business, it  was  a mission and not a trade, and commercialisation of  education has  always been looked upon with disfavour, the  Parliament expressed  its intention by enacting In 1956 the  University

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Grants Commission Act which specified the prevention of  cow motion  of education as one of the duties of the  University Grants Commission which Intention had also been expressed by several   enactment  made   by  the  Parliament  and   State Legislatures since then; (b) imparting of education was  the most  important  function of the State which duty  might  be by State directly or through the instrumentality of private educational Institutions; but when State permitted a private body  or an individual to perform the said function, It  was its  duty  to  ensure that so one got  an  admission  or  an advantage on account of his economic power to the  detriment of  a  more meritorious candidate; (c) the very  concept  of collecting the cost of education  that was what the concept of  cost-based  or self-financing  educational  Institutions meant-  was  morally  abhorrent and was  opposed  to  public policy-,  a capitation fee did not cease to be a  capitation fee just because it was called as cost-based education or by calling  the  Institution  concerned  as  a   self-fianacing Institution;   these  expressions  were  but  a   over   for collecting capitation fee-, It was nothing but exploitation, and,  was  an  elitist  concept  basically  opposed  to  the constitutional  philosephy; the concept suffered from  class bias and by allowing such education, two classes would  come Into  being;  (d) even If It was held that a  citizen  or  a person  had a dot to establish an  educational  institution, the  said  right  did  not  carry  with  it  the  right   to recognition or the right to affiliation, as the case may be; even  a  minority educational institution was held  by  this Court  to have no fundamental right to recolor  affiliation; hence  such a right could not be envisaged  in the  case  of majority community or In the case of individuals or persons, and  it  was open to the State or the  University  according recognition or affiliation to impose such conditions as they think  appropriate  in  the  Interest  of  fairness,  merit, maintenance  of standards of education and so on,  Including that  the  admission of students, In whichever  category  It might  be, should be on the basis of merit and merit  alone; the Institutions obtaining recognition/affiliation would  be bound by such condition and any departure therefrom rendered the recognition/affiliation liable to be withdrawn; 600 and (e) even if such a condition was not expressly  imposed, it  was  implicit,  by virtue of the fact  that  in  such  a situation,   the   activity  of  the   private   educational institution  was  liable to be termed as State  action;  the fact  that these institutions performed an important  public function  coupled  with  the fact that  their  activity  was closely    inter-twined    with    governmental    activity, characterised their action as State action; at the  minimum, the  requirement  would be to act fairly in  the  matter  of admission  of  students  and  probably  in  the  matter   of recruitment  and treatment of its employees as  well;  these institutions  were  further bound not to charge any  fee  or amount   over  and  above  what  was  charged  in.   similar governmental institutions; and if they needed finances, they must  find  them  through  donations or  with  the  help  of religious  or  charitable organisations and they  could  not also  say that they would first collect capitation fees  and with that money, they would establish an institution; at the worst,  only the bare running charges could be charged  from the students and the capital cost could not be charged  from them. On  behalf of the Government of India it was submitted  that the  Central  Government  did  not  have  the  resources  to undertake any aditional financial responsibility for medical

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or  technical  education; it was unable to aid  any  private educational  institution financially at a level higher  than at present; therefore, the policy of the Central  Government was  to  involve  private  and  voluntary  efforts  in   the education  sector  in  conformity with  accepted  norms  and goals;  however, the private educational institutions  could not  be compelled to charge only that fee as was charged  in Governmental  institutions; so far as  engineering  colleges were   concerned,  permission  was  being  granted  by   the A.I.C.T.E.  subject  to  the condition  that  they  did  not collect any capitation fee; It was also submitted that (a) conferring unconditional  and unqualified  right  to  education at all-  levels  to  every citizen  involving a constitutional obligation on the  State to  establish  educational institutions either  directly  or through  State  agencies was not  warranted  by  the  Con- stitution  besides  being unrealistic and  impractical;  (b) when   the   Government  granted  recognition   to   private educational  institutions  it did not create  an  agency  to fulfil its obligations under the Constitution and there  was no  scope  to  import  the  concept  of  agency  in  such  a situation;  (c)  the principles laid down in  Mohini  Jain’s case  required reconsideration; (d) it would be  unrealistic and unwise to discourage private initiative in provid- 601 ing   educational   facilities   particularly   for   higher education.   The  private  section should  be  involved  and indeed  encouraged to augment the much needed  resources  in the  field of education, thereby making as much progress  as possible  in  achieving  the Constitutional  goals  in  this respect; (e) at the same time, regulatory controls had to be continued  and  strengthened  in order  to  prevent  private educational institutions from commercialising education; (f) regulatory measures should be maintained and strengthened so as to ensure that private educational institutions  maintain minimum standards and facilities; (g) admissions within  all groups  and categories should be based on merit.  There  may be reservation of seats In favour of the weaker sections  of the   society  and  other  groups  which   deserve   special treatment.  The norms for admission should be  predetermined and transparent.    The four State Governments also took a similar stand. It was submitted on behalf of the students who had  obtained admissions  against the Management quota of 50% seats,  that they  were Innocent parties and had obtained admission in  a bonafide  belief  that  their  admissions  were  being  made properly,  they  had been studying since then and in  a  few months  their academic year would come to a close;  may  be, the  managements were guilty of an irregularity, but so  far as  the  students  were  concerned  they  had  done  nothing contrary  to  law to deserve the punishment awarded  by  the Full Bench of the High Court.   Disposing of the Writ petitions and appeals, this Court, HELD:By the Court, 1.The  citizens of this country have a fundamental  right to  education.  The said right flows from Article 21.   This right  is, however, not an absolute right.  Its content  and parameters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41.  In other words, every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age  of 14  years.  Thereafter his right to education is subject  to the  limits  of  economic capacity and  development  of  the State. [693B-C] 21.The obligations created by Articles 41, 45 and 46 of  the Constitution  can  be  discharged by  the  State  either  by

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establishing   institutions  of,  Its  own  or  by   aiding, recognising and/or granting affiliation to private 602 educational institutions.  Where and not granted to  private educational   institutions   and   merely   recognition   or affiliation  is  granted  It may a"  be  insisted  that  the private education institution shall charge only that fee  as is charged for similar courses in governmental Institutions. The  private  educational  institutions  have  to  and   are entitled  to charge a higher fee not exceeding  the  ceiling fixed  in  that behalf.  The admission of students  and  the charging  of fee in these private  educational  institutions shall be governed by the evolved by this Court [693D-E] 3.A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an  educational  institution  but  no  citizen,  person   or institution  has  a right much less a fundamental  right  to or  recognition,  or to grant-in-aid from  the  State.   The recognition  and  affiliation shall be given  by  the  State subject only to the conditions set out in, and In accordance with,   the   scheme   laid  down   by   this   Court.    No Government/University  or  authority shall be  competent  to grant recognition or affiliation with the said scheme.   The said scheme shall constitute recognition or affiliation,  as the  case  may  be,  in  addition  except  In  accordance  a condition  of such to such other conditions and terms  which such Government, University or other authority may choose to impose. [693F-G] 4. Those institutions receiving aid shall howeverbe subject to all so terms and conditions, as the aid giving authority may impose In the interest of general public. [693H, 694A] 5.   Section   3-A  of  the   Andhra   Pradesh   Educational Institutions  (Regulation  of Admission and  Prohibition  of Capitation  Fee)  Act,  1983 Is violative  of  the  equality clause enshrined in 14 and is, therefore, void. [694B] 6.None of the provisions of the enactments of other three States,viz., Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra says that the  Management  of a private  educational  institution  can admit  students, against "payment seats’,  ’irrespective  of the  ranking  assigned  to them In such test  (En  Test)  or examination’.    Much  less  do  they  say  that   to   such admissions,  the provision prohibition capitation fee  shall not  apply.   No doubt they do not say expressly  that  such admissions shall be made on the basis of merit, but that  is implicit  If the notifications or orders  issued  thereunder provide otherwise, either expressly or by Implication,  they would be equally bad. [690H, A-B] 603 Per Jeevan Reddy, J. (For himself and Pandian J.) Sharma, CJ and  S.P.Bharucha, J. Concurring except on the  question  of rig to education being a fundamental right 11. Right to education is not statedexpressly    as    a Fundamental Right in Part III of the Constitution of  India. However, having regard to the fundamental significance  of education to thelife  of an individual and  the  nation, right  to education is implicit In and flows from the  right to  life  guarenteed  by  Article 21.   That  the  right  to education   has  been  treated  as  one  of   transcendental importance  in the life of an individual has been  all  over the world.  Without education being provided to the  citizen of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved.  The Constitution would fail. [644G, 652G-H, 653A-B), Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union, of India; [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67, to. Miss  Mohini jain v. State of Karnataka & Ors, [1992] 3  SCC

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666, affirmed. 12.  No  doubt  Article 21, which declares  that  no  person shall  be of his fife or personal, liberty except  according to  the procedure bed by law, is worded in  negative  terms, but  It Is now well that Article 21 has both a negative  and an  affirmative  dimension.  It Is also well  bed  that  the provisions  of  Parts  III  and  IV  are  supplementary  and complementary to each other and that Fundamental Rights  are but  a  to  the  goal indicated in Part  IV,  and  that  the Fundamental  Rights  mad  be construed in  the  not  of  the Directive Principles. [645C, 652E] Newspapers  v. Union of India, [1959] S.C.L 12; Hussain  Ara v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 532; A.R. Antulay  v.R.S.  Nayak,  [1992] Supp.  1  S.C.R.  225;  Olga Tellis  v.  Bombay Municipal Corporation,  [1985]  Suppl.  2 S.C.R.  51; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh  and  Ors "[1964]  1  S.C.R 332; Vincent v. Union of India,  [1967]  2 S.C.R.  468; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1988]  1  S.C.R. 279,;  Maneka  Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 SC.  597;  B.C. Cooper v. Union of [1970] ’SC. 564; Bandhua Mukti Morcha  v. Union  of India [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67; D.S. Nakara v. Union  of of  India  [1983] SCR 130; The State of  Madras  v.Champakan Dorairajan,     [1959] S.C.R. 995; Hanif v. State of 604 Bihar,  [1959] S.C.R. 629; Keshavananda Bharati v. State  of Kerala  1973  Suppl. 521; U.P.S. C.  Board  v.  Harishankar, A.I.R.  1979  S.C. 65 and Minerva Mills v. Union  of  India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, referred to. Munn  v.  Illinois, 1877 (94) U.S. 113/142  and  Boiling  v. Sharpe, 98 Lawyers Ed. 884, referred to. 13.  The fact that right to education occurs in as  many  as three Articles in Part IV viz., Articles 41, 45 and 46 shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers.  Even some  of  the Articles in Part III viz, Articles 29  and  30 speak of education. [653F] Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  98  Lawyers  Ed.  873  and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 32 Lawyers Ed. 2d. 15, referred to. 14.  The  mere fact that the State is not  taking  away  the right  at present does not mean that right to  education  is not  included within the right to life.  The content of  the right is not determined by perception of threat The  content of  right  to life is not to be determined on the  basis  of existence  or absence of threat of deprivation.  The  effect of holding that right to education Is implicit in the  right to life is that the state cannot deprive the citizen of  his right  to education except in accordance with the  procedure prescribed  by law.  Therefore, it would not be  correct  to say that Mohini Jain was wrong in so far as it declared that the  right to education flows directly from right  to  life. [654E-G]. Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors, [1992] 3 SCC 666, referred to. 15.However,  the  citizens of this country  cannot  demand that the State provide adequate number of medical  colleges, engineering  colleges and other educational institutions  to satisfy all their educational needs.  The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal  liberty guaranteed  by Article 21 must be construed in the light  of the  directive  principles in Part IV of  the  Constitution. There are several articles in Part IV which expressly  speak of right to education. [654H, 655A-B] Miss  Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,  [1992]  3 SCC 666, overruled. 16A.  Education  means  knowledge and  knowledge  itself  Is power.  The

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605 preservation of means of Knowledge among the lowest ranks Is of more importanceto the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country. It  Is this  concern which underlies Article 46. [655D-E] John  Adams:  Desertation  on Canon and  Fuedal  Law,  1765; Rauschning. The Voice of Destruction: Hitler referred to. 1.7.A  true democracy is one where education is  universal, where people understand what is good for them and the nation and  know how to govern themselves.  Articles 45, 46 and  41 are  designed to achieve the said goal among others.  It  is In the Hot of these articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. [655F] 1.8.Thus, right to education, understood in the context  of Articles  45 and 41, means: (a) every child/citizen of  this country  has a right to. free education until  he  completes the age of 14 years, and (b) after a child/citizen completes 14  years,  his right to education is circumscribed  by  the limits  of  the  economic  capacity of  the  State  and  its development.  Article 45 assures right to free education for all  children until they complete the age of 14  Am.   Among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit;   no   other  article  does.    This   is   very significant.  The State should honour the command of Article 45.   It  must  be  made  a  reality.   A  childhood  has  a fundamental  right  to free education up to the  age  of  14 years. [655G, 656A, 658D] Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drain, referred to. 1.9.This  does not, however, mean that this obligation  can be performed only through the State schools.  It can also be done   by  permitting,  recognising  and  aiding   voluntary nongovernmental  organisations, who are prepared  to  impart free  education  to children.  It does not also  mean.  that unaided  private schools cannot continue.  They can,  indeed they too, have a role to play.  They meet the demand of that segment  of  population  who  may not  wish  to  have  their children   educated   in  State-run  schools.    They   have necessarily to charge fees from the students. [658E] 1.10.The  right  to  education  further  means  that  a citizen  has  a  right to call upon  the  State  to  provide educational  facilities  to  him within the  limits  of  its economic  capacity  and  development.  This  does  not  mean transferring Article 41 from Part IV to Part 111.  No  State would  say that It need not provide education to its  people even within the limits of Its economic 606 capacity, and development.  It goes without saying that  the limits-of   economic  capacity  are,   ordinarily   speaking matters  within  the subjective satisfaction of  the  State. Therefore,  it is not correct to say that reading the  right to  education into Article 21, this Court would be  enabling each  and  every citizen of this, country  to  approach  the courts to compel the State to provide him such education  as he  chooses.  The right to free education is available  only to children until they complete the age of 14 years.  There- after,  the obligation of the State to provide education  is subject   to  the  limits  of  its  economic  capacity   and development. [660E-H, 661A] Francis C Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516, referred to. 2.1.Private educational Institutions are a necessity in the present day context.  It is not possible to do without  them because  the Governments are not in a position to  meet  the demand  particularly in the sector of medical and technical

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education   which  call  for  substantial  outlays.    While education  is  one of the most Important  functions  of  the Indian   State,  It  has  no  monopoly   therein.    Private educational  institutions  Including  minority  educational institutions  too have a role to play.  Private educational institutions may be aided as well as unaided.  Aid given  by the Government may be cent per cent or partial. [674D-E] 2.2.So  far as aided institutions are concerned, they  have to  abide by all the rules and regulations as may be  framed by the Government and/or recognising(affiliating authorities in  the matter of recruitment of teachers and  staff,  their conditions of service, syllabus, standard of teaching and so on.  In particular, in the matter of admission of  students, they  have  to follow the rule of merit and  merit  alone subject  to  any reservations made under Article  15.   They shall not be entitled to charge any fees higher than what is charged  in Governmental institutions for  similar  courses. These  are and shall be understood to be the  conditions  of grant  of  aid.  The reason is simple:  public  funds,  when given  as  grant   and not as  loan   carry  the  public character  wherever they go; public funds cannot be  donated for  private  purposes.   The element  of  public  character necessarily means a fair conduct in all respects  consistent with the constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 15.   All the Governments and other authorities in charge of  granting aid to educational institutions shall expressly provide  for such conditions (among others), If not already provided, and shall ensure com- 607 pliance  with  the same.  Again aid may take several  forms. For example a medical college doesnecessarily   require   a hospital.   The  Government may permit it to  avail  of  the services  of  a Government hospital for the purpose  of  the college  free of charge.  This  would also be a form of  aid and  the conditions aforesaid  have to be imposed   may  be with  some relation in the of fees chargeable and  observed. The   Governments   (Central  and  State)  and   all   other authorities  granting  aid  shall  impose  such   conditions forthwith,  if not already imposed.  These conditions  shall apply,  to  exist as well as  proposed  private  educational institutions. [674F-H, 675A-C] 23.So  far  as un-aided institutions  are  concerned  they cannot  be compelled to charge the same fee as Is dunged  in Governmental  institution, for the reason that they have  to meet  the  cost  of  imparting  education  from  their   own resources   and  the  main  source,  apart   from   dona- tions/charities,  Many, can only be the fees collected  from the  students.   It  is here that  the  concepts  of  ’self- financing   educational   institutions’   and   cost   based educational    Institutions    come    in.     However     , commercialisation  of  education cannot and  should  not  be permitted.   The  Parliament as well as  State  Lagislatures have  expressed this intention in unmistakable terms.   Both In  the  light of our tradition and km  the  stand-point  of interest of public commercialisation is positively  harmful; it is opposed to public policy. [675D-E, 676B] 3.1.   Article   19(1)(g)  of  the   Constitution   declares that  all  citizens of country shall have the right  to  any profession,  or  to  carry  on  any  occupation,  trade   or business.   No opinion Is expressed on the question  whether the  right  to established an education Institution  can  be said to be on any ’occupation’ within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g).   As- suming that It Is occupation  such  activity can  In  no  event be a trade or business nor can  it  be  a profession within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (g).   Trade

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or business normally connotes an activity carried on with  a profit  motive.  Education has never been commerce  In  this country.   Making It one is opposed to the ethos,  tradition and  sensibilities  of  ibis nation.  The  argument  to  the contrary  has an unholy ring to it.  Imparting of  education has  never  been  treated as a trade  or  business  in  this country  since times immemorial.  It has been treated  as  a religious  duty,  and a charitable activity,  but  never  as trade  or business.  Education in Its true aspect is more  a mission  and a vocation rather than a profession,  trade  or business, 608 however wide may be the denotation of the two latter  words. The  Parliament too has manifested its Intention  repeatedly (by enacting the U.G.C. Act, I.M.C. Act and A.I.C.T.E.  Act) that  commercialisation of education is not permissible  and that no person shall be allowed to steal a march over a more meritorious  candidate because of his economic  power.   The very  same  intention is expressed by  the  Legislatures  of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu In the Preamble to their respective enactments prohibiting charging of capitation fee. [676D-H, 677A-D] 3.2.Imparting  education  cannot be treated as a  trade  or business.  Education cannot be allowed to be converted  into commence  nor  can the petitioners seek to obtain  the  said result  by relying. upon the wider meaning of  ’occupation’. The content of the expression ’occupation’ has to be  ascer- tained keeping in mind the fact that clause (g) employs  all the  four expressions viz, profession, occupation trade  and business.   Their fields may overlap, but each of them  does certainly  have  a  content of its own,  distinct  from  the others.   A  law, existing or future, ensuring  against  the conversion of imparting of education into commerce would  be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of  Article 19. [677F-G] State of Bombay v. R.M.D. C., [1957] SCR 874, relied on. The  sabar kherda Education Society) Sabar kherda v.’  State of  Maharashtra AIR 1968 Bombay 91; Andhra Kesari  Education Society  v. Govemment of A.P., AIR 1984 AP. 251  and  Bapuji Educational Association v.    State, AIR 1986 Karnataka  119 disapproved. 3.3.The activity of establishing an educational institution, cannot  be  called  a ’profession’  within  the  meaning  of Article  19(1) (g).  It is significant to notice  the  words ’to  practice any profession’.  Evidently, the reference  is to  such  professions as may be practised by  citizens  i.e, individuals. [678G] N.U.C.  Employees  v. Industrial Tribunal A.I.R.  1962  S.C. 1080, referred to. 3A. Establishing educational institutions can by no  stretch of  inaginatiop be treated as ’practising  any  profession’. Teaching   may   be  a  profession   but   establishing   an Institution,  employing  teaching  and  nonteaching   staff, procuring the necessary infrastructure for running a  school or  college  Is  not ’practising  profession’.   It  may  be anything  but  not  practisIng  a  profession.   It  Is  not necessary to go into the precise meaning and 609 content of the expressions profession, occupation, trade  or business  in the instant case.  The main concern is only  to establish  that the activity of establishing and/or  running an  educational institution cannot be a matter of  commerce. [678H, 679A-B] 3.5.Assuming  that a person or body of persons has a  right to  establish an educational institution, this right is  not

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an  absolute one.  It is subject to such law as may be  made by  the State in the interest of general  public.   However, the  right to establish an educational institution does  not carry  with  it  the right to recognition or  the  right  to affiliation. [679C] 4.1.Recognition may be granted either by the Government  or any other authority or body empowered to accord recognition. Similarly,   affiliation  may  be  granted  either  by   the University or any other academic or other body empowered  to grant  affiliation  to other educational  Institutions.   In other  words,  it  Is  open to  a  person  to  establish  an educational  institution, admit students, impart  education, conduct examination and award certificates to them.  But be, or the educational institution, has no right to insist  that the certificates or degrees (if they can be called as  such) awarded  by  such institution should be  recognised  by  the State   muchless  have  they the right  to  say  that  the students  trained by the institution should be  admitted  to examinations   conducted  by  the  University  or   by   the Government or any other authority, as the case may be.   The institution has to seek such recognition or affiliation from the appropriate agency. [679F-G] 4..2.No  educational institution except  an  University can  award degrees (Sections 22 and 23 of the  U.G.C.  Act). The private educational institutions cannot award their  own degrees.   Even  if  they award any  certiricates  or  other testimonials  they have no practical value inasmuch as  they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for  admission  into higher courses of  study.   No  private educational  institution  can  survive  or  subsist  without recognition and/or affiliation. [680F-G] 4.3.The  bodies which grant recognition and/or  affiliation are the authoritiesof  the State.  In such a situation,  it is obligatory  in the interest of generalpublic     upon the authority granting recognition or affiliation to  insist upon  such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not  only education of requisite standard but also fairness and  equal treatment in the matter of admission of students.  Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the State, it is  under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of Its duty 610 enjoined  upon  it by Article 14 of  the  Constitution.   It cannot allow Itself or main activity attach to  supplemental activity as well.  Affiliation/recognition is not there  for anybody to get it gratis or unconditionally.  No Government, authority or University is justified or is entitled to grant recognition/affiliation  without imposing  such  conditions. Doing  so,  would  amount  to  abdicating  its   obligations enjoined upon It by Part III, its activity Is bound to be as unconstitutional and illegal [680H, 681A-C] 4.4  The private educational institutions merely  supplement the effort of the State in educating the people.  It is  not an independent activity.  It is an activity supplemental  to the  principal activity carried on by the State.  ore,  what applies to the main activity aplies equally to  supplemental activity.    The  State  cannot  claim  immunity  from   the obligations  arising  from Articles 14 and 15,  and  so,  It cannot  confer  such Immunity upon  Its  affiliates.  [680G, 681D] 5.1.Keeping  in view the positive features of  the  several Central  and  State  enactments, this Court  has  evolved  a scheme,       which      every      authority       granting recognition/affiliation  shall Impose upon the  Institutions seeking recognition/affiliation.  The idea behind the scheme Is  to eliminate discretion In the management altogether  In

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the matter of admission.  It is the discretion in the matter of  admission  that  is  at the root  of  the  several  ills complainedof    and    has   mainly    led    to    the commercialisation of education. [681E-F] 5.2.’Capitation  Fee’ means charging or  collecting  amount beyond what is permitted by law-, all the Acts have  defined this  expression  In  this sense.   A  situation  should  be brought  where  there  Is  no  room  or  occasion  for   the management or anyone on Its behalf to demand or collect  any amount  beyond  what is permitted.   However,  charging  the permitted  fees  by the private educational  institutions which Is bound to be higher than the fees charged in similar governmental institutions by itself cannot be  characterised as  capitation fees.  This is the policy underlying all  the four States’ enactments prohibiting capitation fees.  All of them  recognise  the necessity of charging  higher  fees  by private educational Institutions.  They seek to regulate the fees  that  can  be charged by them  which  may  be  called permitted  fees  and to bar them from  collecting  anything other  than  the permitted fees,  which  is  what’Capitation fees’ means.The attempt In evolving the scheme precisely  is to give effect to the said legislative policy.  It Its power and privilege to be used unfairly.  The  incidents attaching to the 611 would  be  highly  desirable  If  this  scheme  is  given  a statutory shape by incorporating It in the Rules that may be framed under these enactments. [681F-H, 682A-B] 53.The scheme evolved is in the nature of guidelines which the appropriate Governments and recognising and  affiliating authorities should impose and implement in addition to  such other   conditions  and  stipulations  as  they  may   think appropriate as conditions for grant of permission, grant  of recognition or grant of affiliation, as the case may  be.The scheme  for  the present is confined only  to  ’professional colleges’ run by private educational institutions. [682C] 5.4.Only  those  institutions  which  seek  permission   to establish  and/or  recognition and/or affiliation  from  the appropriate  authority  shall alone be made  bound  by  this scheme.   This scheme is not applicable to colleges  run  by Government  or  to University colleges.   Thus,  the  scheme should  be  made a condition of permission,  recognition  or affiliation,  as the case may be.  ’These conditions  should necessarily be imposed, in addition to such other conditions as  the  appropriate authority may  think  appropriate.   No private educational institution shall be allowed to send its students to appear for an examination held by any Government or  other body constituted by it or under any law or to  any examination  held  by any University  unless  the  concerned institution  and the relevant course of study is  recognised by  the  appropriate authority and/or is affiliated  to  the appropriate University, at the case may be. [693A-C] 5.5.It  shall be open to the appropriate authority and  the competent  authority to issue such further  instructions  or directions, as they may think appropriate, not  inconsistent with  this  scheme, by way of elaboration  and  elucidation. This  scheme  shall apply to and govern  the  admissions  to professional  colleges  commencing from  the  academic  year 1993-94. [687G-H] 6.1.Until  the commencement of the current  academic  year, the  Andhra  Pradesh  was  following  a  somewhat  different pattern  in  the  matter of filling  the  seats  in  private unaided  engineering  colleges.  Though  all  the  available seats  were  being filled by the allottees of  the  Convenor (State)  and the managements were not allowed to  admit  any

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student  on their own a uniform fee was collected  from  all the  students.   The concepts of ’free seats’  and  ’payment seats’ were, therefore, not relevant in such a situation 612 all  were payment seats only.  Such a system cannot be  said to  be  constitutionally  provide  more  opportunities    to meritorious students who may not be the to pay the  enhanced free  prescribed by the government  for such colleges.   The system devised would mean correspondingly mm financed burden on payment students whom in the system in vogue in the State of  Andhra Pradesh, the burden is equally distributed  among all  the  stu.  dents.  The theretical  foundation  for  the method devised by the court is that a candidate/studeut  who is  stealing a march over his compatriot  on account of  his economic  power should be made not only to pay  for  himself but  also to pay for another meritorious student.   This  is the  social justification behind the 50% rule prescribed  in the scheme.  In the interest of uniformity and in the  light of  the  above social theory, the State  of  Andhra  Pradesh should adhere to the system devised by the Court [688B-E] 6.2.In  the  circumstances, it is not  necessary  for  this Court  to  go into or answer the question whether  grant  of permission to establish and the grant of affiliation Imposes an obligation upon an educational institution to act  fairly in  the matter of admission of the students and It  requires debate  in  a greater depth and any  expression  of  opinion thereon  at  this juncture is not really  warranted.  [631C, 688F] 7.1.Section   3-A   of  the  Andhra   Pradesh   Educational Institutions  (Regulation  of Admission and  Prohibition  of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 is, in the nature of an  exception to  the other provisions of the Act The Sec. don, read as  a whole leads to the following consequences: (a) it is open to the private eductional institutions to charge as much amount as  they can for admission.  It will be a matter of  bargain between  the Institution and the student seeking  admission; (b) the admission can be made without reference to  inter-se merit  of  paying  candidates.   The  institution  will   be entitled  to  pick  and  choose  the  candidates  among  the applicants  on such considerations as It may deem  fit;  (c) Section  5, which prohibits collection of capitation fee  by an  educational Institution, is expressly made  inapplicable to  such  admissions.  This is not without a  purpose.   The purpose  Is to permit the institutions to charge as much  as they  can  in addition to the collection of  the  prescribed tuition fee. [689E, G-H,69OA-B] 7.2.The  educational  activity of the  private  educational institutions is supplemental to the main effort by the State and what applies to the main activity applies equally to the supplemental activity as well.  Since Article 14 tionally  not  permissible.  But the Idea  in  devising  the scheme has been to 613 of  the Constitution applies to the State innstitutions  and compels  them  to admit students on the basis of  merit  and merit   alone  (subject,  of  course,  to  any   permissible reservations  wherein too, merit inter-se has to  be  fol- lowed)  the applicability of Article 14 cannot  be  excluded from   the   supplemental   effort/activity.    Ile    State Legislature  had, therefore, no power to say that a  private educational  institution will be entitled to admit  students of its choice, irrespective of merit or that it is  entitled to  charge  as much as it can, which means a free  hand  for exploitation  and  more particularly,  commercialisation  of education, which is impermissible in law.  No such  immunity

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from  the  constitutional  obligation  can  be  claimed   or conferred  by the State Legislature.  On this ground  alone, the  Section  is liable to fail.  Mm section falls  foul  of Article  14  and  must  accordingly  fail.   The   offending portions of Section 3-A cannot be severed from the main body of  the section and, therefore, the whole section is  liable to fall to the ground. [690C-G] Kranti  Sangran Parishad v. NJ.  Reddy, (1992) 3  A.L.T.  ", affirmed.. 7.3.Consequent  on  the striking down of Section  3-A,  the question  which  arises is as to what should happen  to  the students  who  were  admitted  by  the  Private  Engineering Colleges  in  this State, at their own  discretion,  to  the extent  of the 50% of the available seats.  Though the  High Court  has invalidated these admissions they are  continuing now  by virtue of the orders of stay granted by  this  Court Until    the   previous   year,   the    State    Government has  been permitting these private engineering  colleges  to collect  a  higher fees from all the  students  allotted  to them.  Of course, all the available seats were filled up  by students  allotted  by the convenor of the  common  entrance exam;  no one could be admitted by these colleges  on  their own.   For the current year, these colleges admitted 50%  of the  students  in their own discretion   which  necessarily means   collection  of  capitation  fees  and/or   arbitrary admissions  for their own private masons.  At the same  time these  colleges  have been collecting the same fees  as  was charged  last  year  both km the students  allotted  by  the convenor  as also-from those admitted by themselves.   Thus, they have reaped a double advantage.  Though the  admissions were  made In a hurry, but the fact remains that  they  have been continuing in the said course under the orders of  this Court  over  the  last  about  four  months.   The   present situation  has  been  brought  about  by  a  combination  of circumstances  namely  the  enactment of  Section  3-A.  the allotment   of  students to the extent of 50%  only  by  the convenor and 614 the  failure  of the Government to immediately  rectify  the misunderstanding of the convenor. [691C-E, H, 692A] 7.4. In the circumstances, these students should not be sent out at this stage.  May be, the result Is rather unfortunate but  all the relevant circumstances have to be weighed.   At the same time, the managements of these private  engineering colleges should not be allowed to walk away with the  double advantage  referred  to  above.  Since  they  have  admitted students  of their own choice to the extent of 50% and  also because It is not possible to investigate or verify for what consideration those admissions were made, It is  appropriate that these colleges should charge only that fee from the 50% free  students  as  is charged for similar  courses  in  the concerned   university   engineering  colleges.    For   the remaining years of their course these colleges shall collect only the said fee, which for the sake of convenience may  be called  the  ’government feel.  The balance  of  the  amount which they have already collected during this year shall  be remitted  Into  the  Government account  within  six  weeks. Whichever  college  fails to comply with this  direction  it will stand disaffiliated on the expiry of six weeks of  this order  and  the recognition granted to it, if any,  by  any appropriate authority shall also stand withdrawn. [692B-E] Per   L.M.  Sharma,  CJ.  (for  himself  and  Bharucha   J.) Concurring 1.1The question whether the right to primary education  as mentioned  in Article 45 of the Constitution of India, Is  a

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Fundamental Right under Article 21 did not arises in  Mohini Jain’s  case and no finding or obserbation on that  question was  called for. h cannot be accepted that since a  positive finding on that question was recorded in Mohini Jain’s case it becomes necessary to consider its correctness on  merits. this  Court should follow the well established principle  of not proceeding to decide any question A" Is not necessary to be  decided  In the case.  Therefore. no  opinion  upon  the question is expressed.  However, the finding given In Mohini Jain’s case on this question was not necessary in that  case and Is, therefore not binding law.  If It becomes  necessary to  decide this question In any subsequent case then  having regard  to  Its  vast impact, inter alia,  on  the  capacity financial capacity, the question may be referred to a larger Bench for decision. [622F-G, 623D-E] Mohini  Jain  v. State of  Karnataka, [1992] 3  S.C.C.  666, referred to. 615 1.2. Suffice it to say that there is no Fundamental Right to Education for a professional degree that flows from  Article 21. [623F] Per Mohan J (Concurring) 1.1.Article 21 acts as a shield against deprivation of life or  personal  liberty since personal liberty and  life  have come to be given expanded meaning It would not be  incorrect to  hold  that life which means to live with  dignity  takes within it education as well. [697E, 705C] Addl.   Dist.   Magistrate  v.  S.S.  Shukla,  [1976]  Supp. S.C.R. 172, relied on. 1.2.The fundamental purpose of Education is the same at all times  sad  In all places.  It is to transfigure  the  human personality into a pattern of perfectionthrough       a synthetic  process  of  the  development  of  the   body,the enrichment of the mind, the sublimation of the  motions and   the  illumination  of  the  spirit  Education   Is   a preparation  for a living and for life,when  and  hereafter. In  the  context of a democratic form  of  government  which depends  for  its sustenance upon the enlightenment  of  the populace education is at once at once a social and political necessity.  Education is enlightenment If the one that leads dignity to a man. [695C, E, 706G] University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 703, relied on. Oliver  Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, US.   Supreme Court Reports 98 Law.  Ed.  U.S. 347, referred to. 13.  It  is  not correct to say that because Article  21  is couched in a negative languauge positive rights to life  and liberty  are not conferred.The as to why Article 21 did  not positively  confer a fundamental right to life  or  personal liberty like Article 19 is that great concepts like  liberty and  We  were  purposefully  left  to  gather  meaning  from experience.   They relate to the whole domain of social  and economic  fact.  The drafters of the Constitution  knew  too well  that only a stagnant society remains  unchanged.   The right to life and liberty inhere In every man.  There is  no need to provide for the  time   in   a   positive    manner. Therefore,  if  really  Article 21, which Is  the  heart  of fundamental brights, has received added meaning from time to time,there  is  no  justification as to  why  It  cannot  be interpreted in the light of Article 45, wherein the State of obligated to provide education up to 14 years of within  the prescribed time limit [699D, 697E, G, 701G] 616 Maneka  Gandhi  v. Union of India A.I.R.  1978  597;  Kharak Singh  v.  State  of UP.,  [1964]  S.C.R.  332;  Kesavananda

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Bharati  v. Kerala, [1973] Supp.  S.C.R. 1; Puthumma &  Ors. v.  State  of Kerala & Ors., [1978] 2 S.C.R.  537;  American Constitution  in Mussorie v. Holland 252 U.S. 416; State  of M.P.  v.  Pramod  Bhyaratiya & Ors.,  [1992]  2  Scale  791; Satwant  Singh  v.  A.P.O. New Deft  [1967]  3  S.C.R.  525; Govinda v. State of UP., [1975] 3 S.C.R. 946; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494; Charles Sobraj  v. Supt.  Central Jail, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 111; Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra,  [1979] 1 S.C.R. 192; Hussaini Katoon v.  State of  Bihar,  [1979]  3  S.C.R. 169;  Prem  Shankar  v.  Delhi Administration [1980] 3 S.C.R. 855; v.  State of Maharashtra [1983] 2 S.C.C. %; A.G. of India v. Lachmadevi, A.I.R.  1986 S.C.  467;  Paramananda Katra v. Union of  India,  [1989]  4 S.C.C.  286;  Santistar Builder v. N.K.I  Totame,  [1990]  1 S.C.C. 520; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [1984]  3 S.C.C.  161;  Olga Tellis v. Bombay  Municipal  Corporation, [1985]  3  S.C.C. 545; Mohini Jain v.  State  of  Karnataka, [1992]  3  S.C.C. 666 and State of Andhra  Pradesh  v.  Lavu Narendranath, [1971] 1 S.C.C. 607, referred to. 1.4.If  life is so interpreted as to bring within it  right to  education,  it  has to be interpreted in  the  light  of directive  principles.   Harmonious  interpretation  of  the fundamental  rights vis-a-vis the directive principles  must be adopted. [706H, 707A] State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Anr.[1976] 1  S.C.R. 906;  Pathumma  & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.,  [1978]  2 S.C.R.  537  and Delhi Development  Horticulture  Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors., [1992] 4 S.C.C. 99, referred to. Constituent  Assembly Debates, 1948-49, Vol.VI, pp. 909  and 910, referred to. 2.1.A  time limit was prescribed under Article 45.  Such  a time limit is found only here.  If, therefore, endeavour has not been made till now to make this Article reverberate with life and articulate with meaning, the Court should step  in. The  State  can  be  obligated to ensure  a  right  to  free education of every child upto the age of 14 years. [713E] Norma  Bernstein, Human Rights and Education, Vol.. 3  p.41; John Ziman, World of Science and the Rule of Law, 1986  Edn. p.49, referred to. 617 2.2.Higher  Education  calls heavily on  national  economic resources.   The right to it must necessarily be limited  in any given country by its economic and social  circumstances. The  State’s  obligation to provide it  is,  therefore,  not absolute and immediate but relative and progressive.  It has to take steps to the maximum of its available resources with a  view to achieving progressively the full  realization  of the right of education by all appropriate means.  But,  with regard  to the general obligation to provide education,  the State  is  bound  to provide the same,  if  it  deliberately starved   its  educational  system  by  resources  that   it manifestly had, unless it could show that it was  allocating them  to some even more pressing programme.   Therefore,  by holding education as a fundamental right up to the age of 14 years this Court is not determining the priorities.  On  the contrary,  reminding it of the solemn endeavour, it  has  to take, under Article 45, within a prescribed time, which time limit has expired long ago. [716D-F] 2.3.Therefore, right to free education up to the age of  14 years is a fundamental right.  Since fundamental rights  and directive principles are complementary to each other,  there is   no  reason  why  this  fundamental  right   cannot   be interpreted  in  this manner.  Mohini Jain’s case  had  laid down  the law somewhat broadly when it stated  education  at

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all  levels.   This must be confined to  what  is  envisaged under Article 45. [719H, 717B, 716B] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues, [1973] 411 U.S., referred to. Mohini  Jain  v. State of Karnataka, [1992]  3  S.C.C.  666, partly affirmed. California Law Review, Vol. 57 19699 p. 380, referred to. 3.It cannot be said that establishment of an  educational institution  would be ’business’.  Nor again, could that  be called  trade  since no trading activities are  carried  on. Equally,  it  is not a profession.  It is one thing  to  say that teaching is a profession but, it is a totally different thing   to  plead  that  establishment  of  an   educational institution  would a profession.  It may perhaps fall  under the category of occupation provided no recognition is sought from  the State or affiliation from the University is  asked on the basis that it is a fundamental right. [724G-H] P.V  G. Raju v. Commissioner of Expenditure, I.T.R.  Vol. 86 p.267; P.K Menon v. Income-tax Commissioner, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 133; Hindustan 618 Steel  Limited v. State of Orissa, [1970] 1 S.C.R.  753  and Barendra  Prasad Ray v. The Income-tax Officer, A.I.R.  1981 S.C. 1047, referred to. Water  Supply  and  Sewerage Board v. R.  Rajappa  [1978]  3 S.C.R.  207  and Miss.  Sundaranbai v.  Government  of  Goa, [1988] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 604, distinguished. P.Ramanatha Aiyar, Law Lexicon Reprint, Edn. 1987  p.897; Black Law Dictionary, Fifth Edn. p.973 and Ramnath Iyer, Law Lexicon, Edn. 1987, referred to. 4.1.Educational  Institutions can be classified  under  two categories (1) those requiring recognition by the State and, (2) those who do not require such a recognition. [725F] 4.2.There is absolutely no fundamental right to recognition in  any  citizen.  The right to establishment  and  run  the educational institution with State’s recognition arises only on the State permitting, pursuant to a policy decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the Statute.  Therefore, where It is dependent on the permission under the Statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot qualify to  be a  fundamental  right.   Then again  the  State  policy  may dictate a different course. [725G-H, 726A] 4.3.The  logical  corollary of holding that  a  fundamental right  to establish an educational Institution is  available under Article 19(1)(g) would lead to the proposition,  right to establish a university also. [726B] S.Azeez  Basha & Anr. v. Union of India [1968]  1  S.C.R. 833, referred to. 4.4.If  there  is  no  fundamental  right  to  establish  a university  a fortiori a fundamental right to  establish  an educational  institution is not available.   By  implication also,  a  fundamental  right of  the  nature  and  character conferred  under  Article  30 cannot be  read  into  Article 19(1)(g).  The conferment of such a right on the  minorities in a positive way under Article 30 negatives the  assumption of  a fundamental right in this behalf in every  citizen  of the country. [727A-B] Ahmedabad  St. Xaviers College Society v. State of  Gujarat, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173, referred to. 619 4.5.Every  activity or occupation by the mere fact  of  its not  being obnoxious or harmful to society cannot by  Itself be  entitled  to  protection  as  fundamental  right.   Some rights,  by  the my very nature cannot be  qualified  to  be protected as fundamental rights. [729B]

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4.6.Accordingly,  there  is  no  fundamental  right   under Article 19(1)(g) to establish an educational institution, if recognition or affiliation is sought for such an educational institution.   However,  anyone  desirous  of  starting   an institution  purely  for  the  purposes   of  education  the students could do so, but 22 and 23 of the University grants C    ion Act Which prohibits the award of degrees except  by a University most be kept in mind. [729C-D] 5.It  is not possible to hold that a private  educational institution  either  by recognition or  affiliation  to  the university could ever be called an instrumentality of State. Recognition  is  for  the purposes   of  conforming  to  the standards  laid  down  by the State.   Affiliation  is  with regard  to the syllabi and the course of study.  Unless  and until  they are’in accordance with the prescription  of  the university,  degrees would not be conferred The  educational Institutions  prepare  the  students  for  the   examination conducted by the university.  Therefore, they are obliged to follow the syllabi and the course of the study. [732B-C] Ajay  Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981] 2  S.C.R.  79; Tekraj  Vasandi v. Union of India, [1989] 1 S.C.C.  236  and All India Sainik Schools Employees’ Assn. v. Sainik  Schools Society, [1989] Supp.  1 S.C.C. 205, relied on. 6.1.These private institutions discharge a public duty.  If a student desires toacquire  a degree, for example,  In medicine, he will have to route through a medical   college. These  medical colleges are the Instruments  to       attain thequalification.  Therefore, since what Is discharged  by the educational institution is a public duty, that  requires it  to  act fairly.  In such a case, it will be  subject  to Article 14. [732D] 6.2.These educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving  aid, it  is  a public duty.  If absence of aid does  not  detract from the nature of duty. [737C] Andi  Mukta  Sadguru  Shree Muktajee  Vandas  Swami  Suvarna Jayanti 620 Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. V.& Rudani [1989] 2 S.C.C. 691 and R.V.  Panel on Take-Overs, 1987 1 All England  Reports  564, relied on. 7.1.As  on  today, it would be unrealistic  and  unwise  to discourage  private  initiative  in  providing   educational facilities, particularly for higher education.  The  private sector  should be involved and indeed encouraged to  augment the much needed resources in the filed of education, thereby making  as  much  progress  as  possible  In  achieving  the constitutional  goals in this respect Private  colleges  are the felt necessities of time.  That does not mean one should tolerate  the so-called colleges run In thatched  huts  with hardly  any equipment, with no or  Improvised  laboratories, scam facility to learn in an unhealthy atmosphere, for  from conducive  to  education.   Such of them most  be  put  down ruthlessly with an iron hand irrespective of who has started the   institution  or  who  desires  to  set  up   such   an institution.They  are  poisonous  weeds  In  the  field   of education.   Those  who venture  are  financial  adventurers without  morals  or  scruples.  Their only aim  is  to  make money,  driving  a  hard bargain,  exploiting  eagerness  to acquire a professional degree which would be a passport  for employment  In  a country rampant with  unemployment.   They could be even called pirates In the high seas of  education. [742A-D) 7.2.However,  not  all the private Institutions  belong  to this  category  There are institutions which  have  attained

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great   reputation  by  devotion  and  by   nurturing   high educational standards.  They surpass the colleges run by the Government  In  many respects.  They  require  encouragement From  this  point  of view regulatory controls  have  to  be continued   and  strengthened.   The  commercialisation   of education,  the racketeering must be prevented.   The  State should strive its utmost in this direction. [743C] 7.3.Regulatory   measures  must  so  ensure  that   private educational  institutions  maintain  minimum  standards  and facilities.   Admission  within all  groups  and  categories should  be based only on merit There may be  reservation  of seats  in favour of the weaker sections of the  society  and other groups which deserve special treatment.  The norms for admission should be predetermined, objective and transparent [743D-E] 7A.  Profiteering  is  an evil.  If a  public  utility  like electricity could be controlled, certainly, the professional colleges also require to be regulated. [744A] 621 Kerala  State  Electricity  Board v.  S.N.  Govinda  Prabhu, [1986] 3 S.C.R.; Suman Gupta and Ors. v. State of J & K  and Ors.,  [1983] 3 S.C.R. 985; Oil and Natural  Gas  Commission and Anr. v. Association of Natural Gas Consuming  Industries of Gujarat and Ors., [1990] Supp.  S.C.C. 397 and  Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. A.P.S.E.B., [1991] 3 S.C.C. 2", referred to. 8.It  is  not  correct  to say  that  education  must  be available  free  and it must be run on a  charitable  basis. The time is not yet ripe to hold that education must be made available on a charitable basis, though whenever trusts  are made  for  advancement  of education it was  held  to  be  a charitable purpose. [746C, 747H, 748A] St.   Stephen’s  College v. University of  Delhi,  [1992]  1 S.C.C. 558; Special Commissioners of Income-tax v. Pemsel, 3 Tax  Cases  53;  The king v. The  Commissioner  for  Special Purposes  of the Income-tax, 5 Tax Cases 408 and  The  Abbey Malvem  Wells Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country  Planning 1951 (2) All England Law Reports 154, referred to. P.R.  Ganapathy  Iyer.   The  Law  relating  to  Hindu   and Mahomedan Endowments, Chap.  III p.46 & 49; B.K. Mukherje  : The Hindu Law of Religious and Chariatable Trust, p.58  para 2.7A, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C)  No.607  of 1992. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.                             WITH W.P.(C) Nos. 657, 602 & 678/92, SLP(C)No. 11852/92,  W.P.(C) No.701, 770 & 729/92 SLP(C) No. 13263, 12830 & 13913/92 with I.A.  Nos.  2-5, 13914 and 12845-58/92, W.P. (C) No.  785  & 836/92,  SLP(C)No.  13940/92,  W.P.(C)  No.  779/92,   2337- 2338/83,  C.A.  No.  3573/92, W.P.(C)  No.870/92,  855/92  & SLP(C) No.15039 of 1992. Milon  Kumar  Banerjee, Attorney  General,  Dipankar  Prasad Gupta,  Solicitor General, V.R. Reddy, Additional  Solicitor General,  K.K. Venugopal, Santosh Hegde, K. Parasam,  Shanti Bhushan,  Kapil  Sibal, R.K.Jain, Ms. Indira  Jaising,  C.S. Vaidyanathan,  D.D.Thakur,  V.M.Tarkunde,  Har  Dev   Singh, Sushil  Kumar,  Rana Jois, S.S. Javeli, S.K  Dholakia  Ashok Desai, C. Sitaramaiah Harish N. Salve, Madhunaik Nair, 622 Suchinto Chatterji, P.P. Tripathi, K.V. Mohan, Ejaz Maqbool, Vijai  Kumar,  V. Balachandran, S.R. Bhat, A.V.  Rangam,  A.

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Ranganadhan, W.C. Chopra, Satish Parasaran, Jayant  Bhushan, A.  Subha  Rao,  Ms.  Bharati  Reddy,  Ms.  Pramila,  T.V.S. Narasimhachari    Naresh    Kaushik,   Navin    Batra,    B. Veerabhadrappa,  Shankar Divate, Mrs. Lalitha Kaushik,  S.C. Patel  Mohan  V.  Katarki Shambhu  Prasad  Singh,  Rajeshwar Thakur,  Ms. Rani Jethmalani, KV.  Viswanathan, Madhu  Naik, K.V. Venkataraman, K. Ram Kumar, Vivek Gambhir, S.K Gambhir, B.E.  Avadh, M.D. Adkar, C.B. Babu, Smt.  Ayajai C.V.  Subba Rao, A.Mariarputham, Mrs. Aruna Mathur, Dr. Sumant Bhardwaj, Anuputham,   Aruna  &  Co.,  Ms.  Madhu  Moolchandani   S.A. Sequeira,  G.K Shevgoor, R.P. Wadhwani, Dr.  J.P.  Verghese, M.P. Raju, LJ.  Vadakara, P.R. Ramasesh, Anip Sachthey, S.S. Khanduja,  Yashpal  Dhingra,  B.K.  Satija,  A.M.  Majumdar, Sanjay  Parikh,  A.K.  Panda, Karanja  Wala,  Ajay  Malviya, Ranjan  Mukherjee,  R.K. Mehta, J.R. Das, D.K.  Sinha,  Mrs. Bharati Sharma, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Dr. Sumant Bhardwaj, R.S. Hegde,  K.R.  Nagaraja,  Sunil  Dogra,  Smiriti  Misra,  Ms. Madhavan,  P.H.  Parekh,  A.S. Bhasme,  Vimal  Dave  and  B. Rajeshwar Rao for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by SHARMA,  CJ.  We have had the benefit of going  through  the two  judgments of our learned Brothers B.P Jeevan Reddy  and S.  Mohan,  JJ.  We are in agreement with  the  judgment  of Brother B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. except to the extent indicated below. 2.The  question  which arose in the case of  Miss  Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, [1992] 3 SCC 666, as also in the present  cases  before  us,  is  whether  a  citizen  has  a Fundamental Right to education for a medical, engineering or other  professional degree.  The question whether the  right to  primary  education, as mentioned in Article  45  of  the Constitution of India, is a Fundamental Right under  Article 21  did  not arise in Mohini Jain’s case and no  finding  or observation  on  that  question  was  called  for.   It  was contended  before us that since a positive finding  on  that question  was  recorded  in Mohini Jain’s  case  it  becomes necessary to consider its correctness on merits.  We do  not think so. 3.Learned  arguments  were addressed in  support  of  and against  the aforesaid view which have been noticed  in  the judgments  of  our learned Brothers.  It  was  contended  by learned counsel appearing for some of the 623 parties  before  us  that  Article 37  in  Part  IV  of  the Consititution expressly states that the provisions contained in  Part IV shall not be enforceable by any court and  that, therefore,  assuming  the  right  under  Article  45  to  be included within the ambit of Article 21, it would still  not be  enforceable.  Emphasis was also laid upon  the  language used in Article 45 which requires the State to "endeavour to provide’ for the free and compulsory education of  children. A  comparison  of the language of Article 45  with  that  of Article  49  was made and it was suggested that  whereas  in Article  49 an ’obligation’ was placed upon the State,  what was required by Article 45 was "endeavour" by the State.  We are  of the view that these arguments as also the  arguments of  counsel  on the other side and the observations  in  the decisions  relied  upon  by  them  would  need  a   thorough consideration,  if  necessary by a larger Bench, in  a  case where the question squarely arises. 4.Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments in favour of and against the question aforementioned, we are of  the  view  that we should follow  the  well  established principle of not proceeding to decide any question which is not necessary to be decided in the case.  We, therefore,  do

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not  express any opinion upon this question except  to  hold that  the  finding  given  in Mohini  Jain’s  case  on  this question  was not necessary in that case and is,  therefore, not  binding  law.  We are of the view that  if  it  becomes necessary  to  decide, his question in any  subsequent  case then, for the reasons set out above and having regard to its vast impact, inter alia on the country’s financial capacity, the question may be referred to a larger Bench for decision. 5.For the purposes of these cases, it is enough to  state that  there  is  no Fundamental Right  to  education  for  a professional degree that flows from Article 21. B.P.  JEEVAN  REDDY, J. In these writ  petitions,  filed  by private  educational institutions  engaged in or  proposing to engage in imparting medical and engineering     education the correctness of the decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising  Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai   JJ. in Miss Mohini Jain V. State of Karnataka and Ors., is called in  question. The petitioners,running medical/engineering colleges in  the States  of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and  Tamil Nadu, say that if Mohini Jain is correct and is followed and implemented  by the respective State Governments  as  indeed they are bound to  they will have to close 624 down;  no other option is left to them.  It  is,  therefore, necessary in the first instance to ascertain what  precisely does the said decision lay down. 2.The  Karnataka Legislature enacted, in the  Year  1984, the  Karnataka  Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition   of Capitation fee) Act.  The preamble to the Act recites:               "An   Act  to  prohibit  the   collection   of               capitation  fee  for admission  to  educations               institutions  in  the State of  Karnataka  and               matters relating thereto;               Whereas the practice of collecting  capitation               fee  for admitting students  into  educational               institutions is widespread in the State;               And  whereas this undesirable practice  beside               contributing to large scale  commercialisation               of  education  has not been conducive  to  the               maintenance of educational standards;               And  whereas  it is  considered  necessary  to               effectively curb this evil practice in  public               interest  by  providing  for  prohibition   of               collection  or  capitation  fee  and   matters               relating thereto;               Be   it   enacted  by  the   Karnataka   State               Legislature in the               Thirty-Fourth Year of the Republic of India as               follows"               Clause (b) of Section 2 defines the expression               ’Capitation fee in the following words:               "2(b)Capitation  fee’  means  any  amount,  by               whatever   name  called,  paid  or   collected               directly or indirectly in excess of the  fee               prescribed under s"on 5, but does not  include               the  deposit  specified under the  proviso  to               section 3." Section  3 prohibits collection of. capitation fees  by  any educational   institution  or  anyone  connected  with   its management, notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force.  The Section along with its proviso reads thus. 625               "3. Collection of capitation fee prohibited.               Notwithstanding anything contained in any  law               for the time being in force, no capitation fee

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             shall  be  collected by or on  behalf  of  any               educational  institution or by any person  who               is  incharge  of  or is  responsible  for  the               management of such institution:               Provided.......................               Section  5,  which  is  the  other   provision               referred to in the aforesaid definition  reads               as follows:               5.  Regulation of fees etc.  (1) It shall  be               competent for the Government, by notification,               to  regulate the tuition fee or any other  fee               or  deposit  or  other  amount  that  may   be               received  or  collected  by  any   educational               institution  or class of such institutions  in               respect  of  any of all class  or  classes  of               students.               (2)No educational institution shall collect               any  fees  or  amount or  accept  deposits  in               excess  of  the amounts  notified  under  sub-               section (1) or permitted under the proviso  to               section 3.               (3)Every   educational  institution   shall               issue  an  official  receipt for  the  fee  or               capitation  fee  or deposits or  other  amount               collected by it.               (4)All  monies received by any  educational               institution by way of fee or capitation fee or               deposits or other amount shall be deposited in               the   account  of  the  institution,  in   any               Scheduled  Bank  and  shall  be  applied               and  expended  for  the  improvement  of   the               institution   and  the  development   of   the               educational  facilities  and  for  such  other               related purpose and to such extent and in such               manner  as  may be specified by order  by  the               Government.               (5)In  order to carry out the  purposes  of               sub-section  (4), the Government  may  require               any  education  institution  to  submit  their               programmes   or  plans  of   improvement   and               development   of  the  institution   for   the               approval of the               626               Government." 3.Section  4 provides for regulation of admission in  the educational  institutions in the State.  According  to  sub- section  (1), the maximum number of students  for  admission that  can be admitted to a course of study and  the  minimum qualifications  shall be fixed by the Government.   However, in  the  case  of  a  course  of  study  in  an  institution maintained  by or affiliated to the University, the  minimum qualifications  shall be fixed by the University and not  by the  Government.   Sub-sections  (2) and (3)  of  Section  4 pertain  to ’regulation of capitation fee during the  period specified  under the proviso to Section 3. In view of  their importance, these sub-sections may be set out in full :               "(2)  in order to regulate the capitation  fee               charged   or  collected  during   the   period               specified under the proviso to section 3,  the               Government may, from time to time, by  general               or  special order, specify in respect of  each               private  educational institution or  class  or               classes of such institutions.               (a)   the   number  of  seats  set  apart   as               Government seats:

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             (b)   the  number of seats that may be  filled               up by the               management of such institution.               (i)   from  among  Karnataka students  on  the               basis  of  merit,  on  payment  of  such  cash               deposits  refundable  after  such  number   of               years,  with  or without interest  as  may  be               specified therein, but without the payment  of               capitation fee; or               (ii) at the discretion               Provided  that such number of seats as may  be               specified by the Government but not less  than               fifty  per cent of the total number  of  seats               referred  to in the clauses (a) and (b)  shall               be filled from among Karnataka students.               Explanation.  For the purpose of this section               Karnataka  students  means  persons  who  have               studied  in such educational  institutions  in               the State of Karnataka run or recog-               627               nised by the Government and for such number of               years as the Government may specify;               (3)   an  educational institution required  to               fill seats in accordance with item (1) of sub-               clause   (b)  of  clause  (2)  shall  form   a               committee to select candidates for such seats.               A  nominee  each  of the  Government  and  the               University    to   which   such    educational               institution is affiliated shall be included as               members of such committee." These two sub-sections, in short, say: (i) it shall be  open to the Government to specify the number of seats that may be set  apart as "Government seats’ in any private  educational institution  or in a class or classes of such  institutions; (ii)  The Government can also specify that out of the  seats to  be  filled  by  the  Management  (Management  quota),  a particular  number  of  seats  may  be  filled  from   among Karnataka students, on the basis of merit on payment of such refundable deposit as may be prescribed; The government  can also  specify the number of seats that may be filled at  the discretion  of  the management. (It is obvious that  if  the seats to be filled on the basis of merit/refundable  deposit are  not  specified, all the seats  other  than  "Government seats"  can be filled at the discretion of the  management;) (iii)  the number of ’Karnataka students’ (which  expression is  defined by the explanation) should not be less than  50% over-all; (iv) in case, the number of seats to be filled  on merit-cum-refundable  deposit  are  specified,  a  selection committee,  as  contemplated by sub-section (3)  has  to  be formed for making the selection.  The expression "Government seats"  is defined in clause (e) of Section 2  in  following words:               "(e)  "Government Seats" means such number  of               seats in such educational institution or class               or  classes of such institutions in the  state               as  the  Government may, from  time  to  time,               specify  for  being filled up by  it  in  such               manner as may be specified by it by general or               special  order  on  the  basis  of  merit  and               reservation  for Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled               Tribes,   Backward  Classes  and  such   other               categories,  as  may  be  specified,  by   the               Government  from  time to  time,  without  the               requirement  of payment of capitation  fee  or               cash deposit."

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             4.    In  exercise of the power  conferred  by               section 5 of the Act, the 628 Government  of  Karnataka issued a notification on  June  5, 1989.  It provided that from the academic year 1989-90,  the fees  payable in private medical colleges shall be  Rs.2,000 p.a. in case of students admitted against ’Government Seats’ (the same as in the Government Medical Colleges),  Rs.25,000 in the case of other Karnataka students and Rs.60,000 in the case of non-Karnataka students. 5.Miss  Mohini Jain, a non-Karnataka student (she  was  from Meerut in Uttar Pradesh) applied for  admission in  M.B.B.S. course in one of the private medical  colleges in Karnataka. She was informed by the college that if she pays Rs.  60,000 towards  the first year’s tuition fee and furnishes  a  bank guarantee  for the fees payable for the remaining  years  of the M.B.B.S.   course,  she  will be admitted.  Her  parents were not in a position to pay the  same and hence she  could not  be admitted. Her further case, which was denied by  the Management  of the college, was that she was asked to pay  a capitation  fee of Rs.4,50,000 as a condition of  admission. She  approached this court under Article 32 challenging  the aforesaid  notification  of  the  Karnataka  Government  and asking for a direction to be admitted on payment of the same fee  as  was  payable by  the  Karnataka  students  admitted against the "Government Seats". 6.  The Bench which heard and disposed of the writ  petition framed    four  questions as arising for  its  consideration viz., (i) Is there a ’right to     education’ guaranteed  to the people of India under the Constitution ? If   so,   does the  concept  of ’capitation fee’ infract the  same  ?  (ii) Whether  the charging of capitation fee in consideration  of admission to educational institutions is arbitrary,  unfair, unjust and as such violates the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution ? (iii) Whether the  impugned notification permits the Private Medical Colleges to charge capitation fee in the guise of regulating fees under the Act ?  and  (iv) Whether the notification is  violative  of  the provisions  of the Act which in specific terms prohibits the charging of capitation fee by any educational institution in the State of Karnataka ? 7. On the first question, the Bench held, on a consideration of   Articles  21,  38,  39(a) and (f), 41  and  45  of  the Constitution: (a) "the framers of the Constitution made it obligatory  for the State  to  provide education for its citizens"; 629 (b)the  objectives  set  forth  in  the  preamble  to  the Constitution cannot be achieved unless education is provided to the citizens of this country, (c)the  preamble also assures dignity of  the  individual. Without  education,  dignity  of the  individual  cannot  be assured; (d)Parts III and IV of the Constitution are  supplementary to each other.  Unless the ’right to education’ mentioned in Article 41 is made a reality, the fundamental rights in Part III will remain beyond the reach of the illiterate majority, (e)Article  21  has  been interpreted  by  this  Court  to include  the right to live with human dignity and  all  that goes  along  with  it.   "The  ’right  to  education’  flows directly  from  right to life.’ In other  words,  ’right  to education’ is concomitant to the fundamental right enshrined in  Part  III  of the Constitution.  The State  is  under  a constitutional  mandate to provide educational  institutions at  all levels for the benefit of citizens." The benefit  of

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education cannot be confined to either classes. (f)Capitation  fee  is  nothing but  a  consideration  for admission.  The concept of "teaching shops" is alien to  our Constitutional scheme.  Education in India has never been  a commodity for sale. (g)"We hold that every citizen has a ’right to  education’ under the Constitution.  The State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy   the  said  right.   The  State  may  discharge   its obligation    through   state-owned   or    state-recognised educational institutions.  When the State Government  grants recognition  to  the  private  educational  institutions  it creates  an  agency  to  fulfil  its  obligation  under  the Constitution.   The  students  are given  admission  to  the educational  institutions  whether state-owned  or  state- recognised  in recognition of their ’right  to  education’ under   the  Constitution.   Charging  capitation   fee   in consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent  denial of a citizen’s right to education  under  the Constitution." 8.On the second question, the Bench held that "the  State action in permitting capitation fee to be charged by  state- recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary  and as  such  violative  of Article 14 of  the  Constitution  of India...........  The  Capitation fee brings to the  fore  a clear class bias." Admission of non-meritorious students  by charging capitation 630 fees  in any form whatsoever  strikes at the very root  of the constitutional scheme and our educational system.   D.P. Joshi   does  not  come  to  the  rescue  of   the   private institutions. 9.On  the third question, the Bench held that having  regard to  the  scheme  of  the Act, charging  of  Rs.  60,000  for admission  is ’nothing but a capitation fee’.   The  private medical colleges have further been given a free hand in  the matter  of admission of non-Karnataka students  irrespective of merit.  It held further : "if the State Government  fixes Rs. 2000 per annum as the tuition fee in government colleges and for "Government Seats’ in private medical colleges  then it  is  the  state-responsibility to see  that  any  private college which has been set up with Government permission and is being run with Government recognition is prohibited  from charging  more  than Rs. 2000 from any student  who  may  be resident  of any part of India.  When the  State  Government permits   a  private  medical  college  to  be  set-up   and recognises its curriculum and degrees then the said  college is  performing a function which under the  Constitution  has been assigned to the State Government.  We are therefore  of the  view that Rs. 60,000 per annum permitted to be  charged from Indian students from outside Karnataka in Para 1 (d) of the notification is not tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee  and  as such cannot be sustained and is  liable  to  be struck down." 10.The  notification impugned was accordingly held  to  be outside the scope of the Act and bad. (It was declared  that the judgment shall not be applicable to foreign students and N.R.Is.).  The  Writ petition was  allowed  accordingly  but Mohini fain was denied admission since "she was not admitted to the college 3n merit and secondly the course commenced in March-April,   1991."   (The  decision   was   rendered   on 30.7.1992).  It  was directed that the said  decision  shall have  only  prospective operation and shall not  affect  the admissions   already  made  in  accordance  with  the   said notification.

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It  is the above propositions that have provoked this  batch of writ petitions. 11. Mohini Jain was followed by a Full Bench of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kranti Sangram Parishad v. NJ.  Reddy, (1992) 3 A.L.T. 99. the Respondents in those writ  petitions including the State of Andhra Pradesh have filed a number of S.L.Ps.  seeking leave to appeal against the said  judgment. In  the  said  S.L.Ps., certain  issues  peculiar  to  those matters 631 arise, which we are not dealing with herein.  This  decision is concerned mainly with the correctness of Mohini jain  and the  following three questions, which were framed by  us  at the hearing.  The three questions are: (1)Whether   the  Constitution  of  India   guarantees   a fundamental right to education to its citizens ? (2)Whether a citizen of India has the fundamental right to establish  and run an educational institution under  Article 19(1)(g) or any other provision in the Constitution ? (3)Whether  the grant of permission to establish  and  the grant  of affiliation by a University imposes an  obligation upon an educational institution to act fairly in the  matter of admission of the students ? Before  we  deal  with  the above  questions,  it  would  be appropriate  to  notice  the  legal  and  relevant   factual position  obtaining  in three others States,  namely  Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.  All the matters before us  arise  from  these four States only.   Notice  in  these matters  were  however  directed to all the  States  in  the country.  None has appeared excepting the above four States.                        ANDHRA PRADESH 12.The  Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 was enacted  by the  State Legislature with a view to consolidate and  amend the laws relating to the educational system in the State  of Andhra Pradesh, for reforming, organising and developing the said educational system and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental therewith.  By virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 1, it applies to all educational institutions and tutorial institutions in the State except those governed by  the University Acts or the A.P.  Intermediate  Education Act, 1971.  Section 2 defines certain expressions  occurring in the Act.  Clause (11) defines the expression ’college’ to include a medical college established or maintained and  ad- ministered  by  or  affiliated  to  or  associated  with  or recognised  by  any University in the  State.   Clause  (18) defines ’educational institution’ to mean recognised schools and   colleges  including  Medical   Colleges.    Chapter-VI (Sections 18 to 33) deals with establishment of  educational institutions, their administration and control.  Section  18 says  that Government may, for the purpose  of  implementing the provisions of the Act, provide adequate 632 facilities  for imparting education either  by  establishing and  maintaining  educational institutions by itself  or  by permitting any local authority or private body of persons to establish and maintain educational institutions.  Section 19 classifies  the  educational  institutions  into  (a)  State institutions  (b)  local  authority  institutions  and   (c) private  institutions.   Section  20  deals  with  grant  of permission  for establishment of  educational  institutions. It  says that the competent authority (as defined in  Clause (12) of Section 2) shall from time to time conduct a  survey to identify the educational needs of the locality under  its jurisdiction and notify in the prescribed manner through the local   newspapers   calling  for  applications   from   the

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educational  agencies desirous of  establishing  educational institutions.  In pursuance of     such        notification, applications may be filed either by existing institutions or new   institutions   as  also  by  local   authorities   for establishment  of new institutions or for expansion  of  the existing ones.  Sub-section (3) prescribes the  requirements which have to be satisfied by an applicant, the matters with respect to which the competent authority has to be satisfied before    grant of permission and the steps that have to  be taken  by  the person (to whom the  permission  is  granted) within the specified period.  According to the  sub-section, an  application  has to be accompanied by  (1)  title  deeds relating  to the site for building, play-grounds and  garden proposed  to  be provided. (2) Plans approved by  the  local authorities concerned which shall  conform   to  the   rules prescribed   therefore   and   (3)   documents    evidencing availability  of the financing needed for  constructing  the proposed buildings.  The Authority must be satisfied  before granting  the permission that there is a need for  providing educational  facilities to the people in the locality,  that there  is  adequate financial provision  for  continued  and efficient  maintenance of the institution as  prescribed  by the competent authority and   evidence that the  institution is   proposed  to  be  located  in  sanitary   and   healthy surroundings.  The local authority or the body of persons to whom  the permission is granted has to appoint the  teaching staff   qualified  according  to  the  rules  made  by   the Government  in  this behalf and satisfy  other  requirements laid down by the Act, rules and the orders made thereunder,      within  the  period specified by the  authorities.   In default  of  such compliance, it shall be competent  to  the Authority  to cancel the permission.  Sub-section (4)  makes it  punishable  for  anyone  to  establish  an   educational institution otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act Anyone running an institution after  cancellation of the permission is also  punishable. 633 13.Section 20-A declares that on and from the commencement of  the A.P. Education (Amendment) Act, 1987, no  individual shall  establish  a private institution.   The  institutions already established by individuals however are not  affected by  the  said provision.  Section 21 deals  with  grant  and withdrawal of recognition of institution.  It provides  that the  competent  authority  may by  order  in  writing  grant recognition  to an educational institution permitted  to  be established  under Section 20 subject to such conditions  as may be prescribed in regard to the accommodation, equipment, appointment  of  teaching  staff  and  so  on.   It  further provides  that  if  any local  authority  or  other  private educational  institution fails to fulfil all or any  of  the conditions  of  recognition  or commits  any  of  the  other irregularities mentioned in sub-section (2), its recognition may  be withdrawn.  It is not necessary to notice  to  other provisions in the Act. 14.In  the  year 1983, the Legislature of  Andhra  Pradesh enacted   the   Andhra  Pradesh   Educational   Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation  Fee) Act,  1983.  The Act was made to provide for  regulation  of admission into educational institutions and to prohibit  the collection of capitation fee in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It  would be appropriate to notice the preamble to the  Act. It reads:               "Whereas    the   undesirable   practice    of               collecting  capitation  fee  at  the  time  of               admitting     students    into     educational

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             institutions is on the increase in the State;               And  whereas,  the  said  practice  has   been               contributing to large scale  commercialisation               of Education;               And  whereas, it is considered  necessary,  to               effectively  curb this evil practice in  order               to avoid frustration among the meritorious and               indigent  students and to maintain  excellence               in the students of education;               Be it enacted by the Legislature of the  State               of Andhra Pradesh in the Thirty-fourth year of               the Republic of India as follows:’ 15.The Act was brought into force on and with effect  from 30th  January, 1983.  Section 2 contains the  interpretation Clause.  Clause (b) defines the expression ’capitation  fee" to mean any amount collected in 634 excess  of  the fee prescribed under section  7.  Section  3 provides that admission into educational institutions in the State  shall be made on the basis of the marks  obtained  in the  qualifying examination or on the basis of  the  ranking assigned  in the entrance test conducted by  such  authority and in such manner as may be prescribed.  So far as  Medical and Engineering colleges are concerned, it is provided  that admission thereto shall be made exclusively on the basis  of the  ranking  assigned in the entrance test. The  State  has also  reserved  to  itself the power to  specify  seats  for Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled Tribes and  Backward  classes. Section   4  provides  that  even  a  minority   educational institutions  shall have to admit students on the  basis  of merit  while  admitting  the  students  belonging  to   that minority  or  other  students.   Section  5  prohibits   the capitation  fee.  It says ’the collection of any  capitation fee  by any educational institution or by any person who  is incharge  of  or is responsible for the  management  of  the institution  is hereby prohibited.’ Section 6 says that  any donations made to educational institution shall be made only in  the  prescribed manner and not otherwise, and  that  the money  so  received shall be deposited and  applied  in  the prescribed manner. Section-7  regulates  the  fee that can  be  charged  by  an educational  institution.  It would be appropriate  to  read the section here in its entirety:               7.    (1)  ’It  shall  be  competent  for  the               Government  by notification, to  regulate  the               tuition  fee  or  any other fee  that  may  be               levied   and  collected  by  any   educational               institution  in  respect  of  each  class   of               students.               (2)No educational institution shall collect               any  fees in excess of the fee notified  under               sub-section (1).               (3)Every  educational  ’institution   shall               issue   an  official  receipt  for   the   fee               collected by it." Section 9 provides for penalties in case of contravention of the provisions of the Act.  The punishment prescribed is not less  than  three years and not exceeding  seven  years,  in addition  to fine.  Section 15 confers upon  the  Government the  power  to make rules to carry out the purposes  of  the enactment.               16. The  1983  Act was amended in  the  year               1992 by inserting Section               635               3-A, which section reads as follows:

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             "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section               3, but subject to such rules as may be made in               this behalf and the Andhra Pradesh Educational               Institutions  (Regulation of Admission)  Order               1974, it shall be lawful for the management of               any  un-aided  private  Engineering   College,               Medical College, Dental College and such other               class of un-aided educational institutions  as               may  be  notified by the  Government  in  this               behalf to admit students into such Colleges or               educational institutions to the extent of  one               half  of the total number of seats from  among               those   who  have  qualified  in  the   common               entrance    test   or   in   the    qualifying               examination,  as the case may be, referred  to               in  sub-section (1) of Section-3  irrespective               of  the ranking assigned to them in such  test               or   examination  and  nothing  contained   in               Section 5 shall apply to such admission." It  is  necessary  to notice  what  precisely  this  Section provides  for.   It  starts with  a  non-obstante  clause ’Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  Section  3,   but subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf and  the Andhra  Pradesh  Educational  Institutions  (Regulation   of Admission)  Order  1974  (Presidential  order  issued  under Article  371-D of the Constitution)"; it then says  that  it shall  be lawful for the management of any un-aided  private Engineering  college,  Medical College, Dental  College  and such other class of un-aided educational institutions as may be  notified  by  the Government in  this  behalf  to  admit students  into such Colleges or educational institutions  to the  extent  of 50 per cent of the seats  from  among  those qualified   in   the  entrance  test   or   the   qualifying examination, as the class may be; the section says further rather curiously  that the educational institution shall be entitled to admit them irrespective of the ranking  assigned to  them in the entrance test or qualifying examination  and further  that nothing contained in Section 5 shall apply  to such  admission.   In short it means that it is  open  to  a private medical/engineering college to admit students of its choice  to the extent of 50 per cent  so long as they  have qualified  in the common entrance test  without  regard  to the  ranking  and/or  merit.  The  dispensing  with  of  the Section  5 for the above purpose is a clear indication  that it is open to the institution to collect such capitation fee as  it can from such students.  Of course, the tuition  fee’ shall be same as is prescribed by 636 the Government under Section 7. Section 3-A came into force on 15.4.1992. No Rules have been made by the Government under the Section so far. 17.On  25.5.1992,  the Government  issued  a  notification inviting  applications for permission to establish  Medical, Dental  and Engineering Colleges.  The last date  prescribed for receipt of applications was 8.6.1992. The applicants for Medical  Colleges had to deposit within the said date a  sum of  rupees  one crore in cash, furnish  bank  guarantee  for another   one  crore  and  produce  evidence  of   financial viability  to  the extent of four crores.  A  committee  was appointed  to inspect the land and other facilities  offered by the applicants.  The Committee formulated its  guidelines on   28.6.1992  and  submitted  its  report   on   21.7.1992 recommending  as  many as 12 Medical Colleges and  8  Dental Colleges.   The  then Chief Minister approved  the  same  on 27.7.1992  and  a G.O. was issued on the same  day  granting

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permission.   A  number of Writ Petitions  were  immediately filed  in the High Court challenging the said grant as  well as Section 3-A. 18.There  are a number of private engineering colleges  in the State. Until the current academic year (1992-1993),  all the  seats in these colleges were filled in by the  convenor of  the common entrance examination.  The management had  no discretion or choice in the matter of admission of students. They  were, however, permitted to charge a  particular  fees which  was  relatively higher than the fees charged  in  the Government  Engineering Colleges.  Nothing more.   But  when Section  3-A  was introduced in the 1983 Act  on  15.4.1992, these private engineering colleges took the stand that  they are entitled to admit students to the extent of 50 per  cent of  the  seats according to their  choice,  irrespective  of merit, so long as they have qualified in the entrance  test. It  is  obvious  that  such  a  stand  meant  collection  of capitation  fee as much as they could.  There was an  uproar among  the  student  and  teaching  community  against  such admissions.   Even the Government could not ignore the  said protest  and intimated the private engineering  colleges  on 26.7.1992 not to make any admissions till the Rules are made under Section 3-A.  The engineering colleges, however,  took the  stand  that  they  have  already  made  the  admissions according  to  their choice to the extent of  50  per  cent. Indeed  all this was facilitated by the fact  that  convenor allotted students to these engineering colleges only to  the extent  of 50 per cent of their respective capacity  instead of 100% as usual 637 thereby  sending an explicit signal that the  colleges  were free  to fill up the rest on their own.  Be that as it  may, these  admissions  led  to the filing of  a  batch  of  Writ petitions  in  the  Andhra Pradesh  High  Court.   Following Mohini Jain and also on certain other grounds, a Full  Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowed the Writ Petitions. It declared Section 3-A up-Constitutional.  It also declared that the admissions made by the private Engineering Colleges to  the  extent  of  50 per cent at  their  own  choice  was illegal.   The  Court  further declared that  the  grant  of permission  to 12 Medical and 8 Dental Colleges was  equally invalid.  It is against the said decision that the State  of Andhra  Pradesh,  certain educational institutions  and  the students admitted at the choice of the managements have come forward with a number of Special leave petitions. 19.Leave  is  granted in all the Special  leave  petitions preferred  against  the Full Bench decision  of  the  Andhra Pradesh  High  Court  dated 18th  September,  1992  in  Writ Petition  No. 8248 of 1992 and batch.  Besides the  appeals, there are a few writ petition-, from this State  questioning the correctness of the dicta in Mohini Jain.                     STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 20.The  Maharashtra  Legislature enacted  the  Maharashtra Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition of  Capitotion  Fee) Act, 1987 (being Maharashtra Act No. VI of 1988) to prohibit collection  of capitation fee for admission of students  to, and  the:  promotion to a higher standard or class in,  the educational institutions in the State of Maharashtra and  to provide  for matters connected therewith.  The  Preamble  to the Act declaims:               "WHEREAS the practice of collecting capitation               fee  for admitting students  into  educational               institutions  and  at the  time  of  promoting               students  to  a higher standard  or  class  at               various stages of education is on the increase

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             in the State;               AND WHEREAS this undesirable practice has been               contributing to large scale  commercialisation               of  education  which is not conducive  to  the               maintenance. of educational standards;               AND  WHEREAS the National Policy on  Education               1986               638               envisages   that  the   commercialisation   of               technical and professional education should be               curbed  and  that  steps should  be  taken  to               prevent the establishment of institutions  set               up to commercialise education;               AND  WHEREAS with a view to  effectively  curb               this  evil  practice, it is expedient  in  the               public  interest  to  prohibit  collection  of               capitation  fee for admission of students  to,               and  their promotion to a higher  standard  or               class in, the educational institutions in  the               State  of  Maharashtra  and  to  provide   for               matters  connected  therewith;  it  is  hereby               enacted  in  the Thirty- eighth  year  of  the               Republic of India as follows:" 21.  Section 2 defines certain expressions occurring in  the Act.  Clause (a)    defines  capitation  fee  to  mean  "any amount,  by whatever name called, whether in cash  or  kind, paid or collected, directly or indirectly, in excess of  the prescribed  or, as the case may be, approved, rates of  fees regulated  under section-4".  Sub-Section (1) of  Section  3 prohibits  the  collection  of  capitation  fee  either  for admission of a student or for his promotion to higher class. Sub-Section  (2),  however,  permits the  management  of  an educational institution to collect and accept donations from benevolent   persons,   organisations,  trusts   and   other associations  but  says that no seats shall be  reserved  in consideration thereof.  The moneys so received shall have to be deposited and dealt with in the prescribed manner.   Sub- section  (3) provides that if in any case it is  found  that any  private  educational institution  has  contravened  any provisions  of  the Act or the.  Rules made  thereunder,  it shall be directed to refund the same to the person from whom it  was  collected.  Section 4 empowers  the  Government  to regulate  the tuition fee that may be received or  collected by  any educational institution for admission to any  course of study in such institution.  Separate fee shall have to be prescribed for aided institutions and un-aided institutions. In the case of un-aided institutions, the tuition fee  shall be  prescribed  "having  regard  to  the  usual  expenditure excluding  any expenditure on lands and building or  on  any such  other  item  as  the  State  Government  may  notify." Different  scales  of  tuition fee  can  be  prescribed  for different  institutions  or  different  areas  or  different courses  of study, as the case may be.  Section  7  provides for  punishment which may extend to three years and fine  in case of contravention of any provisions of Act or Rules. 639 22.It  is  stated that the government of  Maharashtra  had prescribed  an uniform fee of Rs. 6,500/- per annum  in  the case  of  private un-aided engineering colleges,  which  was raised to Rs. 8,500/ in 1991.  In 1992, the fees was  raised only  in the case of outside students (students outside  the Maharashtra State) to Rs. 17,000/. It  is  also stated that the government of  Maharashtra  has issued a notification directing that 90% of the seats in any private  engineering college shall be filled by nominees  of

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the  Government  and  the  remaining  10  per  cent  by  the management  at  its  discretion.  In  the  case  of  medical colleges, the fee prescribed in the case of private un-aided medical  colleges  for  the current  academic  year  is  Rs. 30,000/ for Maharashtra students and Rs. 60,000/ in the case of  outside students.  In the case of medical colleges,  20% of  the seats are allowed to be filled by the management  at their  discretion.  Remaining 80% seats are to be filled  by the Government nominees. 23.Mahatma  Gandhi Mission, Nanded, the appellant in  C.A. No.  3573 of 1992 was permitted by the State  Government  to start  an  un-aided medical college at  Aurangabad.   It  is stated  that  the  appellant is a  Public  Charitable  Trust registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 as well as Bombay  Public  Trusts Act, 1950.  The  medical  college  is affiliated  to Marathwada University and is also  recognised by  the  Maharashtra  medical  council.   The  total  intake capacity  is  to seats each year.  The permission  to  start medical   college   was  accorded  to   the   appellant   on no-grant-in-aid  basis.  The appellant was allowed  to  fill 20%  of  the  seats at their  discretion  from  among  those students who have obtained a minimum of 50% of the marks  in the  aggregate  in specified subjects and  have  passed  the qualifying examination in their first attempt. (There is  no system of common entrance test in Maharashtra).   Admissions were  accordingly made for the current academic year.   Soon after  the  decision of this court in Mohini  Jain  a  large number  of students filed a writ petition in the High  Court of  Bombay  (Aurangabad Bench) claiming refund  of  the  fee collected  from them in excess of the fee prescribed by  the Government  for  students  admitted  in  government  medical colleges for such course.  A Division Bench made an  interim order   on  27th  August,  1992  directing   the   appellant institution to furnish a bank guarantee to the extent of 50% of  the excess amount collected by them from  the  students, i.e., in a sum of Rs. 42 lakhs pending 640 disposal of the writ petition.  It was further directed that pending disposal of the writ petition, the institution shall not  collect any amount in excess of Rs. 3,000/ from any  of the students.  The said interlocutory order is challenged by the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3572 of 1992. 24.Writ Petition 855 of 1992 is filed by Jammu and Kashmir Parents Association of Students questioning the notification issued  by  the  Government of  Maharashtra  obligating  the outside-Maharashtra  students to pay double the tuition  fee payable by the Maharashtra students. 25.Writ  Petition 678 of 1992 is preferred by  Maharashtra Institute of Technology, Pune questioning the correctness of Mohini  fain and praying for issuance of a declaration  that the  petitioner has a fundamental right under Article  19(1) (g)  of  the Constitution of India to establish  and  run  a self-financing  engineering  college subject  to  compliance with  the  regulatory  requirements  of  the  statute.   The petitioner has also invoked Article 19(1) (c) as  conferring upon him a right to establish/form any association to run an engineering college on self-financing basis.                          TAMIL NADU 26.Soon after the decision in Mohini Jain, the Governor of Tamil  Nadu promulgated an ordinance being ordinance No.  10 of  1992  called  the Tamil  Nadu  Educational  Institutions (Prohibition  of  collection of capitation  fee)  Ordinance, 1992.  The ordinance has since been substituted by an Act Tamil   Nadu   Educational  Institutions   (Prohibition   of collection of capitation fee) Act, 1992, being Act No. 57 of

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1992.   The  Act is designed to prohibit the  collection  of capital fee for admission to educational institutions in the State  of  Tamil  Nadu  and  provide  for  matters  relating thereto.  The preamble to the Act recites:               "WHEREAS  the practice of  collecting  capital               fee  for admitting students  into  educational               institutions is widespread in the State;               AND WHEREAS this undesirable practice, besides               contributing  a large scale  commercialisation               of  education, has not been conducive  to  the               maintenance of educational standards;               641               AND  WHEREAS  it is  considered  necessary  to               effectively curb this undesirable practice, in               public interest, by prohibiting the collection               of  capitation fee and to provide for  matters               relating thereto;               BE  it enacted by the Legislative Assembly  of               the  State  of Tamil Nadu in  the  Forty-third               year of the Republic of India as follows:" 27.The Act has been given effect from 20th day of  August, 1992,  the  date  on which the ordinance  was  issued.   The expression  ’capitation  fee’ is defined in  Clause  (a)  of Section 2 to mean "any amount, by whatever name called, paid or  collected, directly or indirectly, in excess of the  fee prescribed  under  Section  4."  Section  3  prohibits   the collection of capitation fee by any educational  institution or  by  any person on its behalf.  Section  4  empowers  the government  to  regulate the fee chargeable  in  educational institutions.   Once  such  a  notification  is  issued,  no institution can charge or collect any fee over and above the fee prescribed.  The Section reads thus:               "4.  (1) Notwithstanding any contained in  any               other  law  for the time being in  force,  the               Government may, by notification, regulate  the               tuition  fee or any other fee or deposit  that               may   be   received  or   collected   by   any               educational institution or class or classes of               such  educational institutions in  respect  of               any or all class or classes of students:               Provided  that before issuing  a  notification               under  this  subsection, the  draft  of  which               shall   be   published  in  the   Tamil   Nadu               Government Gazette stating that any  objection               or  suggestion  which may be received  by  the               Government,  within  such  period  as  may  by               specified  therein,  shall  be  considered  by               them.               (2)No educational institution shall receive               or collect any fee or accept deposit in excess               of the amount notified under sub-section (1).               (3)Every   educational  institution   shall               issue  an  official  receipt for  the  fee  or               deposit received or collected by it." Section   5   empowers  the  Government  to   regulate   the maintenance of 642 accounts  by the educational institutions in such manner  as may  be  prescribed.   Similarly,  Section  6  empowers  the Government  to  call upon the  educational  institutions  to submit  such returns or statements in such form and in  such manner as may be prescribed or carrying out the purposes  of the  Act.   Section  7 Provides for  penalties  in  case  of contravention  of  any of the provisions of the Act  or  the rules  made  thereunder.  The minimum  punishment  is  three

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years  imprisonment  which may extend up to seven  years  in addition   to  fine.   Besides  penalty,   the   educational institution  is  also  made  liable  to  refund  the  excess amount/capitation    fee   collected   to   the    concerned students/persons.  Section 12 gives an overriding effect  to the  provisions of the Act over any other law for  the  time being in force.  Section 14 confers upon the Government  the power  to make rules to carry out the purposes of  the  Act. It  is not brought to our notice that rules have  been  made under the Act as yet.  Sri P.R. Seetharaman, learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, however, filed a statement ’THE PRESENT  ADMISSION  FORMULA  IN  RESPECT  OF  SELF-FINANCING PRIVATE  MEDICAL COLLEGES AND ENGINEERING COLLEGES IN  TAMIL NADU’.   It is necessary to set out the statement  in  full. It reads:               "The   Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  has   also               recently constituted a committee for examining               proposals regarding regulation of fixation  of               fees in respect of self-financing colleges  of               medical and engineering and of Art and Science               as  well as unaided courses of  private  aided               colleges.   True copy of the order is  annexed               hereto.   The self-financing Medical  Colleges               in Tamil Nadu are allowed to admit  candidates               of  their  choice up to 60%  of  the  approved               intake of the college adhering to the  minimum               mark  rule prescribed for  Government  Medical               Colleges.  The remaining 40% of the seats  are               allowed  by the Director of Medical  Education               every  year and this is filled from among  the               approved  list  of  candidates  selected   for               admission  to Government and  Private  Medical               Colleges.     The    self-financing    private               Engineering  Colleges  are  allowed  to  admit               candidates  of  their  choice  up  to  50%  of               approved   intake   of   the   college   under               Management  quota.  The remaining 50%  of  the               seats are allowed by the Director of Technical               Education  every year from among the  approved               list  of candidates selected for admission  to               Government               643               and aided colleges.  True copies of the orders               passed  by  the Government of Tamil  Nadu  are               annexed hereto.               DATED  AT  DELHI THIS 10TH  DAY  OF  DECEMBER,               1992.                          COUNSEL FOR TAMIL NADU." 28.Sri Seetharaman further stated that the Government will insist   that  from  the  students  admitted   against   40% government  seats,  only  the fee  collected  in  government medical  colleges will be allowed to be collected.  He  also brought to our notice that the government has constituted  a committee  to  go into and frame rules  regulating  the  fee structure  in self-financing medical engineering  and  other colleges.  (vide G.O.M.S. 1172 Education (JI)  Deptt.  dated 30.11.1992.). 29.Writ  Petition  701 of 1992 is filed by  the  Annamalai University  and  its Pro-Chancellor,  Dr.  M.A.M.  Ramaswamy questioning  the  provisions  of  the  above  Act  and   the correctness of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain.   A writ  of mandamus is sought by this institution directed  to the respondents (State of Tamil Nadu, Union of India and the University Grants Commission) ’to forbear from in any manner interfering  with  the right of the  petitioner  to  collect

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capitation  fees  by whatever nomenclature the said  fee  or payment may be described from the students seeking admission into  various  degree  courses in  the  colleges  under  the control  of the petitioner University to cover a  reasonable return  on  the capital investment and  meet  the  recurring expenditure  every  year  for  running  the  course  in  the colleges  including  for running Rajah Sir  Muthiah  Medical College  and  Hospital from the various  students  who  seek admission  and who have the requisite merit to  be  admitted and  who are ready and @g to pay such amount.’ ’Yet  another mandamus is sought directing the respondents to ensure  that the petitioners are not compelled to charge merely the rates of  fees as charged by colleges run by the State  Government from the students who have the requisite merit for admission irrespective  of  their  capacity  to  contribute  for   the maintenance  and  running of the college as and  by  way  of payment of fees by whatever nomenclature it may be called. 30.The  petitioners have come forward with  the  following case:  Annamalai  University is  an  autonomous  residential unitary university es- 644 tablished  and incorporated under the  Annamalai  University Act, 1928 enacted by the then Madras Legislature.  It has 45 faculties including Engineering and Technology and Medicine. So  far  as  the medical college is  concerned,  the  annual intake is 125.  Against this strength of 125, the petitioner admits 50 students belonging to Scheduled Castes,  Scheduled Tribes  and  backward  classes.   Only  a  nominal  fee   is collected from them.  From the remaining 75 students, a  sum of Rs. 4 lakhs is collected by way of fees.  This sum of Rs. 4  lakhs  is hardly sufficient to meet the cost  of  medical education.   Unless  this  minimum  fee of  Rs.  4  lakh  is collected from at least 75 students, it is not possible  for the petitioner to run the medical college which is  attached to  a  hospital.  While so, the Governor of Tamil  Nadu  has issued  the aforesaid ordinance prohibiting  the  capitation fee.   This ordinance has evidently been issued pursuant  to the decision of this Court in Mohini Join. if the petitioner is  compelled to collect only that fee which is  charged  by the  Government in Government Medical Colleges, it would  be impossible  to  run the medical college.  It  has  to  close down.  The impugned ordinance (by the date of filing of writ petition  the Act replacing the ordinance had not  yet  come into  force)  is violative of the fundamental right  of  the petitioners to establish and administer a medical college by collecting  appropriate  amounts from the students  who  are ready  and willing to pay the same for their admission  into the medical college, says the petitioner.                           PART II Question   No.  1.-  "Whether  the  Constitution   of   Inda guarantees   a  fundamental  right  to  education   to   its citizens?’ 31.Right  to  education  is  not  stated  expressly  as  a fundamental right in Part Ill.  This Court has, however, not followed the rule that unless a right is expressly stated as a  fundamental right, it cannot be treated as one.   Freedom of Press is not expressly mentioned in Part III, yet it  has been  read into and inferred from the freedom of speech  and expression.  Express Newspapers v. Union of  India,,[1959] S.C.R. 12.  More particularly, from Article 21 has sprung up a  whole  lot of human rights jurisprudence viz.,  right  to legal  aid  and speedy trial Hussain Ara  Khatoon  [1979]  3 S.C.R.  532 to A.R. Antulay, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 225, the  right to  means of livelihood Olga Tellis, [1985] Supp.  2  S.C.R. 51,  right  to dignity and privacy, Karak.  Singh  [1964]  1

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S.C.R.  332,  right  to health Vincent, v.  Union  of  India [1987] 645 2  S.C.R.  468), right to  pollution-free  environment  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 119881 1 S.C.R. 279 and so on.   Let us elaborate. 32.In Express Newspapers V. Union of India, [1959]  S.C.R. 12 it has been held.               "The freedom of speech comprehends the freedom               of  press and the freedom of speech and  press               are  fundamental  and personal rights  of  the               citizens.’ 33.Article 21 declares that no person shall be deprived of his  life  or  personal  liberty  except  according  to  the procedure  established by law.  It is true that the  Article is worded in negative terms but it is now well-settled  that Article 21 has both a negative and an affirmative dimension. As far back as 1962, a Constitution Bench (comprising of six learned Judges) in Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [1964] 1 S.CR. 332 decided on 18th December, 1962 considered the content of the expression "personal, liberty"  occurring in  Article  21.  Rajgopala Ayyangar, J.  speaking  for  the majority, observed:               "We shall now proceed with the examination  of               the width, scope and content of the expression               "Personal  liberty"  in Article 21.   We  feel               unable  to hold that the term was intended  to               bear  only this narrow interpretation  but  on               the   other  hand  consider   that   "personal               liberty’   is  used  in  the  Article   as   a               compendious term to include within itself  all               the  varieties of rights which go to  make  up               the  ’personal  liberties" of man  other  than               those deal with in the several clauses of Art.               19(1).  In other words, while Art. 19(1) deals               with particular species or attributes of  that               freedom,  "personal liberty’ in Art. 21  takes               in and comprises the residue." The leaned Judge quoted the dissenting opinion of Field,  J. (one  of those dissenting opinions which have out-lived  the majority  pronouncements)  in Munn v. Illinois,  (1877  (94) U.S.  113/142  attributing  a broader meaning  to  the  word "fife’  in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to  the  U.S. Constitution,  which correspond inter alia to Article 21  of our  Constitution.   The learned Judge held  that  the  word ’personal  liberty’ would include the privacy sanctity of  a man’s home as well as the dignity of the individual. 646 The  minority  Judges,  however,  placed  a  more  expansive interpretation on Article 21.  They said:               "No doubt the expression’ personal liberty’ is               a  comprehensive  one and the  right  to  move               freely  is an attribute of  personal  liberty.               It is said that the freedom to move freely  is               carved out of personal liberty and, therefore,               the  expression ’personal liberty’ in Art.  21               excludes that attribute.  In our view, this is               not a correct approach.  Both are  independent               fundamental    rights,   though    there    is               overlapping.   There  is no  question  of  one               being carved out of another.  The  fundamental               right  of life and personal liberty  has  many               attributes and some of them are found in  Art.               19.   If  a person’s fundamental  right  under               Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely  upon

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             a  law to sustain the action, but that  cannot               be  a  complete  answer unless  the  said  law               satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19(2)  so               far  as the attributes covered by  Art.  19(1)               are concerned." 34.  In  Maneka  Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978]  S.C.  597 Bhagwati, J.   held  that the judgment in, R. C.  Cooper  v. Union  of India, 1970 S.C. 564 has the effect of  overruling the  majority opinion and of approving the minority  opinion in Kharak Singh. 35.In  Bolling v. Sharpe, 98 Lawyers Ed. 884  Warren,  CJ. speaking  for the U.S. Supreme Court observed "although  the court  has  not assumed to define "liberty’ with  any  great precision,  that term is not confined to mere  freedom  from bodily  restraint.   Liberty under law extends to  the  full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it  cannot  be restricted except for a  proper  governmental objective."  Having said so, the learned Judge proceeded  to observe  "segregation in public education is not  reasonably related to any proper governmental objective,, arid thus  it imposes  on  Negro children of the District  of  Columbia  a burden  that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation  of  their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.’ 36.The  word  "life"  occurring  in  Article  21  too  has received a broad and expansive interpretation., While it  is not  necessary  to refer to all of them, reference  must  be made to the decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay 647 Municipal   Corporation   [1985]   Suppl.   2   S.C.R.   51. Chandrachud,  CJ. speaking for a Constitution Bench of  this court observed:               "The  sweep of the right to life conferred  by               Article 21 is wide and far reaching.  It  does               not   mean   merely  that   life   cannot   be               extinguished or taken away as, for example, by               the  imposition  and execution  of  the  death               sentence,   except  according   to   procedure               established by law.  That is but one aspect of               the right to life.  An equally important facet               of  that  right  is the  right  to  livelihood               because, no person can live without the  means               of  living, that is, the means of  livelihood.               If the right to livelihood is not treated as a               part of the constitutional right to life,  the               easiest way of depriving a person his right to               life  would be to deprive him of his means  of               livelihood  to the point of abrogation.   Such               deprevation would not only denude the fife  of               its  effective content and meaningfulness  but               it  would make life impossible to  live.   And               yet, such deprivation would not have to be  in               accordance  with the procedure established  by               law,  if  the  right  to  livelihood  is   not               regarded  as  a  part of the  right  to  fife.               That,  which alone makes it possible to  live,               leave  aside what makes life viable,  must  be               deemed  to  be an integral  component  of  the               right to life.  Deprive a person of his  right               to livelihood and you shall have deprived  him               of his life.........               Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is  a               Directive Principle of State Policy,  provides               that  the State shall, in  particular,  direct               its policy towards securing that the citizens,               men  and women equally, have the right  to  an

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             adequate  means  of livelihood.   Article  41,               which is another Directive Principle provides,               inter  alia, that the State shall, within  the               limits   of   its   economic   capacity    and               development,  make  effective  provision   for               securing  the  right  to  work  in  cases   of               unemployment and of undeserved want.   Article               37  provides  that the  Directive  Principles,               though  not  enforceable  by  any  court,  are               nevertheless fundamental in the governance  of               the  country.   The  Principles  contained  in               Articles  39(a)  and 41 must  be  regarded  as               equally fundamen-               648               tal in the understanding and interpretation of               the meaning and content of fundamental rights.               If  there is an obligation upon the  State  to               secure  to the citizens an adequate  means  of               livelihood and the right to work, it would  be               sheer   pedantry  to  exclude  the  right   to               livelihood  from the content of the  right  to               life." 37.In  Bandhua  Mukti Morcha v. Union of  India  [1984]  2 S.C.R.  67 Bhagwati J. while affirming the proposition  that Article  21 must be construed in the light of the  Directive Principles of the State Policy observed thus:               "This   right  to  live  with  human   dignity               enshrined  in  Article  21  derives  its  life               breath from the Directive Principles of  State               Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of               Article  39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at  the               least,  therefore, it must include  protection               of the health and strength of workers men  and               women,  and  of  the tender  age  of  children               against abuse, opportunities and facilities of               children to develop in a healthy manner and in               conditions of freedom and dignity, educational               facilities, just and humane conditions of work               and  maternity relief.  These are the  minimum               requirements  which  must exist  in  order  to               enable a person to live with human dignity In  D.S.  Nakara  v. Union of India, [1983]  S.C.R.  130,  a Constitution   Bench  explained  the  significance  of   the addition  of the expression "Socialist" in the  preamble  of our Constitution in the following words:               "During the formative years.... socialism aims               at  providing all opportunities  for  pursuing               the   educational  activity  There   will   be               equitable distribution of national cake.... In  Vincent v. Union of India, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 468,  it  was held by a Division Bench of this Court that:               "In  a  welfare State, therefore,  it  is  the               obligation of the State to ensure the creation               and the sustaining of conditions congenial  to               good  health  In a series  of  pronouncements,               during the recent years, this court has culled               out               649               from   the  provisions  of  Part  IV  of   the               Constitution,  the several obligations of  the               State and called upon it to effectuate them in               order  that  the  resultant  pictured  by  the               Constitution fathers may become a reality.’ In  A.R.Antulay  v.  R.S.  Naik,  [1992]  1  S.C.R.  225,  a Constitution  Bench  of  this Court  held  that  Article  21

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creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily and that the said right encompasses an the stages of a criminal case. It was held that the violation of this right of the  accused may entail the very quashing of the charges. Interplay of parts III and IV/- 38.This  Court  has also been  consistently  adopting  the approach   that   the  fundamental  rights   and   directive principles are supplementary and complementary to each other and  that the provisions in Part III should  be  interpreted having  regard to the Preamble and the directive  principles of  the State policy.  The initial hesitation  to  recognise the profound significance of Part IV has been given up  long ago.  We may explain. While  moving  for  consideration  the  interim  report   on fundamental  rights, Sardar Vallabhai Patel  described  both the  rights  mentioned  in Pam III and  IV  as  ’fundamental rights’  one justificiable and other non-justiciable.   In his supplemental report, he stated:               "There  were  two  parts of  the  report;  one               contains   fundamental   rights   which   were               justiciable  and the other part of the  report               refers  to fundamental rights which  were  not               justiciable but were directives." This  statement  indicates  the  significance  attached   to directive  principles by the founding fathers.  It  is  true that  in The state of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan  119591 S.C.R.  995, fundamental rights were held preeminent  vis-a- vis  Directive  Principles but since then there has  been  a perceptible shift in this Court’s approach to the inter-play of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 39.As far back as in 1958, in the Kerala Education Bill  a Special Bench of this Court speaking through S.R. Das,  CJ., while affirming the primacy of Fundamental Rights, qualified the same with the following 650               observations:               Nevertheless’  in  determining the  scope  and               ambit of the fundamental rights relied upon by               or on behalf of any person or body, the  court               may   not  entirely  ignore  these   directive               principles  of State policy laid down in  Part               IV of        the     constitution  but  should               adopt the principle of harmonious construction               and  should attempt to give effect to both  as               much as possible " This  is  also the view taken in Hanif v.  State  of  Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629 at 655. In  Keshavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973  Suppl.  521 more than one learned Judge adverted to this aspect.  In the words of Hegde and Mukherjee.  JJ.:               "The   Fundamental   Rights   and    Directive               Principles  con  Part  IV  is  to  ignore  the               sustenance  provided for in the  Constitution,               the hopes held out to the nation and the  very               ideals  on  which our  Constitution  is  built               There   is   no   anti-thesis   between    the               Fundamental    Rules   and    the    Directive               Principles .... One Supplements the other."               Shelat  and  Grover,  JJ.  in  their  judgment               observed:               "Both Parts HI and IV .... have to be balanced               and harmonised  then alone the dignity of  the               individual can be achieved They  (Fundamental,               Rights and Directive Principles)were meant               to supplement each other."

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             Mathew,  J. while adopting the  same  approach               remarked:               "The object of the people in establishing  the               Constitution  was to promote  justice,  social               and economic liberty and equality.  The  modus               operandi  to achieve these objectives, is  set               out  in Parts III and IV of the  Constitution.               Both Parts III and IV enumerate certain  moral               rights.  Each of these Parts represents in the               main  the statements in one sense  of  certain               aspirations  whose fulfilment was regarded  as               essens-               651               tial   to  the  kind  of  society  which   the               Constitution-makers wanted to build.  Many  of               the articles, whether in Part III or Part  IV,               represent moral rights which they have  recog-               nised as inherent in every human being in  his               country.  The task of protecting and realising               these rights is imposed upon all the organs of               the State, namely, legislative, executive  and               judicial.   What then is the importance to  be               attached  to the fact that the  provisions  of               Part  III are enforceable in a Court  and  the               provisions in Part IV are not?  Is it that the               rights reflected in the provisions of Part III               are  somehow superior to the moral claims  and               aspirations  reflected  in the  provisions  of                             Part  IV?  I think not.  Free  and  compulsory               education  under  Article 45 is  certainly  as               important as freedom of religion under Article               25.   Freedom from starvation is as  important               as  right to life.  Nor are the provisions  in               Part III absolute in the sense that the rights               represented  by them can always be given  full               implementation."               Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) put  the               same idea in the following words:               "As I look at the provisions of Parts III  and               IV, I feel no doubt, that the basic object  of               conferring  freedoms  on  individuals  is  the               ultimate achievement of the ideals set out  in               Part  IV.....  May I say  that  the  directive               principles  of  State  policy  should  not  be               permitted to become ’a mere rope of sand’.  If               the State fails to create conditions in  which               the  fundamental  freedoms can be  enjoyed  by               all,  the  freedom of the few will be  at  the               mercy  of the many and then all freedoms  will               vanish."               40.   In  State  of  Karnataka  v.  Ranganatha               Reddy, Krishna Iyer, J. stated:               "Our  thesis is that the dialectics of  social               justice should not. be missed if the systhesis               of Part III and Part IV is to influence  State               action and Court pronouncements." In U.P.S.C Board v. Harishankar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 65 it  was observed: Addressed to courts, what the injunction  (Article 37) means is that while 652 courts  are  not free to direct the making  of  legislation, courts  are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt  principle  of interpretation  which will further and not hinder the  goals set  out in the Directive Principles of State Policy.   This command of the constitution must be everpresent in the minds

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of  the  Judges while interpreting  statutes  which  concern themselves  directly or indirectly with matters set  out  in the  Directive Principles of State Policy." This is  on  the view  that  the ’State’ in Article 36 read with  Article  12 includes the judiciary as well. In  Minerva Mills v. Union of India A.I.R. 1980  S.C.  1789, Chandrachud,  CJ.  quoted  with  approval  the  similie   of Granvlle Austin that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot and observed that "to give absolute primacy to one over   the   other  is  to  disturb  the  harmony   of   the Constitution.’ The learned Chief Justice obserned further:               "Those rights (Fundamental Rights) are not  an               end in themselves but are the means to an end.               The end is specified in Part IV.’ 41.It  is thus well established by the decisions  of  this Court   that  the  provisions  of  Parts  III  and  IV   are supplementary  and  complementary  to each  other  and  that Fundamental  Rights  are  but a means to  achieve  the  goal indicated in Part IV.  It is also held that the  Fundamental Rights  must  be  construed in the light  of  the  Directive Principles.  It is from the above stand point that  Ouestion No.1 has to be approached. ARTICLE 21 AND RIGHT TO EDUC4TION. 42.In  Bandhua Mukti March this court held that the  right to  life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in  ’educational facilities".   (The   relevant  portion  has   been   quoted hereinbefore).     Having   regard   to   the    fundamental significance  of education to the life of an individual  and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted  in the   earlier   decisions   of  this   Court   referred   to hereinbefore,  we  hold,  agreeing  with  the  statement  in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, that right to education is implicit in and  flows from the right to life guaranteed by Article  21. That  the  right  to education has been treated  as  one  of transcendental  importance in the life of an individual  has recognised  not  only  in this country  since  thousands  of years,  but  all  over  the  world.   In  Mohini  Jain   the importance of education has 653 been  duly and rightly stressed.  The relevant  observations have  already  been  set out in  para  7  hereinbefore.   In particular,  we  agree  with the  observation  that  without education  being provided to the citizens of  this  country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved.  The Constitution would fail.  We do not think  that  the  importance of education  could  have  been better  emphasised than in the above words.  The  importance of  education  was  emphasised in  the  ’Neethishatakam’  by Bhartruhari (First Century B.C.) in the following words:               "Translation:               Education is the special manifestation of man;               Education   is  the  treasure  which  can   be               preserved without the fear of loss;               Education secures material pleasure, happiness               and  fame;  Education is the  teacher  of  the               teacher;               Education is God incarnate;               Education  secures honour at the hands of  the               State, not money-               A man without education is equal to animal." The fact that right to education occurs in as many as  three Articles  in Part IV viz., Articles 41, 45 and 46 shows  the importance  attached  to it by the founding  fathers.   Even some  of the Articles in Part III viz., Articles 29  and  30 speak of education.

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43.In  Brown  v. Board of Education, 98 Lawyers  Ed.  873, Earl  Warren,  CJ.,  speaking for  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court emphasised the right to education in the following words:               "Today,   education   is  perhaps   the   most               important function               of state and                eats........    It               is  required  in the performance of  our  most               basic  responsibilities, even service  in  the               armed  forces.  It is the very  foundation  of               good  citizenship.  Today it is the  principal               instrument in awaken-               654               ing the child to cultural values, in preparing               him  for later professional training,  and  in               helping   him  to  adjust  normally   to   his               environment.   In these days, it  is  doubtful               any  child  may  reasonably  be  expected   to               succeed   in   life  if  he  is   denied   the               opportunity of an education."               In  Wisconsin  v. Yoder, 32 L.Ed. 2d,  15  the               Court recognised that:               "Providing  public schools ranks at  the  very               apex of the function of a State." The   said   fact  has  also  been   affirmed   by   eminent educationists  of modern India like Dr. Radhakrishnan,  J.P. Naik, Dr. Kothari and others. 44.It is argued by some of the counsel for the petitioners that Article 21 is negative an character and that it  merely declares  that  no person shall be deprived of his  life  or personal   liberty   except  according  to   the   procedure established  by law.  Since the State is not  depriving  the respondents-students of their right to education, Article 21 is  not attracted, it is submitted.  If and when  the  State makes  a  law  taking away the  right  to  education,  would Article 21 be attracted, according to them.  This  argument, in our opinion, is really born of confusion; at any rate, it is  designed  to confuse the issue.  The first  question  is whether the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in  the  right  to education or not.  It is  then  that  the second question arises whether the State is taking away that right.  The mere, fact that the State is not taking away the right as at present does not mean that right to education is not  included within the right to life.  The content of  the right  is  not  determined by  perception  of  threat.   The content  of  right to life is not to be  determined  on  the basis of existence or absence of threat of deprivation.  The effect of holding that right to education is implicit in the right  to fife is that the State cannot deprive the  citizen of  his  right to education except in  accordance  with  the procedure prescribed by law. 45.In  the above state of law, it would not be correct  to contend that Mohini Jain was wrong in so far as it  declared that  "the right to education flows directly from  right  to life.’  But  the  question is what is the  content  of  this right?  How much and what level of education is necessary to make  the life meaningful?  Does it mean that every  citizen of  this  country  can call upon the State  to  provide  him education  of  his  choice?  In  other  words,  whether  the citizens of this country can demand that the State provide 655 adequate  number of medical colleges,  engineering  colleges and  other  educational institutions to  satisfy  all  their educational  needs?   Mohini Jain seems to say,  yes.   With respect, we cannot agree with such a broad proposition.  The right  to education which is implicit in the right  to  fife

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and  personal  liberty  guarenteed by  Article  21  must  be construed  in the fight of the directive principles in  Part IV  of the Constitution So far as the right to education  is concerned,  there  are  several articles in  Part  IV  which expressly  speak  of it.  Article 41 says  that  the  "State shall  within  the  limits  of  its  economic  capacity  and development make effective provision for securing the  right to  work, to education and to public assistance in cases  of unemployment,  old  age, sickness and  disablement,  and  in other cases of underserved want.’ Article 45 says that  "the State  shau  endeavour to provide, within a  period  of  ten years  from the commencement of this Constitution, for  free and  compulsory  education  for  all  children  until   they complete  the  age of fourteen years.’ Article  46  commands that  ’the  State  shall  promote  with  special  care   the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the  Scheduled  Tribes, and shall protect them  from  social injustice  and all forms of exploitation."  Education  means knowledge   and  Knowledge itself is  power.’  As  rightly observed  by  Johan  Adams, ’the preservation  of  means  of knowledge  among the lowest ranks is of more  importance  to the public than all the property of all the rich men in  the country"  (Dissertation on canon and fuedal law, 1765).   It is  this concern which seems to underlie Article 46.  It  is the  tyrants  and  bad rulers who are afraid  of  spread  of education and knowledge among the deprived classes.  Witness Hitler  railing  against  universal  education.   He   said: ’Universal    education   is   the   most   corroding    and disintegrating poison that liberalism has ever invented  for its own destruction.’ (Rauschning, The voice of destruction: Hider speaks).  A true democracy is one where education  is universal where people understand what Is good for them  and nation  and  know  how  to  govern  themselves.   The  three articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others.  It is in the light of these articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to  be determined.  Right to education understood in the context of Articles  45 and 41, means. (a) every child/citizen of  this country has a right to free education until he completes the age  of  fourteen  years  and  (b)  after  a   child/citizen completes  14years, his right to education is  circumscribed by the 656 limits  of  the  economic  capacity of  the  State  and  its development We may deal with both these limbs separately. Right to free education for all children until they complete the  age  of fourteen years (45-A).  It is  noteworthy  that among  the  several  articles in part IV,  only  Article  45 speaks  of a time-limit; no other article does.  Has  it  no significance?  Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44  years of the Constitution?  Can the State flout the said direction even  after 44 years on the ground that the  article  merely calls upon it to "endeavour to provide" the same and on  the further  ground that the said article is not enforceable  by virtue  of  the  declaration in Article 37.   Does  not  the passage  of  44  years  more than  four  times  the  period stipulated in Article 45  convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right?  In this context,  we feel  constrained to say that allocation of available  funds to  different  sectors of education in  India  discloses  an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution.   The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 45.   It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of  the

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limits  of  its economic capacity and development’  as  does Article  41, which inter alia speaks of right to  education. What has actually happened is  more money is spent and more attention  is directed to higher education that to  and  at the  cost of  primary education. (By primary education,  we mean  the  education, which a normal child receives  by  the time  he completes 14 years of age).  Neglected more so  are the  rural sectors, and the weaker sections of  the  society referred  to in Article 46.  We clarify, we are not  seeking to lay down the priorities for the government  we are  only amphasising  the  constitutional  policy  as  disclosed   by Articles  45,  46  and  41.   Surely  the  wisdom  of  these constitutional   provisions   is  beyond   question.    This inversion of priorities has been commended upon adversely by both the educationists and economists. Gunnar  Myrdal  the  noted  economist  and  sociologist,   a recognised  authority  on  South Asia, in  his  book  "Asian Drama"  (abridged  Edition published in  1972)  makes  these perceptive observations at page 335:               "But there is another and more valid criticism               to make.  Although the declared purpose was to               give  priority to the increase  of  elementary               schooling  in  order  to  raise  the  rate  of               literacy in the population, what has  actually               happened is that secondary schooling has  been               rising much faster and               657               tertiary  schooling has increased  still  more               rapidly.   There is a fairly general  tendency               for  planned  targets  of  increased   primary               schooling  not to be reached, whereas  targets               are over-reached, sometimes substantially,  as               regards    increases   in    secondary    and,               particularly,  tertiary schooling.   This  has               all  happened  in  spite  of  the  fact   that               secondary schooling seems to be three to  five               times  more expensive than primary  schooling,               and  schooling at the tertiary level  five  to               seven   times  more  expensive  than  at   the               secondary level.               What we see functioning here is the distortion               of development from planned targets under  the               influence  of  the pressure from  parents  and               pupils in the upper strata who everywhere  are               politically powerful.  Even more remarkable is               the fact that this tendency to distortion from               the  point of view of the planning  objectives               is more accentuated in the poorest  countries,               Pakistan,  India, Burma and  Indonesia,  which               started out with far fewer children in primary               schools  and which should therefore  have  the               strongest  reasons to carry out the  programme               of   giving  primary  schooling  the   highest               priority.    It  is  generally   the   poorest               countries   that  are  spending  least,   even               relatively, on primary education, and that are               permitting  the largest distortions  from  the               planned  targets  in favour of  secondary  and               tertiary education.’ In his other book ’Challenge of World Poverty’ (published in 1970) he discusses elaborately  in chapter 6 ’Education’ the  reasons  for and the consequences of neglect  of  basic education  in  this  country.  He  quotes  J.P.  Naik,  (the renowned   educationist  whose  Report  of   the   Education Commission,  1966  is  still  considered  to  be  the   most

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authoritative  study of education scene in India) as  saying ’Educational development......... is benefiting the  ’haves’ more  than  the "have not’.  This is a  negation  of  social justice and ’planning’ proper’  and our constitution speaks repeatedly  of social justice (Preamble and Article  38(1)). As  late as 1985, the Ministry of Education has this to  say in para 3.74 of its publication "Challenge of Education   a policy perspective".  It is stated there: 658               "3.74.    Considering    the    constitutional               imperative  regarding the universalisation  of               elementary  education  it was to  be  expected               that  the  share  of  this  sector  would   be               protected  from attribution.  Facts,  however,               point in the opposite direction.  From a share               of 56 per cent in the First Plan, it  declined               to  35 per cent in the Second Plan, to 34  per               cent in the Third Plan, to 30 per cent in  the               Fourth Plan. it started going up again only in               the Fifth Plan, when it was at the level of 32               per  cent, increasing in Sixth Plan to 36  per               cent,  stiff 20 per cent below the First  Plan               level.   On the other hand, between the  First               and  the Sixth Five Year Plans, the  share  of               university  education went up from 9 per  cent               to 16 per cent." Be  that as it may, we must say that at least now the  State should honour the command of Article 45.  It must be made  a reality   atleast now.  Indeed,  the  ’National  Education Policy  1986’ says that the promise of, Article 45 will  be redeemed before the end of this century.  Be that as it may, we  hold that a child (citizen, has a fundamental  right  to free education up to the age of 14 years. 46.This does not however mean that this obligation can  be performed  only through the State schools.  It can  also  be done  by permitting, recognising and aiding  voluntary  non- governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart  free education to children.  This does not also mean that unaided private schools cannot continue.  They can, indeed, they too have  a role to play.  They meet the demand of that  segment of  population  who  may not wish  to  have  their  children educated  in  State-run schools.  They have  necessarily  to charge  fees from the students.  In this judgment,  however, we  do  not wish to say anything about such schools  or  for that  matter other private educational  institutions  except ’professional   colleges,   This   discussion   is    really necessitated  on  account of the  principles  enunciated  in Mohini   jain  and  the  challenge  mounted  against   those principles in these writ petitions. 47.At  this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer  to the  additional affidavit filed by the Union of  India.   In this  affidavit.  the  present state of  primary  and  upper primary education is set out. (Primary stage means Classes I to V. Upper primary stage means classes VI to VIII).  After 659 setting  out  the  particulars  of  number  of  schools  and enrollment  therein,  it  is stated in  para  3  that  ’this increase  provided Indian Education System with one  of  the largest systems in the world, providing accessibility within 1  Km. distance of Primary schools to 8.26 habitations  con- taining  about 94% of the country’s population.   Growth  in enrolment  in the decade of 80s showed an acceleration  that has  now  brought enrolment rates close of 100%  at  primary stage.’  Again  in  para  4,  under  the  sub-heading  "Free education", the following statement occurs:

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             "4.   In the endeavour to  increase  enrolment               and  achieve  the  target of  UEE,  all  State               Governments  have  abolished tuition  fees  in               Government  Schools  run by local  bodies  and               private  aided institutions is mostly free  in               these  States;  however,  in  private  unaided               schools  which constitute 3.7.% of  the  total               elementary schools in the country, some fee is               Charged.   Thus, overall it may be  said  that               education   up   to   elementary   level    in               practically all schools is free.  Other  costs               of  education, such as text  books,  uniforms,               schools bags, transport etc. are not borne  by               States  except in a very few cases by  way  of               incentives to children of indigent families or               those  belonging to Scheduled  Caste/Scheduled               Tribes  categories.  The reason why the  State               Government are unable to bear this  additional               expenditure  is  that 96%  of  expenditure  on               elementary  education  goes  in  meeting   the               salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff."               Para 5 of the affidavit deals with "Compulsory               education".  It reads as follows:               "5.  14  States and 4 Union  Territories  have               enacted   legislation  to   make   educational               compulsory  but the socioeconomic  compulsions               that keep the children away from schools  have               restrained them from prescribing the rules and               regulations  whereby those provisions  can  be               endorsed." The  affidavit also mentions the steps taken by Central  and State Governments in pursuance of Naitonal Education  Policy including "Operation Blackboard" and its contribution to the increase  in primary education. It was indeed gratifying  to note these facts, though much more remains to 660       be done to raise the quality of instruction. Before proceeding further  we think it right to say this: We are  aware that "Education is the second highest  sector  of budgeted expenditure after the defence.  A little more  than three  per  cent of the Gross National Product is  spent  in education",  as  pointed out in para 231  of  ’Challenge  of Education.    But  this  very  publication  says  that   "in comparison  to  many countries, India spends  much  less  on education  in  terms  of the proportion  of  Gross  National Product’   and further ’in spite of the fact  that  educa- tional  expenditure  continues  to be the  highest  item  of expenditure  next  only  to Defence  the  resource  gap  for educational needs is one of the major problems.  Most of the current  expenditure is only in the form of salary  payment. It  hardly  needs  to  be  stated  that  additional  capital expenditure  would  greatly  augment  teacher   productivity because  in the absence of expenditure on other  heads  even the  utilisation of staff remains low.’ We do  realise  that ultimately it is a question of resources and  resources-wise this  country is not in a happy position.  AR we are  saying is that while allocating the available resources, due regard should  be  had  to the wise words of  Founding  Fathers  in Articles  45  and  46.  Not that we are  not  aware  of  the importance  and significance of higher education.  What  may perhaps  be  required is a proper balancing of  the  various sectors of education. Right to education after the child/citizen completes the age of 14 years. 48.The right to education further means that a citizen has

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a  right  to  call upon the  State  to  provide  educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and  development.   By saying so, we  are  not  transferring Article 41 from part IV to Part III  we are merely  relying upon  Article 41 to illustrate the content of the  right  to education  flowing from Article 21.  We cannot believe  that any  State would say that it need not provide  education  to its  people even within the limits of its economic  capacity and development.  It goes without saying that the limits  of economic  capacity are, ordinarily speaking, matters  within the subjective satisfaction of the State. 49.In the fight of the above enunciation, the apprehension expressed by the counsel for the petitioners that by reading the right to education into Article 21, this Court would  be enabling each and every citizen of this country to  approach the courts to compel the State to provide him such education as  he chooses must be held to be unfounded.  The  right  to free 661 education is available only to children until they  complete the  age  of 14 years.  Thereafter, the  obligation  of  the State  to provide education is subject to the limits of  its economic  capacity  and  development.  Indeed,  we  are  not stating   anything  new.   This  aspect  has  already   been emphasised   by   this  Court  in  Francis   C   Mullin   v. Administrator,  Union  Territory of Delhi, [1981]  2  S.C.R. 516.   While elaborating the scope of the  right  guaranteed under Article 21, this court stated:               "But the question which arises is whether  the               right to life is limited only to protection of               limb  or  faculty or does it  go  further  and               embrace  something  more.  We think  that  the               right  to  life includes right  to  live  with               human dignity and all that goes along with  it               viz.,  the  bare necessities of life  such  as               adequate  nutrition, clothing and shelter  and               facilities for reading, writing and expressing               oneself in diverse forms, freely moving  about               the  mixing and commingling with fellow  human               beings.  Of course, the magnitude and  content               of  the components of this right would  depend               upon the extent of the economic development of               the  country, but it must in any view  of  the               matter,   include   a  right  to   the   basic               necessities  of  life and also  the  right  to               carry  on  such functions  and  activities  as               constitute the bare minimum expression of  the               humanself" 50.We must hasten to add that just because we have  relied upon  some  of  the  directive  principles  to  locate   the parameters of the right to education implicit in Article 21, it  does  not  follow  automatically  that  each  and  every obligation  referred  to  in  Part  IV  gets   automatically included within the purview of Article 21.  We have held the right  to  education  to be implicit in the  right  to  fife because of its inherent fundamental importance.  As a matter of  fact, we have referred to Articles 41, 45 and 46  merely to determine the parameters of the said right.                          PART  III Question Nos. 2 and 3. 51.It would be convenient to deal with question Nos.2 and  3 together.   The  contentions urged by the  counsel  for  the petitioners  can  be  broadly summarised  in  the  following words: 662

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(a)The  State has no monopoly in the matter  of  imparting education.   Every  citizen  has the  fundamental  right  to establish an educational institution as a part of the  right guaranteed  to him by Article 19(1)(g) of the  Constitution. This   right  extends  even  to  the  establishment  of   an educational  institution  with a profit motive  i.e.,  as  a business adventure.  The said right, no doubt, is subject to such  reasonable restrictions as may be placed upon it by  a law within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19.  But for the said restrictions, the right is absolute. (b)The  vice lies not in the establishment of  educational institutions  by  individuals  and  private  bodies  but  in unnecessary   State   control.   The  law  of   demand   and supply.....  what  may be called the  ’market  forces....... must be allowed a free play.  Because there are more  number of persons seeking admission that the existing  institutions can  provide  that  the  several  ins  complained  of   have developed. (c)The  establishment  of an education institution  is  no different  from any other venture e.g., starting a  business or  industry.  It is immaterial whether the  institution  is established  with  or without profit motive.   Indeed,  only when  there is profit motive that persons with  means  would come  forward  to open more and more schools  and  colleges. There are not many persons available today who are  prepared to donate large funds for establishing such institutions  by way of charity or philantrophy. (d)Even  if it is held, for any reason, that a person  has not  right  to  establish  an  education  institution  as  a business  venture, he has atleast the right to  establish  a self-financing educational institution.  Such a  institution may also be described as an institution providing cost-based education.   This  means  that it is open  to  a  person  to collect  amounts  from  willing  parties  and  establish  an institution  to educate such persons or their  children,  as the  case may be.  Even in an established  institution,  the fees  that may collected from the students must be  such  as not   only  to  defray  the  expenditure  of   running   the institution    but   also   for   improvement.    expansion, diversification  and  growth.   In  such  institutions,  the quantum  of  the fees to be charged should. be left  to  the concerned  institutions.  The Government should have to  say in the matter.  So far as the court is concerned, it is  not possible  for it, in the very nature of things, to  go  into this  issue.  The needs of each educational institution  may be  different.  The standard of education imparted  and  the facilities provided may be different 663 from institution to institution.  May be, the Government  or the  Court may insist that as a condition for  running  such institution, a reasonable number of seats should be allotted to students purely on merit, who shall be asked to pay  only such   fees   as   is  charged   in   similar   Governmental institutions.   If this is done  to which  the  petitioners have  no  objection  it will not only meet  the  needs  of education of those who have the capacity to pay but it  will also  meet the needs of other meritorious students  who  are not   able   to  obtain  admission   in   the   Governmental institutions and are also not in a position to pay the  fees normally  charged such private institutions.  Several  facts and  figures are furnished to us to show how in  each  State these private educational institutions are providing a large number  of "free seats’ to the nominees of  the  Government. It is pointed out that all these students would not have had an  opportunity. of studying the course of their choice  but

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for the existence of these private educational institutions. (e)Mohini  Jain’s  case was not right in  saying,  in  the above  situation, that charging of any amount,  by  whatever name  it is called, over and above’ the fee charged  by  the Government  in  its  own  colleges,  must  be  described  as capitation fee.  Saying so amounts to imposing an impossible condition.   It  is  simply not  possibly  for  the  private educational institutions to survive if they are compelled to charge   only  that  fee  as  is  charged  in   Governmental institutions.   The  cost of educating an engineering  or  a medical  graduate is’ very high.  All that cost is borne  by the  State in Governmental colleges but the State  does  not subsidise the private educational institutions.  The private educational institutions have to find their own finances and that can come only from the students. (f)Even   if  the  right  to  establish   an   educational institution  is not trade or business within the meaning  of Article 19(1)(g), it is certainly an 4occupation’   within the meaning of the said clause.  Indeed, the use of the four expressions  profession, occupation, trade or business  in Article  19(1)(g)  was meant to cover the  entire  field  of human  activity.  In such a  situation, it is  not necessary for   the  petitioners  to  pinpoint  to  which   particular expression does their activity relate.  It is enough to  say that the petitioners do have the right to establish  private educational  institutions at any rate,  self-financing/cost- based  private educational institutions.  This right can  be restricted  only by a law as contemplated by clause (6)  of, Article 19. 664 (g)The  right to establish and administer  an  educational institution (by a member of the majority community, religion or linguistic) arises by necessary implication from  Article 30.  The Constitution could not have intended to confine the said  right  only  to minorities and  deprive  the  majority communities therefrom. (h)The  Government  or  the University  cannot  insist  of stipulate as a condition of recognition/affiliation that the private  educational  institutions  should  admit   students exclusively  on merit.  It has been well recognised by  this court  that one who pays for the education is also  entitled to  stipulate the manner in which he well  admit  students’. There is no reason why such a right should not be recognised in  the  case  of  the  private  educational   institutions. Moreover, there may be several kinds of private  educational institutions; they may be established for achieving  certain specified  purposes.   For example, medical  or  engineering college  may  be  established to cater to  the  needs  of  a particular   region  or  a  district.   Similarly,   another educational institution may have been established by members of  a  particular community to educate their  own  children. The  Gulburga Medical College in the State of Karnataka,  it is pointed out, is established to meet the educational needs in the field of medicine to the students belong to Gulburga, Raichur  and Bidar districts, formerly included  within  the Nizam’s  dominions and which were included in the  State  of Karnataka on the reorganisations of States.  Similarly,  the Kempe  Gowda Medical College in Karnataka, it is  submitted, has  been  established by members  of  Vokkaliga  community. Their wishes and objectives have to be respected.  There may be  yet another institution which may have been  established with the and of a large donation made by a charitable-minded person  e.g., Annamalai University in Tamil Nadu.   If  such University  stipulates that members of the founder’s  family or their nominees will be admitted every year to the  extent

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of a certain percentage, no fault can be found therewith. (i)By virtue of mere recognition and/or affiliation  these private    educational    institutions   do    not    become instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Article 12  of  the  Constitution.  The concept  of  ’State  action’ cannot  be extended to these colleges so as to subject  them to the discipline of Part III.  It may be a different matter if  the institution is in receipt of any aid, partially  and wholly, from the State.  In such a situation, the command of Article 29(2) comes into play but even that does not  oblige the  institution  to admit the students exclusively  on  the basis of merit  but only not to 665 deny  admission  to  anyone any  of  the  grounds  mentioned therein. 52.On  the  other  hand, it is contended  by  the  learned counsel  for the respondents as also by the learned  counsel for  the  India Medical Council and All  India  Council  for Technical  Education  that: (a) imparting of  education  has always been recognised in this country from times immemorial as  the religious duty.  Both Hinduism and Islam treated  it as  such.   It  has also been  recognised  as  a  charitable object.   But  never has it been recognised as  a  trade  or business.  It is a mission, not a trade.   Commercialization of  education has always been looked upon with  disfavor  in this  country.   As  far back as  in  1956,  the  Parliament expressed  its intention by enacting the  University  Grants Commission   Act   which   specified   the   prevention   of commercialization  of education as one of the duties of  the University  Grants Commission.  The same intention has  been expressed  by several enactments made by the Parliament  and State Legislatures since then. (b)Imparting  of education is the most important  function of  the  State.  This duty may. be discharged by  the  State directly   or   through  the  instrumentality   of   private educational  institutions.   But when the  State  permits  a private  body or an individual to perform the said  function it is its duty to ensure that no one gets an admission or an advantage on account of his economic power to the  detriment of a more meritorious candidate. (c)The  very  concept  of  collecting  the  cost  of   the education  that is what the concept of cost-based or  self- financing  educational  institutions  means   is   morally abhorrent and is opposed to public policy.  A cavitation fee does  not  cease to be a capitation fee just because  it  is called  cost-based  education or by calling the  institution concerned   as   a   self-financing   institution.     These expressions  are  but  a  cover   a  mere  pretence   for collecting capitation fee.  It is nothing but  exploitation. It   is  an  elitist  concept  basically  opposed   to   the constitutional  philosophy By allowing such  education,  two classes  will  come into being.  The  concept  suffers  from class bias. (d)If,  for  any reason, it is held that a  citizen  or  a person has a right to establish an educational  institution, the  said  right  does  not  carry  with  it  the  right  to recognition or the right to affiliation, as the case may be. It  has  been  repeatedly held by this  court  that  even  a minority educational institution has no fundamental right to recognition  or  affiliation.  If so, no such right  can  be envisaged in the case of majority community or in the case 666 individuals or persons.  Once this is so, it is open to  the State or the University according recognition or affiliation to  impose such conditions as they think appropriate in  the

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interest  of  fairness, merit, maintenance of  standards  of education and so on.  In short, it is open to the Government or   the   University   to   make   it   a   condition    of recognition/affiliation  that the admission of students,  in whichever category it may be, shall be on the basis of merit and    merit    alone.     The    institutions     obtaining recognition/affiliation will be bound by such condition  and any departure therefrom renders the  recognition/affiliation liable to be withdrawn. (e)Even  if  the  Government or the  University  does  not expressly  impose  such  a  condition,  such  condition   is implicit by virtue of the fact that in such a situation, the activity of the private educational institution is liable to be   termed  as  ’State  action’.   The  fact   that   these institutions  perform an important public  function  coupled with  the fact that their activity is  closely  inter-twined with  governmental activity, characterises their  action  as ’State action’.  At the minimum, the requirement would be to act  fairly  in  the matter of  admission  of  students  and probably in the matter of recruitment’ and treatment of  its employees as well.  These institutions are further bound not to  charge any fee or amount over and above what is  charged in   similar  governmental  institutions.   If   they   need finances, they must find them through donations or with  the help of religious or charitable organisations.  They  cannot also  say that they will first collect capitation  fees  and with that money, they will establish an institution.  At the worst, only the bare running charges can be charged from the students.  The capital cost cannot be charged from them. 53.Before we express ourselves upon the rival  contentions urged by the parties, it would be appropriate to notice  the relevant statutory provisions-. UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION ACT. 54.The University Grants Commission Act was enacted by the Parliament  in  1956  to provided  for  the  ordination  and determination  of  standards in Universities  and  for  that purpose   to  establish  a  University  Grants   Commission. Chapter  III  deals  with the powers and  functions  of  the Commission.  Section 12 empowers the Commission to take,  in consultation  with  the  Universities  and  other  concerned bodies, all such steps as it may think fit for the promotion and ordination of University education 667 and  for, the determination and maintenance of standards  of teaching,  examination  and research  in  the  Universities. Section  12-A is relevant for our purposes.  Clause  (a)  in Sub-section  (1) defines the expression  ’affiliation’.   It reads:               "Affiliation’  together with  its  grammatical               variations, includes in relation to a college,               recognition  or such college,  association  of               such  college  with,  and  admission  of  such               college to the privileges of a University."               Clause (b) defines the expression ’college’ in               the following words:               "  ’College’  means  any  institution  whether               known  as  such  or by any  other  name  which               provides  for a course of study for  obtaining               any qualification from a University and  which               in  accordance with the rules and  regulations               of such University is recognised as  competent               to  provide  for  such  course  of  study  and               present  students  undergoing such  course  of               study  for  the examination for the  award  of               such qualification."

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Sub-secton  (2)  empowers  the  Commission  inter  alia   to regulate  the fee chargeable in constituent  and  affiliated colleges,  if  such  a course is found to  be  necessary  to ensure  that "no candidate secures admission to such  course of study by reason of economic power and thereby prevents  a more  meritorious candidate from securing admission to  such course  of study." It would be appropriate to set  out  Sub- section (2) in its entirety.  It reads:               "Without  prejudice to the generality  of  the               provisions of               Section if, having regard to,               (a)   the  nature of any course of  study  for               obtaining    any   qualification   from    any               University,               (b)   the types of activities in which persons               obtaining such qualification are likely to  be               engaged on the basis of such qualification,               (c)  the  minimum  standards  which  a  person               possessing               such qualification should be able to  maintain               in his               668               work  relating  to  such  activities  and  the               consequent  need for ensuring, so far  as  may               be,  that  no candidate secures  admission  to               such  course  of study by reason  of  economic               power and thereby prevents a more  meritorious               candidate  from  securing  admission  to  such               course of study-, and               (d) all other relevant factors,               the   Commission  is  satisfied  that  it   is               necessary so to do in the public interest,  it               may, after consultation with the University or               Universities  concerned, specify  the  regula-               tions the matters in respect of which fees may               be   charged,  and  the  scale  of   fees   in               accordance with which fees shall be charged in               respect of those matters on and from such date               as may be specified in the regulations in this               behalf,  by  any college  providing  for  such               course  of  study from or in relation  to  any               student  in connection with his  admission  to               and prosecution of such course of study-               Provided that different matters and  different               scales of fees may be so specified in relation               to different Universities or different classes               of colleges or different areas." Sub-Section  (3)  then says that where  regulations  of  the nature  referred  to in sub-section (2) have been  made,  no college  shall  levy  or charge fees in excess  of  what  is specified.   Sub-section  (4) provides  the  consequence  of violation  by any college of such regulations.   Sub-section (5)  says  that violation shall  also  mean  disaffiliation. Section  14  prescribes  the  consequences  of  failure   of Universities  to  comply  with the  recommendations  of  the Commission.  It includes withholding of funds.   Sub-section (1)  of Section 22 which occurs in Chapter IV declares  that ’the  right  of  conferring  or  granting  degree  shall  be exercised  only by a University established or  incorporated by  or under a Central Act, a provincial Act or a State  Act or an institution deemed to be a University under Section  3 or  ,in  institution  specially  empowered  by  an  Act   of Parliament  to  confer or ,;rant degrees."  Sub-section  (2) emphatically declares that "save as provided in  Sub-section (1),  no person or authority shall confer or grant  or  hold

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self  or  itself  out as entitled to  confer  or  grant  any degree.’ Sub-section (3) defines  the  expression  ’degree’. It means "any such degree as may, with 669 the  previous,  approval  of  the  Central  Government,   by specified  in this behalf by the on by notification  in  the official gazette." Section 23 prohibits the use of the  word ’University’  in the name of any on other than a  University established  or incorporated under an enactment or a  deemed University.  Section 24 provides for penalties for violation of  Sections 22 and 23.  Section 25 confers the rule  making power  upon the central Government while Section 26  confers the regulation power upon the Commission. INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL ACT: 55. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 was enacted by  the parliament to provide for the reconstitution of the  Medical Council  of India and the maintenance of a medical  register for   India  and  for  matters  connected  therewith.    The expression ’recognised medical qualification’ is defined  in clause  (h)  of  Section  2  to  mean  "any-of  the  medical qualifications  included in the schedules."  The  expression ’approved  institution’  has been defined in clause  (a)  to mean  ’a hospital, health centre or every  such  institution recognised  by  a University as an institution  in  which  a person may undergo training, if any, required by his  course of  study before the award of any medical  qualification  to him."  Section 11 declares that the  medical  qualifications granted  by any University or medical institution  in  India which are included in the first schedule to the Act shall be recognised  medical qualifications for the purposes  of  the Act.   It also provides the procedure for any University  or Medical  institution applying to the Central Government  for recognising  new  or other qualifications.  Section 13  says that   the   medical  qualifications  granted   by   medical institutions in India not included in the First Schedule but included  in  Part  I of the Third Schedule  shall  also  be recognised  medical qualifications for the purposes  of  the Act.   Section 19 provides for withdrawal of recognition  in cases  where  the  Council finds lowering  of  standards  of proficiency,  knowledge or skill.  Section 21  provides  for the maintenance of an Indian Medical Register.  Section  27 says that a person registered in the Indian Medical  Council Register  shall  be  entitled  to  practice  as  a   medical practitioner  in  any part of India and to  recover  in  due course  of  law in respect of such  practice  any  expenses, charges or fees to which he is entitled.  Section 32 confers the  rule making power upon the Government while Section  33 confers  the regulation making power upon the Council.   The First  Schedule mentions the names of the  Universities  and the recognised medical qualifications 670 awarded  by  them.   Same is done by Part  I  of  the  Third Schedule. ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION ACT, 1987. 56.This  Act  has  been made by  the  Parliament  for  the establishment  of  the  ’All  India  Council  for  Technical Education’   with  a  view  to  the  proper   planning   and coordinated  development of the technical  education  system throughout the country, promotion of qualitative improvement of  such education and other allied matters.  Section  3  of the Act provides for the establishment of the Council  while Section  10 specifies the functions of the  Council.   Apart from  directing  generally that the Council shall  take  all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring coordinated  and integrated   development   of   technical   education    and

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maintenance of standards, the Act specifically empowers  the Council,  inter alia, to "(j) fix norms and  guidelines  for charging  tuition  and other fees; (k)  grant  approval  for starting new technical institutions and for introduction  of new courses or programmes in consultation with the  agencies concerned,  and  (n)  take an  necessary  steps  to  prevent commercialisation of technical education." It is true, there is  no  express  provision in the Act  which  says  that  no engineering  college  or any other  college  or  institution imparting  technical education shall be  established  except with the permission of the Council.  But this may be for the reason that such a power was intended to be exercised by the Council  itself if it thinks necessary to do so.  We are  of the opinion that the vast powers conferred upon the  Council by  Section 10, ’including those specified above, do  extend to and entitle it to issue an order to the above effect.  It can also say that even in the existing institutions, no  new course,  faculty  or class shall be opened except  with  its approval.   It can also pass appropriate directions  to  the existing institutions as well for achieving the purposes  of the Act.  Such an order may indeed be necessary for a proper discharge  of the wide-ranging functions conferred upon  the Council. 57.It  is  brought to our notice by  the  learned  counsel appearing  for  the Council that the Council has  evolved  a proforma  of  undertaking which should be  executed  by  the person-in-charge   of   any  institution  proposed   to   be established  stating inter alia that such  institution  will not only observe the several orders and instructions  issued by  the Council but it shall not charge any  capitation  fee from  the  students/guardians of the students in  any  form. The  proforma  further  stipulates  that  in  the  event  of non-com- 671 pliance  of any of the orders and directions issued  by  the Council or the terms of the undertaking, it shall be open to the Council to take appropriate action including  withdrawal of its approval or recognition, which automatically  entails stoppage  of financial grant or assistance from the  Central and State Government.  It is also brought to our notice that the   Council  has  issued  guidelines  for   admission   to Engineering  Degree  and Engineering Diploma  programmes  in G.S.R.  320 dated 15th June, 1992 in exercise of  the  power conferred upon it by Section 23(1) of the Act (Section 23 of the  Act  confers  the  regulation  making  power  upon  the Council). STATE ENACTMENTS: 58.As mentioned in Part I of this judgment, the States  of Andhra  Pradesh,  Karnataka, Maharashtra  and  recently  the state of Tamil Nadu have all enacted legislation prohibiting the  charging  of capitation fee.  We had also set  out  the Preamble  to  the Andhra Act which Preamble is to  be  found almost in every such enactment.  We had referred to the A.P. Education   Act,  1982  as  well  which  provides  that   no educational  institution shall be established in  the  State except with the permission of the competent authority INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1992: 59.The  last of the statutory provisions to be noticed  is of  great relevance herein viz., the Indian Medical  Council (Amendment)  Ordinance, 1992 being Ordinance No. 13 of  1992 issued  by the President of India on 27th August, 1992.   By this Ordinance, Section 10-A to 10-C have been added besides amending   Section   33.    Section   10-A   provides   that notwithstanding  anything  contained in the  Indian  Medical Council Act or any other law for the time being in force, no

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medical  college shall be established nor any new or  higher course   of  study  or  training  opened  in   an   existing institution nor shall it increase its admission capacity  in any  course of study or training, except with  the  previous permission of the Central Government obtained in  accordance with  the  provisions  of the  said  section.   The  section prescribes the procedure for submitting the application, the matters which the Central Government shall take into account while  considering  the  said  application,  the  obligatory consultation  with the Council and the manner in  which  the application shall be disposed of.  It also 672 provides  the  matters which the Council  should  take  into consideration while making its recommendation to the Central Government.  Suffice it to mention that the several  matters which the Council and the Central Government are directed to take  into  consideration  are designed  to  ensure  that  a properly  equipped  institution  is in place  before  it  is permitted   to  impart  medical  education.   Section   10-B provides  for  non-recognition  of  medical   qualifications awarded by institutions which have been established  without the  previous permission of the Central Government or by  an institution which violates any of the conditions in  Section 10-A.   Section  10-C  provides  that  if  any  person   has established a medical college or has opened a new or  higher course of study in an existing college, he shall, within one year  from  the date of the commencement of  the  Ordinance, seek permission of the Central Government in accordance with Section 10-A. GROUND REALITY: 60.Notwithstanding  the fact that education is the  second highest  sector of budgeted expenditure after  the  Defence, the outlay on education is woefully inadequate to the  needs of  the people.  Whereas many other countries spend  six  to eight per cent of their Gross National Product on education, our  expenditure on education is only three per cent of  the Gross  National Product.  Seventy five to eight per cent  of the expenditure goes in paying the salaries of the  teachers and other connected staff.  These are the statements made in the Government of India publication ’Challenge of  Education   a policy pe rspective" referred to hereinbelow.  Even  so, on  account  of lack of proper supervision,  lack  of  self- discipline  and  commitment,  the quality  and  standard  of instruction in most of the Government schools and colleges except  the  professional colleges  is  woeful.   This  has provided   an  occasion  and  an  opportunity   to   private educational institutions to fill the void, both in terms  of meeting  the  need and more particularly in  the  matter  of quality  of  instruction.   Because,  the  State  is  in  no position to devote more resources and also because the  need is  constantly  growing, it is not possible  to  do  without private  educational institutions.  In this context,  it  is appropriate   nay, necessary, to notice the stand  of  the Government of India in this behalf.  It is thus: the Central Government  does  not have the resources  to  undertake  any additional financial responsibility for medical or technical education;  it  is  unable to aid  any  private  educational institution  financially at a level higher than at  present; therefore the policy 673 of  the  Central  Government  is  to  involve  private   and voluntary efforts in the education sector in conformity with accepted  norms and goals; however, the private  educational institutions cannot be compelled to charge only that fee  as is  charged  in  Governmental  institutions;  in  1986,  the

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Central Government has evolved the ’New Education Policy’ according  to  it,  ’in the  interests  of  maintaining  the standards   and  for  several  other  valid   reasons,   the commercialisation  of technical and  professional  education will  be curbed.  An alternative system will be  devised  to involve  private  and voluntary effort in  this  section  of education,  in  conformity with accepted norms  and  goals.’ (vide  parts 6-20); the amendments proposed to  I.M.C.  Act, 1956  in  1987  have  not materialised so  far;  so  far  as engineering  colleges  are concerned,  permission  is  being granted by the A.I.C.T.E. subject to the condition that they do  not  collect  any  capitation  fee;  according  to   the guidelines issued by the A.I.C.T.E., the technical  colleges will  be permitted to recover ’only a graded  percentage  of the average cost of student education, depending on  whether the  institution is Government-funded,  Government-aided  or unaided.’ (According to the these guidelines, it is  stated, the  students  will  be  asked to pay 20%  of  the  cost  in Government  funded institutions, 30-35% in  Government-aided and  70% in unaided institutions).  It is finally  submitted that: "(a)  Conferring  unconditional  and  unqualified  right  to education  at  all  levels  to  every  citizen  involving  a constitutional   obligation  on  the  State   to   establish educational  institutions either directly or  through  State agencies is not warranted by the Constitution besides  being unrealistic and impractical. (b)When  the  Government  grants  recognition  to  private educational  institutions  it does not create an  agency  to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution and there  is no  scope  to  import  the  concept  of  agency  in  such  a situation. (c)The  principles  laid  down in Mohini  Jain’s  case  do require reconsideration. (d)It  would  be  unrealistic  and  unwise  to  discourage private  initiative  in  providing  educational   facilities particularly  for  higher  education.   The  private  sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed  resources in the field of education, thereby  making as much progress as possible in achieving the Constitutional goals in this respect. 674 (e)At  the  same  time, regulatory  controls  have  to  be continued  and  strengthened  in order  to  prevent  private educational institutions from commercializing education. (f)Regulatory   measures   should   be   maintained    and strengthened  so  as  to  ensure  that  private  educational institutions maintain minimum standards and facilities. (g)Admissions  within all groups and categories should  be based on merit.  There may be reservation of seats in favour of the weaker sections of the society and other groups which deserve  special treatment.  The norms for admission  should be pre-determined and transparent." The  stand  of  the State  Governments  of  Andhra  Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu is no different. 61.The   hard  reality  that  emerges  is   that   private educational institutions are a necessity in the present  day context.  It is not possible to do without them because  the Governments  are  in  no  position  to  meet  the  demand particularly   in  the  sector  of  medical  and   technical education   which  call  for  substantial  outlays.    While education  is  one of the most important  functions  of  the Indian   State   it  has  no  monopoly   therein.    Private educaitonal  institutions  including  minority  educational institutions  too have a role to play.

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62.Private  educational institutions may be aided as  well as  un-aided.  Aid given by the, Government may be cent  per cent   or  partial.   So  far  as  aided  institutions   are concerned,  it  is evident, they have to abide  by  all  the rules  and  regulations as may be framed by  the  Government and/or recognising/affiliating authorities in the matter  of recruitment  of  teachers  and staff,  their  conditions  of service,  syllabus,  standard  of teaching and  so  on.   In particular,  in  the matter of admission of  students,  they have  to follow the rule of merit and merit alone   subject to  any reservations made under Article 15.  They shall  not be  entitled to charge any fees higher than what is  charged in Governmental institutions for similar courses.  These are and  shall  be understood to be the conditions of  grant  of aid.   The  reason is simple: public funds,  when  given  as grant   and  not  as loan   carry  the  public  character wherever they go; public funds cannot be donated for private purposes.  The element of public character necessarily  mean a   fair  conduct  in  all  respects  consistent  with   the constitutional mandate of Article 14 and 675 15.All the Governments and other authorities in charge  of granting  aid  to educational institutions  shall  expressly provide  for such conditions (among others), if not  already provided, and shall ensure compliance with the same.   Again aid  may take several forms, For example, a medical  college does necessarily require a hospital.  We are told that for a 100  seat  medical college, there must be a  fully  equipped 700-bed  hospital.  Then alone, the medical college  can  be allowed to function.  A private medical college may not have or may not establish a hospital of its own.  It may  request the Government and the Government may permit it to avail  of the services of a Government hospital for the purpose of the college  free of charge.  This would also be a form  of  aid and  the  conditions aforesaid have to be imposed   may  be with  some relaxation in the matter of fees  chargeable  and observed.  The Government (Central and State) and all  other authorities  granting  aid  shall  impose  such   conditions forthwith,  if not already imposed.  These conditions  shall apply  to existing as well as proposed  private  educational institutions. 63.So  far as un-aided institutions are concerned,  it  is obvious that they cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as  is charged in Governmental institutions. if they  do  so voluntarily,  it  is perfectly welcome but  they  cannot  be compelled to do so, for the simple reason that they have  to meet  the  cost  of  imparting  education  from  their   own resources    and   the   main   source,    apart    from donations/charities, if any, can only be the fees  collected from  the students.  It is here that the concepts of  ’self- financing   educational   institutions’   and    ’cost-based educational institutions’ come in.  This situation  presents several  difficult  problems.  How does  one  determine  the ’cost of education’ and how and by whom can it be regulated? The  cost  of  education  may very,  even  within  the  same faculty,  from institution to institution.   The  facilities provided, equipment, infrastructure, standard and quality of education   obtaining   may   vary   from   institution   to institution.   The court cannot certainly do this.  It  must be done by Government or University or such other  authority as  may  be  designated  in  that  behalf.   Even  so,  some questions do arise  whether cost-based education only means running charges or can it take in capital outlay?  Who  pays or  who can be made to pay for establishment, expansion  and improvement/diversification   of   a   private   educational

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institutions?   Can an individual or body of  persons  first collect amounts (by whatever name called) from the intending students and with those monies establish an institution  an activity  similar to builders of apartments in  the  cities? How much should 676 the  students. coming in later years pay?  Who  should  work out the economics of each institution?  Any solution evolved has  to take into account all these variable  factors.   But one  thing is clear: commercialisation of  education  cannot and should not be permitted The Parliament as well as  State Legislatures  have expressed this intention in  unmistakable terms.   Both  in the light of our tradition  and  from  the stand-point of interest of general public, commercialisation is  positively harmful; it is opposed to public policy.   As we shall presently point out, this is one of the reasons for holding  that imparting education cannot be trade,  business or  profession.  The question is how  to  encourage  private educational   institutions   without   allowing   them    to commercialise  the  education?   This  is  the   troublesome question  facing the society, the government and the  courts today.   But  before we proceed to evolve a scheme  to  meet this  problem,  it  is  necessary  to  answer  a  few  other questions raised before us. RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 64.Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution declares that  all citizens  of this country shall have the right "to  practice any  profession,  or to carry on any  occupation,  trade  on business".  Clause (6) of Article 19, however, says:               "Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said  clause               shall affect the operation of any existing law               in so far as it imposes or prevents the  State               from making any law imposing, in the interests               of the general public, reasonable restrictions               on the exercise of the right conferred by  the               said clause and, in particular, nothing in the               said sub-clause shall affect the operation  of               any existing law in so far as it relates to or               prevents   the  State  from  making  any   law               relating to:               (i)the     professional    or     technical               qualifications  necessary for  practising  any               profession  or  carrying  on  any  occupation,               trade or business, or               (ii)carrying  on  by  the State,  or  by a               corporation  owned or controlled by the  State               or  any trade, business, industry  or  service               whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,               of citizens or otherwise.’ While we do not with to express any opinion on the  question whether 677 the  right  to establish an educational institution  can  be said  to be carrying on any "occupation’ within the  meaning of Article 19(1)(g),  perhaps, it is  we are certainly  of the  opinion  that such activity can neither be a  trade  or business  nor can it be a profession within the  meaning  of Article  19(1)(g).  Trade or business normally  connotes  an activity  carried  on with a profit motive.   Education  has never  been  commerce  in this country.  Making  it  one  is opposed  to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities  of  this nation.  The argument to the contrary has an unholy ring  to it.   Imparting  of education has never been  treated  as  a trade  or business in this country since  times  immemorial. It  has  been  treated as a religious  duty.   It  has  been

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treated  as  a charitable activity.  But never as  trade  or business.  We agree with Gajendragadkar, J. That  "education in  its true aspect is more a mission and a vocation  rather than a profession or trade or business, however wide may  be the   denotation  of  the  two  latter  words........   (See University  of Delhi [1961] 1 SCR 703).  The Parliament  too has  manifested  its intention repeatedly (by  enacting  the U.G.C.   Act,   I.M.C.   Act  and   A.I.C.T.E.   Act)   that commercialisation of education is not permissible and  that no  person  shall be allowed to steal a march  over  a  more meritorious  candidate because of his economic  power.   The very  game  intention is expressed by  the  Legislatures  of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu in the Preamble to their respective enactments prohibiting charging of capitation fee. 65.We are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning  in State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C, 1957  S.C.R.  874, that  imparting  education cannot be treated as a  trade  or business.  Education cannot be allowed to be converted  into commerce  nor  can the petitioners seek to obtain  the  said result  by relying upon the wider meaning  of  ’occupation’. The  content  of  the  expression  "occupation"  has  to  be ascertained keeping in mind the fact that clause (g) employs all the four expressions viz., profession, occupation, trade and  business.  Their fields may overlap, but each  of  them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from  the others.   Be that as it may, one thing is clear   imparting of  education  is  not  and  cannot  be  allowed  to  become commerce.   A law, existing or future, ensuring  against  it would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Article  19.  We cannot, therefore, agree with the  contrary proposition enunciated in 1968 Bombay 91, 1984 A.P. 251  and 1986 Karnataka 119. 678 66.The  learned  counsel for the petitioners  relied  upon certain decisions in support of their contention that  right to  establish an educational institution flows from  Article 19(1)(g).   The first is in Bharat Sevashram Sangh v.  State of  Gujarat  [1986]  3 S.C.R. 602, a  decision  of  a  Bench consisting  of E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath  Misra,  JJ. At  page 609, while dealing with Section 33 of  the  Gujarat Secondary  Education Act empowering the Government  to  take over an educational institution in certain situations for  a period not exceeding five years, the teamed Judges  observed that  "the said provision is introduced in the  interest  of the   general  public  and  does  not  in  any  way   affect prejudically   the  fundamental  right  of  the   management guaranteed  under  Article 19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution." Actually,  the  issue  now  before  us  was  not  raised  or considered  in  the said decision.  Moreover,  the  decision does  not say whether it is a profession, occupation,  trade or business. Reliance is then placed upon the Seven Judge Bench  decision in  Bangalore  Water Supply and Sewerage Board  v.  Rajappa, [1978]  3  S.C.R. 207.  Krishna Iyer, J.  dealing  with  the meaning  of the expression "industry" in I.D.  Act  observed that  even  educational institutions would fall  within  the purview of "Industry".  We do not think the said observation in a different context has any application here. So far as the other decision in State of Maharashtra v.  Lok Shikshan  Sanstha, [1971] Suppl.  S.C.R. 879  is  concerned, all  that  the  court held there was that  is  view  of  the operation  of emergency, Article 19 is not available to  the petitioners seeking to establish an educational institution. Article 358 was held to be a bar.  But the decision does not

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say that such a right does inhere in the petitioners. 67.We  are  also  of the opinion that  the  said  activity cannot  be  called  a ’profession’  within  the  meaning  of Article 19(1)(g).  It is significant to notice the words "to practice  any  profession.  Evidently, the reference  is  to such  professions  as  may be practised  by  citizens  i.e., individuals.  (See N.U.C Employees v.  Industrial  Tribunal, A.I.R.  1962 S.C. 1080 at 1085).   Establishing  educational institutions can by no stretch of imagination be treated  as ’practising  any profession’.  Teaching may be a  profession but establishing an institution employing teaching and  non- teaching staff,  procuring the necessary infrastructure  for running a school or college is 679 not  ’practising  profession’.  It may be anything  but  not practising a profession.  We must make it clear that we have not  gone  into  the  precise  meaning  an  content  of  the expressions  profession, occupation, trade or  business  for the reason that it is not necessary for us to do so-in  view of the approach we are adopting hereinafter, which would  be evident from the succeeding paragraphs.  Our main concern in the  entire preceding discussion is only to  establish  that the  activity of establishing and/or running an  educational institution cannot be a matter of commerce. 68.For the purpose of these cases, we shall proceed on the assumption  that a person or body of persons has a right  to establish an educationtal institution in this country.   But this  right, we must make it clear, is not an absolute  one. It is subject to such law as may be made by the State in the interest of general public. 69.We  must,  however,  make it clear,  and  which  is  of crucial  importance herein, that the right to  establish  an educationcal institution does not carry with it the right to recognition  or  the right to affiliation.  In  St.  Xaviers College  v.  Gujarat, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173 it has  been  held uniformly  by all the nine learned Judges that there  is  no fundamental  right to affiliation.  Ray, C.J.,  stated  that this has been "the consistent view of this court." They also recognised that recognition or affiliation is essential  for a  meaningful  exercise  of  the  right  to  establish   and administer  educational  institutions.  Recognition  may  be granted  either by the Government or any other authority  or body   empowered   to   accord   recognition.     Similarly, affiliation  may be granted either by the University or  any other academic or other body empowered to grant  affiliation to  other educational institutions.  In other words,  it  is opento  a person to establish an  educational  institution, admit students, imparteducation, conduct examination  and award  certificates  to  them.  But  he,or  the  educational institution  has no right to insist   that the  certificates ordegree (if they can be called as such) awarded by  such institution  should be recognised by the State   much  less have they the right to say that the students trained by  the institution should be admitted to examinations conducted  by the University or by the Government or any other  authority, as  the  case  may be.  The institution  has  to  seek  such recognition  or  affiliation from  the  appropriate  agency. Grant  of recognition and/or affiliation is not a matter  of course  nor is it a formality.  Admission to the  privileges of a University is a power to be exercised with 680 great  care,  keeping in view the interest  of  the  general public  and  the  nation.  it is  a  matter  of  substantial significance  the very life-blood of a private  educational institution.     Ordinarily   speaking,    no    educational

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institution  can run or survive unless it is  recognised  by the  Government  or  the  appropriate  authority  and/or  is affiliated to one or the other Universities in the  country. Unless  it is recognised and/or affiliated as stated  above, it’s certificates will be of no use.  No one would join such educational institution.  As a matter of fact, by virtue  of the  provisions of the U.G.C. Act, noticed  hereinabove,  no educational institution in this country except a  University is  entitled to award degrees.  It is for this  reason  that all  the private educational institutions  seek  recognition and/or  affiliation with a view to enable them to  send  the students  trained  by  them to appear  at  the  examinations conducted by the Government/University.  The idea is that if such    students    pass   the   said    examination,    the Government/University  will  award  its  degree/diploma/cer- tificate to them.  These educational institutions follow the syllabus  prescribed by the Government/University, have  the same  courses of study, follow the same method  of  teaching and    training.     They   do   not   award    their    own degrees/qualifications.   They  prepare their  students  for University/Government     examinations,     request      the University/Government  to  permit  them  to  appear  at  the examinations conducted by them and to award the  appropriate degrees   to   them’.    Clearly   and   indubitably,    the recongnised/affiliated  private  educational   institutions, supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State.   Theirs  is  not an  independent  activity  but  one closely  allied to and supplemental to the activity  of  the State.   In the above circumstances, it is idle  to  contend that  imparting  of education is a business like  any  other business  or  that  it  is an activity  akin  to  any  other activity like building of roads, bridges etc.  In short  the position  is  this.  No educational  institution  except  an University  can  award degrees (Sections 22 and  23  of  the U.G.C.  Act).  The private educational  institutions  cannot award   their   own  degrees.   Even  if  they   award   any certificates  or other testimonials they have  no  practical value  inasmuch  as  they are not  good  for  obtaining  any employment  under  the State or for  admission  into  higher courses  of  study.  The  private  educational  institutions merely  supplement the effort of the State in educating  the people,  as  explained  above.  It  is  not  an  independent activity.   It is an activity supplemental to the  principal activity  carried  on by the State.   No  private  education institution  can  survive  or  subsist  without  recognition and/or 681 affiliation.   The  bodies which  grant  recognition  and/or affiliation  are  the authorities of the State.  In  such  a situation,  it  is obligatory  in the interest  of  general public   upon  the  authority  granting  recognition   or affiliation   to   insist  upon  such  conditions   as   are appropriate  to  ensure  not  only  education  of  requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students.  Since the recognising/affiliating authority is the ’State’ it is under an obligation to impose such  conditions  as part of its duty enjoined  upon  it  by Article  14 of the Constitution.  It cannot allow itself  or its power and privilege to be used unfairly.  The  incidents attaching  to  the  main  activity  attach  to  supplemental activity as well.  Affiliation/recognition is not there  for anybody  to  get  it  gratis  or  unconditionally.   In  our opinion, no Government, authority or University is justified or  is  entitled to  grant  recognition/affiliation  without imposing   such  conditions.   Doing  so  would  amount   to

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abdicating its obligations enjoined upon it by Part III; its activity  is bound to be characterised  as  unconstitutional and  illegal.   To  reiterate,,  what  applies  to  the  man activity  applies  equally to  supplemental  activity.   The State  cannot  claim immunity from the  obligations  arising from  Articles  14  and 15.  If so, it  cannot  confer  such immunity upon its affiliates.  Accordingly, we have  evolved   with  the help of the counsel appearing  before  us  and keeping in view the positive features of the several Central and  State  enactments  refeffred  to  hereinbefore    the following    scheme   which   every    authority    granting recognition/affiliation  shall impose upon the  institutions seeking such recognition/affiliation. The idea behind the scheme is to eliminate discretion in the management altogether in the matter of admission.  It is the discretion in the matter of admission that is at the root of the several ills complained of It is the discretion that has mainly   led   to  the   commercialisation   of   education. ’Capitation fee’ means charging or collecting amount  beyond what  is  permitted by law; all the Acts have  defined  this expression  in this sense.  We must strive to bring about  a situation  where  there  is  no room  or  occasion  for  the management or anyone on its behalf to demand or collect  any amount  beyond  what  is permitted.  We  must  clarify  that charging  the  permitted  fees by  the  private  educational institutions   which is bound to be higher than  the  fees charged  in  similar  governmental  institutions  by  itself cannot  be  characterised as capitation fees.  This  is  the policy underlying all the four States enactments prohibition capitation  fees.   All of them recognise the  necessity  of charging higher fees by private educational institutions. 682 They seek to regulate the fees that can be charged by them which  may be called permitted fees  and to bar  them  from collecting anything other than the permitted fees, which  is what  ’Capitation fees’ means.  Our attempt in evolving  the following  scheme precisely is to given effect to  the  said legislative  policy.  It would be highly desirable  if  this Scheme is given a statutory shape by incorporating it in the Rules that may be framed under these enactments.                            SCHEME 70.The  scheme  evolved  herewith  is  in  the  nature  of guidelines which the appropriate Governments and recognising and  affiliating authorities shall impose and  implement  in addition  to such other conditions and stipulations as  they may think appropriate as conditions for grant of permission, grant  of recognition or grant of affiliation, as  the  case may  be.   We are confining the scheme  for the  present only to ’professional colleges.’               The expression Professional colleges’ in  this               scheme includes:               (i)   medical  colleges, dental  colleges  and               other institutions and    colleges   imparting               Nursing, Pharmacy and other courses allied  to               Medicine,  established and/or run  by  private               education institutions,               (ii)colleges of engineering and colleges and               institutions  imparting  technical   education               including   electronics,  computer   sciences,               established and/or run by private  educational               institutions, and               (iii)such other colleges to which this  scheme               is   made   applicable  by   the   Government,               recognising and/or affiliating authority." The expression "appropriate authority" means the Government,

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University  or  other  authority as is  competent  to  grant permission  to  establish  or  to  grant  recognition  to  a professional college. The  expression ’competent authority’ in this  scheme  means the  Government/University  or other authority,  as  may  be designated  by  the Government/University or by law,  as  is competent  to  allot  students  for   admission  to  various professional colleges in the given State. 683 It  is  made clear that only those institutions  which  seek permission   to   establish   and/or   recognition    and/or affiliation  from the appropriate authority shall  alone  be made bound by this scheme.  This scheme is not applicable to colleges  run by Government or to University  colleges.   In short,  the  scheme hereinafter mentioned shall  be  made  a condition of permission, recognition or affiliation, as  the case  may be.  For each of them viz., grant  of  permission, grant of recognition, grant of affiliation, these conditions shall  necessarily  be imposed, in addition  to  such  other conditions   as   the  appropriate   authority   may   think appropriate.   No Private educational institutaion shall  be allowed  to send its students to appear for  an  examination held  by any Government or other body constituted by  it  or under  any law or to any examination held by any  University unless the concerned institution and the relevant course  of study  is recognised by the appropriate authority and/or  is affiliated  to the appropriate University, as the  case  may be. (1)A  professional  college  shall  be  permitted  to   be established and/or administered only by a Society registered under   the  Societies  Registration  Act,  1860   (or   the corresponding Act, if any, in force in a given State), or by a  Public Trust, religious or charitable,  registered  under the Trusts Act, Wakfs Act (or the corresponding legislation, if any, e.g., Tamil Nadu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act  and A.P. Religious and Charitable Endowments Act).   No individual,  firm, company or other body of individuals,  by whatever appellation called  except those mentioned above will   be  permitted  to  establish  and/or   administer   a professional   college.   All  the   existing   professional colleges  which  do not conform to the above norm  shall  be directed  to take appropriate steps to comply with the  same within  a  period  of six months  from  today.   In  default whereof,   recognition/affiliation  accorded   shall   stand withdrawn. (In this connection reference may be had to  Rule 86(2) of Maharashtra Grant-in-aid code (referred to in State of  Maharashtra  v.  Lok  Shikshan  Sanstha,  [1971]  Suppl. S.C.R.  879  which  provided  that  schools  which  are  not registered  under the Societies Registration Act, shall  not be eligible for grant.  Grant of recognition and affiliation is no less significance). (2)Atleast, 50% of the seats in every professional college shall  be  filled  by  the nominees  of  the  Government  or University,  as the case may be, hereinafter referred to  as "free seats".  These students shall be selected on the basis of merit determined on the basis of a common entrance 684 examination  where  it  is  held or in  the  absence  of  an entrance examination, by such criteria as may be  determined by the competent authority or the appropriate to  authority, as  the  case  may  be.   It  is,  however,  desirable   and appropriate  have  a  common entrance  exam  for  regulating admissions to these colleges/institutions, as is done in the State  of Andhra Pradesh.  The remaining 50% seats  (payment seats) shaft be filled by those candidates who are  prepared

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to  pay  the fee prescribed therefor and who  have  complied with  the instructions regarding deposit and  furnishing  of cash security/Bank guarantee for the balance of the  amount. The  allotment of students against payment seats shall  also be  done  on the basis of inter se merit determined  on  the same basis as in the case of free seats.  There shall be  no quota  reserved for the management or for any family,  caste or  community which may have established such college.   The criteria  of eligibility and all other conditions  shall  be the  same in respect of both free seats and  payment  seats. The only distinction shall be the requirement of higher  fee by the ’payment students’.  The Management of a professional college  shall  not be entitled to impose or  prescribe  any other  and  further eligibility criteria  or  condition  for admission  either  to free seats or to  payment  seats.   It shall, however, be open to a professional college to provide for  reservation of seats for  constitutionally  permissible classes  with  the approval of the  affiliating  University. Such reservations, if any, shall be made and notified to the competent  authority and the appropriate  authority  atleast one  month  prior  to the issuance  of  notification  @  for applications for admission to such category of colleges.  In such  a case, the competent authority shall  allot  students keeping in view the reservations provided by a college.  The rule  of  merit  shall be followed  even  in  such  reserved categories. (3)The  number  of  seats available  in  the  professional colleges (to which this scheme is made applicable) shall  be fixed by the appropriate authority.  No professional college shall be permitted to increase its strength except under the permission   or   authority  granted  by   the   appropriate authority. (4)No professional college shall call for applications for admission  separately or individually.  AD the  applications for  admission to all the seats available  in  such,colleges shall be called for by the competent authority alone,  along with  applications  for admission  to  Government/University colleges  of nature.  For example, there shall be  only  one notification 685 by the competent authority calling for applications for  all the medical colleges in the State  and one notification for all  the engineering colleges in the State and so  on.   The application  forms  for  admission shall be  issued  by  the competent  authority (from such offices, centres and  places as  he  may direct).  The application form shall  contain  a column or a separate part wherein an applicant can  indicate whether he wishes to be admitted against a payment seat  and the order of preference, up to three professional colleges. (5)Each professional college shall intimate the  competent authority, the State Government and the concerned University in  advance  the  fees  chargeable  for  the  entire  course commencing  that  academic year.  The total  fees  shall  be divided into the number of years/semesters of study in  that course.   In  the first instance, fees only  for  the  first year/semester shall be collected.  The payment students will be,  however,  required to furnish either cash  security  or bank  grantee  for  the  fees  payable  for  the   remaining years/semesters.  The fees chargeable, in each  professional college  shall be subject to the ceiling prescribed  by  the appropriate   authority  or  by  a  competent  Court.    The competent  authority shall issue ’a brochure, on payment  of appropriate charges, along with the application form for ad- mission,  giving  full particulars of the  courses  and  the number  of seats available, the names of the colleges  their

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location  and also the fees chargeable by each  professional college.    The  brochure  win  also  specify  the   minimum eligibility conditions, the method of admission (whether  by entrace test or otherwise) and other relevant particulars. (6)(a) Every State Government shall forthwith constitute a Committee  to  fix the ceiling on the fees chargeable  by  a professional  college or class of professional colleges,  as the  case  may be.  The Committee shall consist of  a  Vice- Chancellor,   Secretary   for  Education  (or   such   Joint Secretary,  as  he  may  nominate)  and  Director,   Medical Education/Director Technical Education.  The committee shall make  such  enquiry  as it  thinks  appropriate.   It  shalt however,  give opportunity to the professional colleges  (or their  association(s),  if any) to place such  material,  as they think fit.  It shall, however, not be bound to give any personal hearing to anyone or follow any technical rules  of law.  The Committee shall fix the fee once every three years or at such longer intervals, as it may think appropriate. (b)  It   would   be  appropriate  if  the   U.G.C.   frames regulations under 686 Section 12A (3) of the U.G.C. Act, regulating the fees which the affiliated colleges, operating on no-grant-in-aid basis, are entitled to charge.  The Council for Technical Education may  also  consider the advisability of  issuing  directions under  Section 10 of the A.I.C.T.E. Act regulating the  fees that   may  be  charged  in  private   unaided   educational institutions  imparting  technical  education.   The  Indian Medical Council and Central government may also consider the advisability of such regulation as a condition for grant  of permission to new medical colleges under Section 10-A and to impose  such a condition on existing colleges under  Section 10-C. (c)The several authorities mentioned in sub-paras (a)  and ((1)  shall decide whether a private educational  institution is  entitled to charge only that fee as is required  to  run the  college  or  whether  the  capital  cost  involved   in establishing a college can also be passed on to the students and  if so, in what manner.  Keeping in view the  need,  the interest  of  general  public and of the  nation,  a  policy decision may be taken.  It would be more appropriate if  the Central  Government and these several  authorities  (U.G.C., I.M.C. and A.I.C.T.E.) cordinate their efforts and evolve  a broadly uniform criteria in this behalf.  Until the  Central Government,    U.G.C.,   I.M.C.   and    A.I.C.T.E.    issue order/regulations in this behalf, the committee referred  to in  the  sub-para (a) of this para shall be  operative.   In other  words, the working and orders of the committee  shall be  subject  to the orders/regulations,  issued  by  Central Government,  U.G.C., I.M.C. or A.I.C.T.E., as the  case  may be. (d)We  must hasten to add that what we have said  in  this clause is merely a reiteration of the duty  nay, obligation    placed   up on  the  Governments   of   Andhra   Pradesh, Maharashtra,  Karnataka and Tamil Nadu by  their  respective legislatures  to wit, Section 7 of Andhra Pradesh Act 5  of 1983,  Section 4 of Maharashtra Act 6 of 1988, Section 5  of Karnataka Act of 1984 and Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Act 57  of 1992.  Other States too may have to have similar provisions, carrying statutory force. (7)Any  candidate who fulfils the  eligibility  conditions would  be entitled to apply for admission.  After  the  free seats  in  professional colleges are filled up,  atleast  10 days’ time will be given to the candidates (students) to opt to be admitted against payment seats.  The candidates  shall

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be entitled to indicate their choice for any three  colleges (if  available).  In such a case, he shall comply  with  the deposit and cash security/Bank guarantee 687 -  taking the institution charging the highest fees  as  the basis within the said period of ten days.  If he is admitted in an institution, charging less fee, the difference  amount shall  be  refunded  to  him. (The  cash  security  or  Bank guarantee shall be in favour of the competent authority, who shall transfer the same in favour of the appropriate college if that student is admitted). (8)The  results of the entrance examination, if any,  held should  be published atleast in two leading newspapers,  one in  English  and  the  other  in  vernacular.   The  payment candidates  shall  be  allotted  to  different  professional colleges  on the basis of merit-cum-choice.   The  allotment shall  be made by the competent authority.   A  professional college  shall be bound to admit the students  so  allotted. The  casual vacancies or unfilled vacancies, if  any,  shall also  be  filled in the same manner.  The  management  of  a professional  college  shall not be permitted to  admit  any student  other  than  the  one  allotted  by  the  competent authority  whether against free seat or payment  seat,  as the  case may be.  It is made clear that even in the  matter of  reserved categories, if any, the principle of  inter  se merit  shall  be  followed.  All allotments  made  shall  be published in two leading newspapers as aforesaid and on  the notice  boards of the respective colleges and at such  other places as the comptent authority may direct, along with  the marks  obtained by each candidates in the relevant  entrance test  or  qualifying examination, as the case  may  be.   No professional college shall be entitled to ask for any  other or further payment or amount, under whatever name it may  be called,  from any student allotted to it   whether  against the free seat or payment seat. (9)After  making the allotments, the  competent  authority shall  also  prepare  and  publish a  waiting  list  of  the candidates  along  with the marks obtained by  them  in  the relevant test/examination.  The said list shall be  followed for filling up any casual vacancies or  ’drop-out’-vacancies arising after the admissions are finalised.  These vacancies shall be filled until such date as may be prescribed by  the competent  authority.  Any vacancies still  remaining  after such date can be filled by the Management. It  is made clear that it shall be open to  the  appropriate authority and the competent authority to issue such  further instructions  or directions, as they may  think  appropriate not inconsistent with this scheme, by way of elaboration and elucidation. The  scheme  shall  apply to and govern  the  admissions  to professional 688 colleges commencing from the academic year 1993-94. We  are  aware that until the commencement  of  the  current academic  year, the Andhra Pradesh was following a  somewhat different  pattern  in the matter of filling  the  seats  in private  unaided  engineering  colleges.   Though  all   the available  seats were being filled by the allottees  of  the Convenor  (State)  and the managements were not allowed  to admit any student on their own  a uniform fee was collected from  all  the students.  The concepts of ’free  seats’  and ’payment  seats’  were  therefore not  relevant  in  such  a situation  all were payment seats only.  We cannot say that such a system is constitutionally not permissible.  But  our idea  in  devising  this scheme has  been  to  provide  more

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opportunities  to meritorious students, who may not be  able to  pay  the enhanced fee prescribed by the  government  for such  colleges.   The  system  devised  by  us  would   mean correspondingly  more financial burden on  payment  students whereas in the aforesaid system (in vogue in Andhra Pradesh) the  financial burden is equally distributed among, all  the students.   The  theoretical foundation for our  method  is, that  a candidate/student who is stealing a march  over  his compatriot  on account of his economic power should be  made not  only  to pay for himself but also to  pay  for  another meritorious  student.   This  is  the  social  justification behind  the fifty per cent rule prescribed in clause (2)  of this scheme.  In the interest of uniformity and in the fight of  the above social theory, we direct the State  of  Andhra Pradesh to adhere to the system derived by us. 71.In  view of the above, we do not think it necessary  to go  into or answer Question No. 3. In our opinion, the  said question  requires  debate  in  a  greater  depth  and   any expression of opinion thereon at this juncture is not really warranted.                           PART IV VALIDITY OF SECTION 3-A OF THE ANDHRA PRADESH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (REGULATION OF ADMISSION AND PROHIBTION OF CAPITATION FEE) ACT 1983. 72.Section 3-A of the aforesaid Act, as introduced by  the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 12 of 1992, read as follows:               "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section               3, but subject to such rules as may be made in               this behalf and the               689               Andhra   Pradesh   Educational    Institutions               (Regulation  of  admission)  Order,  1974,  it               shall  be  lawful for the  management  of  any               unaided  private engineering college,  medical               college,  dental college and such other  class               of unaided educational institutions as may  be               notified  by the Government in this behalf  to               admit   students   into   such   colleges   or               educational institutions to the extent of  one               half  of the total number of seats from  among               those   who  have  qualified  in  the   common               entrance  test or in the qualifying   examina-               tion, as the case may be, referred to in  sub-               section  (1) of Section 3 irrespective of  the               ranking  assigned  to  them in  such  test  or               examination and nothing contained in Section 5               shall apply to such admissions." A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has struck  it down  as being violative of Article 14 of  the  Constitution and  also on the ground of repugnancy with Section  12-A  of the  University Grants Commission Act, 1956  Kranti  Sangram Parishad  v.  Sri  N.J.  Reddy, (1992)  3  A.L.T.  99.   The correctness of the said decision is assailed before us. 73.This Section is in truth, in the nature of an exception to   the  other  provisions  of  the  Act.   It  says   that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, but subject to  the  rules as may be framed by the  Government  in  this behalf,  the private educational institutions of the  nature mentioned  therein, shall be entitled to admit  students  to the extend of half the number of seats from among those  who have qualified in the common entrace test or the  qualifying examination,  as  the  case  may  be.   This  statement   is accompanied by two significant features viz., (1)  admission of  such  students  could be  irrespective  of  the  ranking assigned  to  them  to the common  entrance  test  or  other

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qualifying  examination, as the case may be; and (2)  it  is made  clear that nothing contained in Section 5 shall  apply to  such admissions.  The Section is, thus, an exception  to Section 3, 5. Section 3, it may be remembered, provides that admissions  have to be made, to all categories, strictly  in accordance with merit.  The section, read as a whole,  leads to the following consequences: (a)It  is open to the private educational institutions  to charge as much amount as they can for admission.  It will be a matter of bargain between the institution and the  student seeking admission. 690 (b)The admission can be made without reference to inter-se merit  of  paying  candidates.   The  institution  will   be entitled  to  pick  and  choose  the  candidates  among  the applicants on such considerations as it may deem fit. (c)Section 5, which prohibtis collection of capitation fee by an education institutions, is expressly made inapplicable to  such  admissions.  This is not without a  purpose.   The purpose  is to permit the institutions to charge as much  as they  can  in addition to the collection of  the  prescribed tuition fee. 74.We have held hereinbefore that the educational activity of  the private educational institutions is supplemental  to the  main effort by the State and that what applies  to  the main  activity applies equally to the supplemental  activity as well.  If Article 14 of the Constitution applies  as  it does,  without  a  doubt  to  the  State  institutions  and compels  them  to admit students on the basis of  merit  and merit   alone  (subject,  of  course,  to  any   permissible reservations   wherein  too,  merit  inter-se  has  to  be followed) the applicability of Article 14 cannot be excluded from   the   supplemental   effort/activity.    The    State Legislature  had, therefore, no power to say that a  private educational  institution will be entitled to admit  students of its choice, irrespective of merit or that it is  entitled to  charge  as much as it can, which means a free  hand  for exploitation  and  more particularly,  commercialisation  of education, which is impermissible in law.  No such  immunity from  the  constitutional  obligation  can  be  claimed   or conferred  by the State Legislature.  On this ground  alone, the Section is liable to fail. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to go  into the  question  whether  the section is  bad  on  account  of repugnancy  with  Section  12-A  of  the  University  Grants Commission  Act.  It is enough to say that the said  section falls  foul  of Article 14 for the reasons given  above  the must accordingly fail.  We agree that the offending portions of  Section 3-A cannot be severed from the main body of  the section and, therefore, the whole section is liable to  fall to the ground. It is not brought to our notice that the enactments of other three  States  viz., Karnataka, Tamil Nadu  and  Maharashtra contain similar offending provisions.  Indeed, they do  not. None  of  their provisions says that, the  Management  of  a private educational institution can admit students,  against "payment  seats", "irrespective of the ranking  assigned  to them in 691 such test (entrance test) or examination." Much less do they say  that  to  such admissions,  the  provision  prohibiting capitation  fee  shall  not apply.  True, they  do  not  say expressly that such admissions shall be made on the basis of merit,  but  that,  according to us, is  implicit.   If  the notifications or order issued thereunder provide  otherwise,

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either  expressly or by implication, they would  be  equally bad for the reason given above. 75.Once Section 3-A is struck down, the question arises as to  what should happen to the students who were admitted  by the Private Engineering Colleges in this State, at their own discretion, to the extent of the 50% of the available seats. The High Court has invalidated these admissions but they are continuing  now by virtue of the orders of stay  granted  by this  Court.   A  fact which must be kept in  mind  in  this behalf  is this: Until the previous year, the Government  of Andhra Pradesh has been permitting these private engineering colleges  to  collect a higher fees from  all  the  students allotted to them. (We are told that the fees permitted to be collected  was Rs. 10,000 per annum for the previous  year). Of  course,  all  the  available seats  were  filled  up  by students  allotted  by the convenor of the  common  entrance exam;  no one could be admitted by these colleges  on  their own.  Now, for the current year, these colleges admitted 50% of the students in their own discretion  which  necessarily means  collection of capitation andior arbitrary  admissions for  their  own private reasons.  At the  same  time,  these colleges have been collecting the same fees (Rs. 10,000  per annum)  both from the students allottee by the  convenor  as also  from  those admitted by themselves.   Thus  they  have reaped a double advantage. 76.It  is  submitted by Shri Shanti  Bhushan  the  learned counsel  for these students that they were innocent  parties and had obtained admission in a bona fide belief that  their admissions  were  being  made  properly.   They  have   been studying since them and in a few months their academic  year will  come to a close.  May be, the managements were  guilty of  irregularity,  he says, but so far as the  students  are concerned they have done nothing contrary to law to  deserve the punishment awarded by the Full Bench of the High Court. 77.It is true. as pointed out by the High Court that these admissions  were made in a hurry but the fact  remains  that they  have  been  continuing in the said  course  under  the orders  of this Court over the last about four  months.   As stated hereinbefore, the present situation has been brought 692 about   by  a  combination  of  circumstances,  namely   the enactment  of Section 3-A, the allotment of students to  the extent  of 50% only by the convenor and the failure  of  the Government  to immediately rectify the  misunderstanding  of the  convenor.   In the circumstances we are  not  satisfied that  these students should be sent out at this stage.   May be,  the result is rather unfortunate but we have  to  weigh all  the relevnt circumstances.  At the same time we are  of the   opinion   that  the  managements  of   these   private engineering colleges should not be allowed to walk away with the  double  advantage referred to above.  Since  they  have admitted  students of their own choice to the extent of  50% and also because it is not possible to investigate or verify for what consideration those admissions were made, we  think it  appropriate to direct that these colleges should  charge only that fee from the 50% ’free students’ as is charged for similar  courses  in the  concerned  university  engineering colleges.   For  the remaining years of their  course  these colleges shall collect only the said fee, which for the sake of  convenience  may be called the  ’government  fee’.   The balance  of  the amount which they  have  already  collected during  this  year  shall be remitted  into  the  Government account within six weeks from today, in default whereof  the recognition  and affiliation given to these  colleges  shall stand withdrawn.  In other words whichever college fails  to

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comply with the above direction it will stand  disaffiliated on  the expiry of six weeks from today and  the  recognition granted  to it, if any, by any appropriate  authority  shall also stand withdrawn. 78.So  far as Writ Petition 855 of 1992 is  concerned,  it complains  of charging of double the tuition fee is case  of students  coming from outside the Maharashtra.   The  matter stand  concluded against the petitoners by a decision  of  a Constitution  Bench of this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State  of Madhya  Pradesh, [1955] 1 SCR 1215.  This Writ  Petition  is accordingly dismissed. 79.Coming to Civil Appeal No. 3573 of 1992 filed by  Mahatma Gandhi  Mission,  we  are inclined, in  all  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  case to stay the  operation  of  the impugned   order  which  is  only  an  interlocutory   order effective till the disposal of the main Writ Petition.  Writ Petition  may  be disposed of according to law  and  in  the light to this Judgment.      693      PART V 80.  For  the  above reasons the Writ  Petitions  and  Civil Appeals except (W.P. (C) 855/92, C.A. 3573/92 and the  Civil Appeals arising from S.L.Ps. 13913 and  13940/92)        are disposed of in the following terms: 1.   The  citizens of this country have a fundamental  right to education. The said   right  flows from Article 21.  This right  is, however, not an absolute right.  Its content  and para  meters have to be determined in the light of  Articles 45  and  41.   In other words every  child/citizen  of  this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years.  Thereafter his right to education is subject  to the limits of economic capacity and  development of the State. 2.   The  obligations created by Articles, 41, 45 and 46  of the  Constitution can be discharged by the State  either  by establishing   institutions  of  its  own  or   by   aiding, recognising  and/or granting affiliation to  private  educa- tional  institutions.  Where aid is not granted  to  private educational   institutions   and   merely   recognition   or affiliation  is  granted  it may not be  insisted  that  the private education institution shall charge only that fee  as is charged for similar courses in governmental institutions. The  private  educational  institutions  have  to  and   are entitled  to charge a higher fee, not exceeding the  ceiling fixed  in  that behalf.  The admission of students  and  the charging  of fee in these private  educational  institutions shall  be governed by the scheme evolved herein set  out  in Part III of this Judgment. 3.   A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an  educational  institution  but  no  citizen,  perosn   or institution  has a right much less a fundamental  right,  to affiliation  or  recognition, or to  grant-in-aid  from  the State.  The recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the  State  subject only to the conditions set out  in,  and only  accordance  with the scheme contained in Part  III  of this Judgment.  No Government/University or authority  shall be  competent to grant recognition or affiliation except  in accordance  with  the said scheme.  The  said  scheme  shall constitute  a condition of such recognition or  affiliation, as the case may be, in addition to such other conditions and terms  which such Government, University or other  authority may choose to impose. Those  receiving aid shall however, be subject to  all  such terms and 694

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conditions,  as the aid giving authority may impose  in  the interest of general public. 4.   Section   3-A   of  the  Andhra   Pradesh   Educational Institutions  (Regulation  of Admission And  Prohibition  of Capitation  Fee)  Act,  1983 is violative  of  the  equality Clause  enshrined in Article 14 and is accordingly  declared void.   The declaration of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in this behalf is affirmed. 5. Writ Petition No. 855 of 1992 is dismissed. Civil  Appeal No. 3573 of 1992 is allowed and  the  impugned order is set aside.  The main Writ Petition wherein the said interim  order  has  been  passed may  now  be  disposed  of according to law. 6.  Civil  Appeals arising from S.L.Ps. 13913  and  13940/92 (preferred by students who were admitted by private  unaided engineering colleges in Andhra Pradesh, without an allotment from  the convenor of the common entrance  examination)  are allowed.   The  students so admitted for the  academic  year 1992-93  be allowed to continue in the said course  but  the management shall comply with the directions given in para 77 hereinabove. MOHAN, J. I have had the advantage of perusing the  judgment of my learned brother Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy.  Though,  I am in agreement with his conclusion, I would like to give my own  reasonings.  Since my learned brother has set  out  the facts,  I  will  confine  myself  to  answering  the   three questions, namely:               1.    Whether   the  Constitution   of   India               guarantees a fundamental right to education to               its citizens?               2.    Whether there is a fundamental right  to               establish  an  educational  institution  under               Article 19(1)(g)?               3.    Does recognition or affiliation make the               educational institution an instrumentality?                All the these matters raise a burning  issue;               as  to  how  to  put an end  to  the  evil  of               capitation fee or at least to regulate it.               As a prelude, the importance of education  may               be set out.               695               The  immortal Poet Valluvar  whose  Tirukkural               will  surpass  all  ages  and  transcend   all               religions said of education:               "Learning  is excellence of wealth  that  none               destroy; To man nought else affords reality of               joy."               Therefore,  the importance of  education  does               not require any emphasis. The  fundamental  purpose of Education is the  same  at  all times  and  in all places.  It is to transfigure  the  human personality into a pattern of perfection through a synthetic ’process  of the development of the body, the enrichment  of the mind, the sublimation of the emotions and the  illumina- tion of the spirit.  Education is a preparation for a living and for life, here and hereafter. An old Sanskrit adage states: "That is Education which leads to liberation"  liberation from ignorance which shrouds the mind;  liberation from superstition which paralyses  effort, liberation  from  prejudices which bring the Vision  of  the Truth. In  the  context of a democratic form  of  government  which depends once a social and political necessity.  Even several decades  ago,  our  leaders harped  upon  universal  primary education  as  a desideratum for national progress.   It  is

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rather  sad that in this great land of ours where  knowledge first  lit its torch and where the human mind soared to  the highest  pinnacle  of wisdom, the percentage  of  illiteracy should be appalling.  Today, the frontiers of knowledge  are enlarging with incredible swiftenss. The foremost need to be satisfied by our education is, therefore, the eradication of illiteracy  which  persists  in a  depressing  measure,  Any effort taken in this direction     of  be deemed to  be  too much. Victories  are  gained,  peace  is  preserved,  progress  is achieved,  civilization is build up and history is made  not on the battle-fields where ghastly murders are committed  in the  name of patriotism, not in the Council  Chambers  where insipid  speeches  are spun out in the name of  debate,  not even  in factories where are manufactured novel  instruments to strangle life, but in educational institutions which  are the  seed-beds  of culture, where children  in  whose  hands quiver the destinies of the future, 696 are  trained From their ranks will come out when  they  grow up,  statesmen and soldiers, patriots and philosophers,  who will determine the progress of the land. The  importance  of education has come to be  recognised  in various judicial decisions. In  Oliver  Brown  v. Board of  Education  of  Topeka,  U.S. Supreme Court Reports 98 Law.  Ed.  U.S. 347 at page 880  it was observed:               "Today,   education   is  perhaps   the   most               important   function   of  state   and   local               governments.   Compulsory  school   attendance               laws and the great expenditures for  education               both   demonstrate  our  recognition  of   the               importance  of  education  to  our  democratic               society.  It is required in the performance of               our  most basic public responsibilities,  even               service  in  the  armed forces.   It  is  very               foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a               principal instrument in awakening the child to               cultural  values, in preparing him  for  later                             professional  training, and in helping  him  t o               adjust normally to his environment." Various fundamental rights enumerated under Part III of  our Constitution can be divided into two classes. 1.   Injuction  restraining the State from  denying  certain fundamental rights like Articles 14 and 21. 2.   A positive conferment of such fundamental rights  under Articles 19, 25 and 26 etc. In this connection, the following passage from Addl.   Dist. Magistrate v.  S.S. Shuukla, [1976] Supp.  SCR 172 @ 229-230 may be quoted:               "Part   III   of  our   Constitution   confers               fundamental  rights in positive as well as  in               negative  language.   Article 15(1),  16(1)  9               22(2),  22(5), 25(1), 26, 29(1), 30 and  32(1)               can  be described to be Articles  in  positive               language.  Articles 14, 15(2), 16(2), 20,  21,               22(1), 22(4), 27, 28(1), 29(2), 31(1) and  (2)               are in negative language.  It is apparent that               most  categories of fundamental rights are  in               positive as well as               697               in  negative  language.  A  fundamental  right               couched  in negative language  accentuates  by               reason  thereof the importance of that  right.

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             The  negative language is worded to  emphasise               the   immunity   from  State   action   as   a               fundamental right. (See The State of Bihar  v.               Maharajadhuraja   Sir   Kameshwar   Singh   of               Darbhanga  and Ors.) These fundamental  rights               conferred  by  our  Constitution  have   taken               different  forms.  Some of  these  fundamental               rights  are said to have the texture of  Basic               Human  Rights (See A.K Gopalan’s case  (supra)               at pp. 96-97, 248-293 and Bank nationalisation               case (Supra) at pp. 568-71, 576-78)."               Article 21 reads as follows:               "Perfection of life and personal liberty:-  No               person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  life  or               personal liberty except according to procedure               established by law." It  would  be  clear  that  it  acts  as  a  shield  against deprivation of fife or personal liberty. A  question  may be asked as to why it  did  not  positively confer a fundamental right to life or personal liberty  like Article 19.  The reason is, great concepts like liberty  and life   were  purposefully  left  to  gather   meaning   from experience.   They relate to the whole domain of social  and economic fact.  The drafters of. this Constitution knew  too well that only a stagnant society remains uncharged. Unlike such rights as required to be enumerated it has  long been   recognised  that  the  individual  shall  have   full protection  in  person.  It is a principle as  old  as  law. However,  it has been found necessary from time to  time  to define  a  new  the  exact nature and  the  extent  of  such protection.   Political social and economic  changes  entail the  recognition  of new rights and the law in  its  eternal youth  grows to meet the demands of society.  The  right  to life  and liberty inhere in every man.  There is no need  to provide for the same in a positive manner. While  dealing with the scope of Article 21 it was  observed in  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 597  @  620-21 that:               "It is obvious that Art. 21, though couched in               negative               698               language,  confers  the fundamental  right  to               life  and  personal liberty.  So  far  as  the               right  personal  liberty is concerned,  it  is               ensured  by  providing that no  one  shall  be               deprived of personal liberty except  according               to  procedure prescribed by law.   The  first               question that arises for consideration on  the               language  of Art. 21 is: what is  the  meaning               and content of the words ’personal liberty’ as               used   in   this   Article?    This   question               incidentally came up for discussion in some of               the  judgments  in  A.K Gopalan  v.  State  of               Madras,  [1950] SCR 88 : (AIR 1950 SC 27)  and               the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, J.,               Mukherjee, J. and S.R. Das, J. seemed to place               a narrow interpretation on the words ’personal               liberty’  so as to confine the  protection  of               Art.  21  to  freedom of  the  person  against               unlawful detention.  But there was no definite               pronouncement  made  on this point  since  the               question  before the Court was no so much  the               interpretation of the words ’personal liberty,               as the inter-relation between Arts. 19 and 21.               It was in Kharak Singh v. State of UP., [1964]

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             1  SCR  332;  (AIR  1963  SC  1295)  that  the               question as to the proper scope and meaning of               the  expression  ’personal  liberty’  came  up               pointedly for consideration for the first time               before this Court.  The majority of the Judges               took the view ’that ’personal liberty’ is used               in  the  article  as  a  compendious  term  to               include  within  itself all the  varieties  of               rights  which  go  to make  up  the  ’personal               liberties’ of man other than those dealt  with               in  the  several clauses of  Art.  19(1).   In               other  words,  while  Art.  19(1)  deals  with               particular  species  of  attributes  of   that               freedom, ’personal libertyin Art. 21 takes  in               and  comprises  the  residue".   The  minority               Judges,  however,  disagreed  with  this  view               taken  by  the majority  and  explained  their                             position in the following words:               "No doubt the expression ’personal liberty’ is               a  comprehensive  one and the  right  to  move               freely  is an attribute of  personal  liberty.               It is said that the freedom to move freely  is               carved  out of personal liberty and  therefore               the  expression ’personal liberty’ in Art.  21               excludes that attribute.  In our view, this is               not a correct approach.  Both               699               are  independent  fundamental  rights,  though               there is overlapping.  There is no question of               one   being  carved  out  of   another.    The               fundamental right of fife and personal liberty               has many attributes and some of them are found               in  Art. 19. If a person’s  fundamental  right               under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely               upon  a  law to sustain the action,  but  that               cannot  be a complete answer unless  the  said               law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19(2)               so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19(2)               so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19(1)               are concerned."               There  can  be no doubt that in  view  of  the               decision  of  this Court in R.  C.  Cooper  v.               Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530: (AIR 1970 SC               564)  the  minority view must be  regarded  as               correct and the majority view must be held  to               have been overruled."(Emphasis supplied) Therefore,  it  is  not correct to state  that  because  the article  is couched in a negative language, positive  rights to  life  and  liberty are not conferred as  argued  by  Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel. This  Court in Choarak Singh v. State of U.P., 119641 1  SCR 332,  (345, 347 and 349) interpreted the word  "liberty"  on the lines of the meaning accorded to liberty in the 5th  and 14th  amendments  to the U.S. Constitution by in  Munshi  v. Illuonis, [1877] 94 U.S. 113.  Accordingly it was held: "  ’Personal Liberty’ in Art. 21 takes in all the rights  of man." The 4th Amendment of U.S. Constitution guaranteed "the right to be secure on their persons, houses......." This  right  was read into Article 21 and it was  held  that "there  cannot be an unauthorised intrusion into a  person’s home". In  Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, [1973] Supp.  SCR page  1 Mathew,  J.  stated  therein  that  the  fundamental  rights themselves  have  no fixed content, most of them  are  empty

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vessels into which each generation must pour its content  in the light of its experience.  It is relevant in this context to  remember that in building up a just social order  it  is sometimes  imperative that the fundamental rights should  be subordinated to directive principles. 700 In Puthumma’s case, [1978] 2 SCR 537, it has been stated: "The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach  and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than accentuate their meaning  and content by process of judicial  construction... Personal liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude’;, In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall what was said of the American Constitution in Mussorie v. Holland 252 U.S. 416 at 433:               "When we are dealing with words that also  are               constituent act, like the constitution of  the               United States, we must realize that they  have               called  into fife a being the  development  of               which could not have been foreseen  completely               by the most gifted of its begetters."               In  State  of M.P. v.  Pramod  Bhyaratiya  and               others, (1992) 2 Scale 791 it is stated:               Because  clause  (d) of Article  39  spoke  of               "equal  pay for equal work" for both  men  and               women  it did not cease to be part of  article               14.   To say that the rule having been  stated               as a directive principle of State Policy,  and               no  enforceable in court of law is to  indulge               in sophistry.  Parts IV & III of  Constitution               are not supposed to be exclusion any     of               each  other.  They are complementary  to  each               other.The  rule  is as much a part of  Article               14 as it is of clause               (1)   of Article 16." This  Court has held that several unenumerated  rights  fall within  Article  21  since personal  liberty  is  of  widest amplitude.               The  following rights are held to  be  covered               under Article 21:               1. The right to go abroad               Satwant  Singh v. A.P. O. New Delhi  [1967]  3               SCR page 525.               2. The right to privacy               Govinda v. State of U.P., [1975] 3 SCR 946               701               In  this  case  reliance  was  placed  on  the               American decision in Griswols v.  Connecticut,               381 US 479 at 510               3.  The  Right  against  solitary  confinement               Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1978]  4               SCC 494 at 545               4. The Right against Bar fetters               Charles Sobraj v. Sup(.  Central fail,  [1979]               1 SCR Ill               5. The Right to legal aid               Hoskot  v. State of Maharashtra, [1979] 1  SCR               192               6. The Right to speedy trial               Hussainuia Katoon v. State of Bihar, [1979]  3               SCR 169               7. The Right against Handcuffing               Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration [1080]  3               SCR 855               8. The Right against delayed execution               TV.  Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu,  AIR

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             1983 SC 361               9. The Right against custodial violence               Sheela Bhasre v. State of Maharashtra,  [1983]               2 SCC 96               10. The Right against public hanging               A.G. of India v. Lachmadevi AIR 1986 SC 467               11. Doctor’s Assistance               Parantananda Katra v. UOI, [1989] 4 SCC 286               12. Shelter               Santistar  Builder v. N.KI. Totame,  [1990]  1               SCC 520 If  really  Article  21, which is the  heart  of  fudamental rights has received expanded meaning from time to time there is  no justification as to why it cannot be  interpreted  in the  light of Article 45 wherein the State is  obligated  to provide  education  up  to  14  years  of  age,  within  the prescribed time limit.               So much for personal liberty.               Now coming to life: this Court interpreted  in               Bandhua Mukti Morcha               702               v.    Union of India, [1984] 3 SCC 161 @  183-               84:               "It  is the fundamental right of  everyone  in               this country, assured under the interpretaiton               given  to Article 21 by this Court in  Francis               Mullin’s  case,  to live with  human  dignity,               free  from exploitation.  This right  to  live               with  human dignity, free  from  exploitation.               This   right  to  live  with   human   dignity               enshrined  in  Article  21  derives  its  life               breath from the directive Principles of  State               Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of               Article  39 and Article 41 and 42 and  at  the               least,  therefore, it must include  protection               of the health and strength of workers, men and               women,  and  of  the tender  age  of  children               against  abuse, opportunities  and  facilities               for  children to develop in a  healthy  manner               and  in  conditions of  freedom  and  dignity,               educational   facilities,  just   and   humane               conditions  of  work  and  maternity   relief.               These are the minimum requirements which  must               exist in order to enable a person to five with               human  dignity  and  no State   neither  the               Central Government nor any State Government               has  the right to take any action  which  will               deprive  a  person of the enjoyment  of  these               basic   essentials.    Since   the   Directive               Principles   of  State  Policy  contained   in               clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Articles 41               and 42 are not enforceable in a court of  law,               it  may  not be possible to compel  the  State               through the judicial process to make provision               by  statutory enactment or executive fiat  for               ensuring  these basic essentials which  go  to               make  up  a life of human  dignity  but  where               legislation  is already enacted by  the  State               providing  these  basic  requirements  to  the               workmen and thus investing their right to live               with   basic  human  dignity,  with   concrete               reality  and content, the State can  certainly               be  obligated  to ensure  observance  of  such               legislation  for inaction on the part  of  the               State  in  securing  implementation  of   such

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             legislation  would  amount to  denial  of  the               right to live with human dignity enshrined  in               Article 21, more so in the context of  Article               256 which provides that the executive power of               every State shall be so exercised as to ensure               compliance  with the laws made  by  Parliament               and any existing laws which apply in               703               that State."               This, was elaborated in Olga Tellis v.  Bombay               Municipal Corporation, 119851 3 SCC 545 @ 571-               573:               "As  we  hive  stated  while  summing  up  the               petitioners  case,  the main  plank  of  their               argument  is that the right to fife  which  is               guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to               livelihood and since, they will be deprived of               their  livelihood  if they  are  evicted  from               their   slum  and  pavement  dwellings   their               eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their               life  and  is  hence  unconstitutional.    For               purposes  of  argument,  we  will  assume  the               factual correctness of the premise that if the               petitioners are evicted from their  dwellings,                             they  will  be deprived  of  their  livelihood .               Upon  that assumption, the question  which  we               have to consider is whether the right to  fife               includes the right to livelihood.  We see only               one  answer to that question, namely, that  it               does.    The  sweep  of  the  right  to   life               conferred  by  Article  21  is  wide  and  far               reaching.   It does not mean merely that  life               cannot  be extinguished or taken away as,  for               example,  by the imposition and  execution  of               the   death  sentence,  except  according   to               procedure established by law.  That is but one               aspect  of  the  right to  life.   An  equally               important facet of that right is the right  to               livelihood because, no person can live without               the  means  of livingn that is, the  means  of               livelihood.  If the right to livelihood is not               treated as a part of the constitutional  right               life, the easiest way of depriving a person of               his  right to life would be to deprive him  of               his  means  of  livelihood  to  the  point  of               abrogation.   Such deprivation would not  only               denude  the life of its effective content  and               meaningfulness  but it would make life  impos-               sible to live.  And yet such deprivation would               not   have  to  be  in  accordance  with   the               procedure established by law, if the right  to               livelihood  is not regarded as a part  of  the               right  to  live.  That, which alone  makes  it               possible to live, leave aside what makes  life               livable,  must  be deemed to  be  an  integral               component  of  the right to life.   Deprive  a               person  of  his right to  livelihood  and  you               shall have deprived him               704               of  his  life.   Indeed,  that  explains   the               massive  migration of the rural population  to               big cities.  They migrate because they have no               means  of  livelihood in  the  villages.   The               motive force which peoples their desertion  of

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             their  hearts and homes in the village is  the               struggle  for survival that is,  the  struggle               for fife.  So unimpeachable is the evidence of               the  nexus  between  fife  and  the  means  of               livelihood.  They have to eat to live: Only  a               handful  can  efford the luxury of  living  to               eat.   That they can do, namely, eat, only  if               they  have the means of livelihood.   That  is               the  context in which it was said by  Douglas,               J.  in  Baksey that the right to work  is  the               most precious liberty that man possesses.   It               is  the  most  precious  liberty  because,  it               sustains  and  enables a man to live  and  the               right to life is a precious freedom.   ’Life’,               as observed by Field, J. in Munn v.  Illinois,               means   something   more  than   mere   animal               existence  and  the  inhibition  against   the               deprivation  of  fife  extends  to  all  those               limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed.               This  observation was quoted with approval  by               this Court in Singh v. State of UP.               Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is  a               Directive Principle of State Policy,  provides               that the State shall in particular, direct its               policy towards securing that the citizens, men               and  women  equally,  have  the  right  to  an               adequate  means  of livelihood.   Article  41,               which   is   another   Directive    Principle,               provides,  inter  alia, that the  State  shalt               within the limits of its economic capacity and               development   make  effective  provision   for               securing  the  right  to  work  in  cases   of               unemployment and of undeserved want.   Article               37  provides  that the  Directive  Principles,               though  not  enforceable  by  any  court,  are               nevertheless fundamental in the governance  of               the,  country.   The principles  contained  in               Articles  39(a)  and 41 must  be  regarded  as               equally  fundamental in the understanding  and               interpretation  of the meaning and content  of               fundamental rights.  If there is an obligation               upon  the State to secure to the  citizens  an               adequate means of livelihood and the right  to               work it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the               right  to livelihood from the content  of  the               right to life.  The State may               705               not  by affirmative action, be compellable  to               provide  adequate means of livelihood or  work               to  the  citizens.  But, any  person,  who  is               deprived  of  his right to  livelihood  except               according   to   just   and   fair   procedure               established   by   law,  can   challenge   the               deprivation  as  offending the right  to  life               conferred by Article 21."(Emphasis supplied) If  thus,  personal liberty and life have come to  be  given expanded  meaning, the question to be addressed is,  whether life  which means to live with dignity, will take within  it education  as  well?  To put it more  emphatically,  whether right  to education flows from right to life?  Before we  go to  Mohini Jain’s case [1992] 3 SCC 666 it may be  necessary to  refer to State of Andhra Pradesh v.  Lavu  Narendranath, [1971] 1 SCC 607.  At page 614 it is stated:               "Lastly  it was urged that such test  affected               the personal liberty of the candidates secured

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             under Article 21 of the Constitution.  We fail               to see how refusal of an application to  enter               a medical college can be said to affect  one’s               personal   liberty   guaranteed   under   that               article.     Everybody,   subject    to    the               eligibility prescribed by the University,  was               at  liberty  to  apply for  admission  to  the               medical  college.  The number of  seats  being               limited  compared to the number of  applicants               every   candidate  could  not  expect  to   be               admitted.   Once it is held that the  test  is               not   invalid  the  deprivation  of   personal               liberty, if any, in the matter of admission to               a  medical college was according to  procedure                             established by law.  Our attention was drawn t o               the  case of Spottwood v. Sharpe, in which  it               was held that due process clause of the  Fifty               Amendment   of   the   American   Constitution               prohibited racial segregation in the  District               of  Columbia.  Incidentally the Court  made  a               remark (at p. 887):               "Although the Court has not assumed to  define               "liberty". with any great precision, that term               in  not confined to mere freedom  from  bodily               restraint.   Liberty under law extends to  the               full range of conduct which the individual  is               free  to pursue, and it cannot  be  restricted               except for a proper               706               governmental objective.  Segregation in public               education  is  not reasonably related  to  any               proper  governmental  objective, and  thus  it               imposes  on Negro children of the District  of               Columbia   a   burden  that   constitutes   an               arbitrary  deprivation  of  their  liberty  in               violation of the Due Process Clause.               The  problem before is  altogether  different.               In this case everybody subject to the  minimum               qualification  prescribed  was at  liberty  to               apply for admission.  The Government objective               in  selecting a number of them  was  certainly               not,  improper  in the  circumstances  of  the               case,." It requires to be carefully noted that deprivate of personal liberty if done by a valid procedure established by law, the fundamental  right under Article 21 was not, in any  manner, affected.  That is the crux of this ruling.               Now,  coming to Mohini Jain’s case (supra)  it               was observed at pages 679-80:               "Right to life" is the compendious  expression               for  all  those rights which the  courts  must               enforce   because  they  are  basic   to   the               dignified  enjoyment of life.  It  extends  to               the full range of conduct which the individual               is  free  to pursue.  The right  to  education               flows directly from right to life.  The  right               to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an               individual  cannot  be assured  unless  it  is               accompanied  by the right to  education.   The               State  Government  is under an  obligation  to               make    endeavor   to   provide    educational               facilities at all levels to its citizens." Education  is  enlightenment.   It is  the  one  that  lends dignity to a man as was rightly observed by Gajendragarkear,

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J.  (as  he then was) in University of Delhi  v.  Ram  Nath, [1964] 2 SCR 703 at 710:               "Education  seeks to build up the  personality               of  the  pupil  by  assisting  his   physical,               intellectual,     moral     and      emotional               development." If  life  is so interpreted as to bring within it  right  to education, it has 707 to  be  interpreated in the light of  directive  principles. This  Court  has uniformly taken the  view  that  harmonious interpretation  of  the  fundamental  rights  vis-a-vis  the directive principles must be adopted.  We will now refer  to some of the important cases.               In  State  of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M.  7homas  &               Anr., [1976] 1 SCR 906, at 914 it was held:               "There  is  complete  unanimity  of   judicial               opinion  of  this  Court  that  the  Directive               Principles  and the Fundamental Rights  should               be  construed in harmony with each  other  and               every  attempt should be made by the Court  to               resolve apparent inconsistency.               The Directive Principles contained in Part  IV               constitute  the  stairs  to  climb  the   High               edifice   of  a  socialistic  State  and   the               Fundamental Rights are the means through which               one can reach the top of the edifice.               The Directive Principles form the  fundamental               feature  and  the  social  conscience  of  the               Constitution  which enjoins upon the State  to               implement  these  Directive  Principles.   The               Directives,  thus  provide  the  policy,   the               guidelines   and  the  end  of   socioeconomic               freedom  and Arts. 14 and 16 are the means  to               implement  the  policy  to  achieve  the  ends               sought   to  be  promoted  by  the   Directive               Principles.    So  far  as  the   Courts   are               concerned   where   there   is   no   apparent               inconsistency between the Directive Principles               contained  in  Part  IV  and  the  Fundamental               Rights  mentioned  in Part III,  there  is  no               difficulty    in    putting    a    harmonious               construction which advances the object of  the               Constitution.’               In Pathumma and others v. State of Kerala  and               others,  [1978]  2 SCR 537 at  545-46  it  was               observed:               "In   fact  in  the  case  of   His   Holiness               Kesavananda  Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.  State               of  Kerala  all the  Judges  constituting  the               Bench have with one voice given the  Directive               Priciples  contained  in  the  Constitution  a               place               708               of  honour.  Hegde and Mukhejea, JJ.  as  they               they  were  have  said  that  the  fundamental               rights and the Directive Principles constitute               the  "conscience’  of our  Constitution.   The               purpose, of the Directive Principles is to fix               certain   social   and  economic   goals   for               immediate attainment by bringing about a  non-               violent  social revolution.   Chandrachud,  J.               observed   that  our  Constitution   aims   at               bringing    about    a    synthesis    between               ’Fundamental   Rights’  and   the   ’Directive

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             Principles  of State Policy’ by giving to  the               former  a place of pride and to the  latter  a               place of permanence.               In  a  latter case State of Kerala &  Anr.  v.               N.M. Thomas & Ors., [1976] 2 SCC 310 one of us               (Fazal  Ali, J.) after analysing the  Judgment               delibered by all the Judges in the  Kesvananda               Bharati’s  case (supra) on the  importance  of               the Directive Principles observed as follows:               "In view of the principles adumbrated by  this               Court   it   is  clear  that   the   Directive               Principles  form the fundamental  feature  and               the social conscience of the Constitution  and               the  Constitution  enjoins upon the  State  to               implement  these  directive  principles.   The               directives   thus  provide  the  policy,   the               guidelines   and  the  end  of   socioeconomic               freedom of Articles 14 and 16 are the means to               implement  the  policy  to  achieve  the  ends               sought   to  be  promoted  by  the   directive               principles.   So  far as the courts  are  con-               cerned    where   there   is    no    apparent               inconsistency between the directive principles               contained   in   Part  111,  which   in   fact               supplement each other, there is no  difficulty               in  putting a harmonious  construction,  which               advances the object of the Constitution.  Once               this   basic  fact  is  kept  in   mind,   the               interpretation of Articles 14 and 16 and their               scope and ambit become as clear as day’.               In  the case of The State of Bombay v.  R.M.D.               Chamarbaugwala this Court while stressing  the               importance  of directive principles  contained               in the Constituion observed as follows:               709               The  avowed purpose of our constitution is  to               create   a  welfare  State.    The   directive               principles  of State Policy set forth in  Part               IV  of our Constitution enjoin upon the  State               the  duty to strive to promote the welfare  of               the  people by and protecting, as  effectively               as  it may, a social order in  which  justice,               social economic and political shall inform all               the institutions of the national life.’               In the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors.  v.               State   of   Maharashtra  etc.   (supra)   the               Constitution  Bench of this Court observed  as               follows:               "Incorporation  of  Directive  Principles   of               State  Policy casting the high duty  upon  the               State to strive to promote, the welfare of the               people   by   securing   and   protecting   as               effectively as it may, a social order in which               justice   social economic  and  political               shall  inform  all  the  institutions  of  the               national  life, is not idle point but  command               to action.  We can never forget, except at our               peril  that  the  Constitution  obligates  the               State   to   ensure  an  adequate   means   of               livelihood to its citizens and to see that the               health and strength of workers, men and women,               are  not abused, that exploitation, moral  and               material,  shall  be  extradited.   In  short,               State  action  defending the  weaker  sections               from  social  injustice  and  all  forms of

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             exploitation  and  raising  the  standard   of               living  of the people, necessarily imply  that               economic  activities,  attired  as  trade   or               business or commerce, can be de-recognised  as               trade or business."               In  Delhi Development Horticulture  Employees’               Union  v.  Delhi  Administration,  Delhi   and               others,  [1992]  4  SCC  99  at  110  it   was               observed:               "There  is no doubt that  broadly  interpreted               and as a necessary logical corollary, right to               life  would  include the right  to  livelihood               and, therefore, right to work.  It is for this               reason  that  this  Court in  Olga  Tellis  v.               Bombay Municipal Corporation while considering               the  consequences of eviction of the  pavement               dwellers had pointed out that in that case the               eviction not merely resulted in deprivation of               shelter but also deprivation of livelihood               710               inasmuch   as  the  pavement   dwellers   were               employed  in the vicinity of their  dwellings.               The Court had, therefore, emphasised that  the               problem  of eviction of the pavement  dwellers               bad  to be viewed also in that context.   This               was,  however,  in the context of  Article  21               which   seeks  to  protect  persons   at               the deprivation of their life except according               to procedure established by law.  This Country               has   so   far  not  found  it   feasible   to               incorporate  the  right  to  livelihood  as  a               fundamental  right in the Constitution.   This               is because the country has so far not attained               the  capacity to guarantee it, and no  because               it  considers it any the less  fundamental  to               life.  Advisedly, Article 41 of which  enjoins               upon the State to make effective provision for               securing  the same "within the limits  of  its               economic capacity and development".  Thus even               while  giving  the direction to the  State  to               ensure  the  right to work,  the  Constitution               makers though it prudent not to do so  without               qualifying it."               Such   a  conclusion  may  not  be   open   to               criticism.  So interpreted it advances  social               justice.               In  Vol.   VII  at pages 909 and  910  of  the               Constitutent Debates (1948-49) it is stated:               "The  Honourable Shri K. Santhanam : Sir,  you               will remeber that throughout Europe, after the               First  World’  War, all  that  the  minorities               wanted  was  the  right  to  have  their   own               schools,  and to conserve their  own  cultures               which the Fascist and the Nazis refused  them.               In  fact,  they did not want  even  the  State               schools.   They  did not want  State  aid,  or               State  assistance.   They simply  wanted  that               they  should  be allowed to pursue  their  own               customs  and to follow their own cultures  and               to  establish and conduct their  own  schools.               Therefore  I do not think it is right  on  the               part of any minority to depreciate the  rights               given in article 23(1).               Sir,  in  clause (2) of article  23  they  are               protected against discrimination.  It is  just

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             possible  that  there may  be  many  provinces               based on language and therefore the Govern-               711               ment, the ministry and the legislature will be               composed dominantly by members of the majority               language.   This right  of  non-discrimination               will then become fundamental and valuable.               And then in clause (3) of this article, it  is               provided  that  when the State  gives  aid  to               education,  it shall not discriminate  against               any  educational  institution, on  the  ground               that it is under the management of a minority.               Whether based on community or on language, and               this  will be particularly applicable  to  the               linguistic  minorities.   In  every  province,               there   are   islands  of   these   linguistic               minorities.  For instance, in my own  province               of  Tamil  Nadu there are islands,  in  almost               every  district,  of villages  where  a  large               number  of Telugu-speaking people reside.   In               this  connection we have to hold  the  balance               even  between two different trends.  First  of               all,  we  have  to give  to  large  linguistic               minorities  their  right  to  be  educated               especially  in the primary stages   in  their               own language.  At the same time we should  not               interfere  with  the  historical  process   of               assimilation.  We ought not to think that  for               hundred  and thousands of years to come  these               linguistic    minorities    will    perpetuate                             themselves   as  they  are.   The   historical               processes should be allowed free play.   These               minorities   should   be  helped   to   become               assimilated  with the people of the  locality.               They  should gradually absorb the language  of               the locality and become merged with the people               there.   Otherwise they will be aliens, as  it               were,  in  those  provinces.   Therefore,   we               should  not  have rigid  provisions  by  which               every child is automatically protected in what               may  be  ,called his  mother-tongue.   On  the               other hand, this process should not be sudden,               it  should not be forced.  Wherever there  are               large  numbers  of children,  they  should  be               given education  primary education  in their               mother-tongue.  At the same time, they  should               be  encouraged  and  assisted  to  go  to  the               ordinary  schools  of  the  provinces  and  to               imbibe  the local tongue and  get  assimilated               with  the  people.  If feel this  clause  does               provide  for these contingencies in  the  most               practicable fashion.               712               Sir, Mr. Lari wanted an amendment which  seeks               to provide that every child, rather that every               section of the citizens, shall be entitled  to               have   primary  education  imparted   to   its               children through the medium of the language of               that section.  I suppose what he means is that               wherever primary education is imparted at  the               expense  of the State, such provisions  should               be  made.  But this, I think, would  give  the               minority  or  section  of  people  speaking  a               language  the complete and absolute  right  to               have  primary  education which the  people  of

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             this  country  do  not  have  today.   In  the               directives  we have provided that  in  fifteen               years’ time there should be universal  primary               education.   But  no  one  knows  whether  the               financial and other conditions in the  country               would permit of universal primary education to               be  established  even then.  Today no  one  in               India can ask for primary education as a right               as  only  ten per cent of the  population  get               primary  education.   Therefore,  it  is   not               possible  to  accept  Mr.  Lari’s   amendment,               because  that  would  lead  to  all  kinds  of               difficulties.  If it were passed, then  anyone               can  go to the Supreme Court and say that  his               child  must  get  education  in  a  particular               language.   That is not practicable, and I  do               not think even his intention is at all that.               At the same time, I think, what he has pleaded               for must be kept in mind as a general  policy.               It should be direction of the Central and  the               Provincial  Governments to see  that  wherever               there  are  congregations of  boys  and  girls               having  a  distinct  mother  tongue,   schools               should be provided in that language.  I  hope,               that  will be the policy adopted all over  the               country,  especially as, if there is going  to                             be new linguistic revisions of the  boundaries ,               all  the  border areas will be  full  of  this               problem.    I  hope  the  respondent  of   the               Linguistic  Provinces Commission will  contain               some  wise  provisions to be adopted  in  this               behalf.   There  should be  no  difficulty  or               hardship whatsoever in provinces when they are               rearranged   on  a  linguistic   basis.    For               instance, if a Telugu goes to one area or  the               other, he should not have any hardship.  As  I               said, this is a most difficult and com-               713               plicated  problem and it cannot be dealt  with               in  detail  in the fundamental  rights.   This               article 23 provides as much security as can be               done  in the Constitution.   Other  securities               will   have  to  be  provided  for   both   by               Parliamentary and provincial,legislation,  and               I hope it will be done in due course.’ It  is true the framers of the Constitution took that  view. But the position as on today is very different.  The  reason is Article 45 States as under:               "Provision  for free and compulsory  education               for  children.  The State shall  endeavor  to               provide, within a period of ten years from the               commencement  of this Constitution,  for  free               and  compulsory  education  for  all  children               until  they  complete  the  age  of   fourteen               years." 14 years, spoken to under the Article, had long ago come  to an  end.  We are in the 43rd year of Independence.  Yet,  if Article 45 were to r a pious wish and a fond hope, what good of it having regard to the importance of primary  education? A time limit was prescribed under this Article.  Such a time limit  is found only here, If, therefore, endeavor  has  not been  made  till now to make this Article  reverberate  with life and articulate with meaning, we should think the  Court should step in.  The State can be objected to ensure a right

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to free education of every child up to the-age of 14  years. On this aspect a useful reference could be made to what have been observed in Human Right and Education Vol. 3 edited  by Norma Bernstein Tarrow at page 41:               "The State is directed to strive for the right               to  education,  make provision  for  free  and               compulsory, education (Article 45) and promote               the. educational interests of Scheduled Castes               and   Tribes,   and  other   weaker   sections               (including women).               Education  is primarily the responsibility  of               the   State   Governments,   but   the   Union               Government   has   certain    responsibilities               specified in the Constitution on matters  such               as  promote higher education and promotion  of               education  for weaker sections.   Most  states               have enacted               714               legislation for compulsory education.  At  the               end of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1985) primary               education for ages 6-11 is free in all states,               and  for  age group 11-14 it is  free  in  all               except Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West  Bengal.               In   these  States,  girls  and   members   of               Scheduled   Castes   and   Tribes   get   free               education,  and  incentives  such  as  mid-day               meals, free books and uniforms, are  provided.               At  the  secondary stage several  states  have               free  education  for all  children  and  those               which do not make free education available  to               all  do  so for girls,  Scheduled  Castes  and               Tribes.  Thus free education in all states  is               provided  at the primary and secondary  stages               for girls, Scheduled Castes and Tribes."               Again at page 43 it is stated:               ’Useful  measures of achievement in  terms  of               the  right  to  education  are  literacy   and               enrollment levels.  The contemporary  picture,               however,  is not as good as one  would  expect               after 39 years of independence.  The  literacy               rate has risen from 16.6. per cent in 1951  to               36.6  per cent according to the  1981  census.               But  regional variations indicate a  range  of               above 60 per cent literacy in Kerala to  below               20  per  cent  in  some  states.   Nearly  120               million  in the functional age group of  15-35               are still illiterate (Bhandari 1981).               Over   the  last  three  decades  of   planned               development,  rapid growth in  facilities  has               attempted to provide access for minorities and               girls.  The number of educational institutions               has  more than doubled, while the  number.  of               teachers  and  students  has  multiplied  many               tunes.  But despite the fact that 93 per  cent               of the rural population have access to schnook               nearly  30  per  cent of  6-14  year  old  (60               million)  do not go to school and T7 per  cent               drop out.  A large percentage of the  dropouts               are  grids  and  Scheduled  Caste  and   Tribe               members.  The main problems are  socioeconomic               constraints   which  result   in   educational               constraints.   Poverty is a majory  cause  for               keeping chidren               715               away from school."

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             Article 26(1) of the Universal Declaration  of               Human Rights states:               "Everyone   has   the  right   to   education.               Technical  and professional  and  professional               education  shall be made  generally  available               and   higher   education  shall   be   equally               accessible  to  all on the  basis  of  merit."               (Emphasis supplied)               In the World of Science and the Rule of Law by               John  Ziman  1986  Edition at page  49  if  is               stated:               "The principal global treaty which covers this               right   is  the  ICESCR,  whose   Article   13               recognizes  the  general  right  to  education               enunciated  by the UDHR, but then goes  on  to               add the following more specific provisions:               (2)   The   States  Parties  to  the   present               Covenant  recognize  that,  with  a  view   to               achieving the full realization of this right:               (a)   Primary  education shall  be  compulsory               and available fee    to all;               (b)   Secondary  education  in  its  different               forms,  including  technical  and   vocational               secondary  education, shall be made  generally               available  and  accessible  to  all  by  every               appropriate  means, and in particular  by  the               progressive introduction of free education:                (c)  Higher education shall be  made  equally               accessible   to   all   on   the   progressive               introduction of free education;               (d)   Fundamental    education    shall     be               encouraged  or intensified as far as  possible               for  those  persons who have not  received  or               completed  the whose period of  their  primary               education;               (e)   The  development of a system of  schools               at  all levels shall be actively  pursued,  an               adequate    fellowship   system    shall    be               established,  and the material  conditions  of               teach-               716               ing staff shall be continuously improved.               The  status  of  this  Article  is  a   useful               reminder  of  the  problems  inherent  in  any               attempt  to  create a ’social’ right  of  this               kind for individuals against their states." No doubt, the above extract from Mohini Jain’s case  (supra) states  "education at all levels", but we ’consider the  law has  been  somewhat broadly stated and, therefore,  must  be confined to what is envisaged under Article 45. The  criticism  by  Mr. Ashok Desai,  learned  counsel  that Article  37  has not been adverted to and  the  reliance  on directive  principles is untenable, in view of what we  have stated above. Higher   education  calls  heavily  on   national   economic resources.   The right to it must necessarily be limited  in any given country by its economic and social  circumstances. The  State’s  obligation to provide it  is,  therefore,  not absolute and immediate but relative and progressive.  It has to take steps to the maximum of its available resources with a  view to achieving progressively the full  realization  of the  right of education by all appropriate means’ But,  with regard  to the general obligation to provide education,  the State  is  bound  to provide the same,  if  it  deliberately starved   its  educational  system  by  resources  that   it

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meanifestly  had available unless it could show that it  was allocating them to some even more pressing programme.  fore, by holding education as a fundamental right up to the age of 14  years this Court is not determining the priorities.   On the  contrary, reminding it of the solemn endeavour, it  has to  take, under Article 45, within a prescribed time,  which time limit was expired long ago. Mr.  K.K.  Venugopal, learned counsel contends that  in  the U.S.  Supreme Court in the case of San  Antonio  Independent School District v. Rodrgues, 1973 411 U.S. it was observed:               "It  is not province of this Court  to  create               substantive constitutional rights in the  name               of guaranteeing equal protection of the  laws.               Thus the key to discovering whether  education               is   ’Fundamental"   is  not   to   be   found               (imcomparisons)   of  the  relative   societal               significances of               717               education   as  opposed  to   subsistence   or               housing...   Rather,   the  answer   lies   in               assessing   whether  there  is  a   right   to               education  explicitly or implicity  guaranteed               by the Constitution. But if in reality, the, fundamental rights and the directive principles are complementary to each other we are unable  to see why this fundamental right cannot be interpreted in this manner.  The American Constitution does not have a directive principle  like, Article 45.  Therefore, the  contraly  view was  struck  in  San  Antonio  Independent  School  District (supra). While  dealing with the American Law on this aspect in  Vol. 57 1969 Califomia Law Review at page 380 it was stated:,               "It is true that the quotation from the  Brown               opinion  seems  stunningly  relevant.    Taken               literally  it would be decisive in some  sense               upon the question of this Article.   Education               ;must be made available to @ on equal  terms."               From the vantage point of 1968, however, it is               no  longer  clear  that  Brown  was  specially               concerned  about  the interest  in  education.               The decision had scarcely appeared before  the               "ftmdamental"  character of  education  become               the fundamental character of golf and swimming               rights,  and all the cases since  Brown,  even               the  cases  involving  education,  have  shown               complete preoccupation with the racial factor.               Meanwhile  the Court has done nothing  further               to   suggest  that  education  enjoy    as   a               constitutional life of its own.’ As  to the present position of primary education  in  India, the  additional affidavit on behalf of Union of India  filed by  Mr.  H.C.  Baveja, Assistant Education  Advisor  in  the Ministry  of  Human  Resources  Development,  Government  of India, Department of Education, New Delhi, puts the position thus:            STATUS OF ELEMENTRY EDUCATION IN INDIA               1.    Provision   of   free   and   compulsory               education to all children until they  complete               the  age of 14 years is a Directive  Principle               of the Constitution.  Recognising the               718               need for literate population and provision  of               elementary  education as a crucial  input  for               nation building, the policy of the  Government               has been to provide all children the free  and

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             compulsory education at least up to elementary               level (primary and upper primary level).   The               6th  Five  Year Plan document made  a  serious               reference to the desirability of a time  bound               plan to achieve universal enrolment.  The  7th               Plan  conveyed  a sense of urgency  about  the               need  to  achieve this  objective.   This  was               reinforced  mid-way by the National Policy  on               Education, 1986.               Progress over the years.               2.    Concerted  efforts to reach  the  target               has led to manifold increase in  institutions,               teachers  and students as shown in  the  table               below.- Number of Institution (in lakhs) ---------------------------------------------------                                 1950-51     1990-91 ----------------------------------------------------      Primary Schools              2.10         5.58      (Class I-V) ---------------------------------------------------      Upper Primary Schools        0.13         1.46      (Class VI-VIII) ----------------------------------------------------      Total                        2.23         7.04 ---------------------------------------------------- Number of Teachers (In lakhs) ----------------------------------------------------      Primary Schools             5.38          16.36 ----------------------------------------------------      Upper Primary Schools       O.36          10.59 -----------------------------------------------------      Total                       6.24          26.95 -----------------------------------------------------                      Gross Enrolment ------------------------------------------------------      Primary Enrolment (in       192             991 ------------------------------------------------------      Gross Enrolment Ratio      43.1%            101.03% --------------------------------------------------------                      Upper Primary State -------------------------------------------------------- Total Enrolment (in lakhs)     31                  333 --------------------------------------------------------- Gross Enrolment Ratio         12.9%              60.11% --------------------------------------------------------- 719                3.  This increase provided  Indian  Education               System with one of the largest systems in  the               world,  providing accessibility within  1  km.               walking   distance  of  Primary   schools   to               8.26lakhs habitations containing about 94%  of               the country’s population.  Growth in enrolment               in  the decade of 80s showed  an  acceleration               that has now brought enrolment rates close  of               100% at primary stage.                FREE EDUCATION.                4. In the endeavour to increase enrolment and               achieve   the   target  of  UEE,   all   State               Governments  have  abolised  tuition  fees  in               Government  Schools  run by local  bodies  and               private  aided institutions is mostly free  in               these  States.   However, in  private  unaided               schools  which  constitute 3.7. of  the  total               elementary schools in the country, some fee is

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             charged.   Thus, overall it may be  said  that               education   up   to   elementary   level    in               practically all schools is free.  Other  costs               of  education  such as text  books,  uniforms,               school  bags, transport etc. are not borne  by               States  except in a very few cases by  way  of               incentives to children of indigent families or               these  belonging to Scheduled  Caste/Scheduled               Tribes  categories.  The reason why the  State               Government are unable to bear this  additional               expenditure  is  that 96%  of  expenditure  on               elementary  education  goes  in  meeting   the               salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff.                COMPULSORY EDUCATION                5.14  States  and 4  Union  Territories  have               enacted   legislation   to   make    education               compulsory  but the socioeconomic  compulsions               that keep the children away from schools  have               restrained them from prescribing the rules and               regulations  whereby those provisions  can  be                             endorsed. Thus,  it  has  to  be concluded  that  the  right  to  free education up to the age of 14 years is a fundamental right. 720 The next question is whether there is a fundamental right to establish  an  educational institution.  That  takes  us  to Article 19(1)(g).  That reads as follows:               to  practise any profession, or to cam on  any               occupation, trade or business.’ The question now is: what is the meaning to be attributed to the words ’profession, "occupation", "trade" or "business". In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon Reprint Edition 1987  at page 897 ’Occupation means:               "The   principal  business  of   one’s   life,               vocation,trade,  the  business  which  a   man               follows to procure a living or obtain  wealth:               that  which occupies or engages one’s time  or               attention,   vocation,   employment,   calling               trade; the business in which a man is  usually               engaged, to the knowledge of his neighbour." According  to Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition  at  page 973 ’Occupation’ means:               "Possession; control; tenure; use.  The act or               process  by which real property  is  possessed               and   enjoyed.   Where  a   person   exercises               physical control over land’.               That  which principally takes up  one’s  time,               thought,   and  energies,  especially,   one’s               regular business or employment; also, whatever               one   follows  as  the  means  of   making   a               livelihood.  Particular business,  profession,               trade,  or calling which engages  individual’s               time  and  efforts; employment  in  which  one               regularly engages or vocation of his life." In P. V. G. Raju v. Commissioner of Expenditure, ITR Vol. 86 page 267 it is observed thus:               "The  activity termed as ’Occupation’.  if  of               wider import than vocation or profession.   It               is  also  distinct from a hobby which  can  be               resorted to only in leisure hours for               721               the  purpose  of  killing  time.   Occupation,               therefore,   is  that  with  which  a   person               occupies   himself  ’either   temporarily   or               permanently or for a considerable period  with

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             continuity of activity.  It is analogous to  a               business,  calling or pursuit.  A  person  may               have  more than one occupation in  a  previous               year.  The Occupations may be seasonal or  for               the whole year."               "Firstly, there can be a business, profession,               vocation  or  occupation  without  any  profit               motive  or on ’no profit no loss  basic.   To,               illustrate,  co-operative societies or  mutual               insurance  companies  may  carry  on  business               without  earning  any income  or  without  any               profit motive.  The vocation or occupation  to               do  social  service of various kinds  for  the               uplift  of  the people would also  come  under               this  category.  The profit motive or  earning               of  income is not an essential  ingredient  to               constitute  the activity, termed as  business,               profession, vocation or occupation."               "If  any  authority is needed, we find  it  in               Commissioner   of  Expenditure  Tax  v.   Mrs.               Manorama  Sarabhai, (1966) 59 ITR  262  (Guj.)               wherein  it  was  held  that  the  educational               activities  of  the assessees amounted  to  an               occupation within the meaning of Section  5(a)               and  that  no profit motive  is  necessary  to               treat an activity as a vocation or  occupation               within  the meaning of Section 5(a).  For  all               these   reasons,   we   must   negative   this               submission  of  Mr. Ramarao  relating  to  the               interpretation   of   the   words   "business,               profession, vocation or occupation’ in section               5(a) of the Act."               In  P.K  Menon  v.  Income-tax   Commissioner,               [1959]  Supp.  1 SCR 133 at p. 137 this  Court               observed as follows:               "We  find  no  difficulty  in  thinking that               teaching  is a vocation if not  a  profession.               It  is plainly so and it is not  necessary  to               discuss  the  various  meanings  of  the  word               "vocation’   for  the  purpose  or   to   cite               authorities  to support this view.  Nor do  we               find   any  reason  why,  if  teaching  is   a               vocation,  teaching of Vedanta is not.  It  is               just as much               722               teaching  and  therefore, a vocation,  as  any               other  teaching.  It is said that in  teaching               Vedanta  the  appellant  was  only  practising               religion.   We are unable to see why  teaching               of  Vedanta  as a matter of  religion  is  not               carrying on of a vocation.’               "It  is-said that as the word  ’Vocation’  has               been used along with the words ’business"  and               "profession" and the object of business and  a               profession,  is  to make a profit,  only  such               activities   can  be  included  in  the   word               ’Vocation" the object of which likewise is  to               make   a   profit.   We   think   that   these               contentions   lack  substance.   We   do   not               appreciate the significance of saying that  in               order to become a vocation an activity must be               organised.  If by that a continuous, or as was               said, a systematic activity, is meant,we  have               to  point  out that it is well  known  that  a               single act may amount to the carrying on of  a

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             business or profession". The  meaning of "business" can be gathered from Law  Lexicon Edition 1987 by Ramnath Iyer: "Business  is  that  which  engages  the  time,  talent  and interest  of a man" and is what a man proposes  to  himself. There may be a "Business" without precuniary profit being at all contemplated.               "Business" and "Trade" : "Business" has a more               extensive meaning that "Trade" (per Willes, J.               Hariis   v.   Amery  35   L.J.   C.P.92)   But               "Ordinarily  speaking, Business is  synonymous               with ’Trade", (per Chatterton V. C. Delany  v.               Deleny, 15 L.R. Ir. 67).  There may,  however,               be a "Business" without pecuniary profit being               at  all  contemplated.   In  such  connection,               "Business’  is  a very much larger  word  than               ’Trade’ and the word "Business" is employed in               order  to include occupations which would  not               strictly  come within the meaning of the  word               "Trade (per Person, J. Rolls v. Miller, 53 LJ.               Ch.  101)  per  Scruitton.   L.J.  The   words               ’Trade"  and ’Business" do not mean  the  same               thing  .....  ;on  business,  though   usually               business  is carried on for profit.  It is  to               be  presumed  that the Railways are run  on  a               profit,  though  it may be  that  occasionally               they are run               723               at a loss."               "Monetary   consideration  for   service   is,               therefore, not an essential characteristic  of               industry in a modern State".               In Hindustan Steel Limited v. State of Orissa,               [1970] 1 SCR 753 it is observed:               "A person to be a dealer within the meaning of               the Act must carry on the business of  selling               or supplying goods in Orissa.  The expression,               ’business’ is not defined in the Act.  But  as               observed  by  this Court in  State  of  Andhra               Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi, [1964] 7 SCR 664:               "The expression ’business’ though  extensively               used as a word of indefinite import, in taxing               statutes  it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  an               occupation,  or profession which occupies  the                             time,   attention  and  tabour  of  a   person ,               normally with the object of making profit.  To               regard an activity as business there must be a               course  of dealings either actually  continued               or contemplated to be continued with a  profit               motive, and no for sport of pleasure." In  Barendra Prasad Ray v. The Income-tax Officer,  AIR’1981 SC 1047: [1981] 3 SCR 387 at 400 B and H and 401 A and B  it is observed:               "The expression ’business does not necessarily               mean trade or manufacture only.  It is  being:               used as including within its scope profession,               vocations and calling from a fairly long time.               The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary  defines               ’Business" as stated occupation, profession or trade’  and a  man of business is  defined  as               meaning  "an attorney’ also.  In view  of  the               above   dictionary   meaning  of   the,   word               ’business’   it  cannot  be  said   that   the               definition of business given in Section 45  of

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             the  Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict.   C.               39)  was an extended definition  intended  for               the  purpose of that Act only.  Section 45  of               that Act says:               The   expression  ’Business"  includes   every               Trade, occupation, or profession".               724               "Section  2(b) of the Indian Partnership  Act,               1932 also defines ’Business’ thus:-               "Business’  includes every  trade,  occupation               and profession."               "The   observation   of   Rowlatt,   J.    in,               Christopher  Barker & Sons v. Commissioner  of               Inland Revenue, (1919) 2 KB 222 at p.228. ’All               professions are businesses, but all businesses               are  not professions, ..." also  supports  the               view  that professions are generally  regarded               as  business.   The same learned Judge  in  an               other  case Commissioner of Inland Revenue  v.               Marine  Steam Turbine Co. Ltd.,  (1920)  1.KB.               193 held:               "The  word ’Business’ however is also used  in               another and a very different sense, as meaning               an    active    occupation    or    profession               continuously  carried  on and it  is  in  this               sense  the word is used in the Act with  which               we are here concerned".               "The word "Business" is one of wide import and               it  means an activity carried on  continuously               and   systematically  by  a  person   by   the               application of his labour skiff with a view to               earning an income.  We are of the view that in               the context in which the expression "business"                             is used in Section 9(1) of the Act, there is n o               warrant for giving a restricted meaning to  it               excluding  professional connections  from  its               scope." In  each of these cases, depending upon the statute,  either "occupation"   or  ’business’  has  come  to   be   defined. Certainly,  it cannot be contended that establishment of  an educational  institution  would be "business".   Nor  again, could  that  be  called trade since  no  trading  activities carried  on.   Equally, it is not a profession.  It  is  one thing  to  say that teaching is a profession but,  it  is  a totally  different  thing to urge that establishment  of  an educational institution would a profession.  It may  perhaps fall   under   the  category  of  occupation   provided   no recognition is sought from the State or affiliation from the University  is  asked on the basis the it is  a  fundamental right.  This position is explained, below: 725 However,  some  of the learned counsel relied  on  Bangalore Water  Supply and Sewerage Board v. R Rajappa, [1978] 3  SCR 207  to  urge that the activity of  running  an  educational institution was an industry.  In that case, Krishna Iyer, J. observed:               "To Christian education as a mission, even  if               true,  is not to negate it being an  Industry,               we have to look at education activity from the               angle of the Act and so viewed the ingredients               of  education  are  fufiled.   Education   is,               therefore,  an industry nothing can  stand  in               the way of that conclusion."               This ruling was relied on in Miss  Sundarambai

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             v. Government of Goa, [1988] Suppl. 1 SCR  604               at page 608B.  It was held:               "Thus   it  is  seen  that  even   though   an               educational  institution has to be treated  as               an  industry  in view of the decision  in  the               Bangalore  Water Supply and Sewerage Board  v.               R.   Rajappa  (supra)  the  question   whether               teachers in an educational institution can  be               considered  as  workmen still  remains  to  be               decided.’ It requires to be carefully noted that while considering  as to  what would constitute an industry under  the  Industrial Disputes   Act,   these  observations  came  to   be   made. Certainly,   that   is  very  different  from   claiming   a fundamental tat right under Article 19(1) (g). Even  on general principles, the matter could be  approached this way.  Educational institutions can be classified  under two categories: 1.   Those requiring recognition by the State and 2.   Those who do not require such a recognition.. It is not mere an establishment of educational  institution, that   is  urged  by  the  petitioners,  but,  to  run   the educational institution  dependent on recognition  by  the State.    There  is  absolutely  no  fundamental  right   to recognition in any citizen.  The right to establishment  and run  the  educational institution with  State’s  recognition arises  only  on the State permitting pursuant to  a  policy decision  or  on  the fulfilment of the  conditions  of  the Statute.  Therefore, where it is dependent on the permission under the 726 statute  or  the exercise of an executive power,  it  cannot qualify  to be a fundamental right.  Then again,  the  State policy may dictate a different course. The logical corollary of holding that a fundamental right to establish  in  educational institution  is  available  under Article  19(1) (g) would lead of the proposition,  right  to establish  a  university  also.  In  fact,  this  Court  had occasion to point out in S. Azeez Basha and Anr v. Union  of India, 19681 1 SCR 833 at page 848 thus:               "Before  we do so we should like to  say  that               the  words  educational institutions"  are  of               very   wide   import  and  would   include   a               university  also.   This was not  disputed  on               behalf of the Union of India and therefore  it               may be accepted that a religious minority  had               the right to establish a university under Art.               30(1).   The  position  with  respect  to  the               establishment   of  Universities  before   the               Constitution came into force in 1950 was this.               There was no law in India which prohibited any               private individual or body from establishing a               university  and  it was therefore  open  to  a               private  individual  or body  to  establish  a               university.   There is a good deal  in  common               between educational institutions which are not               universities and those which are universities.               Both teach students and both have teachers for               the   purpose.   But  what   distinguishes   a               university   from   any   other    educational               institution   is  that  a  university   grants               degrees  of  its own while  other  educational               institutions  cannot.  It is this granting  of               degrees by a university which distinguishes it               from   the   ordinary   run   of   educational

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             institutions.   (See  St.   David’s   College,               Lampeter v. Ministry of Educations 1951 1  All               E.R. 559).  Thus in law in India there was  no               prohibition    against    establishment     of               universities by private individuals or  bodies               and  if any university was so  established  it               must  of necessity be granting degrees  before               it  could be called a university.  But  though               such a university might be granting degrees it               did  not  follow that the  Government  of  the               country was bound to recognise those degrees." 727 It there is no fundamental right to establish a university a fortiori  a  fundamental right to establish  an  educational institution is not available. By  implication also a fundamental right of the  nature  and character  conferred  under Article 30 cannot be  read  into Article  19(1) (g).  The conferment of such a right  on  the minorities  in a positive way under Article 30 negatise  the assumption  of a fundamental right in this behalf  in  every citizen of the country. In  Ahmedabad  St.  Xaviers  College  Society  v.  State  of Gujarat, [1975] 1 SCR 173 at page 191 it is observed:               "The   tight  to  establish   and   administer               educational  institutions of their choice  has               been  conferred  on religious  and  linguistic               minorities so that the majority who can always               have their tights by having proper legislation               do   not   pass  a   legislation   prohibiting               minorities   to   establish   and   administer               educational institutions of their choice.   If               the   scope  of  Article  30(1)  is  made   an               extension of the right under Article 29(1)  as               the   right   to  establish   and   administer               educational institutions for giving  religious               instruction  or  for  imparting  education  in               their  religious  teachings  ’or  tenets   the               fundamental  right of minorities to  establish               and  administer  educational  institution   of               their choice will be taken away.               (Emphasis Supplied)               At page 192 it is observed:               "Article  30 is a special right to  minorities               to establish educational institutions of their               choice.  This Court said that the two Articles               create  two  separate  rights  though  it   is               possible that the rights might meet in a given               case.               The real reason embodied in Article 30 (1)  of               the  Constitution  is the  conscience  of  the               nation that the minorities, religious as  well               as   linguistic,  are  not   prohibited   from               establishing  and  administering   educational               institutions  of their choice for the  purpose               of  giving  their children  the  best  general               education to make them com-               728               plete  men  and  women of  the  country.   The               minorities  are  given this  protection  under               Article 30 in order to preserve and strengthen               the  integrity and unity of the country.   The               sphere   of  general  secular   education   is               intended to develop the commonness of boys and               girls  of  our country.  This is in  the  true               spirit  of  liberty, equality  and  fraternity

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             through the medium of education.  If religious               or   linguistic  minorities  are   not   given               protection  under Article 30 to establish  and               administer  educational institutions of  their               choice, they will feel isolated and  separate.               General  secular education will open doors  of               perception  and  act as the natural  fight  of               mind for our countrymen to live in the whole."               Then again, at page 224 it is observed:               "The idea of giving some special rights to the               minorities is not to have a kind of privileged               or  pampered section of the population but  to               give to the minorities a sense of security and               a feeling of confidence.  The great leaders of               India  since time immemorial had preached  the               doctrine  of  tolerance  and  cathnolicity  of               outlook.  Those noble ideas were enshrined  in               the   Constitution.    Special   rights    for               minorities   were  designed  not   to   create               inequality.   Their real effect was  to  bring               about equality by ensuring the preservation of               the minority institutions and by  guaranteeing               to  the minorities autonomy in the  matter  of               the administration of these institutions.  The               differential  treatment for the minorities  by               giving  them  special rights  is  intended  to               bring about an equilibrium, so that the  ideal               of -quality  may not be reduced  to  a  mere               abstract  idea  but  should  become  a  living               reality and result in true, genuine  equality,               an  equality not merely in theory but also  in               fact.   The  majority  in a  system  of  adult               franchise hardly needs any protection.  It can               look  after itself and protect its  interests.               Any measure wanted by the majority can without               much  difficulty  be brought on  the statute               book because the majority can get that done by               giving   such   a  mandate  to   the   elected               representatives.  It is only the               729               minorities  who need protection,  and  article               30,  besides some other articles, is  intended               to afford and guarantee that protection.               (Emphasis supplied) The  argument that every activity or occupation by the  mere fact  of  its not being abnoxious or  harmful  to  society-, cannot  by itself be entitled to protection  as  fundamental right.   As  pointed  out above, some rights,  by  the  very nature,  cannot be qualified to be protected as  fundamental rights. Accordingly,  it is held that there is no fundamental  right under   Article  19(1)  (g)  to  establish  an   educational institution,  if  recognition or affiliation is  sought  for such an educational institution.  It may be made clear  that any  one desirous of starting an institution purely for  the purposes  of  educating  the students he  could  do  so  but Sections  22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission  Act which prohibits the award of degrees except by a  University must be kept in mind. The  next  question which calls for determination  is;  does recognition or affiliation make the educational  institution an  instrumentality  ? We propose to examine  this  question with reference to the following cases. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1981] 2 SCR 79 at pages 96 and 97 it was observed:

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             "The  tests  for  determining  as  to  when  a               corporation    can   be   said   to   be    an               instrumentality  or agency of  Government  may               now  be  called out from the judgment  in  the               Intemational Airport Authority’s case.   These               tests  are  not conclusive or  clinching,  but               they are merely indicative indicate which have               to  be  used with care  and  caution,  because               while  stressing  the  necessity  of  a   wide               meaning to be placed on the expression  "other               authorities’,  it  must be  realised  that  it               should not be stretched so far as to bring  in               every  autonomous  body which has  some  nexus               with  the Government within the sweep  of  the               expression.  A wide enlargement of the meaning               must be tempered by a wise limitation.  We may               summarise the relevant tests gathered from the               decision in the Intemational Airport               730               Authority’s case as follows:                (1)"One  thing  is clear that if  the  entire               share  capital of the corporation is  held  by               Government  it  would go a  long  way  towards               indicating   that   the  corporation   is   an               instrumentality or,agency of Government."                (2)"Where  the  financial assistance  of  the               State  is  so much as to  meet  almost  entire               expenditure  of  the  corporation,  it   would               afford  some  indication  of  the  corporation               being     impregnated    with     governmental               character."                (3)"It  may  also  be  a  relevant  factor...               whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status               which   is  the  State  conferred   or   State               protected."                (4)"Existence  of  deep and  pervasive  State               control  may  afford an  indication  that  the               Corporation    is    a   State    agency    or               instrumentality.’                (5)"If  the functions of the  corporation  of                             public   importance  and  closely  related   t o               governmental functions, it would be a relevant               factor  in classifying the corporation  as  an               insmmentality or agency of Government."                (6)"Specifically,   if   a   department    of               Government is transferred to a corporation, it               would  be a strong factor supportive  of  this               inference   of   the  corporation   being   an               instrumentality or agency of Government."               If  on  a  consideration  of  these   relevant               factors it is found that the corporation is an               instrumentality  or agency of  government,  it               would,  as  pointed  out  in  the  Inter  alia               Airport  Authority’s case, be  an  ’authority’               and, therefore, ’State’ within the meaning  of               the expression in Article 12.               We  find that the same view has been taken  by               Chinnappa  Reddy, J. in a subsequent  decision               of   this  Court  in  the   UP.    Warehousing               Corporation  v. Vijay Narain [1980] 3 SCC  459               and the observations made by the learned Judge               in  that case strongly reinforced the  view,we               are               731

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             taking  particularly  in  the  matrix  of  our               constitutional system." Ranganath  Mishra,  J. (as he then was),  speaking  for  the Court,  after a succinct analysis of the entire case law  on the  subject concludes in Tekraj Vasandi v. Union  of  India [1988] 1 SCC 236 at page 257 as under:               "We have several cases of societies registered               under  Societies Registration Act  which  have               been  treated as ’State’ but in each of  those               cases it would appear on analysis that  either               governmental  business had been undertaken  by               the  Society  or what was expected to  be  the               public  obligation  of the  ’State’  had  been               undertaken  to be performed as a part  of  the               Society’s  function.  In a Welfare  State,  as               has been pointed out on more than one occasion               by  this Court, governmental control  is  very               pervasive  and in fact touches all aspects  of               social  existence.  In the absence of  a  fair               application of the tests to be made, there  is               possibility of turning every  non-governmental               society  into an agency or instrumentality  of               the State.  That obviously would not serve the               purpose and may be far from reality.  A  broad               picture  of the matter has to be taken  and  a               discerning mind has to be applied keeping  the               realities and human experiences in view so  as               to  reach  a reasonable’  conclusion.   Having               given  our anxious consideration to the  facts               of this case, we are not in a position to hold               that    ICPS   is   either   an   agency    or                             instrumentality  of  the State so  as  to  com e               within  the purview of ’other authorities’  in               Article  12 of the Constitution.  We must  say               that  ICPS is a case of its type  typical  in               many ways and the normal tests may perhaps not               properly apply to test its character.’ The  same  learned  Judge,  after  referring  to  the  tests adumberated in Ajay Hasia (supra), holds in All India Sainik Schools  Employees Assn. v. Sainik Schools  Society,  [1989] Supp 1 SCC 205 at 212:               "...... that the Sainik School Society is also               ’State’.   The entire funding is by the  State               Governments  and the Central Government.   The               overall  control  vests  in  the  governmental               authority.  The main object of the Society is               732               to  run schools and prepare students  for  the               purpose   of  feeding  the  National   Defence               Academy.  Defence of the country is one of the               regal functions of the State." Applying  these tests, we find it impossible to hold that  a private  educational  institution either by  recognition  or affiliation  to  the  university could  ever  be  called  an ’instrumentality of State.  Recognition is for the  purposes of  conforming  to  the standards laid down  by  the  State. Affiliation is with regard to the syllabi and the course  of study.   Unless  and until they are in accordance  with  the prescription  of  the  University,  degrees  would  not   be conferred.    The  educational  institutions   prepare   the students  for the examination conducted by  the  university. Therefore,  they are obliged to follow the syllabi  and  the course of the study. As  a sequel to this, an important question arises: what  is

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the  nature of functions discharged by these institutions  ? they  discharge  a  public duty.  If a  student  desires  to acquire a degree, for example, in medicine, he will have  to route through a medical college.  These medical colleges are the instruments to attain the qualification.  If, therefore, what  is  discharged by the educational  institution,  is  a public duty that requires, duty and act fairly. In such a case, it will be subject to Article 14. Andi  Mukta  Sadguru  Shree  Muktajee  Vandas  Swami  Suvama Jayanti Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. VR.  Rudani, [1989] 2  SCC 691  is  an interesting case where a writ  of  mandamus  was issued to a private college.  In paragraph 12 at page 697 it was held:               "The   essense   of   the   attack   on    the               maintainability  of  the writ  petition  under               Article 226 may now be examined.  It is argued               that  the  management of the college  being  a               trust registered under the Bomaby Public Trust               Act  is not amenable to the writ  jurisdiction               of  the High Court.  The contention  in  other               words,   is  that  the  trust  is  a   private               institution against which no writ of  mandamus               can be issued.  In support of the  contention,               the counsel relied upon two decisions of  this               Court:  (a)  Executive  Committee  of   Vanish               Degree  College,  Shamli  v.  Lakshmi  Narain,               [1976] 2 SCC 58 and (b) Deepak Kumar Biswas v.               Director of Public Instructions, [1987] 2  SCC               252.  In the first of the               733               two  cases, the respondent institution  was  a               Degree  College  managed by a  registered  co-               operative  society.  A suit was filed  against               the  college  by the dismissed  principal  for               reinstatement.   It  was  contended  that  the               Executive  Committee of the college which  was               registered  under the  Co-operative  Societies               Act and affiliated to the Agra University (and               subsequently  to  Meerut  University)  was   a               statutory   body.   The  importance  of   this               contention  lies in the fact that in  such  as               case,  reinstatement could be ordered  if  the               dismissal is in violation of statutory obliga-               tion.   But this Court refused to  accept  the               contention.    It   was  observed   that   the               management of the college was not a  statutory               body since not created by or under a  statute.               It  was emphasised that an  institution  which               adopts  certain statutory provisions will  not               become  a  statutory body  and  the  dismissed               employee cannot enforce a contract of personal               service against a non-statutory body."               At paragraphs 15 to 20 it was held:               "If  the  rights  are  purely  of  a   private               character  no  mandamus  can  issue.   If  the               management of the college is purely a  private               body  with  no public duty mandamus  will  not               lie.These are two exceptions to mandamus.  But               once  these are absent and when the party  has no other equa lly convenient remedy,  mandamus               cannot  be, denied.  It has to be  appreciated               that  the  appellants-trust was  managing  the               affiliated  college to which public  money  is               paid as government aid.  Public money paid  as               government  aid  plays  a major  role  in  the

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             control maintenance and working of educational               institutions.   The  aided  institutions  like               government   institutions   discharge   public               function  by  way of  imparting  education  to               students.   They are subject to the rules  and               regulations  of  the  affiliating  University.               Their activities are closely supervised by the               University  authorities  Employment  in   such               institutions, therefore, is not devoid of  any               public  character. (See The Evolving Indian  I               Administrative Law by M.P. Jain (1983) p. 226)               So are the service conditions of the  academic               staff.  When the               734               University  takes a decision  regarding  their               pay   scales,  it  will  be  binding  on   the               management.   The  service conditions  of  the               academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a               private   character.    It   has   super-added               protection by University decisions creating  a               legal  right-duty  relationship  between   the               staff  and  the  management.   When  there  is               existence   of  this  relationship,   mandamus               cannot be refused to the aggrieved party.               The law relating to mandamus has made the most               spectacular advance.  It may be recalled  that               the  remedy  by prerogative writs  in  England               started  with very limited scope and  suffered               from   many  procedural   disadvantages.    To               overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner  (the               Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section  3(1)               (e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested               the  Law  Commission ’to review  the  existing               remedies   for   the   judicial   control   of               administrative acts and omissions with a  view               to  evolving  a  simpler  and  more  effective               procedure’.   The  Law Commission  made  their               report  in March 1976 (Law  Commission  Report               No. 73).  It was implemented by Rules of Court               (Order  53) in 1977 and given statutory  force               in  1981  by Section 31 of the  Supreme  Court               Act,   1981.   It  combined  all  the   former               remedies  into one proceeding called  Judicial               Review.   Lord Denning explains the  scope  of               this "judicial review:               "At one storke the courts could grant whatever               relief  was appropriate.  Not only  certiorari               and   mandamus,  but  also   declaration   and               injunction.  Even damages.  The procedure  was               much  more  simple and  expeditious.   Just  a               summons   instead  of  a  writ.    No   formal               pleadings.    The   evidence  was   given   by               affidavit.  As a rule no cross-examination, no               discovery,  and  so  forth.   But  there  were               important safeguards.  In particular, in order               to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave               of a judge.               The statute, is phrased in flexible terms.  it               gives  scope  for development.   It  uses  the               words ’having regard to               735               Those  words  are indefinite.  The  result  is               that the courts are not bound hand and foot by               the  previous law.  They are to  ’have  regard               to’  it.  So the previous law as to who are

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             and  who are not  public authorities, is  not               absolutely  binding.. Nor is the previous  law               as  to the matters in respect of which  relief               may  be granted.  This means that  the  judges               can develop the public law as they think best.               That  they have done and are doing.  (See  The               Closing Chapter by Rt.  Hon.  Lord Denning  p.               122)"               There,   however,  the  prerogative  writ   of               mandamus   is   confined   only   to    public               authorities  to compel performance  of  public               duty.   The ’public authority’ for  them  mean               every  body which is created by statute   and               whose   powers  and  duties  are  defined   by               statute.   So  government  departments,  local               authorities, police authorities, and statutory               undertakings and corporations, are all ’public               authorities’.  But there is no such limitation               for  our High Courts to issue the writ in  the               nature of mandamus.  Article 226 confers  wide               powers  on the High Courts to issue  writs  in               the  nature of prerogative writs.  This  is  a               striking  departure  from  the  English   law.               Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any               person  or authority".  It can be issued  ’for               the  enforcement  of any  of  the  fundamental               rights and for any other purpose".                226.Power  of  High Courts to  issue  certain               writs.   (1)  Notwithstanding  anything   in               Article 32, every High Court shall have power,               throughout  the  territories  in  relation  to               which  it exercises jurisdiction, to issue  to               any   person   or   authority   including   in               appropriate cases, any government within those               territories   directions  orders  and   writs,               including  writs  in  the  nature  of   habeas               corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and               certiorari or any of them for the  enforcement               of any of the rights conferred by Part III and               for any other purpose.               The  scope of this article has been  explained               by Subba               736               Rao, J., In Dwarkanath v. ITO, [1965] 3 SCR 536:               This  article  is  couched  in   comprehensive               phraseology  and  it ex-facie confers  a  wide               power  on the High Courts to  reach  injustice               wherever   it  is  found.   The   Constitution               designedly used a wide language in  describing               the nature of the power, the purpose for which               and  the person or authority against  whom  it               can  be exercised.  It can issue writs in  the               nature  of prerogative writs as understood  in               England; but the scope of those writs also  is               widened by the use of the expression "nature",               for  the said expression does not  equate  the               writs  that can be issued in India with  those               in  England,  but only draws an  analogy  from               them.  That apart, High Courts can also  issue               directions,  orders  or writs other  then  the               prerogative writs.  It enables the High  Court               to would the reliefs to meet the peculiar  and               complicated requirements of this country.  Any               attempt  to equate the scope of the  power  of               the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the

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             Constitution with, that of the English  courts               to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the               unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over               the  years in ,a comparatively  small  country               like England with a unitary form of government               into  a  vast country like  India  functioning               under    a   federal   structure.    Such    a               construction   a  construction   defeats   the               purpose of the article itself.                The term "authority" used in Article 226, the               context must receive a liberal meaning  unlike               the term in Article 12.   Artcle     12     is               relevant  only for the purpose of  enforcement               of   fundamental  rights  under  Article   32.               Article  confers power on the High  Courts  to               issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental               rights as well as non-fundamental rights.  The               words  "any  person  or  authority’  used   in               Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined               only    to    statutory    authorities     and               instrumentalities  of  the  State.   They  may               cover  any  other person  or  body  performing               public  duty.  The form of the body  concerned               is  not very much relevant.  What is  relevant               is  the  nature  of the duty  imposed  on  the               body.The duty must be judge in the light               737               of  positive obligation owed by the person  or               authority to the affected party.  No matter by               what means the duty is imposed, if a  positive               obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. The  emphasis  in  this case is as to  the  nature  of  duty imposed  on the body.  It requires to be observed  that  the meaning of authority under Article 226 came to be laid  down distinguishing  the same term from Article 12.  In spite  of it,  if  the emphasis is on the nature of duty on  the  same principle   it  has  to  be  held  that  these   educational institutions  discharge public duties.  Irrespective of  the educational  institutions  receiving aid it should  be  held that  it  is  a public duty.  The absence of  aid  does  not detract from the nature of duty. In R. v. Panel on Take-Overs, 1987 (1).  All England Reports 564 at page 568 it is observed:               "The  principal issue in this appeal, and  the               only  issue  which may matter  in  the  longer               term, is whether this remarkable body is above               law.   Its respectability is beyond  question.               So is its bona fides.  I do not doubt for  one               moment that it is intended to and does operate               in the public interest and that the enormously               wide discretion which it arrogates to  ’itself               is necessary if it is to function  efficiently               and effectively.  While not wishing to  become               ’involved in the political controversy on  the               relative   merits   of   self-regulation   and               governmental  or  statutory regulation,  I  am               content  to  assume for the purposes  of  this               appeal  that seff-regulation is preferable  in               the  public interest.  But that said, what  is               to  happen if the panel goes off the  rails  ?               Suppose,  perish the thought, that it were  to               use  its  powers  ’in  a  way  in  which   was               manifestly  unfair.  What then ?  Counsel  for               the  panel submits that the panel  would  lose               the support of public opinion in the financial

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             markets  and  would be unable to  continue  to               operate.  Further or alternatively, Parliament               could and would intervene.  Maybe but how long               would that take and who in the meantime  could               or would come. to the assistance of those  who               were being oppressed by such conduct"?               738               At page 574 it is held:               "The  picture which emerges is clear.   As  an               act  of  government it was  decided  that,  in               relation  to  takeovers,  there  should  be  a               central  self-regulatory body which  would  be               supported  and  sustained by  a  periphery  of               statutory  powers and penalties wherever  non-               statutory    powers   and    penalties    were               insufficient  or  non-existent  or  where  EEC               requirements called for statutory provisions."               At page 577 it is held:               "In  fact, given its novelty, the  panel  fits               surprisingly  well into the format which  this               court  had in mind in R.v.  Criminal  Injuries               Compensation  Board.   It  is  without   doubt               performing a public duty and an important one.               This  is clear from the expressed  willingness               of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  and               Industry to limit legislation in the field  of               takeovers and mergers and to use the panel  as               the  centerpiece  of his  regulation  of  that               market.  The rights of citizens are indirectly               affected  by  its decisions, some, but  by  no               means all of whom, may in a technical sense be               said to have assented to this situation,  e.g.               the  members of the Stock Exchange.  At  least               in its determination of whether there has been               a  breach  of the code, it has a duty  to  act               judicially and it asseas that its raison deter               is  to do equity between one  shareholder  and               another.   Its source of power is only  partly               based  on moral persuasion and the  assent  of               institution and their members, the bottom line                             being  the statutory powers exercised  by  the               Department of Trade and Industry and the  Bank               of England.  In this context I should be  very               disappointed if the courts could not recognise               the  realities of executive power and  allowed               their  vision to the clouded by  the  subtlety               and  sometimes complexity of the way in  which               it can be exerted.               Given  that it is really unthinkable that,  in               the  absence  of legislation such  as  affects               trade  unions, the panel should go on its  way               cocooned from the attention of the courts,  in               defence   of  the  citizenry,  we  sought   to               investigate               739               whether it could conveniently be controlled by               established  forms of private law  e.g.  torts               such  as actionable combinations in  restraint               of  trade, and, to this end,  pressed  counsel               for  the applicants to draft a writ.   Suffice               it   to  say  that  the  result   was   wholly               unconvincing  and, not  surprisingly,  counsel               for  the panel did not admit that it would  be               in the least effective."               At page 584 it is held:

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             "More  recently  in R.v. BBC,  ex  p  Lavelle,               (1983) 1 AU.  ER 2451 (1983) 1 WLR Woolf J had               to consider an application for judicial review               where the relief sought was an induction under               Ord  53,  1 (2).  The case was brought  by  an               employee of the BBC.  In refusing relief Woolf               J  said (1983) 1 AD ER 241 at 249, 1983 1  WLR               23 at 31:               "Paragraph  (2)  of  r 1 of Ord  53  does  not               strictly  confine  applications  for  judicial               review  to cases where an order for  mandamus,               prohibition  or certiorari could  be  granted.               It Merely requires that the court should  have               regard to the nature of the matter ’in respect               of which such relief may be granted.  However,               although applications for judicial review  are               not confined to those cases where relief could               be  granted  by way of  prerogative  order,  I               regard the wording of Ord 53, r 1 (2) and sub-               s (2) of s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as               making  it  clear  that  the  application  for               judicial  review is confined to reviewing  ac-               titivities  of a public nature as  opposed  to               those   of  a  purely  private   or   domestic               character.  The disciplinary appeal  procedure               set  up  by  the BBC  depends  purely  on  the               contract  of employment between the  applicant               and  the BBC, and therefore it is a  procedure               of a purely private or domestic character."               739               PRIVATE COLLEGES AND THEIR ROLE. The  Union  of  India  takes  the  stand  that  the  Central Government  does  not have the resources  to  undertake  any additional financial responsibility for medical or technical education.  Taking the case of medical 740 education,  the total plan outlay for the health  sector  is 3.2  per  cent and medical education gets a  pro-rata  share after   apportionment  of  priorities  and   allocation   of available  funds.  Priorities include promotions of  primary health, hospital services etc.  The Government in particular is  unable  to  aid  any  private  educational   institution financially  at  levels  higher than  at  present.   Certain statistical details regarding the cost of medical  education have  been  given in the counter affidavit  of  the  Central Government.   Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the affidavit may  kindly be seen in this connection. It has, therefore, been the policy of the Central Government to  involve private and voluntary efforts in the  sector  of education in conformity with accented norms and goals.   The adverse   consequences   which  will   follow   if   private educational  institutions have to limit themselves to a  fee structure  which  is  charged  in  Government  medical   and technical  educational institutions have been enumerated  in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit of the Union of India. The Central Government’s policy on education was  formulated in the year 1986.  Modifications were undertaken in 1992.  The   relevant  extracts  from  the  National   Policy   on Education, being paragraph 6.20, 10.1, 10.9 and 11.2 are set out herein below:               "6.20   In   the  interests   of   maintaining               standards and for several other valid reasons,               the   commercialisation   of   technical   and               professional  education  will be  curbed.   An               alternative system will be devised to  involve

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             private and voluntary effort in this sector of               education,  in conformity with accepted  norms               and goals."               "10.1  An overhaul of the system  of  planning               and  the management of education will  receive               high  priority.   The  guiding  considerations               will be:                (a)  Evolving  a  long-  term  planning   and               management  perspective of education  and  its               integration  with the country’s  developmental               and manpower needs:                (b)  Decentralisation and the creation  of  a               spirit    of    autonomy    for    educational               institutions;               741               (c)Giving pre-eminence to people, involvement,               including   association  of   non-governmental               agencies and voluntary effort;               (d)Inducting  more women in the  planning  and               management of education;               (e)Establihing the principle of accountability               in relation to given objectives and norms."               "10.9  Non-Government  and  voluntary   effort               including  social  activist  groups  will   be               encouraged, subject to proper management,  and               financial  assistance provided.  At  the  same               time,  steps  will  be taken  to  prevent  the               establishment   of  institutions  set  up   to               commercialise education."               "11.2 Resources, to the extent possible,  will               be raised by mobilising donations, asking  the               beneficiary  communities  to  maintain  school               buildings  and supplies of  some  consumables,               raising fees at the higher levels of education               and  effecting some savings by  the  efficient               use of facilities.  Institutions involved with               research and the development of technical  and               scientific manpower should also mobilize  some               funds by levying a cress or charge on the user               agencies,  including  Government  departments,               and entrepreneurs.  All these measures will be               taken  not only to reduce the burden on  State               resources  but  also for  creating  a  greater               sense of responsibility within the educational               system.     However,   such   measures    will               contribute   only  marginally  to  the   total               funding.  The Government and the community  in               general  will find funds for  such  programmes               as;   the   universalisation   of   elementary               education; liquidating illiteracy; equality of               access  to  educational opportunities  to  all               sections throughout the country; enhancing the               social   relevance,  quality  and   functional               effectiveness   of   educational   programmes;               generating     knowledge    and     developing               technologies  in scientific fields crucial  to               self-sustaining   economic   development   and               creating  a  critical  consciousness  of   the               values and imperatives of national survival." 742 Therefore,  as on today, it would be unrealistic and  unwise to  discourage private initiative in  providing  educational facilities, particularly for higher education.  The  private sector  should be involved and indeed encouraged to  augment the much needed resources in the field of education, thereby

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making  as  much  progress  as  possible  in  achieving  the constitutional goals in this respect.  It could be concluded that the private colleges are the felt necessities of  time. That  does  not  mean one  should  tolerate  the  "so-called colleges"  run in thatched huts with hardly  any  equipment, with no or improvised laboratories, scarce facility to learn in an unhealthy atmosphere, far from conducive to education. Such  of them must be put down ruthlessly with an iron  hand irrespective  of  who  has started the  institution  or  who desires  to set up such an institution.  They are  poisonous weeds  in  the field of education.  Those  who  venture  are financial  adventurers without morals or  scrupules.   Their only  aim  is  to  make  money,  driving  a  hard   bargain, exploiting eagerness to acquire a professional degree  which would be a passport for employment in a country rampant with unemployment.  They could be even called pirates in the high seas of education. At  this  juncture,  it  is  worthwhile  to  refer  to   the Resolution passed at the 48th AR India Medical Conference:               "Resolution No. 2               Racketeering in Medical Education:               Whereas, a number of institutions have  sprung               up  in  the country that style  themselves  as               Medical College; and               Whereas,  such institutions charge large  sums               as  capitation  fees,  a  practice  which  the               Indian  Medical  Association and  the  Medical               Council  of  India have opposed  a  number  of               times; and Whereas, such institutions  neither               have suitable buildings, nor proper  equipment               and  even  lack adequate  staff  of  requisite               qualifications  and  further it  has  come  to               light  that  these  institutions  swindle  the               public  by  taking large sums, of  money  from               students although these institutions have  not               been recognised by the authorities;               743               This  48th All India Medical Conference  urges               upon   the  Governments  to   take   stringent               measures     against      persons/institutions               who/which run such medical colleges and  close               them  and recommend to the Medical Council  of               India not to grant them recognition.               (48th Conference Dec. 29, 31, 1972 at Ahmedabad)" However, a word of caution requires to be uttered.  Not  all the  private instutions belong to this category.  There  are institutions   which  have  attained  great  reputation   by devotion and by nurturing high educational standards.   They surpass the colleges run by the Government in many respects. They  require  encouragement.   From  this  point  of   view regulatory  controls have to be continued and  strengthened. The commercialisation of education, the racketeering must be prevented.   The  State  should strive its  utmost  in  this direction. Regulatory measures must so ensure that private  educational institutions  maintain  minimum  standards  and  facilities. Admission  within all groups and categories should be  based only on merit.  There may be reservation of seats in  favour of the weaker sections of the society and other groups which deserve  special treatment.  The norms for admission  should be pre-determined, objective and transparent. Before  the scheme, a question may arise whether a  mandamus could issue for the enforcement of scheme if proposed by the Court.  For this, we may look up at Suman Gupta and Ors.  v. State of J & K and Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 985 at page 991:

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             "The  Medical Council of India is directed  to               formulate  a proper constitutional  basis  for               determining  the selection of  candidates  for               nomination   to  seats  in  Medical   Colleges               outside   the  State  in  the  light  of   the               observations   contained  in  this   judgment.               Until  a policy is so formulated and  concrete               criteria   are  embodied  in   the   procedure               selected,  the  nominations shall be  made  by               selecting candidates strictly on the basis  of               merit,  the candidates nominated being  those,               in  order  of  merit,  immediately  below  the               candidates  selected  for  admission  to   the               Medical Colleges of the home State." 744 It  cannot be gainsaid that profiteering is an evil.   If  a public   utility  like  electricity  could  be   controlled, certainly,  the  professional colleges also  require  to  be regulated. In  Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N.  Govinda  Prabhu, [1986] 3 SCR it is held:               "It  is a public utility monopoly  undertaking               which may not be driven by pure profit  motive               not  that  profit is to be  shunned  but  that               service  and  not  profit  should  inform  its               actions.  It is not the function of the  Board               to  so  manage  its affairs  as  to  earn  the               maximum  profit  even as a  private  corporate               body may be inspired to earn huge profits with               a  view  to  paying  large  dividends  to  its               shareholders.  But it does not follow that the               Board  may not and need not earn  profits  for               the  purpose  of  performing  its  duties  and               discharging its obligations under the statute.               It stands to common sense that the Board  must               manage   its   affairs   on   sound   economic               principles.  Having ventured into the field of               Commerce,  no public service  urdertaking  can               afford   to  say  it  will   ignore   business               principles  which are as essential  to  public               service   undertakings   as   to    Commercial               ventures."               At pages 650-51 it is held:               "The  Board may not allow its character  as  a               public utility undertaking to be changed  into               that of a profit motivated private trading  or               manufacturing house.  Neither the tariffs  nor               the  resulting surplus may reach such  heights               as  to lead to the inevitable conclusion  that               the   Board  has  shed  its   public   utility               character.   When that happens the  Court  may               strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly               arbitrary."               In  Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Anr  v.               Association of Natural Gas Conmming Industries               of  Gujarat and others, [1990] Supp.  SCC  397               at 399 it is held:               The  notion that the ’cost plus’ basis can  be               the  only criterion for fixation of prices  in               the case of public               745               enterprises  stems basically from the  concept               that  such enterprises should function  either               on  a no profit no loss basis or on a  minimum               profit basis.  This is not a correct approach.

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             In the case of vital commodities or  services,               while  private  concerns  must  be  allowed  a               minimal  return  on capital  invested,  public               undertakings or utilities may even have to run               at  losses,  if  need be and  even  a  minimal               return  may  not be assured.  In the  case  of               less vital, but still basic commodities,  they               may  be  required  to cater to  needs  with  a               minimum  profit  margin for  themselves.   But               given   a   favourable  area   of   operation,               "commercial   profits’  need  not  be   either               anathema  or  forbidden fruit even  to  public               sector enterprises."               In Hindustan Zinc Ltd v. A.P.S.E.B., [1991]  3               SCC 299 at pages 306-307 it is held:               "This Court expressly rejected the  submission               which  had found favour with the  Kerala  High               Court  that in the absence of a  specification               by the State Government, the position would be               as it was before the 1978 amendment, that  is,               the  Board  was to carry on  its  affairs  and               adjust the tariffs in such a manner as not  to               incur a loss and no more.  While rejecting the               submission, this Court held as under: (SCC pp.               213-14, para 10)               "We  are of the view that the failure  of  the               government to specify the surplus which may be               generated  by  the  Board cannot  prevent  the               Board from generating a surplus after  meeting               the expenses required to be met.  Perhaps, the               quantum  of  surplus  may not  exceed  what  a               prudent  public  service  undertaking  may  be               expected  to generate without sacrificing  the               interests it is expected to serve and  without                             being obsessed by the pure profit motive of th e               private entrepreneur.  The Board may not allow               its chara cter as a public utility undertaking               to be changed into that of a profit  motivated               private  trading or  manufacturing  household.               Neither the tariffs nor the resulting  surplus               may  reach  such  heights as to  lead  to  the               inevitable conclusion               746               that  the  Board has shed its  public  utility               character.   When that happens the  Court  may               strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly               arbitrary.   But not until then.  Not,  merely               because  a  surplus  has  been  generated,   a               surplus  which can by no means be said  to  be               extravagant.  The court will then refrain from               touching  the tariffs.  After all as has  been               said   by  this  Court  often  enough   ’price               fixation’ is neither the forte nor the funtion               of the Court." It cannot be conteded that education must be available  free and  it  must  be  run  on  a  charitable  basis.   In  this connection, we may usefully quote P.R. Ganapathy Iyer’s  The Law  relating to Hindu and Mahomedan Endowments, as  to  the concept  of charity which is elastic.  At page 46  of  Chap. III it is stated:               "A  charitable  establishment is  a  choultry,               college,  dispensary etc., while  a  religious               establishment  is a mosque, temple  etc.   For               these endowments may be made.’

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             At page 47 it is stated:               "In English law the word ’charity’ has both  a               popular and a technical meaning.  The  popular               meaning of the word does not coincide with its               legal or technical meaning.  Even according to               the  popular or ordinary meaning the  word  is               used in more senses than one.  In a narrow and               limited sense the ordinary acceptation of  the               word  is  "relief  of  physical  necessity  or               want". (Per Lord Shand in Baird’s Trustees  v.               Lord Advocate, 15 Sess.  Cas. 4th Series  682)               In   a  somewhat  more  extended  sense,   the               ordinary  and popular acceptation of the  word               is  ’refief of poverty’ and "a charitable  act               or  purpose" consists in refieving poverty  or               want. (bid per Lord President (Ingfis).  In  a               still  more extended sense and in its  popular               and ordinary acceptation ’charity’ comprehends               all benefits, whether religious,  intellectual               or  physical  bestowed upon  persons  who,  by               reason of their poverty, are unable to  obtain                             such    benefits   for    themselves    withou t               assistance. (Per Lord Watsom in  Commissioners               for special purposes of Income-tax     v.    Pemsel               (1891) A.C. 531 (557)."               747               At page 49 it is stated:               "Charity  in its legal sense as understood  in               the  English  Law  comprises  four   principal               divisions:-  (1)  trusts  for  the  relief  of               poverty-,  (2) trusts for the  advancement  of               education;  (3)  trusts  for  advancement   of               religion;  (4) and trusts for  other  purposes               beneficial to the community not falling  under               any of the preceding heads.’               In  B.K.  Mukherjee on the The  Hindu  Law  of               Religious and Charitable Trust at page 58 para               2.7A it is stated:               "2.7A.  Education:-  The  second  category  on               charitable   trusts   in   Lord    McNaghten’s               classification comprises trusts for education.               These trusts need not be meant exclusively for               the  poor.  Of course, there must be a  public               purpose,  something tending to the benefit  of               the  community.  There must be general  public               benefit through the advancement or furtherance               of  some  educational purpose.   But  if  this               important condition is satisfied, the scope of               "education" would appear to be fairly wide  in               several respects.’               In  St.  Stephen’s College  v.  University  of               Delhi,  [1992] 1 SCC 558 at page 609-10 it  is               held:               "The educational institutions are not business               houses.   They do not generate  wealth.   They               cannot survive without public funds or private               aid.   It is said there is also  restraint  on               collection   of  students  fees.    With   the               restraint   on   collection   of   fees,   the               minorities  cannot be saddled with the  burden               of   maintaining   educational    institutions               without   grant-in-aid.   They  do  not   have               economic  advantage  over others.  It  is  not               possible  to  have  educational   institutions

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             without  State  aid.  This was also  the  view               expressed  by  Das, CJ., in  Kerala  Education               Bill case, (1970) 2 SCC 417: [1971] 1 SCR 734.               The minorities cannot, therefore, be asked  to               maintain  educational  institutions  on  their               own." The time is not yet ripe to hold that education must be made available on a charitable basis.  It is true whenever trusts are made for 748 advancement  of  education it was held to  be  a  charitable purpose.  In Special Commissioners of Income-tax v.  Pemsel, 3  Tax  Cases 53 at 96 the dictum of Lord Macnaghten  is  as follows:               "No  doubt, the popular meaning of  the  words               "charity’  and "charitable" does not  coincide               with  their legal meaning, and no doubt it               is easy enough to collect from the books a few               decisions  which seem to push the doctrine  of               the  Court  to the extreme, and to  present  a               contrast between the two meanings in an aspect               almost  ludicrous.  But still it is  difficult               to fLx the point of divergence, and no one has               yet succeeded in defining the popular  meaning               of  the word "charity’.  The  learned  counsel               for the Crown did not attempt the task.   Even               the  paraphrase of the Master of the Rolls  is               not quite satisfactory.......... "Charity’  in               its,  legal  sense  comprises  four  principal               divisions:  trusts for the relief of  poverty,               trusts  for  the  advancement  of   education,               trusts  for the advancement of  religion,  and               trusts  for other purposes beneficial  to  the               community   not  falling  under  any  of   the               preceding heads.  The trusts last referred  to               are not the less charitable in the eye of  the               law because incidentally they benefit the rich               as  well as the poor, as indeed every  charity               that   deserves  the  name  must  do,   either               directly or indirectly." The next case to which reference can be made is The King  v. The  Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax,  5 Tax  cases 408.  The question arose whether  the  University College  of  North Wales could be held  as  established  for charitable  purposes.   Fletcher  Moulton,  LJ.  relying  on Pemsel’s  case (supra) held that a trust for advancement  of edur-ation was charitable. In  The  Abbey  Malvem Wells, Ltd v. Minister  of  Town  and Country  Planning, 1951 (2) All England Law Reports  154  at pages 160-161 it was held:               "In the present case, it seems to me that  one               is entitled, and indeed, bound, to look at the               constitutional  of the company to see who,  in               fact,  is in control.  I find that, by Art.  3               of  the  company’s articles,  the  company  is               controlled               749               entirely by a body called a council a body  of               persons, and, by Art. 64 that body of  persons               must  be  the  trustees  of  the  trust  deed.               Therefore,  while the company,  theoretically,               has the power to apply its property and assets               for the purpose of making profits and devoting               the  resulting profit to the  distribution  of               divident  among the members, I find  that  the

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             persons  who  regulate the operations  of  the               company  are not free persons unrestricted  in               their operations, but are the trustees of  the               trust deed, and, under the terms of the  trust               deed, they may use the property of the company               only in a particular way and must not make  us               of  the assets of the company for the  purpose               of a profit-making concern.  I find that  they               are strictly bound by the trusts of the  trust               deed,  and  that those trusts  are  charitable               trusts.   It  seems to  me,  therefore,  that,               while nominally the property of the company is               held  under the provisions of  the  memorandum               and  articles of association, in  actual  fact               the  property of the company is  regulated  by               the  terms of the memorandum and  articles  of               association  plus the provisions of the  trust               deed,   and,   therefore,   the   company   is               restricted  in  fact  in  application  of  its               property  and assets and may apply  them  only               for   the   charitable  purposes   which   are               mentioned in the trust deed." This may be so, for the purpose of defining charity, but’ in a  country  like  ours it is impossible to  hold  that  such theories could be advanced or implemented. N.P.V.               Petitions and Appeals disposed of 750