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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2319 of 2004

PETITIONER: United India Insurance Co. Ltd

RESPONDENT: M/s. Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/07/2007

BENCH: A.K.MATHUR & TARUN CHATTERJEE

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

A.K. MATHUR,  

1.              This appeal is directed against the order passed by  the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New  Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ’the Commission’) whereby the   Commission  has  allowed the claim of the respondent to the  tune of Rs. 4,94,22,000/-  and directed the appellant-  Insurance Company to pay  the said amount with interest at  the rate of 9 % per annum  from the date  after two months of  the survey report  by the Apex Surveyors Pvt. Ltd.  i.e. from  1.3.1995 till its payment.  Aggrieved against this order   of the  Commission, the present appeal has been filed by the  appellant- Insurance Company. 2.              Brief facts which are necessary for disposal  of this  appeal are that the claimant-respondent is engaged in import  of sugar and other items  and in connection with import of  12,000 metric tons of sugar from China to Calcutta the  respondent had taken an insurance policy for which cover note  dated 9.6.1994 and policy was valid from  23.9.1994  i.e. from  the date of issue.  The policy  was further   extended  by  endorsement  dated 28.9.1994 for up-country destinations in  India.  It was alleged that after taking delivery of sugar, the  bags could not be transported from the dock area  because of  Durga Puja celebrations and as a result of which  all activities   including transportation facilities  virtually came to a  stand  still from 10.10.1994.  Therefore, in all 82,237 bags of sugar  were temporarily stored in T-sheds at Calcutta Port area en  route up-country destinations.  On 21.10.1994 fire broke out  in the godown and destroyed  the entire stock  of sugar bags.  Hence,  a First Information Report was lodged  and the  appellant- Insurance Company was also informed by the  respondent.  The appellant appointed  M/s. Apex Surveyors  Pvt. Ltd. on 22.10.1994. On 24.10.1994  the Surveyors wrote  to the respondent asking for the books of accounts and stock  register  and also took  the spot inspection. The appellant  appointed one N.V.P. Sharma Associates Pvt. Ltd. as another   additional surveyor. Since the claim was not settled  by the  appellant- Insurance Company, the respondent  filed the  present complaint before the Commission on 21.3.1996.  The  appellant  on 6.5.1996 repudiated the claim  of the  respondent. The letter dated 6.5.1996 reads as under :

               "  The unsold remaining bags of sugar  were taken to three different private godown  outside the port premises. The fire broke out on

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the 26th day after the cargo  was stored. This  storage was general storage other than the "in  the ordinary course of transit". The case falls  under Clause 108, 102 & 2.1 of the Institute  Cargo Clause (a) of the policy issued, as a  consequence  of which transit terminated upon  storage, in the T-shed and before sale and  disposal of the cargo. It was destroyed by the  fire after the cover under the policy ceased. The  risk would have been covered, if you had  obtained a "Storage Risk Policy". Such a policy  would have covered a loss due to fire when the  goods were stored. In the absence of such a  policy, the loss which occurred due to fire to the  stored goods, well after the voyage and transit  terminated, cannot be claimed under the above.  The claim, therefore,  is not maintainable. "

The plea of the appellant-Insurance company for repudiating  the  present claim was that the goods were destroyed in  general storage other than  in the ordinary course of transit  and it was also observed that what was covered  was transit  risk and not storage risk.  Therefore, it was held that the claim  was not maintainable.  The Commission examined the relevant  provisions  and took the view that as per the  Institute Cargo  clause and extended coverage  to the policy on payment of   additional amount,    the insurance cover of the goods  would  be till the delivery to the consignees  at the destination named  therein  i.e. the insurance coverage was valid till the goods  were delivered to the consignees’ warehouse or other final  warehouse or the place of storage at the destination.   Ultimately, the Commission decreed the claim of the  respondent. Hence the present appeal. 3.              We have  heard learned counsel for the parties and  perused the records.  A policy was taken out which is known as  Marine Insurance Policy for import of  12,000 metric tones  of  crystal sugar from Guangzhou, China to Calcutta, India Port for  which a premium  of Rs.13,57,450/- was paid.  It was also  mentioned that   it was subject to the clauses attached  which  formed part of the policy, inter alia, Institute Cargo Clause ’A’  (21-A).  As per this policy, the ship was supposed to take the  cargo from Guangzhou, China to Calcutta Port.  It was also not  in dispute that the goods  safely reached Calcutta Port on  22.9.1994.  The discharge of sugar commenced on 22.9.1994  and continued up to 13.10.1994.  1,39,000 bags of sugar were  transported by 274 trucks from the port to private godowns.  The transportation work started on 26.9.1994  till 10.10.1994  and it was stored at different sheds. Thereafter on 27.9.1994 a  request was made for extension of insurance  coverage  and  extension of insurance coverage was granted on 28.9.1994  which reads as under:

               " At the request of the insured it is  hereby declared and agreed to extend the cover  under the within mentioned policy  No.01/534/94 from Calcutta Port to any place  of Indian Republic. All other terms and  conditions of the policy remains unaltered." Unfortunately, fire broke out  in T-shed on 21.10.1994.  Therefore, the respondent raised a claim for loss of  sugar by  fire in T-shed. Relevant provisions of  Institute Cargo Clause,  which deals with duration \026 transit clause reads as under : " 9.1.3 On the expiry of 60 days after  completion of discharge overside of the goods  hereby insured from the overseas vessel at the

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final port of discharge, whichever shall first  occur." It further says that so far as law and practice is concerned  this  insurance was subject to English law and practices. As per this  transit clause of the Institute Cargo clause, the       policy covered  on delivery to the consignee’s or other final warehouse, or  place of storage at the destination named  therein.  It further  laid down the period, that on expiry of 60 days after  completion of discharge overside of the goods insured from  the overseas vessels at the final port of discharge, whichever  shall first occur. As per the policy, the destination was   Calcutta Port, India. This policy was extended by the  subsequent cover note as mentioned above and it was  mentioned that the policy was extended to cover from Calcutta  Port to any other  place of destination in Indian Republic and  the terms and conditions of the policy remained unaltered.  4.              The submission of  Mr.Vishnu Mehra, learned  counsel for the appellant was that since the destination was  Calcutta Port and once the goods  reached  Calcutta Port and  the same were discharged,  then the policy stood discharged  and if the goods were kept in some other different sheds then  that storage is not covered.  Learned counsel for the appellant  submitted  if the goods had been taken out and had been  destroyed in transit  then perhaps  the loss would have been  covered.  So far as the present case is concerned,  the goods  reached the Calcutta Port and they were discharged from the  vessels and they were taken out and kept in storage in  different sheds  and there it was destroyed because of fire,  the  storage in the godown  is not covered as per the original  policy.  According to learned counsel for the appellant the  destination in the original policy was Calcutta Port and  the  goods were discharged and kept in storage at the risk of the  respondent.  It was submitted that the policy which was  extended was only for transit purpose and not for storage  purpose. Therefore, the  appellant rightly repudiated the claim. 5.              As against this,  Mr.Divan, learned senior counsel  for the respondent-claimant submitted that when the coverage  stood extended on same terms and conditions and it was  clearly mentioned that it would cover to any part of the Indian  Republic, that means that the goods in storage in transit from  Calcutta Port to any part of the destination  would cover the  policy on same terms and conditions along with the original  marine policy.  Therefore, the limited question that arises for  consideration is whether the coverage which has been  extended  would cover the goods till they reached the  destination in any part of the country or not.  

6.              Mr. Mehra, learned counsel for the appellant has  very strenuously urged and took us through the Marine  Insurance Act, 1963 and tried to impress upon us that as per  the terms and conditions of the policy, once the goods reached   the destination i.e. Calcutta Port, the policy stood discharged  and the extended coverage does not cover the storage but   goods in transit till they reached any part of the country.  7.              We have bestowed  our best of consideration to the  rival submissions of the parties.  Mr.Divan, learned senior  counsel for the respondent  submitted that as per the Institute  Cargo Clause, the English law and practice covers the dispute  and in that connection, Mr.Divan invited our attention to a   decision  in Bayview Motors Ltd. v. Mitsui Marine & Fire  Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.  reported in [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Law  Reports 131 and  in  John Martin of London, Ltd. v. Russel   reported in [1960] 1 Lloyd’s List Law Reports 554.  He has also  referred to The Law Lexicon,  so as to give the meaning of the  words, ’extension’  and ’renewal’ and also invited our attention

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to various interpretation of the word, ’extension’ and in that  connection,  he has also invited our attention to a decision of  this Court in  Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. v. Biswanath  Banerjee & Anr. [1989 Supp. (1) SCC 487] , and in that  connection our attention was invited   at paragraph 14 which  reads as under :

                "  14.  It is pertinent to note that  the word used is ’extension’ and not ’renewal’.  To extend means to enlarge, expand, lengthen,  prolong, to carry out further than its original  limit. Extension, according to Black’s Law  Dictionary, means enlargement of the main  body; addition of something smaller than that  to which  it is attached; to lengthen or prolong.  Thus extension ordinarily implies the continued  existence of something to be extended. The  distinction between ’extension’ and ’renewal’ is  chiefly that in the case of renewal, a new lease is  required, while in the case of extension the  same lease continues in force during additional  period by the performance of the stipulated act.  In other words, the word ’ extension’ when used  in its proper and usual sense in connection with  a lease means a prolongation  of the lease.   Construction of this stipulation in the lease in  the above manner will also be consistent when  the lease is taken as a whole. \005"

He has also submitted that in case of interpretation of policy if  two views are possible, then the one which  favours the policy-  holder should be accepted  as the same serves the purpose for  which the policy is taken and would be in consonance with the  object to be achieved  for the lives assured. 8.              In support of his contention, learned counsel relied  on a  decision of this Court in Shashi Gupta (Smt.)  vs. Life  Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. [ 1995 Supp.(1) SCC 754]  in which it has been held as follows :

               " As both the aforesaid interpretations  are reasonably possible, we would accept the  one which favours the policy-holder, as the  same advances the purpose for which a policy is  taken and would be in consonance with the  object to be achieved for getting lives assured."

9.              Our attention was also invited to a decision of this  Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India  vs. Raj Kumar  Rajgarhia & Anr.  [(1999) 3 SCC 465] wherein it has been held  as follows :                 " It is not always possible to be guided  by the meaning of the words as found in the  dictionary while resorting to interpret the actual  meaning of a word found in an agreement  between the parties. While construing the  meaning of a particular word found in an  agreement between the parties the intention of  the parties to the document in question  will  have to be given necessary weightage and it is  not possible to give a wider and liberal meaning  merely because one of the parties to the said  agreement  is a public authority. While  interpreting the terms of the insurance policies  if two views are possible, courts will accept the  one which favours the policy-holders."

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10.             Our attention was also invited to a decision of this  Court in United India Insurance Co, Ltd. vs. Pushpalaya Printers  [(2004) 3 SCC 694] wherein it has been held as follows :                 "  In order to interpret clause 5 of the  insurance contract, it is also necessary  to  gather the intention of the parties from the  words used in the policy. It is evident from the  terms of the insurance policy that the property  was insured as against destruction or damage to  whole or part. If the word "impact" is interpreted  narrowly, the question of impact by any rail  would not arise as the question of a rail forcibly  coming into contact with a building or  machinery would not arise.  In the absence of  specific exclusion and the word "impact"  having  more meanings in the context,  it cannot be  confined to forcible contact alone when it  includes the meanings "to drive close", "effective  action of one thing upon another" and "the  effect of such action"; it is reasonable and fair to  hold in the context that the word "impact"  contained in  clause 5 of the insurance policy  covers the case of the respondent to say that  damage caused to the building and machinery  on account of the bulldozer moving closely on  the road was on account of its "impact". Clause  5 speaks of "impact" by "any rail/road vehicle or  animal". If  the appellant Company wanted to  exclude any damage or destruction caused on  account of driving of vehicle on the road close  to the building, it could have expressly excluded  the same. The insured possibly did not  understand  and expect that the destruction and  damage to the building and machinery is  confined only to a direct collusion by vehicles  moving on the road, with the building or  machinery. In  the ordinary course, the question  of a vehicle directly dashing into the building or  the machinery inside the building does not  arise. Further, "impact" by road vehicle found in  the company of other words in the same clause  5 normally indicates that damage caused to the  building  on account of vibration by driving  vehicle close to the road is also included."                                                                                                                                                                         

11.             Our attention was also invited to a decision of this  Court  in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan [(1999) 6  SCC 451] wherein it has been held as follows :

               "  The insurance policy between  the  insurer and the insured represents a contract  between the parties. Since the insurer  undertakes to compensate the loss suffered by  the insured on account of risks covered by the  insurance policy, the terms of the agreement  have to be strictly construed to determine  the  extent of liability of the insurer. The insured  cannot claim anything more than what is  covered by the insurance policy."

12.             Our attention was also invited to a decision of this

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Court in  M/s. Peacock Plywood Pvt. Ltd. V. The Oriental  Insurance Co. Ltd. [ JT 2007 (1) SC 191] wherein at paragraph  71 of the judgment  while interpreting  the expression, " peril  insured against", it has been held as follows :

               "  Marine Insurance Act is subject to the  terms of insurance policy. Where the insurer  takes additional premium and insure a higher  risk, no restrictive meaning thereto need be  given. A term of the policy must be given  its  effect. While construing  a contract of insurance,  the reason for entering thereinto and the risks  sough to be covered must be considered  on its  own terms. "

13.             A reference may  also be made to a decision of this  Court in Polymat India (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. National Insurance Co.  Ltd.  & Ors.  [ (2005) 9 SCC 174] wherein this Court held as  follows :

               " The expression "factory-cum- godown" occurring in the policy document has  to be read in the present context  with the other  conditions  which appear in the policy  document.  In  fact clause 8 of the policies  concerned specifically  made a query as to  whether the goods were stored in the open or  there was a kutcha shed or timber-built  or  thatched-roof building within 15 m (50ft)  of  the property, asking for details in this regard.  But no details were given and the query in  clause 8 was answered in the negative.  Therefore, what was sought to be insured was  the plant and machinery. It is admitted that  there was no godown. Therefore, it is clear that  the goods lying outside the plant were not  insured. Had the intention  of the parties been  otherwise, then they would have answered  the  query in clause 8 in positive terms, which  details. But it was answered in the negative.  Therefore, the documents have to be construed  in the manner they are presented and a different  interpretation cannot be given dohors  the  context."

14.             Learned counsel also referred to The Law :Lexicon,   to give dictionary meaning to the word, "extend", which reads  as follows : " Extend. This  term has a wide variety of  meanings and has been defined as follows : To   prolong, to continue or continue in any  direction; stretch out; to stretch out of reach; to  expand; to enlarge or lengthen the bounds or  dimensions or; lengthen. And it is sometimes  used as  equivalent to the word "exceed" (as) to  extend the bounds of jurisdiction."

Learned counsel also referred to  K.J.Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary  wherein  the word "extend" has been defined as follows :

               " EXTEND.       The word "extend" in an  enactment is not quite analogous to "shall come  into force". Where  it is laid down in an Act that  it extends  to a certain area it does not

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necessarily mean that it is also in that area,  particularly  when there is an express provision  that before it can come  into force, something  further, such as a notification, is necessary."

Learned counsel also invited our attention to  Black’s  Dictionary of Law ( Fifth Edition) which defines the word,  "extend" as follows :

               "  Extend.      Term lends itself to great  variety of meanings, which must in each case be  gathered from context. It may mean to expand,  enlarge, prolong, lengthen, widen, carry or draw  out further than the original limit; e.g., to  extend the time for filing an answer, to extend a  lease, term of office, charter, railroad track, etc."                   15.            Learned counsel  also invited our attention to a  decision of this Court in General Assurance Society Ltd. v.  Chandumull Jain & Anr. { [1966] 3 S.C.R. 500}. In that case it  was observed as follows :                 "  In other respects there is no  difference between a contract of insurance and  any other contract except that in a contract of  insurance there is a requirement of  uberrima  fides i.e., good faith on the part of the assured  and the contract is likely to be construed contra  proferentem  that is against the company in  case of ambiguity or doubt. A contract is formed  when there is an unqualified acceptance of the  proposal. Acceptance may be expressed in  writing or it may even be implied if the insurer  accepts the premium and retains it. In the case  of the assured, a positive  act on his part by  which he recognizes or seeks to enforce the  policy amounts to an affirmation of it. This  position was clearly recognized by the assured  himself, because he wrote,  close upon the   expiry of the time of the cover notes, that either  a policy should be issued to him before that  period had expired or the cover note extended  in time. In interpreting documents relating to a  contract of insurance, the duty of the court is to  interpret the words in which the contract is  expressed by the parties, because  it is not for  the court to make a new contract, however  reasonable, if the parties have not made it  themselves. Looking at the proposal,  the letter  of acceptance  and the cover notes, it is clear  that a contract of insurance under the standard  policy for fire and extended to cover flood,  cyclone etc. had come into being."

16.             Our attention was invited to Queen’s Bench decision  in John Martin of London, Ltd. v. Russell ( [1960] Vol.I Q.B.  (Com.Cr.) 554).  In this case, purchase of 7200 cartons of  pure  refined lard,c.i.f., J.K.Port  was made by the plaintiff from  Chicago company in May, 1957. In the same month lard was  sold by plaintiffs to various English customers on landed terms  ex-quary Liverpool.  The defendant insured on June 7, 1957  covering lard against all risks and including Institute Cargo  Clauses (Extended cover) and the policy provided  at and from  Chicago to Liverpool or held covered Institute Cargo Clauses  (Extended cover). This insurance continued until the goods  were delivered to the consignees’ or other final warehouse at

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the destination named in the policy.  In terms of the aforesaid  policy, lard discharged from vessel into transit shed on quary,  on July 2,1957 and delivery orders were issued.  On July 4,  1957  lard was found to be infested with copra beetle from  another part of transit shed. Delivery orders were cancelled  and reissued later.  The plaintiffs claimed under the policy and  it was denied that the cover terminated on discharge into  transit shed which was final warehouse and that insurance  ceased on discharge of goods if consignees did not intend to  send goods to final warehouse. The plaintiffs’ contention was  that the lard was still insured because it was in a transit shed  and had not reached consignees or other final warehouse. It  was also contended that transit shed was not a warehouse and  the transit shed was owned by the port authority and that the  transit shed was  not a final warehouse. In this background,  when the policy was repudiated, the claim was filed. In that  context, leaned Judge held as follows :                 " \005 that transit shed at Liverpool was  the place at which goods were placed as soon as  they were discharged and they were then  waiting patently to go somewhere else; and that   therefore, the transit shed was not the final  warehouse; that insurer’s contention  that cover  ceased if consignee did not intend to send  goods  to a final warehouse did not give  reasonable businesslike meaning to the clause  and that there was no condition that goods were  only covered so long as they were intended to  go to a final warehouse; and that  there fore, the  insurer had failed to prove that goods were not  covered when damaged.."

Mr. Divan, learned senior counsel strongly relied on the above  observation and submitted that this decision given by the  English Court  is binding as per the terms of policy that the  English law in question would be applicable. Learned senior  counsel submitted that  in view of the direct decision of the  English Court, the repudiation of the claim by the appellant- Company is ex facie bad. Learned senior counsel also invited  our attention to another English decision  in Bayview Motors  Ltd. v. Mitsui Marine and Fire Insurance Co.Ltd. & Ors. { [2003]  Vol.1  C.A.131}. In this case the claimants were dealers in  motor vehicles in Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands. In  1997 they bought two consignments, each of six vehicles from  Toyota Tsusho Corporation. The vehicles were sold c.i.f. Santo  Domingo in the Dominican Republic  although the terms of the  contracts of sale both referred to the destination of the goods   being the Turks and Caicos Islands.  The consignment was  insured. The first consignment arrived in Santo Domingo on  August 11, 1997 and the second consignment arrived on  September 14, 1997. The vehicles were not released by the  Dominican customs for transshipment to the Turks and Caicos  Islands.  The claimant claimed under the insurance policies  alleging that the vehicles were stolen or otherwise taken  without any legal justification by employees of the Dominican  customs after discharge from the vessels in Santo Domingo.   The defendants claim was that the cars were "confiscated" by  the Dominican custom  authority because of contravention of  Dominican law. Therefore, loss was caused  by seizure and  it  excluded or excepted peril under the terms of the insurance  cover.  It was contended that the loss was proximately caused  by the claimant’s failure to take reasonable steps to avert or  minimize their loss in particular by ensuring that their rights  against the Dominican customs were properly preserved  by

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seeking legal advice or otherwise pursuing legal proceedings.  The Queen’s Bench  held that the insurers’ submission that the  losses occurred after cover had ended  and /or by seizure, an  excluded peril, would be rejected.   The insurers filed an  appeal and in the appeal their Lordships held as follows:

               " ..where goods were intended to go to  the destination named in the policy and then on  to some other destination cl. 1(a) did not  contemplate that there would be a final  warehouse or place of storage at the   destination named in the policy; in such a case  the warehouse or place of storage was not final  and cover would only cease if the assured  elected to use it either for storage other than in  the course of transit or for allocation or  distribution; otherwise cover was extended for  up to 60 days by cl. 1(c)."

Learned counsel submitted that in view of this interpretation of  the clause it would mean that after the extended coverage  granted  by the  Insurance company the  goods till they reach   any destination on any part of the country would equally stand  covered.

17.             After considering the ratio with regard to the  construction of the terms of the policy it transpires that while  interpreting  the policy the courts should keep in view the  intention of the parties  as well as the words used in the policy.  If the intention of the parties  subserves the expression used  therein then the expression used in that context should be  given its full and extended meaning.  In the present case, as is  apparent on reading of the Institute Cargo clause  and the  coverage, terms of the policy and the extended coverage, the  intention that appears from these terms and conditions that  the goods were first covered from port in China, destination in  Calcutta port and thereafter  extended coverage was sought  and in that it was extended to any part of the Republic of India.   If these two terms of the   policy are read in conjunction then it  clearly transpires that the goods are covered till they reach  the  destination in any part of India. If the extended cover would  not be given  the policy would extend to Calcutta port.   If  extended coverage is read,  which clearly stipulates that this  extension is covered on same terms and conditions of the  original policy then it could mean that the policy has been  covered till the goods  reach the consignee in any part of the  country in India.  In fact, the extended coverage was only  meant for the goods to be covered till they reach destination  either by rail or road in any part of the country. If this  extended coverage is not interpreted to mean that goods  should reach the destination in any part of India, then the  extended coverage on payment of higher premium  would be  meaningless. The coverage was sought  because  the final  destination of the goods  was not at Calcutta port.  When the  coverage was extended on same terms and conditions that  would mean  that the goods were covered till the same reached  in any part of the country in India. In the present case,  the  goods reached the Calcutta Port and they were taken to  different sheds. But unfortunately, the goods were destroyed  by fire at Calcutta  port itself. Therefore, we are of  the view  that  since the goods were covered from Calcutta port till the  same reach its destination  and they were lying on storage,  that would cover the goods by the extended policy and the  insurer cannot defeat the claim of the claimant that the goods

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once reached the destination at Calcutta  the policy stood  discharged.  The contention of Mr. Mehra that the extended  coverage does not cover the goods in transit till they reach any  part of the country  is not correct because the transit infers  storage also till it reaches its destination. The damage on the  rail or road would also include that in transit  the goods are to  be  kept in transit shed,  the policy would cover that also.  If  this interpretation is not given then the extended coverage  would  be of no use. Looking to the expression used in the  background of the intention of the parties, it clearly transpires  that once the goods  were insured,  then till  they reach any  part of the country shall be covered by the extended coverage.    Therefore, the contention of Mr. Mehra cannot be accepted.

18.             The next question comes with regard to the  quantum of compensation.  In view of the fact that the reports  of  M/s. Apex Surveyors Pvt. Ltd as well as N.V.P.Sharma  Associates Pvt. Ltd. were considered by the Commission for  computing the quantum of compensation and on that basis the  compensation has been granted by the Commission, that  cannot be said to be in any manner bad as  both the Surveyors  were of the appellant company and the appellant company  cannot  possibly deny the amount of compensation arrived at  by these surveyors.  The calculation given by M/s. Apex  Surveyors Pvt. Ltd. has been accepted by the Commission and  there is no reason for us to take a different view from the  Commission as the Commission  has arrived at the amount of  compensation as assessed by M/s. Apex Surveyors Pvt. Ltd.  Therefore, we affirm the order passed by the Commission on  this count also. However, we may modify the order of the  Commission with regard to interest. The Commission has  granted interest @ 9%  from the date of report of the Surveyor  but we modify the said order and direct that  the claimant will  be entitled to interest at the same rate from the date of the  order of the Commission  instead of the date of  report of the  Surveyor.

19.             As a result of our above discussion, we find that the  view taken by the Commission appears to be justified and   there is no ground to interfere with the order of the  Commission except to the extent of interest as indicated  above. Hence,  this appeal fails and is dismissed. There would  be no order as to costs.