REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7064 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9599 OF 2019)

  Union of India & Anr.                          … Appellants

Versus

Tarsem Singh & Ors.                 … Respondents With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7068 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.10210 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7065 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9600 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7066 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9602 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7067 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9604 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7084 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15478 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7086 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15482 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7081 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15472 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7079 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15470 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7070-7071 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS.15442-15443 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7104 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21689 OF 2019)                                                (D.NO.18425 OF 2019)

1

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7101 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21683 OF 2019) (D.NO.18428 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7090 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15488 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7072-7073 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS.15444-15445 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7089 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15487 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7085 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15479 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7083 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15477OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7087 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15485 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7082 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15474 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7102 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21687 OF 2019)

                                                 (D.NO.18730 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7078 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15466 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7074 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15446 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7075 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15447 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7103 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21688 OF 2019)                                                   (D.NO.19328 OF 2019)

2

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7080 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15471 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7076 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15448 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7077 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15450 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7105 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21690 OF 2019)

                                                               (D.NO.19353 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7088 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15486 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7069 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.14491 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7092 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21662 OF 2019)

                                               (D.NO.20552 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7110 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 21696 OF 2019)

                                                 (D.NO.20561 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7091 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21657 OF 2019)

                                                (D.NO.20565 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7094  OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21664 OF 2019)

                                               (D.NO.20573 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7095 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21666 OF 2019)

                                               (D.NO.20612 OF 2019) With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7097 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21671 OF 2019)

                                               (D.NO.20617 OF 2019)

3

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7100 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21682 OF 2019)                                                   (D.NO.20770 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7099 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21675 OF 2019)                                                 (D.NO.20775 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7096 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21670 OF 2019)                                                   (D.NO.20779 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7098 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21673 OF 2019)                                                   (D.NO.20783 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7093 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21663 OF 2019)                                                  (D.NO.20785 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7109 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21695 OF 2019)                                                  (D.NO.20817 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7106 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21691 OF 2019)                                                  (D.NO.20821 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7107 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21692 OF 2019)                                                  (D.NO.20939 OF 2019)

With CIVIL APPEAL NO.7108 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21693 OF 2019)                                                   (D.NO.20941 OF 2019)

4

JUDGMENT

R.F. NARIMAN, J.  

1. Leave granted.

2. A batch of appeals before us by the Union of India question

the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which is that the

non-grant  of  solatium  and  interest  to  lands  acquired  under  the

National  Highways  Act,  which  is  available  if  lands  are  acquired

under the Land Acquisition Act, is bad in law, and consequently that

Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 be struck down as

being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to this extent.

3. The  facts  of  one  of  these  appeals  may  be  taken  up  as

illustrative of  the points for  consideration in  all  these appeals.  In

Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7064

of  2019  @  SLP  (C)  No.9599  of  2019),  a  notification  dated

24.12.2004 was issued under Section 3A of the National Highways

Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), intending to acquire

land belonging to the Respondents for the purpose of four-laning

National  Highway  No.1-A on  certain  stretches  of  the  Jalandhar-

Pathankot section as well as the Pathankot-Jammu section falling

within the State of Punjab.   On 11th July, 2005, the said lands were

declared to have vested in the State pursuant to Section 3D(2) of

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the said Act.   On 5th October 2006, the competent authority under

the Act passed an Award in which compensation was calculated at

Rs.4,219/- per marla or Rs.6.75 lakhs per acre.   As this Award was

disputed by the Respondents, an Arbitrator was appointed under the

Act,  who  then  arrived  at  a  figure  of  Rs.1.5  lakhs  per  marla  as

compensation.  It is important to note that as no solatium or interest

is provided by the Act, such solatium and interest was not awarded

by the learned Arbitrator.   Meanwhile, a Section 34 application filed

under the Arbitration Act by the Union of India was dismissed on the

ground  that  it  was  hopelessly  time-barred.   On  appeal  to  the

Division Bench of the High Court, it was found on facts that as the

amount  of  compensation  awarded was not  challenged in  certain

cases, the National Highways Authority of India being “State” under

Article  12  of  the  Constitution  cannot  be  permitted  to  pick  and

choose between persons similarly situate, as a result of which the

appeal  against  valuation  at  the  rate  of  1.5  lakhs  per  marla  was

rejected.  However, the Court deleted the grant of severance and

18% interest if the awarded amount is not paid within six months,

following an earlier Division Bench judgment of the same Court. The

Court then went on to state that despite the fact that no appeal has

been  filed  against  the  learned  Single  Judge’s  judgment  by  the

owners, yet compensation for acquired land being in the nature of

6

beneficial  legislation,  they would be bound by an earlier  Division

Bench judgment which requires the National Highway Authority  to

pay solatium and,  therefore,  directed payment  of  solatium at  the

rate of 30%, as laid down in the said judgment.

4. Shri  Shyam Divan,  learned Senior  Advocate appearing on

behalf of the Union of India and NHAI, took us through the relevant

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as the National

Highways Act.  According to him, the National Highways Act is a

complete  Code  which  expressly  excluded  the  application  of  the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and this being so, it is clear

that absent discrimination or manifest arbitrariness, the non-award

of  solatium  and  interest  that  is  awardable  under  the  Land

Acquisition Act would not fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India.   According to the learned Senior Advocate, it is not possible

to choose between one Acquisition Act and another, as the National

Highways  Act  alone  would  apply  when  land  is  acquired  for  the

purpose  of  National  Highways.   This  being  the  case,  all  the

judgments that are cited by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs. Union of India 2011 (4) RCR

(Civil)  375,  would,  therefore,  not  apply.    According to  him,   the

Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya

7

vs Union of India 2005-06 Supp RLW 559, correctly distinguished

this line of cases and equally correctly followed a line of judgments

under  various  state  town  planning  Acts,   the  Requisitioning  and

Acquisition of  Immovable Property Act,  1952 and the Defence of

India Act, 1971 to arrive at the conclusion that solatium and interest

need not be paid in cases covered under the National Highways

Act.  He further argued that given the fact that market value on the

date of publication of the Section 3A notification was to be given at

the full market rate, there could be no fundamental right violated as

solatium  and  interest  that  are  granted  are  mere  statutory  rights

which can be awarded if the statute so enjoins, and equally need

not  be  awarded  where  a  separate  special  statute  expressly

excludes them.   He also contended, somewhat feebly, that since

only strips of land adjoining the National Highways were required to

be acquired, in many cases, the landowners would have properties

which would not be subject to acquisition left with them, obviating

any need to pay solatium to them.   Finally, he also referred to and

relied upon Article 31-C of  the Constitution to argue that  if  at  all

there was an infraction of Article 14, the Amendment Act of 1997 to

the National Highways Act, 1956, enacting Sections 3A to 3J, being

in furtherance of the Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b),

8

would be shielded from attack on the ground that Article 14 of the

Constitution has been violated.   

5. Shri Amit Sibal,  learned Senior Advocate, together with Shri

Neeraj Kumar Jain, defended the view of the Punjab and Haryana

High  Court  in  M/s  Golden  Iron  and  Steel  Forging (supra)  by

pointing  out  that  the  object  sought  to  be  achieved  by  the  1997

Amendment  Act  to  the  National  Highways  Act,  1956  was  far

removed from the Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b)  and,

therefore,  did  not   receive  the  protection  of  Article  31-C  of  the

Constitution  of  India.   They  argued  that  the  main  object  of  the

Amendment  Act  was  the  speedy  implementation  of  Highway

projects, which could only be achieved by expediting the process of

land  acquisition.   This  being  the  case,  excluding  solatium  and

interest that is awardable under the Land Acquisition Act results in a

discrimination between persons who are similarly situate so far as

lands are acquired by the Union of India from them for the purpose

of national highways as opposed to other public purposes, having

no rational relation to the object of the 1997 amendment. They were

at  pains  to  point  out  that  “solatium”  is  awarded  because  of  the

compulsory nature of acquisition, which is present whether the land

is  acquired  for  the  National  Highways  or  for  any  other  public

9

purpose.   They,  therefore,  argued that  solatium and interest  are

integral parts of compensation that is awardable to persons whose

lands have been compulsorily expropriated.  They took us through

the  provisions  of  the  Requisitioning  and  Acquisition  of  the

Immovable Property Act, 1952 and the Defence of India Act, 1971,

and stated that the judgments that were delivered under those Acts,

which upheld  the non-grant  of  solatium,  was because requisition

was first made of private property for public purposes under those

Acts,  for  which compensation was granted.    Possession having

been taken by the State,  such properties could be handed back

under those Acts once the purpose of requisitioning such properties

was over. Also, it was only in very limited circumstances that such

requisitioned  property  was  to  be  acquired,  which,  therefore,

obviated payment of any solatium.  They, therefore, relied upon the

line of authorities which struck down provisions of statutes which did

not  grant  solatium  where  land  was  acquired  without  first  being

requisitioned.  They  also  took  us  through  the  judgment  of  the

Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court and pointed out that this

basic distinction between the two sets of applicable precedents was

not properly appreciated, leading the High Court to follow the wrong

line of authority.   On merits, they argued that in some cases in the

Supreme Court itself, the then Solicitor General, Shri Ranjit Kumar,

10

expressly stated that solatium will be paid to some of the persons

who are covered by notifications under Section 3A of the National

Highways  Act.    This  apart,  as  was  correctly  observed  by  the

Division  Bench  of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  in  the

impugned judgment, the National Highway Authority being “State”

under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, cannot file objections in

certain cases and accept arbitration awards in others.  In any case,

no  case  has  been  made  out  under  the  limited  jurisdiction  to

challenge arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

6. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  on  both  sides,  it  is

necessary to first mention that the National Highways Act, 1956, as

originally enacted, did not provide for acquisition of land.  Thus, till

the  National  Highways  Laws  (Amendment)  Act,  1997,  all

acquisitions for the purpose of National Highways were made under

the Land Acquisition Act, and the owners were given, in addition to

market value, solatium as well as interest under the provisions of

that Act.

7. Coming to the Amendment Act of 1997, it is important to set

out the Objects and Reasons that led to the aforesaid amendment.

They are:

11

“1. In order to create an environment to promote private investment  in  national  highways,  to  speed  up construction of highways and to remove bottlenecks in their proper management, it was considered necessary to  amend  the  National  Highways  Act,  1956  and  the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988.

2. One of the impediments in the speedy implementation of highways projects has been inordinate delay in the acquisition of land. In order to expedite the process of land  acquisition,  it  is  proposed  that  once  the  Central Government declares that the land is required for public purposes for  development  of  a highway,  that  land will vest in the Government and only the amount by way of compensation is to be paid and any dispute relating to compensation will be subject to adjudication through the process of arbitration.

3. It was also felt necessary to ensure continuity of the status of bypasses built through private investment. To achieve  this,  it  is  proposed  to  amend  the  National Highways  Act,  1956  so  as  to  include  the  highway stretches situated within any municipal area as a part of National  Highway.  Further,  as  the  National  Highways Act,  1956 permits participation of the private sector in the development  of  the National  Highways,  it  became imperative to amend the National Highways Authority of India  Act,  1988  so  as  to  provide  that  the  National Highway Authority of India may seek the participation of the private sector in respect of the highways vested in the Authority.

4. With a view to provide adequate capital and loans to the National Highways Authority of India by the Central Government, it is proposed to make amendment in the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988.

5. With a view to achieve the above objectives and also as both Houses of Parliament were not in session and the President was satisfied that  circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate

12

action,  the  National  Highways  Laws  (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 was promulgated by the President on the 24th day of January, 1997.

6. The Bill seeks to replace the aforesaid Ordinance.”

8. Pursuant  to  this,  the amendments  that  were  made to  the

National Highways Act, 1956 with which we are directly concerned,

are set out hereinbelow:

“3. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) "competent authority" means any person or authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the  Official  Gazette,  to  perform  the  functions  of  the competent authority for such area as may be specified in the notification;

(b)  "land"  includes  benefits  to  arise  out  of  land  and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

3A. Power to acquire land, etc. - (1) Where the Central Government  is  satisfied that  for  a public  purpose any land  is  required  for  the  building,  maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof,  it  may,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette, declare its intention to acquire such land.

(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a brief description of the land.

(3) The competent authority shall cause the substance of  the  notification  to  be  published  in  two  local newspapers,  one  of  which  will  be  in  a  vernacular language.

3B. Power to enter for survey, etc.- On the issue of a notification under sub-section (1) of section 3A, it shall

13

be  lawful  for  any  person,  authorised  by  the  Central Government in this behalf, to—

(a)  make  any  inspection,  survey,  measurement, valuation or enquiry;

(b) take levels;

(c) dig or bore into sub-soil;

(d) set out boundaries and intended lines of work;

(e)  mark  such  levels,  boundaries  and  lines  placing marks and cutting trenches; or

(f) do such other acts or things as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government.

3C. Hearing of objections - (1) Any person interested in the land may, within twenty-one days from the date of publication  of  the  notification  under  sub-section  (1)  of section 3A, object to the use of the land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in that sub-section.

(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the competent authority in writing and shall set out the grounds thereof and the competent authority shall give the  objector  an  opportunity  of  being  heard,  either  in person or by a legal practitioner, and may, after hearing all  such  objections  and  after  making  such  further enquiry,  it  any,  as  the  competent  authority  thinks necessary,  by  order,  either  allow  or  disallow  the objections.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "legal practitioner" has the same meaning as in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961).

(3)  Any order  made by the competent  authority  under sub-section (2) shall be final.

3D. Declaration of  acquisition- (1)  Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 3C has been made to the  competent  authority  within  the  period  specified

14

therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under subsection (2)  of  that  section,  the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report  accordingly  to  the  Central  Government  and  on receipt  of  such  report,  the  Central  Government  shall declare, by notification in the Official  Gazette, that the land  should  be  acquired  for  the  purpose  or  purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3A.

(2)  On  the  publication  of  the  declaration  under  sub- section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.

(3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been published  under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  3A for  its acquisition but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of  publication  of  that  notification,  the  said  notification shall cease to have any effect:

Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the  period  or  periods  during  which  any  action  or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3A is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.

(4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section  (1)  shall  not  be  called  in  question  in  any court or by any other authority.

3E. Power to take possession.- (1) Where any land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of  section  3D,  and  the  amount  determined  by  the competent  authority  under  section  3G with  respect  to such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of section 3H, with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may  be  in  possession  of  such  land  to  surrender  or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice.

15

(2)  If  any  person  refuses  or  fails  to  comply  with  any direction  made  under  sub-section  (1),  the  competent authority shall apply—

(a) in the case of any land situated in any area falling within the metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of Police;

(b) in case of any land situated in any area other than the area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a District,

and such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be,  shall  enforce  the  surrender  of  the  land,  to  the competent authority or to the person duly authorised by it.

3F. Right to enter into the land where land has vested in the Central Government. - Where the land has vested in the Central  Government  under  section 3D,  it  shall  be lawful  for  any  person  authorised  by  the  Central Government  in  this  behalf,  to  enter  and  do  other  act necessary upon the land for  carrying out  the building, maintenance,  management  or  operation  of  a  national highway or a part thereof, or any other work connected therewith.

3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.- (1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be  paid  an  amount  which  shall  be  determined  by  an order of the competent authority.

(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement  on,  any land is acquired under  this  Act, there  shall  be paid  an amount  to  the owner  and  any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the amount  determined under  sub-section (1),  for  that land.

(3)  Before proceeding to determine the amount  under sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2),  the  competent

16

authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers,  one  of  which  will  be  in  a  vernacular language inviting claims from all  persons interested in the land to be acquired.

(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall  require  all  persons  interested  in  such  land  to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land.

(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2)  is  not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the  arbitrator  to  be  appointed  by  the  Central Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.

(7)  The  competent  authority  or  the  arbitrator  while determining the amount  under  sub-section (1)  or  sub- section  (5),  as  the  case  may  be,  shall  take  into consideration—

(a)  the  market  value  of  the  land  on  the  date  of publication of the notification under section 3A;

(b)  the  damage,  if  any,  sustained  by  the  person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by  reason  of  the  severing  of  such  land  from other land;

(c)  the  damage,  if  any,  sustained  by  the  person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of  the acquisition  injuriously  affecting his other  immovable  property  in  any  manner,  or  his earnings;

(d)  if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the  person  interested  is  compelled  to  change  his

17

residence  or  place  of  business,  the  reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change.

3H. Deposit and payment of amount. - (1) The amount determined under section 3G shall be deposited by the Central  Government  in  such  manner  as  may  be  laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority before taking possession of the land.

(2)  As  soon  as  may  be  after  the  amount  has  been deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall  on  behalf  of  the  Central  Government  pay  the amount to the person or persons entitled thereto.

(3)  Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them.

(4)  If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same  or  any  part  thereof  is  payable,  the  competent authority  shall  refer  the dispute to the decision of  the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.

(5)  Where the amount determined under section 3G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the  competent  authority,  the  arbitrator  may  award interest  at  nine  per  cent,  per  annum on such  excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof.

(6) Where the amount determined by the arbitrator is in excess  of  the  amount  determined  by  the  competent authority,  the  excess  amount  together  with  interest,  if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid  down  by  rules  made  in  this  behalf  by  that Government,  with  the  competent  authority  and  the

18

provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit.

3-I. Competent authority to have certain powers of civil court.-  The  competent  authority  shall  have,  for  the purposes of this Act, all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b)  requiring  the  discovery  and  production  of  any document;

(c) reception of evidence on affidavits;

(d) requisitioning any public record from any court or office;

(e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses.

3J. Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply.- Nothing in  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  shall  apply  to  an acquisition under this Act.”

9. Keeping in  view the  object  of  reducing  delay and speedy

implementation  of  highway  projects,  the  amended  National

Highways Act does away with any “award” by way of an offer to the

landowner.   Post the notification under Section 3A, objections are

to be heard by the competent authority, whose order is then made

final.  The moment the authority disallows the objections, a report is

submitted to the Central Government, and on receipt of such report,

the  Central  Government,  by  a  declaration,  states  that  the  land

should be acquired for the purpose mentioned in Section 3A. The

19

important innovation made by the Amendment Act is that vesting is

not  postponed  to  after  an  award  is  made  by  the  Competent

Authority. Vesting takes place as soon as the Section 3D declaration

is made. One other important difference between the Amendment

Act  and  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  is  that  determination  of

compensation is to be made by the competent authority under the

Amendment Act which, if not accepted by either party, is then to be

determined  by  an  Arbitrator  to  be  appointed  by  the  Central

Government.   Such arbitrator’s Award is then subject to challenge

under  the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996.  Thus,  delays in

references made to District  Judges and appeals therefrom to the

High Court and Supreme Court have been obviated. Section 3G(7)

does not provide for grant of solatium, and Section 3H(5) awards

interest at the rate of 9% on the excess amount determined by the

arbitrator  over  what  is  determined  by  the  competent  authority

without the period of one year contained in the proviso to Section 28

of the Land Acquisition Act, after which interest is only awardable at

the rate of 15% per annum, if such payment is made beyond one

year.

10. Before embarking on a discussion as to  the constitutional

validity  of  the Amendment  Act,  it  is  important  to  first  understand

20

what is meant by the expression “solatium”.  In Sunder vs Union of

India (2001) 7 SCC 211, a bench of 5 judges of this Court laid down

the nature of solatium as follows:

“21. It is apposite in this context to point out that during the enquiry contemplated under Section 11 of  the Act the Collector has to consider the objections which any person  interested  has  stated  pursuant  to  the  notice given  to  him.  It  may  be  possible  that  a  person  so interested would advance objections for highlighting his disinclination to part with the land acquired on account of a variety of grounds, such as sentimental or religious or psychological or traditional etc. Section 24 emphasises that no amount on account of any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land shall be granted as  compensation.  That  aspect  is  qualitatively  different from  the  solatium  which  the  legislature  wanted  to provide “in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition”.

22. Compulsory  nature  of  acquisition  is  to  be distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In the latter, the landowner has the widest advantage in finding out a would-be buyer and in negotiating with him regarding the sale  price.  Even  in  such  negotiations  or  haggling, normally no landowner would bargain for any amount in consideration of his disinclination to part with the land. The mere fact that he is negotiating for sale of the land would show that he is willing to part with the land.  The owner is free to settle terms of transfer and choose the buyer as also to appoint the point of time when he would be receiving consideration and parting with his title and possession  over  the  land.  But  in  the  compulsory acquisition the landowner is  deprived of  the right  and opportunity to negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It depends on what the Collector or the court fixes as per the provisions of the Act. The solatium envisaged in sub-

21

section (2) “in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition”  is  thus not  the same as damages on account  of  the  disinclination  to  part  with  the  land acquired.”

Thus, the solatium that is paid to a landowner is on account of

the fact that a landowner, who may not be willing to part with his

land, has now to do so, and that too at a value fixed legislatively and

not through negotiation, by which, arguably, such land owner would

get  the  best  price  for  the  property  to  be  sold.   Once  this  is

understood in its correct perspective, it is clear that “solatium” is part

and  parcel  of  compensation  that  is  payable  for  compulsory

acquisition of land.

11. As has been stated by us hereinabove, solatium and interest

were  awarded  to  landowners  for  compulsory  acquisition  of  their

lands  for  the  purpose  of  National  Highways  until  the  1997

Amendment Act.   Interestingly, after the Land Acquisition Act has

been  repealed  and  The  Right  to  Fair  Compensation  and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Act, 2013 has come into force, Section 105 of the said Act provides

as under:

“105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or  to  apply  with  certain  modifications.-  (1)  Subject  to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply

22

to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.

(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.

(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of  compensation in  accordance with the First  Schedule  and  rehabilitation  and  resettlement specified  in  the  Second  and  Third  Schedules,  being beneficial  to  the  affected  families,  shall  apply  to  the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in  the  Fourth  Schedule  or  shall  apply  with  such exceptions  or  modifications  that  do  not  reduce  the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to  compensation  or  rehabilitation  and  resettlement  as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.

(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of  Parliament,  while it  is  in session,  for  a total period  of  thirty  days which may be  comprised in  one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of  the session immediately  following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses  agree  in  disapproving  the  issue  of  the notification  or  both  Houses  agree  in  making  any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.”

12. The First  Schedule  to  the  said  Act  provides  that  solatium

equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors,

23

depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area,

constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those

whose land is acquired.  The Fourth Schedule to this Act, to be read

along  with  Section  105,  expressly  includes  under  Item  7,  the

National Highways Act, 1956.  In Item 9, this Schedule also includes

The  Requisitioning  and  Acquisition  of  Immovable  Property  Act,

1952.   By  a  notification  dated  28th  August,  2015  issued  under

Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided

that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions

that take place under the National Highways Act. The result is that

both  before  the  1997 Amendment  Act  and  after  the coming into

force  of  the  2013  Act,  solatium  and  interest  is  payable  to

landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of

National Highways.   This is one other very important circumstance

to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the

1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015.

Article 31-C

13. Articles 31-C and 39(b) of the Constitution of India read as

under:

24

“31C.  Saving  of  laws  giving  effect  to  certain  directive principles.- Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall  be  deemed  to  be  void  on  the  ground  that  it  is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights  conferred  by article  14  or  article  19 and  no  law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy  shall  be  called  in  question in  any  court  on  the ground that it does not give effect to such policy:

Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.”

“39.  Certain  principles of  policy  to  be followed by the State.–  The  State  shall,  in  particular,  direct  its  policy towards securing -

xxx xxx xxx

(b)  that  the  ownership  and  control  of  the  material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;

xxx xxx xxx”

An  interesting  discussion  is  contained  in  Sanjeev  Coke

Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr (1983) 1

SCR 1000 at pages 1023 to 1025, on the scope of the expression

“material  resources  of  the  community”  and  the  expression

“distribute” that are used in Article 39(b).  Finally, the Court held:

25

“We hold that the expression ‘Material resources of the community’ is not confined to natural resources; it is not confined to resources owned by the public; it means and includes  all  resources,  natural  and  man-made,  public and private-owned.”  (at page 1026)

However, we were referred to three judgments in Property Owners’

Association   v.  State  of  Maharashtra.    In  the  first  of  these

judgments reported in (1996) 4 SCC 49, this Court has referred the

matter to five learned Judges on the vexed question as to whether

Article 31-C survived at all in view of the declaration contained in

Minerva Mills v. Union of India 1981 (1) SCR 206 to the effect that

the  amended  Article  31-C  was  constitutionally  invalid.   As  the

aforesaid declaration would not revive the original Article 31-C, the

Article became a dead letter.  When the same case travelled to five

learned Judges reported in (2001) 4 SCC 455, this Court was of the

opinion that the views expressed in  Sanjeev Coke (supra) require

reconsideration  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Sanjeev  Coke  (supra)

adopted the reasoning of Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Karnataka vs

Shri Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 and not the reasoning of

the majority judgment of Untwalai, J. who stated that he must not be

understood to agree with all that has been said by  Krishna Iyer, J.

in his judgment. The Court, therefore, referred the matter to seven

learned  Judges.  When  the  matter  came  up  before  the  seven

26

learned Judges, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 522, this Court held  that

the statement made in  Sanjeev Coke (supra), followed by several

other  judgments,  that  the  “material  resources  of  the  community”

would  include  privately  owned  resources,  would  be  prima  facie

incorrect and hence the matter was referred to nine learned Judges

of this Court, which reference is still pending.  We have not deemed

it necessary to refer this case to be tagged along with the reference

to nine learned Judges, as we will assume for the purpose of this

case that Article 31-C, as originally enacted, continues to exist and

that the “material resources of the community” would include private

property as well.   

14. Shri Divan next referred us to State of Tamil Nadu vs L. Abu

Kavur Bai (1984) 1 SCC 515, which held that the Tamil Nadu Stage

Carriage  and  Contract  Carriages  (Acquisition)  Act,  1973  was

protected by Article 31-C of the Constitution of India.   This was held

on the footing that a nationalisation measure would fall within Article

39(b) as the word “distribution” is a word of extremely wide import,

which  would  include  nationalisation  of  transport  as  a  distributive

process  for  the  good  of  the  community.   This  situation  is  far

removed from the Amendment Act to the National Highways Act in

the present case, which is not a nationalisation measure at all, but is

a measure to speed up the acquisition process.  Shri Divan then

27

relied upon this  Court’s  judgment  in  Maharashtra SEB vs Thana

Electric Supply Co. (1989) 3 SCC 616, in which the Indian Electricity

(Maharashtra  Amendment)  Act,  1976  was  engrafted  on  to  the

Electricity Act,  1910, the effect of which was to substitute market

value of the undertaking that was compulsorily acquired, with the

concept  of  an  “amount”,  which  was  the  book  value  of  the

undertaking at  the time of  its  delivery.   Even as per this  Act,  by

virtue of the compulsory acquisition of the undertaking, the licensee

was given a solatium of 10% of such book value.  Importantly, this

Court,  after  holding  that  nationalisation  would  come  within  the

expression “distribution” for the purposes of Article 39(b), engrafted

another test when legislation claims the protection of Article 31-C.

The Court held that the protection of Article 31-C is accorded only to

those provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for

giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b) – See paragraph 43. This

case is again distinguishable for the same reason as pointed out

qua State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai (supra) as this is a

nationalisation measure far  removed from the object  of  the 1997

Amendment Act  to the National  Highways Act.  It  is  interesting to

note that despite the fact that a challenge under Articles 14 and 31

were bound to fail in view of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C,

yet the Amendment Act had still provided for 10% solatium as the

28

legislature  had  correctly  appreciated  that  solatium  is  a  part  of

compensation  given  for  the  compulsory  nature  of  acquisition  of

property.

15. Shri Divan then referred us to Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.

Ltd.  vs  State  of  Assam (1989)  3  SCC 709,  in  which  the  Indian

Electricity  (Assam Amendment)  Act,  1973 and the Tinsukhia and

Dibrugarh Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1973 were

challenged.   These being nationalisation measures, this Court held

that these enactments were entitled to the protection of Article 31-C.

This  nationalisation  statute,  again,  is  very  far  removed  from the

Amendment Act, 1997 to the National Highways Act.

16. It is well-settled that in order that a law avail of the protection

of Article 31-C, it is not necessary that any declaration be made in

that  behalf.  (See  State  of  Maharashtra  vs  Basantibai  Mohanlal

Khetan (1986) 2 SCC 516 at 530).  It is also important to remember

that in order that a law be shielded by Article 31-C, the said law

must have a direct and rational nexus with the principles contained

in Article 39(b).  (See Assam Sillimanite Ltd. vs Union of India 1991

Supp 3 SCR 273 at 290)

29

17. An example of a law which claimed the benefit of Article 31-

C, but was denied such benefit is set out in Dr K. R. Lakshmanan vs

State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226 as follows:

“44. The main object for which the Club was established is to carry on the business of race-club, in particular the running of horse-races, steeplechases or races of any other  kind  and  for  any  kind  of  athletic  sports  and for playing  their  own  games  of  cricket,  bowls,  golf,  lawn tennis, polo or any other kind of games or amusement, recreation, sport or entertainment etc. In the earlier part of  this  judgment,  we have noticed the  working of  the Club which shows that apart from 5% commission from the totalizator and the bookmakers no part of the betting- money comes to the Club. The Club does not own or control any material resources of the community which are  to  be  distributed  in  terms  of  Article  39(b)  of  the Constitution  of  India.  There  are  two  aspects  of  the functioning of the Club. One is the betting by the punters at the totalizator and with the bookies. The Club does not earn any income from the betting-money except 5% commission.  There  is  no  question  whatsoever  of  the Club owning or controlling the material resources of the community  or  in  any manner  contributing towards the operation  of  the  economic  system  resulting  in  the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. The second aspect is the conduct of  

horse-races by the Club. Horse-racing is a game of skill, the horse which wins the race is given a prize by the Club.  It  is  a  simple  game  of  horse-racing  where  the winning horses are given prizes.  Neither  the “material resources  of  the  community”  nor  “to  subserve  the common good” has any relevance to the twin functioning of the Club. Similarly, the operation of the Club has no relation  or  effect  on  the  “operation  of  the  economic system”. There is no question whatsoever of attracting the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. The declaration in Section 2 of the Act and the recital containing aims and objectives totally

30

betray the scope and purpose of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution.  While Article 39(b) refers to “material resources of the community”, the aims and objects of the Act refer to “the material resources of the Madras Race Club”. It  is difficult  to understand what exactly are the material resources of the race-club which are sought to be  distributed  so  as  to  subserve  the  common  good within the meaning of the Directive Principles. Equally, the reference to Article 39(c) is wholly misplaced. While Article 39(c)  relates to “the operation of  the economic system  …  to  the  common  detriment”,  the  aims  and objectives of the Act refer to “the economic system of the Madras Race Club”. What is meant by the economic system of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it is assumed that betting by the punters at the totalizator and with the bookmakers is part of the economic system of  the Madras  Race Club,  it  has no relevance to  the objectives  specified  in  Article  39(b)  and  (c).  We  are, therefore, of the view that reference to Article 39(b) and (c) in the aims and objects and in Section 2 of the Act is nothing but a mechanical reproduction of constitutional provisions in a totally inappropriate context. There is no nexus  so  far  as  the  provisions  of  the  1986  Act  are concerned with the objectives contained in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that the protection under Article 31-C of the Constitution cannot be extended to the 1986 Act.”

This is despite the fact that the impugned enactment, namely, the

Madras Race Club (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act,

1986 contained a declaration that it was enacted to give effect to the

policy of the State under Article 39(b) and (c).

18. When we examine the Objects and Reasons which led to the

1997  amendment  of  the  National  Highways  Act,  we  do  not  find

mentioned therein any object relating to distribution of the material

31

resources of the community. The object of the Amendment Act has

no relationship whatsoever to the Directive Principle contained in

Article  39(b),  inasmuch  as  its  limited  object  is  to  expedite  the

process of  land acquisition by avoiding inordinate delays therein.

The object of the Amendment Act was not to acquire land for the

purpose  of  national  highways  as,  pre-amendment,  the  Land

Acquisition Act provided for this. The object of the Amendment Act

was fulfilled by providing a scheme different from that contained in

the Land Acquisition Act, making it clear that the stage of offer of an

amount  by  way  of  compensation  is  removed  altogether;  vesting

takes place as soon as the Section 3D notification is issued; and

most importantly, the tardy Court process is replaced by arbitration.

Obviously, these objects have no direct and rational nexus with the

Directive  Principle  contained  in  Article  39(b).   Article  31-C  is,

therefore, out of harm’s way.  Even otherwise, on the assumption

that Article 31-C is attracted to the facts of this case, yet, as was

held by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1981

(1) SCR 206,  

“…it is not every provision of a statute, which has been enacted with the dominant  object  of  giving effect  to  a directive principle, that it entitled to protection, but only those provisions of the statute which are basically and essentially  necessary  for  giving  effect  to  the  directive

32

principle are protected under the amended Article 31-C” (at page 338-339)

This  passage  was  specifically  referred  to  in  Tinsukhia  Electric

Supply Co. Ltd. vs State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709 at 735. Also,

in Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs Thana Electric Supply Co.

(1989) 3 SCC 616, at para 43, this Court said:

“43. The idea of nationalisation of a material resource of the  community  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  idea  of distribution  of  that  resource  in  the  community  in  a manner  which  advances  common  good.  The  cognate and sequential question would be whether the provisions of the Amending Act, 1976, had a reasonable and direct nexus  with  the  objects  of  Article  39(b).  It  is  true,  the protection  of  Article  31-C  is  accorded  only  to  those provisions  which  are basically  and  essentially necessary for giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b). The High Court  from the trend of  its  reasoning in the judgment,  appears  to  take  the  view  that  while  the provision  for  the  takeover  in  the  principal  Act  might amount to a power to acquire, however, the objects of the Amending Act of 1976, which merely sought to beat down the price could not be said to be part of that power and was, therefore, incapable of establishing any nexus with Article 39(b). There is,  we say so with respect,  a fallacy in this reasoning.”

The test of Article 31-C’s protection being accorded only to those

provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for giving

effect to the objects of Article 39(b) is lifted from Akadasi Padhan vs

State of Orissa 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 691, where this Court held, with

reference to Article 19(6),  that  qua laws passed creating a State

33

monopoly, it is only those essential and basic provisions which are

protected by the latter part of Article 19(6).   This Court stated the

test thus:

“17. In  dealing  with  the  question  about  the  precise denotation  of  the  clause  “a  law  relating  to”,  it  is necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  this  clause  occurs  in Article 19(6) which is,  in a sense, an exception to the main  provision  of  Article  19(1)(g).  Laws  protected  by Article  19(6)  are  regarded  as  valid  even  though  they impinge upon the fundamental  right  guaranteed under Article  19(1)(g).  That  is  the  effect  of  the  scheme contained in Article 19(1) read with Clauses (2) to (6) of the said Article. That being so, it would be unreasonable to place upon the relevant clause an unduly wide and liberal construction. “A law relating to” a State monopoly cannot,  in  the  context,  include  all  the  provisions contained  in  the  said  law  whether  they  have  direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion,  the  said  expression  should  be  construed  to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential  features.  If  a law is passed creating a State monopoly,  the  Court  should  enquire  what  are  the provisions  of  the  said  law  which  are  basically  and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential  and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental  or  helpful  to  the operation of  the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Article 19(6). In other words, the effect of the amendment made in Article 19(6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that it is only the provisions of the law which are integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under the latter part of Article 19(6) and would inevitably have to satisfy the test  of  the first  part  of  Article 19(6).”  (at page 707)

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Even if the Amendment Act, 1997 be regarded as an Act to carry out

the purposes of Article 39(b), the object of the Amendment Act is not

served by removing solatium and interest from compensation to be

awarded.   It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation

without  solatium  and  interest  is  not  basically  and  essentially

necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, 1997, even

if it is to be considered as an acquisition Act pure and simple, for the

object of the said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate

delays  in  the  acquisition  process  of  acquiring  land  for  National

Highways.   On application of this test as well, it is clear that the

grant  of  compensation  without  solatium  and  interest,  not  being

basically and essentially necessary to carry out  the object  of  the

Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article

31-C and, therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into

by the Court.   

Article 14 - Discrimination

19. The  sheet  anchor  of  the  case  of  the  Respondents  is  the

Constitution  Bench judgment  in  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar  vs  Special

Deputy  Collector  for  Land  Acquisition  (1965)  1  SCR  614  and

Nagpur Improvement Trust vs Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500.   It is,

35

therefore, most important to advert to these two decisions in some

detail.  

20. In  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar (supra),  the  Madras  Legislature

amended the Land Acquisition Act providing for acquisition of land

for  housing  schemes  by  laying  down  principles  for  fixing

compensation different from those prescribed in the principal Act.

These differences are set out in the judgment as follows:

“The next  question  is  whether  the  amending  Act  was made  in  contravention  of  Article  31(2)  of  the Constitution. The amending Act prescribes the principles for  ascertaining  the  value  of  the  property  acquired.  It was passed to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the  State  of  Madras  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the State to acquire lands for  housing schemes. “Housing scheme”  is  defined  to  mean  “any  State  Government scheme  the  purpose  of  which  is  increasing  house accommodation” and under Section 3 of the amending Act, Section 23 of the principal Act is made applicable to such acquisition with certain modifications. In Section 23 of the principal Act, in sub-section (1) for clause first, the following clause is substituted:

“first, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4,  sub-section  (1)  or  an  amount  equal  to  the average market value of the land during the five years  immediately  preceding  such  date, whichever is less.”

After clause sixthly, the following clause was added:

“seventhly, the use to which the land was put at the  date  of  the  publication  of  the  notification under Section 4, sub-section (1).”

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Sub-section (2)  of  Section 23 of  the principal Act  was amended  by  substituting  the  words,  in  respect  of solatium,  “fifteen  per  centum”  by  the  words  “five  per centum”.  In  Section  24  of  the  principal  Act  after  the clause seventhly the following clause was added:

“eighthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired  by  reason  of  its  suitability  or adaptability  for  any use other  than the use to which  the  land  was  put  at  the  date  of  the publication of  the notification under  Section 4, sub-section (1).”

Under Section 4 of the amending Act, the provisions of Section  3  thereof  shall  apply  to  every  case  in  which proceedings  have  been  started  before  the commencement  of  the said Act  and are pending.  The result  of  the  amending  Act  is  that  if  the  State Government acquires a land for a housing purpose, the claimant gets only the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act or an amount equal to the average market value  of  the  land  during  the  five  years  immediately preceding such date,  whichever  is  less.  He will  get  a solatium of only 5 per centum of such value instead of 15 per centum under the principal Act. He will  not get any compensation by reason of the suitability of the land for any use other than the use for which it was put on the date of  publication of  the notification.”  (at  page 629 & 630)

      A challenge made to the said Amendment Act on the ground

that it is hit by Article 14 succeeded, the Court holding:

“Now what are the differences between persons owning lands in the Madras city or between the lands acquired which have a reasonable relation to the said object. It is suggested that the differences between people owning lands rested on the extent, quality and the suitability of the lands acquired for the said object. The differences

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based upon the said criteria have no relevance to the object of the Amending Act. To illustrate: the extent of the land depends upon the magnitude of  the scheme undertaken by the State. A large extent of land may be acquired for  a university  or  for  a network of  hospitals under the provisions of the principal Act and also for a housing scheme under the Amending Act. So too, if the housing scheme is a limited one, the land acquired may not  be  as  big  as  that  required  for  a  big  university.  If waste  land  is  good  for  a  housing  scheme  under  the amending Act, it will equally be suitable for a hospital or a school for which the said land may be acquired under the principal Act. Nor the financial position or the number of  persons owning the land has any relevance,  for  in both the cases land can be acquired from rich or poor, from one individual or from a number of persons. Out of adjacent lands of the same quality and value, one may be acquired for a housing scheme under the amending Act and the other for a hospital under the principal Act; out  of  two  adjacent  plots  belonging  to  the  same individual and of the same quality and value, one may be acquired under the principal Act and the other under the Amending Act. From whatever aspect the matter is looked at,  the alleged differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It  is said that the object of the amending Act in itself may project the differences in the lands sought to be acquired under the  two Acts.  This  argument  puts  the  cart  before  the horse. It is one thing to say that the existing differences between  persons  and  properties  have  a  reasonable relation  to  the  object  sought  to  be  achieved and it  is totally a different thing to say that the object of the Act itself  created  the  differences.  Assuming  that  the  said proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences in the people owning lands or in the lands on the basis of the object. The object is to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low price. For achieving that object, any land falling in any of the said categories can be acquired under the amending Act.  So too,  for  a public purpose any such land can be acquired under the principal Act. We,  therefore,  hold that  discrimination is writ  large on the  amending  Act  and  it  cannot  be  sustained  on  the principle of reasonable classification. We, therefore, hold

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that the amending Act clearly infringes Article 14 of the Constitution and is void.” (at page 634 & 635)

(Emphasis supplied)

21. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), this Court referred to

the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, under which lands were to be

acquired with reference to the Land Acquisition Act,  as modified.

We are concerned in this case with the modification that has to do

with acquisition for the purposes of the Improvement Act, which did

not  provide  for  solatium of  15% that  would  have  been  obtained

under the Land Acquisition Act.  A Seven-Judge Bench of this Court

examined  the  matter  in  some  detail,  and  followed  P.  Vajravelu

Mudaliar (supra)  together  with  another  judgment,  Balammal  vs

State of Madras (1969) 1 SCR 90.  The Court held:

“27. What  can  be  reasonable  classification  for  the purpose of determining compensation if the object of the legislation  is  to  compulsorily  acquire  land  for  public purposes?

28. It  would not be disputed that different principles of compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill, tall  or  short,  or  whether  the  owner  has  inherited  the property or built  it  with his own efforts, or whether the owner is politician or  an advocate. Why is this sort of classification not sustainable? Because the object being to compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the object is equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type of owner or another type.

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29. Can classification be made on the basis of the public purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land is acquired? In other words can the Legislature lay down different  principles of  compensation for  lands acquired say for a hospital or a school or a Government building? Can the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60% of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the market value? All three objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Article 14 confers an individual  right  and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. It seems to us that  ordinarily  a  classification  based  on  the  public purpose  is  not  permissible  under  Article  14  for  the purpose  of  determining compensation.  The  position is different  when  the  owner  of  the  land  himself  is  the recipient of benefits from an improvement scheme, and the benefit  to  him is  taken into consideration in  fixing compensation. Can classification be made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land? In other words can different principles of compensation be laid if the land is acquired for  or  by an Improvement  Trust  or  Municipal Corporation or the Government? It seems to us that the answer is in the negative because as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other.

30.     It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated the owner who is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Article 14.”

22. Both,  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar (supra)  and Nagpur

Improvement  Trust  (supra)  clinch  the  issue  in  favour  of  the

Respondents,  as  has  been  correctly  held  by  the  Punjab  and

40

Haryana High Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra).

First and foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen

hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to speed up

the process of acquiring lands for National Highways.  This object

has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove.   It will be

noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do

with  achieving  this  object,  as  it  is  nobody’s  case  that  land

acquisition for the purpose of national highways slows down as a

result of award of solatium and interest.  Thus, a classification made

between different  sets of  landowners whose lands happen to be

acquired  for  the  purpose  of  National  Highways  and  landowners

whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational

relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act,

i.e.  speedy  acquisition  of  lands  for  the  purpose  of  National

Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of

Article 14.   

23. Even otherwise,  in  P.  Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra),  despite

the fact that the object of the Amendment Act was to acquire lands

for housing schemes  at a low price, yet the Amendment Act was

struck down when it provided for solatium at the rate of 5% instead

of 15%, that was provided in the Land Acquisition Act,  the Court

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holding that whether adjacent lands of the same quality and value

are acquired for a housing scheme or some other public purpose

such  as  a  hospital  is  a  differentiation  between  two  sets  of

landowners having no reasonable relation to the object sought to be

achieved.   More pertinently, another example is given – out of two

adjacent  plots  belonging  to  the  same  individual one  may  be

acquired under the principal Act for a particular public purpose and

one acquired under the Amending Act for a housing scheme, which,

when looked at from the point of view of the landowner, would be

discriminatory, having no rational relation to the object sought to be

achieved,  which  is  compulsory  acquisition  of  property  for  public

purposes.

24.  Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  (supra)  has  clearly  held  that

ordinarily a classification based on public purpose is not permissible

under Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensation.  Also,

in para 30, the Seven-Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is

immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition

Act under which the land is acquired, as, if the existence of these

two  Acts  would  enable  the  State  to  give  one  owner  different

treatment from another who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be

infracted.  In the facts of these cases, it is clear that from the point

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of view of the landowner it is immaterial that his land is acquired

under the National Highways Act and not the Land Acquisition Act,

as solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact alone.  

25. A contention was taken by Shri  Divan in  that  Article  31-A

second proviso would make it  clear  that  compensation at  a rate

which shall not be less than the market value would be payable only

in the circumstances mentioned therein and not otherwise.   For this

reason, the Nagpur Improvement Trust case is distinguishable, as

one of the instances given therein is that it would not be possible to

discriminate between landowners who are similarly situate by giving

one landowner compensation at let us say 60% of the market value

and the other owner 100% of the market value.   

26. The Nagpur Improvement Trust case has to be read as a

whole.  Merely emphasising one example from the passages that

have been extracted above (supra) will  not make the ratio of the

said judgment inapplicable.   Besides, the second proviso to Article

31-A deals  with  persons  whose  lands  are  acquired  when  such

person is cultivating the same personally.   The reason for awarding

compensation at a rate which is not less than market value is in

order that a farmer, who is cultivating the land personally, gets other

land of equivalent value, which he can then cultivate personally.   As

such  farmer  is  at  the  centre  of  agrarian  reform legislation,  such

43

legislation would be turned on its head if lands were to be acquired

without  adequately  compensating  him  instead  of  from  absentee

landlords whose lands are then to be given to the landless and to

such persons if they personally cultivate lands less than the ceiling

area  under  State  Agricultural  Ceiling  Acts.   We  think  that  any

reference to the second proviso of Article 31-A is wholly irrelevant to

the question before us and cannot under any circumstance be used

in order to distinguish a judgment which otherwise applies on all

fours.

27. However,  it  was  argued  that  a  line  of  judgments  have

distinguished  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar (supra)  and  Nagpur

Improvement Trust  (supra) and that this line of judgments should

be followed in preference to the aforesaid two judgments.

28. In  Union of  India vs Hari  Krishnan Khosla  1993 Supp (2)

SCC 149, this Court upheld the Requisitioning and Acquisition of

Immovable Property Act, 1952 and stated that non-grant of solatium

and  interest  which  were  otherwise  grantable  under  the  Land

Acquisition Act would not render the 1952 Act constitutionally infirm.

The  Court  undertook  a  minute  distinction  between  the  Land

Acquisition Act  on the one hand and the 1952 Act  on the other.

Thus, the Court stated:

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“43. Coming to dissimilarities, in the case of requisition, one  of  the  important  rights  in  the  bundle  of  rights emanating  from  ownership,  namely,  the  right  to possession and enjoyment has been deprived of, when the property was requisitioned. It is minus that right for which,  as stated above, the compensation is provided under  Section  8(2),  the  remaining  rights  come  to  be acquired.

44. In contradistinction under the Land Acquisition Act, as stated above, the sum total of the rights, namely, the ownership itself comes to be acquired. We may usefully quote from Salmond on Jurisprudence (1966) 12th Edn., Chapter 8 at pages 246-247:

“Ownership  denotes  the  relation  between  a person and an object forming the subject-matter of his ownership.  It  consists  in  a  complex of  rights,  all  of which are  rights  in  rem,  being good against  all  the world  and  not  merely  against  specific  persons. Though in certain situations some of these rights may be  absent,  the  normal  case  of  ownership  can  be expected to exhibit the following incidents.

First, the owner will have a right to possess the thing which he owns….

Secondly, the owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the right to decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income from it ….

                              *    * *

Fifthly,  ownership  has  a  residuary  character.  If,  for example,  a landowner gives a lease of  his property to A, an easement to B and some other right such as a  profit  to C,  his  ownership  now  consists  of  the residual  rights,  i.e.,  the  rights  remaining  when  all these lesser rights have been given away ….”

45. Then  again,  under  the  Act,  the  acquisition  even though it is for a public purpose is restricted to the two clauses  of  Section  7(3)  of  the  Act  to  which  we  have

45

already made a reference. Thus two clauses of Section 7(3) constitute statutory embargo.

46. Under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  the  power  of eminent  domain  could  be  exercised  without  any embargo  so  long  as  there  is  an  underlying  public purpose. In our considered view, these vital distinctions will  have  to  be  kept  in  mind  while  dealing  with  the question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. We may,  at  once,  state,  when  examined in  this  light,  the reasonings  of  the  High  Court  to  make  out  a  case  of discrimination, seem to be incorrect.

xxx xxx xxx

58.     We are of the firm view that cases of acquisition of land stand on a different footing than those where such property  is     subject  to  a  prior  requisition  before acquisition.

59. Therefore,  the  cases  relating  to  acquisition like Vajravelu  Mudaliar  case [(1965)  1  SCR 614 :  AIR 1965 SC 1017], Balammal case [(1969) 1 SCR 90 : AIR 1968 SC 1425], Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500] and Peter case [(1980) 3 SCC 554] are not helpful  in  deciding  the  point  in  issue here. Goverdhan v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 3058 of 1983, allowed by this Court on January 31, 1983) no doubt was a case of acquisition under the Defence of India  Act,  1962  but  it  contains  no  discussion.  It  has already been noticed that the award of solatium is not a must in every case as laid down in Prakash Amichand Shah case [(1986) 1 SCC 581]”

29. Similarly, in Union of India vs Chajju Ram (2003) 5 SCC 568,

a case which arose under the Defence of India Act, 1971, this Court

followed Hari Krishnan Khosla (supra), finding that the provisions

of the Defence of India Act were in pari materia to those of the 1952

Act. The Court, therefore, held:  

46

“25. Here  it  is  not  a  case  where  existence  of  the Acquisition  Act  enables  the  State  to  give  one  owner different treatment from another equally situated owner on which ground Article  14 was sought  to be invoked in First Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500]. The purposes for which the provisions of the said Act can be invoked are absolutely different and distinct from which the provision of the Land Acquisition Act can be  invoked  for  acquisition  of  land.  In  terms  of  the provisions of the said Act, the requisition of the land was made. During the period of requisition the owner of the land is to be compensated therefor.  Section 30 of the said Act, as referred to hereinbefore, clearly postulates the  circumstances  which  would  be  attracted  for acquisitioning of the requisitioned land.

26. The  purposes  for  which  the  requisitioning  and consequent acquisition of land under the said Act can be made, are limited. Such acquisitions, inter alia, can be made only  when works have been constructed during the  period  of  requisition  or  where  the  costs  to  any Government of restoring the property to its condition at the  time  of  its  requisition  would  be  excessive  having regard to the value of the property at the relevant time.

27. One of the principles for determination of the amount of  compensation  for  acquisition  of  land  would  be  the willingness  of  an  informed  buyer  to  offer  the  price therefor.  In  terms  of  the  provisions  of  the  said  Act acquisition of  the property  would be in  relation to the property which has been under requisition during which period  the  owner  of  the  land  would  remain  out  of possession.  The  Government  during  the  period  of requisition would be in possession and full enjoyment of the property.

28. It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which a  willing  and  informed  buyer  would  offer  would  be different in the cases where the owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where he is not. The formulation of the criteria for payment of compensation  in  terms  of  Section  31  of  the  Act  was clearly  made  having  regard  to  the  said  factor,  which cannot  be  said  to  be  arbitrary  or  unreasonable.

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Parliament while making the provisions for payment of compensation must have also taken into consideration the  fact  that  the  owner  of  the  property  would  have received compensation for remaining out of possession during  the  period  when  the  property  was  under acquisition.

29. The learned Attorney-General appears to be correct in his submission that the provision for grant of solatium was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by Parliament having  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  amount  of compensation awarded to the owner of the land is to be determined on the basis of the value thereof as on the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. It has been noticed that the process takes a long time.  Taking  into  consideration  the  deficiencies  in  the Act, the Land Acquisition Act was further amended in the year 1984. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act,  therefore, solatium is paid in addition to the amount of market value of the land.

30. We  are,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  the classification sought to be made for determination of the amount  of  compensation  for  acquisition  of  the  land under the said Act vis-à-vis the Land Acquisition Act is a reasonable  and  valid  one.  The  said  classification  is founded  on  intelligible  differentia  and  has  a  rational relation  with  the object  sought  to  be  achieved by  the legislation in question.”

30. We may hasten to add that a Division Bench of this Court in

H.  V.  Low and  Company  Private  Ltd.  vs.  State  of  West  Bengal

(2016) 12 SCC 699 has found on a prima facie examination that the

case of Chajju Ram (supra) requires reconsideration.   

31. For  our  purposes,  it  is  enough  to  state  that  the  line  of

judgments under the 1952 Act and the Defence of India Act, 1971,

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which contained a two-step process, namely, requisition which may

be  followed  by  acquisition,  are  wholly  distinguishable  for  the

reasons stated in those judgments. As was stated in  Chajju Ram

(supra),  the object of a Requisition Act is completely different from

an Acquisition Act.  In a Requisition Act, private property is taken for

public purposes only temporarily – when the reason for requisition

ends,  ordinarily  the  property  is  handed  back  to  the  owner.  This

being the case, in requisition statutes handing back of the property

is the rule and acquisition of the property the exception, as property

can only be acquired for the two reasons set out in Section 7 of the

1952 Act and Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1971. Also, as

has been pointed out in  Hari Krishnan Khosla (supra), what gets

acquired is  only rights as to ownership,  possession having been

taken  over  by  requisition.   In  addition,  the  owner  has  already

received compensation for remaining out of possession during the

period when the property is under requisition.  For all these reasons,

the  aforesaid  judgments  are  wholly  distinguishable  from  the

acquisition measure in this case.    

32. The next  judgment relied upon by the learned counsel on

behalf  of  the  Appellants  is  Prakash  Amichand  Shah  vs  State  of

Gujarat (1986) 1 SCC 581.   This judgment contained a challenge to

49

the Bombay Town Planning Act.   The Nagpur Improvement Trust

(supra) judgment was distinguished in this judgment by stating that

the scheme of  the Bombay Town Planning Act  is wholly different

from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act.  In particular, the Court

held:

“34.  … Under  Section  53  of  the  Act  all  rights  of  the private owners in the original plots would determine and certain  consequential  rights  in  favour  of  the  owners would arise therefrom. If in the scheme, reconstituted or final plots are allotted to them they become owners of such final plots subject to the rights settled by the Town Planning Officer in the final scheme. In some cases the original plot of an owner might completely be allotted to the  local  authority  for  a  public  purpose.  Such  private owner may be paid compensation or a reconstituted plot in some other place. It may be a smaller or a bigger plot. It may be that in some cases it may not be possible to allot  a  final  plot  at  all.  Sections  67  to  71  of  the  Act provide  for  certain  financial  adjustments  regarding payment of money to the local authority or to the owners of  the  original  plots.  The  development  and  planning carried out under the Act is primarily for the benefit of public.  The  local  authority  is  under  an  obligation  to function according to the Act. The local authority has to bear a part of the expenses of development. It is in one sense a package deal. The proceedings relating to the scheme are not like acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor are the provisions of the Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  made  applicable  either without  or  with  modifications  as  in  the  case  of  the Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  Act,  1936.  We  do  not understand  the  decision  in Nagpur  Improvement  Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500 : AIR 1973 SC 689 : (1973) 3 SCR 39] as laying down generally that wherever land is taken away by the government under a separate statute compensation should be paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only and if there is any difference between the

50

compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the compensation payable under the statute concerned the  acquisition  under  the  statute  would  be discriminatory.  That  case  is  distinguishable  from  the present case. In State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter [(1980) 3 SCC 554 : AIR 1980 SC 1438 : (1980) 3 SCR 290] also Section 34 of the Cochin Town Planning Act which came up  for  consideration  was  of  the  same pattern  as  the provision  in  the  Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  Act,  1936 and for  that  reason the court  followed the decision in the Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500 : AIR  1973  SC  689  :  (1973)  3  SCR  39]  .  But  in  that decision itself  the court  observed at  pp.  302 and 303 thus: (SCC p. 564, para 21)

“We are not to be understood to mean that the rate of compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all cases. We need not investigate this question further as it does not arise here although we are clear in our mind  that  under  given  circumstances  differentiation even in the scale of compensation may comfortably comport with Article 14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed.”

33. This judgment is again distinguishable in that it was found,

having regard to the Bombay Town Planning Act, that the person

from whom the land was expropriated gets a package deal in that

he may be allotted other lands in the final Town Planning Scheme,

apart from compensation that is payable.  However, it is worthy of

comment that State of Kerala vs T. M. Peter (1980) 3 SCC 554,

which  was  relied  upon  in  this  case,  expressly  followed  Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra), holding:

51

“20. Is it rational to pay different scales of compensation, as  pointed  out  by  Sikri,  C.J.,  in Nagpur  Improvement Trust  case  [Nagpur  Improvement  Trust v. Vithal  Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500 : AIR 1973 SC 689 : (1973) 3 SCR 39], depending on whether you acquire for housing or hospital, irrigation scheme or town improvement, school building or police station? The amount of compensation payable has no bearing on this distinction, although it is conceivable  that  classification  for  purposes  of compensation may exist and in such cases the statute may  be  good.  We  are  unable  to  discern  any  valid discrimen in the Town Planning Act  vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act warranting a classification in the matter of denial of solatium.

21. We uphold the Act in other respects but not when it deals  invidiously  between  two  owners  based  on  an irrelevant  criterion  viz.  the  acquisition  being  for  an improvement scheme. We are not to be understood to mean  that  the  rate  of  compensation  may not  vary  or must be uniform in all  cases. We need not investigate this question further as it does not arise here although we  are  clear  in  our  minds  that  under  given circumstances  differentiation  even  in  the  scale  of compensation may comfortably comport with Article 14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed. Indeed,  the  State,  realising  the  force  of  this  facet  of discrimination,  offered,  expiratory  fashion,  both  before the High Court and before us, to pay 15%, solatium to obliterate the hostile distinction.

22. The  core  question  now arises.  What  is  the  effect even if we read a discrimination design in Section 34? Is plastic surgery permissible or demolition of the section inevitable?  Assuming  that  there  is  an  untenable discrimination in  the matter  of  compensation does the whole  of  Section  34  have  to  be  liquidated  or  several portions voided? In our opinion, scuttling the section, the course the High Court has chosen, should be the last step. The court uses its writ power with a constructive design, an affirmative slant and a sustaining bent. Even when  by  compulsions  of  inseverability,  a  destructive stroke becomes necessary the court minimises the injury

52

by  an  intelligent  containment.  Law  keeps  alive  and “operation  pull  down”  is  de  mode.  Viewed  from  this perspective,  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  see,  the  only discriminatory factor as between Section 34 of the Act and  Section  25  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  vis-à-vis quantification  of  compensation  is  the  nonpayment  of solatium in the former case because of the provision in Section 34(1) that Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act shall have no application. Thus, to achieve the virtue of equality and to eliminate the vice of inequality what is needed  is  the  obliteration  of  Section  25  of  the  Land Acquisition Act from Section 34(1) of the Town Planning Act.  The whole of  Section 34(1)  does not  have to be struck down. Once we exclude the discriminatory and, therefore, void part in Section 34(1) of the Act, equality is restored.  The owner will  then be entitled to the same compensation,  including  solatium,  that  he  may  be eligible  for  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  What  is rendered void by Article 13 is only “to the extent of the contravention” of Article 14. The lancet of the court may remove the offending words and restore to constitutional health the rest of the provision.

23. We hold that the exclusion of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition  Act  from  Section  34  of  the  Act  is unconstitutional but it is severable and we sever it. The necessary  consequence  is  that  Section  34(1)  will  be read omitting the words “and Section 25”. What follows then?  Section 32 obligates the State to act  under  the Land Acquisition Act but we have struck down that part which excludes Section 25, of the Land Acquisition Act and so, the “modification” no longer covers Section 25. It continues to apply to the acquisition of property under the  Town  Planning  Act.  Section  34(2)  provides  for compensation  exactly  like  Section  25(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  and  in  the  light  of  what  we  have  just decided Section 25(2) will also apply and “in addition to the  market  value  of  the  land  as  above  provided,  the court  shall  in  every  case  award  a  sum of  fifteen  per centum on  such  market  value  in  consideration  of  the compulsory nature of the acquisition”.

53

34. One more judgment needs to be referred to, namely, Girnar

Traders (3) vs State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, which was

relied  upon by  Shri  Divan  to  argue  that,  like  Chapter  VII  of  the

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, the amendment to

the National Highways Act is a complete self-contained code and

must, therefore, be followed on its own terms.  This judgment dealt

with whether Section 11-A introduced by the 1984 amendment to

the Land Acquisition Act could be said to apply to acquisitions made

under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act.  The answer to

this question was that Section 11-A could not be so applied as the

Maharashtra  Regional  Town  Planning  Act  referred  to  the  Land

Acquisition  Act  as  legislation  by  way  of  incorporation  and  not

legislation  by  way  of  reference.   In  the  present  case,  the  Land

Acquisition Act, by virtue of Section 3J of the National Highways Act,

does not apply at all.  The controversy in the present case does not,

in any manner, involve whether the Land Acquisition Act applies by

way of  incorporation or  reference.   This case is also,  therefore,

wholly distinguishable. Further, the ‘self-contained code’ argument

based on this judgment cannot be used as a discriminatory tool to

deny benefits available to landowners merely because land has to

be  acquired  under  a  different  Act,  as  has  been held  in  Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra).

54

35. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the Union of India and NHAI, has stated that under Section

3G(2) of the National Highways Act, where the right of user or any

right in the nature of an easement on land is acquired under the Act,

there shall be paid to the owner and any other person whose right is

so affected,  an amount  calculated at  10% of  the amount  that  is

determined  as  payable  by  the  order  of  the  competent  authority.

According  to  the  learned  Senior  Advocate,  this  amount  is  not

payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that this being

the case, it is clear that what is given by way of compensation under

the National Highways Act being more than what is given under the

Land Acquisition Act in certain respects, the Scheme of the Acts,

therefore,  being  different,  the non-giving  of  solatium and interest

under  the  National  Highways  Act  is  justified.    Even  otherwise,

persons should not be given compensation under Section 3G(2) as

a matter of course, but would have to submit proof that a right of

easement  or  a  right  of  user  has  been  acquired  for  which

compensation ought  to  be paid.   Shri  Amit  Sibal,  learned Senior

Advocate, on the other hand, has argued, referring to Sections 3(b),

9 and 31(1) of the Land Acquisition Act that easementary rights are

compensated even under the Land Acquisition Act and in point of

fact the sum of 10% payable under Section 3G(2) of the National

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Highways  Act  is  really  in  the  nature  of  a  cap  beyond  which  no

further compensation can be granted.   Even otherwise, according

to  the learned Senior  Advocate,  granting  of  compensation  under

Section 3G(2) would have no bearing on interest and solatium that

is  payable  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  not  under  the

National Highways Act.  

36. Section 3G(2) makes it clear that rights of user and rights in

the  nature  of  easement  being  valuable  property  rights,

compensation must be payable therefor.  It is obvious that there is

no double payment to the owner on this score as the owner and/or

any  other  person  has  to  prove  that  a  right  in  the  nature  of  an

easement has also been taken away.  Obviously, the right of user

being subsumed in acquisition of ownership, the owner cannot get a

double  benefit  on  this  score.    The  right  of  user  is,  therefore,

referable  only  to  persons  other  than the owner,  who may have

tenancy rights, and other rights of license on land which is acquired

under the National Highways Act.   

37. Insofar as easementary rights under the Land Acquisition Act

are concerned, three Sections are relevant and need to be quoted:

“3. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,—

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xxx xxx

(b)  the  expression  “person  interested”  includes  all persons  claiming  an  interest  in  compensation  to  be made on account of the acquisition of  land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land;

xxx xxx

9. Notice to persons interested.— (1) The Collector shall then  cause  public  notice  to  be  given  at  convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him.

(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed, and shall require all persons interested in the land  to  appear  personally  or  by  agent  before  the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective  interests  in  the  land  and  the  amount  and particulars  of  their  claims  to  compensation  for  such interests,  and  their  objections  (if  any)  to  the measurements  made  under  section  8.  The  Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent.

(3)  The Collector  shall  also serve notice  to  the same effect on the occupier (if  any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein, or  to  be  entitled  to  act  for  persons  so  interested,  as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate.

(4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere, and has no such agent the notice shall be sent to him by post  in  a  letter  addressed  to  him  at  his  last  known residence, address or place of business and registered under sections 28 and 29 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898).

57

xxx xxx

31.  Payment  of  compensation  or  deposit  of  same  in Court.— (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector  shall  tender  payment  of  the  compensation awarded  by  him  to  the  persons  interested  entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless  prevented  by  some  one  or  more  of  the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.

xxx xxx”

A reading of these Sections shows that a person who is interested

in  an  easement  affecting  land  can  claim  compensation  therefor

under the aforesaid provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.   Under

both the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act, such

claims have to  be proved in  accordance with  law,  the difference

being  that  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  actuals  are  payable,

whereas under the National Highways Act, a fixed amount of 10% of

the amount determined by the competent authority is payable.  It is,

therefore, wholly incorrect to state that extra amounts are payable to

the  owner  under  the  National  Highways  Act,  which  are  not  so

payable  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.   Also,  both  Acts

contemplate  payment  of  compensation  to  persons  whose

easementary rights have been affected by the acquisition.  In any

event,  this  contention  cannot  possibly  answer  non-payment  of

solatium and interest under the National Highways Act, which has

been dealt with in extenso in this judgment.   

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38. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place

under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification

of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and

interest payable in cases covered by both Acts.  In fact, with effect

from 1st January, 2015, an Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 2014 was

promulgated  amending  the  2013  Act.   Section  10  of  the  said

amendment Ordinance states as follows:

“10. In the principal Act, in section 105,-  

(i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:-

“(3)  The provisions of  this  Act  relating to  the determination  of  compensation  in  accordance with  the  First  Schedule,  rehabilitation  and resettlement  in  accordance  with  the  Second Schedule  and  infrastructure  amenities  in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to  the  enactments  relating  to  land  acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1st January, 2015.”;

(ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.”

It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the notification dated 28 th

August, 2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act.

This notification is important and states as follows:

  “MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT  

          ORDER

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New Delhi, the 28th August, 2015

S.O.  2368(E).—  Whereas,  the  Right  to  Fair Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  RFCTLARR Act)  came into effect from 1st January, 2014;

And  whereas,  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  105  of  the RFCLTARR  Act  provided  for  issuing  of  notification  to make  the  provisions  of  the  Act  relating  to  the determination  of  the  compensation,  rehabilitation  and resettlement  applicable  to  cases  of  land  acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;

And whereas,  the notification envisaged under  sub- section (3) of Section 105 of RFCTLARR Act was not issued,  and  the  RFCTLARR (Amendment)  Ordinance, 2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31st December, 2014, thereby,  inter-alia,  amending Section 105 of  the RFCTLARR  Act  to  extend  the  provisions  of  the  Act relating to the determination of  the compensation and rehabilitation  and  resettlement  to  cases  of  land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;

And  whereas,  the  RFCTLARR  (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of  2015) was promulgated on 3rd April,  2015  to  give  continuity  to  the  provisions  of  the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014;

And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30th May,  2015  to  give  continuity  to  the  provisions  of  the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015);

And  whereas,  the  replacement  Bill  relating  to  the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee;

As whereas, as per the provisions of article 123 of the Constitution,  the  RFCTLARR  (Amendment)  Second

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Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the land owners at the  disadvantageous  position,  resulting  in  denial  of benefits  of  enhanced  compensation  and  rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the  13  Acts  specified  in  the  Fourth  Schedule  to  the RFCTLARR Act as extended to the land owners under the said Ordinance;

And  whereas,  the  Central  Government  considers  it necessary to extend the benefits available to the land owners  under  the  RFCTLARR  Act  to  similarly  placed land  owners  whose  lands  are  acquired  under  the  13 enactments  specified  in  the  Fourth  Schedule;  and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the  determination  of  compensation  and  rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land  acquisition  under  the  said  enactments  in  the interest of the land owners;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section  (1)  of  Section  113  of  the  Right  to  Fair Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the  Central  Government  hereby  makes  the  following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely;-

1. (1)  This  Order  may  be  called  the  Right  to  Fair Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015.

(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of September, 2015.

2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation and  Resettlement  Act,  2013,  relating  to  the determination of  compensation in  accordance with the First  Schedule,  rehabilitation  and  resettlement  in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure

61

amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply  to  all  cases  of  land  acquisition  under  the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act.

[F.No. 13011/01/2014-LRD]

K. P. KRISHNAN, Addl. Secy.”

It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have

applied  the  principle  contained  in  Nagpur  Improvement  Trust

(supra), as the Central Government has considered it necessary to

extend  the  benefits  available  to  landowners  generally  under  the

2013 Act to  similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired

under  the  13  enactments  specified  in  the  Fourth  Schedule,  the

National  Highways  Act  being  one  of  the  aforesaid  enactments.

This  being  the  case,  it  is  clear  that  the  Government  has  itself

accepted that the principle of  Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra)

would  apply  to  acquisitions  which  take  place  under  the  National

Highways  Act,  and  that  solatium  and  interest  would  be  payable

under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the

purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those

landowners  whose  lands  have  been  acquired  for  other  public

purposes under the 2013 Act.   This being the case, it is clear that

even  the  Government  is  of  the  view  that  it  is  not  possible  to

discriminate  between  landowners  covered  by  the  2013  Act  and

62

landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes

to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the

enactments.  The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well

as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look

in the light of this development.1  In any case, as has been pointed

out  hereinabove,  the  case  of  Chajju  Ram (supra),  has  been

referred to a larger Bench.   In this view of the matter, we are of the

view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is correct,

whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court is not correct.    

39. We were also referred to the judgment of a learned Single

Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported as Lalita vs Union of

India AIR 2003 Karnataka 165, as well as a judgment of the Division

Bench of the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani vs Union of India,

both of  which distinguished the Requisition  Act  cases and relied

upon  Nagpur  Improvement  Trust (supra)  in  order  to  reach  the

same conclusion as the Punjab and Haryana High Court.    Both

these judgments are also correct.

1 The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and for a period of six months thereafter – vide Section 1(3) of the Act.  As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.

63

40. One  more  argument  was  raised  by  learned  counsel

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Respondents,  which  is  that  nothing

survives in these mattes in view of orders passed by this Court in

Union of India v. T. Chakrapani – the Division Bench judgment of

the Madras High Court having come before this Court.   This order

is quoted by us in full :

“In view of  the statement made by Shri  Ranjit  Kumar, learned Solicitor General of India on an earlier date of the hearing that solatium in terms of the impugned order of  the  High  Court  would  be  granted  for  the  instant acquisitions made under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, no subsisting issue remains in the present appeals as also in the special leave petition. The appeals  as  also  the  special  leave  petition  are accordingly  closed.  The respondents  –  writ  petitioners be  paid  solatium  as  due  in  terms  of  the  impugned order(s) along with interest thereon.”

We were also referred to an order in  Sunita Mehra v. Union of

India (2016) SCC OnLine 1128, in which this Court held :

“6.  The  only  point  agitated  before  us  by  the  learned Solicitor General is that in paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, it has been held that land- owners would “henceforth”  be entitled to solatium and interest as envisaged by the provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the ultimate paragraph of  the impugned judgment  it  has,  however, been mentioned that in respect of all acquisitions made under  the  National  Highways  Act,  1956,  solatium and interest in terms similar to those contained in Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have to be paid.

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7. Learned Solicitor General has pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency in the judgment, which needs to be clarified. It has also been submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the order of the High Court should be clarified to mean that the issue of grant of interest and  solatium  should  not  be  allowed  to  be  reopened without  any  restriction  or  reference  to  time.  Learned Solicitor  General  has  particularly  submitted  that  to understand  the  order  of  the  High  Court  in  any  other manner  would  not  only  seriously  burden  the  public exchequer  but  would  also  amount  to  overlooking  the delay that may have occurred on the part of the land- owner(s)  in  approaching  the  Court  and  may  open floodgates for en masse litigation on the issue.

8. We  have  considered  the  submissions  advanced. In Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457, this Court, though in a different context, had restricted the  operation  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court in Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 and had granted the benefit of interest on solatium only in respect of  pending  proceedings.  We  are  of  the  view  that  a similar  course should be adopted in  the present  case also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron & Steel Forgins v. Union of India i.e. 28.03.2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of  the Right  to  Fair  Compensation and Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 01.01.2014), which  Act  has  been  made  applicable  to  acquisitions under  the  National  Highways  Act,  1956  by  virtue  of notification/order issued under the provisions of the Act of 2013.”

41. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the

aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases.

65

This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the

impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when

the  arbitral  awards  did  not  provide  for  solatium  or  interest,  no

Section  34  petition  having  been  filed  by  the  landowners  on  this

score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us

ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest.  Ordinarily, we

would  have  acceded  to  this  plea,  but  given  the  fact  that  the

Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be

granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the

interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our

discretionary  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of

India.  We  therefore  declare  that  the  provisions  of  the  Land

Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Section

23(1A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of section 28 proviso

will  apply to acquisitions made under the National  Highways Act.

Consequently, the provision of Section 3J is, to this extent, violative

of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to

be unconstitutional.  Accordingly, Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 9599/2019

is dismissed.

42.  Coming  to  the  individual  appeals  in  the  case,  Shri  Mukul

Rohatgi has raised essentially 11 grounds, which, according to him,

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require  the  Court’s  attention.  We  will  deal  with  each  of  these

grounds seriatim hereinbelow:

Ground 1: That the acquired land was treated as commercial land,

ignoring Section 143 of The Punjab Regional and Town Planning

and Development Act, 1995, due to which construction is restricted

upto 50m on either side of the National Highway.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15470/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15442-

15443/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15488/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15444-

15445/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  15487/2019;  SLP (C)  No.15479/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No.

15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No.

21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No.

21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No.

9600/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21687/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21689/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

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In  these  matters,  this  ground  has  been  raised  and  argued

sometimes at the Section 34 stage, sometimes at the Section 37

stage, and sometimes at both stages. The burden to prove that the

land in question is within 50m of the National Highway, and that it

does not have commercial potentiality, is on the NHAI but, on facts,

has  never  been  discharged.  This  being  the  case  in  all  these

appeals, they stand dismissed.  

SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No.

15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken or argued in the

Section 34 petition. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 2:  That the arbitrator conducted the spot visit  five years

after  the  Section  3A  notification  was  issued,  based  on  which

compensation was determined.  

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15470/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15442-

15443/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15488/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No.

15474/2019; SLP (C) No.  15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019;

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SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.

15471/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No.

14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No.

21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No.

21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No.

21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in the

Section 34 petitions filed in these cases. Further,  assessment, in

any case, of the land in question, relates to the date of the original

notification. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 3: That exemplars of faraway villages in other districts were

relied upon to enhance compensation.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15470/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15442-

15443/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15488/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

SLP  (C)  No.  15477/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15485/2019;  SLP  (C)

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No.15474/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15446/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.

15447/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21688/2019;  SLP (C)  No.15471/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No.

21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No.

21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019;

SLP (C)  No.  9602/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  9600/2019;  SLP (C)  No.

21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No.    21689  /2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

Ground 4: That the Arbitrator relied upon the Collector Rate of the

year 2011-13/ 2012-13.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No.

15470/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15488/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

70

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.

15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21693/  2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No.

15485/2019;  

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15471/2019

In  this  matter,  this  ground has been taken up in  the Section 34

petition, however, the High Court has rightly dismissed this appeal

in terms of the Punjab & Haryana High Court order dated 15.02.17,

in FAO No. 6522 of 2016, titled ‘Mangal Dass vs. Govt. of India’,

wherein  compensation  of  Rs.  7,00,000  per  marla,  which  was

calculated based on the collector rate of 2011, was held to be not

justified, and was reduced to Rs. 4,50,000 per marla. Therefore, this

appeal also stands dismissed.

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Ground 5: That compensation on account of loss of structure was

awarded.

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019;   SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019;   SLP (C)

No. 15485/2019;

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15472/2019

In this matter,  this ground has not  been taken in the Section 37

appeal. Therefore, this appeal also stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019

In  this  matter,  this  ground has been taken up in  the Section 34

petition,  and the High Court, noting that the landowner gave up his

claim on loss of structure awarded at the rate of Rs. 50,000 by the

Arbitrator,  held  that  no  further  adjudication  is  necessary  on  this

point. Therefore, no interference is required, and this appeal also

stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No.

15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019;

72

SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No.

15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34  petition,  as  this  ground  is  factual,  no  patent  illegality  arises.

Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 6: That compensation for shifting expenses was granted

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C)

No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34  petition,  as  this  ground  is  factual,  no  patent  illegality  arises.

Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 7: That arbitration costs were awarded

73

SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C)

No.  15477/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  15474/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.

14491/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21657/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  9600/2019;

SLP (C) No. 10210/2019;    SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019;   SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  in  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

9602/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21687/2019;  SLP (C)  No.  21683/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019;    SLP (C) No. 15446/2019;    SLP (C) No.

15448/2019;   SLP (C) No. 15450/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  37  appeals.  Therefore,  these  appeals  also  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15485/2019;    SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;    SLP (C) No.

21692/2019

74

In these matters, this ground has not been taken up in any of the

Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground  8: That  compensation  was  awarded  based  on  post-

notification sale deed

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C)

No.  14491/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.  21664/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.

21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No.

9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP

(C)  No.  21683/2019;  SLP  (C)  No.    21689  /2019;  SLP  (C)  No.

9604/2019;   SLP (C) No. 21696/2019;   SLP (C) No. 21666/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

Ground 9: That compensation was awarded based on sale deeds

of smaller plots of land

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No.

21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No.

75

21683/2019;  SLP (C)  No.    21689  /2019;  SLP (C)  No.  9604/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21696/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

Ground 10: That compensation on account of severance of land

was awarded

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No.

15471/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In this matter, this ground has not been taken in the Special Leave

Petitions. Therefore, this appeal stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15485/2019;    SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019;   SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

76

In these matters, though this ground has been taken in the Section

34  petition,  no  patent  illegality  arises.  Therefore,  these  appeals

stand dismissed.

Ground 11: That compensation on account of loss of business was

awarded

SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of  the  Section  34  petitions.  Therefore,  these  appeals  stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21688/2019;    SLP (C) No. 15471/2019;    SLP (C) No.

15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019;    SLP (C) No. 21691/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21692/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34  petition,  no  patent  illegality  arises.  Therefore,  these  appeals

stand dismissed.

…………………………J.                                          (R.F. Nariman)

…………………………J.  New Delhi (Surya Kant) September 19, 2019.

77