Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5151-5152 OF 2008  (Arising out of SLP [C] Nos.3820-3821 of 2008)

Union of India & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

Tarsem Singh       … Respondent  

O R D E R

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave granted. Heard learned  counsel for the parties.  

2. The respondent  while working in  the Indian Army was invalidated

out of Army service, in medical category, on 13.11.1983. He approached the

High  Court  in  1999  seeking  a  direction  to  the  appellants  to  pay  him

disability pension. A learned Single Judge by order dated 6.12.2000 allowed

the writ petition and directed the appellants to grant him disability pension

at the rates permissible. In so far as arrears, the relief was restricted to 38

months  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  writ  petition.  The  respondent  was  also

1

directed to appear before the Re-survey Medical Board as and when called

upon by the appellants. The appellants did not contest the said decision and

granted disability pension to respondents  and also released the arrears of

disability pension for 38 months.  

3. The  respondent  however  was  not  satisfied.  According  to  him  the

disability pension ought to be paid from the date it fell due on 13.11.1983.

He therefore filed a Letters Patent Appeal. The said appeal was allowed by

the Division Bench of the High Court  by judgment dated 6.12.2006. The

Division Bench held that the respondent was entitled to disability pension

from the date it fell due, and it should not be restricted to a period of three

years and two months prior to the filing of the writ petition. By a subsequent

modification  order  dated  23.2.2007,  the  Division  Bench  also  granted

interest on the arrears at the rate of 6% per annum. The said judgment and

order of the Division Bench is challenged in this appeal. The only question

that therefore arises for our consideration is whether the High Court  was

justified in directing payment of arrears for a period of 16 years instead of

restricting it to three years.  

4. The  principles  underlying  continuing  wrongs  and  recurring/

successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing

2

wrong’ refers  to  a single wrongful  act  which causes  a continuing injury.

‘Recurring/successive  wrongs’  are  those  which  occur  periodically,  each

wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in

Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare  vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan –

[AIR 1959  SC 798],  explained  the  concept  of  continuing  wrong  (in  the

context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of

Limitation Act, 1963) :  

“It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.”  

In  M.  R.  Gupta  vs.  Union  of  India [1995  (5)  SCC  628],  the  appellant

approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial

pay fixation with effect  from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it  was

raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong

and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held :

“The appellant’s  grievance that  his  pay fixation  was not  in  accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not  computed in  accordance with  the  rules.  So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is  paid  his  monthly salary on  the  basis  of  a  wrong computation  made

3

contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant’s claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant’s claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly,  any  other  consequential  relief  claimed  by  him,  such  as, promotion  etc.,  would  also  be  subject  to  the  defence  of  laches  etc.  to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred……...”

In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India – 2007 (9) SCC 274, this Court held:

“The  High  Court  does  not  ordinarily  permit  a  belated  resort  to  the extraordinary remedy because it  is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled  with  the  creation  of  third  party  rights  in  the  meantime  is  an important  factor  which  also  weighs  with  the  High  Court  in  deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition………. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”

5. To  summarise,  normally,  a  belated  service  related  claim  will  be

rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing

a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to

the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases

4

relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a

continuing  wrong,  relief  can  be granted  even  if  there  is  a long  delay in

seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong

commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury.

But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of

any order  or  administrative  decision  which related  to  or  affected several

others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights

of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the

issue  relates  to  payment  or  re-fixation  of  pay  or  pension,  relief  may be

granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But

if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting

others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation

will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears

for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will

apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief

relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of

filing of the writ petition.  

6. In  this  case,  the  delay  of  16  years  would  affect  the  consequential

claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of

5

arrears  relating  to  16  years,  and  that  too  with  interest.  It  ought  to  have

restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of

writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever

was  lesser.  It  ought  not  to  have  granted  interest  on  arrears  in  such

circumstances.   

7. In view of  the above,  these  appeals  are  allowed.  The  order of  the

Division Bench directing payment of disability pension from the date it fell

due, is set aside. As a consequence, the order of the learned Single Judge is

restored.  

…………………………..J [R. V. Raveendran]

…………………………..J [Lokeshwar Singh Panta]

New Delhi;  August 13, 2008.  

6