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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARISH CHAND ANAND

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/07/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  203            1995 SCC  Supl.  (4) 113  JT 1995 (6)   144        1995 SCALE  (4)586

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                        O R D E R      This is  an appeal  by Certificate  granted by the High Court by  order dated  December 14,  1978 with a question as under :      "Whether the  only right  of the grantee      is to claim compensation and whether the      Government can  take possession  at  any      time after  expiry of  one month in view      of Governor General’s Order No.179 dated      12th September, 1836?"      In view  of the  Certificate granted  by the High Court under Art.133(1)  of the  Constitution, the  question arises whether the  State is  entitled to resume land granted under s.3  of   Government   Grant   Act,   1895   without   prior determination of  the amount  for the  structure. Though the respondent has  been served,  he has not appeared, either in person or  through counsel.  We have taken the assistance of counsel for  the appellant  and we have perused the judgment of the  Delhi High  Court reported in Sh. Raj Singh v. Union of India,  (AIR 1973  Delhi  169)  and  the  Division  Bench judgment of the High Court of Allahabad reported in Bhagwati Devi  v.  President  of  India,  (1974  (72)  Allahabad  Law Journal, 43)  which  was  relied  on  and  followed  by  the Division Bench  in this  case to hold that it is a condition precedent  that   the  State   should  give  notice  to  the respondent, determine  the compensation  and then resume the property granted to the respondent. The question, therefore, is whether it is a condition precedent for the Government to resume the land only after determination of the compensation and payment  thereof or  on the  issuance of  the notice  as required  under   the  Grant   and  on  expiry  thereof.  To appreciate the  contention, it  is necessary  to look to the provisions of  the Grant  itself. Under  s.3 of the Act, the Governor General  in Council exercised the power and granted licence to  the respondent  to erect  the structure  on  the

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Government land. The conditions of the Grant are :           "No ground  will be  granted except      on the  following conditions,  which are      to be  subscribed by  every  grantee  as      well as  by those  to whom his grant may      subsequently be transferred:-           1st :  The Government to retain the      power  of  resumption  at  any  time  on      giving one month’s notice and payment of      the value  of such buildings as may have      been authorised to be erected."      The other  clauses are  not relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence they are omitted.      In the  Order No.179  of 1836,  the Governor General in Council had  issued the  regulation empowering  the Governor General to  rescind authorised orders in force till then and to substitute  for them  by regulations.  The regulations in order No.  179 of 1836 are statutory regulations made by the Governor General  in Council  in exercise  of his  statutory power. The  covenants for  the  Grant  clearly  empower  the Government retaining  its power  of resumption  at any time. The conditions  precedent are  : to issue one month’s notice and payment  of the  value of such building as may have been authorised to be erected.      The Division  Bench of  the Delhi  High Court  has left open the  question of  mode of determination of the value of the  building  to  be  determined  in  accordance  with  the relevant provisions  of the  law. The  Division Bench of the Allahabad High  Court in  Bhagwati Devi’s  case, (supra)  in paragraph 7, had held that though the Government is entitled to resume  the land,  the grantee  is entitled  to  a  prior opportunity to  represent  his  case  before  the  competent authority in  determination of the value of the building and for payment  of the  value of  such building  resumed by the State.      It would  appear that  detailed  instructions  in  that behalf were  made in  the Standing  Order No.241  which  was produced before  the Division  Bench of  the High  Court  of Allahabad in  which  Military  Engineer  was  instructed  to evaluate the  value of the building which was resumed by the Government for  payment  of  the  amount  to  the  erstwhile licencee. We  are not  concerned in  this appeal  as to  the method of  valuation. Suffice  it to  state that  the  Order No.241 though  does not  contemplate of issuing prior notice to erstwhile  licencee whose  licence  has  been  determined under Clause  I of  the Grant,  before determination  of the actual amount,  the  erstwhile  grantee  is  entitled  to  a notice, so  that the  grantee would  be at  liberty to place before the  competent authority  all relevant  material  for determining the value of the building and for payment of the amount thereof.  It is  seen that  it  is  not  a  condition precedent  to   determine,  at   the  first   instance,  the compensation  after  giving  an  opportunity;  make  payment thereof and then to resume the property. What is a condition precedent is  issuance of  one month’s  notice and on expiry thereof the  Government is  entitled to resume the land. The amount is  to be  determined as  required under the relevant provisions after  giving opportunity and which could be done thereafter. After  all, the  property would  be resumed  for public use  and  determination  of  value  of  the  building errected is  a ministerial  act and  payment thereof  is the resultant consequence. This process would take some time and if the  reasoning of  the High  Court of  Allahabad is given effect to,  it would  defeat the public purpose. The view of the Delhi  High Court  is consistent  with  the  scheme  and

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appears to  be pragmatic  and  realistic.  The  High  Court, therefore, was  not right  in its  conclusion that  it is  a condition precedent  to determine the amount of the value of the building  in the  first  instance  and  payment  thereof before resumption of the property.      The  appeal  is  accordingly  allowed,  but  since  the respondent is not present, without costs.