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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHER SINGH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/01/1993

BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1993 SCR  (1) 326        1993 SCC  (1) 608  JT 1993 (3)   693        1993 SCALE  (1)209

ACT: Land   Acquisition  Act,  1894  :  Section  18-’Any   person interested’-Scope of-Includes person directly or  indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. Land-Acquisition  by  State  for  the  purpose  of  National Security  Guard  as desired by Union of  India-Land  owners’ reference  for  enhancement of  compensation-Application  by Union    of   India   for   impleadment   as    respondents- Maintainability  of-Held  Union of India is entitled  to  be impleaded as respondents.

HEADNOTE: The State of Haryana acquired some land in District  Gurgaon for the benefit of National Security Guard as desired by the Union  of India.  Being dissatisfied with  the  compensation awarded  the  landowners  filed  reference  petitions  under section  18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.   During  the pendency  of the reference, an application was moved by  the Union  of  India for being impleaded as respondents  on  the ground  that the land had been acquired for the  purpose  of National  Security  Guard being controlled by the  Union  of India  and that any order enhancing the  compensation  would adversely affect the Union of India and it would be deprived of  an  opportunity  to file an appeal, in case  it  is  not impleaded  as  a  party.   The  Additional  District   Judge declined to implead the Union of India as a party.  Union of India  filed  a revision petition before the High  Court  of Punjab  and  Haryana  which by  its  order  dated  24.5.1989 dismissed  the  same.  Against the order of the  High  Court Union  of India preferred an appeal in this court.   In  the meantime,  by  its  order  dated  17.1.1990  the  Additional District Judge enhanced the compensation. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the  High Court, this Court, HELD  : 1. The definition of ’a person interested’ given  in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be  liberally construed so as to embrace 327 all  persons  who may be directly or  indirectly  interested either  in  the  title  to the land or  in  the  quantum  of compensation. [338B]

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Himalayan  Titles  and Marbles (P) Ltd.  v.  Francis  Victor Countinho  (dead)  by Lrs. and Ors., [1980]  3  S.C.R.  235; Neelgangabai and Anr. v. State of Kamataka and Ors.,  [1990] 3 S.C.C. 617 and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Ashok   Singhal and Ors., [1991] Supp. 2 S.C.C. 419, relied on. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahemdabad v.  Chandulal Shamaldas   Patel   and  Ors.,  1970   (1)   S.C.W.R.   183, distinguished. Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran  Singh, S.L.P.  No.  5389  of  1981 decided  on  January  11,  1982, referred to. Kulbhushan  Kumar and Company v. State of Punjab  and  Anr., A.I.R. 1984 P & H 55 (FB), overruled. M/s  Indo  Swiss  Time Ltd., Dundahera v.  Umrao  and  Ors., A.I.R.  1981  P  & H 213 overruled  (Minority  view  of  SS. Sandhawalia, J. approved) Hindustan Sanitary Ware and Industries Ltd and Anr. v. State of  Haryana and Ors., A.I.R. 1972 P & H 59, referred  to  as approved. 2.   The  Union  of  India has been deprived  of  filing  an appeal  against the order of the Additional  District  Judge dated  17.1.1990  as  its application  for  impleadment  was itself dismissed.  Accordingly, the application of the Union of India for impleadment is allowed as a result of which  it is entitled to file an appeal in the High Court against  the judgment  of the Additional District Judge dated  17.1.1990. [339B-C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1639  of 1990. From  the Judgment and Order dated 24.5.1989 of  the  Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 124 of 1989. Dr.  Gouri Shankar, Vipin Sanghi and C.V. Subba Rao for  the Appellant. Harbans  Lal and Sarva Mitter (for M/s.  Mitter  and  Mitter Co.) for the Respondents. 328 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by   KASLIWAL,  J.  The short controversy raised in  the  above appeal  is  whether the Union of India  through  the  Deputy Inspector  General, National Security Guard is  a  necessary and proper party to be impleaded when the land ’in  question was  acquired  by the State of Haryana for  the  purpose  of National Security Guard as desired by the Union of India.   The  State  of  Haryana acquired  some  land  situated  in District Gurgaon for the purposes of National Security Guard in  1985 as desired by the Union of India.  The land  owners being  not  satisfied with the compensation awarded  by  the Land  Acquisition Collector, submitted  reference  petitions under   section  18  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,   1894 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).  During the pendency of the reference application before the Additional  District Judge,  Gurgaon,  an application was moved by the  Union  of India for being impleaded in the array of the respondents on the  ground that the land had been acquired for the  purpose of National Security Guard being controlled by the Union  of India.   It  was  submitted that  any  order  enhancing  the compensation  would adversely affect the Union of India  and it would be deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal, in case  it  is  not  impleaded as  a  party.   The  Additional District  Judge by his Order dated 28.11.1988 dismissed  the application  filed by the Union of India.  It may  be  noted

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that some of the land owners had impleaded Union of India as a  party,  but in 25 cases including the  present  case  the Union  of India was not impleaded as a party.  The Union  of India aggrieved against the order of the Additional District Judge  filed  a revision before the High  Court.   The  High Court  of  Punjab and Haryana by its order  dated  24.5.1989 dismissed the revision placing reliance upon the Full  Bench decision  of  the  same Court in M/s.   Kulbhushan  Kumar  & Company  v. State of Punjab & Another, AIR 1984  Punjab  and Haryana 55.  This Full Bench decision in turn relied on  the decision  of the Full Bench of the same Court in  M/s.  Indo Swiss  Time Limited Dundahera v. Umrao and Others, AIR  1981 Punjab & Haryana 213.   In  order  to resolve the controversy and  to  decide  the question raised in this appeal by grant of special leave, we would refer to the cases decided by this Court and the  Full Bench decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court relied in the  impugned  order.  In The Municipal Corporation  of  the City  of  Ahemdabad  v. Chandulal Shamaldas  Patel  &  Ors., [1970] 1 SCW/R 329 183  decided on 8.1.1970, a Division Bench of two judges  of this  Court held that the land was notified for  acquisition by  the  State  Government  for the  use  of  the  Municipal Corporation,  but  that did not confer any interest  in  the Municipal  Corporation so as to enable it to file an  appeal against  the order of the High Court allowing the  petition. In  the  said  case certain  lands  belonging  to  Chandulal Shamaldas   Patel,   the  respondents  were   notified   for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act by the Government  of Bombay by a Notification dated February 19, 1959.  The  area in which the land was situated was subsequently allotted  to the  State  of Gujarat on the bifurcation of  the  State  of Bombay  under the States Reorganization Act, 1960,  as  such the Divisional Commissioner of the State of Gujarat issued a Notification  under  Section  6 on May 2,  1961.   Both  the Notifications  were challenged in the High Court of  Gujarat on various grounds and the petition was allowed by the  High Court.   The Municipal Corporation of the City of  Ahemdabad being the fourth respondent in the writ petition in the High Court filed an appeal before this Court against the order of the High Court.  A preliminary objection was raised  against the  maintainability  of the appeal on the ground  that  the Corporation  was  not  aggrieved by the order  of  the  High Court.   This Court allowed the preliminary objection  on  a short  ground  that  though the property  was  notified  for acquisition  by  the  State Government for the  use  of  the Municipal   Corporation  after  it  was  acquired   by   the Government,  but  that did not confer any  interest  in  the Municipal  Corporation so as to enable it to file an  appeal against  the  order  of  the High  Court.   It  was  further observed  that substantially the grounds on which  the  writ petition was filed were that the Notifications were  invalid on  account of diverse reasons.  Some of these  reasons  had been  upheld  and some had not been upheld,  but  all  those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications  issued by  the Government of Bombay and the Government of  Gujarat. This Court further observed as under :               "Not  even an order of costs has  been  passed               against the Municipal Corporation of the  City               of  Ahemdabad.  We fail to see  what  interest               the  Municipal  Corporation  has  Which  would               sustain  an appeal by it against the order  of               the  High  Court allowing  the  writ  petition               filed by the first respondent.

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The appeal is dismissed as not maintainable." 330 A  perusal of the above order shows that this Court did  not examine  any  provisions  of the Land  Acquisition  Act  nor applied its mind on the question of ’any person  interested’ under the provisions of the Act having a right to  challenge the  order of the enhanced compensation passed by the  Court in a reference under Section 18 of the Act.  The preliminary objection was allowed simply on the ground that the impugned Notifications in that case were issued by the Government  of Bombay  and the Government of Gujarat and the challenge  was relating to the validity of such Notifications and no  order had  been  passed against the Municipal Corporation  of  the City of Ahemdabad. A  Division Bench of this Court of two Judges  in  Himalayan Tiles  & Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho  (dead) by Lrs. & Others, [1980] 3 SCR 235 examined the question  of ’person  interested’ under the land acquisition  proceedings in   detail  and  categorically  held  that  the   appellant Himalayan Tiles & Marbles being a private company for  which the land was acquired was undoubtedly ’a person  interested’ as  contemplated by Section 18 (1) of the Act.  It was  held that  the  definition  of ’a  person  interested’  given  in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be  liberally construed  so as to embrace all persons who may be  directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land  or in  the quantum of compensation.  It was further  held  that the  lands  were actually acquired for the  purpose  of  the Company  and  once the land vested in the  Government  after acquisition,  it stood transferred to the Company under  the agreement   entered  into  between  the  Company   and   the Government.  Thus, it cannot be said that the Company had no claim  or title to the land at all.  Secondly,  since  under the  agreement the Company had to pay the  compensation,  it was  most  certainly  interested in  seeing  that  a  proper quantum  of compensation was fixed so that the  company  may not  have to pay a very heavy amount of money.   This  Court categorically  held that the view taken by the  Orrisa  High Court  or  even by the Calcutta High Court that  a  company, local  authority or a person for whose benefit the  land  is acquired is not an interested person is not correct.  In the above case this Court further held that the preponderance of judicial   opinion  seems  to  favour  the  view  that   the definition of person interested must be liberally  construed so  as to include a body, local authority, or a company  for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement  to pay the compensation.  This view accords  with the  principles of equity, justice and good conscience.   It may  be  further important to note that this  Court  in  the above 331 case approved the case of Punjab & Haryana High Court in The Hindustan  Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.   Bahadurgarh  & Anr.  v.  The State of Harayana & Ors., AIR  1972  Punjab  & Haryana 59.     The point came up for consideration before a Full  Bench of  three Judges of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the  case of  M/s Indo Swiss Time Limited (supra).  S.S.  Sandhawalia, CJ, followed the view taken in Himnalayan Tiles &  Marbles’s case  (supra) and did not follow the view of this  Court  in The  Municipal Corporation of the City of  Ahemdabad’s  case (supra).   Sandhawalia,  CJ, held that in the  case  of  The Municipal  Corporation  of the City of  Ahemdabad,  a  short order  was passed upholding a preliminary objection  against the  maintainability  of  the appeal.  In  that  case  their

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Lordships  of the Supreme Court observed that the  Municipal Corporation  of the City of Ahemdabad for whose benefit  the land  had been acquired could not maintain an appeal in  the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court setting aside that Notification.  It is evident from the brief order that  the  matter  was disposed of  at  the  very  threshold without  any elaborate reference to either principle  or  by diverting  to any authority.  The appeal was held to be  not maintainable on the short ground that their Lordships failed to  see  what  interest the  Municipality  had  which  would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High  Court allowing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  land  owners. Sandhawalia,  CJ,  as  such held that a  company  for  whose benefit the land is acquired, can be impleaded as a party in the  Court of the District Judge, in a  reference  preferred under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  It  was further  held  that there was no conflict  or  inconsistency between  Order  1 Rule 10 of the Civil  Procedure  Code  and Section  50(2)  of  the  Act.  The  two  provisions  can  be construed harmoniously and the provisions of Order 1 rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply within the  confines of  Section  50 (2) and the petitioner company  (Indo  Swiss Time  Ltd.)  was  entitled  to  be  impleaded  as  a   party thereunder.  On the other hand P.C. Jain and J.M. Tandon, JJ holding a majority view followed the view propounded in  the Municipal  Corporation  of  the  City  of  Ahemdabad’s  case (supra)  and  did  not agree with  the  view  enunciated  in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case (supra).  The majority view wag  that an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the  Civil Procedure Code for being impleaded as a party by the company is  not  legally  maintainable.   The  company  is  not   an interested person so as to give it a right to become a party to  the proceedings in reference before the District  Judge. The only right under the Act available to the company is to 332 appear  and  adduce evidence for the  determination  of  the amount of compensation and the company by itself would  have no  right to file an appeal.  It was also held that  when  a company  has no right to file an appeal then a fortiori,  it follows  that  an application under Order 1 Rule 10  of  the Civil  Procedure Code by a company to become a party in  the proceedings  would  not  be maintainable,  because  once  an application for becoming a party is allowed and a company is made a party then the company would have a right to file  an appeal.   The  only right given to a company  under  Section 50(2)  of the Act is to appear and adduce evidence  for  the purpose  of determination of the amount of compensation  and for  the exercise of that right, it is not necessary nor  is there any provision in the Act which may entitle the Company to  ask for being impleaded as a party under the  provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.     Before  a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court consisting  of  S.S.  Sandhawalia, CJ, P.C.  Jain  and  S.C. Mittal, JJ. in M/s.  Kulbhushan Kumar & Company,  Ahmadgarh, Petitioner  v. State of Punjab and another  respondent,  AIR 1984  Punjab and Haryana 55, the question again came up  for consideration  whether the ratio in the Full Bench  Judgment of Indo Swiss Time Ltd.’s case (supra) still held the  field or  not.  The question arose because of a short  observation of  their  Lordships of the Supreme Court in  special  leave petition  No.  5389 of 1981 (Punjab  United  Pesticides  and Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh) decided on January 11,  1982. In that case Supreme Court had affirmed the earlier judgment in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case (supra).  The Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the above case of  M/s

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Kulbhushan  Kumar & Company held that in the  Punjab  United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited’s case (supra), the special leave petition and the appeal were directed against an order in limine of dismissal by a Letters Patent Bench of the High Court,  the  correctness  or otherwise  of  the  Full  Bench decision  in  lndo Swiss Time Limited’s case  was  not  even remotely  canvassed before the Supreme Court.  It  was  held that it is well-settled that a Full Bench Judgment could not be presumed to have been expressly overruled, which far from being  considered  had  not been even  referred  to  by  the superior  Court.  It was thus held that the order  of  their Lordships   in  Punjab  United  Pesticides   and   Chemicals Limited’s case (supra) did not overrule either expressly  or impliedly  the Indo Swiss Time Limited’s case.  It was  also highlighted  that a special leave petition against the  Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited’s case (supra) was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of 333 a compromise.  A short order recorded in that special  leave petition was in the following terms : -               "It  is  agreed by all the  parties  that  the               Company for whose benefit the acquisition  has               been  made viz.  Indo Swiss Time Ltd., may  be               impleaded as a party to the proceedings.   The               application made by the appellant under  Order               1  Rule 10 C.P.C. to the District  Judge  will               stand allowed.  The matter may by disposed  of               expeditiously  by the learned District  Judge.               Special  leave  to  appeal  granted  and   the               appeals  are allowed in the  manner  indicated               above with no order as to costs." It  was thus held that the above agreed order in Indo  Swiss Time  Limited’s case (supra) before their Lordships  of  the Supreme  Court  does  not alter the situation  or  fact  the precedential  value of the earlier Full Bench.  It was  thus held  that  the  ratios in Indo Swiss  Time  Limited’s  case (supra) still held the field. In  Neelagangabai & Another v. State of Kamataka  &  Others, [1990]  3  SCC 617, a Division Bench of this  Court  of  two Judges affirmed the decision of the High Court of  Karnataka dated  March 4, 1987 which had. relied upon the decision  in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case (supra).  In this case  the High  Court of Karnataka in a writ petition filed  by  Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation, set aside an award made under the   Land   Acquisition  Act,  1894  in  respect   of   the compensation payable to the appellants T. Ramakrishniah  and directed to reopen the proceedings before the Civil Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, for fresh  disposal in accordance with law.  After the case was received by  the Civil  Court  on  reference, no notice  was  issued  to  the respondent   Corporation.   The Court  did  not,  however, proceed  to take evidence and record its own finding on  the valuation, as it was conceded on behalf of the State Govern- ment  that the market value of the land could be  calculated at the rate of Rs. 3,800 per guntha.  The Court answered the reference on the basis of the consent of the land owners and the  State.  The State, however, was not satisfied with  the award and filed an appeal which was dismissed on the  ground of being not maintainable as the impugned judgment was  held to  be a compromise decree.  An attempt by  the  respondent- Corporation  to  intervene  also  failed.   The  Corporation thereafter moved the High Court 334 with a writ petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution, inter  alia, challenging the validity of the  Civil  Court’s

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judgment directing higher compensation to be paid.  The High Court  held  that admittedly the land was acquired  for  the purpose of the Corporation and the burden of the payment  of the  compensation  was on the Corporation.   In  this  back- ground  the  High Court held that it was mandatory  for  the Court  of reference to have caused a notice to be served  on the  respondent-Corporation before proceeding  to  determine the  compensation claim.  Since no notice was given  to  the Corporation, it was deprived of an opportunity to place  its case  before  the  Court and the judgment  rendered  in  the reference   case  was  illegal  and  not  binding   on   the Corporation.   This  Court confirmed the view taken  by  the High Court. In  Krishi  Upaj  Mandi Samiti v. Ashok  Singhal  &  Others, [1991]  Supp. 2 SCC 419, a Division Bench of this  Court  to which  one of us was a party, it was held that the land  was acquired by the Government for the benefit of the  appellant Krishi  Upaj  Mandi Samiti which as a statutory body  was  a distinct  entity.   The Land Acquisition Officer  under  his award made under Section 11 of the Act determined the market value of the acquired lands at Rs. 500 per bigha and awarded compensation  accordingly.   On a reference  sought  by  the respondent   land  owners  the  Additional  District   Judge enhanced  the compensation to Rs. 1,000 per bigha.   In  the first appeal at the instance of the claimant land owners the High Court made a further enhancement of the compensation to Rs.  2,000 per bigha.  The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti came  in appeal before this Court and contended that the  acquisition not  having  been  for  the Government  itself,  but  for  a statutory  authority,  it was incumbent upon  the  Court  of reference  as  also the High Court in the  appeal  to  issue notice to the appellant before considering the claim of  the land owners for enhancement of the compensation.  It was not disputed  that the provisions of the Act which required  the service  or  notice  to  the  body  for  whose  benefit  the acquisition  was made were attracted in this case  and  such notice  was not served on the appellants and  the  appellant had not been given an opportunity of being heard.   However, the learned counsel for the respondent land owners appearing in  the above case fairly submitted that the judgment  under appeal  be set aside and the matter be remitted to the  High Court for a fresh disposal after affording an opportunity to the appellant of being heard in the matter.  In view of this submission, the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the  appeal  was  remitted to the High  Court  for  a  fresh disposal in 335 accordance  with  law  after  affording  an  opportunity  of hearing to the appellant. In  the case in hand before us, it is an  admitted  position that  the  State of Haryana acquired the  land  in  District Gurgaon  for  the  benefit of  National  Security  Guard  as desired  by the Union of India.  The land  owners  including the   respondents  of  the  present  case  filed   reference petitions under Section 18 of the Act.  During the  pendency of the reference application before the Additional  District Judge,  Gurgaon,  an application was moved by the  Union  of India  through Deputy Inspector General,  National  Security Guard for being impleaded as respondents on the ground  that the  land  had-been  acquired for the  purpose  of  National Security  Guard.  It was submitted in the  application  that the interest of the applicant Union of India will  adversely suffer in case the rate of compensation was enhanced and  it would  also be deprived of an opportunity to file an  appeal in  case  Union of India is not impleaded as a  party.   The

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Additional  District Judge declined to implead the Union  of India  as a party.  A revision application was dismissed  by the  High Court by the impugned order dated  24.5.1989.  The High  Court  in the impugned order took the  view  that  the matter  stands concluded by the Full Bench judgment  in  the case of M/s Kulbhushan Kumar & Company’s case (supra). We  have  heard  learned counsel for the  parties  and  have thoroughly  perused the record.  It was contended on  behalf of the appellant Union of India that the Central  Government is  neither a company nor a firm and as such the Full  Bench judgment of the High Court relied upon in the impugned order has  no  application  in  the  instant  case.   The  Central Government has no machinery of its own for acquiring of land and  as such it had to depend upon the State Government  for the above purpose.  However, the financial implication  with regard to the payment of compensation is to be borne by  the Central  Government.   It was contended that  the  point  is fully  covered by the decision of this Court in the case  of Himalayan  Tiles & Marbles (supra).  It was  also  submitted that in the meantime the learned Additional District  Judge, Gurgaon  by  its  order  dated  17.1.1990  has  decided  the reference  and  has  enhanced  the  compensation.   It   was submitted that a great injustice has been done to the appel- lant as it has not been given an opportunity to contest  the order of enhanced compensation and in view of the fact  that its  application for impleadment has been dismissed, it  has been left with no remedy of filing 336 an  appeal  against the judgment of the  learned  Additional District Judge, enhancing the compensation. On  the  other  hand,  it was contended  on  behalf  of  the respondent land owners that the learned Single Judge of  the High  Court passing the impugned order dated  24.5.1989  was bound  by  the Full Bench decisions of the  said  Court  and there was no infirmity in taking such view.  It was  further contended that even if there was a conflict between the  two decisions of this Court in The Municipal Corporation of  the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors. and in Himalayan  Tiles  &  Marbles  (P) Ltd.’s  case,  both  by  a Division  Bench  comprising  of  two  Hon’ble  Judges,   the conflict  can  only be resolved by referring the case  to  a larger Bench of this Court. In our view, there is no necessity of referring the case  to a  larger  Bench.   So  far as the  case  of  the  Municipal Corporation  of the City of Ahmedabad decided as back as  in 1970 is concerned, it is a short order based on the peculiar facts  of  that  case  alone.  In  that  case  there  is  no discussion  of  the relevant provisions of the Act  nor  any case  has been discussed.  The Notification under Section  4 of  the  Act  was  issued by the  Government  of  Bombay  on February 19, 1959.  Another Notification under Section 6  of the  Act  was issued by the Divisional Commissioner  of  the State of Gujarat under section 6 of the Act on May 2,  1961. Both the Notifications were challenged by the land owner  on various grounds by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The  petition was allowed by the High Court.  The  Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad came in appeal to  this Court  and  a preliminary objection was raised  against  the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Corporation.   It was  urged  that the Corporation was not  aggrieved  by  the order.   This Court upheld the preliminary objection on  the ground  that all the grounds related to the validity of  the Notifications  issued  by the Government of Bombay  and  the Government  of Gujarat.  It was held that not even an  order of  costs has been passed against The Municipal  Corporation

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of the City of Ahmedabad.  It was further observed "we  fail to  see  what interest the Municipal Corporation  has  which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the  High Court  allowing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the   first respondent."  It  admittedly shows that in  the  above  case neither  any stage of filing any reference under Section  18 of the Act before the Court had arrived nor any compensation had been determined by the Court adverse to the interest  of The Municipal 337  Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad for whose benefit  the land  was  acquired.  Even no award had been passed  by  the Land Acquisition Collector and it was only the Notifications issued  under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act by the  Government of Bombay and Government of Gujarat had been challenged by a writ  petition in the High Court.  In  these  circumstances, this Court took the view that not even an order of costs had been passed against The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad  and no interest of the Municipal Corporation  was affected and on this ground alone the preliminary  objection was sustained.  Thus, the above case cannot be considered as an authority for deciding the question raised in the case in hand before us. In Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case (supra), the  appellant, a   private  company  was  carrying  on  the   business   of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles.  In or about  1957 the company moved the Government  for  acquiring additional land for purposes of the company and the  Govern- ment on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under  Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate  notice by the Land Acquisition  Officer  acquiring the   land  in  dispute.   This  was  followed  by   another notification under Section 6 of the Act which was served  on the  respondent  on January 25, 1960.  The  purpose  of  the acquisition  was mentioned in the Notification,  as  "public purposes  for which the land is needed for  Himalayan  Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd." The acquisition proceedings  culminated in  an award made under Section 12 of the Act on  April  11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April  18, 1961.   On December 11, 1961 a letter was written on  behalf of  the Government informing the owner of the acquired  land that  possession  would  be taken on or about  the  12th  of January, 1962.  The first respondent in his writ petition to the  High  Court,  contended that  the  Government  was  not competent  to  acquire the land for purposes  of  a  private company which could not be said to be a public purpose under Section  4  of  the  Act and prayed  that  the  entire  land acquisition  proceedings should be quashed.  A single  Judge of  the  High  Court accepted the  plea,  allowed  the  writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings  along with  the  notifications.   The appellant  filed  an  appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view  of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as  it was not ’a person interested’ within the meaning of  Section 18  (1) of the Act.  The Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (P)  Ltd. came in appeal to this Court by 338 grant of special leave.  The Court in this case examined the question   elaborately  with  reference  to   the   relevant provisions  of the Act including Section 18 and  the  entire case  law  on  the  point.  It was  clearly  held  that  the definition  of ’a person interested’ given in Section 18  is an  inclusive definition and must be liberally construed  so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or  indirectly

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interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of  compensation.   It  was observed that  since  under  the agreement  the company had to pay the compensation,  it  was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation  was fixed so that the company may not have  to pay  a  very  heavy amount of money.   After  examining  the various  case law on the subject, it was observed  that  the preponderance  of judicial opinion seems to favour the  view that  the definition of person interested must be  liberally construed  so  as to include a body, local  authority  or  a company  for whose benefit the land is acquired and  who  is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation.  In  their Lordships opinion this view accorded with the principles  of equity,  justice  and good conscience.  It  may  be  further noted  that the above decision in Himalayan Tiles &  Marbles (P)  Ltd.’s  case was given on March 28, 1980 and  has  been consistently  followed  by this Court as  already  mentioned above  in the cases of Neelagangabai & Another  (supra)  and Krishi (Jpaj Mandi Samiti (supra) decided on May 3, 1990 and March 25, 1991 respectively.  No decision was brought to our notice  by the learned counsel taking a contrary view  after the  decision in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case.  Even  in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited, S.S. Sandhawalia,  CJ., had  followed the judgment in the Himalayan Tiles &  Marbles case and had rightly distinguished the case of The Municipal Corporation  of the City of Ahmedabad The majority  view  in the  above case which followed the Municipal Corporation  of the City of Ahmedabad is held to be wrong.  So far as  later Full  Bench  of  the Punjab & Harayana High  Court  in  M/s. kulbhushan  Kumar & Company’s case (supra) is concerned,  it had  followed  its  earlier  decision  in  Indo  Swiss  time Limited’s case and as such while approving the minority view of  S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ., we overruled both the above  Full Bench  decisions  of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  being contrary  to  the law laid down by this Court  in  Himalayan Tiles & Marbles’s case (supra). We fully agree with the reasons and conclusion arrived at in Himalayan  Tiles & Marbles case.  We accordingly allow  this appeal  and  set  aside the order of the  High  Court  dated 24.5.1989. However, after dismiss- 339 ing  the application for impleadment filed by the  Union  of India  by  the  Additional District  Judge  by  order  dated 28.11.1988,  it  has  been brought to  our  notice  that  by decision dated 17.1.1990, the Additional District Judge  has enhanced  the  compensation.  The Union of  India  has  been deprived  of filing an appeal against the said order of  the Additional District Judge dated 17.1.1990 as its application for  impleadment  was  itself dismissed  by  the  Additional District  Judge, we now direct that the application  of  the Union  of  India for impleadment is allowed as a  result  of which  it  is entitled to file an appeal in the  High  Court against the judgment of the Additional District Judge  dated 17.1.1990. The period of limitation of 90 days for filing an appeal  in the High Court shall be counted from the date  of the  present order.  In case such appeal is filed, the  High Court shall pass an appropriate order in accordance with law on  the merits of the appeal.  In the circumstances  of  the case, there will be no order as to costs. T.N.A.              Appeal allowed. 340