07 February 1997
Supreme Court
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UNION OF INDIA Vs SHER SINGH .

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,S. SAGHIR AHMAD
Case number: C.A. No.-001639-001639 / 1990
Diary number: 72613 / 1990
Advocates: C. V. SUBBA RAO Vs MITTER & MITTER CO.


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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHER SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/02/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the  division Bench  of the  High court of Delhi, made on May 30, 1991 in R.F.A. NO.167/86.      The admitted  facts are that notification under Section 4(1)  of  the  land  Acquisition  Act,  1864  was  published acquiring certain  lands for  public purpose.  Therein rival claims came  to be  made by  Gaon  Sabha,  Tekhand  and  the respondents claiming  title to  the compensation.  Since the Land Acquisition  officer/collector was unable to decide the title to receive the compensation on reference under section 30 of  the Act, the District court by award and decree dated February 22,  1986 held  that the  land  in  question  stood vested in  the Gaon  Sabha under Section 7 read with Section 154 of  the Delhi  Land Reforms  Act (for short, the ‘Act’). Therefore, it  is entitled  to the  compensation of the land acquired by  the Union of India. Dissatisfied therewith, the respondents filed  the above  appeal. The  High Court in the impugned judgment  has held  that "Gair  Mumkin Pahar"  is a cultivable land  and, therefore, by operation of explanation to Section  7, it  stands excluded  from the  vesting in the Gaon Sabha. Resultantly, the respondents being the owners of the property  are entitled  to the  compensation. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Initially, Shri  M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for some of the respondents, as brought to our notice that since this Court had  dismissed similar  special leave  petitions, this appeal does not merit consideration. We find no force in the contention. This  Court, by  then, had already granted leave in this  appeal, but  unfortunately, that was not brought to the notice  of the  respective  Benches  including  the  one presided over  by one  of us  (K. Ramaswamy,  J.), when  the matters had  come up. As a consequence, without any speaking order some  special leave petitions came to be dismissed. In view of  the settled legal position by a catena of decisions of this  Court that  the dismissal of special leave petition without speaking order does not constitute res judicata, the question of law is at large to be gone into. Accordingly, We reject the  objection and  we have heard the counsel on both sides on merits.

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    Shri Wasim A. Qadri, learned counsel for Union of India and Gaon  Sabha, in  a pains  taking investigation  and neat presentation,  has   brought  to  our  notice  the  relevant provisions of  the Act  and the  decision of  this Court  in Hatti vs. Sunder Singh [(1971) 2 SCR 163] and contended that the object  of the  Act and the Delhi Land Reforms, 1954 was to extinguish  the pre-existing  right, title  and  interest held  by  bhumidar,  sirdar,  tenant,  proprietor  etc.  and conferment of  new rights in them. It is also envisaged that all other  lands shall  stand vested  in the  Gaon Sabha  by operation of  Section 154  of the Act read with Section 7 of the Act.  The respondents  are not  bhumidars. The  land  in question has  been recorded  in the revenue records as "gair mumkin pahar",  in other  words, it is an uncultivable waste land. It  is not  excluded from the definition of waste land as explained  in explanation  to Section  7 of  the  Act.  A reading of  the relevant  provision of Sections 5, 7, 11 and 154 of  the Act  read with the definitions of ‘land’ defined in  Section  3(13),  ‘holding  defined  in  Section  3(11A), ‘khudkhast’ defined in Section 3(12A) and ‘proprietor’ under Section 3(17)  of the  Act, would  clearly indicate that the respondents are  not bhumidars  in respect  of  gair  mumkin pahar. As  a consequence, the land stands vested in the Gaon Sabha under  Section 7  read with Section 154 of the Act. On the other  hand, Shri  Dhingra and Shri L.C. Chechi, learned counsel for  the respondents  contended that by operation of the comprehensive  definition of ‘waste land’ in explanation to Section  7 of  the Act read with the object of conferment of right  under Section  11 read  with Section 5 of the Act, the respondents are bhumidars. As a consequence, the land is a cultivable land which confers them title to the land under the  Act.   It  is   also    further  contended  that  in  a representative suit  for a declaration that this gair mumkin pahar is  cultivable land was declared to be so by the civil Court. The  Deputy Commissioner’s finding under the Act that it is  a waste land is not correct. On an appeal against the decree, the High Court remitted the matter with an option to the Deputy  Commissioner had  not decided  that it  is  gair mumkin pahar.  As a consequence, the vesting order passed by the  Deputy   Commissioner  is  non  est.  The  High  Court, therefore, had  rightly gone  into the  question. In support thereof, the  learned counsel  placed reliance on a judgment of the  learned single  judge in a second appeal. It is also contended that  the view  taken by the Division Bench of the High Court  in that  behalf is  correct in  law. It does not warrant interference.      Having  regard   to  the  respective  contentions,  the question that  arise for  consideration is  :  whether  gair mumkin pahar  land is  cultivable  land  coming  within  the meaning of explanation to Section 7 so as to exclude it from the operation  of the  main part  of Section  7 of  the Act? Section 3(13) defines ‘land; thus:      "(15) "land" except in Sections 22,      23  and  24,  means  land  held  or      occupied  for   purposes  connected      with agriculture,  horticulture  or      animal     husbandry      including      pisciculture  and  poultry  farming      and includes..."      Admittedly, the lands in question have been recorded in the revenue  recorded as  gair mumkin  pahar. Therefore, the lands cannot be held or occupied or used  in connection with agriculture,  horticulture,   animal   husbandry   including pisciculture and poultry farming etc.      ‘Holding’ has  been defined  under Section 3(11) of the

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Act means:      "(a)...      (b) in  respect of  proprietors,  a      parcel or  parcels of  land held as      sir or khud-khast."      ‘khudkhast’ has been defined under Section 3(12A) means land (other  than Sir) cultivated by a proprietary either by himself or by servants or by hired labour,...      "(a) at  the commencement  of  this      Act, or  (b) at any time during the      period of  five  years  immediately      before  the  commencement  of  this      Act,  whether  or  not  it  was  so      cultivated  at  such  commencement,      provided that  it has  not, at  any      time   after    having   been    so      cultivated  been   let  out   to  a      tenant".      Therefore, it  is clear  from the above provisions that the gair  mumkin pahar  is not  a  land  cultivated  by  the proprietor and so it is not a khud-khast land.      Section 5 of the Act defines Bhumidar thus :      "5.   Bhumidhar--    Every   person      belonging to  any of  the following      classes shall  be a  Bhumidhar  and      shall  have   all  rights   and  be      subject  to   all  the  liabilities      conferred   or   imposed   upon   a      Bhumidhar by  or  under  this  Act,      namely:      (a) a  proprietor  holding  Sir  or      Khudkhast   land   a   proprietor’s      grover holder,  an occupancy tenant      under  Section   5  of  the  Punjab      Tenancy Act,  1887, paying  rent at      revenue rates  or a  person holding      land   under    Patta   Dawami   or      Istamrari with  rights of  transfer      by   sale,    who   are    declared      Bhumidhars on  the commencement  of      this Act:      (b) every  class of  tenants  other      than those  referred to  in  clause      (a) and subtenants who are declared      to in clause (a) and subtenants who      are  declared   Bhumidhars  on  the      commencement of this Act ; or      (c) every  person  who,  after  the      commencement  of   this   Act,   is      admitted to  land as  Bhumidhar  or      who acquires Bhumidhar rights under      any provisions of the Act."      Resultantly, the  respondents are not bhumidhars, since they did  not hold  the land  as proprietor  and, therefore, shall not have proprietary right in gair mumkin pahar.      part B  of the  Act postulates  acquisition of  certain rights of  proprietors. Section 7 under this part postulates the rights  of proprietary  in waste lands. pasture lands of common utility  etc. to  vest in Gaon Sabha and compensation to be paid for the...      "(1) All  rights of  an  individual      proprietor      or      proprietors      pertaining to  waste lands. grazing      or  collection  of  forest  produce      from forest  or fish from fisheries

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    lands of  common utility,  such  as      customary  common   pasture  lands,      cremation or  burial grounds, abide      sites pathways, public wells, tanks      and water  channels, or  khalihans,      whether  covered   by  an  existing      contract between such proprietor or      proprietors and any other person or      not, shall  with  effect  from  the      commencement   of   this   Act   be      terminated in  accordance with  the      provision of  sub-section  (2)  and      the said  contracts, if  any, shall      become void  with effect  from such      commencement.      provided that where such land was a      result of consolidation of holdings      made  available  for  use  for  any      purposes other  than those referred      to in  this subsection,  land  kept      aside  in  exchange  thereof,  land      kept aside  in exchange thereof, as      a  result  of  such  consolidation,      shall for  the purposes of this Act      be deemed  to  be  land  originally      meant for  purposes referred  to in      this sub-section.      Explanation --  for the  purpose of      this sub-section--      (i)  "waste   land’  shall  include      cultivable and  uncultivable  waste      area or  the village  including any      land  in   the  bed   of  a  river,      occupied  or   held  by   f  river,      occupied  or   held  by   an  Asami      referred to in Section 6(a)(iii) of      the  Act  except  the  uncultivated      area---      (a)  included  in  the  holding  of      such proprietor proprietors, or      (b)  used for  purposes  other than      those mentioned  in clause (143) of           Section 3  at any  time before      the 26th day of October, 1956 or      (c)  acquired    by    bona    fide      purchaser for  value  at  any  time      before the  28th  day  of  October,      1958 for  purpose other than  those      mentioned in clause (13) of Section      3."      Conjoint  reading   of  Section   7   read   with   the explanation, it  emerges that  unless the  waste land stands excluded from  Section 7,  the rights  of the proprietors in waste lands,  posture lands  or community utility lands etc. shall vest  in Gaon  Sabha. The  waste land  included in the holding of  the proprietor  stands excepted  from the  waste land contemplated by Section 7.      Section  11   of  the   Act  provides   declaration  of Bhumidhari Rights  in favour  of  proprietors  and  superior class of  tenants, compensation and revenue. Subsection (1) provides that;      "(1) Subject  to the  provisions of      Section 10, the Deputy Commissioner      shall declare  as Bhumidhar persons      holding   the    following   lands,

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    namely:-      (a)  Khudkhast    land     or     a      proprietor’s grover  in the  tracts      to which  the Punjab  Tenancy  Act,      1887 was  applicable or Sir land or      khudkhast land  or  a  proprietor’s      grove in  the tracts  to which  the      Agra   Tenancy   Act,   1901,   was      applicable:      (b)  land held by occupancy tenants      under  Section   5  of  the  Punjab      Tenancy Act,  1887, with  right  of      transfer by sale; and      (c)  land held  under patta  Dawami      or Istamrari  by tenants with right      of transfer by sale."      By operation of Section 11, all the lands including the holding   of the  Bhumidhar etc.  shall be  declared to be a Bhumidhar right.  It is,  thus, clear  that by  operation of Section 5 read with the definition of khudkhast land and the explanation to  waste land  under Section  7 of the Act, the lands not  having been  held by  Bhumidhars,  it  cannot  be treated to  be a  waste land  for the  purpose of  exclusion under the explanation from the purview of Section 7 of the Act.      what would  be  the  consequence  has  been  stated  in Section 154  of the  Act is  to be  seen. Section  154 reads thus:      "154. Vesting of certain lands etc.      in  Gaon   Sabha  --   (1)  On  the      commencement of this Act--      (1) all lands whether cultivable or      otherwise, except land for the time      being comprised  in any  holding or      grove,      xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx      situate in a Gaon Sabha Area, shall      vest in Gaon Sabha."      Thus, it  could be  seen that  except the  land for the time being  comprised in any holding or a grove, rest of all lands whether  cultivable or otherwise vest in the Gaon from the date of the commencement of the Act.      This question  also no  longer res integra. In  Hatti’s case  (supra),   this  Court  has  gone  into  the  relevant provisions of the Act and held thus:      "Sections 6,  11, 13 and 154 of the      Act read together, thus, show that,      after  the  Act  came  into  force,      proprietors of agricultural land as      such ceased  to exist.  if any land      was  part   of  a   holding  of   a      proprietor, he became a Bhumidar of      it. if  it was part of a holding of      some other person, such as a tenant      or a  sub-tenant  etc.,  he  became      either a  Bhumidar   or  an  Asami,      whereupon   the   rights   of   the      proprietor  in  that  land  ceased,      Land, which  were  not  holding  of      either the  proprietor or any other      person, vested  in the  Gaon Sabha.      In the  case of  proprietors, their      rights in  the  land  continued  to      exist only  in respect  of holdings      which, under  the definition,  must

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    have  been   either  their  sir  or      khudkasht at  the  commencement  of      the Act.  If  it  was  not  sir  or      khudkasht of a proprietor, it would      not    be    his    holding    and,      consequently, such  land would vest      in the  Gaon  Sabha  under  Section      154, the  result of  which would be      that the  rights of  the proprietor      would be extinguished".      As stated  earlier, indisputably in the revenue records the land in question had been recorded as gair mumkin pahar. Under those circumstances, this gair mumkin pahar land which was  not   held  by  the  respondents  as  khudkhastdars  as proprietors thereof.  As a consequence, the land shall stand vested in  the Gaon  Sabha. It  is true  that in the earlier civil  suit   filed  in  a  representative  capacity  for  a declaration, the  High Court has gone into the question, but the entire  matter was  left at  large stating that "it does not mean  that the  Deputy Commissioner  Cannot redecide the matter. in  fact, he  should reconsider  the matter and hear the parties  to determine whether the order is in accordance with law...  However, I would also like to clarify that this does not  by any  means end  the matter".  Thus, there is no concluded finding  recorded by  the High Court in the second appeal with  regard to  the nature of the land. On the other hand, the  matter was  kept at  large. At  that  stage,  the acquisition proceedings were initiated. As a consequence, no further action has been taken by the Deputy commissioner. Consequently,  the   entire  issue  was  at  large.  Obvious therefore, that when there was conflict of decisions between tow learned  single Judges, the Division Bench has gone into the question. But, it had not properly considered the effect of the provisions of the Act and came to the conclusion that the explanation  of ‘waste  land’ under  Section 7  includes cultivable, waste  and gair mumkin pahar is cultivable waste land and  the respondents  became owners  of  the  land  and entitled  to   the  compensation.   In  view  of  the  above discussion, the view taken by the division. Bench is clearly in error. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and confirmed that of the District Court.      The  appeal   is  accordingly    allowed,  but  in  the circumstances, without costs.