http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 22  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2887 of 2001

PETITIONER: Union of India and Anr.                                  

RESPONDENT: S.B. Vohra and Ors.                                      

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/01/2004

BENCH: CJI, S.B. Sinha & Dr. AR. Lakshmanan.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J :

INTRODUCTION:

How far and to what extent a writ of or in the nature of mandamus  should  issue directing the Union of India to pay salary to the Officers of the  High Court in a particular scale of pay is the question involved in this   appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 21.07.2000 passed by  the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No. 1131 of 1993. BACKGROUND FACTS: The respondents are Assistant Registrars of the Delhi High Court.   Their scale of pay was fixed at Rs.3000-4500 and recommendations therefor  were made by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi in terms of his  letter dated 15.10.1991 to the effect that  the scales of pay be revised with  effect from 1.1.1986.  Before making the said recommendations, the Chief  Justice of the  High Court constituted a committee which had gone into the  said matter.  The Committee submitted a report which was accepted by the  Chief Justice.  While fixing the scales of pay of the Assistant Registrars, it  was noticed that the post of Assistant Registrar is a promotional post for the  Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries who had been placed  in the Scale of pay of Rs. 2000-3500.  As despite such recommendations no  heed was paid thereto by the appellant, the writ petition was filed.

The appellants herein inter alia contended before the High Court that  the Assistant Registrars should  not have been placed in a higher scale of pay  of Rs. 3000-4500 as the Fourth Pay Commission, had recommended the   scale of pay of Superintendent, Court Master and Private Secretary as also  the Assistant Registrar at Rs. 2000-3500 and thus it must have given a go- bye to the old relativities and treated both categories of the post as equal or  merged.  The appellant also highlighted the repercussions thereof on the  officers of the equivalent rank of Central Government who might also  agitate for higher scale of pay.

JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT:

The High Court having regard to the decisions of this Court in S.B.  Mathur and Others Vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and  Others [AIR 1988 SC 2073] wherein Kania, J. held that the three categories  of posts, namely, Private Secretary, Court Master and Superintendent are of  equal status and they are interchangeable and further having regard to the  fact that the post of Assistant Registrar was still a promotional post rejected  the contention of the appellant that such posts must be held to have  merged.    It was observed:

"Another stand taken by respondents Nos. 1 and 2  in their reply affidavit that in case same scales of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 22  

pay have been prescribed by Pay Commission for  two posts, one promotional to another, the old  relativities are no more valid and new relativities  have been established by the Commission and the  two posts are treated equal/merged.  In other words  after 1.1.1986, no promotion can be made from the  feeder cadre to the promotion cadre since the post  of Private Secretary, Court Master, Superintendent  and those of Assistant Registrar will be deemed to  have merged.  This contention is also not tenable  since as per the rules, promotion is made and is  being made to the post of Assistant Registrar from  only three feeder cadres of Superintendent, Court  Master and Private Secretary and from no other  source.  These posts cannot be said to have deemed  merged as alleged."

The High Court opined: "The Committee submitted its report  recommending higher pay scales. Hon’ble the  Chief Justice agreed with the recommendations  made by the Committee. The reasons which  prevailed with the Chief Justice in agreeing with  the recommendations of the Committee may be  stated as follows:- "(i) FR 22-C lays down that an officer performing  duties and functions involving higher  responsibility should draw higher pay. Admittedly,  the post of Assistant Registrar carries duties and  functions of a higher responsibility than those  attached to the posts of Private Secretaries, Court  Masters and Superintendents. (ii) The Delhi High Court Establishment  (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules,  1972 lay down the mode of appointment to the  post of Deputy Registrar and Joint Registrar. These  posts carry the pay scales of Rs. 3700-5000  respectively. These officers besides administrative  work, also hold Court in accordance with the  powers delegated to them under the High Court  Rules and Orders, as also under Delhi High Court  (Original Side) Rules. The responsibilities attached  to these posts are higher than those of the Assistant  Registrar. (iii) The Registrar who is a senior Officer of  Higher Judicial Service is the Head of the Office  of this Court. Apart from administrative functions,  the incumbent to the post of Registrar has also to  discharge judicial functions and hold Court in  exercise of powers under the High Court Rules and  Orders and Original Side Rules of this Court. The  present pay scale of the post of Registrar is Rs.  5900-6700. (iv) If the imbalance as stated above, is allowed to  continue, it will, besides causing hardship, lead to  frustration and heart-burning amongst the officers  of this Court which would be detrimental to the  smooth and efficient functioning of the Registry.  Thus, in public interest, it is essential that the  imbalance created in the pay structure of the  officers of this Court be removed without undue  delay.""

It was further observed that the repercussion of a higher scale of pay

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 22  

upon the officers of the equivalent rank of the Central Government cannot  be a ground to deny the legitimate scale of pay to the Assistant Registrar  stating:

"The respondents have not refuted and cannot  legitimately refute the fact that the post of  Assistant Registrar is a higher status post attaching  to it higher responsibility and moreover it is a  promotional post from the post of Superintendent,  Court Master and Private Secretary. Similar is the  position with respect to the post of Deputy  Registrar and Joint Registrar vis-a-vis the post of  Assistant Registrar."

SUBMISSIONS:

Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned Additional Solicitor General,  appearing for the Union of India, inter alia, submitted that the Division  Bench of the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the  impugned judgment insofar as it  failed to take into consideration that no  writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the Central Government and  the Respondents herein to grant the pay scale of Rs.2000-3500/- w.e.f.  1.1.1986 in favour of the respondents can be issued.  The learned counsel  would urge  that having regard to the provisions contained in Clause 2  of  Article 229 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court  may in his wisdom fix the pay scale but therefor approval  of the President  of India was required to be obtained.

Mr. Bhat, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the private  respondents, on the other hand, supported the order of the High Court.  

Mr. Bhat would submit that the need for pay revision arose in the  following factual background :

(i)     Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries  constitute feeder channel for promotion to the post of Assistant  Registrar.  These three posts are interchangeable.  It was held so  specifically by this Hon’ble Court in a decision in SB Mathur  vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Others   [AIR 1988 SC 2073]. (ii)    After the implementation of the IIIrd Pay Commission  recommendations, Private Secretaries and Court Masters of the  High Court of Delhi filed Writ Petition seeking parity of pay  with that of Private Secretary to the Chief Secretary, Delhi  Administration.  The same was allowed by the High Court of  Delhi in a judgment in P.N. Chopra vs. Union of India  [ILR  (1981) II Delhi 102]. (iii)   Sangram Singh, representing the Superintendents also filed a   writ petition before the High Court claiming parity of pay  scales with Private Secretaries and Court Master on the strength  of pre-existing parity of status with the said two categories of  posts.  The writ petition was allowed.  The Union of India  challenged the decision by way of SLP (C) No.8934 of 1982,  which was however dismissed by this Hon’ble Court on  3.1.1982. (iv)    A writ petition being CWP No.2901 of 1984 (Trl. Narayanan  and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.) came to be filed by  Assistant Registrars, Deputy Registrars and Joint Registrars of  the High Court of Delhi seeking enhancement of pay scales.  A  Division Bench of the High Court on 18.12.1985 allowed the  same. (v)     After the Fourth Pay Commission Private Secretaries, Court  Masters and Superintendents were drawing pay in the scale of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 22  

Rs.2000-3500. (vi)    Shri A.K. Gulati, a Private Secretary filed writ petition before  the High Court of Delhi (CWP No.289 of 1991) contending  inter alia that Private Secretaries to Secretaries, Government of  India were drawing pay in the scale of Rs.3000-4500/- whereas  the pay-scale of Private Secretaries in the High Court was kept  at Rs.2000-3500.  The claim was that the pre-existing and  unbroken parity, crystallized by judgment that had become  final, was broken.  The writ petition was allowed on 7.5.1991  granting the pay scales at par with the Private Secretaries in the  Government of India.  The special leave petition filed by the  Union of India (SLP (C) No.13229/1991 was dismissed by this  Hon’ble Court on 26.8.1991.  The matter, thus, attained finality  and pay scales of Private Secretaries in the High Court  and  Private Secretaries in the Government of India were brought on  par. (vii)   In the wake of Gulati’s judgment, Court Masters and  Superintendents also approached the High Court of Delhi by  way of a writ petition (CWP No.2756 of 1991; Hari Sharma  and Ors. vs. Union of India) which was allowed on 14.11.1991,  following the reasoning in Mathur’s case (supra).  Accordingly,  their pay fixation and payment of arrears were directed by this  Hon’ble Court.  The judgment was implemented.  Here too, the  matter attained finality, and the Government of India did not  raise any objection. (viii)  As a result of the implementation of the said judgment, Court  Master, Superintendents and Private Secretaries in the High  Court of Delhi started drawing pay on the same scale of pay as  prescribed for Assistant Registrars (Rs.3000-4500).  As already  stated the post of Assistant Registrar is a promotional post for  the three feeder cadres mentioned.

Only thereafter representations were made by the Assistant  Registration, pursuant whereto a Committee of three Judges, as noticed  hereinbefore, was constituted.

ARTICLE 229 OF THE CONSTITUTION:

Clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India empowers the  Chief Justice of the High Court to prescribe by rules the conditions of  service of Officers and servants of the High Court.  Such Rule shall,  however, be subject to : (1) the provision of any law made by the legislature  of the State; (2) the approval of the President/Governor of the State so far as  it relates to salary, allowances, leave or pensions.

Independence of the High Court is an essential feature for working of  the democratic form of the Government in the country.  An absolute control,  therefore, have been vested in the High Court over its staff which would be  free from interference from the Government subject of course to the  limitations imposed by the said provision.  There cannot be, however, any  doubt whatsoever that while exercising such a power the Chief Justice of the  High Court would only be bound by the limitation contained in Clause 2 of  the Article 229 of the Constitution of India and the proviso appended  thereto.  Approval of the President/Governor of the State is, thus,  required  to be obtained in relation to the Rules containing provisions as regard,  salary, allowances, leave or promotion.  It is trite that  such approval should  ordinarily be granted as a matter of course.

MANDAMUS VIS-@-VIS ARTICLE 229(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION:

Mandamus literally means a command.  The essence of mandamus in  England was that it was a royal command issued by the King’s Bench (now  Queen’s Bench) directing  performance of a public legal duty.

A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 22  

legal right in himself.  A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who  has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so.  Such a  legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation  of law.  The writ of mandamus is a most extensive remedial nature.  The  object of mandamus is of to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is  required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific  remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been granted.

In Comptroller and Auditor General Vs. K.S. Jaganathan, (1986 (2)  SCC 679) it was held that, "Article 226 is designedly couched in wide  language in order not to confine the power conferred by it on the High  Courts only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in  England.  The High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 can  issue directions, orders or writs so as to enable the High Courts to reach  injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the particular  and complicated needs of this country.

It was, however, held in  Ajit Singh and Others (II) Vs. State of  Punjab and Others, [(1999) 7 SCC 209] in a different context that the view  taken in the above decision and in  Superintending Engineer, Public Health,  U.T. Chandigarh and Others  Vs. Kuldeep Singh and Others [(1997) 9 SCC  199] cannot be said to be correct as Article 16(4) confers a discretion and  does not confer any constitutional duty or obligation and therefore the view  taken in the aforementioned cases that a writ of mandamus can be issued in  such cases, cannot be said to be correct.

In State of A.P. & Anr. Vs. T.Gopalakrishna Murthi & Ors. [1976 (1)  SCR 1008], a three Judge Bench of this Court observed :

"One should expect in the fitness of things and in  view of the spirit of Article 229 that ordinarily and  generally the approval should be accorded.  But  surely it is wrong to say that the approval is a mere  formality and in no case it is open to the  Government to refuse to accord their approval.  On  the facts and in the circumstances of this case and  in the background of the conditions which are  prevalent in other States Government could have  been well-advised to accord approval to the  suggestion of the Chief Justice, as the suggestion  was nothing more than to equate the pay scales of  the High Court staff with those of the equivalent  posts in the Secretariat.  That merely because the  Government is not right in accepting the Chief  Justice’s view and refusing to accord the approval  is no ground for holding that by a writ of  mandamus the Government may be directed to  accord the approval."

Despite the said finding, it was observed :

"We, however, trust and hope that the Government  will give their second thought to the matter and see  whether it is possible in the State of Andhra  Pradesh to obliterate the distinction in the matter of  pay scales etc. between the High Court and the  Secretariat Staff.  There does not seem to be any  good and justifiable reason for maintaining the  distinction."

In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association  Vs. Union of  India and Anr.  [1989 (4) SCC 187] this Court, while considering the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 22  

provisions of Article 146(2)  of the Constitution of India which is in pari  materia with Article 229 of the Constitution of India, held :

"The legislative function of Parliament has been  delegated to the Chief Justice of India by Article  146(2).  It is not disputed that the function of the  Chief Justice of India or the Judge or the officers  of the Court authorised by him in framing rules  laying down the conditions of service, is legislative  in nature.  The conditions of service that may be  prescribed by the rules framed by the Chief Justice  of India under Article 146(2) will also necessarily  include salary, allowances, leave and pensions of  the officers and servants of the Supreme Court.   The proviso to Article 146(2) puts a restriction on  the power of the the Chief Justice of India by  providing that the rules made under Article 146(2)   shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances,  leave or pensions, require the approval of the  President of India.  Prima facie, therefore, the  conditions of service of the employees of the  Supreme Court that are laid down by the Chief  Justice of India by framing the rules will be final  and conclusive, except that with regard to salaries,  allowances, leave or pensions the approval of the  President of India is required.  In other words, if  the President of India does not approve of the  salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, it will not  have any effect.  The reason for requiring the  approval of the President of India regarding  salaries, allowances, leave or pensions is the  involvement of the financial liability of the  government."

It was further observed :

"It is true that the President of India cannot be  compelled to grant approval to the rules framed by  the Chief Justice of India relating to salaries,  allowances, leave or pensions, but it is equally true  that when such rules have been framed by a very  high dignitary of the State, it should be looked  upon with respect and unless there is very good  reason not to grant approval, the approval should  always be granted.  If the President of India is of  the view that the approval cannot be granted, he  cannot straightway refuse to grant such approval,  but before doing so, there must be exchange of  thoughts between the President of India and the  Chief Justice of India."

JUDICIAL REVIEW:

The scope of  judicial review in the context of grant of contract has  been the subject matter of a decision of this Court in Sterling Computers  Limited Vs. M/s. M&N Publications Limited and Others [(1993) 1 SCC  445] wherein this Court noticed the commentary of  Prof. Wade in his well- known treatise ’Administrative Law’  in the following terms: "It is true that by way of judicial review the Court  is not expected to act as a court of appeal while  examining an administrative decision and to record  a finding whether such decision could have been  taken otherwise in the facts and circumstances of  the case. In the book Administrative Law, Prof.  Wade has said:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 22  

"The doctrine that powers must be exercised  reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less  important doctrine that the court must not usurp  the discretion of the public authority which  Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within  the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in  which the deciding authority has genuinely free  discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra  vires. The court must therefore resist the  temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely  according to its own opinion. It must strive to  apply an objective standard which leaves to the  deciding authority the full range of choices which  legislature is presumed to have intended. The  decisions which are extravagant or capricious  cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within  the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the  court’s function to look further into its merits. With  the question whether a particular policy is wise or  foolish the court is not concerned it can only  interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the  authority.""

But in the same book Prof. Wade has also said:

"The powers of public authorities are therefore  essentially different from those of private persons.  A man making his will may, subject to any rights  of his dependents, dispose of his property just as  he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit  of revenge, but in law this does not affect his  exercise of his power. In the same way a private  person has an absolute power to allow whom he  likes to use his land, to release a debtor, or, where  the law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his  motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a public  authority may do none of these things unless it acts  reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and  relevant grounds of public interest. There are many cases in which a public authority  has been held to have acted from improper motives  or upon irrelevant considerations, or to have failed  to take account of relevant considerations, so that  its action is ultra vires and void."

The Court further noticed: " While exercising the power of judicial review, in  respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the  State, the Court is concerned primarily as to  whether there has been any infirmity in the  "decision making process". In this connection  reference may be made to the case of Chief  Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans  where it was said that: (p. 144 a) "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that  the individual receives fair treatment, and not to  ensure that the authority, after according fair  treatment, reaches on a matter which it is  authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a  conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the  court."

       In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and  Others [(1991) 1 SCC 212], however, the Court sought to draw a distinction  between the powers of public authorities vis-‘-vis the private authorities

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 22  

referring to Wade’s Administrative Law, 6th Edition, page 401 to the  following effect and stating:

"For the same reasons there should in principle be  no such thing as unreviewable administrative  discretion, which should be just as much a  contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion.   The question which has to be asked is what is the  scope of judicial review, and in a few special cases  the scope for the review of discretionary decisions  may be minimal.  It remains axiomatic that all  discretion is capable of abuse, and that legal limits  to every power are to be found somewhere."

The power of judicial review of High Court as also this Court is now  well-defined in a series of decisions of this Court.  It is trite that the court  will not exercise its jurisdiction to entertain a writ application wherein public  law element is not involved. (See Life Insurance Corporation Vs. Escorts  AIR 1986 SC 1370,  F.C.I. Vs. Jagannath Dutta, AIR 1993 SC 1494, State  of Gujarat Vs. Meghraj Peth Raj Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) 3 SCC 552,  Assistant Excise Commissioner Vs. Issac Peter, (1994) 4 SCC 104, National  Highway Authority of India Vs. M/s. Ganga Enterprises & Anr. 2003 (7)  SCALE 171)

In any event, the modern trend also points to judicial restraint in  administration action as has been held in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India  [(1994) 6 SCC 651], Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner,  Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Others [(2000) 5 SCC 287], W.B.  State Electricity Board Vs. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Others [(2001) 2  SCC 451] and L.I.C. v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, [AIR  1995 SC 1811].

The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a  statute or an instrument having the force of law.  For a public law remedy  enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the  authority need to fall in the realm of public law \026be it a legislative act or the  State, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or  authority imbued with public law element.  The question is required to be  determined in each case having the aforementioned principle in mind.   However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which  would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it  desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions.

The question as to whether this Court, would permit judicial review  and, if any, to what extent will vary from case to case and no broad  principles can be laid down therefor.

       We may usefully notice that Grahame Aldous and John Alder in  "Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice" stated the law thus:

"There is a general presumption against ousting the  jurisdiction of the courts, so that statutory  provisions which purport to exclude judicial  review are construed restrictively.  There are,  however, certain areas of governmental activity,  national security being the paradigm, which the  courts regard themselves as incompetent to  investigate, beyond an initial decision as to  whether the government’s claim is bona fide.  In  this kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is  not entirely excluded, but very limited.  It has also  been said that powers conferred by the royal  prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since  the speeches of the House of Lords in Council of  Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 22  

Service this is doubtful.  Lords Diplock, Scaman  and Roskili appeared to agree that there is no  general distinction between powers, based upon  whether their source is statutory or prerogative but  that judicial review can be limited by the subject  matter of a particular power, in that case national  security.  Many prerogative powers are in fact  concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for  example, foreign affairs, but some are reviewable  in principle, including where national security is  not involved.  Another non-justiciable power is the  Attorney General’s preprogative to decide whether  to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the  public interest."

However, we may notice that in the Comptroller and Auditor General  of India and Anr. Vs. K.S. Jagannathan and another [(1986) 2 SCC 679 :  1987 SC 537] this Court upon considering a large number of decisions  including Dwarkanath Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur  [(1965) 3 SCR 536], Hochtief Gammon Vs. State of Orissa [(1976) 1 SCR  667], Mayor of Rochester Vs. Regina [1858 EB & E 1024], The King Vs.  Revising Barrister for the Borough of Hanley [(1912) 3 KB 518], Padfield  Vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968 AC 997] and  Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I, paragraph 89  observed: "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in  India exercising their jurisdiction under Article  226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or  a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders  and give necessary directions where the  government or a public authority has failed to  exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion  conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy  decision of the government or has exercised such  discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations  or by ignoring the relevant considerations and  materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the  object of conferring such discretion or the policy  for implementing which such discretion has been  conferred.   In all such cases and in any other fit  and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise  of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of  mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or  pass orders and give directions to compel the  performance in a proper and lawful manner of the  discretion conferred upon the government or a  public authority, and in a proper case, in order to  prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties,  the court may itself pass an order or give directions  which the government or the public authority  should have passed or given had it properly and  lawfully exercised its discretion. " [Emphasis supplied]

In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat [(1997) 7 SCC  622] this Court held: "Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under  Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be  issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public  duties which may be administrative, ministerial or  statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either  directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they  are intended to be mandatory in character, are  indicated by the use of the words "shall" or "must".

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 22  

But this is not conclusive as "shall" and "must"  have, sometimes, been interpreted as "may". What  is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is  obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme  of the statute in which the "duty" has been set out.  Even if the "duty" is not set out clearly and  specifically in the statute, it may be implied as  correlative to a "right". In the performance of this duty, if the authority in  whom the discretion is vested under the statute,  does not act independently and passes an order  under the instructions and orders of another  authority, the Court would intervene in the matter,  quash the order and issue a mandamus to that  authority to exercise its own discretion."

Prof. Wade, also, in his well-known treatise ’Administrative Law’, 8th  Edition, at page 609 makes a distinction between a discretionary power and  obligatory duties in the following terms:

"Obligatory duties must be distinguished from  discretionary powers.  With the latter mandamus  has nothing to do: it will not, for example, issue to  compel a minister to promote legislation.   Statutory duties are by no means always imposed  by mandatory language with words such as ’shall’  or ’must’.  Sometimes they will be the implied  counterparts of rights, as where a person ’may  appeal’ to a tribunal and the tribunal has a  correlative duty to hear and determine the appeal.   Sometimes also language which is apparently  merely permissive is construed as imposing a duty,  as where ’may’ is interpreted to mean ’shall’.   Even though no compulsory words are used, the  scheme of the Act may imply a duty.

Having developed from a piece of purely  administrative machinery, mandamus was never  subject to the misguided notion which at one time  afflicted its less fortunate relative certiorari, that it  could apply only to ’judicial’ functions.   Administrative or ministerial duties of every  description could be enforced by mandamus.  It  was, indeed, sometimes said that this remedy did  not apply to judicial functions, meaning that where  a public authority was given power to determine  some matters, mandamus would not lie to compel  it to reach some particular decision.  The law as to  this is explained below under ’Duty to exercise  jurisdiction’.

The fact that the statutory duty is directory  as opposed to mandatory, so that default will not  invalidate some other action or decision, is no  reason for not enforcing it by mandamus."

The broad principles of judicial review as has been stated in the  speech of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for  the Civil Service [(1985) A.C 374] i.e., illegality, irrationality and   procedural impropriety, have greatly been overtaken by other developments  as for example, generally not only in relation to proportionality and human  rights but also in the direction of principles of legal certainty, notably  legitimate expectations.

In R. Vs. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 22  

[2000] 2 WLR 622, CA the Court of Appeals  held that a health authority  which promised a small number of residents in a care home for the severely  disabled that it would be their home for life was not entitled to frustrate the  legitimate expectation they had generated by closing the home as this would  be an abuse of power.

Judicial review is a highly complex and developing subject.  It has its  roots long back and its scope and extent varies from case to case.  It is  considered to be the basic feature of the Constitution.  The Court in exercise  of its power of judicial review would jealously guard the human rights,  fundamental rights and the citizens’ right of life and liberty as also many  non-statutory powers of governmental bodies as regards their control over  property and assets of various kinds which could be expended on building  hospitals, roads and the like, or overseas aid, or compensating victims of  crime (See for example, R. Vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department,  ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 WLR 1.

The Court, however, exercises its power of restraint in relation to  interference of policy.  In his recent book ’Constitutional Reform in the UK’  at page 105, Dawn Oliver commented thus:

"However, this concept of democracy as rights- based with limited governmental power, and in  particular of the role of the courts in a democracy,  carries high risks for the judges \026 and for the  public.  Courts may interfere inadvisedly in public  administration.  The case of Bromley London  Borough Council v. Greater London Council  ([1983] 1 AC 768, HL) is a classic example.  The  House of Lords quashed the GLC cheap fares  policy as being based on a misreading of the  statutory provisions, but were accused of  themselves misunderstanding transport policy in so  doing.  The courts are not experts in policy and  public administration \026 hence Jowell’s point that  the courts should not step beyond their institutional  capacity (Jowell, 2000).  Acceptance of this  approach is reflected in the judgments of Laws LJ  in International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary  of State for the Home Department ([2002] EWCA  Civ 158, [2002] 3 WLR 344) and of Lord Nimmo  Smith in Adams v. Lord Advocate (Court of  Session, Times, 8 August 2002) in which a  distinction was drawn between areas where the  subject matter lies within the expertise of the  courts (for instance, criminal justice, including  sentencing and detention of individuals) and those  which were more appropriate for decision by  democratically elected and accountable bodies.  If  the courts step outside the area of their institutional  competence, government may react by getting  Parliament to legislate to oust the jurisdiction of  the courts altogether.  Such a step would  undermine the rule of law.  Government and public  opinion may come to question the legitimacy of  the judges exercising judicial review against  Ministers and thus undermine the authority of the  courts and the rule of law."

It is not possible to lay down the standard exhaustively  as to in what  situation a writ of mandamus will issue and in what situation it will not.  In  other words, exercise of  its discretion by the Court will also depend upon  the law which governs the field, namely, whether it is a fundamental law or  an ordinary law.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 22  

It is, however, trite that ordinarily the Court will not exercise the  power of the statutory authorities.  It will at the first instance allow the  statutory authorities to perform their own functions and would not usher the  said jurisdiction itself.

In State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Nuruddin Mallic and Others  [(1998) 8 SCC 143] this Court declined a suggestion that the Court itself  examined and decided the question in issue stating:

"28\005.Instead of sending any reply, the  management filed the writ petition in the High  Court, leading to passing of the impugned orders.  Thus, till this date the appellant-authorities have  not yet exercised their discretion. Submission for  the respondents was that this Court itself should  examine and decide the question in issue based on  the material on record to set at rest the long- standing issue. We have no hesitation to decline  such a suggestion. The courts can either direct the  statutory authorities, where it is not exercising its  discretion, by mandamus to exercise its discretion,  or when exercised, to see whether it has been  validly exercised. It would be inappropriate for the  Court to substitute itself for the statutory  authorities to decide the matter."

It was further observed :

"30\005As we have held above, without the statutory  authority applying its mind for their approval and  the impugned order not adjudicating the issue in  question how could the impugned orders be  sustained\005"

JURISDICTION OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

The Chief Justice of the High Court in this case was not bound to  accept that the posts of Assistant Registrar and Court Masters should be  merged.  The question as regard merger of the two posts was within the  exclusive domain of the Chief Justice.  Whether the post of  Assistant  Registrar should be a promotional post or not, thus, could not fall for  decision of the  Central Government.

In Tarsem Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and Others [(1994) 5  SCC 392], this Court held :

"Promotion as understood under the service law  jurisprudence  means advancement in rank, grade  or both.  Promotion is always a step towards  advancement to a higher possession, grade or  honour.  Opting to come to a lower pay scale or  lower post cannot be considered a promotion, it is  rather a demotion.  A Superintendent in the Labour  Department who is holding a higher pay scale and  higher status cannot seek promotion to the post of  Labour Inspector which post is lower in grade and  status.  Since a ministerial employee - under rule  8(1)(a)(i) - can be appointed as Labour Inspector  only by the process of promotion, a Superintendent  who is in a higher pay scale, cannot seek  promotion to the post of Labour Inspector and as  such is not eligible for the same under rule

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 22  

8(1)(a)(i).  Even otherwise it is difficult to  comprehend why a person drawing a higher pay  scale and enjoying a better status as a civil servant  should hanker for a post which is carrying lesser  pay and is comparatively of lower status."

If the nature of duties performed by the Assistant Registrars had been  more onerous than the Court Masters, a higher scale of pay was required to  be fixed.  The Appellant, therefore, took a stand before the High Court  which was patently unsustainable.

Furthermore, merger of the cadres must be made in terms of the  statutory rules.  For the said purpose, an order is required to be passed.  Conjectures  or  surmises in such a situation had no role to play.

In view of the aforementioned decision, the Chief Justice was entitled  to hold the opinion that hierarchy of the posts was required to be maintained  in respect whereof the necessary scales of pay could be directed to be  revised.

In State of U.P. Vs. C.M. Agarwal [(1997) 5 SCC 1], a Constitution  Bench of this Court categorically held that the Chief Justice of a High Court  has the power to create posts.

In High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal  and Another [1998 (3) SCC 72], a Division bench of this Court inter alia  held that the Chief Justice has the requisite power to revise the scales of pay  subject of course to the approval granted in this behalf by the Governor.   This Court in no certain terms observed :

"We again reiterate the hope and feel that once the  Chief Justice, in the interest of High Court  administration, has taken a progressive step  specially to ameliorate the service conditions of  the officers and staff working under him, the State  government would hardly raise any objection to  the sanction of creation of posts or fixation of  salary payable for that post or the recommendation  for revision of scale of pay if the scale of pay of  the equivalent post in the Government has been  revised."

In State of Maharashtra Vs. Association of Court Stenos, PA, PS and  Anr. [(2002) 2 SCC 141], this Court interpreted the provisions Article 229  and proviso appended thereto in the following terms :

"On a plain reading of Article 229(2), it is apparent  that the Chief Justice is the sole authority for  fixing the salaries etc. of the employees of the  High Court, subject to the Rules made under the  said article. Needless to mention rules made by the  Chief Justice will be subject to the provisions of  any law made by the legislature of the State.  In  view of proviso to sub-article (2) of Article 229,  any rule relating to the salaries, allowances, leave  or pension of the employees of the High Court  would require the approval of the governor, before  the same can be enforced.  The approval of the  governor, therefore, is a condition precedent to the  validity of the rules made by the Chief Justice and  the so-called approval of the Governor is not on  his discretion, but being advised by the  Government.   It would, therefore, be logical to  hold that apart from any power conferred by the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 22  

rules framed under Article 229, the Government  cannot fix the salary or authorise any particular  pay scale of an employee of the High Court.  It is  not the case of the employees that the Chief Justice  made any rules, providing a particular pay scale  for the employees of the Court, in accordance with  the constitutional provisions and that has not been  accepted by the governor.  In the aforesaid  premises, it requires consideration as to whether  the High Court in its discretionary jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution, can itself  examine the nature of work discharged by its  employees and issue a mandamus, directing a  particular pay scale to be given to such employees.   In the judgment under challenge, the Court appears  to have applied the principle of "equal pay for  equal work" and on an evaluation of the nature of  duties discharged by the Court Stenographers,  Personal Assistants and Personal Secretaries, has  issued the impugned directions. In Supreme Court  Employees’ Welfare Asson.  V. Union of India this  Court has considered the powers of the Chief  Justice of India in relation to the employees of the  Supreme Court in the matter of laying down the  service conditions of the employees of the Court,  including the grant of pay scale and observed that  the Chief Justice of India should frame rules after  taking into consideration all relevant factors  including the recommendations of the Pay  Commission and submit the same to the President  of India for his approval.  What has been stated in  the aforesaid judgment in relation to the Chief  Justice of India vis-‘-vis the employees of the  Supreme Court, should equally apply to the Chief  Justice of the High Court vis-‘-vis the employees  of the High Court.  Needless to mention,  notwithstanding the constitutional provision that  the rules framed by the Chief Justice of a High  Court, so far as they relate to salaries and other  emoluments are concerned, require the prior  approval of the Governor. It is always expected  that when the Chief Justice of  a High Court makes  a rule, providing a particular pay scale for its  employees, the same should be ordinarily  approved by the Governor, unless there is any  justifiable reason, not to approve the same.  The  aforesaid assumption is on the basis that a high  functionary like the Chief Justice, before framing  any rules in relation to the service conditions of the  employees of the Court and granting any pay scale  for them is expected to consider all relevant factors  and fixation is made, not on any arbitrary basis."

                       [Emphasis supplied]

In High Court Employees Welfare Association, Calcutta and others  Vs. State of West Bengal and Others [2003 AIR SCW 6338] a Bench of this  Court observed:

"The Government will have to bear in mind the  special nature of the work done in the High Court  of which the Chief Justice and his colleagues alone  could really appreciate.  If the erdGovernment  does not desire to meet the needs of the High  Court, the administration of the High Court will

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 22  

face severe crisis."

THE APPELLANT’S DUTY: In this case, the appellants admittedly have failed and/or neglected to  perform a constitutional duty.   

In P.N. Chopra (Supra) Rajindar Sachar, J. (as the learned Chief  Justice then was) held:

"As a result we are quite satisfied that the refusal to  equate the Private Secretaries and Readers of this  Court with the Private Secretary to the Chief  Secretary in the matter of pay scale is so arbitrary as  to amount to an act of discrimination.  We would,  therefore, in the circumstances quash Annexures ‘G’  and ‘H’ and the latest decision communicated on  7.8.1979 (R-2 filed in reply by the Delhi  Administration).  A mandamus will, therefore, issue  directing the respondents 1 & 4 to equate the posts of  Private Secretaries and the Readers of Judges of this  court to that of a Private Secretary to the Chief  Secretary, Delhi Administration.  This will take effect  from 1.1.1973 in terms of the decision already taken  by the Government of India, as mentioned in their  memoranda of 8.8.1975 and 22.8.1975 (Annexures  ‘G’ & ‘H’ - to the petition."

Decisions of this Court, as discussed hereinbefore, in no unmistakable  terms suggest that it is the primary duty of the Union of India or the  concerned State normally to accept the suggestion made by a holder of a  high office like a Chief Justice of  a High Court and differ with his  recommendations only in exceptional cases.  The reason for differing with  the opinion of the holder of such high office must be cogent and sufficient.   Even in case of such difference of opinion, the authorities must discuss  amongst themselves and try to iron out the differences.  The appellant  unfortunately did not perform its own duties.

In a matter of this nature the Appellant,  with a view to show that its  action is reasonable, was bound to perform its duties within a reasonable  time.  Reasonableness being the core of Article 14 of the Constitution of  India would imply that the constitutional duties be performed within a  reasonable time so as to satisfy the test of reasonableness adumbrated under  Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

It has to be further borne in mind that it is not always helpful to raise  the question of financial implications vis-‘-vis the effect of grant of a  particular scale of pay to the officers of the High Court on the ground that  the same would have adverse effect on the other employees of the State.   Scale of pay is fixed on certain norms; one of them being the quantum of  work undertaken by the officers concerned as well as  the extent of  efficiency, integrity, etc. required to be maintained by the holder of such  office.  This aspect of the matter has been highlighted by this Court in the  case of the judicial officers in All India Judges’ Association Vs Union of  India and Others [(1992) 1 SCC 119] and [(2002) 4 SCC 247] as well as the  report of the Shetty Commission.

CONCLUSION The matter as regard fixation of scale of pay of the officers working in  the different High Courts must either be examined by an expert body like  Pay Commission or any other body but in absence of constitution of any  such expert body the High Court itself is to undertake the task keeping in  view the special constitutional provisions existing in this behalf in terms of  Article 229 of the Constitution of India.

We agree with the submission of the Learned Addl. Solicitor General

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 22  

to the effect that the decision of the High Court had been rendered having its  origin in A.K. Gulati (CW.289/91) which had a spiraling  effect particularly  in the case of Assistant Registrars.  That was more a reason why a competent    authority of the appellant should have taken immediate steps in holding a  meeting with the Chief Justice or an authorized officer of the High Court.

Having regard to the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of  this Court there cannot be any doubt  whatsoever that the recommendations  of the Chief Justice should ordinarily be approved by the State  and refusal  thereof must be for strong and adequate reasons. In this case the appellants  even addressed itself on the recommendations made by the High Court.   They could not have treated the matter lightly.  It is unfortunate that the  recommendations made by a high functionary like the Chief Justice were not  promptly attended to and the  private respondents had to file a writ petition.  The question as regard fixation of a revision of the scale of pay of the High  Court being  within exclusive domain of the Chief Justice of the High Court,  subject to the approval, the State is expected to accept the same  recommendations save and except for good and cogent reasons.

The High Court, however, should not ordinarily issue a writ of or in  the nature of mandamus and ought to  refer the matter back to the Central/  State Government with suitable directions pointing out the irrelevant factors  which are required to be excluded  in taking the decision and the relevant  factors which are required to be considered therefor.  The statutory duties  should be allowed to be performed by the statutory authorities at the first  instance.  In the event, however, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the  State are not  ad idem, the matter should be discussed and an effort should  be made to arrive at a consensus.

We are further of the opinion that only in exceptional cases the High  Court may interfere on the judicial side, but ordinarily it would not do so.   Even if an occasion arises for the High Court to interfere on its judicial side,  the jurisdiction of the High Court should be exercised with care and  circumspection.

As the matter has been pending for a long time and keeping in view  the fact and the situation obtaining herein, namely, the officers holding the  post of Private Secretaries to the Judges have been given a particular scale of  pay, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case wherein this Court should  exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

This appeal is accordingly dismissed.  In  the facts and circumstances  of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###                                                                    Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                             

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 22  

#Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                             

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 22  

#Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                             

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 22  

#Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622#4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI#Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey andS 25734 Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited                              #Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh   #2003-11-25#25622# 4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI # Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN. ###                                                                 Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey and Ors.                      

#State of Bihar                                          #2003-11-25#25623# 104-106#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                              Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  10906 of 1996#1996#Shanti Kumar Panda                                          #Shakutala Devi                                          #2003-11-03#25624# 10906#R.C. LAHOTI # ASHOK BHAN. ###                                                                                                         Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  11483 of 1996#1996#Amrendra Pratap Singh                      

#Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.                       #2003-11-21#25625# 11483#R.C. LAHOTI # ASHOK BHAN. ###                                                                                     Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  9130 of 2003#2003#Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd.              

#Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd.                          #2003-11-18#25626# 9130#CJI# S.B. Sinha # AR. Lakshmanan. ##                                                                            Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  14178-14184 of 1996#1996#Brij Behari Sahai (Dead) through L.R s., etc. etc.                      #State of Uttar Pradesh                                    #2003-11-28#25627# 14178-14184#Do raiswamy Raju # Arijit Pasayat. ### Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  1968 of 1996#1996#Goa Plast (P) Ltd.                                                   #Chico Ursula D’Souza                                                   #2003-11-20#25628# 1968#B.P. Singh # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan ###                                                                           Writ Petition (crl.)#Writ Petition (crl.)  199 of 2003#2003#Ashok Kumar Pandey #The State of West Bengal #2003-11-18#25629# 199#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                         

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 22  

Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  20 of 2003#2003#Surendra Paswan                                          #State of Jharkhand                                              #2003-11-28#25630# 20#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                                        Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  278 of 1997#1997#Vidyadharan                                                     #State of Kerala                                                         #2003-11-14#25631# 278#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                                           Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  292 of 1997#1997#State of Madhya Pradesh. #Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors.                    #2003-11-18#25632# 292#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                          ###State of Punjab & Anr.                                        #M/s Devans Modern Brewaries Ltd. & Anr.                         #2003-11-20#25633##CJI.# R.C. Lahoti # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan. ##                                                                                                                        Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  331 of 1997#1997#Shriram                                                         #State of Madhya Pradesh                                         #2003-11-24#25634# 331#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                                        Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  3630-3631 of 2003#2003#The Prohibition & Excise Supdt., A.P.  & Ors.                            #Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally  & Ors.          #2003-11-17#25635# 3630-3631#CJI. #Dr. AR. Lakshmanan ###              Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  371-372 of 2003#2003#Ram Dular Rai & Ors.                                #State of Bihar                                          #2003-11-27#25636# 371-372#S.B. Sinha. ####                                                                                                                  Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4075-4081 of 1998#1998#Nair Service Society                                                  #Dist. Officer, Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors.  #2003-11-17#25637# 4075-4081#CJI. # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan. ###                                          Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  4698-4700 of 1994#1994#State of U.P. & Ors.                                          #Lalji Tandon (Dead)                                            #2003-11-03#25638# 4698-4700#R.C. LAHOTI #  ASHOK BHAN  ###                                            Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  506 of 1997#1997#State of Karnataka                                              #Puttaraja                                                       #2003-11-27#25639# 506#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                                           Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  519-521 of 2003#2003#Goura Venkata Reddy                                Vs. #State of Andhra Pradesh                                         #2003-11-19#25640# 519-521#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                  Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  530-531 of 2003#2003#Bhargavan & Ors.                                            #State of Kerala                                                 #2003-11-17#25641# 530-531#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                                                               

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 22  

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  7371 of 2002#2002#N.D. Thandani (Dead) By Lrs.                                 #Arnavaz Rustom Printer & Anr.                              #2003-11-24#25642# 7371#R.C. LAHOTI # ASHOK BHAN. ###                                                                          Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  9205-07 of 2003#2003#The Land Acquisition Officer, Nizamabad,  District, Andhra Pradesh        #Nookala Rajamallu and Ors.                              #2003-11-21#25643# 9205-07#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                        Transfer Petition (crl.)#Transfer Petition (crl.)  77-78 of 2003#2003#K. Anbazhagan                                                   #The Superintendent of Police & ors.     #2003-11-18#25644# 77-78#S.N. VARIAVA # H.K. SEMA. ###                                                  Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  7868 of 1995#1995#ITW Signode India Ltd.                               #Collector of Central Excise                     #2003-11-19#25645# 7868#CJI# S.B. Sinha # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan. ##                                                                                  Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  857 of 1998#1998#Shyam Singh #Daryao Singh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors               #2003-11-19#25646# 857#Shivaraj V. Patil # D.M. Dharmadhikari. ###                                                                                             Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  3630-3631 of 2003#2003#Prohibition & Excise Supdt. A.P. & Ors .                #Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally & Ors.                                             

#2003-11-17#25647# 3630-3631#S.B. Sinha          ####                                                      Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  62-65 of 1999#1999#Pramod K. Pankaj                                            #State of Bihar and Ors.                                           #2003-11-20#25648# 62-65#CJI# # S.B. Sinha. ##                                                                                                  Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  8232 of 1996#1996#Hindustan Lever & Anr.                                               #State of Maharashtra & Anr.                                     #2003-11-18#25649# 8232#R.C. Lahoti # Ashok Bhan. ###                                                                                        Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  5337-5339 of 1999#1999#Manager, Nirmala Senior, Secondary Sch ool, Port Blair          #N.I. Khan & Ors.                                                #2003-11-21#25650# 5337-5339#SHIVARAJ V. PATIL # ARIJIT PASAYAT. ###                                                     Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  9131 of 2003#2003#Rekha Mukherjee                                                      #Ashish Kumar Das & Anr.                                         #2003-11-18#25651# 9131#CJI# S.B. Sinha # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan. ##                                                                                         Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  3130 of 2002#2002#Ashan Devi & Anr.                                    #Phulwasi Devi & Ors.            #2003-11-19#25652# 3130#Shivaraj V. Patil # D.M. Dharmadhikari. ###                                                                                        Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  7096 of 2000#2000#Smt. Lila Ghosh (Dead) through LR, Shri Tap as Chandra Roy #The State of West Bengal                #2003-11-18#25653# 7096#S. N. Variava # H. K. Sema. ###                                                                 ###Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.                    #State of Bihar & Ors.                           #2003-11-19#25654##Brijesh Kumar # Arun Kumar.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 22  

###                                                                                                                                         Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.)  115-120 of 2002#2002#R. Sai Bharathi                                                     #J. Jayalalitha & Ors.                                           #2003-11-24#25655# 115-120#S. RAJENDRA BABU  # P. VENKATARAMA REDDI ###                                                                                 Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil)  9136-9137 of 2003#2003#M/s.Sathyanarayana Brothers (P) Ltd.          #Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board  #2003-11-18#25656# 9136-9137#Brijesh Kumar # (Arun Kumar. ###