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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAM KISHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1971

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1402            1971 SCR  753  1971 SCC  (2) 349  CITATOR INFO :  D          1988 SC 805  (10)  D          1989 SC 811  (10)

ACT: Punjab Police Rules, r. 16. 38-Dismissal of foot  constable- Order  of  dismissal by Superintendent of  Police  (Traffic) competent-Order  illegal for non-compliance with first  Part of r. 16, 38.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent, a foot constable, filed a suit  challenging his dismissal on the main grounds (i) the Superintendent  of Police  (Traffic)  was not competent to pass  the  order  of dismissal; and (ii) the order was illegal as the  provisions of  Punjab  Police Rule 16.38 were not complied  with.   The Sub-Judge upheld the first ground and decreed the suit.   On the second ground it was held that the necessary  permission for  taking  departmental  action  was  obtained  from   the District  Magistrate.  On appeal the High  Court,  following its earlier decision held that the Superintendent of  Police (Traffic)  was  not  competent to  dismiss  the  respondent. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  :  (i)  The  first ground  is  concluded  against  the plaintiff (respondent) by a decision of this Court in  Union of India v. Jagjit Singh. [754H] (ii)However  the  appeal must fail on the ground  that  the provisions of r. 16.38 were not complied with in this  case. No   immediate  information  was  given  to   the   District Magistrate in respect of the complaint received against  the plaintiff nor did the District Magistrate decide whether the investigation  shall  be conducted by a police  officer,  or made over to a selected magistrate having 1st Class  powers. No   doubt  the  District  Magistrate  purported   to   give permission under sub-r. 2 of r. 16.38, but as the first part of  the rule was not complied with at all  the  departmental inquiry  is  vitiated  and the order of  dismissal  must  be declared illegal. [754H, 756D] Union of India v. jagjit Singh, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 163, 168 and Delhi  Administration v. Chanan Shah, [1969] 3  S.C.R.  658,

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referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 571 of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated October 12, 1966 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench  at Delhi in Regular Second Appeal No. 28-D of 1966. R.   N. Sachthey, for the appellant. N.   D. Bali and D. D. Sharma, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was- delivered by Sikri, C. J.-The respondent Ram Kishan, hereinafter referred to  as the plaintiff, a Foot Constable, filed a suit in  the Court 48-1 S.C. India/71 754 of  Sub-Judge  1st Class, Delhi, challenging  his  dismissal from  service  by an order dated 25th October,  1960.   This order  was  passed by Shri M. K. Saxena,  Superintendent  of Police  (Traffic), Delhi.  It was alleged by  the  plaintiff that this order was bad and illegal on various grounds.  Two grounds pay be mentioned here : (1) That Shri M. K.  Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi was not a District Superintendent of Police, (2) That the mandatory  provisions of Punjab Police Rule 16.38 had been violated inasmuch as no information  was  given to the District Magistrate  as  laid down  in  the Punjab Police Rule 16.38(1) and  the  District Magistrate    never   decided   whether   the    preliminary investigation  was  to be conducted by the police  or  by  a selected Magistrate 1st Class.  It was further alleged  that even  the provisions of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 16.38 were  not observed.   The learned Sub-Judge decreed the suit and  gave a, declaration that the dismissal of the plaintiff was void. A  decree  for Rs. 1151/- was passed in favour of  the  Foot Constable’  Among other issues framed, the following  issues may be noticed:               (1)Whether  the  Superintendent  of  Police               (Traffic)  was  not  competent  to  pass   the               impugned order as alleged ?               (2)   Whether  the provisions of  Rules  16-38               and               16.24of the Punjab Police Rules were  complied               with by the defendant ? If not, to what effect               ? The  learned Sub-Judge held and decided issue No. 1  against the  Government  and  held  the order  of  dismissal  to  be vitiated.   Regarding  issue No. 2, however,  he  held  that there  was a complete compliance of Rule 16.24.  He  further held  that  even  as  regards  Rule  16.38,  the   necessary permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi for taking  the departmental action against the plaintiff was obtained  from the District Magistrate vide Ex.  P.9A. The  Government filed an appeal and the Additional  District Judge dismissed the appeal. The  Government then filed an appeal before the High  Court. Mehar  Singh,,  J. following an earlier decision(1)  of  the Division  Bench of that Court dated March 4, 1964 held  that Mr. M. K. Saxena, Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Delhi, was  not  competent to dismiss the plaintiff.   The  learned Judge  did not give leave to file Letters Patent Appeal  and the Government having obtained Special Leave, the appeal  is now before us. The first issue is now concluded against the plaintiff by  a decision of this Court in the case Union of India v.  Jagjit

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Singh (2).  However, the appeal must fail on the ground that the (1)Union of India v. Ram Kishan-Regular Second Appeal  No. 258-D of 1962. (2)[1970] 1 S.C. R. 163, 168. 755 provisions  of  Rule 16.38 were not complied  with  in  this case.  In a similar case Delhi Admn. v. Chanan Shah(1)  this Court observed               "It  is hot necessary to decide in  this  case               whether  the provisions of Rule 16.38  of  the               Punjab   Police   Rules   are   mandatory   or               directory.   Even  assuming that the  rule  is               directory  we  find  that there  has  been  no               substantial  compliance with  its  provisions.               The complaint fell, within rule 16.38, and  it               was for the District Magistrate to decide  who               should investigate the case.  No investigation               of  any  kind was made under  his  directions.               Without   obtaining   his   directions,    the               Superintendent  of Police held an inquiry  and               passed an order of censure.  The order was set               aside   by   the   Deputy   Inspector-General.               Thereafter  by  D. O. letter No.  2165-C,  the               Superintendent   of  Police,  asked  for   the               sanction of the District Magistrate to proceed               departmentally.   Even  at  this  stage,   the               District Magistrate was not informed that  the               Superintendent  of Police held an inquiry  and               passed an order of censure and that his  order               was set aside by the Deputy Inspector-General.               The  inquiry  held by  the  Superintendent  of               Police  was  not authorised  by  the  District               Magistrate  nor did it receive  his  approval.               The  District  Magistrate  gave  his  sanction               without  recording  any  reasons  and  without                             applying  his  mind to the  requiremen t  of  r.               16.38.   In   the   circumstances,   we    are               constrained  to  hold  that  the  departmental               action   taken  against  the   respondent   is               invalid." In  this case the permission relied on by the Government  is in following terms:                            "MEMO               Referring your memorandum No. 4425/T dated the               8th February, 1960 on the subject noted above.               I  agree  to departmental action  being  taken               against F. C. Ram Kishan No. 4494."               We  may here reproduce relevant part  of  Rule               16.38.               "16.38.  (1).  Immediate information shall  be               given  to  the  District  Magistrate  of   any               complaint received by (1)  [1969] 3 S.C.R. 658. 756               the Superintendent of Police, which  indicates               the  commission  by  a  police  officer  of  a               criminal   offence  in  connection  with   his               official  relations  with  the  public.    The               District  Magistrate will decide  whether  the               investigation   of  the  complaint  shall   be               conducted by a police officer, or made over to               a selected Magistrate having 1st class powers.               (2). When investigation, of such a  complaint

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             establishes aprima  facie case, a  judicial               prosecution shall normally follow; the  matter               shall  be disposed of departmentally  only  if               the District Magistrate so orders for  reasons               to be recorded.  When it is decided to proceed               de’partmentally  the procedure  prescribed  in               rule  16.24  shall be  followed.   An  officer               found  guilty  on  a  charge  of  the   nature               referred  to in this rule shall ordinarily  be               dismissed. " In  the present case no immediate information was  given  to the District Magistrate in respect of the complaint received against the plaintiff nor did the District Magistrate decide whether   the  investigation  of  the  complaint  shall   be conducted  by a police officer, or made over to  a  selected magistrate  having  1st class powers.  It is true  that  the District Magistrate purported to give permission under  sub- Rule  2 of Rule 16.38 but as the 1st part of the  Rule  was not  complied  with  at  all  the  departmental  inquiry  is vitiated  and  the  order  of  dismissal  must  be  declared illegal.  In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs. K.B.N.                             Appeal dismissed. 757