16 July 2010
Supreme Court
Download

UNION OF INDIA Vs PRITILATA NANDA

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-005646-005646 / 2010
Diary number: 9210 / 2009
Advocates: SUSHMA SURI Vs


1

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO.5646  OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.12866 of 2009)

Union of India and others         …. Appellants

Versus  

Miss Pritilata Nanda          …. Respondent

O R D E R

Leave granted.

The  only  question  which  arises  for  consideration  in  this  

appeal filed by the Union of India and four functionaries of South  

Eastern Railway against the order of the Division Bench of Orissa  

High Court is whether respondent – Miss Pritilata Nanda, who is  

physically handicapped, could be denied appointment on Class III  

post despite her selection by the competent authority only on the  

ground that she did not get her name sponsored by an employment  

exchange.

Since the inception of mankind, many lacs have suffered from  

different  types  of  physical  handicaps  (today  about  600  million  

people suffer from such handicaps), but many of them overcame all

2

kinds of handicaps and achieved distinctions in various fields.  

Sarah Bernhardt – French actress was disabled by a knee injury.  

Her leg was amputated in 1914 but she continued to work on stage  

until just before her death.  Beethoven was deaf when he composed  

his 9th symphony.  Winston Churchill, Walt Disney, Thomas Edison,  

Albert Einstein, Alexander Graham Bell, Nelson Rockefeller, George  

Washington and many others had learning disability.  Stevie Wonder  

who was blinded during his childhood became world famous pianist  

and  singer.   Brail,  who  was  a  blind,  had  the  distinction  of  

inventing script for the blind.  With the aid of brail script, a  

large  number  of  physically  handicapped  (blind)  made  tremendous  

achievement in life.  Dr. Hellen Keller who was blind became an  

international figure because despite her handicap, she discovered  

the world through her finger tips.  Her achievements of difficult  

goals and her loving kindness made her life an inspiration for  

countless people all over the world.  Expressing his admiration for  

Dr.  Hellen  Keller,  Eleanor  Roosevelt  wrote  “in  her  life  and  

happiness in life, Miss Keller has taught an unforgettable lesson  

to the rest of us who would not have had such difficulties to  

overcome.  Ralph Barton Perry in his introduction to Dr. Keller’s  

book ‘The Story of My Life’ wrote “it is true that Hellen Keller is  

handicapped as indeed, who is not but that which distinguishes her  

is not her handicap but the extent to which she has overcome it and  

even profited by it.  She calls for sympathy and understanding and  

not  pity.   No  one  can  know  her  or  read  her  without  feeling  

admiration and gratitude.  Soordas and Milton, both of whom were

3

blind  made  poetry  great  by  their  brilliance  and  richness  of  

thoughts and language.  Edison, a great scientist and inventor was  

deaf.  Byron, a great poet of England and Taimoor Leng, Mangolian  

warrior were lame.  Maharaja Ranjit Singh, a great warrior and  

administrator was handicapped in eye sight.  Mr. Mukat Behari Lal,  

a renowned and eminent advocate of the country, who became blind at  

a young age acquired phenomenal memory and argued cases after cases  

with  extraordinary  brilliance.   He  also  remained  member  of  

Parliament  for  two  decades  and  did  not  face  any  difficulty  in  

discharging his role in that capacity.  

The framers of the Constitution recognized the necessity of  

providing  assistance  to  the  physically  challenged  by  making  it  

obligatory  for  the  State,  within  the  limits  of  its  economic  

capacity and development, to make effective provision for securing  

the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases  

of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other  

cases of undeserved want. (Article 41).  

In Jacob M. Puthuparambil and others v. Kerala Water Authority  

and others (1991) 1 SCC 28, this Court highlighted the importance  

of both, Part III and Part IV of the Constitution in the following  

words:  

“The Preamble of our Constitution obligates the  State to secure to all its citizens social and  economic justice, besides political justice. By  the Forty-second Amendment, the Preamble of the  Constitution was amended to say that ours will be  a socialistic democracy. In furtherance of these

4

promises  certain  fundamental  rights  were  engrafted in Part III of the Constitution. The  Constitution  guarantees  ‘equality’,  abhors  discrimination,  prohibits  and  penalises  forced  labour  in  any  form  whatsoever  and  extends  protection  against  exploitation  of  labour  including  child  labour.  After  extending  these  guarantees,  amongst  others,  the  Constitution  makers proceeded to chart out the course for the  governance  of  the  country  in  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution  entitled  ‘Directive  Principles  of  State Policy’. These principles reflect the hopes  and  aspirations  of  the  people.  Although  the  provisions of this part are not enforceable by  any court, the principles laid down therein are  nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the  country and the State is under an obligation to  apply them in making laws. The principles laid  down  therein,  therefore,  define  the  objectives  and  goals  which  the  State  must  endeavour  to  achieve  over  a  period  of  time.  Therefore,  whenever the State is required to make laws it  must  do  so  consistently  with  these  principles  with  a  view  to  securing  social  and  economic  freedom so essential for the establishment of an  egalitarian  society.  This  part,  therefore,  mandates that the State shall strive to promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  by  minimising  the  inequalities  in  income  and  eliminating  inequalities  in  status,  facilities  and  opportunities;  by  directing  its  policy  towards  securing, amongst others, the distribution of the  material resources of the community to subserve  the  common  good;  by  so  operating  the  economic  system  as  not  to  result  in  concentration  of  wealth;  and  by  making  effective  provision  for  securing  the  right  to  work  as  also  to  public  assistance  in  cases  of  unemployment,  albeit  within  the  limits  of  its  economic  capacities.  There are certain other provisions which enjoin  on the State certain duties, e.g. securing to all  workers  work,  a  living  wage,  just  and  humane  conditions of work, a decent standard of life,  participation in management, etc. which are aimed  at improving the lot of the working classes. Thus  the Preamble promises socio-economic justice, the  fundamental  rights  confer  certain  justiciable  socio-economic  rights  and  the  Directive  Principles fix the socio-economic goals which the  State must strive to attain. These three together  constitute  the  core  and  conscience  of  the  Constitution.”

5

In  last  about  six  decades,  the  Parliament  and  State  

Legislatures have enacted several laws for giving effect to the  

provisions  contained  in  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution  but  

implementation of these legislations has been extremely tardy and  

intended beneficiaries of such legislations have to struggle hard  

and, at times, seek intervention of the Court for getting their  

dues.   

In one of her lectures, Dr. Hellen Keller said: Science may  

have found a cure for most evils; but it has found no remedy for  

the worst of them all – the apathy of human beings.  This appeal is  

one of many cases illustrative of lack of sensitivity on the part  

of  those  entrusted  with  the  task  of  doing  justice  on  the  

administrative side which is sine qua non for good governance. The  

respondent, who suffers from paralysis of lower limbs, has become a  

victim of constitutionally flawed approach adopted by the officers  

of South Eastern Railway and has been deprived of her legitimate  

right to be appointed on a Class III post.  The respondent appears  

to have become so frustrated that even though she succeeded in  

convincing the High Court to issue a direction to the competent  

authority to appoint her on a Class III post with retrospective  

effect, she has not thought it proper to appear and contest this  

appeal filed against order dated 5.8.2008 passed by the Division  

Bench of Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No.9958/2001.  

In response to notification / advertisement dated 31.1.1987

6

issued by the office of Railway Divisional Manager, South Eastern  

Railway, Khurda Road, the respondent applied for appointment as  

Class  III  employee.   At  the  relevant  time,  she  possessed  the  

qualification of B.A. (Economics with Hons.) and was registered  

with Employment Exchange, Pun with registration No.CW/750/87 (Code  

No.XOI/30).   

The  competent  authority  entertained  the  respondent’s  

application and allowed her to appear in the written test held on  

2.7.1989.  On being declared successful in the written test, the  

respondent was called for viva voce test.  She was finally selected  

and  her name was placed at serial No. 11 in the merit list.  

Notwithstanding this, she was not appointed against one of the  

advertised posts and those placed at Sl. Nos.12 and 13 were offered  

appointment.  The respondent represented her grievance before the  

higher authorities of South Eastern Railway, but without success.  

She then filed O.A. No. 112 of 1996 in Cuttack Bench of the Central  

Administrative Tribunal (for short, `the Tribunal’).  The Tribunal  

passed  an  interim  order  and  made  it  clear  that  any  future  

appointment of physically handicapped candidate will be subject to  

the  result of  the O.A.   During  the pendency  of the  case, the  

respondent’s father was informed by General Manager, South Eastern  

Railway, Caluctta that his daughter’s case would be considered only  

if the O.A. is withdrawn.  Thereupon, the respondent withdrew O.A.  

No.  112  of  1996.   However,  her  candidature  was  not  considered  

necessitating filing of O.A. No. 198 of 1997 in which she prayed

7

for issue of a direction to the concerned authorities of South  

Eastern Railway to appoint her on a class III post.  In the counter  

filed by the appellants herein, it was pleaded that even though the  

respondent  had  been  selected,  she  was  not  offered  appointment  

because  her  candidature  had  not  been  sponsored  by  any  special  

employment exchange or any ordinary employment exchange.   

By  an  order  dated  3.5.2001,  the  Tribunal  dismissed  O.A.  

No.198/1997  by  observing  that  respondent’s  candidature  was  not  

sponsored by any employment exchange.  The Tribunal distinguished  

the judgments of this Court in Excise Superintendent, Malkapatnam,  

Krishna District, A.P.  v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao and others (1996)  

6 SCC 216 and of the Orissa High Court in Susanta Kumar Kar v.  

Registrar (Judicial), Orissa High Court, Cuttack, 83(1997) CLT 335  

by making the following observations:

“In support of his contention the learned counsel  for the petitioner has relied on the decision of  the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in the case of  Susanta  Kumar  Kar  vs.  Registrar  (Judicial),  Orissa High Court, Cuttack, 83(1997) CLT 335.  In  that case, going by the decision of the Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  ion  the  case  of  Excise  Superintendent,  Malkapatnam,  Krishna  District,  Andhra Pradesh vs. KBN Viweshwara Rao and others,  19965 (7) SCC 201, the Hon’ble High Court have  held that for the post of Junior Assistant in the  High  Court  of  Orissa,  compulsory  sponsoring  arrangement by employment exchange, if insisted  upon, affects interests of those candidates who  have not been able to register their names or are  awaiting to be so registered, and therefore, the  opposite  parties  were  directed  to  consider  the  cases  of  those  candidates  who  have  applied  directly to the High Court.  IN the instant case,  the respondents in their counter have stated that

8

applications  were  invited  in  1987  and  written  test held on 2.7.1989 and viva voce was held on  28.8.1989  and  6.11.1989.   Thus,  the  selection  process in this was undertaken much before the  decision  of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  and  therefore the law as laid down by the Hon’ble  Supreme Court in the above case is not applicable  to the present case.  We accept the above stand  of the respondents.”

The  respondent  challenged  the  aforesaid  order  in  O.J.C.  

No.9958/2001.  The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the  

pleadings of the parties and observed:

“In  view  of  the  aforesaid  stand  taken  by  the  Railway  authority,  the  averments  made  by  the  petitioner remain uncontroverted and are affirmed.  The recruitment process started in the year 1987  through an advertisement and thereafter, written  test and viva voce test were held in the year 1989  and the select list of candidates was published on  14.1.1992.  It is indeed necessary to note the  very sorry state of affairs of the manner in which  the  authorities  concerned  are  dealing  with  the  life and livelihood of common citizens.  It needs  to be reiterated that whereas physical handicapped  candidates are required to be approached with a  more compassionate manner, the authorities seem to  have acted in a callous and heartless manner.

Once the petitioner’s application was accepted by  the authorities and she was allowed to appear in  the written and viva voce tests and after name  find mention at serial No.11 of the merit list, it  was no longer open to the authorities concerned to  raise  any  question  relating  to  petitioner’s  application for the purpose of dis-entitling her  from  the  benefit  of  issuing  her  with  an  appointment letter.  We consider it to be a gross  abuse of the statutory power.  In the case at  hand, the plight of the petitioner is writ large  in the averments contained in the writ application  and accompanying documents and unfortunately, the  utter callous attitude of the authorities are writ  large in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of  Opp. Party No.5.  It is indeed unfortunate that a  physically  handicapped  female  candidate  who  had  applied in the year 1989 and more than 20 years  have lapsed by now, has been denied appointment by  the Railway authorities which is none else, but

9

the Union of India, which is supposed to be an  ideal employer.”

The Division Bench then referred to the two judgments on which  

reliance was placed by the respondent and observed:

“It is reiterated herein that once the Court has  held  that  compulsory  sponsoring  arrangement  by  Employment  Exchange,  if  insisted  upon,  affects  interest of those candidates who have not been  able to register their names or are awaiting to  be so registered, the same principle is final and  binding on all courts and Judicial Tribunals and  would apply fully to any pending case.  We are of  the view that the Tribunal, in the present case  has approached the subject in pedantic manner by  treating  the  aforesaid  judgment  has  only  prospective operation even though the challenge  was pending before it even after the judgments  were pronounced both by the Hon’ble Supreme Court  and  the  High  Court.   It  is  averred  by  the  petitioner  and  not  denied  by  the  Opp.  Parties  that the petitioner had registered her name in  the  Employment  Exchange,  Puri  and  had  been  granted a Registration number. Apart from it, all  necessary certificates in support of her being a  handicapped  candidate  has  been  appended  to  her  application  along  with  her  certificates  of  educational qualification.

We  are  of  the  view  that  the  petitioner  satisfied all requirements of the advertisement  inviting applications by the Railways and after  accepting  her  application  and  ultimately  preparing a select list which contained her name,  not issuing appointment letter to her amounts to  travesty of justice.”

The Division Bench finally allowed the writ petition in the  

following terms:

“In view of the discussions made herein above,  the  writ  application  is  allowed  and  the  order  impugned  under  Annexure-1  is  quashed  and  we  direct  Opp.  Parties  4  and  5  to  issue  the  petitioner with necessary letter of appointment  and  such  appointment  shall  be  given  effect  to  from  the  date  on  which  her  juniors  have  been  given appointment.  We further direct that the  petitioner shall also be entitled to full back

10

wages and seniority.  The letter of appointment  be issued to the petitioner within a period of 30  (thirty) days from the date of this judgment and  all  arrears  be  computed  and  paid  to  the  petitioner  within  a  period  of  six  months  from  today.”

Shri Mohan Jain, learned Additional Solicitor General referred  

to the advertisement issued by the office of Divisional Railway  

Manager to show that the names of the candidates were required to  

be sponsored by any special or ordinary employment exchange and  

argued  that  the  appellants  rightly  refused  to  appoint  the  

respondent  because  her  name  had  not  been  sponsored  by  the  

employment exchange.  Learned Additional Solicitor General further  

argued  that  even  though  the  application  of  the  respondent  was  

entertained  without  insisting  on  sponsoring  her  name  by  the  

employment exchange and her name was included in the merit list,  

she did not acquire a to be appointed against the advertised post  

and  the  High  Court  committed  serious  error  by  ordaining  her  

appointment with retrospective effect along with monetary benefits.

In our opinion, there is no merit in the arguments of the  

learned  Additional  Solicitor  General.   In  the  first  place,  we  

consider it necessary to observe that the condition embodied in the  

advertisement that the candidate should get his/her name sponsored  

by  any  special  employment  exchange  or  any  ordinary  employment  

exchange cannot be equated with a mandatory provision incorporated  

in a statute, the violation of which may visit the concerned person  

with penal consequence.  The requirement of notifying the vacancies  

to the employment exchange is embodied in the Employment Exchanges

11

(Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short, `the  

1959 Act’), but there is nothing in the Act which obligates the  

employer to appoint only those who are sponsored by the employment  

exchange.   Section  4  of  the  1959  Act,  which  provides  for  

notification of vacancies to employment exchanges reads as under:

“4(1) After the commencement of this Act in any  State  or  area  thereof,  the  employer  in  every  establishment in public sector in that State or  area shall, before filling up any vacancy in any  employment  in  that  establishment,  notify  that  vacancy  to  such  employment  exchanges  as  may  be  prescribed.

(2)  The  appropriate  government  may,  by  notification in the Official Gazette, require that  from  such  date  as  may  be  specified  in  the  notification, the employer in every establishment  in  private  sector  or  every  establishment  pertaining  to  any  class  or  category  of  establishments  in  private  sector  shall,  before  filling up any vacancy in any employment in that  establishment,  notify  that  vacancy  to  such  employment exchanges as may be prescribed, and the  employer  shall  thereupon  comply  with  such  requisition.

(3) The manner in which the vacancies referred to  in  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2)  shall  be  notified  of  the  employment  exchanges  and  the  particulars of employments in which such vacancies  have occurred or are about to occur shall be such  as may be prescribed.

(4) Nothing in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be  deemed to impose any obligation upon any employer  to  recruit  any  person  through  the  employment  exchanges to fill any vacancy merely because that  vacancy has been notified under any of those sub- sections.”

A reading of the plain language of Section 4 makes it clear  

that even though the employer is required to notify the vacancies  

to the employment exchanges, it is not obliged to recruit only

12

those who are sponsored by the employment exchanges.  In Union of  

India v. N. Hargopal (1987) 3 SCC 308, this Court examined the  

scheme of the 1959 Act and observed:

“It is evident that there is no provision in the  Act which obliges an employer to make appointments  through the agency of the Employment Exchanges.  Far from it, Section 4(4) of the Act, on the other  hand, makes it explicitly clear that the employer  is  under  no  obligation  to  recruit  any  person  through  the  Employment  Exchanges  to  fill  in  a  vacancy  merely  because  that  vacancy  has  been  notified under Section 4(1) or Section 4(2). In  the face of Section 4(4), we consider it utterly  futile  for  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  to  argue  that  the  Act  imposes  any  obligation on the employers apart from notifying  the vacancies to the Employment Exchanges.”  

xxx xxx xxx xxx

“It is, therefore, clear that the object of the  Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field  of choice so that the employer may choose the best  and  the  most  efficient  and  to  provide  an  opportunity to the worker to have his claim for  appointment considered without the worker having  to knock at every door for employment.  We are,  therefore, firmly of the view that the Act does  not oblige any employer to employ those persons  only  who  have  been  sponsored  by  the  Employment  Exchanges.” (emphasis supplied)

In K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao’s case, a three-Judge Bench of this  

Court  considered  a  similar  question,  referred  to  an  earlier  

judgment in Union of India v. N. Hargopal (supra) and observed:

“It is common knowledge that many a candidate is  unable to have the names sponsored, though their  names are either registered or are waiting to be  registered in the employment exchange, with the  result that the choice of selection is restricted  to only such of the candidates whose names come to  be  sponsored  by  the  employment  exchange.  Under  these circumstances, many a deserving candidate is  deprived  of  the  right  to  be  considered  for

13

appointment to a post under the State. Better view  appears to be that it should be mandatory for the  requisitioning  authority/  establishment  to  intimate the employment exchange, and employment  exchange  should  sponsor  the  names  of  the  candidates to the requisitioning departments for  selection  strictly  according  to  seniority  and  reservation, as per requisition. In addition, the  appropriate  department  or  undertaking  or  establishment  should  call  for  the  names  by  publication  in  the  newspapers  having  wider  circulation  and  also  display  on  their  office  notice boards or announce on radio, television and  employment news bulletins; and then consider the  cases of all the candidates who have applied. If  this  procedure  is  adopted,  fair  play  would  be  subserved.  The  equality  of  opportunity  in  the  matter  of  employment  would  be  available  to  all  eligible candidates.”

By applying the ratio of the above noted judgments to the case  

in  hand,  we  hold  that  the  concerned  authorities  of  the  South  

Eastern Railway committed grave illegality by denying appointment  

to the respondent only on the ground that she did not get her name  

sponsored by an employment exchange.   

The issue deserves to be considered from another angle.  It  

was neither the pleaded case of the appellants before the Tribunal  

and the High Court nor any evidence was produced by them to prove  

that notification/advertisement dated 31.1.1987 was sent to all the  

employment exchanges including the special employment exchanges in  

the State of Orissa.  Before this Court also, no document has been  

produced  to  show  that  the  advertisement  was  circulated  to  the  

employment exchanges in the State.  In this backdrop, it is not  

possible  to  approve  the  stance  of  the  appellants  that  the

14

respondent  was  not  appointed  because  she  did  not  get  her  

candidature sponsored by an employment exchange.

We also agree with the High Court that once the candidature of  

the respondent was accepted by the concerned authorities and she  

was  allowed  to  participate  in  the  process  of  selection  i.e.,  

written test and viva voce, it was not open to them to turn around  

and question her entitlement to be considered for appointment as  

per her placement in the merit list on the specious ground that her  

name had not been sponsored by the employment exchange.   

In  our  considered  view,  by  denying  appointment  to  the  

respondent despite her selection and placement in the merit list,  

the appellants violated her right to equality in the matter of  

employment guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution.

However, there is a small aberration in the operative part of  

the impugned order.  While the High Court was fully justified in  

directing the appellants to appoint the respondent from the date  

persons lower in merit were appointed, but it is not possible to  

confirm  the  direction  given  for  payment  of  full  salary  with  

retrospective effect.  In our view, the High Court should have  

directed the appellants to notionally fix the pay of the respondent  

with effect from the date person placed at Sl. No.12 at the merit  

list was appointed and give her all monetary benefits with effect  

from that date.

15

In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  dismissed.   However,  the  

operative part of the impugned order is modified in the following  

terms:  

(1) The concerned competent authority of the South Eastern Railway  

shall,  within  a  period  of  two  weeks  from  today,  issue  order  

appointing the respondent on a Class III post.  The appointment of  

the respondent shall be made effective from the date person placed  

at Sl. Nos.12 in the merit list was appointed.  The pay of the  

respondent shall be notionally fixed with effect from that date and  

she  shall  be  given  actual  monetary  benefits  with  effect  from  

5.9.2008 i.e., the date specified in the order passed by the High  

Court.

(2) The pay of the respondent shall also be fixed in the revised  

pay scales introduced from time to time and she be paid arrears  

within a period of four months.

(3) The  seniority  of  the  respondent  among  Class  III  employees  

shall be fixed by placing her below the person who was placed at  

Sl. No.10 in the merit list.

(4) If during the intervening period, any person junior to the  

respondent has been promoted on the next higher post, then her  

candidature shall also be considered for promotion and on being  

found suitable, she shall be promoted with effect from the date any  

of  her  junior  was  promoted  and  she  be  given  all  consequential  

benefits.

(5) The  General  Manager,  South  Eastern  Railway  is  directed  to

16

ensure that the respondent is not victimised by being posted in a  

remote area.

(6) Since  the  respondent  has  been  deprived  of  her  rights  for  

almost  21  years,  we  direct  the  appellants  to  pay  her  cost  of  

Rs.3,00,000/-.  The amount of cost shall be paid within 2 months  

from today.

The Divisional Railway Manager, South Eastern Railway, Khurda  

Road shall send compliance report to this Court on or before 22nd  

November, 2010.  The Registry shall bring the report to the notice  

of the Court by listing the case on judicial side.

Copies of this order be sent to General Manager, South Eastern  

Railway, Garden Reach, Calcutta, Divisional Railway Manager (P),  

Khurda Road, Jatni, District Khurda and respondent, Miss Pritilata  

Nanda, D/o Mr. Nityananda Nanda, Nanda Nivas-II, Dutta Tola, Post  

Office/District – Puri, Orissa.

...….………………….………..J. [G.S. Singhvi]

……..…..…………………………J.  [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi July 16, 2010.