Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No.404 of 2013

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

P.S. GILL                                            …. Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

1. The Union of India is in Appeal against the judgment

of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi

(hereinafter,  ‘the  Tribunal’)  quashing  the  order  dated

23.02.2010, by which General Court Martial was convened

against the Respondent.   

2. In the year 2005, the Chief of the Army Staff directed

an investigation by the Court of Inquiry into the allegations

pertaining to irregularities in procurement of ration, as a

result of which the quality of supplies for the troops was

compromised.     A  Court  of  Inquiry  was  convened  on

10.10.2005  by  the  General  Officer  Commanding-in-Chief

(GOC-in-C)  Western  Command  to  identify  the  Army

personnel  responsible  for  the  aforementioned

1

irregularities.   Twenty-three witnesses were examined by

the Court of Inquiry.  The Court of Inquiry identified Twelve

Army personnel who were  prima facie responsible for the

said improprieties.   The Respondent who was working as

the  Chief  Director  of  Purchase  (CDP),  Army  Purchase

Organisation,  Ministry  of  Defence  was  one  out  of  the

twelve  persons  against  whom  a  prima  facie case  was

found.  Disciplinary action was also initiated against the

Respondent  by  the  GOC-in-C,  Western  Command  on

14.06.2006 which was challenged by the Respondent by

filing a Writ  Petition in the High Court of Delhi.    By an

order dated 11.01.2007, the High Court quashed the Court

of Inquiry on the ground that Rule 180 of the Army Rules,

1954  (hereinafter,  ‘the  Army  Rules’)  was  violated.

However, an option was given to the Appellants to either

hold a fresh Court of Inquiry after complying with Rule 180

of the Army Rules or to proceed directly under Rule 22 by

hearing the charge without relying on the Court of Inquiry.

The  Court  of  Inquiry  was  re-constituted pursuant  to  the

option  given  by  the  High  Court.   Later,  the  Appellants

sought a modification of the order dated 29.07.2008 and

informed  the  High  Court  that  proceedings  would  be

initiated under Rule 22 of the Army Rules since most of the 2 | P a g e

officers involved had already retired and that it would be

difficult to re-constitute a Court of Inquiry.    The High Court

permitted the Appellants to proceed under Rule 22 with

the condition that no reliance can be placed on the old

Court of Inquiry.   The order of the Chief of the Army Staff

by which cognizance was taken of the offences and the

attachment order issued on 26.09.2008 were the subject

matter of another Writ Petition filed by the Respondent in

the  High  Court  of  Delhi,  which  was  dismissed  on

03.10.2008.

3. A hearing of  the charge under Rule 22 against  the

Respondent was convened on 08.12.2008 and recording of

summary of evidence under Rule 23 of the Army Rules was

ordered  against  the  Respondent  on  24.12.2008.   The

Commanding Officer of the Respondent i.e. General Officer

Commanding  (GOC),  15  Infantry  Division  found  that  no

offence was prima facie made out against the Respondent.

The  said  view was  approved  by  the  GOC,  15  Corps  on

28.04.2009.  In the meanwhile, the Respondent retired on

attaining  the  age  of  superannuation  on  31.05.2009.

However, Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950 was invoked

by the Appellants to continue the proceedings against the

Respondent.   The GOC-in-C, Western Command examined 3 | P a g e

the matter and the recommendations made by the GOC,

15 Infantry Division and GOC, 15 Corps.    He disagreed

with the views taken by the GOC, 15 Infantry Division and

GOC, 15 Corps and arrived at a conclusion that a  prima

facie case  was  made  out  against  the  Respondent.   An

attempt  was  made by  the  Respondent  to  challenge  the

findings of the GOC-in-C, Western Command, but in vain.

The General Court Martial was convened by a letter dated

23.02.2010.   The Respondent filed O.A.  No.147 of 2010,

assailing the validity of the order convening the General

Court  Martial.   He  also  sought  for  quashing  the

proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, summary of evidence

and  the  conclusion  of  the  GOC-in-C,  Western  Command

holding him prima facie guilty.  He further questioned the

invocation of Section 123 of the Army Act against him to

continue the proceedings even after his retirement.   He

also sought promotion to the rank of Major General along

with his batchmates.   

4. The Tribunal held that a prima facie case to proceed

against the Respondent by a General Court Martial was not

made out.  The Tribunal was of the opinion that even if the

entirety of evidence of the prosecution is taken to be true,

no offence was made out against the Respondent.   The 4 | P a g e

Appellants  made  an  attempt  to  obtain  leave  to  Appeal

under Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

(hereinafter, ‘the Act’) to approach this Court, which was

not  entertained.    Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  of  the

Tribunal, the above Appeal is filed.  

5. The Charges against the Respondent are as follows:

“First Charge  

AA Sec 52 (f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN

CLAUSE  (f)  OF  SECTION  52  OF  THE  ARMY ACT,  WITH

INTENT TO DEFRAUD in that he, at New Delhi, on 15 Mar

2005,  which  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  authority

competent  to  initiate  action  on  25  Sep  2008,  while

performing the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army

Purchase Organization, Ministry of Defence, contrary to

Army  Purchase  Organization,  Ministry  of  Defence,

Department of Defence Consolidated Order no.3 of 1987,

with intent to defraud, approved addition of  two more

tendering  stations  (namely  Gadarwara,  District

Narsingpur (MP) and Narsingpur (MP) in Acceptance of

Tender for Risk Purchase Contract No.J-13028/1/4-03/45-

RP/2005-PUR  III  dated  28  Feb  2005  for  Masur  Whole

awarded to M/s. GREEN FED (Gujrat Co-operative Grain

Grower’s Federation Ltd.,)  after issue of Acceptance of

Tender on the last day of Delivery Period.  

Second Charge  

AA  Sec  63  (Alternative  to  first  charge)  AN  ACT

PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE

in that he, at New Delhi, on 15 Mar 2005, which came to

the  knowledge  of  the  authority  competent  to  initiate

action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing the duties of

Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase Organization, 5 | P a g e

Ministry  of  Defence,  contrary  to  Army  Purchase

Organization,  Ministry  of  Defence,  Department  of

Defence  Consolidated  Order  no.3  of  1987,  improperly

approved  addition  of  two  more  tendering  stations

(namely  Gadarwara,  District  Narsingpur  (MP)  and

Narsingpur  (MP)  in  Acceptance  of  Tender  for  Risk

Purchase  Contract  No.  J-13028/1/4-03/45-RP/2005-  PUR

III dated 28 Feb 2005 for Masur Whole awarded to M/s.

GREEN  FED  (Gujrat  Co-operative  Grain  Grower’s

Federation Ltd) after issue of Acceptance of  Tender on

the last day of Delivery Period.

THIRD CHARGE

AA SEC. 52(f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN

CLAUSE  (f)  OF  SECTION  52  OF  THE  ARMY ACT,  WITH

INTENT  TO DEFRAUD in  that  he,  at  New Delhi,  on  or

about 29 July 2005, which came to the knowledge of the

authority competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008,

while performing the duties of Chief Director of Purchase,

Army  Purchase  Organization,  Ministry  of  Defence,  and

being aware that para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000-CDN,

Govt of India, Min of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal

complications dt 30 Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation

from  ASC  Specification  and  Price  reduction  in  Risk

Purchase  contracts,  with  intent  to  defraud  acquiesced

with decision of Director General of Supply and Transport

vide  letter  No.69642/5/1-05/163-RP/05/Q/ST-7  dt  29  Jul

2005  granting  relaxation  to  M/s  Punjab  State  Civil

Supplies  Corporation  Ltd  in  a  Risk  Purchase  Contract

Acceptance Tender No. J-13075/5/163/2005-PUR III dt 27

Jun 2005 for 350/400 grains per 100 gms of Kabli Chana

on price reduction of 0.5% instead of 300-350 grains per

100 gms as stipulated in Revised ASC specification No.

97.  

FOURTH CHARGE  6 | P a g e

AA SEC. 63 (Alternative to third charge) AN OMISSION

PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE

in that he, at New Delhi, on or about 29 July 2005, which

came to the knowledge of the authority  competent  to

initiate  action  on  25  Sep  2008,  while  performing  the

duties  of  Chief  Director  of  Purchase,  Army  Purchase

Organisation, Ministry of Defence and being aware that

para 4(VI) of No. J- 11011/1/2000/CDN, Govt of India, Min

of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal complications dt

30  Mar  2000  prohibited  any  deviation  from  ASC

Specification  and  Price  reduction  in  Risk  Purchase

contracts,  improperly  acquiesced  with  decision  of

Director General of Supply and Transport vide letter No.

69642/5/1-05/163-RP/05/Q/ST-7 dt 29 Jul  2005 granting

relaxation to M/s Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation

Ltd in a Risk Purchase Contract Acceptance Tender No. J-

13075/5/163/2005-PUR III  dt  27  Jun  2005  for  350-400

grains per 100 gms of Kabli Chana on price reduction of

0.5%  instead  of  300-350  grains  per  100  gms  as

stipulated in Revised ASC specification No. 97.  

FIFTH CHARGE

AA SEC. 52(f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN

CLAUSE  (f)  OF  SECTION  52  OF  THE  ARMY ACT,  WITH

INTENT  TO DEFRAUD in  that  he,  at  New Delhi,  on  or

about 23 Aug 2005, which came to the knowledge of the

authority competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008,

while performing the duties of Chief Director of Purchase,

Army  Purchase  Organization,  Ministry  of  Defence,  and

being aware that para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000-CDN,

Govt of India, Min of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal

complications dt 30 Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation

from  ASC  Specification  and  Price  reduction  in  Risk

Purchase  contracts,  with  intent  to  defraud  acquiesced

with decision of Director General of Supply and Transport 7 | P a g e

vide letter  No.69644/7/4-05/165-R/05/Q/ST-7 dt  23 Aug

2005 granting relaxation to M/s MMTC in a Risk Purchase

Contract Acceptance Tender No. J13075/7/165/2005-PUR

III dt 27 Jun 2005 for 350-400 grains per 100 gms of Kabli

Chana  on  price  reduction  of  0.5% instead  of  300-350

grains  per  100  gms  as  stipulated  in  Revised  ASC

specification No. 97.

SIXTH CHARGE  

AA SEC.  63  (Alternative  to  fifth  charge)  AN OMISSION

PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE

in that he, at New Delhi, on or about 23 Aug 2005, which

came to the knowledge of the authority  competent  to

initiate  action  on  25  Sep  2008,  while  performing  the

duties  of  Chief  Director  of  Purchase,  Army  Purchase

Organisation, Ministry of Defence and being well aware

that para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000/CDN, Govt of India,

Min  of  Def,  APO  Guidelines  to  prevent  legal

complications dt 30 Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation

from  ASC  Specification  and  Price  reduction  in  Risk

Purchase contracts, improperly acquiesced with decision

of Director General of Supply and Transport vide letter

No.  69644/7/4-05/165-R/05/Q/ST-7  dt  23  Aug  2005

granting  relaxation  to  M/s  MMTC  in  a  Risk  Purchase

Contract Acceptance Tender No. J-13075/7/165/2005-PUR

III dt 27 Jun 2005 for 350-400 grains per 100 gms of Kabli

Chana  on  price  reduction  of  0.5% instead  of  300-350

grains  per  100  gms  as  stipulated  in  Revised  ASC

specification No. 97.”                

6. The Tribunal, being aware of the law that it is only the

probative value of the material on record that has to be

looked into at the time of framing of charge, proceeded to

8 | P a g e

decide as to whether a  prima facie case is made out.  In

respect of the first charge which is related to the addition

of  two  more  tendering  stations  namely  Gadarwara  and

Narsingpur,  Madhya  Pradesh,  the  Tribunal  examined  the

exhibits that were placed on record in support of the said

charges.   The  Tribunal  held  that  the  addition  of  two

tendering  stations  was not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the

Respondent.   Brigadier P.P.S. Bal of CDP, Army Purchase

Organisation,  Army  Headquarters,  New  Delhi  in  his

testimony stated that he was aware of  the consolidated

order  No.3  of  1987  permitting  the  inclusion  of  two

additional  tendering stations.   Moreover,  a  decision was

taken  by  the  competent  authority  that  there  should  be

additional  tendering  stations  for  which  there  was  no

objection  from  the  audit  authorities  or  by  the  Principal

Controller  of  Defence  Accounts  (PCDA).   The  Tribunal

further held that no monetary benefit was derived by the

Respondent  by  adding two tendering  stations  and there

was no extra expenditure borne out by the Appellants due

to the addition of two new stations.   

7. In so far as the second charge is concerned, which

deals  with  the extension  of  the  delivery  period and the

issue of final performance notice, the Tribunal was of the 9 | P a g e

opinion that there is nothing on record to substantiate any

act or omission on the part of the Respondent by which the

supplier  was  benefited.   Moreover,  evidence  suggested

that  extra  expenditure  was  incurred  by  the  supplier  for

transportation.   The  Tribunal  opined  that  there  was  no

violation of any Government instructions.   The evidence of

DW-1,  Mr.  P.V.D.  Prasada  Rao,  Deputy  Secretary  to  the

Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, Department

of Agriculture & Cooperation, New Delhi was recorded in

the summary of evidence and was perused by the Tribunal.

It  was  concluded that  there  was  no  foundation  even to

prima facie show the lapses on the part of the Respondent.

8. Deviation from ASC specifications and price reduction

in risk purchase contract was the subject matter of charges

Nos.3 to 6.  After pursuing the evidence of PW-1, Brigadier

PPS  Bal  and  PW-2,  Col.  Ambrish  Malhotra,  the  Tribunal

accepted the contention of the Respondent that Director

General  of  Supplies  and  Transport  (DGST)  was  the  sole

authority  to  grant  relaxation  of  specifications  and  the

Respondent  who was a  CDP did  not  have the power  to

over-rule the decision of DGST. For the aforesaid reasons,

the submission of the Appellants that the Respondent was

under an obligation to protest the violation of guidelines by 10 | P a g e

the  DGST was  not  accepted  by  the  Tribunal.   Even  the

seventh  charge  pertaining  to  the  issuance  of  letters  on

02.08.2005,  12.09.2005  and  13.09.2005  without  taking

into  account  the  existing  guidelines  regarding  the  price

reduction  in  R.P.  contracts  was  held  in  favour  of  the

Respondent by the Tribunal.   On the basis of  the above

evidence, the Tribunal found that no prima facie case was

made out against the Respondent and the charges framed

against him were found unsustainable. Consequently, the

charges were quashed.   

9. Ms.  Diksha  Rai,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

Appellant contended that the judgment of the Tribunal is

vitiated due to a jurisdictional error.  According to her, the

O.A. in this case was filed under Sections 14 and 15 of the

Act  against  an  order  by  which  the  Court  Martial  was

convened.  The Tribunal, according to Ms. Rai, did not have

jurisdiction to entertain the O.A. at the interlocutory stage.

She relied on the statement of objects and reasons of the

Act to submit that jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal

only for adjudication of complaints and disputes regarding

service matters and appeals arising out of the verdicts of

the Court  Martial.   According to her,  a verdict  is  a final

judgment  or  order  passed  by  the  Court  Martial  and  as 11 | P a g e

such,  an  order  by  which  the  General  Court  Martial  was

convened  cannot  be  the  subject  matter  of  an  appeal

before  the  Tribunal.  On  the  merits  of  the  case,  she

contended that the Tribunal has transgressed its limit by

delving deep into the merits of the case which can be done

only by the Court Martial.   

10. Mr. K.  Ramesh, learned counsel  for the Respondent

argued that Section 14 of the Act provides that the Tribunal

shall  exercise  all  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authorities

exercisable by all Courts (except the Supreme Court or the

High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution), in relation to service matters.  Mr.

Ramesh further submitted that according to Section 14 (2),

any person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service

matter  may  make  an  application  to  the  Tribunal.   He

submitted  that  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunal  cannot  be

curtailed  on  pedantic  grounds  and  the  order  by  which

General Court Martial was convened was rightly set aside

by the Tribunal.    

11. Sections 14 and 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act,

2007 which are relevant for adjudication of the dispute in

this case are as follows:

12 | P a g e

“14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service

matters. —(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in

this  Act,  the  Tribunal  shall  exercise,  on  and  from the

appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority,

exercisable  immediately  before  that  day  by  all  courts

(except  the Supreme Court  or  a High Court  exercising

jurisdiction  under  articles  226  and  227  of  the

Constitution) in relation to all service matters.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person

aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter

may make an application to the Tribunal  in such form

and accompanied by such documents or other evidence

and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed.  

(3)  On  receipt  of  an  application  relating  to  service

matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due inquiry,

as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication

by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is

not  so  satisfied,  it  may  dismiss  the  application  after

recording its reasons in writing.  

(4) For the purpose of adjudicating an application, the

Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a

Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908),  while  trying  a  suit  in  respect  of  the  following

matters, namely—  

(a)  summoning  and  enforcing  the  attendance  of  any

person and examining him on oath;  

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning

any public record or document or copy of such record or

document from any office;  

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses

or documents;  13 | P a g e

(f) reviewing its decisions;  

(g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex

parte;  

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application

for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and  

(i)  any  other  matter  which  may be  prescribed  by  the

Central Government.  

(5) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of law and

facts that may be raised before it.  

15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in matters

of appeal against court martial. —

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the

Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day,

all  the  jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority  exercisable

under this  Act in relation to appeal against any order,

decision, finding or sentence passed by a court martial

or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto.  

(2) Any person aggrieved by an order, decision, finding

or  sentence passed by  a  court  martial  may prefer  an

appeal  in  such form, manner and within such time as

may be prescribed.  

(3) The Tribunal shall  have power to grant bail  to any

person accused of  an offence and in  military custody,

with  or  without  any  conditions  which  it  considers

necessary: Provided that no accused person shall be so

released if there appears reasonable ground for believing

that  he has been guilty of  an offence punishable with

death or imprisonment for life.  

(4) The Tribunal shall allow an appeal against conviction

by a court martial where—  

(a)  the  finding  of  the  court  martial  is  legally  not

sustainable due to any reason whatsoever; or  

(b) the finding involves wrong decision on a question of

law; or 14 | P a g e

(c) there was a material irregularity in the course of the

trial resulting in miscarriage of justice, but, in any other

case,  may  dismiss  the  appeal  where  the  Tribunal

considers that  no miscarriage of  justice is  likely  to be

caused  or  has  actually  resulted  to  the  appellant:

Provided  that  no  order  dismissing  the  appeal  by  the

Tribunal shall be passed unless such order is made after

recording reasons therefor in writing.   

(5) The Tribunal may allow an appeal against conviction,

and pass appropriate order thereon.  

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing

provisions  of  this  section,  the  Tribunal  shall  have  the

power to—

(a)  substitute  for  the  findings  of  the  court  martial,  a

finding  of  guilty  for  any  other  offence  for  which  the

offender  could  have been lawfully  found guilty  by the

court martial and pass a sentence afresh for the offence

specified  or  involved  in  such  findings  under  the

provisions  of  the  Army Act,  1950 (46 of  1950)  or  the

Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) or the Air Force Act, 1950

(45 of 1950), as the case may be; or  

(b) if sentence is found to be excessive, illegal or unjust,

the Tribunal may—  

(i) remit the whole or any part of the sentence, with or

without conditions;  

(ii) mitigate the punishment awarded;  

(iii) commute such punishment to any lesser punishment

or punishments mentioned in the Army Act, 1950 (46 of

1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force

Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), as the case may be;

(c)  enhance the sentence awarded by a court  martial:

Provided that no such sentence shall be enhanced unless

the appellant  has  been given  an opportunity  of  being

heard;  15 | P a g e

(d) release the appellant, if sentenced to imprisonment,

on parole with or without conditions;  

(e) suspend a sentence of imprisonment;

(f) pass any other order as it may think appropriate.  

(7) Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Act, for

the  purposes  of  this  section,  the  Tribunal  shall  be

deemed  to  be  a  criminal  court  for  the  purposes  of

sections 175, 178, 179, 180, 193, 195, 196 or 228 of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and Chapter XXVI of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).”

12. It is also relevant to examine Section 3 (o) of the Act

which defines ‘service matters’ which is as under:

“(o)  “service  matters”,  in  relation  to  the  persons

subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Navy

Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45

of 1950), mean all matters relating to the conditions of

their service and shall include—  

(i)  remuneration  (including  allowances),  pension  and

other retirement benefits;  

(ii)  tenure,  including  commission,  appointment,

enrolment,  probation,  confirmation,  seniority,  training,

promotion,  reversion,  premature  retirement,

superannuation,  termination  of  service  and  penal

deductions;  

(iii) summary disposal and trials where the punishment

of dismissal is awarded;  

(iv) any other matter, whatsoever, but shall not include

matters relating to—  

(i) orders issued under section 18 of the Army Act,

1950 (46 of 1950), sub-section (1) of section 15

16 | P a g e

of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and section 18

of the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950); and  

(ii) (ii) transfers and postings including the change of

place or unit on posting whether individually or as

a part of unit, formation or ship in relation to the

persons  subject  to  the  Army  Act,  1950  (46  of

1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the

Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950);  

(iii) (iii) leave of any kind;  

(iv) (iv)  summary  court  martial  except  where  the

punishment  is  of  dismissal  or  imprisonment  for

more than three months;

13. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the O.A. was

filed both under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act.  Section 15

confers jurisdiction and power on the Tribunal to entertain

appeal  against  any  order,  decision,  finding  or  sentence

passed by a Court Martial.   

14. Section 15 (2) of the Act provides for an appeal which

can be filed by the person aggrieved by an order, decision,

finding or sentence passed by a Court Martial. The order

challenged in the OA in this case is a proceeding by which

the General Court Martial was convened.   As there was no

order, decision, finding or sentence by the Court Martial,

an appeal under Section 15 per se is not maintainable.   

15. Section 14 enables a person aggrieved to make an

application to the Tribunal in any service matter.  ‘Service

17 | P a g e

matters’ are defined in Section 3 (o) to mean all matters

relating  to  the  conditions  of  their  service,  which  shall

include termination of service, inter alia.   There are some

matters  which  are  excluded  from  the  purview  of  the

definition of ‘service matters’.   There is no dispute in this

case that the said exclusions do not come into play.  

16. Any matter relating to the conditions of service falls

within the definition of ‘service matters’ under Section 3

(o)  of  the  Act  and  can  be  the  subject  matter  of  an

application  filed  before  the  Tribunal.    ‘Conditions  of

service’ mean those conditions which regulate the holding

of  a  post  by  any  person  right  from  the  time  of  his

appointment  till  his  retirement  and  even  after  his

retirement including pension etc.  Therefore, conditions of

service also include dismissal from service.1       

17. The words ‘relating to’  appearing before  the words

‘conditions of service’ in the definition of ‘service matters’

in  Section  3  (o)  of  the  Act  should  be  given  a  wide

interpretation.2     In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath

Ogale (supra) this Court referred to Blacks’ Law Dictionary

where ‘relate’ was defined as under:

1 State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee Desai, (2002) 2 SCC 318 2 Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Ogale, (1995) 2 SCC 665

18 | P a g e

“to  stand  in  some  relation;  to  have  bearing  or

concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association

with or connection with; ‘with to’.”  

18. It is clear from the above that any proceeding which

leads to  an  order  of  termination would  fall  within  the

expression ‘relating to  conditions of  service’.    In  any

event, the proceedings initiated against the Respondent

cannot be said to be not related to his service.  A final

order to be passed by the General Court Martial, apart

from the imposition of other penalties, might have led to

the termination of the service of the Respondent.   

19. We have no doubt in our mind that Section 14 of

the Act which confers jurisdiction over service matters of

the  Army  personnel  should  receive  wide  construction.

This Court had held that an interpretation which confers

jurisdiction  should  be  preferred  over  an  interpretation

which takes away jurisdiction3.    

20. We are also conscious that the object with which

the  Act  was  made  is  to  provide  adjudication  of

complaints and disputes regarding service matters and

not  only  appeals  against  the  verdicts  of  the  Court

3 Mantri Technozone v. Forward Foundation, 2019 SCC Online SC 322 (3JB)

19 | P a g e

Martial.   It  is  trite  law  that  statement  of  objects  and

reasons can be used as a tool for interpretation4.  The

sequitur of the above discussion is  that the impugned

judgment  of  the  Tribunal  does not  suffer  from lack  of

jurisdiction.   

21. Regarding the charges sought to be framed against

the Respondent, we do not find any error in the approach

of the Tribunal.  The material on record was perused by

the Tribunal to come to a conclusion that no prima facie

case is made out against the Respondent.  We do not

see any reason to interfere with the said findings.   

22. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed.    

                    …................................J                                                         [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

                                              ..…............................J                                                              [HEMANT GUPTA]

New Delhi, November  27, 2019

4 S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sharma (1997) 2 SCC 522, State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F.  Desai, (2002) 2 SCC 318  

20 | P a g e