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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHINDRA SUPPLY COMPANY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/09/1961

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1962 AIR  256            1962 SCR  (3) 497  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC1442  (18)  D          1967 SC 226  (11)  RF         1981 SC1786  (31,102,136,145)

ACT: Arbitration-Order of Subordinate Judge refusing to set aside award  Appeal  to High Court-Single Judge  allowing  appeal- Letters  Patent Appeal, whether  maintainable-Interpretation of  codifying statutes-Indian-Arbitration Act, 1940   (X  of 1940) s. 39(2)-Letters Patent of Lahore High Court, cl.10.

HEADNOTE: A  dispute between the appellant and the respondent  arising out  of  a contract for the supply of fuel was  referred  to arbitration.   The arbitrators gave an award  directing  the appellant  to pay a certain sum of money to  the  respondent and  filed the award in the court of the Subordinate  judge. The  appellant  made an application for  setting  aside  the award but it was rejected.  Against this order the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court under s. 39(1) of  the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, and a Single judge allowed the appeal  and set aside the award.  Thereupon  the  respondent filed  a Letters Patent appeal against the judgment  of  the Single judge.  This appeal was allowed, the judgment of  the Single judge was set aside and the order of the  Subordinate judge  was  restored.   The  appellant  contended  that  the Letters  Patent Appeal was incompetent as s. 39(2) barred  a second  appeal  from an order passed in appeal under  s.  39 (1). Held,  that  an appeal against the appellate  order  of  the single Judge was barred by s. 39(2) of the Arbitration  Act. The  expression "second appeal" in s. 39(2) means a  further appeal from an order passed in appeal under s. 39(1) and not an  appeal  under s. 100 of the Civil  Procedure  Code,  and includes  an appeal under the Letters Patent.   The  Letters Patent  of the Lahore High Court, which applied,  could,  by virtue  of  cl.  37 thereof, be amended or  altered  by  the Legislatures.   By  enacting  clause (2) of  s.  39  of  the Arbitration  Act  the Legislature has prohibited  an  appeal under  the Letters Patent against an order passed  under  s.

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39(1).The  provisions of s. 39 apply to appeals to  superior courts aswell as to "intra-court appeals". Madhavdas v. Fithaldas I. L. R. (1952) Bom, 570and  Radha Krishna   Murthy  v.  Ethirajulu,  I.L.R.  (1945)   Mad.564, approved. Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi v, JassaRam  Nand, A.I.R.  (1948) Lah. 64, Banwari Lal Ram Dev v. The Board  of Trustees Hindu College, I.L.R. (1948) E.P. 159 498 and  Mulchand  Kewal  Chand Daga v.  Kishan  Das  Gridhardas (1961) 74 L.W. 408 F.B., disapproved. In considering whether s. 39(2) has taken away the right  of appeal under the Letters patent the court must interpret the words of the statute without any predisposition towards  the state  of  the  law as it was before the  enactment  of  the Arbitration  Act,  1940.  In interpreting  a  statute  which codifies  the  law it is not permissible to start  with  the assumption that it was not intended to alter the preexisting law. Narendra  Nath  Sircar v. Kamlabasini Dasi, L.R.  (1896)  23 I.A. 18, applied. Under  the  Code  of Civil Procedure of  1882  there  was  a conflict of opinion amongst the High Courts on the  question whether  an  appeal  lay under the Letters  Patent  from  an appellate  order of a Single judge in  arbitration  matters. The  Code of 1908 by enacting s. 4 and s.  104(1)  preserved the right of appeal under any other law for the time  being. The  Arbitration  Act,  1940  removed  all  the   provisions relating to arbitration from the Code and made comprehensive provisions  in  the Act.  Though under the Code of  1908  an appeal did lie under the Letters Patent from an order passed by a Single judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction that was  because the power to hear appeals under a  special  law was  expressly  reserved by s. 4 of the Code.  There  is  no provision in the Arbitration Act, 1940, corresponding to  s. 4  of  the  Code and there is nothing  which  preserves  the jurisdiction  of  the High Court under the  Letters  Patent. Accordingly, the Letters Patent must be read subject to  the provisions of s. 39 of the Arbitration Act. Hurrish  Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia, (1882)  L.R. 10 I.A. 4, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 112 of 1958. Appeal  from the judgment and decree dated May 25, 1954,  of the Punjab High Court in L.P.A. No. 82 of 1948. Naunit Lal and T. M. Sen, for the appellant. S.  T. Desai, Chatter Behari and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for  the respondent. 1961.  September 5. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SHAH, J.-A dispute, arising under a contract relating to the supply of solidified fuel between 499 Messrs.   Mohindra  Supply Company-hereinafter  referred  to as  the  respondents-and the Governor-General  of  India  in Council was referred to arbitration of two arbitrators.   On March 19, 1946, the arbitrators made and published an  award directing the Governor-General to pay to the respondents Rs. 47,250/-  with  interest  at  3%  from  July  17,1944,  till payment.   This  award  was  filed  in  the  court  of   the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi.  The Governor-General applied  for  an order setting aside the  award  on  certain

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grounds  which  for  the purposes of  this  appeal  are  not material.   The Subordinate Judge refused to set  aside  the award  on the grounds set up and rejected  the  application. Against  the  order  refusing to set aside  the  award,  the Governor-General  preferred  to  the Lahore  High  Court  an appeal which after the setting up of the Dominions of  India and  Pakistan  was transferred to the Circuit Bench  of  the East Punjab High Court at Delhi.  Falshaw, J., who heard the appeal set aside the order, because in his view the  dispute could  not  be referred to arbitration  under  the  contract which gave rise to the dispute and ",that was sufficient  to invalidate  the  award".  Against that order an  appeal  was preferred  under  cl.10 of the Letters Patent  of  the  High Court  of  Lahore, which by the High Court  (Punjab)  Order, 1947  applied  to the East Punjab High  Court.   Before  the Appellate  Bench,  the Governor-General contended  that  the appeal  under the letters Patent was prohibited by s.  39(2) of  the  Indian Arbitration Act.  The question  whether  the appeal was maintainable was referred to a Full Bench of  the High  Court.  The Full Bench opined that an appeal from  the judgment  of a Single Judge exercising appellate powers  did lie under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, notwithstanding  the bar  contained in s. 39(2) of the, Arbitration  Act.   After the  opinion  of the Full Bench was  delivered,  a  Division Bench considered the appeal on its merits and set aside 500 the order of Falshaw, J. The Union of India appeals  against the decision of the High Court. In  this  appeal, we are only concerned  with  the  question whether the appeal under el. 10 of the Letters Patent of the High   Court   against  the  order  of  Falshaw,   J.,   was maintainable.  The proceedings relating to arbitration  are, since the enactment of the Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940, governed  by  the  provisions of that Act.   The  Act  is  a consolidating   and  amending  statute.   It  repealed   the Arbitration  Act  of 1899, Schedule 2 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure and also cls. (a) to (f) of s. 104(1) of the  Code of Civil Procedure which provided for appeals from orders in arbitration  proceedings.  The Act set up machinery for  all contractual  arbitrations  and its  provisions,  subject  to certain  exceptions, apply also to every  arbitration  under any  other enactment for the time being in force, as if  the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if  that  other  enactment were  an  arbitration  agreement, except in so far as the Arbitration Act is inconsistent with that  other  enactment or with any  rules  made  thereunder. Section 39 of the Act, which deals with appeals, provides:               "(1)  An appeal shall lie from  the  following               orders  passed  under this Act  (and  from  no               others) to the Court authorised by law to hear               appeals  from  original decrees of  the  Court               passing the order:                An order-               (i)   superseding an arbitration;               (ii)  on  an  award stated in the  form  of  a               special ease;               (iii) modifying or correcting a award;               (iV)  filing   or   refusing   to   file    an               arbitration agreement;                                    501               (Y)   staying   or  refusing  to  stay   legal               proceedings  where  there  is  an  arbitration               agreement;               (vi)  setting  aside or refusing to set  aside               an award:

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Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court. (2)  No  second  appeal shall lie from an  order  passed  in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect  or  take  away any right to appeal  to  the  Supreme Court." The  two  sub-sections  of s. 39 are manifestly  part  of  a single  legislative  pattern.  By sub-s. (1), the  right  to appeal is conferred against the specified orders and against no  other orders ; and from an appellate order passed  under sub-s. (1) no second appeal (except an appeal to this Court) lies.  On the question whether the interdict, in sub-s.  (2) operates  against an appeal under the Letters Patent,  there has been a divergence of opinion amongst the High Courts  in India.  The Bombay High Court in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas  (1) held  that  there is no further right of  appeal  under  the Letters  Patent  when  a  Single Judge  of  the  High  Court disposed  of  an appeal under s. 39 (1) of  the  Arbitration Act.   The same view was expressed by the Madras High  Court in  Radha  Krishna  Murthy  v.  Ethirajulu(2).   In  Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand (3  ) and  Banwari  Lal Ram Dev v. The Board  of  Trustees,  Hindu College  (4)  it was held that a right to appeal  under  the Letters  Patent against an order passed in appeal  under  s. 39(1)  is  not restricted by s. 39(2).  In the view  of  the Lahore and the East Punjab High Courts appeals prohibited by sub-s.  (2) were second appeals, i.e., appeals under s.  100 of  the Civil Procedure Code and "Intra-court appeals"  such as appeals under the (1)  I.L.R. (1952) Bom. 570. (2)  I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 564. (3)  A.I.R. (1948) Lah. 64. (4)  I.L.R. (1948) E.P. 159. 502 Letters Patent from an order of a Single Judge to a Bench of the  same Court were not prohibited.  The Madras High  Court in a recent judgment-Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Das Gridhardass (1) has overruled its earlier decision in  Radha Krishna  Murthy’s  case and has held that s. 39  deals  only with  appeals  from orders passed by a court to  a  superior court  and not with appeals "intra-court" and  therefore  s. 39(2)  does  not  operate to prohibit an  appeal  under  the Letters   Patent  against  the  order  of  a  Single   Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction in an arbitration matter. Section  39(2) expressly prohibits a second appeal  from  an order  passed in appeal under s. 39(1) except an  appeal  to this  court.  There is clear indication inherent  in  sub-s. (2)  that  the expression "second appeal" does not  mean  an appeal under s. 100 of the Code of Civil procedure.  To  the interdict  of a ,’second appeal", there is an  exception  in favour  of  an appeal to this Court; but an appeal  to  this Court  is not a second appeal.  If the legislature  intended by enacting s. 39(2) nearly to prohibit appeals under s. 100 of  the Code of Civil Procedure, it was plainly  unnecessary to enact an express provision saving appeals to this  Court. Again  an  appeal  under  s. 39(1)  lies  against  an  order superseding  an award. or modifying or correcting an  award, or  filing or refusing to file an arbitration  agreement  or staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement or setting aside or refusing to set aside  an  award  or on an award stated in  the  form  of  a special  case.   These  orders are not  decrees  within  the meaning  of  the Code of Civil Procedure and  have  not  the effect of decrees under the Arbitration Act.  Section 100 of the  Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from  appel-

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late decrees-and not with appeals from appellate (1)  (1961) 74 L.W. 408 F.B. 503 orders.   If  by enacting s. 39(2)  appeals  from  appellate decrees  were intended to be prohibited, the  provision  was plainly otiose; and unless the, context or the circumstances compel  the Court will not be justified in ascribing to  the legislature an intention to enact a sterile clause.  In that premise  the  conclusion is inevitable that  the  expression "second  appeal’  used in s. 39(2) of  the  Arbitration  Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal  under s.  39(1)  and  not  an appeal under s.  100  of  the  Civil Procedure Code.  This view was expressed by Savdekar, J., in Madhavdass  v.  Vithaldas (1) and by Rajamannar, C.  J.,  in Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Das Gridhardass (2)  and we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective "imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal". The  problem  to which attention must then  be  directed  is whether  the right to appeal under the Letters Patent is  at all  restricted by s. 39, sub-ss.(1) and(2).  Clause  10  of the  Letters Patent of the High Court, in so far- as  it  is material, provides :               "’And  we do further ordain that an  ap.  peal               shall  lie to the said High Court ......  from               the  judgment (not being a judgment passed  in               exercise of appellate jurisdiction in  respect               of  a decree or order made in the exercise  of               appellate jurisdiction by’ a Court subject  to               the superintendence of the said High Court and               not  being  an order made in the  exercise  of               revisional  jurisdiction of one Judge  of  the               High Court......." By  this  clause,  a right to appeal  except  in  the  cases specified,  from one Judge of the High Court to  a  Division Bench  is  expressly granted.  But the  Letters  Patent  are declared  by el. 37 subject to the legislative power of  the Covernor-General  in  Council and also of  the  Governor-in- Council under (1) I.L.R. [1952] Bom. 570.  (2) (1961) 74 L.W. 408 F.B. 504 the Covernment of India Act, 1915 and may in all respects be amended  or  altered in exercise of  legislative  authority. Under s. 39(1), an appeal lies from the orders specified  in that  sub-section and from no others.  The  Legislature  has plainly  expressed itself that the right of  appeal  against orders  passed  under the Arbitration Act may  be  exercised only  in  respect of certain orders.  The  right  to  appeal against  other  orders is expressly taken away.  If  by  the express  provision contained in s. 39(1), a right to  appeal from  a Judgment which may otherwise be available under  the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that clause (2) does not similarly restrict the excercise of appellate  power  granted  by the Letters  Patent.   If  for reasons   aforementioned  the  expression  "second   appeal" includes  an  appeal under the Letters Patent, it  would  be impossible   to  hold  that  notwithstanding   the   express prohibition,  an  appeal under the Letters  Patent  from  an order passed in appeal under sub-s.(1) is competent. The Punjab High Court in Banwari Lal Ram Dev v. The Board of Trustees,  Hindu  College (1) and the Lahore High  Court  in Hanuman  Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi v. Jassa  Ram  Hira Nand held that the appeals contemplated by s. 39 are appeals to  superior  courts  and  not  "intra-court  appeals"   and therefore  the right to appeal under the Letters Patent  was not  restricted  by  sub-ss.  (1) and  (2).   But  a  little

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analysis of this argument is likely to exhibit the  somewhat startling consequences.  If the appeal contemplated by s. 39 (1) is only an appeal to a superior court, orders passed  by a subordinate court decisions whereof are made appealable to the  same  court  will not be appealable at  all  under  the Arbitration  Act.   For  instance, under  the  Bombay  Civil Courts  Act, certain decisions of Assistant Judges are  made appealable to the District Courts.  An Assistant Judge is  a Judge of the District Court and under the Bombay (1) I. L. R. (1948) E. P. 159. (2) A. I. R. (1948) Lah, 64, 505 Civil Courts Act, appeals against his orders and decrees  in certain  cases lie to the District Court.  If  the  argument that  an appeal under el. (1) of s.39 means an appeal  to  a superior  court, be accepted, an appeal from an order  under s. 39 (1) by an Assistant Judge will not lie at all.   There are similar provisions in the Civil Courts Acts in the other States  as  well.  The qualifying expression "to  the  court authorised  by law to hear appeals from original decrees  of the  Court passing the order" in s. 39 (1) does  not  import the  concept that the appellate court must be  distinct  and separate  from. the court passing the order or  the  decree. The legislature has not so enacted and the context does  not warrant such an interpretation.  The clause merely indicates the  forum  of  appeal.  If from the  decision  of  a  court hearing  a suit or proceeding an appeal will lie to a  Judge or more Judges of the same court, by virtue of s. 39 (1) the appeal will lie from the order passed under the  Arbitration Act, if the order is appealable, to such Judge or Judges  of that  court.  The argument that the right to file an  appeal to the Supreme Court from orders in arbitration  proceedings would be seriously restricted has in our view no  substance. If  an order passed in a proceeding on the original side  of the High Court is appealable under s. 39 (1), an-appeal will lie  to  a Division Bench of the High Court and  from  the order  passed  by  the Division Bench,  an  appeal,  by  the express  provision contained in sub-s. (2) will lie  subject to  the restrictions contained in the relevant  articles  of the Constitution to the Supreme Court.  If the order is  not one falling within s. 39 (1), no appeal will evidently  lie. It  is  true  that against an order  passed  in  arbitration proceeding,  by  a  Division Bench of a  High  Court  in  an appeal,  an  appeal to this Court as a matter of  right  may lie, if the requirements of Art. 133 are fulfilled ; but  if the same case is heard by a Single Judge no 506 such appeal will lie.  But the right to appeal is a creature of  statute;  no, litigant has an inherent right  to  appeal against  a decision of a court.  The anomaly relied upon  by the  appellant  occurs  in  second  appeals,  and   revision applications  as  well. If these proceedings are  heard  and disposed of by Single Judges, there is no right of appeal to this Court but against decisions of Division Benches the right to appeal may be exercised. But it was urged that the interpretation of s.    39  should not be divorced from the setting of legislative history, and if  regard be had to the legislative history and the  dictum of  the  Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder  Chowdry  v.  Kali Sundari  Debia (1) which has been universally followed,  in considering  the  extent of the right of  appeal  under  the Letters  Patent,  the  Court  would  not  be  justified   in restricting  the right of appeal which was exercisable  till 1940 by litigants against decisions of single Judges of High Courts in arbitration matters from orders passed in appeals.

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In  considering  the argument whether the  right  of  appeal which  was  previously  exercisable  by  litigants   against decisions  of  single Judges of the High Courts  in  appeals from  orders passed in arbitration proceedings was  intended to be taken away by s. 39 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, the Court must proceed to interpret the words of the statute without  any  predisposition towards the state  of  the  law before the Arbitration Act was enacted.  The Arbitration Act of  1940 is a consolidating and amending statute and is  for all  purposes  a code relating to arbitration.   In  dealing with the interpretation of the Indian Succession Act,  1865, the Privy Council in (1)  (1882) L. R. 10 I. A. 4,17.                             507 Narendra Nath Sircar v. Kamlabasini Dasi(1) observed that  a code  must be construed according to the natural meaning  of the  language  used and not on the presumption that  it  was intended to leave the existing law unaltered.  The  Judicial Committee approved of the observations of Lord Herschell  in Bank  of  England v. Vagliano Brothers(1) to  the  following effect :-               "I  think  the proper course is in  the  first               instance  to  examine  the  language  of   the               statute and to ask what is its natural meaning               uninfluenced  by  any  considerations  derived               from the previous state of the law, and not to               start  with inquiring bow the law  previously               stood, and then, assuming that it was probably               intended to leave it unaltered, to see if  the               words   of   the  enactment   will   bear   an               interpretation  in conformity with this  view.               If  a statute, intended to embody in a code  a               particular branch of the law, is to be treated               in  this  fashion, it appears to me  that  its               utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and               the very object with which it was enacted will               be frustrated.  The purpose of such a  statute               surely  was  that on  any  point  specifically               dealt with by it the law should be ascertained               by interpreting the language used instead  of,               as  before, by roaming over a vast  number  of               authorities in order to discover what the  law               was,  extracting  it  by  a  minute   critical               examination        of        the         prior               decisions.................. ". The  court in interpreting a statute must therefore  proceed without  seeking to add words which are not to be  found  in the statute, nor is it permissible in interpreting a statute which  codifies  a  branch  of the law  to  start  with  the assumption  that  it  was not intended  to  alter  the  pre- existing law; nor to add words which are not to be found  in the statute, or (1) (1896) L. R. 23, I. A. 18. (2) [1891] A.C. 107, 144-145. 508 ’for  which an authority is not found in the statute".   But we do not propose to dispose of the argument merely on these general  considerations.  In our view, even the  legislative history  viewed  in  the light of the dictum  of  the  Privy Council  in  Hurrish  Chunder’s case, does  not  afford  any adequate  justification  for departing from  the  plain  and apparent intendment of the statute. Under the code of Civil Procedure of 1877, a right of appeal was  conferred upon litigants against certain orders  by  s. 588  and  from no other such orders.  Clauses  (s)  and  (t)

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dealt  with a right to appeal against an order under s.  514 superseding  an  arbitration,  and  an  order  under  s.518, modifying  an award.  It was enacted-in the last  paragraph! that the orders passed in appeals under the section shall be final.    By paragraph 2 of s. 589, it was provided :               "When  an appeal from any order is allowed  by               this  chapter,  it shall lie to the  Court  to               which  an appeal would lie from the decree  in               the  suit in relation to which such order  was               made.........".               By s. 591 it was provided:               "Except as provided in this Chapter, no appeal               shall lie from an order passed by any Court in               the  exercise  of its  original  or  appellate               jurisdiction." The  Code of 1877 was replaced by the Code of 1882  but  the provisions  relating to appeals from orders were  re-enacted in   identical  terms.   Before  the  decision  in   Hurrish Chunder’s case, the view was held, especially by the  Bombay and  the  Madras  High Courts, that  under  cl.(15)  of  the Letters  Patent  of the High Courts of  Bombay,  Madras  and Calcutta an appeal from an order passed by a single Judge of a High Court lay only under s. 588                             509 of  the  Code and not otherwise.  In Sonba’  v.  Ahmed  bha’ Habibha’  (1)  a  Full Bench of the  Bombay  High  Court  in construing the provisions of the Letters Patent of the  High Court in the light of the provisions of s. 363 of the  Civil Procedure Code held that under cl. 15 of the Letters  Patent and under the rules of the High Court, an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order mad(, by one of the Judges lies only in those cases in which an appeal is allowed under the  Code  of  Civil Procedure and  its  amending  Acts.   A similar  view  was  expressed by the Madras  High  Court  in Achaya  v. Ratrandu, (2).  But the Privy Council in  Hurrish Chunder  Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia (3) in a  very  terse observation  expressed  a different view, in that  case  one Kassiswari executed a will devising a taluk in equal  shares to  her  daughter Chundermoni and her  daughter-in-law  Kali Soondari.   After the death of Kassiswari, the two  devisees under  the  will sued one Hurrish Chunder for a  decree  for possession of the taluk.  The Subordinate Judge decreed  the suit  and that decree was ultimately affirmed by  the  Privy Council in an appeal filed by the daughters of  Chundermoni, and the order of the Queen-in-Council was transmitted to the High  Court for execution.  In the meanwhile,  Chundermoni’s moiety  in the  taluk was purchased  by  Hurrish  Chunder. Thereafter,   Kali   Sundari   applied   in   the   original jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta for execution  of the  order of the Queen-in-Council.  Pontifox, J.,  declined to  execute the order, because in his view it could  not  be executed  by  one only out of the two  original  plaintiffs. Against that order, an appeal was preferred under cl. 15  of the  Letters Patent of the High Court.  A Full Bench of  the High Court was unanimously of the view that the "discretion" exercised by Pontifex, J., was erroneous but in the view  of Garth, C. J., the order passed by Pontifex, J., was merely a ministerial order which he 1872) 9 Bom.  R. C. Reports 398.  (2) I.L.R. 9 Mad. 447. (3) (1882) L.R. 10 I. A. 4, 17. 510 had no jurisdiction to pass and the appeal was  incompetent. White  and  Romeshchunder Mitter, JJ., held that  the  order amounted to a "judgment" and was appealable under cl. 15  of the Letters Patent.  Against the order of the High Court, an

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appeal  was  taken to the Judicial Committee  of  the  Privy Council  by  the defendant Hurrish Chunder.   The Judicial Committee  approved of the majority view of the High  Court. In  negativing  the argument of Garth, C.J.,  the  Committee pointed out that Pontifex, J., was not shown to have usurped jurisdiction  which  did not belong to him, but even  if  he had, that was a valid ground of appeal, and that if a  Judge of  the High Court made an order under a misapprehension  of the extent of his jurisdiction the High Court had the  power to  entertain ,an appeal to set right such a miscarriage  of justice.  The Committee then observed               "It   only  remains  to  observe  that   their               Lordships do not think that s. 588 of Act X of               1877,  which  has the  effect  of  restricting               certain  appeals,  applies to such a  case  as               this  where  the  appeal is from  one  of  the               Judges of the Court to the full Court." This judgment (in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry’s case) gave  rise to  a  serious  conflict of opinion in the  High  Courts  in India.  The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras held, following the dictum of the Privy Council, that an order not appealable  under  s. 588 of the Civil  Procedure  Code  may still  be  appealable provided it amounted to  a  "judgment" within  the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent  of  the respective   High  Courts.-Chappan  v.  Moidin  Kutti   (1), chabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanaswami Chetti(2), Toolsee Money Dassee  v.  Sudevi Dassee (3 ), and Secretary  of  State  v. Jehangir (4). But the Allahabad High Court in Banno Bibi v.     Mehdi Husain (1) expressed a contrary opinion. It  was observed by Sir John Edge, C. J., that if the (1) I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 68. (2) I.L.R. (1902) 25 Mad.  555, (3) LL.R.(1899)26Cal.363. (4) [1902] 4 Bom. 342. (5) I.L.R. (1889) 11 All. 375. 511 order was not appealable under s. 588 and s. 591 of the Code of  Civil Procedure it could not be appealed  against  under the  Letters  Patent  of the High  Court.   This’  view  was affirmed by a Full Bench of the same court in Muhammad Naim- Ul-Lah Khan v. Ihsan-Ul-Lah Khan (1). The legislature in this state of affairs intervened, and  in the  Code of 1908 incorporated a. 4 which by the first  sub- section provided :               "In  the absence of any specific provision  to               the  contrary, nothing in this Code  shall  be               deemed  to  limit  or  otherwise  affect   any               special  or  local law now in  force  or  any,               special  jurisdiction or power  conferred,  or               any special form ’of procedure prescribed,  by               or  under any other law for the time being  in               force"- and  enacted in s. 104(1) that an appeal shall lie from  the orders  set  out  therein and save  as  otherwise  expressly provided, in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders.  The legislature  also expressly provided that "’no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section." Section 105 was substantially in the Fame terms as s. 591 of the earlier Code. The  intention of the legislature in enacting sub-s. (1)  of s. 104 is clear : the right to appeal conferred by any other law  for  the time being in force  is  expressly  preserved. This intention is emphasised by s. 4 which provides that  in

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the  absence  of  any specific provision  to  the  contrary, nothing in the Code is intended to limit or otherwise affect any special jurisdiction or power conferred by or under  any other law for the time being in force.  The right’ to appeal against  judgments (which did not amount to  decrees)  under the Letters Patent, was therefore not affected by s. 104 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (1)  I.L.R. (1892) 14 All. 226. 512 Under  the Code, as amended, the view has consistently  been taken  that interlocutory judgments (i.e., decisions  though not  amounting  to decrees which affect the  merits  of  the questions  between the parties by determining some right  or liability) passed by single Judges of Chartered High  Courts were  appealable under the Letters Patent : Ruldu  Singh  v. Sanwal  Singh(1), Paramasivan v. Ramasami (2),  Vaman  Ravji Kulkarni  v.  Nagesh Vishnu Joshi’s (3), and  Ram  Sarup  v. Kaniz Ummebani (4). Prior  to 1940 the law relating to  contractual  arbitration (except  in so far as it was dealt with by  the  Arbitration Act  of 1899) was contained in the Code of  Civil  Procedure and  certain  orders  passed  by courts  in  the  course  of arbitration proceedings were made appealable under the  Code of  1877  by s.588 and in the Code of 1908 by  s.  104.   In 1910,  the  legislature  enacted Act X  of  1940,  repealing schedule  2  and s. 104 (1) cls. (a) to (f) of the  Code  of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Arbitration Act of 1899.  By s. 39  of  the  Act,  a right  of  appeal  was  conferred  upon litigants  in  arbitration  proceedings  only  from  certain orders and from no others and the right to file appeals from appellate  orders was expressly taken away by sub-s.  2  and the clause in s. 104 of the Code of 1908 which preserved the special jurisdiction under any other law was incorporated in s. 39.  The section was enacted in a form which was absolute and  not subject to any exceptions.  It is true  that  under the Code of 1908, an appeal did lie under the Letters Patent from  an order passed by a single Judge of a Chartered  High Court  in  arbitration  proceedings even if  the  order  was passed  in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but that  was so, because, the power of the Court to hear appeals under  a special  law for the time being in operation  was  expressly preserved. (1)  (1922) 3 Lah. 188.  (2) I.L.R. (1933) 56 Mad. 915. (3)   I.L.R. (1940) Bom.426.  (4) I.L.R. (1937) All. 386. 513 There is in the Arbitration Act no provision similar to s. 4 of  the  Code  of Civil  Procedure  which  preserves  powers reserved  to courts under special statutes.  There  is  also nothing in the expression "authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court" contained in s. 39(1) of the  Arbitration  Act  which  by  implication  reserves  the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent to entertain an appeal against   the  order  passed  in  arbitration   proceedings. Therefore,  in  so far as Letters Patent deal  with  appeals against orders passed in arbitration proceedings, they  must be read subject to the provisions of s. 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act. Under  the  Code  of 1908, the right to  appeal   under  the Letters  Patent  was  saved  both by s.  4  and  the  clause contained in s. 104(1), but by the Arbitration Act of  1940, the  jurisdiction of the Court under any other law  for  the time  being in force is not saved; the right of  appeal  can therefore   be  exercised  against  orders  in   arbitration proceedings  only  under  s. 39, and no  appeal  (except  an appeal to this Court) will lie from an appellate order.

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There is no warrant for assuming that the reservation clause in  s. 104 of the Code of 1908 was as contended  by  counsel for  the  respondents, "superfluous" or that  its  ’deletion from s. 39(1) has not made any substantial difference" : the clause was enacted with a view to do away with the unsettled state  of  the law and the cleavage of opinion  between  the Allahabad  High Court on the one hand and  Calcutta,  Bombay and Madras High Courts on the other on the true effect of s. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the power  conferred by  the Letters Patent.  If the legislature being  cognizant of this difference of opinion prior to the Code of 1908  and the unanimity of opinion which resulted after the amendment, chose not to include the reservation clause 514 in the provisions relating to appeals in the Arbitration Act of  1940, the conclusion is inevitable that it was  so  done with  a  view  to restrict the right of  appeal  within  the strict  limits defined by s. 39 and to take away  the  right conferred by other statutes.  The Arbitration Act which is a consolidating  and amending Act, being substantially in  the form  of  a code relating to arbitration must  be  construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals.  The words of the statute are plain and  explicit and they must be given their full  effect  and must  be interpreted in their natural meaning,  uninfluenced by  any assumptions derived from the previous state  of  the law  and  without any assumption that the  legislature  must have  intended to leave the existing law unaltered.  In  our view  the legislature has made a deliberate  departure  from the law prevailing before the enactment of Act X of 1940  by codifying the law relating to appeals in s. 39. In that view of the case, the appeal must allowed.  No order as to costs in this court.  The order of the Division  Bench of  the High Court is set aside and the order passed by  the learned  Single Judge is restored.  We may add that  on  the view  taken by us as to the competency of the  appeal  under cl.  10 of the Letters Patent, we have not heard counsel  on the merits of the appeal. Appeal allowed.                             515