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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/04/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  125            1968 SCR  (3) 784  CITATOR INFO :  D          1971 SC2177  (7)

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226--Jurisdiction of court to  deal  with  question not  specifically  raised  in  writ petition--Land of lessee for winning coal notified under  s. 4(1) of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (20 of 1957)--If lessee aggrieved--Writ petition filed about 5 months after issue of notification--If amounts to laches.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent was a lessee of 1401 bighas of land and  was carrying on mining operations on the land for winning  coal. On 9th October 1963,  the appellant-Government issued a notification  under s.   4(1)  of  the  Coal  Bearing  Areas  (Acquisition   and Development)  Act, 1957, giving .notice of the  Government’s intention  to  prospect  for coal in,  1200  bighas  of  the leasehold  land.  These 1200 bighas covered land, on  which, amongst  other  buildings, a railway siding,  boiler  rooms, office rooms, fan house and air shaft premises were situate. On 23rd March 1964, the respondent filed a writ petition  in the High Court challenging the notification as  contravening s.  4(4)  of  the  Act  and  the  High  Court  quashed   the notification. In appeal to this Court, HELD : (1) In the premises notified, processes ancillary  to the  getting,  dressing  or preparation  for  sale  of  coal obtained  as  a result of the mining operations  were  being carried on, and therefore the impugned notification violated the second limb of s. 4(4) and was invalid. [787 D-E] (2)  Though  no  specific case under the second part  of  s. 4(4)  was  pleaded  in  the writ  petition,  all  the  facts necessary for determining the question were before the Court and  the matter was fully argued in the High  Court  without any objection.  Therefore, it could not be urged that it was open to this Court to consider that aspect of the case. [787 F. 788 A] (3)  Under  s. 5 of the Act the effect of  the  notification was  to  require the respondent to bring to a halt  all  his operations in the notified area till action was taken  under s. 7 or till the period prescribed in that ,Section came  to

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an  end.   Therefore, the respondent was  aggrieved  by  the impugned notification. [787 B] (4)  The   delay  in  filing  the  writ  petition  was   not sufficient to refuse relief to the respondent. [786 G] (5)  If  the  notification was invalid, it is not  for  this Court  to  decide whether any other area  of  the  leasehold could have been notified. [788 B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 332 of 1965. Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated October 30,  1964 of  the  Patna High Court in Misc.  Judl.  Case No.  643  of 1964. Syed Mohammed and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant. 785 A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee and A. K. Nag, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J--In  this appeal by certificate the  question  for decision  is whether the High Court of Patna was correct  in its  conclusion that the notification No. S. 0. 2991  issued by the Union Government on October 9, 1963 under s. 4(1)* of the  Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and  Development)  Act, 1957,  (No.  20  of 1957)-hereinafter called  "the  Act"  is violative of sub-s. (4)  of that section. The  facts  of the case fall within a narrow  compass.   The respondent,  Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited, took on  lease 1401  bighas  of  land  in mouza sale  in  the  district  of Hazaribagh  as per a registered lease deed of July  8,  1949 for  the purpose of winning coal.  Thereafter  it  commenced working the colliery in 1952.  Certain seams were opened up. Electric  transmission  lines were put up,  staff  quarters, office-quarters, houses for labourers, hospital, school etc. were  built.   For the purpose of despatching  the  coal,  a separate railway track was constructed and a railway  siding built.  These works were completed long before the  impugned notification was issued.  Under the notification in question 1200   bighas  of  land  were  notified  with  a   view   to acquisition,  which  included  areas on  which  the  railway siding,  staff quarters, boiler house, houses for  labourers etc. were constructed. The   respondent,  challenged  the  validity  of  the   said notification  in MJC No. 643 of 1964--an  application  under Art.  226  of the Constitution-before the High  Court.   The main  contention  taken in the, writ petition was  that  the notification in question contravenes sub-s. (4) of s. 4. The High   Court  accepted  that  contention  and  quashed   the notification. The  material facts are more or less admitted.   Along  with its  writ  petition the respondent produced a  plan  of  the colliery  showing  therein the railway  track,  the  railway siding,  labour quarters, office premises and various  other buildings put up on the land.  It had also shown therein the actual places where muning operations were carried on.   The correctness of this plan has not been (*)  "4  (1) Whenever it appears to the  Central  Government that  coal  is  likely  to be  obtained  from  land  in  any locality,  it may, by notification in the Official  Gazette, give notice of its intention to prospect for coal therein. (2) (3) (4)  In  issuing  a  notification under  this  section,  the Central  Government shall exclude therefrom that portion  of any land in which coal mining operations are actually  being

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carried  on  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of   any enactment, rule or order for the time being in force or  any premises  on  which any process ancillary  to  the  getting, dressing  or  preparation  for sale of coal  obtained  as  a result of such operations is being carried on are situate." 786 disputed.  From that plan it is seen that in a  considerable portion  of  the  land  notified under  s.  4(1)  there  are premises  on  which  processes  ancillary  to  the  getting, dressing  or  preparation  for sale of coal  obtained  as  a result of the mining operation are being carried on.   There is  also no doubt that if the respondent is deprived of  the benefit  of  those premises it would be  difficult,  if  not impossible for it, to continue to work the colliery. The  High Court has come to the conclusion that the area  in which  coal mining operations is being actually carried  on, one  is  not to take into consideration merely  those  spots where  actual digging is going on, but also areas which  are sufficient to constitute a commercial or economic unit,  and if  so  viewed,  the entire leasehold  may  ’be  justifiably considered  as  areas on which coal  mining  operations  are actually being carried on.  Alternatively, it held that  the entire notified area had to be excluded because in parts  of that  area mining operations are actually being  carried  on and  in  the remaining parts there are  premises,  on  which processes ancillary to the getting, dressing or  preparation for  sale  of  coal  obtained as  a  result  of  the  mining operations  are  being carried.  In other words  the  entire area  is exempt from being notified under s. 4 ( 1 )  either because it is protected by the first part of s. 4 (4) or  by its  second part.  These conclusions were challenged  before us.  It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the  words "any  land  in  which coal mining  operations  are  actually carried on" found in the first part of s. 4(4) do not permit of a liberal interpretation so as to bring in the conception of  a  commercial  or economic unit; they  merely  mean  the actual  area where mining is taking place.  As  regards  the alternative conclusion based on the second part of s. 4  (4) it was urged that on the pleadings there was no occasion for the High Court to consider Whether the requirements of  that part are satisfied.  In addition, two other contentions were advanced  on  behalf of the appellant.  They are  :  (i)  no relief  under  Art.  226  should  have  been  given  as  the respondent was guilty of laches, and (ii) the writ  petition was premature.  We are in agreement with the High Court that there  is no substance in the last two contentions  advanced on  behalf of the appellant.  As seen earlier, the  impugned notification  was  issued on October 9, 1963  and  the  writ petition  was  filed  on March 23,  1964,  well  within  six months--the date of the notification. This   delay  is   not sufficient to refuse the relief prayed for. In   support  of  the  contention  that  the  petition   was premature,  Dr.,  Syed  Mohemmad, learned  counsel  for  the appellant,  urged that the respondent has no real  grievance yet,  as only a notification under s. 4(1) had been  issued; further   proceedings  are  yet  to  take  place,  and   the respondent can be aggrieved only when a notifica- 787 tion  under  section  7 this issued.   We  think  that  this contention  is  misconceived.  As soon as  the  notification under s. 4(1) was issued, in view of s. 5* the mining  lease granted  in favour of the respondent ceased to  have  effect for  so long as that notification was in force.  The  effect of that notification was to require the respondent to  bring to  a  halt  all his operations in the  area  notified  till

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action was taken under s. 7 or till the period prescribed in that  section came to an end.  Hence it cannot  denied  that the  respondent  was  seriously aggrieved  by  the  impugned notification. This  takes  us  to the remaining  two  contentions  noticed earlier.   It  was strenuously argued by Dr.  Syed  Mohammed that  s.  4(1) empowers the Government to notify  all  lands excepting those in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on; the notification in question has  excluded 201  bighas in which mining was actually carried  on;  hence there is nothing illegal in that notification.  He wanted us to  construe  the  words  "any land  in  which  coal  mining operations  are being actualy carried" strictly.   The  High Court  has  rejected  this  contention  after  taking   into consideration the purposes of the Act, its preamble and  the various  provisions  therein.  But we have  not  thought  it necessary to go into that controversy as in our opinion  the impugned notification definitely violates the second limb of s.  4(4) and hence it is invalid.  It covers land  on  which amongst  other  buildings,  railway  siding,   boiler-rooms, office  room, fan house and air shaft premises are  situate. It cannot be denied that in, these premises processes ancil- lary  to  the getting, dressing or preparation for  sale  of coal obtained as a result of the mining operations are being carried on.  This conclusion of ours is resisted on the plea that in the writ petition no specific case is pleaded  under the  second part of sub-s. (4) ’of s. 4 and therefore it  is not open for us to consider that aspect of the case.  We are unable to accept this contention.  It is true that (*)  "7.  (1) If the Central Government  is  satisfied  that coal,  is  obtainable in the whole or any part of  the  land notified under sub-section (1) of section 4, it may,  within a period of two years from the date of the said notification or within such further period not exceeding one year in  the aggregate  as  the Central Government may  specify  in  this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, give notice of  its  intention to acquire the whole or any part  of  the land or of any rights in or over such land, as the case  may be. (2)  If  no notice to acquire the land or any rights  in  or over  such  land is given under sub-section (1)  within  the period  allowed  thereunder, the notification  issued  under sub-section  (1) of section 4 shall cease to have effect  on the expiration of three years from the date thereof" (*)  "5.  On the issue of a notification  under  sub-section (1) of section 4 in respect of any land- (a)  any prospecting licence which authorises any person  to prospect  for  coal or any other mineral in the  land  shall cease to have effect; and (b)  any mining lease in so far as it authorises the  lessee or  any  person  claiming  through  him  to  undertake   any operation  in the land, cease to have effect for so long  as the notification under that sub-section is in force." 788 the  pleadings on this point are rather vague; but  all  the facts necessary for determining that question are before the court.   That aspect of the case appears to have been  fully argued  before  the High Court without any  objection.   The High Court has considered and decided that question.   Hence the  appellant cannot now be permitted to contend  that  for want  of  necessary pleadings that question cannot  be  gone into.   If areas in which  those premises are situate  could not  have  been notified under s. 4 (1) as in  our  judgment they could not have been-it is not for us to decide  whether any of the other areas included in the lease-hold could have

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been notified; we cannot make out a new notification for the appellant. One  other contention was vaguely touched at the hearing  of the appeal, and that was that though there are ten seams  in the  colliery  only four seams are at present  worked  after obtaining the necessary permission, the remaining six  seams are  not  yet opened up for the working; hence  those  seams cannot  be  said  to-have been worked on  the  date  of  the notification.   Mr.  A.  K. Sen,  learned  counsel  for  the respondent,  urged that all the ten seams were being  worked in conformity with the provisions of law.  According to him, once  permission is obtained for grading the coal in a  seam and  he  says  that such permission  had  been  obtained  in respect  of all the seams, in law it means that those  seams are  being  actually  worked.   We need  not  go  into  this question in view of our earlier conclusion.  At the  hearing reference was made to the decision of this Court in  Messrs. Burrakur  Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India(.). The rule  laid down in that case does not bear on any of the issues arising for decision in this appeal. For  the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails  and  is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. (1) [1962]1 S.C.R. 44. Appeal dismissed. 789