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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JASWANT RAI KOCHHAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/03/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1352            1996 SCC  (3) 491  JT 1996 (3)   671        1996 SCALE  (3)119

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard the counsel on both sides.      Notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short the ‘Act’] was published on November 6, 1958 acquiring the land for housing scheme. The same came to be challenged  on the ground that the appellant had proposed to use  the land  for the  district center  i.e., commercial purpose. The  learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed  the  notification  holding  that  the  property acquired was  for housing  scheme which  cannot be  used for commercial purpose,  namely, District Center. On appeal, the Division Bench  of Delhi  High Court  in LPA No.1 of 1977 by order dated  February 6,  1884 confirmed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave.      It is  contended for  the respondents  that  since  the acquisition is  for housing  scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial  purpose, namely, District Center. Therefore, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench have rightly disapproved the  change of  the user contrary to the purpose notified in  section 4(1)  of the  Land Acquisition  Act. We find no  force in  the contention.  It is  conceded  by  the learned counsel that the construction of the District Center for commercial  purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was  sought to  be contended  in the High Court that in a housing scheme,  providing facilities for commercial purpose is also  one of  the composite purposes and that, therefore, acquisition was  valid in  law. However,  the contention was rejected by  the High  Court. We  need not  go to that part. Suffice it  to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought to  be acquired  for public  purpose may  be used for another public purpose. Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but  it is sought to be used for district Center, the public purpose  does not  cease to be public purpose and the

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nomenclature mentioned  in the  notification  under  section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a colorable one. The notification under section 4(1) could not have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for District Center,  namely,  for  commercial  purpose.  It  is obvious that  the lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only  the public  purpose of  providing facilities  of commercial purpose,  namely, District  Center as conceded by the learned  counsel in fairness to be a public purpose. The notification under  section 4(1)  cannot be  quashed on  the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in quashing the notification on the ground of change of user.      It is  next contended  that  the  first  respondent  is entitled to  be provided with alternative site. It is stated in the additional affidavit filed in this Court, pursuant to the direction  issued earlier,.  that a  private company  by name Sunlight  Assurance ,  New Delhi  had floated  a scheme Sunlight Estate,  which was  not approved  by the  competent authority,  i.e.,  either  MCD  or  DDA.  But  some  persons purchased plots and to purchase peace with them a compromise was entered  into and  they have  been allotted  alternative sites. It  is contended  that the respondents also similarly are entitled  to alternative  sites. It  is  stated  in  the counter-affidavit filed  in the  High Court that the land of the first  respondent was  not the  subject  matter  of  the acquisition and  that, therefore,  he is not entitled to the alternative site.  In the  additional-affidavit also  it was mentioned that  since the first respondent had constructed a house and  has been  living therein,  he is  not entitled to alternative site  and if  the  house  of  the  appellant  is acquired, action would be taken according to law. It is also stated by  the counsel  for respondent  Nos.2 to 4 that they have also  constructed houses  and they are also entitled to alternative sites.  Since that  controversy was  not  raised before us,  we did  not have  an occasion  to  go  into  the question whether  they have  constructed  the  house  either prior  to   or  after  the  notification  etc.  Under  these circumstances, we  cannot go  into that question because the question of  providing alternative  sites was  not addressed before the  learned single  Judge or  the Division Bench. If they  are  otherwise  entitled  according  to  the  practice prevailing, they  are at liberty to make a representation to the  competent   authority  and  have  the  matter  examined according to the practice.      The appeals  is accordingly  allowed. The orders of the High  Court   are  set   aside.  The  writ  petition  stands dismissed. No costs.