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PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: H. C. GOEL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/08/1963

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1964 AIR  364            1964 SCR  (4) 718  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC1103  (9)  D          1967 SC1445  (10)  R          1969 SC 966  (5)  R          1969 SC1294  (5)  F          1969 SC1302  (8)  R          1970 SC1095  (6)  R          1974 SC1589  (22)  R          1978 SC1277  (18)  RF         1981 SC 858  (6)  F          1983 SC 454  (10)  D          1984 SC 273  (44)  RF         1988 SC1000  (4)  RF         1991 SC 471  (6,7)  RF         1992 SC2219  (138)

ACT: Civil Service-Disciplinary proceedings-Enquiry--proposal  by enquiry  officer,  if  binding on  the  Government-Order  of dismissal based on no evidence--Government acting bona fide- jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere-Constitution  of India,   Arts.   226  and  311(1)   &   (2)-Civil   Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. r. 55.

HEADNOTE: On a complaint the appellant decided to hold a  departmental enquiry  against the respondent, suspended him and served  a notice  calling  upon  him to show  cause  why  disciplinary action  should  not be taken on the following  charges;  (i) Meeting  the Deputy Director, Administration,  C.P.W.D.,  at his residence without neccssary permission, (ii) Voluntarily expressing  regret  at his not having  brought  sweets  from Calcutta for the Deputy Director’s Children, (iii)  Offering a currency note which from size and colour appeared to be  a hundred rupee note as bribe with the intention of presuading Deputy   Director,   Shri   Rajagopalan   to   support   his representation regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C., (iv) violation  of Rule 3 of the C. C. B. (Conduct  Rules).   The respondent  tendered  his explanation and  on  enquiry,  the charges were not found proved.  The appellant considered the

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enquiry report and provisionally came to the conclusion that the respondent should be dismissed and accordingly issued  a second  notice  against him.  The respondent  submitted  his explanation  to  this notice.  At that stage, his  case  was referred  to  the  Union  Public  Service  Commission.   The Commission advised the appellant that none of the  penalties could  be  inflicted  on  the  respondent.   The   appellant considered  the  matter afresh and remitted it back  to  the commission  to reconsider it again.  The Commission, on  re- examining the matter adhered to its earlier views 719 and   conveyed  them  to  the  appellant.    The   appellant considered the whole case again and dismissed the respondent from service.  The respondent then moved a writ petition  in the High Court under Arts. 226 and 311 for quashing the said order  of  dismissal.   The petition was  dismissed  by  the learned single Judge.  The respondent then preferred Letters Patent  Appeal before the Division Bench of the High  Court. The appeal was allowed and his dismissal was set aside.   In this  Court  two questions of law arose  for  consideration, namely  (1) whether Government is competent to  differ  from the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has been  entrusted with the work of holding a departmental  en- quiry against a delinquent Government servant under r. 55 of the  Civil Services Rules and (2) whether the High Court  in dealing  with a writ petition filed by a Government  Officer who has been dismissed from service is entitled to hold that the  conclusion reached by the Government in regard  to  his misconduct  is  not supported by any evidence at  all.   The appellant  mainly contended that if it acted bona fide,  the High  Court would not be justified in interfering  with  its conclusions  though  the High Court may feel that  the  said conclusions are based on no evidence. Held,  that on principle, neither findings recorded  by  the enquiry officer, nor hisrecommendations are binding on  the Government and therefore,the  constitutional  safeguard afforded by Art. 311(2) cannotbe  said  to  have   been contravened by the appellant. The Secretary ofState  for  India v. 1.  M.  La,  [1945] F.C.R.   103,   High  Commissioner  for   India   and   High Commissioner  for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal, 75 I.A.  225,  Khem Chand v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1080, State of  Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, [1964] 2. S.C.R. I and A. N.  D’Silva v. Union of India, [19621 Supp.  I S.C.R. 968, referred to. In  dealing with writ petition filed by public servants  who have been dismissed or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2), the High Court under Art. 226 has  jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the  impugned order of dismissal rests is not  supported  by any evidence at all. It  cannot be held, that if mala fides are not  alleged  and bona  fides  are  assumed in favour of  the  appellant,  its conclusion  on  a question of fact  cannot  be  successfully challenged even if it is manifest that there is no  evidence to support it. In  the present case, there is no evidence on the record  to sustain  the finding of the appellant that charge no. 3  has been proved against the respondent.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 645 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated August 2, 1960, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench)  at

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Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. 27-D of 1959. 720 C.K.  Daphtary,  Attorney-General  for India  and  R.  H. Dhebar, for the appellant. N.C.  Chatterjee,  A. N. Sinha and K. K. Sinha,  for  the respondent. August 30, 1963.  The judgment of the court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-Two short questions of law arise for  our decision  in  the  present appeal.  The  first  question  is whether Government is competent to differ from the  findings of  fact  recorded  by  the enquiry  officer  who  has  been entrusted  with the work of holding a  departmental  enquiry against a delinquent government servant under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules  ; and the other question is whether the High Court in  dealing with  a writ petition field by a Government Officer who  has been  dismissed from Government service is entitled to  hold that  the conclusion reached by the Government in regard  to his misconduct is not supported by any evidence at all.   As our ]judgment will show, we are inclined to answer both  the questions  in  the affirmative.  Thus,  the  appellant,  the Union  of Union of India. succeeds on the first  point,  but fails  on  the second.  At the hearing of this  appeal,  the learned  Attorney-General  told us that  the  appellant  was fighting  this appeal as a test case not so much to  sustain the  order of dismissal passed against the respondent is  to obtain  a decision from this Court on the two points of  law raised by it in the present appeal. The above two points arise in this way.  The respondent,  H. C.  Goel, joined the Central Public Works Department on  the 26th November, 1941, and in due course, he was selected  for appointment  in  Class  I  post in  or  about  1945-46.   In January,  1956,  he  was  posted as  Surveyor  of  Works  at Calcutta.   It appears that he felt that his  seniority  had not been properly fixed and so, he had made a representation in  that behalf to the Union Public Service Commission.   He happened  to go to Delhi about the middle of January,  1956. Then,  he called on Mr. R. Rajagopalan, who was  the  Deputy Director  of  Administration, at his residence on  the  19th January,  1956.  His idea in seeing Mr. RajaGopalan  was  to acquaint him with the merits of his case. 721 In the course of his conversation with Mr. Rajagopalan it is alleged   that   be  apologised  for  not   having   brought ‘rasagullas’  for the children of Mr.  Rajagopalan.   There- upon, Mr. Rajagopalan frowned and expressed his  displeasure at  the  implied  suggestion.  A little  later,  during  the course  of the interview, it is alleged that the  respondent took out from his pocket a wallet and from it produced  what appeared  to  Mr. Rajagopalan to be a folded  hundred  rupee note.  Mr. Rajagopalan showed his stern disapproval of  this conduct,  whereupon  the respondent said ’No’  and  put  the wallet  with the note in his -pocket.  After a  few  minutes the   interview   ended   and  the   respondent   left   Mr. Rajagopalan’s -place. Soon thereafter Mr. Rajagopalan reported the incident to Mr. Ananthakrishnan, Director of Administration, C.P. W.D.,  and at  his suggestion be submitted a complaint in writing.   In this  complaint.  Mr. Rajagopalan narrated the incidents  as they  had  occurred  and  added  that  at  the  end  of  the interview,  the respondent asked him whether he  could  meet Mr. Rajagopalan again the next day to know about the  result of his representation, and Mr. Rajagopalan told him that  he might make the enquiry when he happened to visit Delhi next. On  receiving  this  complaint  from  Mr.  Rajagopalan,  the

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appellant decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the respondent, suspended him and served a notice on him on  the 9th  February, 1956, setting forth the charges  against  him and  calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary  action should not be taken against him.  This notice contained four charges which read thus:-               (i)   Meeting     the     Deputy     Director,               Administration,  C.P.W.D.,  at  his  residence               without necessary permission.               (ii)Voluntarily expressing regret at his not               having  brought sweets from Calcutta  for  the               Deputy Director’s children.               (iii) Offering a currency note which from size               and colour appeared to be a hundred rupee note               as  bribe  with the  intention  of  persuading               Deputy  Director, Sri Rajagopalan  to  support               his representation regarding his seniority  to               the U.P.S.C.               (iv)  Violation  of  Rule  3 of  the  C.C.  S.               (Conduct Rules).               722 The  respondent tendered his explanation and the matter  was enquired  into under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules  by Mr.  Kapoor.  The Enquiry Officer examined  Mr.  Rajagopalan and the respondent, considered the evidence produced  before him,  and  came to the conclusion that  the  charges  framed against  the respondent had not been satisfactorily  proved. This  report  was made by the enquiry officer  on  the  10th April, 1956. The  appellant considered the report submitted to it by  Mr. Kapoor  and  provisionally came to the conclusion  that  the respondent should be dismissed from service, and accordingly issued  a second notice against the respondent on  the  14th June,  1956.   The respondent submitted his  explanation  in response to this notice. At  that  stage, the respondent’s case was referred  to  the Union Public Service Commission.  By its report made on  the 30th  October, 1956, the Commission took the view  that  the first charge should be dropped; the second charge was hardly a matter justifying framing of a charge against the officer; the  third  charge had not been proved on the basis  of  the available evidence; and in view of the said conclusion,  the Commission   thought   that   the   fourth   charge   failed automatically.   The  Commission  accordingly  advised   the appellant that none of the penalties provided for in Rule 49 of the Civil Rules need be inflicted on the respondent. The  appellant considered the matter afresh in the light  of the report received from the U.P.S.C., but since it  adhered to the conclusion which it had provisionally reached  before issuing  the  second  notice  against  the  respondent,   it requested  the Commission to reconsider the matter  and  re- mitted the said matter to it on the 8th December, 1956.  The Commission,  on  re-examining  the matter,  adhered  to  its earlier views and conveyed the same to the appellant on  the 15th January, 1957.  The appellant considered the whole case again  and  came  to the conclusion that  a  case  had  been established  against the respondent for his  dismissal,  and so,  by its order passed on the 13th March, 1957,  dismissed him from service. The respondent then moved the Punjab High Court by his  writ petition  No. 201-D of 1957 for quashing the said  order  of dismissal, under Articles 226 and 311 of the 723 Constitution.  A learned Single Judge of the said High Court heard  the  matter  and  came to  the  conclusion  that  the

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respondent had not made out a case for quashing the order of dismissal passed against him.  The respondent then preferred an  appeal under the Letters Patent and a Division Bench  of the  said High Court which heard the Letters  Patent  Appeal has  allowed the respondent’s appeal.  It has held  that  in view of the fact that the Enquiry Officer had made a  report in  favour  of  the  respondent, it  was  not  open  to  the appellant  to differ from his findings and inasmuch  as  the impugned order of dismissal was passed by the appellant as a result  of its conclusion that the findings of  the  enquiry officer  were  erroneous,  the said  order  contravened  the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution.  That is how the writ  petition filed by the respondent was allowed  and  his dismissal  set  aside  The  appellant  then  applied  for  a certificate  to the High Court but the said application  was rejected.   The appellant then moved this Court for  special leave and it is with the special leave granted by this Court that it has brought the present appeal before us. The  first question which calls for our decision is  whether it  was competent to the appellant to take a different  view on  the evidence adduced against the respondent and  proceed on  the basis that the conclusions of fact recorded  by  the enquiry  officer were unsound and erroneous.  If it is  held that  the  appellant was precluded from differing  from  the conclusions  of  the enquiry officer, then, of  course,  the subsequent  steps  taken  by  the  appellant  would  be  in- consistant with Art. 311 of the Constitution.  On the  other hand, if the competence of the appellant to differ from  the conclusions of the enquiry officer cannot be seriously ques- tioned,  then  the argument that the  appellant  contravened Art.  311 when it issued the second notice against the  res- pondent cannot succeed. Article 311 consists of two sub-articles and their effect is no  longer  in  doubt.  The question  about  the  safeguards provided to the public servants in the matter of their  dis- missal,  removal or reduction in rank by the  Constitutional provision  contained in Art. 311, has been examined by  this court  on several occasions.  It is now well-settled-that  a public servant who is entitled to the protection of Art. 311 724 must get two opportunities to defend himself.  He must  have a clear notice of the charge which he is called upon to meet before the departmental enquiry commences, and after he gets such  notice  and  is given the  opportunity  to  offer  his explanation, the enquiry must be conducted according to  the rules  and  consistently with the  requirements  of  natural justice.   At  the end of the enquiry, the  enquiry  officer appreciates  the  evidence,  records  his  conclusions   and submits his report to the Government concerned.  That is the first stage of the enquiry, and this stage can validly begin only  after charge has been served on the delinquent  public servant. After  the  report  is  received  by  the  Government,   the Government  is entitled to consider the report and the  evi- dence  led against the delinquent public servant.  The  Gov- ernment  may  agree with the report or  may  differ,  either wholly  or partially, from the conclusions recorded  in  the report.   If  the  report makes findings in  favour  of  the public  servant,  and the Government agrees  with  the  said findings,  nothing more remains to be done, and  the  public servant   who  may  have  been  suspended  is  entitled   to reinstatement  and  consequential reliefs.   If  the  report makes  findings  in  favour of the public  servant  and  the Government  disagree with the said findings and  holds  that the  charges  framed against the public  servant  are  prima

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facie  proved,  the Government should  decide  provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant  and proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf. If the enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are  in favour  of  the  public servant and some  against  him,  the Government  is entitled to consider the whole matter and  if it  holds  that some or all the charges framed  against  the public servant are, in its opinion, prima facie  established against  him,  then  also  the  Government  has  to   decide provisionally  what  punishment  should be  imposed  on  the public  servant and give him notice accordingly.   It  would thus  be  seen that the object of the second  notice  is  to enable the public servant to satisfy the Government on  both the  counts, one that he is innocent of the  charges  framed against him and the other that even if the charges are  held proved against him, the punishment proposed to be  inflicted upon him is unduly severe.  This position under Art. 311  of the Con- 725 stitution  is  substantially similar to the  position  which governed the public servants under s. 240 of the  Government of India Act, 1935.  The scope and effect of the  provisions of  s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as well  as the  scope and effect of Art. 311 of the  Constitution  have been  considered by judicial decisions on several  occasions and  it  is unnecessary to deal with this point  in  detail, vide The Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal(1),  High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal(2) ; and Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors. (3). These reported decisions would show, that it has never  been suggested that the findings recorded by the enquiry  officer conclude  the matter and that the Government which  appoints the enquiry officers and directs the enquiry is bound by the said  findings  and  must act on the  basis  that  the  said findings are final and cannot- be reopened.  The High  Court has, however, held that there are certain observations  made by  the  Federal Court in the case of I. M. Lal(1),  and  by this  Court in the case of Khem Chand(3) which  support  the respondent’s contention that the appellant was bound by  the findings  recorded by the enquiry officer in his  favour  in the  present enquiry proceedings Before referring  to  these observations,  it is relevant to examine this contention  on principle.  It is obvious that the enquiry officer holds the enquiry  against  the  respondent  as  a  delegate  of   the appellant.   That indeed is the character which the  enquiry officer  inevitably  occupies when he holds  a  departmental enquiry  at the instance of the Government.  The  object  of the  enquiry  is plain.  It is to enable the  Government  to hold  an  investigation into the charges  framed  against  a delinquent  public servant, so that the Government  can,  in due course, consider the evidence adduced and decide whether the  said charges are proved or not.  The  interposition  of the  enquiry  which  is held by  a  duly  appointed  enquiry officer  does  not alter the true legal  position  that  the charges  are  framed  by  the  Government  and  it  is   the Government  which is empowered to impose punishment  on  the delinquent  public servant.  Therefore, on principle, it  is diffi- (1)[1945] F.C.R. 1-03.    (2) 75, I.A. 225. (2)[1958] S.C.R. 1080. 726 cult  to see how the respondent is justified  in  contending that  the findings recorded by the enquiry officer bind  the appellant in the present case. If  the  contention  raised by the  respondent  were  to  be

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upheld,  it  would lead to illogical  and  almost  fantastic results.  If the enquiry officer makes findings against  the public  servant, on the respondent’s contention the  Govern- ment  can never re-examine the matter, so that even  if  the Government  were  satisfied that the  findings  against  the public servant were erroneous, it must proceed on the  basis that the public servant is guilty and impose some punishment on  him.   It is obvious that this proposition  is  entirely inconsistant with the Constitutional rights of the appellant which is the appointing authority and which has the power to impose the punishment on the respondent. Similarly,  if the enquiry officer makes findings in  favour of  the  public servant, on the respondent’s  case  that  is final  and however illogical, erroneous or unsound the  said findings may be, the appellant is powerless and must act  on the  basis that the public servant is innocent.  That  again is  a very anomalous position and it ignores the  true  Con- stitutional rights of the appellant and the character of the enquiry officer and the scope of his enquiry. Sometimes,  several  charges  are framed  and  findings  are recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of them.  In such cases,  Government may accept some findings and  may  reject others,  and  it has naturally to proceed to take  the  next step in the light of its own conclusions.  Such a case arose before  this Court in The State of Assam and Anr.  v.  Bimal Kumar  Pandit(1).  Dealing with the requirements  which  the second  notice must satisfy in such a case, this  Court  has held  that  the  said notice must  indicate  to  the  public servant   clearly  the  grounds  on  which  the   Government provisionally  intends  to  act  in  imposing  the  proposed punishment specified in the notice. Besides,  it  would  be apparent that  if  the  respondent’s argument  is valid, then the second notice would serve  very little purpose.  If, at that stage, the Government is  bound to   accept  the  findings  of  the  enquiry  officer,   the opportunity whichis  intended to be given to  the  public servant to show  causenot   only  against  the   proposed punishment but also (1)[1964] 2 S.C.R. 1. 727 against the findings recorded against him, would be  defeat- ed, because on the respondent’s case Government cannot alter the said findings.  In our opinion, the contention raised by the respondent is patently unsound and must be rejected. In  this  connection, we may add that unless  the  statutory rule  or  the  specific  order under  which  an  officer  is appointed to hold an enquiry so requires, the enquiry  offi- cer  need not make any recommendations as to the  punishment which  may be imposed on the delinquent officer in case  the charges  framed against him are held proved at the  enquiry; if, however, the enquiry officer makes any  recommendations, the said recommendations like his findings on the merits are intended  merely  to  supply appropriate  material  for  the consideration of the Government.  Neither the findings,  nor the  recommendations are binding on the Government, vide  A. N. D’Silva v. Union of India(1). Let  us  now briefly consider whether  the  observations  on which  the respondent rests Ms case justify his  contention. In  The Secretary of State for India v. I. M.  Lal(2)  Spens C.J. examined the provisions of s. 240(3) of the  Government of  India Act, 1935, and observed that the said  sub-section involves  in all cases "where there is an enquiry and  as  a result thereof some authority definitely proposes dismissal, or  reduction  in rank, that the person concerned  shall  be told in full, or adequately summarised form, the results  of that  enquiry and the findings of the enquiring officer  and

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be   given  an  opportunity  of  showing  cause  with   that information why he should not suffer the proposed  dismissal or   reduction."   Mr.  Chatterjee   suggests   that   these observations  indicate that it is only on the basis  of  the findings  recorded  by the enquiry officer that  the  second notice  can  be issued.  In our opinion,  this  argument  is completely  misconceived.   ID the case of 1.  M.  Lal,  the findings were against him and it is by reference to the said findings  that the observations made by Spens C. J. must  be considered.  If the findings are against the public servant, and the Government on considering the evidence, accepts  the said  findings provisionally, it would be right to say  that on  the  said findings the second notice is  served  on  the public servant, and so, ((I) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R.  968, (2) [1945] F.C.R. 103. 728 he should be given a clear idea as to the nature of the said findings.  That, of course, does not mean that the  findings of  the enquiry officer arc binding and  virtually  conclude the matter. The same comment has to be made about the observations  made by S. R. Das C.J. in the case of Khem Chand(1).  Summarising his  conclusions, the learned Chief justice observed,  inter alia, that the second opportunity to which a public  servant is  entitled  can  be  effective  only  if  "the   competent authority  after the enquiry is over and after applying  its mind  to  the  gravity or otherwise of  the  charges  proved against  the  Government servant,  tentatively  proposes  to inflict  one of the three punishments and  communicates  the same to the Government servant." It is obvious that when the learned  Chief justice refers to the charges proved  against the  Government servant, it is not intended to be  suggested that the findings made by the enquiry officer in that behalf arc  final.   The  enquiry report along  with  the  evidence recorded constitute the material on which the Government has ultimately to act.  That is the only purpose of the  enquiry held by competent officer and the report which he makes as a result   of  the  said  enquiry.   Therefore,  we  have   no hesitation  in holding that the High Court was in  error  in coming  to  the  conclusion  that  the  appellant  was   not justified  in  differing from the findings recorded  by  the enquiry  officer.  As we have just indicated, if it is  held that the report of the enquiry officer is not binding on the Government,  then the Constitutional safeguard  afforded  by Art. 311(1) & (2) cannot be said to have been contravened by the  appellant and the grievance made by the  respondent  in that behalf must fail. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal.   It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right  when  he contends that in the circumstances  of  this case,  the  conclusion  of the Government  is  based  on  no evidence  whatever.   It is a conclusion which  is  perverse and-,  therefore,  suffers from such an obvious  and  patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified  in quashing it.  In dealing with  writ  petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or other- (1)[1958] S.C.R. 1080. 729 wise  dealt  with so as to attract Art. 311  (2),  the  High Court under Art. 226 has Jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order  of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all.  It is  true  that the order of dismissal which  may  be  passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can

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be  described as an administrative order; nevertheless,  the proceedings  held  against such a public servant  under  the statutory  rules  to determine whether he is guilty  of  the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasijudicial proceedings  and  there can be little doubt that a  writ  of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if  he is able to satisfy the High Court that  the  ultimate conclusion  of the Government in the said proceedings  which is  the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence.   In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we  ought to  add that he did not seriously dispute this, position  in law. He, however, attempted to argue that if the appellant  acted bona  fide,  then the High Court would not be  justified  in interfering  with its conclusion though the High, Court  may feel that the said conclusion is based on no evidence.   His contention was that cases where conclusions. are reached  by the  Government without any evidence, could Dot, in law,  be distinguished from cases of mala fides; and so he  suggested that perverse conclusions of fact may be and can be attacked only on the ground that, they are mala fides, and since mala fides were not alleged in the present case, it was not  open to  the  respondent to contend that the view  taken  by  the appellant can be corrected in writ proceedings. We  are  not prepared to accept this  contention.   Malafide exercise  of  power  can be attacked  independently  on  the ground  that it is mala fide.  Such an exercise of power  is always  liable to be quashed on the main ground that  it  is not a bona fide exercise of power.  But we are not  prepared to  hold that if mala fides are not alleged and  bona  fides are assumed in favour of the appellant, its conclusion on  a question  of fact cannot be successfully challenged even  if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it.  The two  infirmities  are  separate and  distinct  though,  con- ceivably, in some cases, both may be present.  There may 47- 2 S. C. India/64 730 be cases of no evidence even where the Government is  acting bona  fide;  the  said infirmity may also  exist  where  the Government  is  acting  mala  fide and  in  that  case,  the conclusion  of the Government not supported by any  evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if  it  is proved that there is no evidence to  support  the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorary will  not issue  without further proof of mala fides.  That is why  we are  not  prepared to accept the  learned  AttorneyGeneral’s argument  that since no mala fides are alleged  against  the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari’ can be issued in favour of the respondent. That  takes us to the merits of the respondent’s  contention that  the conclusion of the appellant that the third  charge framed  against the respondent had been proved, is based  on no  evidence.   The learned  Attorney-General  has  stressed before  us that in dealing with this question, we  ought  to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with  the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and  seek to decide whether this Court would have taken  the same  view or not.  This contention is no  doubt  absolutely sound.   The  only test which we can legitimately  apply  in dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there any  evidence  on which a finding can be  made  against  the respondent  that  charge No. 3 was proved against  him?   In exercising  its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a  plea,

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the  High  Court  cannot consider  the  question  about  the sufficiency  or  adequacy  of  evidence  in  support  of   a particular conclusion.  That is a matter which is within the competence  of the authority which dealt with the  question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence  at all in support of the impugned conclusion.   In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is  accepted  as true, does the conclusion follow  that  the charge  in question is proved against the respondent?   This approach will avoid weighing the evidence.  It will take the evidence  as  it  stands and only examine  whether  on  that evidence  legally  the impugned conclusion follows  or  not. Applying  this  test,  we  are inclined  to  hold  that  the respondent’s 731 grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the find- ing  which is implicit in the appellant’s  order  dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence. The  facts relating to this narrow point are very few.   The respondent  expressed his regret to Mr. Rajagopalan that  he had not brought rasagullas for his children.  There is  some controversy  as  to whether this statement was made  by  the respondent  at  the  beginning of  his  interview  with  Mr. Rajagopalan  or  at  its end.  The  complaint  made  by  Mr. Rajagopalan   shows  that  the  interview  began  with   the respondent’s  expression of regret that he had  not  brought sweets  for Mr. Rajagopalan’s,children.  Mr. Rajagopalan  in his  evidence  stated that this statement was  made  by  the respondent at the close of the interview.  One fact is clear that the respondent did express regret that he had not taken sweets  to  Mr. Rajagopalan’s place.   If  the  respondent’s version that he said so at the beginning of the interview is believed, particularly when it is supported by the complaint made  by  Mr.  Rajagopalan,  it  may  show  that  the  stern disapproval expressed by Mr. Rajagopalan on hearing the said remark  from the respondent must have acted as a warning  to him.  That, however is another Matter. Then,  as to the hundred rupee note which according  to  Mr. Rajagopalan,  was  taken  out by  the  respondent  from  his wallet, Mr. Rajagopalan has admitted that the said note  was folded double.  He says, that be noticed that its colour was blue  and that its size was bigger than the usual ten  rupee or  five  rupee note.  Mr. Rajagopalan who appears to  be  a straightforward  officer gave his evidence in a very  honest way.  He frankly told the enquiry officer that it could  not be  said  that the hundred rupee note which he  thought  the respondent took out from his wallet had been offered to  him by  the respondent, but he thought that the whole thing  had to be viewed in the context of the matter.  He also admitted that his eye-sight was not perfect. The  respondent, on the other hand, suggested that in  reply tothe questions which Mr. Rajagopalan put to him he tookout some papers from his pocket to find out the letter ofhis appointment, and as soon as Mr. Rajagopalan 732 appeared  to  discourage him, he put the said paper  in  his pocket. Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said  that respondent  even  attempted to offer a bribe  to  Mr.  Raja- gopalan.   Mr. Rajagopalan makes a definite  statement  that respondent  did not offer him a bribe.  He merely refers  to the  fact that respondent took out a paper from  his  wallet and the said paper appeared to him like a hundred rupee note duble  folded.  Undoubtedly, Mr. Rajagopalan  suspected  the

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respondent’s  conduct,  and so, made a  report  immediately. But the suspicion entertained by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot,  in law,  be  treated as evidence against  the  respondent  even though  there  is  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Rajagopalan  is   a straightforward  and  an honest officer.   Though  we  fully appreciate  the  anxiety  of  the  appellant  to  root   out corruption  from public service, we cannot ignore  the  fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not  be allowed to take the place of proof even in  domestic enquiries.  It may be that the technical rules which  govern criminal  trials  in  courts may not  necessarily  apply  to disciplinary  proceedings, but nevertheless,  the  principle that  in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be  taken to  see that the innocent are not punished, applies as  much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under   the  statutory  rules.   We  have   very   carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne in mind the plea made by the learned AttorneyGeneral, but we are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence which  can sustain the finding of the appellant that  charge No. 3 has been proved against the respondent.  It is in this connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant  to add  that the U.P.S.C. considered the matter twice and  came to  the  firm  decision that the  main  charge  against  the respondent had not been established. The  result  is,  though  the  appellant  succeeds  on   the principle  point  of law raised in the  appeal,  the  appeal fails, because, on the merits, we hold that no case had been made out for punishing the respondent. The appellant to pay the costs of respondent. Appeal dismissed. 733